"Surveillance, Sabotage, and Strikes: Industry Perspectives on How Drone Warfare Abroad Is Transforming Threats at Home"

1[House Hearing, 119 Congress]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34                   SURVEILLANCE, SABOTAGE, AND STRIKES: INDUS-5                    TRY PERSPECTIVES ON HOW DRONE WARFARE6                    ABROAD IS TRANSFORMING THREATS AT7                    HOME89=======================================================================1011                                HEARING1213                               BEFORE THE1415                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON16                  TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY1718                                 OF THE1920                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY21                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES2223                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2425                             FIRST SESSION2627                               __________2829                             JULY 15, 20253031                               __________3233                           Serial No. 119-213435                               __________3637       Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security3839[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]4041        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov4243                               __________4445                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE4661-404 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 20254748-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------4950                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY5152                 Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman53Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice       Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,54    Chair                                Ranking Member55Clay Higgins, Louisiana              Eric Swalwell, California56Michael Guest, Mississippi           J. Luis Correa, California57Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida           Shri Thanedar, Michigan58August Pfluger, Texas                Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island59Andrew R. Garbarino, New York        Daniel S. Goldman, New York60Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois61Tony Gonzales, Texas                 Timothy M. Kennedy, New York62Morgan Luttrell, Texas               LaMonica McIver, New Jersey63Dale W. Strong, Alabama              Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking64Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma                  Member65Elijah Crane, Arizona                Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico66Andrew Ogles, Tennessee              Nellie Pou, New Jersey67Sheri Biggs, South Carolina          Troy A. Carter, Louisiana68Gabe Evans, Colorado                 Al Green, Texas69Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania         Vacancy70Brad Knott, North Carolina71                    Eric Heighberger, Staff Director72                  Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director73                       Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk74                                 ------7576          SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY7778                  Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida, Chairman79Andrew R. Garbarino, New York        LaMonica McIver, New Jersey,80Elijah Crane, Arizona                    Ranking Member81Sheri Biggs, South Carolina          Timothy M. Kennedy, New York82Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex     Troy A. Carter, Louisiana83    officio)                         Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi84                                         (ex officio)85             Roland Hernandez, Subcommittee Staff Director86           Alex Marston, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director8788                            C O N T E N T S8990                              ----------91                                                                   Page9293                               Statements9495The Honorable Carlos A. Gimenez, a Representative in Congress96  From the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on97  Transportation and Maritime Security:98  Oral Statement.................................................     199  Prepared Statement.............................................     3100The Honorable LaMonica McIver, a Representative in Congress From101  the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on102  Transportation and Maritime Security:103  Oral Statement.................................................     4104  Prepared Statement.............................................     6105The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress106  From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on107  Homeland Security:108  Prepared Statement.............................................     7109110                               Witnesses111112Mr. Paul Churchill Hutton, IV, Chief Growth Officer,113  Aerovironment, Inc.:114  Oral Statement.................................................     9115  Prepared Statement.............................................    10116Mr. Tom Walker, Founder and CEO, DroneUp, LLC:117  Oral Statement.................................................    12118  Prepared Statement.............................................    14119Mr. Brett Feddersen, Vice President, Strategy and Government120  Affairs, D-Fend Solutions:121  Oral Statement.................................................    20122  Prepared Statement.............................................    22123Mr. Michael Robbins, President and CEO, Association for Uncrewed124  Vehicle Systems International:125  Oral Statement.................................................    26126  Prepared Statement.............................................    28127128                 SURVEILLANCE, SABOTAGE, AND STRIKES:129   INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON HOW DRONE WARFARE ABROAD IS TRANSFORMING130                            THREATS AT HOME131132                              ----------133134                         Tuesday, July 15, 2025135136             U.S. House of Representatives,137                    Committee on Homeland Security,138                        Subcommittee on Transportation and139                                         Maritime Security,140                                                    Washington, DC.141    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in142room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Carlos A. Gimenez143(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.144    Present: Representatives Gimenez, Garbarino, Crane, Biggs145of South Carolina, McIver, Kennedy of New York, and Carter of146Louisiana.147    Also present: Representative Pfluger.148    Mr. Gimenez. The Committee on Homeland Security149Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security will come150to order.151    Without objection, the Chair may declare the subcommittee152in recess at any point.153    Today's hearing is examining how drone warfare tactics used154abroad are transforming threats to our homeland.155    From Ukraine to the Middle East, our adversaries are156deploying increasingly sophisticated drone capabilities that157can be adapted by terrorists, lone actors, or State proxies158within the United States.159    This hearing will explore how industry leaders are160innovating to help close critical security gaps and better161protect our transportation systems and infrastructure.162    Without objection, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Pfluger,163is permitted to sit with the subcommittee and ask questions of164the witnesses.165    I now recognize myself for an opening statement.166    Good morning. I want to thank everyone for joining us for167today's hearing, which will examine how drone warfare overseas168is reshaping the threat environment here at home.169    In recent years, the use of unmanned aircraft systems--or170drones--by foreign adversaries, terrorist groups, and proxy171forces has grown significantly.172    Once confined to distant battlefields, these platforms are173now being deployed in ways that challenge traditional security174assumptions and expose critical vulnerabilities across our175homeland.176    Drones have become essential tools of modern warfare. On177the battlefields of Ukraine, both Russian and Ukrainian forces178are deploying thousands of drones not only for surveillance and179artillery targeting, but for direct offensive operations.180    These include quadcopters assembled from commercial parts,181long-range loitering munitions, and first-person-view kamikaze182drones enhanced by open-source software. They are low-cost,183adaptable, and increasingly precise.184    Just weeks ago, Ukraine launched a deep strike inside185Russian territory using a coordinated wave of drones, damaging186strategic bombers thousands of miles from the front lines.187    Russia continues to rely on Iranian-made Shahed drones to188bombard Ukrainian energy infrastructure, saturate air defenses,189and inflict lasting psychological and economic harm.190    In the Middle East, Iranian-backed groups such as Hezbollah191and the Houthis have demonstrated the operational reach and192lethality of these systems. They have targeted U.S. service193members, international shipping, and critical infrastructure.194    The drone strike that killed 3 American service members in195Jordan in early 2024 underscored just how dangerous and196asymmetric this threat has become.197    More recently, during a 12-day conflict last month, Israel198launched a series of drone and missile strikes against Iranian199military sites, some originating from launch points within Iran200itself, illustrating how even layered air defense systems can201be bypassed using prepositioned commercial technologies.202    What makes these developments more alarming is the203accessibility of the technology. Many of the systems deployed204abroad are constructed using commercially-available components205and open-source software.206    These tools are not limited to nation-states. Lone actors,207extremists, networks, and transnational criminal organizations208can easily acquire and weaponize drones with minimal cost and209training.210    Here in the United States the warning signs are emerging.211Reports of unauthorized drone activity near airports and other212critical infrastructure are becoming more frequent. Hundreds of213sightings have been documented near military installations and214sensitive energy facilities in the past year alone.215    The potential for a coordinated drone attack on an airport,216seaport, or mass gathering is a credible and growing threat.217    My home district in South Florida is particularly exposed.218With major transportation hubs like Miami International219Airport, the Port of Miami, and a dense network of energy and220telecommunications infrastructure, we are a high-profile221target.222    A single drone equipped with an explosive device or223electronic warfare payload could cause significant disruption,224physical damage, and wide-spread panic.225    We cannot afford to be reactive. The time to act is now.226    Another concern is the wide-spread presence of Chinese-227manufactured drones operating within the United States.228    DJI, a company based in Communist China, commands a229significant share of both the global and U.S. commercial drone230market. Its platforms are used by private industry, lobbyists,231and even some public safety agencies.232    In fact, even several DHS components have--inexplicably--233used DJI's AeroScope system to monitor drone activity near234sensitive locations.235    While AeroScope may offer affordable situational awareness,236it also raises serious concerns about the national security237risks posed by Chinese-linked technology, especially regarding238data access, remote control capabilities, and potential239sabotage during a future crisis or conflict with China.240    Today's hearing will explore what the private sector is241experiencing on the front lines of drone security, the counter-242UAS tools that are currently available, and the extent to which243Federal, State, and local authorities are equipped with the244legal and operational capabilities to address these threats.245    At present, the Department of Homeland Security has limited246authorities to disrupt or disable malicious drone activity.247Most State and local law enforcement agencies have no authority248whatsoever.249    This is a glaring gap in our national preparedness, one250that we must urgently address as we prepare to host globally251significant events like the 2026 FIFA World Cup and the 2028252Summer Olympics.253    We'll also hear testimony on the broader risks posed by254Chinese-made drones collecting sensitive location data across255the United States. These systems could be used for surveillance256or even to carry out attacks.257    This is not simply a question of data privacy. It's a258matter of homeland security.259    Our adversaries are adapting rapidly. Our defenses must260keep pace. That means updating our legal authorities, investing261in next-generation detection and mitigation tools, and262partnering closely with industry and State and local263stakeholders.264    I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before the265subcommittee today and for their continued efforts to keep our266Nation secure. Your perspectives will help inform the267committee's work as we seek to close dangerous gaps before they268are exploited.269    I look forward to your testimony and to a productive270discussion. Thank you.271    [The statement of Chairman Gimenez follows:]272                  Statement of Chairman Carlos Gimenez273                             July 15, 2025274    Good afternoon. I want to thank everyone for joining us for today's275hearing, which will examine how drone warfare overseas is reshaping the276threat environment here at home.277    In recent years, the use of unmanned aircraft systems, or278``drones'', by foreign adversaries, terrorist groups, and proxy forces279has grown significantly. Once confined to distant battlefields, these280platforms are now being deployed in ways that challenge traditional281security assumptions and expose critical vulnerabilities across our282homeland.283    Drones have become essential tools of modern warfare. On the284battlefields of Ukraine, both Russian and Ukrainian forces are285deploying thousands of drones not only for surveillance and artillery286targeting, but for direct offensive operations. These include287quadcopters assembled from commercial parts, long-range loitering288munitions, and first-person-view kamikaze drones enhanced by open-289source software. They are low-cost, adaptable, and increasingly290precise.291    Just weeks ago, Ukraine launched a deep strike inside Russian292territory using a coordinated wave of drones, damaging strategic293bombers thousands of miles from the front lines. Russia continues to294rely on Iranian-made Shahed drones to bombard Ukrainian energy295infrastructure, saturate air defenses, and inflict lasting296psychological and economic harm.297    In the Middle East, Iranian-backed groups such as Hezbollah and the298Houthis have demonstrated the operational reach and lethality of these299systems. They have targeted U.S. service members, international300shipping, and critical infrastructure. The drone strike that killed 3301American service members in Jordan in early 2024 underscored just how302dangerous and asymmetric this threat has become.303    More recently, during a 12-day conflict last month, Israel launched304a series of drone and missile strikes against Iranian military sites,305some originating from launch points within Iran itself, illustrating306how even layered air defense systems can be bypassed using307prepositioned commercial technologies.308    What makes these developments more alarming is the accessibility of309the technology. Many of the systems deployed abroad are constructed310using commercially-available components and open-source software. These311tools are not limited to nation-states. Lone actors, extremist312networks, and transnational criminal organizations can easily acquire313and weaponize drones with minimal cost and training.314    Here in the United States, the warning signs are emerging. Reports315of unauthorized drone activity near airports and other critical316infrastructure are becoming more frequent. Hundreds of sightings have317been documented near military installations and sensitive energy318facilities over the past year alone. The potential for a coordinated319drone attack on an airport, seaport, or mass gathering is a credible320and growing threat.321    My home district in South Florida is particularly exposed. With322major transportation hubs like Miami International Airport, the Port of323Miami, and a dense network of energy and telecommunications324infrastructure, we are a high-profile target. A single drone equipped325with an explosive device or an electronic warfare payload could cause326significant disruption, physical damage, and wide-spread panic. We327cannot afford to be reactive. The time to act is now.328    Another concern is the wide-spread presence of Chinese-manufactured329drones operating within the United States. DJI, a company based in330Communist China, commands a significant share of both the global and331U.S. commercial drone market. Its platforms are used by private332industry, hobbyists, and even some public safety agencies. In fact,333even several DHS components have, inexplicably, used DJI's AeroScope334system to monitor drone activity near sensitive locations.335    While AeroScope may offer affordable situational awareness, it also336raises serious concerns about the national security risks posed by337Chinese-linked technology, especially regarding data access, remote338control capabilities, and potential sabotage during a future crisis or339conflict with China.340    Today's hearing will explore what the private sector is341experiencing on the front lines of drone security, the counter-UAS342tools that are currently available, and the extent to which Federal,343State, and local authorities are equipped with the legal and344operational capabilities to address these threats.345    At present, the Department of Homeland Security has limited346authorities to disrupt or disable malicious drone activity. Most State347and local law enforcement agencies have no authority at all. This is a348glaring gap in our national preparedness, one that we must urgently349address as we prepare to host globally significant events like the 2026350FIFA World Cup and the 2028 Summer Olympics.351    We will also hear testimony on the broader risk posed by Chinese-352made drones collecting sensitive location data across the United353States. These systems could be used for surveillance or even to carry354out attacks. This is not simply a question of data privacy. It is a355matter of homeland security.356    Our adversaries are adapting rapidly. Our defenses must keep pace.357That means updating our legal authorities, investing in next-generation358detection and mitigation tools, and partnering closely with industry359and State and local stakeholders.360    I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee361today and for their continued efforts to keep our Nation secure. Your362perspectives will help inform the committee's work as we seek to close363dangerous gaps before they are exploited.364    I look forward to your testimony and to a productive discussion.365366    Mr. Gimenez. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the367gentlewoman from New Jersey, Mrs. McIver, for her opening368statement.369    Mrs. McIver. Good morning. Thank you so much, Chairman.370    Thank you to our witnesses for joining us today.371    Before turning to the topic of today's hearing, I want to372offer my condolences to the families, friends, and loved ones373of the children and other victims lost in the devastating374floods in Texas last week. My thoughts and prayers are with all375those impacted.376    As the affected communities begin to recover from this377tragedy, I hope our committee will soon have the opportunity to378examine what went wrong and ensure our Government can better379respond to future disasters.380    I also want to thank the brave first responders who helped381prevent further loss of life, including Coast Guard Petty382Officer Third Class Scott Ruskan of New Jersey and the other383Coast Guard members on board helicopter 6553 who helped save384many lives from the floodwaters.385    The emergency response in Texas is actually relevant to386today's hearing as one helicopter involved in the rescue and387recovery operations had to be grounded after a collision with a388private drone flying in restricted air space.389    The incident goes to show the threats drones can pose even390when operators have no ill intent and the need for more robust391Government capabilities to address such threats.392    In recent years, drone usage has become commonplace across393a wide range of applications, from emergency response to394photography and news coverage. Drone operations provide395benefits to businesses and hobbyists alike.396    As drone activity increases, we must ensure the Government397has the authorities and resources necessary to take action398against drone operators who do not follow the rules, including399both careless and clueless operators, as well as those who may400seek to use drones to carry out attacks.401    Though such large-scale attacks have yet to occur within402the United States, our critical infrastructure, mass403gatherings, and Government facilities are vulnerable to being404targeted, especially by lone-wolf actors.405    With the World Cup coming to the United States next year,406including to MetLife Stadium in my home State of New Jersey, as407well as the Olympics coming in 2028, the need for Congress to408extend and expand the Government's counter-drone authorities409have never been more pressing.410    In October 2018, Congress passed legislation providing the411Departments of Homeland Security and Justice with limited412authorities to detect, track, intercept, and seize drones.413    However, just a few months later, incidents at Gatwick414Airport in England and my home airport, Newark Liberty415International Airport, displayed the inaccuracy of CUAS416capabilities as drones shut down airport operations, disrupting417travel for thousands of passengers.418    Given this subcommittee's jurisdiction over transportation419security, I am hopeful that any expansion of authorities420provides a path forward for protecting airports from drones.421    Last year, New Jersey was again the focus of media422attention as the public reported spotting large numbers of423drones and unknown aircraft flying over our State.424    Further investigation revealed that the aircraft were most425likely authorized flights. But, nevertheless, the incident426revealed the Government's lack of domain awareness and427capabilities for protecting the national air space.428    Moving forward, Congress must act to extend and expand429authorities in a matter that provides the capabilities needed430to counter the threats we face.431    At the same time, we must ensure counter-drone systems are432operated in a safe and responsible manner that does not impact433the safety of commercial flights or violate individual privacy434rights and civil liberties.435    I hope the Republican majority will prioritize moving436legislation to address counter-drone authority soon.437    Thank you again for our witnesses for joining us today.438    With that, I yield back.439    [The statement of Ranking Member McIver follows:]440              Statement of Ranking Member LaMonica McIver441                             July 15, 2025442    Before turning to the topic of today's hearing, I want to offer my443condolences to the families, friends, and loved ones of the children444and other victims lost in the devastating floods in Texas last week. My445thoughts and prayers are with all those impacted.446    As the affected communities begin to recover from this tragedy, I447hope our committee will soon have the opportunity to examine what went448wrong and ensure our Government can better respond to future disasters.449    I also want to thank the brave first responders who helped prevent450further loss of life, including Coast Guard Petty Officer 3d Class451Scott Ruskan and the other Coast Guard members onboard helicopter 6553,452who helped save many lives from the flood waters.453    The emergency response in Texas is actually relevant to today's454hearing, as one helicopter involved in rescue and recovery operations455had to be grounded after a collision with a private drone flying in456restricted air space. The incident goes to show the threats drones can457pose even when operators have no ill intent--and the need for more458robust Government capabilities to address such threats.459    In recent years, drone usage has become commonplace across a wide460range of applications, from emergency response to farming to461photography and news coverage. Drone operations provide benefits to462businesses and hobbyists alike. As drone activity increases, we must463ensure the Government has the authorities and resources necessary to464take action against drone operators who do not follow the rules--465including both ``careless and clueless'' operators, as well as those466who may seek to use drones to carry out attacks.467    Recent drone attacks by Russia, Ukraine, and Israel have displayed468how drones can be used in warfare to deadly effect. Though such large-469scale attacks have yet to occur within the United States, our critical470infrastructure, mass gatherings, and Government facilities are471vulnerable to being targeted, especially by lone-wolf actors.472    With the World Cup coming to the United States next year--including473to MetLife Stadium in my home State of New Jersey--as well as the474Olympics coming in 2028, the need for Congress to extend and expand the475Government's counterdrone authorities has never been more pressing. In476October 2018, Congress passed legislation providing the Departments of477Homeland Security and Justice with limited authorities to detect,478track, intercept, and seize drones.479    However, just a few months later, incidents at Gatwick Airport in480England and my home airport of Newark Liberty International Airport481displayed the inadequacy of C-UAS capabilities, as errant drones shut482down airport operations, disrupting travel for thousands of passengers.483    Given this subcommittee's jurisdiction over transportation484security, I am hopeful that any expansion of authorities provides a485path forward for protecting airports from drones. Last year, New Jersey486was again the focus of media attention as the public reported spotting487large numbers of drones and unknown aircraft flying over our State.488Further investigation revealed that the aircraft were mostly authorized489flights, but nevertheless, the incident revealed the Government's lack490of domain awareness and capabilities for protecting the national air491space.492    Moving forward, Congress must act to extend and expand authorities493in a manner that provides the capabilities needed to counter the494threats we face. At the same time, we must ensure counterdrone systems495are operated in a safe and responsible manner that does not impact the496safety of commercial flights or violate individual privacy rights and497civil liberties. I hope the Republican Majority will prioritize moving498legislation to address counterdrone authorities soon.499500    Mr. Gimenez. I want to thank the Ranking Member.501    Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening502statements may be submitted for the record.503    [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]504             Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson505                             July 15, 2025506    I want to begin by offering my condolences to those impacted by the507tragic floods in Texas. The loss of life is devastating, and my508thoughts are with the victims, survivors, and their families and loved509ones. Sadly, the damage wrought by the floods was exacerbated by the510Trump administration's mismanaged response. I have called on Chairman511Green to immediately convene a hearing to examine the administration's512actions to undermine FEMA and our preparedness for the remainder of513hurricane season. I hope he will answer that call soon.514    In the mean time, today we are here to discuss a different threat515to the homeland: the threat posed by unmanned aerial systems or drones.516In 2018, Congress enacted the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018,517which provided the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice with518targeted authorities to detect, track, and mitigate unauthorized drones519that pose a threat to certain facilities, assets, and events. These520authorities have allowed the Federal Government to begin to develop the521testing, policies, and processes to procure and deploy effective522counter-UAS systems and technologies.523    DHS and DOJ have had some significant successes in protecting high-524profile National Special Security Events from unauthorized drone525incursions. However, the use of drones has continued to proliferate526rapidly, both domestically and abroad. Drones are used for a wide527variety of purposes across many sectors, including in emergency528response, agriculture, law enforcement, photography, and package529delivery. Drones have also been used in warfare by the United States530and our allies and adversaries alike, providing militaries and531intelligence agencies with a novel tool for intelligence, surveillance,532reconnaissance, interference, and kinetic attacks. Though the vast533majority of drone use within the United States is harmless and law-534abiding, the use of drones in warfare abroad makes clear the potential535threats drones may pose to the homeland.536    The potential for bad actors to use drones to carry out attacks on537mass gatherings, critical infrastructure, and other targets538necessitates the extension and expansion of authorities for the Federal539Government and law enforcement partners to detect, track, intercept,540and seize unauthorized drones flying in restricted air space. The541Government must have the ability to respond to developing threats and542prevent attacks. At the same time, authorities must be expanded in a543manner that protects individuals' privacy and due process rights, as544well as the safety of the national air space. Already, we have seen the545potentially damaging effects counter-drone technologies can have when546operated without appropriate coordination.547    Earlier this year, the U.S. Secret Service allegedly operated a C-548UAS system without clearance from the Federal Aviation Administration,549resulting in inappropriate automated alerts to several pilots flying550aircraft near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, which could551have undermined flight safety. Over the past several years, I have552worked in a bipartisan manner with colleagues across the committees553with shared jurisdiction to develop legislation to extend and expand554counterdrone authorities in a significant yet thoughtful manner. Last555Congress, Chairman Green introduced H.R. 8610, the Counter-UAS556Authority, Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act, which I supported557as a cosponsor.558    The bill would have extended and expanded C-UAS authorities in559several key ways, including by establishing a DHS pilot program for560State and local law enforcement agencies to receive counterdrone561mitigation authorities. The Transportation and Infrastructure Committee562reported the bill with bipartisan support last September, but House563Republican leadership never called the bill up for floor consideration.564I have continued to work with my colleagues to refine the legislation565and expect we will reintroduce a version of it soon. I hope the566Republican Majority will act swiftly to advance the bill to the floor,567through the House, and ultimately into law.568    The threats posed by drones are too critical for Congress to wait,569especially given the need to protect upcoming events including the570World Cup and the Olympics. Thank you again to our witnesses for571joining us today to discuss these critical challenges.572573    Mr. Gimenez. I'm pleased to have a distinguished panel of574witnesses before us today on this critical topic.575    I ask that our witnesses please rise and raise their right576hands.577    [Witnesses sworn.]578    Mr. Gimenez. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have579answered in the affirmative.580    Thank you, and please be seated.581    I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses.582    Mr. Church Hutton serves as AeroVironment's chief growth583officer, a role he assumed in May 2025 to lead the company's584strategic expansion and long-term growth initiatives.585    Prior to this, he served as senior vice president of586government relations, marketing, and communications beginning587in 2024 where he played a key role in shaping AeroVironment's588public profile and strengthening relationships with government589stakeholders.590    A retired Army officer and combat veteran, Mr. Hutton spent591a decade in senior staff positions on Capitol Hill, including592on the professional staff of the Senate Appropriations and593Senate Armed Services Committees.594    Mr. Tom Walker is the founder and chief executive officer595of DroneUp, a leading U.S.-based drone technology company596specializing in advanced American-made unmanned aerial systems597and integration services.598    Under his leadership, DroneUp has become a key industry599innovator, supporting a wide range of mission-critical600operations, including border security, emergency response,601infrastructure monitoring, and last-mile logistics.602    Prior to founding DroneUp, Mr. Walker served nearly 17603years as a U.S. Navy officer where he led efforts to modernize604digital systems and enhance operational support for the United605States and allied special operations forces.606    Mr. Brett Feddersen serves as the vice president for607strategy and governmental affairs at D-Fend Solutions, where he608oversees the company's strategy, public policy, and engagement609with U.S. Government agencies, policy makers, and regulators.610    Prior to joining the private sector, he held senior611executive roles across the Federal Government, including the612Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of Defense, and613the White House. He is also a retired U.S. Army lieutenant614colonel and a former Pennsylvania State trooper.615    Mr. Michael Robbins is president and chief executive616officer of the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems617International, the world's largest trade association for618uncrewed systems, robotics, and autonomous technologies,619representing companies in both the commercial and defense620sectors.621    He joined the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems622International in 2020 and previously served as chief advocacy623officer. Michael is also presently serving as an officer in the624United States Navy Reserve.625    I thank each of our distinguished guests for being here626today.627    I now recognize Mr. Hutton for 5 minutes to summarize his628opening statement.629630 STATEMENT OF PAUL CHURCHILL HUTTON, IV, CHIEF GROWTH OFFICER,631                      AEROVIRONMENT, INC.632633    Mr. Hutton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.634    Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver, and distinguished635Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to636testify on drone warfare abroad and how it's informing domestic637investments that will help us prepare for threats here in the638United States.639    I commend the committee's focus on these challenges and640your efforts to enhance the safety of the American people and641U.S. transportation systems.642    My name is Church Hutton. I serve as the chief growth643officer at AV, formerly AeroVironment. It is my pleasure to644testify alongside my industry partners in highlighting the645challenges and opportunities of providing effective646capabilities to our service members and first-line responders647in light of the lessons learned from drone warfare abroad.648    By way of background, AV is the top producer and supplier649by volume of unmanned aerial systems, or UAS, to the Department650of Defense, as well as the leading provider of counter-UAS651solutions deployed overseas actively protecting Americans,652allies, and critical infrastructure abroad. This gives us a653holistic view of UAS threats, mitigation tools, and the654implications for both to U.S. homeland security.655    With major public events on the near horizon, including the656World Cup, as you said, Chairman, America's 250th anniversary657celebrations, and the 2028 Summer Olympics, we have a658collective need to apply these lessons to address threats to659U.S. infrastructure and public safety.660    Collaboration between Congress and industry is essential to661ensure the safety of the American people and critical662infrastructure from the evolving threat.663    Effective collaboration has a few basic tenets. The first664is that we learn the lessons of the foreign drone experience;665that authorities are granted to Federal and State agencies to666deploy safe and effective UAS solutions in what are clearly667complex jurisdictional scenarios; and finally, that Congress668provide flexible funding so that Government agencies can669validate and adopt technology quickly.670    State and non-State actors have increased access to drone671capabilities and have demonstrated their ability to achieve672lethal effects.673    The rapid evolution of small drone systems in conflicts, as674demonstrated by Operation Spider's Web in Ukraine and of course675Israel's recent campaign against Iran, emphasized the need for676agile real-time collaboration to field detection and677interdiction tools.678    These threats, of course, are not limited to overseas679conflicts. UAS increasingly threaten U.S. critical680infrastructure with techniques like drone swarming and GPS and681radar jamming.682    Recent aerial intrusions highlight the need for advanced683detection and mitigation technologies to protect our space and684maritime domains.685    Additionally, acquisition processes must evolve to deliver686necessary capabilities. We advocate for agile development and687deployment of affordable open systems, clear operational688authorities, and Government-industry partnerships to address689these threats effectively.690    U.S.-based defense innovators have developed systems to691detect, track, and counter these threats that you'll hear about692today.693    To meet these challenges, the defense industrial base694requires strong demand signals, enabling policies, and695streamlined authorities. We must act decisively to prevent696foreign battlefield lessons from becoming domestic threats.697    AV and other innovative companies stand ready to698collaborate and provide solutions, but policy inertia and699acquisition drag remain significant obstacles.700    Collectively, we'll either address these issues now, before701we suffer a major drone attack in the homeland, or we'll702address them afterward, but certainly we will have to address703them.704    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look705forward to your questions.706    [The prepared statement of Mr. Hutton follows:]707            Prepared Statement of Paul Churchill Hutton, IV708                              8 July 2025709    Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver, and distinguished Members710of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity today to testify on711how drone warfare abroad is transforming and informing domestic712investments to prepare for threats here in the United States. I commend713this committee's focus on these national security challenges along with714your efforts to enhance the safety of U.S. transportation systems. The715collaboration between Congress and industry is essential to keeping the716American people and critical national infrastructure safe from today's717rapidly-evolving drone threats.718    AV has a unique vantage point in this space as the top producer and719supplier of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to the Department of Defense720(DoD) coupled with our layered counter-UAS solutions deployed to721multiple conflict zones abroad. This gives us a holistic view of the722UAS threats, mitigation tools, and relevant implications for homeland723security. The lessons we have learned from operations abroad underscore724the urgent need to address this threat with greater speed and resolve725to protect critical U.S. infrastructure and public safety including at726high-visibility events like the 2026 FIFA World Cup, America's 250th727birthday celebrations, and the 2028 Summer Olympics. In order to728accomplish this goal, we believe it is vital that the U.S. Government729and Industry have 3 key things in place: (1) a resolve to adopt lessons730learned from real operational feedback; (2) flexible sources of funding731to modify or scale up the production and delivery of new, software-732defined platforms that can be updated in response to evolving threats,733and (3) the necessary authorities to allow Federal and State government734users to employ technology solutions in what we know are complex735jurisdictional scenarios.736                    threats and evolving environment737    As a former soldier who benefited from DoD's nascent UAS arsenal738over 2 decades ago, I commend this panel for bringing awareness to the739American people regarding the proliferation of UAS technology--740particularly how its capability, lethality, availability, and quantity,741when combined, can enable malign actors to threaten unprotected742infrastructure and lives.743    Looking abroad, Ukraine's recent ``Operation Spider's Web'' against744Russia's strategic bomber infrastructure demonstrated the precision,745reach, and destructive ability of small UAS. Spider's Web highlighted746the rapid evolution of small drone system capabilities at an affordable747cost. The reports of covert Ukrainian launches from inside Russia748emphasize the need for agile, real-time Government and industry749collaboration to develop detection systems and interdiction tools here750at home. Municipal, State, and Federal agencies need to adequately751prepare for unmanned and increasingly autonomous systems in their752public safety and security strategies.753    More recently, in June 2025, during a 12-day conflict with Iran,754Israel coordinated a drone and missile campaign targeting Iranian air755defenses, ballistic missile platforms, and command infrastructure.756While Israeli fighter jets visibly degraded Iran's missile sites and757attacked military personnel, Israeli drones, pre-positioned758quadcopters, and internet-connected launch platforms operated from759within Iran, showcasing this new frontier of drone warfare.760    The implications for the defense of our homeland is significant.761The use of drones built from commercial parts and operated with minimal762infrastructure is increasingly plausible by proxy networks or lone763actors on domestic soil. Techniques like drone swarming, GPS jamming,764and antiradar flights, perfected abroad, could be adapted to threaten765critical U.S. infrastructure.766    In the maritime environment, UAS pose a significant threat to767shipping in vital trade chokepoints. From 2023 to 2024, there were over76850 UAS incidents in the Red Sea, many involving direct attacks or769surveillance of commercial vessels. The increasing frequency and770sophistication of these drone operations, by state and non-state actors771alike, highlight the urgent need for improved countermeasures to772protect critical maritime infrastructure.773    Closer to home, unidentified aerial objects have reportedly entered774U.S. air space off the East Coast and have raised national security775concerns. From 2021 to 2024, over 30 incidents were reported, with776objects demonstrating advanced maneuverability and speed. These777incursions underscore the critical need for advanced detection and778mitigation technologies to protect key maritime regions and ensure U.S.779air space security.780    Activities at the Southern Border continue to pose a direct threat781to our homeland, as transnational criminal organizations, gangs, and782extremist organizations adopt UAS to aid in their transport of illicit783material into the United States. The defense industrial base is poised784to work with Congress and our Executive branch counterparts to ensure785we are prepared for UAS incursions and possible attacks through our own786borders.787    Many of your industry partners recognize these threats and are788developing robust countermeasures today. Although these investments are789taking place, many challenges remain--requiring Congressional, Federal790Executive, plus State, local, and municipal action.791                               challenges792    Traditional defense acquisition processes are inadequate to deliver793the capabilities necessary to outpace the fast-evolving UAS threat. We794can no longer afford multi-year requirements development followed by795lengthy science and technology experimentation cycles. Government and796industry must work together to develop and field new agile counter-UAS797programs, and pair these programs with key authorities designed to798protect critical infrastructure.799    Effective solutions require affordable, open, and adaptable800technologies rather than high-cost, proprietary systems. Operational801clarity and streamlined authorities are essential for establishing802guidelines for UAS detection and defeat within domestic air space.803Government and industry partnership will benefit all parties,804maximizing innovative and delivering cost-effective solutions.805    Solutions must be tailored to meet the unique demands of countering806UAS threats. To succeed, we need acquisition reform--but we also need807operational clarity. Homeland security stakeholders must work together808to establish operational directives that define authorities for UAS809detection, identification, and defeat in domestic air space and enable810responsible action under clearly-defined legal and safety parameters.811    The rapid increase in UAS lethality--as demonstrated in the Ukraine812conflict, where drones now cause the majority of casualties--serves as813a stark warning. Our traditional defenses and authorities have not kept814pace, and we must act swiftly to prevent similar threats against our815infrastructure and population.816                             opportunities817    U.S.-based defense innovators are developing promising systems to818detect, track, and defeat UAS threats. Soft-kill techniques, such as819jamming or radio frequency (RF) manipulation, have dominated this space820in the past 5 years. In an effort to combat these defensive tactics,821adversaries increasingly employ drones guided by fiber optics,822preprogrammed autonomy, various frequency bands, or cellular signals. A823few systems, like ours at AV, have capabilities against GPS. The824existing authorities make it difficult to utilize these advanced825technologies, so we are expanding our ability to counter peer threat826capable systems. In parallel, we must continue the development of hard-827kill solutions--systems that physically destroy or disable drones.828    As has been heard in testimony before other House committees, the829President's budget requests critically-needed investments in drone830technologies and policy changes to improve acquisition and production831of drone systems, at scale. The Government is poised to be able to take832advantage of fast-moving private-sector innovation to field low-cost,833attritable, kinetic, and non-kinetic UAS and counter-UAS systems.834    Detection technologies, directed energy (laser) and kinetic defeat835capabilities offer a promising path forward. The U.S. Army, for836example, has demonstrated the effectiveness of high-energy laser837systems deliver hard-kill effects with minimal collateral damage. When838combined with acoustic sensors, passive radar, and software-defined839radio receivers, this creates an integrated drone shield that can be840safely deployed in mixed civilian environments focused today on small841and medium-sized UAS at close range. Kinetic alternatives, like the842Army's Next Generation Counter-UAS Missile, complement directed energy843solutions, allowing affordable defense at greater range, elevation, and844weather scenarios, though the employment of these systems would be845limited in accordance with the sensitivity of the protected846infrastructure and public safety requirements. Kinetic solutions are847more effective against large UAS, which have been used extensively in848Ukraine and the Middle East. These offerings provide alternatives to849the unsustainable practice currently employed of shooting down low-cost850drones with multi-million-dollar weapons systems, which are expended851upon use and difficult to replace.852    These technologies are ready, but they require strong demand853signals, enabling policies, and streamlined authorities to mature and854scale. Without decisive action, the United States risks trailing our855adversaries' rapid innovations. We need expanded authorities for UAS856defeat operations inside U.S. borders, clear operational doctrines, and857funding structures that reward responsiveness. With additional858authorities and funding, the defense industrial base can meet the needs859of the country. Affordable, attritable platforms at mass are860transforming the way in which we fight and are rapidly evolving in a861way that necessitates we take advantage of solutions available today,862both custom and commercial. We commend the DoD's continued efforts to863eliminate overly bureaucratic processes and fund the fielding of864systems across all domains.865    AV, alongside other forward-leaning, innovative U.S. companies,866stands ready to meet this challenge. However, policy inertia and867acquisition drag--not technology--remain our most significant868obstacles. It is encouraging to see agencies like DoD, DHS, and Members869of Congress and committees like yours begin to take steps to rectify870the issues we face today. All parties understand that we must act now871to prevent foreign battlefield experiences from becoming domestic872tragedies.873    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to874your questions.875876    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Hutton.877    I now recognize Mr. Walker for 5 minutes to summarize his878opening statement.879880     STATEMENT OF TOM WALKER, FOUNDER AND CEO, DRONEUP, LLC881882    Mr. Walker. Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver, and883Members of the committee, thank you again for the opportunity884to testify this morning.885    My name is Tom Walker. I am the CEO of DroneUp and a former886U.S. Naval officer, and I lead one of the Nation's top drone887technology companies.888    Over the past decade, I've been proud to play a part in the889evolution of uncrewed systems from novelty tools to essential890elements of our critical infrastructure.891    Today, we've all seen that these systems are also emerging892as national security threats.893    DroneUp has operated one of the most significant drone894services operations in the United States with tens of thousands895of operators. We also built one of the most extensive drone896delivery networks in the world.897    Through our work with the FAA and the national defense898agencies, we have gained direct operational insight into both899the extraordinary promise and the real dangers of drone900technology.901    Today, our air space faces an urgent threat. In the first902quarter of 2025 alone, the FAA recorded more than 400 illegal903drone incursions over U.S. airports, representing a 25 percent904increase over the same period last year. The military905documented or reported 350 unauthorized flights over more than906a hundred bases.907    These are not isolated events. They are growing, sustained,908and increasingly malicious.909    In one case, persistent hostile drone activity forced the910relocation of F-22 Raptors at Langley Air Force Base in911Virginia. Despite weeks of investigation by the Pentagon, the912FBI, and NASA, the operators were never identified.913    As a veteran, it scares the hell out of me to imagine if914something like that had happened during Operation Midnight915Hammer.916    Just 2 weeks ago, as the Ranking Member mentioned, during917high-intensity search-and-rescue operations amid the July 4918flash floods in Texas, a privately-operated drone struck a919rescue helicopter over Kerr County forcing it to land and920taking it out of service while dozens were still missing.921    Fortunately, no one was injured in the accident. However,922the incident could have had very different outcomes. It's the923latest reminder that these are not hypothetical threats. They924are happening now in active emergency zones and putting lives925at risk.926    These threats now affect nearly every sector that is927exposed to air space misuse, including commercial aviation,928critical infrastructure, prisons, and public events. Drones929have recently collided with manned aircraft and in some cases930have grounded emergency response efforts.931    Criminals have used drones to drop contraband into932correctional facilities. They have conducted surveillance on933energy facilities and seaports.934    This is no longer theoretical. The systems meant to stop935this are simply not up to the task.936    The root problem is simple: We do not have an integrated937national framework for drone oversight. The system we were938promised still does not exist.939    We rely on fragmented tools. We rely on unconnected940sensors. We rely on outdated approval processes. This creates941blind spots. It slows response time and it leaves critical942infrastructure exposed.943    But the solutions are within reach. The technology to keep944Americans safe exists today.945    We must mandate a national real-time flight information946exchange. We need a low altitude air space coordination system947that provides law enforcement, regulators, and commercial948operators with a real-time view of what is flying, where it is,949and its intentions.950    We must unify all flight authorizations into a single951secure process. We must bind pilot, drone, and mission data952together, using cryptographic credentials to prevent spoofing.953    All aircraft, manned and unmanned, should electronically954broadcast their position to reduce collision risk and remain955visible in our air space.956    Remote ID signals must be authenticated and protected from957spoofing. Detection systems, such as radar, RF, and acoustic958tools, must be fused into a single integrated surveillance959picture.960    The FAA should publish national mission priority tables.961This must digitally be enforced by the authorization system so962that emergency and critical flights are automatically963prioritized.964    America must equip and empower local law enforcement by965expanding its counter-UAS authority. Today, only a handful of966Federal agencies are authorized to act against rogue drones.967That must change before the current authority sunsets in968September.969    This is no longer a concern for the future. It's a present-970day crisis. Each delay increases our exposure to a serious971event. The technology is ready. What we need now is clear972direction and decisive action.973    I stand ready to assist the committee in protecting our974national air space and ensuring the safe, responsible growth of975uncrewed systems in the United States.976    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.977    [The prepared statement of Mr. Walker follows:]978                    Prepared Statement of Tom Walker979                              July 8, 2025980                        introduction and purpose981    Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver, and Members of the982committee: I am Tom Walker, chief executive officer of DroneUp and a983former U.S. naval officer. Throughout my career, from military service984to leading one of the Nation's largest uncrewed aviation networks, I985have witnessed the rapid evolution of drone technology, both in its986ability to serve the public and in the emerging risks it poses to987national security.988    My written testimony provides operational data and first-hand989insights from thousands of commercial drone missions conducted across990the United States. These missions have revealed consistent991vulnerabilities in our air space and infrastructure that warrant urgent992attention from the Federal Government.993    I will also outline practical measures that government and industry994can take together to close these gaps, improve air space coordination,995and reduce the risks posed by uncrewed systems.996    I appreciate the committee's leadership on this issue and stand997ready to support efforts to ensure the safety, security, and998scalability of U.S. air space.999                     background and qualifications1000    DroneUp was founded in 2016 to scale drone services nationwide. We1001built what became the world's largest drone services network,1002activating tens of thousands of independent drone pilots nationwide.1003    We subsequently launched the largest drone delivery operation in1004the country at that time, with the capacity to serve nearly 4 million1005households through partnerships with major retailers and State1006governments.1007    As part of that effort, we operated 34 drone hubs in 6 States,1008including Chairman Gimenez's home State of Florida. We obtained FAA1009Part 135 Air Carrier Certification and gained first-hand insight into1010both the operational potential and the technical limitations of drone1011systems at scale.1012    As our operations expanded, it became clear that the most1013significant constraint was not aircraft performance or logistics. The1014limiting factor was the absence of a technological foundation to safely1015integrate uncrewed systems into national air space. Ensuring future1016aviation safety, protecting critical infrastructure, and maintaining1017safe separation between crewed and uncrewed aircraft requires a1018systems-level solution.1019    Today, DroneUp focuses on integrating autonomous air space using1020AI-enabled technology. Our platform enables real-time deconfliction,1021autonomous flight coordination, and persistent situational awareness in1022dynamic and high-risk environments. We collaborate directly with1023Federal regulators, defense agencies, and commercial operators to close1024security and operational gaps that traditional aviation systems were1025never designed to address.1026    This perspective is grounded in real-world operational experience1027and technical development. It reflects what we are already observing in1028the field and what must now be done to protect the air space.1029                    overview of the threat landscape1030    As of mid-2025, the United States is facing a sharp escalation in1031drone-related threats across aviation, infrastructure, and national1032security. In the first quarter of 2025 alone, the FAA recorded 4111033illegal drone incursions near U.S. airports, a 25.6 percent increase1034over the same period in 2024 (FAA).1035    Separately, U.S. Northern Command documented over 350 unauthorized1036drone flights across more than 100 military installations in 2024 (Fox1037News).1038    These are not isolated incidents. They are active, sustained, and1039growing. They disrupt flight operations, interfere with emergency1040services, and expose vulnerabilities at military and civilian1041facilities nationwide.1042    This is not a domestic problem alone. Internationally, drones have1043shut down major airports, penetrated secure sites, and been used for1044espionage, sabotage, and targeted attacks. When drone activity shut1045down London's Gatwick Airport for 33 hours in 2018, it disrupted 1,0001046flights and stranded over 140,000 passengers (BBC). That type of1047disruption is no longer hypothetical here. It is beginning to happen on1048U.S. soil.1049    The threat is real, immediate, and growing faster than our ability1050to contain it.1051                          threats to aviation1052    Drones now pose a direct and rising risk to manned aviation in the1053United States. In 2024, they accounted for nearly two-thirds of all1054reported near-mid-air collisions at the Nation's 30 busiest airports,1055according to analysis by the Associated Press and NASA's Aviation1056Safety Reporting System (AP News, The Sun).1057    Pilots have reported drones within hundreds of feet of commercial1058aircraft during takeoff and landing:1059   A quadcopter flew within 300 feet of a jetliner's cockpit on1060        approach to San Francisco International (AP News)1061   A drone was observed at 4,000 feet near Miami International1062   At Newark Liberty, a drone came within 50 feet of a1063        departing jet's wing.1064    The FAA continues to receive over 100 drone sighting reports every1065month near U.S. airports (FAA).1066    The trend is accelerating, and these are not all near misses. In1067January 2023, an F-16 fighter jet collided midair with a drone during a1068training mission over Arizona (AZFamily). In January 2025, a drone1069struck a Los Angeles County firefighting aircraft during an emergency1070evacuation, tearing a 6-foot hole in the wing and grounding the1071aircraft while 192,000 residents were under evacuation orders (ABC7,1072AP).1073    The threat is global. In September 2023, a Virgin Atlantic Boeing1074787 carrying 264 passengers narrowly avoided a drone collision just1075after takeoff from Heathrow Airport. U.K. aviation authorities1076described it as one of the closest calls on record (D-Fend Solutions).1077    Many of these drones are too small to appear on radar and are often1078operated by individuals who may not be visible to authorities. Without1079stronger detection systems, improved coordination, and apparent1080enforcement authority, the risk to commercial and emergency aviation1081will continue to grow.1082                   threats to critical infrastructure1083Military Installations1084    Drone incursions into U.S. military air space have reached1085unprecedented levels. In December 2023, Langley Air Force Base in1086Virginia experienced 17 consecutive nights of drone overflights.1087Witnesses described formations as large as 20 feet long, traveling at1088100 miles per hour, and reaching altitudes of 3,000 to 4,000 feet (Task1089& Purpose). The incident forced the relocation of F-22 Raptor aircraft1090and the suspension of training operations. Despite weeks of1091investigation by the Pentagon, FBI and NASA, the drone operators were1092never identified.1093    In December 2024, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base was forced to1094close its air space for 4 hours due to heavy UAS activity. Controllers1095reported multiple unidentified drones operating over the facility (CNN,1096The War Zone).1097    These are not hobbyist drones. These are sustained, strategic1098incursions targeting sensitive national security infrastructure.1099Energy Infrastructure1100    In 2024, over 13,000 drone incursions were detected at U.S. power1101generation sites. Analysts estimate that 60 new vulnerability points1102are added to the grid every day (E&E News, Dedrone). The Department of1103Homeland Security has warned that extremist actors and foreign1104adversaries have considered using drones for surveillance or sabotage.1105    In January 2024, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security1106Agency and the FBI issued a joint advisory warning that Chinese-1107manufactured drones operating in the U.S. energy and telecommunications1108sectors could expose sensitive data to foreign access (CISA).1109Prisons1110    Drones are now a standard tool for delivering contraband into U.S.1111prisons. From 2023 to 2024, Georgia reported 774 drone sightings at1112State correctional facilities. Of these, 720 involved contraband drops,1113including drugs, weapons, and cell phones. The incidents led to over1114540 felony arrests. At Washington State Prison alone, authorities1115intercepted 21 drone drops in 1 year, arresting more than 401116individuals linked to smuggling operations (WGXA News).1117Public Events1118    In 2023, NFL stadiums reported 2,845 unauthorized drone incursions,1119up from just 67 in 2018, a 4,145 percent increase (Reuters). The NFL,1120Department of Justice, and FBI have all called on Congress to expand1121detection and mitigation authority to protect public events.1122Ports and Maritime Infrastructure1123    America's maritime transportation system underpins more than $5.41124trillion in economic activity and carries over three-quarters of all1125U.S. trade, according to the 2023 Cyberspace Solarium Commission and1126independent StateScoop reporting. (cybersolarium.org, Statescoop.com)1127    Yet ports remain attractive, under-protected targets. The Port of1128Los Angeles blocked roughly 60 million attempted cyber-intrusions every1129month in 2023, up from 7 million in 2014, its chief information1130security officer told trade press and security researchers. (ajot.com,1131amu.apus.edu)1132    At the same time, the U.S. Coast Guard warns that unauthorized1133drone flights over sensitive maritime facilities have become ``a common1134occurrence,'' and that most local authorities still lack the equipment1135and legal authority to detect or interdict them. (hstoday.us)1136    These low-cost aircraft can hover above container stacks, record1137ship movements, and capture other line-of-sight intelligence that1138traditional perimeter systems cannot block, exposing a critical gap1139between the economic value of U.S. ports and the security resources1140dedicated to protecting them.1141         conclusion: a growing gap between threat and response1142    These incidents are not anomalies. They reflect an accelerating1143pattern. Drone technology is becoming faster, cheaper, and easier to1144operate, while our detection systems, legal authorities, and response1145capabilities have not kept pace. From airliners and emergency aircraft1146to power grids, prisons, and ports, drones are exposing fundamental1147operational gaps.1148    If these vulnerabilities are not addressed with urgency and1149coordination, it is not a matter of if they will be exploited, but when1150and with what consequence.1151    the system we were promised still doesn't exist, and the gap is1152                               dangerous1153    By 2017, NASA's UTM trials had demonstrated that data-driven1154services, rather than radio calls, could safely manage low-altitude1155drones. The industry told Congress that a nationwide system was1156imminent. Every drone would file a digital plan, receive near-instant1157clearance, and broadcast a trusted ID while shielding crewed aircraft1158and sensitive air space.1159    Eight years on, that promise remains unfulfilled. LAANC automates1160only the simplest flights; Remote-ID is little more than a broadcast1161license plate; and the architecture intended to weave authorization,1162intent, surveillance, and enforcement into a single safety net stalled1163at the prototype stage. The low-altitude NAS is a patchwork of manual1164waivers, siloed registries, partial awareness, and policy-only1165defenses.1166    Nine critical gaps keep the system fragmented:1167    1. Patchwork Authorization.--Anything beyond basic flights slides1168        into slow waivers; approval pipelines don't share live pilot,1169        aircraft, or risk data, so regulators default to broad caps no1170        one can enforce.1171    2. Fragmented Identity.--Pilot certificates, hull IDs,1172        Authorizations, and Restrictions all live in different1173        databases. Nothing cryptographically binds drone + pilot +1174        mission.1175    3. No Live Intent Ledger.--While each DSS can expose only minimal1176        ``need-to-know'' metadata, each USS keeps its complete plans1177        private. Multiple DSSs can overlap but federate only on a best-1178        effort handshake, with no cryptographic trust anchor or shared1179        governance in place. The result: no authoritative, real-time1180        ledger of intent, leaving controllers, law enforcement, and1181        defense without a complete situational picture or conformance1182        guarantee.1183    4. Prototype-level UTM Functions.--While basic constraint ingestion1184        has been proven, functions such as collaborative detect-and-1185        avoid, demand/capacity balancing, and dynamic rerouting remain1186        at the prototype stage, even as low-altitude drone activity1187        continues to rise faster than the supporting infrastructure can1188        keep pace.1189    5. Policy-only Protection.--Flight rules, TFRs, and NOTAMs depend1190        on voluntary compliance. The 2018 Gatwick shutdown demonstrated1191        how quickly policy can fail when authorities can't verify or1192        neutralize a rogue drone. The recent withdrawal of manufacturer1193        geofences further widens the exposure.1194    6. Thin Cooperative Detection.--Remote-ID has a limited range, can1195        be spoofed, and has experienced slow adoption; significant gaps1196        exist in conformance validation and law enforcement's ability1197        to respond.1198    7. Invisible Manned Traffic.--ADS-B Out is mandatory only in1199        controlled cores. Below 10,000 ft or outside Mode C veils,1200        numerous helicopters and general aviation aircraft fly1201        electronically dark. Drones must either hire human spotters or1202        stay grounded, while manned pilots receive no warning, creating1203        an asymmetric blind spot that endangers safety and national1204        security.1205    8. Siloed Non-cooperative Sensors.--Radar, RF, acoustic, and EO/IR1206        feeds terminate in siloed consoles. Without a consolidated1207        fusion layer that de-duplicates tracks, tags provenance, and1208        applies confidence scores, agencies lack an authoritative air1209        picture; low-signature threats slip through the seams while1210        false alarms drain resources.1211    9. Minimal Enforcement Tools.--Many agencies lack the resources,1212        statutory authority, or training to act; penalties rarely deter1213        non-compliance.1214    These gaps compound: the labyrinthine nature of authorizations,1215weak identity, a missing intent ledger, and endless prototype tests and1216deployments have left the NAS blind. Policy-only protection and scant1217enforcement embed risk; asymmetric conspicuity and unfused sensors1218hamper both safety and security. Domestic incidents, from prison1219contraband drops to critical-infrastructure overflights, are1220accelerating, and foreign actors already field swarm-scale, AI-directed1221drone operations that would overwhelm today's fragmented defenses.1222    Without a fully digital, interoperable, security-grade low-altitude1223traffic management and security backbone, we risk ceding safety,1224commerce, and strategic credibility. Closing these gaps requires a1225cohesive national program. One that unifies real-time authorization and1226intent data, provides universal e-conspicuity for every aircraft, fuses1227cooperative and non-cooperative sensor feeds, and ensures adequately1228funded enforcement and training, so that every flight is known, every1229risk is quantified, and every violation is actionable.1230     building a safe, trusted, and scalable low-altitude air space1231    What we need today is not theoretical. It is practical, achievable,1232and urgent. The foundation is simple. If something is in the sky, we1233should know what it is, who is operating it, whether it belongs there,1234and how to respond if it does not.1235    establish a national low-altitude information & flight exchange1236    The exchange will provide every UAS Service Supplier and Government1237stakeholder with a live, sub-second view of low-altitude air space by1238requiring them to publish their flight data to, and subscribe to, a1239common event bus protected by role-based access control. An immutable,1240cryptographically-signed ledger will preserve each transaction,1241enabling regulators, first responders, and counter-UAS systems to1242verify provenance and reconstruct events with forensic certainty.1243             deploy a unified flight-authorization service1244    This service will replace disparate grids, waivers, and letters of1245authorization with a single standards-based API. Operators will submit1246an Operational Intent that describes their mission and objectives. The1247service will automatically validate air space status, aircraft1248performance, crew credentials, and relevant exemptions, and then issue1249a digitally-signed authorization token. The token will be broadcast via1250Remote-ID during flight and stored in the National Low-Altitude1251Information and Flight Exchange, providing field personnel with instant1252compliance checks and enabling the FAA with a tunable, permission-1253verified control point for all mission types.1254                 mandate digital credentials & binding1255    Verifiable credentials will cryptographically bind pilot, aircraft,1256flight plan, and authorizations. Any mismatch or change in1257authorization will block take-off and trigger immediate alerts. Public-1258safety officers will resolve a Remote-ID signal to a licensed operator1259with one query, and insurers will rely on tamper-evident evidence after1260an incident.1261                require universal electronic conspicuity1262    All crewed and uncrewed aircraft will transmit a verifiable1263position signal using on-board equipment or low-power beacons. Making1264every aircraft electronically visible balances the see-and-avoid burden1265and enables safe, scalable drone operations nationwide.1266             implement network remote-id & non-repudiation1267    Add a compact cryptographic signature to every Remote-ID packet,1268broadcast or on-line, so the Unified Flight Authorization Service,1269public-safety observers, and counter-UAS sensors can verify1270authenticity within milliseconds. Spoofed or replayed identifiers will1271be flagged instantly, while genuine packets will flow unchanged into1272the National Low-Altitude Information & Flight Exchange as tamper-proof1273evidence. Every legitimate drone in U.S. air space will thus carry a1274verifiable, non-repudiable identity, providing regulators, integrators,1275and first responders with the cryptographic certainty needed to1276automate trust decisions at machine speed.1277                 adopt a mission-priority rules engine1278    Embed a five-tier priority framework directly in the authorization1279service so emergency, public-safety, and critical-infrastructure1280flights automatically outrank commercial and recreational missions. The1281engine will eliminate manual deconfliction and restore predictability1282for time-sensitive operations.1283      build a sensor-fusion backbone for low-altitude surveillance1284    Fuse cooperative tracks from the National Low-Altitude Information1285& Flight Exchange with radar, RF, acoustic, and electro-optical1286detections provided by Government and commercial sources. Privacy1287controls will permit graduated data disclosure, ensuring that all1288authorized users, from airport towers to local law enforcement, use the1289same trusted, continuously-updated common operating picture.1290                       launch a friend-or-foe api1291    Provide authorized sensors and effectors with a one-call verdict:1292COMPLIANT, UNKNOWN, or HOSTILE, plus confidence and priority metadata.1293This API will shorten decision cycles, reduce friendly-fire risk, and1294log every query for after-action accountability.1295                operate a flight-restricted-area service1296    Publish a single, near-real-time catalog of restricted air space, 12972209 critical-infrastructure sites, stadium Temporary Flight1298Restrictions, wildfire boxes, VIP security rings, and temporary1299counter-UAS volumes, and push updates digitally within seconds. The1300authorization service will validate the current catalog during planning1301and periodically in flight. If a change is detected, onboard logic will1302force a reroute or a safe landing, delivering geofence-like protection1303in a standardized, manufacturer-agnostic format.1304            fund a local enforcement equip-and-train program1305    Supply State, local, Tribal, and territorial agencies with multi-1306band Remote-ID receivers tied into the National Low-Altitude1307Information & Flight Exchange, a Friend-or-Foe-enabled mobile1308application, and concise on-line training. Statutory amendments will1309authorize certified officers to order landings or seize non-compliant1310aircraft, transforming Federal data streams into actionable local1311enforcement.1312       start a vehicle-to-vehicle spectrum & standards initiative1313    Kick off a technical and regulatory effort to identify and allocate1314low-latency spectrum for direct detect-and-avoid messaging between1315crewed and uncrewed aircraft, while deferring any equipage mandate1316until the Unified Flight-Authorization Service and Universal Electronic1317Conspicuity have operated long enough to reveal any remaining mid-air-1318collision risk.1319                          why time is critical1320    The pace of the drone threat is outstripping our national response.1321What was once a future-looking concern is now a present and growing1322danger. The volume, complexity, and frequency of drone-related1323incidents are rising across every major sector: commercial aviation,1324military installations, public infrastructure, law enforcement1325operations, and emergency services. Each passing month adds to the1326evidence that we are operating in a risk environment that is evolving1327faster than our laws, technologies, and authorities can keep up.1328    This urgency is not abstract. It is measurable in hard numbers and1329operational strain. In the first quarter of 2025 alone, drone1330incursions near airports increased by more than 25 percent compared to1331the previous year. Security officials at military bases are now forced1332to treat drone sightings as recurring operational threats rather than1333one-off anomalies. Emergency response aircraft have been grounded mid-1334mission. Correctional facilities and utility providers are managing not1335theoretical vulnerabilities, but routine air space violations.1336    What makes the current threat especially urgent is that many of the1337most critical policy tools to address it already exist on paper, but1338have not been implemented. For example, FAA Section 2209, mandated1339initially in 2016, was intended to create a process for restricting1340drone flights over critical infrastructure. Nearly 9 years later, the1341rule remains unfinalized, leaving power plants, refineries, and other1342sensitive sites without the reliable Federal protection they need.1343    Similarly, the FAA's long-awaited rule to enable beyond visual1344line-of-sight (BVLOS) drone operations remains delayed. This rule is1345essential not only for commercial expansion but also for ensuring the1346safe and scalable use of drones in emergency response and1347infrastructure monitoring. Its continued absence has created both1348operational inefficiencies and potential safety risks.1349    Most concerning is the limited authority for detecting and1350neutralizing rogue drones. As of today, only a handful of Federal1351agencies have narrowly defined counter-UAS mitigation authority. State1352and local law enforcement, as well as most infrastructure operators,1353remain legally barred from using even basic mitigation tools.1354Bipartisan proposals to expand this authority have been repeatedly1355drafted, but Congress has yet to act. If the current Federal authority1356sunsets in September 2025 as scheduled, no agency, Federal or local,1357will have a clear legal ability to respond to a malicious drone in real1358time.1359    We are approaching a point where the probability of a serious1360incident, such as a downed aircraft, a disrupted power grid, or a mass1361evacuation triggered by an air space breach, is no longer low. Without1362coordinated action, the current patchwork of regulations and1363capabilities will leave critical gaps that adversaries, criminals, or1364careless actors can continue to exploit.1365    The United States has the technological capacity to lead in the1366safe and secure integration of drones. But every delay in closing these1367policy and infrastructure gaps increases the risk to public safety and1368national security. Time is not neutral. Inaction allows the threat to1369mature, while preparedness becomes more difficult and costly.1370    We are not sounding the alarm in anticipation of a future crisis.1371We are responding to the reality that the crisis has already begun. The1372question before us is how quickly we choose to act.1373                     conclusion and call to action1374    The vulnerabilities outlined in this testimony are not theoretical;1375they are real and present a significant risk. They are documented,1376active, and growing. The threats posed by uncrewed aerial systems to1377aviation safety, critical infrastructure, and national security have1378increased in frequency, complexity, and impact. At the same time, the1379systems designed to detect, identify, authorize, and respond to these1380threats remain fragmented, underdeveloped, and in many cases1381unenforced.1382    The foundational technologies required to close these gaps are1383already available. Real-time air space coordination, digital flight1384authorization, cryptographically-verifiable credentials, secure1385identity broadcasts, and integrated sensor fusion are not experimental.1386These capabilities have been demonstrated in operational environments1387and validated through collaboration between Government and industry.1388What remains is the directive to implement them at scale.1389    To that end, I respectfully submit the following priorities for1390immediate Congressional action:1391    1. Mandate the establishment of a national real-time low-altitude1392        air space coordination framework. This system must integrate1393        flight intent, identity, and enforcement data into a single1394        operational platform.1395    2. Require digital credentialing that binds pilots, aircraft,1396        missions, and authorizations. This will enable instant1397        validation of lawful flights and allow for automated detection1398        of non-compliant activity.1399    3. Implement a universal electronic conspicuity requirement for all1400        crewed and uncrewed aircraft operating below 18,000 feet. This1401        is essential for ensuring visibility and reducing the risk of1402        mid-air collisions.1403    4. Finalize FAA Section 2209 and direct the creation of a Federal1404        flight-restriction service. This service must provide a1405        machine-readable feed that all drones and autopilot systems1406        consult before and during flight.1407    5. Expand counter-UAS detection and mitigation authority to1408        qualified State, local, Tribal, and territorial agencies.1409        Oversight and safeguards must be in place, but these agencies1410        need the authority to act.1411    6. Fund and deploy a local law enforcement equip-and-train program.1412        This program must provide officers with the tools, training,1413        and legal clarity to verify and respond to drone threats in the1414        field.1415    7. Require the FAA to implement a unified flight authorization1416        service. This service should support all drone operations1417        through a single digital process from request to real-time1418        verification.1419    Each of these actions addresses a core structural weakness that has1420allowed unregulated drone activity to outpace national preparedness.1421These are not isolated or speculative risks. They are recurring1422incidents that have grounded emergency aircraft, disrupted commercial1423aviation, penetrated military air space, and exposed key infrastructure1424to surveillance and interference.1425    The time line for addressing these issues is urgent. As the pace of1426drone innovation continues to increase, so does the risk of a high-1427consequence event. The United States cannot afford to treat low-1428altitude air space as an ungoverned or optional domain. It must be1429protected with the same level of accountability and structure applied1430to every other mode of transportation that affects public safety and1431national defense.1432    Congress has both the authority and the responsibility to ensure1433this system is put in place. The tools are ready. The risks are known.1434The solution is feasible. What is needed now is coordinated direction1435and the will to act.1436    I thank the committee for the opportunity to provide this written1437testimony. I stand ready to support any effort that will help secure1438the national air space system and enable the safe, scalable, and1439responsible integration of uncrewed aircraft systems in the United1440States.14411442    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Walker.1443    I now recognize Mr. Feddersen for 5 minutes to summarize1444his opening statements.14451446  STATEMENT OF BRETT FEDDERSEN, VICE PRESIDENT, STRATEGY AND1447              GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, D-FEND SOLUTIONS14481449    Mr. Feddersen. Good morning, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking1450Member McIver, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee.1451Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you on matters1452of critical importance to the national security and public1453safety of our country and our citizens.1454    My name is Brett Feddersen. I am the vice president of1455strategy and government affairs at D-Fend Solutions, the1456leading counter-drone manufacturer of radio frequency cyber1457takeover solutions for drone threats, both domestically and1458internationally.1459    I also serve as the chair of the Security Industry1460Association's drone security subcommittee and have been working1461on the drone and counter-drone problem set since 2008. During1462my time in the military, as a Federal civilian, and in the1463private sector, we've seen this problem grow.1464    Today, I hope to help the subcommittee better understand1465how overseas drone operations are transforming domestic risk1466vectors, the status of the U.S. capabilities and legal1467frameworks, and offer targeted recommendations for Congress to1468bolster detection, interdiction, and resilience against drone-1469borne threats in the United States homeland.1470    Drones have transitioned from niche reconnaissance tools to1471central components of modern warfare. Their wide availability,1472small size, low cost, and modular payloads make them attractive1473for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as1474destruction of critical infrastructure and effective delivery1475of ordnance.1476    In conflicts outside the United States, inexpensive1477commercially-available drones and do-it-yourself drones have1478become the weapon of choice.1479    Alarmingly, these same drones are flown across the United1480States every day. There are over 1 million drones registered in1481the United States according to the FAA, and that number is1482predicted to grow to 2.7 million by 2027.1483    The weaponization of private drones in the United States is1484also a significant and growing concern. While drones have been1485beneficial applications with public safety and various1486industries, their potential misuse, especially when armed,1487poses challenges for law enforcement and national security.1488    Battlefield tactics, techniques, and procedures for drones1489have proliferated through the internet and are ready to be used1490today.1491    During my time at the FAA, we received several videos and1492briefings showcasing drones outfitted with chainsaws,1493flamethrowers, firearms, and makeshift chemical dispensers.1494    Just weeks ago, the world witnessed a historic shift in1495small drone warfare. Ukraine's planning and execution of1496Operation Spiderweb has rewritten the rule book on drone1497threats: distance, cost, and autonomy no longer constraining1498our adversaries.1499    The audacious plan involved Ukraine striking Russian air1500bases up to 3,100 miles from the battlefield using small1501commercially-available AI-enabled drones.1502    For context, this is equivalent to conducting an attack by1503drone in Los Angeles, California, from your home in Cape Cod,1504Massachusetts.1505    This attack demonstrates the capability to build and deploy1506do-it-yourself drones at scale and at distance, accurately1507delivering ordnance to create strategic impact and fast1508destruction of significant assets.1509    An attack like this can be prevented today using current1510safe and effective counter-drone technology, such as RF cyber1511takeover technology which can detect, track, identify, and take1512control of the drone, then landing it safely when and where law1513enforcement or security want it to.1514    This type of technology is legal and safe to use. It does1515not violate privacy laws or Fourth Amendment protections. And1516it does not implicate Federal wiretap or pen trap statutes or1517regulations.1518    According to the FAA data and previous DOD testimony, drone1519incursions have steadily increased since the establishment of1520the Federal counter-drone authorities in 2018. That 5-year1521pilot program is now in its seventh year.1522    First responders report that drones are tailing SWAT teams,1523dropping contraband into prisons, spying on neighbors, and1524hovering over chemical plants.1525    While the threat is local, the legal tools remain1526predominantly Federal in nature.1527    DHS, DOJ, the security industry, State and local law1528enforcement, Tribal and territorial law enforcement agencies,1529along with trained security professionals, have repeatedly1530urged Congress to expand authorities to enable air domain1531awareness and drone protection in American communities and over1532our critical infrastructure.1533    Unfortunately, those requests have not resulted in any1534expanded new authorities and limited authorities since 20181535have been periodically renewed only for short periods of time,1536creating uncertainty for law enforcement and the industry.1537    To summarize, drone warfare abroad has evolved rapidly over1538the past decade. Regrettably, U.S. legislation, regulation, and1539policy has not. Today, we should acknowledge the topic of drone1540threats in our homeland is neither timely nor new.1541    What we can say is that the threat is real, the United1542States is vulnerable, and that without bold and immediate1543legislative action the American public will remain unprotected1544from a drone attack.1545    The industry agrees an attack is only a matter of time. It1546is not a matter of if it will happen.1547    I strongly urge the subcommittee and the full committee to1548take immediate action in meaningful bipartisan legislation.1549    The industry, public safety professionals, and American1550public are calling for 3 simple actions that can be taken now1551to make Americans and our skies safer.1552    Expand authorities to State and local law enforcement and1553trained security professionals guarding our critical1554infrastructure.1555    Develop and implement a counter-UAS training program using1556a Federally-accredited curriculum.1557    Provide dedicated funding programs that enable critical1558infrastructure operators to procure, train, deploy, and operate1559counter-UAS systems.1560    Thank you for your leadership and the opportunity to appear1561before you. I look forward to taking your questions.1562    [The prepared statement of Mr. Feddersen follows:]1563                 Prepared Statement of Brett Feddersen1564                              July 8, 20251565                              introduction1566    Chairmen Gimenez and Green, Ranking Members McIver and Thompson,1567and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the1568opportunity to testify before you on matters critically important to1569the national security and public safety of our country and its1570citizens.1571    My name is Brett Feddersen, and I am the vice president of strategy1572and government affairs at D-Fend Solutions, the leading counter-drone1573manufacturer of radio frequency (RF)-cyber takeover solutions for the1574drone threat, both overseas and in the United States. I also serve as1575the chair of the Security Industry Association's (SIA) drone security1576subcommittee and have been working on the drone and counter-drone1577problem set since 2008, during my time in the military, as a Federal1578civilian, and in the private sector. Today, I am honored to appear1579before the subcommittee representing both D-Fend Solutions and the1580drone security industry.1581    Bottom line up front: Drone warfare abroad has evolved rapidly over1582the past decade, with State and non-State actors fielding drones for1583surveillance, sabotage, and strikes in theaters from Eastern Europe to1584the Middle East. Tactics refined in these conflict zones--persistent1585reconnaissance, weaponized loitering munitions, and saturation swarm1586attacks--are now manifesting as emerging threats to U.S. homeland and1587national security.1588    These threats are here to stay and mean that things like our1589critical infrastructure--such as power grids, water treatment plants,1590transportation networks, and communication systems--is increasingly1591vulnerable to threats from nefarious actors who can exploit drones'1592capabilities, including surveillance, sabotage, and payload delivery,1593to conduct physical attacks. Successful drone attacks on critical1594infrastructure can lead to power outages, transportation disruptions,1595communication failures, and substantial economic consequences. More1596concerning is the potential for the loss of human life, for example, a1597drone using aerosol dispersal or payload delivery over a mass gathering1598can cause mass panic, causing serious injury or even death to1599attendees. Confronting this reality requires a proactive and multi-1600layered homeland defense strategy that includes early detection, safe1601and effective mitigation technologies, and updated security protocols.1602    From local football games to open-air shopping centers, large1603gatherings of Americans are part of our everyday lives and remain1604incredibly vulnerable to drone-based threats. As the United States1605prepares to host high-profile, global sporting events like the 20261606FIFA World Cup and the 2028 Olympics, I am grateful that the committee1607is closely overseeing the threat environment and preparations for these1608events and is willing to engage in difficult conversations surrounding1609our real vulnerability and capability gaps.1610    Today, I hope to help the subcommittee better understand how1611overseas drone operations are transforming domestic risk vectors, the1612status of U.S. capabilities and legal frameworks, and offer targeted1613recommendations for Congress to bolster detection, interdiction, and1614resilience against drone-borne threats in the United States homeland.1615                modern drone warfare abroad and at home1616    Drones have transitioned from niche reconnaissance tools to central1617components of modern warfare. Their wide availability, small size, low1618cost, and modular payloads make them attractive for intelligence,1619surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, as well as the destruction1620of critical infrastructure and the effective delivery of ordnance.1621    Just weeks ago, the world witnessed a historic shift in small drone1622warfare. Ukraine's planning and execution of Operation Spider Web has1623rewritten the rulebook on drone threats: distance, cost, and autonomy1624no longer constrain adversary reach. Below are key counter-drone1625lessons drawn from Ukraine's Operation Spider Web--an audacious1626campaign in which Ukraine struck Russian airbases up to 5,000 km (3,1061627miles) from the front using small, commercial AI-enabled drones. This1628is farther than driving from New York City to Los Angeles.1629Rear Areas Are Not Safe1630   Ukraine proved that ``strategic depth'' offers no immunity:1631        drones launched from deep inside friendly territory reached1632        ostensibly secure Russian airfields, destroying billions of1633        dollars' worth of aircraft. Defenders must extend coverage well1634        beyond the front lines to include logistics hubs, maintenance1635        depots, and forward operating bases.\1\1636---------------------------------------------------------------------------1637    \1\ American University, ``Ukraine's Operation Spider Web Upended1638Traditional Rules of War,'' June 5, 2025. Benjamin Jensen;1639chathamhouse.org american.edu.1640---------------------------------------------------------------------------1641Defense in Depth--Layer Every Segment1642   Traditional point-defense systems (e.g., local radar or a1643        single interceptor battery) were overwhelmed. Operation Spider1644        Web integrated covert logistics, telecom exploitation, and1645        ground infiltration to bypass singular defenses, underscoring1646        the need for a layered approach to counter-drone detection (RF,1647        radar, EO/IR) and mitigation (RF cyber takeover, electronic1648        warfare measures, and directed energy).\2\1649---------------------------------------------------------------------------1650    \2\ Counter-UAS Hub, ``Putting Operation Spider's Web in Context,''1651June 20, 2025, Ben Connable; cuashub.comirregularwarfare.org.1652---------------------------------------------------------------------------1653Resilience to Jamming and GPS Denial1654   Spider Web's drones used dead-reckoning navigation and1655        civilian cellular (SIM-card) links rather than GPS, making them1656        resilient to traditional GNSS jamming. Given this, counter-1657        drone systems should include extensive RF spectrum monitoring,1658        non-GPS-dependent geofencing, and safe mitigation techniques1659        that can detect, take control of, or disrupt alternate control1660        channels.1661    In conflicts outside the United States, inexpensive, commercially1662available, and do-it-yourself (DIY) drones have become the weapon of1663choice. Alarmingly, these same drones are flown across the United1664States every day. There are over 1 million drones registered with the1665FAA in the United States--a number that is predicted to grow to 2.71666million by 2027.\3\1667---------------------------------------------------------------------------1668    \3\ FAA, ``Drones by the Numbers,'' updated April 1, 2025, https://1669www.faa.gov/node/54496; ``Drone Operations,'' Government Accountability1670Office, https://www.gao.gov/drone-operations.1671---------------------------------------------------------------------------1672    The weaponization of private drones in the United States is a1673significant and growing concern. While drones have beneficial1674applications in public safety and various industries, their potential1675for misuse, especially when armed, poses challenges for law enforcement1676and national security. Battlefield tactics, techniques, and procedures1677for drones have proliferated through the internet, and the same drones1678used in combat overseas are available and in use here in the United1679States.1680    During my time at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), we1681received several videos and briefings showcasing drones outfitted with1682chainsaws, flamethrowers, firearms, and makeshift chemical dispersal1683systems. We have witnessed rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) warheads and1684grenades being dropped from simple commercial and do-it-yourself (DIY)1685drones. Additionally, we have seen drones equipped with modified1686shotguns used to shoot down other drones.1687Key Concerns and Examples of Weaponization1688   Potential for Malicious Use.--Drones can be easily outfitted1689        with various weapons, including firearms, explosives,1690        incendiary devices, or even chemical or biological agents,1691        posing a risk to individuals, critical infrastructure, and1692        Government facilities.1693     Terrorism.--Terrorist organizations can adapt and exploit1694            drone technology to target public spaces and1695            infrastructure, potentially magnifying casualties and1696            damage. Cartels operating in Mexico along the U.S. Southern1697            Border are already using weaponized drones to drop munition1698            payloads.1699     Drone swarms.--Coordinated attacks utilizing drone swarms1700            can overwhelm traditional defenses and enhance the1701            effectiveness of sabotage operations.1702   Drone Incursions and Modern Espionage.--There have been1703        numerous drone incursions over sensitive sites, including1704        military bases and critical infrastructure, raising concerns1705        about potential threats. Drones can be used for corporate and1706        foreign espionage, including surveillance of facilities,1707        intimidation through observation, and even cyber attacks by1708        leveraging proximity to networks.1709   Smuggling and Criminal Activity.--Drones are used by1710        criminals for illegal drug shipments, delivery of contraband1711        into prisons, and counter-surveillance of law enforcement.1712   Privacy Concerns.--Drones equipped with cameras and other1713        sensors can be used for unauthorized surveillance and invasion1714        of privacy.1715   Interference with Public Events and Aircraft.--Unauthorized1716        drone flights can disrupt public events and pose a risk to1717        aviation safety, including the potential for collisions with1718        manned aircraft.1719    Common commercial drones have already been used in attempts to1720destroy or damage critical infrastructure, and we continue to see1721variations of weaponized drones attempting to attack the public in the1722heartland and law enforcement in cities and on the border.1723   2020 Pennsylvania Power Substation Incident.--A modified1724        drone was discovered outside an electrical substation in1725        Pennsylvania. It was equipped with a copper wire, likely1726        intended to create a short circuit and disrupt power. The drone1727        crashed before reaching its target, but it highlights the1728        potential threat.1729   Attempted Attack in Nashville (2024).--A man was arrested in1730        November for planning to use a weapon of mass destruction to1731        attack an energy facility in Nashville. Court documents1732        indicated he planned to use a drone to deliver an explosive.1733   Suspicious Drone Activity Near Energy Sites (2024).--In1734        December, multiple energy sites requested temporary flight1735        restrictions due to unusual drone activity in New Jersey, New1736        York, and Maryland. Although the operators weren't identified,1737        this incident reflects the on-going concern about drone1738        threats.1739What is Our Current Air Space Protection Posture?1740    Over the years, drones have evolved from simple weekend toys to1741sophisticated tools used for smuggling, corporate espionage, and1742terrorist surveillance. Unfortunately, Federal policies have struggled1743to keep up with these emerging threats, leaving State, local, Tribal,1744and territorial (SLTT) law enforcement agencies in a challenging1745position and their constituents unprotected. These agencies and trained1746security professionals are on the front lines protecting critical1747locations--such as stadiums, power plants, and city skylines--but they1748face legal restrictions that prevent them from effectively addressing1749drones that pose a danger to these sites and the American public.1750    As you know, only a few Federal law enforcement components in the1751Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and Defense1752(DoD)--have explicit legal authority under 6 U.S.C.  124(n) and 101753U.S.C.  130(i) to detect and mitigate (or stop) illicit drone1754activities. Other entities, including State and local police1755departments and trained security professionals, must rely on Federal1756support or remain powerless, while unidentified drones fly dangerously1757over parades, concerts, major sporting events, and critical1758infrastructure. By their own admission, the DOJ and DHS can only1759respond to less than 1 percent of the thousands of counter-drone1760operational requests they receive each year.1761    According to FAA data and previous DoD testimony, drone incursions1762have steadily increased since the establishment of Federal counter-1763drone authorities in 2018. First responders report that drones are1764tailing SWAT teams, dropping contraband into prisons, spying on1765neighbors, and hovering over chemical plants. While the threat is1766local, the legal tools remain predominantly Federal in nature.1767    In 2014, while serving as the National Security Council Director1768for Aviation Security at the White House, we encountered drone1769incursions on the White House and Capitol campuses. Subsequently, the1770interagency met to develop a response plan for these ``non-traditional1771aviation threats.'' As a result of these efforts, the FAA received1772Congressional direction to begin testing counter-drone technology1773systems in 2016. In 2017, the Department of Defense was granted1774additional authorities. In 2018, Congress authorized a 5-year pilot1775program for Federal law enforcement as part of the FAA Reauthorization1776process to provide counter-drone authorities to the Department of1777Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ). Seven1778years later, these authorities remain unchanged.1779    DHS, DOJ, the security industry, and State, local, Tribal, and1780territorial (SLTT) law enforcement agencies and trained security1781professionals have repeatedly urged Congress to expand authorities to1782enable air domain awareness and drone protection in American1783communities and over our critical infrastructure. Unfortunately, those1784requests have not resulted in any expanded or new authorities, and the1785limited authorities from 2018 have been periodically renewed only for1786short periods of time, creating uncertainty for law enforcement and the1787industry.1788               legislative recommendations and next steps1789    The President's recent Executive Orders are a good start to address1790our legislative and regulatory inaction. However, Executive action1791alone is not a permanent shield--it can be revoked by future1792administrations or challenged in court. Congress must move now to1793codify SLTT counter-UAS authorities with the same privacy safeguards1794and oversight as outlined in President Trump's Executive Orders.1795    I strongly urge the subcommittee and full committee to take1796bipartisan legislative action now. The industry, public safety1797professionals, and the American public are calling for 3 simple actions1798that can be taken immediately to make Americans and our skies safer.1799    1. Expand the current 6 U.S.C.  124(n) detection and mitigation1800        authorities to all SLTT-LE and trained security professionals,1801        safeguarding our critical infrastructure, and amend 49 U.S.C. 1802        14501 to include an explicit ``Counter-UAS Exception,''1803        authorizing approved non-Federal entities to employ safe and1804        effective, non-kinetic mitigation under DHS oversight.1805    2. Develop, implement, and oversee a counter-drone operator1806        training regime, using a Federally-accredited curriculum1807        required for all counter-drone operators using approved1808        mitigation technology; and1809    3. Provide dedicated funding programs that enable critical1810        infrastructure operators to procure, train, deploy, and operate1811        counter-drone systems deemed safe and effective by the Federal1812        Government.1813                               conclusion1814    The tactics developed in overseas drone conflicts--such as1815persistent surveillance, sabotage using payload delivery, loitering1816munitions, and swarm saturation strikes--are now poised to harm us at1817home. The increasing number of drone incursions into sensitive air1818space we've seen in recent years should serve as a loud and distinct1819alarm bell, warning us of the immediate necessity for deploying safe1820and effective counter-drone technology to enable rapid response1821capabilities. While the industry has developed effective detection,1822identification, and mitigation solutions, challenges such as legal1823uncertainties, regulatory delays, and funding shortages are hindering1824nationwide implementation. To address these issues, Congress should1825clarify its legal authorities, streamline the approval process, and1826establish dedicated funding. This will enable U.S. stakeholders to1827effectively deter and counter drone-related threats before they reach1828our shores. Now is the time to strengthen our defenses in the skies1829before tomorrow's headlines report the first successful drone strike on1830U.S. soil.1831    Thank you for your leadership and the opportunity to appear before1832you today. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.18331834    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you Mr. Feddersen.1835    I now recognize Mr. Robbins for 5 minutes to summarize his1836opening statements.18371838 STATEMENT OF MICHAEL ROBBINS, PRESIDENT AND CEO, ASSOCIATION1839           FOR UNCREWED VEHICLE SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL18401841    Mr. Robbins. Thank you, Chairman Gimenez and Ranking Member1842McIver and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. It's an1843honor to be with you here again today and to represent AUVSI1844and our member companies that are providing solutions in1845aviation and national security every day.1846    We're at a pivotal moment in aviation history. Drones and1847advanced aviation are unlocking tremendous gains for safety,1848security, technology, and economic opportunity.1849    These technologies, they're no longer theoretical. They're1850delivering real-world value today across our economy and for1851our Armed Forces.1852    Drones are enhancing public safety, enabling faster1853emergency response, improving infrastructure inspections,1854supporting precision agriculture, and expanding package1855delivery networks.1856    Across the country, high-rate production facilities are1857coming on-line, thousands of skilled manufacturing jobs are1858being created, and these innovations are expanding access to1859aviation careers.1860    But all of that progress and the significant national1861benefit it represents is at risk today if we fail to address1862the growing security threats posed by the malicious use of1863drones.1864    We've long rightly been focused on aviation safety, but we1865can no longer afford to ignore the security side of the1866equation.1867    I actually entered this industry in direct response to a1868drone incident. As mentioned by Ranking Member McIver, in1869December 2018 London's Gatwick Airport, the second-busiest in1870the United Kingdom, was shut down for nearly 24 hours because1871of a drone--or possibly multiple drones--spotted near the1872airfield.1873    The Government and the airport were paralyzed. Thousands of1874flights across Europe were canceled or delayed. In the end no1875one could say with certainty what happened, how to respond, or1876if the drones were actually ever even there.1877    In the aftermath of that event, I formed and staffed the1878Blue Ribbon Task Force on UAS Mitigation at Airports on behalf1879of AUVSI and the Airports Council International--North America.1880    Our mission was simple: Make sure a Gatwick-style shutdown1881never happens in the United States. The task force made dozens1882of policy recommendations to Congress to help achieve that1883goal. Unfortunately, most of those have still not been acted1884upon.1885    In the years since, we've seen far more serious and1886frequent drone incursions--in military installations, like, as1887mentioned, at Langley Air Force Base, at commercial airports1888and ports and power plants, prisons and disaster response1889sites, stadiums, and even the White House complex. A Chinese1890DJI drone was even used in the attempted assassination of1891President Trump around this time last summer.1892    We've seen mass confusion over drones--or what some1893mistakenly thought to be drones--in New Jersey last December,1894resulting in significant media excitement and very few answers.1895    We've seen drone warfare evolve at a blistering pace1896overseas, from Ukraine and the stunning Spiderweb swarm attack1897last month, to the Middle East and Africa where small, low-cost1898drones are being used to overwhelm air defenses and carry out1899coordinated strikes with devastating efficiency.1900    Despite all of this, U.S. policy hasn't changed, not1901meaningfully and not at the scale this threat demands.1902    This is not a technology problem. AUVSI member companies,1903including the 3 at this witness table with me today, have built1904and deployed proven, effective solutions for detection,1905identification, and mitigation of rogue drones.1906    This is a policy failure, and that failure is putting1907American lives, infrastructure, and national security at risk.1908    There is a great deal of finger-pointing whenever1909unauthorized drones disrupt sensitive air space. But let me be1910clear: Congress should not be pointing any fingers unless1911holding up a mirror.1912    The last expansion of counter-UAS authorities was in 2018,19137 years ago, and the authorities granted are limited and1914clearly inadequate for addressing the evolving threat. This is1915an unacceptably long time line.1916    Furthermore, the lack of progress is unjust to local,1917State, Tribal, and Federal authorities, including Capitol1918Police, as well as infrastructure owners and operators, who1919lack the tools and authorities to do much of anything in a1920drone disruption situation.1921    We applaud the Trump administration's Executive Order1922issued last month restoring American air space sovereignty1923which begins to address these challenges. But executive action1924alone is not enough. Congress must act.1925    We need legislation that expands detection authority1926broadly, especially to those responsible for protecting1927critical infrastructure and mass gatherings, and expands1928mitigation authority narrowly, with strong training, oversight,1929and accountability.1930    We cannot let perfection be the enemy of progress. We need1931to start chipping away at the problem with urgency and resolve.1932    Congress can either shape the future with considered1933proactive legislation or be forced to react to the next crisis1934with confusion and regret.1935    Every time a drone is used to spy or disrupt or threaten,1936it erodes public trust and jeopardizes the life-saving, job-1937creating, future-defining promise of drone technology.1938    The time for action is long past. Congress must act to1939ensure our air space, to secure our air space, empower those on1940the front line, and ensure that innovation and security are1941moving forward together.1942    Thank you, and I very much look forward to your questions.1943    [The prepared statement of Mr. Robbins follows:]1944                 Prepared Statement of Michael Robbins1945                             July 15, 20251946    Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver, and Members of the1947subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you1948today. My name is Michael Robbins, and I am the president and CEO of1949the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI), the1950world's largest nonprofit trade association dedicated to the1951advancement of uncrewed systems, autonomy, and robotics. AUVSI1952represents a broad spectrum of stakeholders who are committed to the1953secure, responsible, and innovative integration of drones and other1954autonomous technologies into our national air space system and1955associated infrastructure.1956    The topic of this hearing could not be timelier. Across the globe,1957including on-going conflicts in Ukraine, Africa, and the Middle East,1958we are witnessing a transformation in modern warfare and at the center1959of this transformation are uncrewed systems, in particular, unmanned1960aircraft systems (UAS or drones). Drones transform battlefields because1961they both extend operational reach as well as reduce the risk to human1962life. As I have said on a number of occasions, including in recent1963Congressional testimony, robots don't bleed.\1\1964---------------------------------------------------------------------------1965    \1\ AUVSI Testifies Before House Aviation Subcommittee on FAA1966Reauthorization Implementation with Emphasis on Drone & Advanced Air1967Mobility Regulations--AUVSI.1968---------------------------------------------------------------------------1969    But this hearing is not just about foreign battlefields. What1970happens abroad is actively shaping the threat landscape here in the1971United States. Unfortunately, to date, what is happening abroad has not1972yet meaningfully changed our policy landscape to mitigate these1973threats. Inexpensive, consumer, and commercial drones that are easily1974accessible and widely available are being modified to carry out1975surveillance, cyber disruption, espionage, and kinetic attacks against1976critical infrastructure. State-sponsored and criminal actors are1977increasingly looking to these platforms for asymmetric advantages1978because they are accessible, inexpensive, adaptable, and often1979undetectable by legacy air defenses. Drone warfare abroad has shown us1980what's possible, and just as significantly, what's vulnerable.1981    As the title of today's hearing suggests, the same systems1982transforming how we move goods, inspect infrastructure, and save lives1983through public safety operations are also reshaping the threat1984landscape. Drones are inherently dual-use. Their commercial potential1985is vast and offers tremendous promise, yet their accessibility and1986adaptability also make them attractive tools for malicious actors. It1987is imperative that Federal policy both leverages the benefits of these1988technologies and mitigates the emerging risks. Innovation and security1989must advance in lockstep.1990    U.S. airports, maritime facilities, power plants, prisons,1991amusement parks, sports stadiums, and even Statehouses have1992increasingly seen incursions by unauthorized drones. While most are not1993overt attacks, they are proof points of how porous our defenses remain.1994Unfortunately, despite the many responsible drone users and operators1995around our country, especially those operating under Federal Aviation1996Administration (FAA) rules including Part 107 and Part 135, there are1997rogue actors looking to utilize these critical life-saving tools for1998nefarious purposes.1999    Yet our domestic policy and regulatory framework has not kept pace2000with the threat. There is no singular Federal authority to counter2001uncrewed threats, no consistent framework for what technologies can be2002deployed or by whom, and no mandated reporting of drone incidents that2003could inform a national picture of risk. Congress has not updated our2004Nation's UAS detection and mitigation authorities since 2018.\2\2005Meanwhile, the air space has evolved tremendously, the threat landscape2006has changed dramatically, and the number of drones operating in the2007United States has expanded exponentially.2008---------------------------------------------------------------------------2009    \2\ https://www.auvsi.org/progress-on-domestic-uas-detection-2010mitigation-is-required-for-public-trust-enabling-drone-regulations/.2011---------------------------------------------------------------------------2012    The lack of Federal action and investment has left a dangerous gap2013in our ability to respond to reckless or nefarious drone activity.2014Today, only 4 Federal agencies, the Department of Defense (DoD),2015Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Energy (DOE), and2016Department of Justice (DOJ), are authorized to detect and mitigate UAS2017threats, and their authorities are very limited. State and local law2018enforcement, airport and prison operators, and other critical2019infrastructure entities are left watching and waiting while2020unauthorized drones fly overhead.2021    Today, only a limited number of top-tier events are able to get2022Federal support and equipment painting a clear picture of the air2023space. If something catastrophic happens--a drone collision with a2024passenger aircraft, an attack on a packed stadium, or an intrusion into2025a sensitive Government facility--finger-pointing will be inevitable.2026Congress, the White House, FAA, DHS, industry, and local authorities2027will all scramble to assign blame. But pointing fingers won't prevent a2028crisis, acting now will.2029    AUVSI applauds the Trump administration's recent Executive Orders,2030Restoring American Airspace Sovereignty\3\ and Unleashing American2031Drone Dominance,\4\ that addressed some counter-UAS (c-UAS) related2032issues and showcased the importance this administration places on drone2033issues, but Congressional action is still necessary to expand c-UAS2034authorities.2035---------------------------------------------------------------------------2036    \3\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/06/2037restoring-american-airspace-sovereignty/.2038    \4\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/06/2039unleashing-american-drone-dominance/.2040---------------------------------------------------------------------------2041    The threats we're examining today demand a serious and coordinated2042response, one that strengthens our ability to defend against malicious2043use of drones while also preserving the critical benefits these2044technologies bring. Every day, drones support law enforcement,2045firefighters, energy providers, and emergency response teams in2046protecting lives and infrastructure. As we enhance our national2047security posture, it's essential that we also sustain the innovation2048and trusted uses that serve our communities. Striking that balance is2049not only possible, but also essential to both our security and our2050continued progress.2051 the dual-use nature of drones: a strategic asset and a tactical threat2052    Events unfolding around the world are not just instructive, they2053are sounding an alarm we cannot afford to ignore.2054    In Ukraine, the defense ministry's Operation Spiderweb \5\ clearly2055showcased how swarms of small drones can be used to saturate enemy air2056space, overwhelm air defense systems, and execute lethal strikes. These2057low-cost, high-impact platforms are changing the dynamics of warfare,2058not with brute force, but with agility, coordination, and volume. In2059the Middle East, Israel has leveraged drones to preemptively disrupt2060Iranian air defense networks, enhancing the safety and effectiveness of2061manned and unmanned aerial operations.2062---------------------------------------------------------------------------2063    \5\ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Spiderweb.2064---------------------------------------------------------------------------2065    These examples demonstrate a common truth: even small,2066commercially-available drones, when used in a strategic and coordinated2067manner, can pose serious threats to fixed infrastructure. Ports,2068bridges, shipping terminals, and maritime chokepoints are all2069vulnerable to surveillance, sabotage, or disruption by hostile UAS2070activity. These vulnerabilities do not only exist in active war zones.2071They exist today, here at home, across the transportation and maritime2072sectors that support our national economy and security.2073    In short, the tactics we are witnessing in modern conflict zones2074are not constrained by geography. The barriers to entry are low, the2075technology is widely available, and the intent of our adversaries is2076clear. We must assume that the threat is already here, and we must act2077accordingly to protect the systems and infrastructure that keep this2078country not only moving, but safe.2079   drones in transportation and maritime security: a critical force2080                               multiplier2081    Those very same drone systems that can be misused are also being2082used daily to protect American lives, infrastructure, and supply2083chains. Across the United States, transportation and maritime2084authorities are leveraging drones as essential tools for homeland2085security operations, providing perimeter monitoring, real-time subject2086tracking, and as part of Drone as First Responder (DFR) public safety2087programs. These applications allow rapid situational awareness and2088response to developing threats or incidents.2089    When used by trusted operators, with secure platforms, drones offer2090unmatched speed, agility, and visibility. They enable rapid situational2091awareness, improve officer safety, and shorten response times during2092high-risk incidents from port intrusions to natural disasters.2093    In infrastructure management, drones enable safe and cost-effective2094inspections of bridges, railways, pipelines, ports, runways, and more,2095tasks that would otherwise require human workers to operate in high-2096risk, unsafe environments. They provide real-time imaging and data that2097supports predictive maintenance and operational readiness. A2098particularly powerful example of the utility of drones came in the2099aftermath of the Francis Scott Key Bridge collapse in Baltimore,2100Maryland. Drones were immediately deployed by local and Federal2101authorities to assist with damage assessment, guide search and rescue2102teams, and coordinate the emergency response. These operations2103illustrated the agility, speed, and value of drone systems in2104supporting critical transportation and maritime missions.2105    This is the dual-use reality we face. While malicious actors may2106seek to weaponize this technology, the overwhelming majority of use2107cases, particularly in public safety and critical infrastructure, are2108enhancing our ability to respond to threats and protect American lives.2109As policy makers, it is vital to distinguish between threats and2110trusted uses, and to ensure that our response to one does not hinder2111our ability to leverage the other.2112     national security risks from people's republic of china (prc)-2113                          manufactured drones2114    While drones are proving to be essential tools for homeland defense2115and emergency response, not all systems are created equal, and some2116represent an active and growing risk. Drones manufactured by companies2117with ties to the PRC continue to be widely used by public safety and2118other agencies, even in sensitive infrastructure environments. In some2119cases, Federal agencies are still using these platforms. This is2120largely due to the absence of consistent Federal procurement2121restrictions or guidance and minimal oversight of mandates already2122enacted into law as part of the American Security Drone Act and other2123legislation.2124    The national security implications are stark and well-documented.2125Numerous assessments by DoD, DHS, and other Federal intelligence2126agencies have documented how PRC-made drones present unacceptable2127risks, including unauthorized data collection and transmission to the2128PRC.2129    AUVSI has been the tip of the spear in urging the swift2130implementation of Section 1709 of the Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense2131Authorization Act (NDAA), which would add the communications equipment2132and services of PRC drone manufacturers DJI and Autel Robotics (and any2133of their subsidiaries, affiliates, partners, joint venture entities, or2134entities with a technology sharing or licensing agreement with a named2135entity) to the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) Covered List.2136This will occur after a relevant national security agency makes a2137determination on their unacceptable risk to national security, or, on213823 December 2025 as directed by Congress if action is not taken2139sooner.\6\2140---------------------------------------------------------------------------2141    \6\ Whitepaper: AUVSI Partnership for Drone Competitiveness.2142---------------------------------------------------------------------------2143    Despite these legitimate and documented concerns, many agencies2144continue to procure and operate PRC platforms due to a lack of2145consistent Federal policy, market incentives, and clear alternatives.2146Allowing adversary-linked systems to operate in the heart of our2147national infrastructure networks is a liability we cannot afford. To2148defend against emerging threats, we must ensure that the platforms used2149to secure our infrastructure are not themselves potential vectors for2150surveillance, sabotage, cyber intrusion, or supply chain warfare.2151    This is not about cutting off access to drones, it is about2152ensuring that the platforms used to secure the homeland are not2153themselves Trojan horses. Allowing systems tied to adversarial2154governments to operate within our most critical infrastructure networks2155is a legitimate threat that we can address through common-sense action.2156    We cannot effectively defend against surveillance or sabotage if we2157continue to operate systems that may be compromised from within.2158Building a trusted, resilient domestic drone ecosystem is not just a2159competitive advantage, it's a national security necessity here in the2160United States. Congress must act to accelerate the transition to2161trusted U.S. and allied systems, by setting clear procurement2162standards, supporting domestic manufacturing, and incentivizing the2163adoption of secure platforms.\7\2164---------------------------------------------------------------------------2165    \7\ AUVSI_Rethinking Acquisition to Unleash American Leadership in2166Uncrewed Systems.2167---------------------------------------------------------------------------2168    advancing security solutions and maritime-specific applications2169    Several mature, scalable solutions are already available and in2170use. Technologies such as Remote Identification (Remote ID), drone2171detection and tracking systems, and defensive mitigation tools, both2172kinetic and non-kinetic, have advanced significantly in recent years2173alone. These tools allow security personnel to identify, assess, and,2174when authorized, neutralize malicious drone activity.2175    While much of the public conversation has focused on protecting2176airports, stadiums, and Federal buildings, our maritime and2177transportation infrastructure remains significantly under protected.\8\2178Shipyards, ports, offshore energy platforms, rail crossings, and inland2179waterways are just as vulnerable to surveillance, sabotage, and2180disruption; and in many cases, even more difficult to secure due to2181their geographic scale and open access.2182---------------------------------------------------------------------------2183    \8\ AUVSI Testifies at Congressional Hearing on the State of2184America's Maritime Infrastructure.2185---------------------------------------------------------------------------2186    Adaptation of these technologies for maritime domains, including2187ports, shipyards, and offshore energy infrastructure, is both necessary2188and feasible. These critical nodes in our logistics and energy networks2189deserve the same layered protections that are being discussed for2190airports, stadiums, and Government facilities.2191    Importantly, these efforts must be guided by clear Federal2192frameworks that balance security with privacy, protect authorized drone2193operations, and enable public-private coordination. AUVSI urges2194Congress to support the deployment of scalable c-UAS solutions,2195particularly in cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), Customs2196and Border Protection (CBP), and the Department of Transportation2197(DOT). These agencies must be empowered and resourced to defend our2198maritime and other infrastructure effectively.2199   the need for expanded c-uas authorities and thoughtful regulation2200    Today, the Federal Government's ability to detect and mitigate2201rogue drones remains limited to a small number of agencies under narrow2202statutory authorities. This patchwork is unsustainable in the face of a2203growing and evolving threat.2204    I had the privilege of co-chairing the FAA's Section 383 UAS2205Detection and Mitigation Systems Aviation Rulemaking Committee, which2206brought together industry, Government, and civil society to assess the2207legal and operational challenges of c-UAS deployments. One resounding2208conclusion: More entities need clearly-defined, narrowly-tailored2209authorities to engage in drone detection and mitigation activities,2210especially those protecting high-risk infrastructure.2211    We urge Congress to act on the committee's recommendations, create2212a legal framework for authorized detection and mitigation operations,2213and ensure interagency coordination, privacy protections, and operator2214transparency.\9\2215---------------------------------------------------------------------------2216    \9\ UAS Detection and Mitigation Systems Aviation Rulemaking2217Committee Final Report. January 9, 2024.2218---------------------------------------------------------------------------2219    Congress should pass the bipartisan Disabling Enemy Flight Entry2220and Neutralizing Suspect Equipment (DEFENSE) Act which aims to protect2221outdoor sporting events from unauthorized drones and enhances security2222at major outdoor gatherings and sporting events by ensuring that State2223and local law enforcement have the authority and tools necessary to2224protect these events from aerial threats in real time, rather than2225waiting for Federal intervention. The bill would give State and local2226law enforcement the authority to mitigate threats posed by drones in2227places where a temporary flight restriction is in place. This includes2228large outdoor and sporting events. It would also require DOJ, FAA, FCC,2229and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration2230(NTIA) to create a list of approved technology that local and State law2231enforcement officers can use to address these threats.2232    Additionally, it is imperative that Congress consider broad c-UAS2233legislation this Congress. Whether it is a refreshed version of the2234Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act from2235the 118th Congress,\10\ which this committee worked diligently on, or a2236something akin to the Safeguarding the Homeland from the Threats Posed2237by Unmanned Aircraft Systems Act,\11\ our country and threat landscape2238needs 3 critical things--modernization, protection, and progress.2239---------------------------------------------------------------------------2240    \10\ https://www.Congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/8610/2241text/.2242    \11\ https://www.Congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/4333/2243text/.2244---------------------------------------------------------------------------2245                     conclusion and recommendations2246    Drone technology is transforming the landscape of transportation2247and maritime security, creating both unprecedented capabilities and new2248avenues of risk. As we've seen on the global stage, drones can be tools2249of war, espionage, and disruption. But they are also indispensable2250assets in defending the homeland, securing our infrastructure, and2251responding to emergencies with speed and precision.2252    As the threats are evolving rapidly, so must our policies,2253capabilities, and posture. The time for Federal leadership is now.2254    To meet this call to action, AUVSI recommends that Congress take2255the following actions:2256    1. Expand c-UAS authorities to additional Federal agencies and2257        delegate detection authorities to State, local, Tribal, and2258        territorial (SLTT) agencies operating at critical sites, with2259        appropriate and robust Federal training and oversight, and2260        delegate mitigation authorities in more limited instances,2261        again with significant Federal training and oversight.2262    2. Enact legislation restricting PRC-manufactured drones from use2263        in critical infrastructure environments, inclusive of a2264        suitable transition period, and a funding stream that provides2265        support for operators to transition their fleets away from2266        unsecure PRC platforms to secure domestic or allied2267        alternatives.\12\2268---------------------------------------------------------------------------2269    \12\ Whitepaper: AUVSI Partnership for Drone Competitiveness.2270---------------------------------------------------------------------------2271    3. Support domestic drone production and adoption of secure,2272        trusted systems through advanced market commitments, grant2273        programs, tax incentives, loan guarantees, and other Federal2274        mechanisms.2275    4. Invest in detection, Remote ID, and mitigation technologies,2276        including maritime applications.2277    5. Promote interagency coordination through unified national2278        strategies and continued stakeholder engagement.2279    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today, as well as2280the committee's leadership and focus on these urgent issues. AUVSI and2281its members stand ready to support this committee and the broader2282Congress in advancing smart, secure, and future-ready drone policies2283that defend our homeland while enabling innovation and trusted use.2284    I look forward to your questions.22852286    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Robbins.2287    Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their22885 minutes of questioning. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes2289of questioning.2290    A lot of the testimony I think hits the point that we can2291either be reactive when it happens or we can actually be2292proactive now and start to address this issue.2293    Some 25 years ago, some manned aircraft systems were used2294to perpetrate the largest terrorist attack in American history.2295    My fear is that in the not-too-distant future unmanned2296systems will perpetrate the largest terrorist attack in2297American history using drones, obviously.2298    This is not something that's new to me. In 2017, I traveled2299to Israel when I was mayor of Miami-Dade County. We operate2300Miami International Airport. I went there with the explicit2301purpose of finding out from the Israelis what they did to2302protect their airports from drones, AI drones. I know we can2303protect ourselves from piloted drones, but AI drones.2304    Their solution at the time was eagles. I just don't think2305we just have enough eagles to go around to do that.2306    So we haven't done much since then. Drone technology has2307just gotten worse--I mean, gotten more and more advanced--and I2308think the threat is expanding.2309    We talk a lot about authorities, and so let me put an2310assumption to you.2311    If a drone, an AI drone, were to interfere or incur into an2312airport, say, the airport space, would that airport have the2313authority to deal with it in a kinetic fashion, in a way to2314knock it down in whatever way?2315    If you can't do it through signal interruption, is there2316any way that that airport, does it have the authority to bring2317it down, even though they may know it poses an unbelievable2318risk to their passengers?2319    Mr. Robbins. No, sir.2320    Mr. Gimenez. We do not have that authority?2321    Mr. Robbins. No, sir.2322    Mr. Gimenez. OK.2323    Does anybody have that authority?2324    Mr. Robbins. In a very limited fashion, the Department of2325Defense, the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland2326Security, and the Department of Energy have the authority to2327mitigate a rogue drone.2328    It's not a standing authority. They can't just be doing2329that all of the time. The way Congress has restricted the2330authority at the moment, it has to go through a very specific2331approval process and requires a very high-level signature,2332usually at like the deputy secretary level or higher.2333    Mr. Gimenez. Let me put an example to you. What happened in2334Ukraine, what the Ukrainians did to the Russians, it should be2335a wake-up call to us and a call to action, because had that2336happened here in the United States, let's say a coordinated2337attack on major airports, yes, there would be loss of life,2338there would be injury, there would be a lot of damage.2339    But there's something else that we're not thinking about.2340It's the economic damage that it does. In Miami-Dade County2341alone, Miami International Airport is the single largest2342economic generator of that county, 40,000 people directly2343employed by that airport, 300,000 people indirectly employed by2344that airport.2345    If you had that kind of attack in the United States and,2346say, across the world, you could ground air transportation to a2347halt--to a halt--and that would cause irreparable economic2348damage.2349    So I'm committed and hopefully my colleagues on the other2350side of the aisle should be committed to confronting this head-2351on. We need to do this now. Because, like you said, also I live2352in Miami and we have things called hurricanes. Hurricanes2353aren't a question of if. It's a question of when. I consider2354this threat by drones not to be a question of if. It's a2355question of when.2356    The question is, then, are we going to be proactive against2357it and try to mitigate that or are we going to say, ``Oh my2358God,'' and then do all kinds of stuff after the fact.2359    So what kind of legislation do we need in order to break2360through the barriers and actually give our State, local, and2361Federal agencies the power that they need, the authorities that2362they need in order to protect the American public?2363    Who would be best to answer that?2364    Mr. Walker.2365    Mr. Walker. Thank you, Chairman.2366    I think I would challenge the presumption that the2367immediate need is to be able to develop a reactionary device or2368a reactionary element to the strategy. I think a more important2369component is that right now we don't have awareness of the air2370space.2371    So we don't necessarily know whether the drone that's in--2372recently, as you know, in Miami a drone was spotted at 4,0002373feet above the Miami airport.2374    The question was: What was that drone? Who was flying that2375drone? What was their mission?2376    So we can't automatically make the assumption that just2377because a drone is operating within 3 miles or 5 miles of an2378airport that it is necessarily hostile. So we need to start2379with understanding what is in the air space.2380    Right now we have no integrated air space management2381solution that tells us who's operating, what platform they're2382operating, and what are their intents. Therefore, we also have2383no way to be able to authorize those flights and deauthorize2384those flights to be able to separate potentially hostile from2385nonhostile or friend from foe.2386    So we have to start with: How do we identify what's in the2387air space? Is it a threat? Then from that point determine what2388we're going to authorize legislatively as the appropriate2389response to those threats. I think we have to start there2390first.2391    Mr. Gimenez. I will disagree on one point. I think we have2392to do all of the above at the same time. We have to find out2393what's out there, but also if it becomes--if we know it's2394hostile, we need to take action against it.2395    So my time is up, and I recognize the Ranking Member.2396    Mrs. McIver. Thank you so much.2397    Thank you all for your testimonies today.2398    Mr. Robbins, am I saying that right? Robbins?2399    Mr. Robbins. Yes, ma'am.2400    Mrs. McIver. OK. Robbins. I want to make sure I get it2401right.2402    Mr. Robbins. Thank you, ma'am.2403    Mrs. McIver. Thank you for joining us today again.2404    As you are well aware, expanding counter-drone authorities2405to additional government agencies and potentially State and2406local law enforcement is a complicated task. Agencies must2407ensure careful coordination to avoid unintended consequences2408that counter-drone systems can have on air space safety,2409especially in urban environments and near airports.2410    In March, the Secret Service allegedly operated a counter-2411drone system without appropriate coordination with interagency2412partners, including the FAA. The system reportedly operated2413outside of the approved frequencies, resulting in automated2414alerts to the pilots of several aircraft flying around DCA2415airport, which could have had an adverse impact to flight2416safety.2417    With that being said, what can be learned from this2418incident?2419    Mr. Robbins. Great question, ma'am. Thank you so much.2420    First and foremost, I think it's important that there is a2421hot wash from that incident and that the lessons are understood2422and distributed to all currently Federally-authorized users to2423learn lessons from what occurred in that incident so it doesn't2424happen again elsewhere in the Nation.2425    But I think one of the elements that we can also take is2426training and delegating authority to State, local, Tribal,2427territorial law enforcement is not entirely new to the Federal2428Government.2429    There are programs that exist now that include explosive2430ordnance disposal and SWAT team training that are typically2431held at the Federal level and then delegated down to the State2432level through training programs, as well as with Federal grants2433as well.2434    There's training facilities at Quantico, in Huntsville,2435Alabama, and other places around the country where State and2436local law enforcement go and they learn from our Nation's very2437best operators, and then they are deputized to go out and do2438these kind of more difficult missions.2439    Not necessarily every public safety official, therefore,2440should be a counter-UAS operator, but some should be and go2441through very rigorous training.2442    Then it is incumbent upon Congress, in my view, to then2443provide oversight of that program and how is it going. In the2444same way that you're providing oversight on the Secret Service2445incident, providing oversight on the future authorities that2446are delegated down.2447    Thank you, ma'am.2448    Mrs. McIver. Thank you so much for that. That was my Part 22449question about what can Congress do. But thank you so much for2450that, because I am always preaching about oversight, which is2451extremely important.2452    Mr. Feddersen, I understand you have experience working2453within the Executive branch, including at the National Security2454Council. What can we as legislators do to help ensure2455appropriate interagency coordination within the Executive2456branch?2457    Mr. Feddersen. I think the actual interagency coordination2458is on-going and moving well. Obviously, there was a missed2459connection with the last incident that you mentioned.2460    However, I'd like it to be known that out of the 5-year2461pilot program for Federal law enforcement, now 7 years into the2462program, that was the first and only publicly-broadcast issue2463that they've had.2464    I know there is a concern with, again, moving that to2465private security or moving it to State and local law2466enforcement, but out of 7 years, 1 incident, and it was2467deconflicted following the incident.2468    They have interagency processes in place to go ahead and2469deal with an investigation, to follow up and correct those2470issues.2471    So beyond that, I think it's just transparency between--I2472know some departments and agencies are a little slow to respond2473to Congressional requests for reports, but I think that is,2474again, just transparency, communication, and coordination.2475    I know that the interagency is talking about this issue. I2476know the interagency wishes that we'd have the expansion2477authorities. DHS, DOJ, and the FAA have all commented on2478expansion authorities.2479    I think, to wrap up that question, I think it's important2480to understand that there is no reason today why detection2481authorities and mitigation authorities cannot be expanded so2482long as the individuals are properly trained.2483    Mrs. McIver. Thank you. Thank you so much for that.2484    I'm short on time for my next question about drones flying2485over New Jersey. For some reason, they seem to love New Jersey.2486    But with that, I'll yield back, Chairman. Thank you.2487    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Ranking Member.2488    I'll recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane.2489    Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.2490    Thank you guys for showing up today.2491    Obviously, this is a very serious topic. I don't think that2492most Americans have the slightest idea how warfare is evolving,2493especially over in the Middle East and Europe right now when it2494comes to drones, and that greatly concerns me as somebody who2495sits on the Homeland Security Committee.2496    A couple weeks ago up here in the District of Columbia we2497were down in the SCIF getting a secret briefing from several of2498the agencies on our drone capabilities pertaining to many of2499these major events that are coming up in the United States,2500like the World Cup, the Olympics, et cetera.2501    One of the recommendations that I made was that we do2502everything in our power to make sure that these events take2503place in domes, with roofs over the top, for obvious reasons. I2504think that would cut down a lot and seriously mitigate attacks2505from drones and the effectiveness that they could have in2506either dropping chemicals, dropping explosives, et cetera.2507    One of the gentlemen in there said he would put that in his2508report, but he said he couldn't guarantee that it wouldn't be2509stripped out of the report.2510    I did some research and there are 10 NFL stadiums within2511the United States that have domes. I'll read those for you now.2512We got the State Farm Stadium in Arizona; Mercedes-Benz Stadium2513in Atlanta; AT&T Stadium, Dallas Cowboys; Ford Field, Detroit2514Lions; NRG Stadium, Houston, Texas; Lucas Oil Stadium,2515Indianapolis Colts; Allegiant Stadium, Las Vegas Raiders; SoFi2516Stadium, Los Angeles; U.S. Bank Stadium, Minnesota Vikings;2517Caesars Superdome in New Orleans.2518    Have any of you guys made any recommendations to the2519interagency or any of the other groups that are responsible for2520hosting these events about making sure that they do everything2521in their power to hold these events in domes?2522    Go ahead, Mr. Hutton.2523    Mr. Hutton. Thank you, Congressman.2524    I would be happy to follow up in a Classified session to2525talk about some of the things that my company and others have2526done to support Federal law enforcement agencies at high-2527profile events. We have not made that specific recommendation,2528though it makes a lot of sense.2529    Mr. Crane. Why not?2530    Mr. Hutton. That's been outside of our remit. It makes a2531lot of sense. It's entirely possible that at the action officer2532tactical level that that recommendation has been made, but as a2533company we have not. It has not come across our path. However--2534--2535    Mr. Crane. Thank you for that.2536    Let me ask you a follow-up, Mr. Hutton. I know you can't2537give me a specific here. But what percentage do you think that2538that would cut down the threat if we were to host the Olympics2539and these World Cup games in domes when it comes to drone2540warfare?2541    Mr. Hutton. I think that would take a significant risk off2542the table.2543    Mr. Crane. OK. Would you commit to pass that along and help2544me amplify that message to FIFA and everybody involved in2545homeland security and protecting Americans?2546    Because I also looked up the average stadium size for the2547World Cup coming up, and it's between 64,000 to 105,0002548Americans.2549    If we don't think for a second that terrorists and other2550State actors who would be willing to commit an attack on U.S.2551soil doesn't see that as a fat, juicy, vulnerable target, we're2552out of our minds.2553    Would you commit to helping me amplify that, Mr. Hutton?2554    Mr. Hutton. I'd be happy to.2555    Mr. Crane. What about the rest of you guys?2556    Mr. Robbins. Yes, sir.2557    Mr. Feddersen. Yes.2558    Mr. Crane. OK.2559    Thank you. I yield back.2560    Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman yields back.2561    I now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Kennedy.2562    Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Chairman. I want to thank you and2563Ranking Member McIver for holding this important hearing today.2564    Up in New York, we have had many conversations about the2565impact on drones, both positive for the communities across our2566State as well as the potential threats that are coming with the2567drones, in many ways incursions into air space. We know last2568year the worry, the concern, and the fright that it caused up2569in the Northeast, whether it be New York, New Jersey.2570    I'd like to know, especially being along the Canadian2571border, my district, the 26 New York, Buffalo Niagara region, I2572have 4 bridges into Canada in my district. We are also aware2573that many of these foreign nationalists have used drones--when2574I say negative--to smuggle narcotics across the border. It is2575part of their network.2576    How do we balance as a Government the positive influence of2577drones in our lives and the technology that society can benefit2578from to the real negatives that oversaturation of drones is2579bringing into our society?2580    Mr. Walker. I appreciate that question, and I think it goes2581back to what we were discussing earlier. I appreciate the2582Congressman's question about potentially moving everybody2583indoors for safety and protecting against that capability.2584    But one of the things that you pointed out is very--is2585probably the most critical point here, and that is we have both2586good and bad actors in the air. Right now we can't identify2587which is which.2588    Whether they're flying over a bridge for appropriate2589purposes, not flying, flying across the border for appropriate2590purposes, not flying, we have to start there. We have to start2591by having an awareness and seeing our air space.2592    The NFL, for example, has reported a 4,000-percent2593increase. I know you pointed out that there's 10 stadiums.2594Ironically enough, there's 22 others and they have mostly2595better teams, which I don't know if that has anything to do2596with being indoors or outdoors.2597    So we have to be able to identify what's operating in that2598air space, be able to control and protect and restrict those2599operators from flying in those areas that we don't want, and2600then and only then should we be able to effectively initiate2601whether it's electronic or kinetic countermeasures.2602    I think that's where we have to start, and I think that2603fixes the problem. It also establishes public trust.2604    Back to the Ranking Member's question about what happened2605in New Jersey. The bigger issue there, I think we all know, it2606turns out what was there was, if were it drones, was2607authorized, but we didn't know that at the time and we probably2608should have known that at the time.2609    So I want to just continue to reemphasize that we need to2610understand what's happening, we need an integrated air space2611management, we need to be able to be comfortable, you as2612regulators, policy makers, our Americans as the general public,2613and first responders and law enforcement.2614    Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Walker.2615    Thank you all for being here and your testimony.2616    But, Mr. Walker, thank you for taking that question head-2617on.2618    As a leader in the industry, what are your thoughts on it?2619How does the industry suggest that we regulate your own2620industry to make it safer and to prevent these bad actors from2621doing harm to our communities?2622    Mr. Walker. Well, the industry is working I think2623aggressively to both grow the industry and create systems,2624technologies, and our own individual policies at the operator2625level that protect the general public.2626    But we're operating in silos. We're fragmented and we're2627awaiting a set of standards that we can mutually agree upon2628that both grant policies for how we operate and then regulatory2629authorities for how we leverage the systems that we've created.2630    I think it's important--and I think Mr. Robbins said it2631earlier, I think everybody up here that's witnessing now--the2632technologies exist. This is not a technology problem. We keep2633talking about it as though, how do we solve this problem?2634    We solve this problem by getting a Congressional mandate,2635getting funding, and allow for innovative development programs2636to start testing these solutions. They've been around.2637    So how do we do it? The industry is ready to come together.2638I know we are. I know everyone else in our industry is. We just2639need direction, we need authority, and we need funding.2640    Mr. Feddersen. If I can add to that, sir.2641    The issue is, like we said, is the technology is there and2642there is safe technology. The FAA has been testing and2643evaluating counter-UAS technology since 2019. Every one of our2644vendors, every one of the industry members have to go through2645several levels of test and evaluation at every agency, every2646department, and every component. It's a burden on the industry2647to have to do that because the Government can't share that2648information.2649    But, regardless, there are safe technologies out there that2650can detect, track, identify, and monitor air space and give us2651air domain awareness, and it can be layered.2652    Mr. Kennedy. Thank you. I yield back.2653    Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman yields.2654    I now recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter.2655    Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.2656    Thank you all for being here today.2657    In today's world, technology is rapidly advancing, and with2658that progress comes new challenges for us in Congress, the2659Federal agencies, and first responders at home.2660    Unmanned aircraft systems have become more prevalent in our2661daily lives. We must ensure that the safety and security of2662Americans are protected.2663    This is particularly true for my district, which covers the2664greater New Orleans area, home to the Superdome. I thank Mr.2665Crane for highlighting that we're a great place to have events.2666Safe, secure. We recently hosted the Super Bowl without2667incident, I might add. We have Final Four, Sugar Bowls,2668countless conventions and festivals.2669    As I look forward and continue to work on this committee on2670bipartisan legislation that empowers Federal agencies and local2671governments to counter the threats drones pose, and as my dear2672friend Mr. Kennedy just said, we know that there are great2673applications, we also know that there are nefarious2674applications. So we must continue to work to endeavor to2675amplify those positive ones and discourage the negative ones.2676    Mr. Robbins, my district and the Gulf Coast will soon be in2677the most active period of hurricane season. How do unauthorized2678and unidentified drones interfere with disaster response2679activities, such as search-and-rescue missions, using2680helicopters and drones, and what are the potential consequences2681for survivor recovery and response safety given the new2682application?2683    Mr. Robbins. Thank you for that question, Mr. Carter, and2684it's a serious problem. Ranking Member McIver mentioned it in2685her opening statement as well, as did Mr. Walker.2686    The incident that occurred just a couple weeks ago down in2687Texas in a similar situation during search-and-rescue disaster2688response, an unauthorized rogue drone collided with a2689helicopter. We had a similar incident in California last year2690when a scooper airplane was doing water distribution on a2691forest fire also was struck by a drone.2692    When that happens, it hurts public trust, it endangers2693lives, and it damages the reputation of responsible drone users2694across the country. We have to do better.2695    When there is an incident response, like a hurricane or a2696wildfire or a flood, there is a temporary flight restriction2697put in place. There is technology available that should be able2698to restrict the flight from occurring if the operator is2699responsible and looking at technology that the FAA makes2700available to individuals who are operating these flights.2701    I also think it's important to distinguish between2702responsible commercial operators and those that are flying2703commercial off-the-shelf drones that maybe they bought on2704Walmart or----2705    Mr. Carter. Are these Walmart-type commercial drones that2706are purchased capable of being retrofit to do harm?2707    Mr. Robbins. They absolutely are, sir. The No. 1 seller of2708those drones in this country is a Chinese company called DJI,2709which used to restrict their drones from flying in spaces like2710where there was a TFR in place or over an airport.2711    Last December DJI removed the geofencing on their drones,2712giving the operators--these are not typically commercial2713operators. Sometimes they are, but oftentimes they're just2714random people who buy a drone and sometimes do stupid things2715with them. They've removed the geofencing, so now they can go2716into a zone, like the helicopter incident in Texas, that used2717to not be able until DJI changed their own rules.2718    Mr. Carter. How can UAS intervention mitigate the dangers2719of drones, particularly with the Port of New Orleans or major2720sporting events, as I mentioned? We know these drones at large-2721scale public events, free parties, Mardis Gras. I mean, I'm2722deathly afraid of what could happen. How do we detect and2723mitigate the dangers of that?2724    Mr. Robbins. Yes. As mentioned, it is not a technology2725problem anymore. All 3 of these companies as well as many other2726AUVSI member companies have technologies that provide a very2727complex, intimate portrait of the air space to be able to2728distinguish between authorized drones and unauthorized rogue2729drones, and then as necessary be able to take action, whether2730it's a kinetic or nonkinetic action, against a drone to remove2731it from the unauthorized air space.2732    Mr. Carter. Real quickly, because I have about 29 seconds.2733What can local and State government do to augment what we're2734doing at the Federal level and what you're doing? We have local2735players, our State police, our State sheriffs--local sheriffs--2736--2737    Mr. Robbins. Presently not much. You can maybe find the2738operator and ask him politely land the drone. But until2739Congress extends and expands detection and mitigation2740authorities and allows for delegation to State and local law2741enforcement, unfortunately, those individuals, those great2742public servants are left without many tools right now, and2743that's unfair to them and it's unsafe to Americans.2744    Mr. Carter. My time is expired, but I'd love to dig deeper2745into this, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Another time.2746    Thank you all.2747    Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman yields.2748    I now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Garbarino.2749    Mr. Garbarino. Thank you, Chairman. Perfect timing. Thanks2750for holding this great hearing today.2751    As the Chair of the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and2752Infrastructure Protection, I'm especially concerned about the2753potential for foreign-manufactured drones to be exploited by2754adversaries to carry out cyber and physical attacks against2755critical systems.2756    Many U.S. law enforcement and municipal agencies continue2757to use DJI drones despite security warnings from the Department2758of Homeland Security and CISA.2759    Mr. Walker and Mr. Feddersen, from your perspectives, what2760are the cyber risks posed by these platforms? Do you believe2761agencies understand the surveillance or data exfiltration2762vulnerabilities they may be exposing themselves to?2763    Mr. Feddersen, if you want.2764    Mr. Feddersen. Yes. So I appreciate the question, sir.2765    The cyber effect obviously we've seen in different formats2766and different forms capable of carrying a virus and injecting2767it into the internet of things and different places. We've seen2768this happen. We know it's happened several times. Anything that2769can connect to WiFi, Bluetooth, or anything, that connect even2770on the LTE bands, can inject some type of virus or some type of2771cybersecurity vulnerability into the system.2772    This is something that I know the interagency is aware of.2773They're trying to address it. But when it comes from all the2774different threat vectors out there, a cyber attack from a drone2775tends to fall low on the list.2776    It's not that it shouldn't be up on the list or it2777shouldn't be considered, it's just a priority-based aspect of2778things. But we know the potential's there. We know it's been2779used in the past.2780    Mr. Garbarino. Mr. Walker.2781    Mr. Walker. Thank you.2782    It's a really good question, and it's a very important2783matter. Essentially any time that we have interconnected2784devices, internet of things, on a broad scale like this, you2785have cybersecurity concerns.2786    One of the things that we proposed in our written statement2787was that we need to have a digital flight-authorization service2788that has cryptographic credentials for both the operators for2789the platform and for their intention, and that only when those27903 elements are fused together in an appropriate manner will we2791authorize that flight.2792    That is just one approach that we believe is appropriate to2793ensuring that we are strengthening our cybersecurity wall2794against potential vulnerabilities.2795    Mr. Garbarino. Mr. Feddersen, in your answer you said that2796the interagencies are aware, you believe they're aware, and2797they're trying to address it. Wouldn't addressing it just be2798stop using the drones? Or, I mean, is there another way to2799address it?2800    Mr. Feddersen. Honestly, the simplest way to do it is to2801use detection and mitigation capabilities that are out there2802today. I mean, the technologies and vendors that are out there2803can identify and stop a drone from moving into an area that may2804be sensitive or unprotected.2805    Again, when you talked about critical infrastructure,2806though, I think it's important for us to remember that critical2807infrastructure is protected by private security, not law2808enforcement.2809    So when we talk about data centers, we talk about the2810stadiums or anything else, or even power plants, even our2811nuclear plants are private security, not State and local law2812enforcement.2813    So the authorities that we talk about must be expanded to2814them as well if we're going to actually take care of our2815critical infrastructure.2816    Mr. Garbarino. I've had this discussion with the NFL and a2817whole bunch of other people, saying these authorities need to2818be expanded to local law enforcement when these issues arise.2819    Mr. Walker, did you want to add something else? You looked2820like you were about to.2821    Any others? Do you want to add anything? OK.2822    Mr. Feddersen, as we've seen, our adversaries have utilized2823unmanned aircraft system capabilities at various activities and2824conflicts around the world.2825    Based on your work in intelligence and cyber operations,2826how realistic is the threat of adversaries using unmanned2827aircraft systems or platforms to preconflict-shaping2828activities, such as mapping soft targets or collecting signal2829intelligence inside the United States?2830    Mr. Feddersen. It's already being used, sir. I mean, you2831just take a look at the borders. You take a look at the2832cartels. You talk to the cells that we know are inside the2833country. We know the agencies are actively pursuing them and2834going after them. But the threat is here today.2835    Mr. Garbarino. It's just not the border. But what else are2836they mapping out that we might not have--the public doesn't2837know about yet or it's not on the top of their radar?2838    Mr. Feddersen. It's pattern of life. So they watch agents.2839They watch officials, Government officials going to and from2840their house. They figure out patterns of that. They can do2841surveillance and figure out patterns at airports, other2842critical infrastructure aspects of things.2843    We know--and particularly prisons are being infiltrated2844every day with drones that are going back and forth. So, again,2845it's being able to figure out guard shifts, patterns, different2846things like that.2847    Mr. Walker. Yes. I would like to add to that, Congressman.2848    I mean, there's been 3,000 drone flights, unauthorized and2849unidentified drone flights over power plants and power2850installations in the last 24 months alone.2851    We don't know who flew it, why they were there, what their2852intention was, and what data they collected. So sometimes it is2853difficult to answer your question on specifically what we're2854doing because we don't know who they are.2855    Mr. Garbarino. I had another question, but I've run out of2856time. I yield back.2857    Thank you, Chairman.2858    Mr. Gimenez. I thank the gentleman from New York.2859    I now recognize the gentlewoman from South Carolina, Mrs.2860Biggs.2861    Mrs. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.2862    The FAA has reported over 1 million registered unmanned2863aircraft systems, more commonly known as drones, as of April28642025, with many more believed to be unregistered.2865    Unauthorized drone incursions are increasing in frequency,2866particularly in proximity to sensitive sites, such as military2867installations, nuclear power plants, which were just mentioned,2868and airports.2869    Between 2022 and 2024, North American Aerospace Defense2870Command and the Department of Defense documented more than 6002871unauthorized drone overflights of U.S. military facilities.2872    Public reporting has also noted concerning incidents near2873critical infrastructure, such as the appearance of low-altitude2874drones over nuclear facilities and near commercial airport2875perimeters in multiple States.2876    So I think all of you are perfectly capable of answering my2877question, so I'll just leave it open.2878    But my first question is, what are some of the direct2879impacts of unauthorized drone overflights at military2880facilities, airports, and maritime ports?2881    Specifically for airports and maritime ports, could you2882explain the potential cascading effects that such incidents2883could or may have regionally or even nationwide?2884    Mr. Robbins. I'm happy to take that question,2885Congresswoman, and thank you very much.2886    I think, first and foremost, obviously, there's with each2887incident the potential for there being some sort of a2888catastrophic event.2889    Thankfully, as mentioned, we haven't seen that in the2890United States as yet, but we have seen it overseas, as the2891topic of this overall hearing, of how drone warfare abroad is2892changing the situation at home.2893    But even without those catastrophic events, each time one2894of these incidents occurs it erodes public trust as well. It2895also damages the public perception around the positive utility2896of drones.2897    At AUVSI we represent companies that focus on the defense2898against drones. But we also represent dozens of drone operators2899that are doing lifesaving critical missions every day, whether2900it's for public safety or package delivery or other really2901important things for our economy and public safety. All of that2902could go away if there's a very terrible drone incident that2903occurs in the United States.2904    Again, as we've talked about today, this is no longer a2905technology problem. The technology is in place. These 32906companies, as well as others, all have the ability to offer the2907protection to all the different sites that you listed.2908    But Congress hasn't updated the rules since 2018.2909Obviously, the landscape and the threat environment have2910changed dramatically. It's incumbent upon you as lawmakers to2911give Federal officials more authorities and to be able to2912delegate those authorities with proper training and oversight2913to local and State police as well.2914    Mrs. Biggs. Thank you so much.2915    Mr. Feddersen. I think there's 2 things to add back on2916there. I think one of it is really kind-of a lexicon we've had2917for a while. We should get rid of careless and clueless. Just2918like a vehicle on the road and our highways, you either drive2919it legally or you drive it illegally. The enforcement aspect of2920that needs to be understood.2921    I think also when we say counter-drone or counter-UAS, I2922think sometimes that's a misnomer. Again, these systems provide2923air domain awareness. They are a safety tool. More than2924everything else, they provide safety to the general public, to2925any of the events that we have.2926    The security element is there in mitigation which is also2927necessary. It's making sure that you have the exact tools that2928you need to enforce what crimes are being committed and then2929take appropriate action through the judicial process.2930    Mrs. Biggs. Thank you so much for your insight.2931    Mr. Walker, I have a quick question for you.2932    From an industry perspective, what are the most effective2933tools available today to detect and neutralize these threats2934before they cause harm? Are private operators and owners of2935critical infrastructure equipped to use them?2936    Mr. Walker. That's a very good question.2937    So first you have to understand that there are a variety of2938technologies out there, from RF detection, acoustic, we could2939go down the list of the various different ways to detect these2940devices. Everybody's technology is--everybody's system is an2941amalgamation of a very specific group of technologies.2942    But, no, not everybody has the availability of that. I've2943spoken with multiple law enforcement agencies who don't even2944know these technologies exist, much less have access to them.2945    So I think back to what everybody here has been saying.2946First off, do we need to give--and I really appreciate him2947pointing out that I think there's a fear about delegating2948counter-UAS authority down to certain agencies because2949everybody just assumes that that means we're going to be2950shooting down drones or taking down drones and that's not2951necessarily the case. It is the identification of whether or2952not these are hostile or not hostile.2953    There's, again, we've said it enough, but I'm going to say2954it one more time, it's not a technology problem. They exist.2955    Do the appropriate law enforcement agencies at all various2956different levels have access to these technologies? They don't.2957They don't have access to the training for them either.2958    So there's a lot Congress can do to help make this2959situation a lot better and fast.2960    Mrs. Biggs. Thank you.2961    I yield back.2962    Mr. Gimenez. The gentlewoman yields back.2963    We're going to go through a second round of questioning2964here, and I'll ask each of you to please answer this.2965    Mr. Hutton, are you worried about a catastrophic drone2966attack happening in the United States?2967    Mr. Hutton. It's a very short space between the2968inconvenience that we have seen to date--shutting down2969airports, raising alarm bells--and a catastrophe.2970    Mr. Gimenez. Are you worried about a catastrophic drone2971attack on the United States?2972    Mr. Hutton. It's very worrisome, yes. The answer is yes.2973    Mr. Gimenez. Mr. Walker.2974    Mr. Walker. Yes, sir.2975    Mr. Gimenez. Mr. Feddersen.2976    Mr. Feddersen. Absolutely.2977    Mr. Gimenez. Mr. Robbins.2978    Mr. Robbins. Yes, sir.2979    Mr. Gimenez. Would you consider that--I mean, you're right,2980that we've seen the enemy and probably the enemy is right here,2981that we haven't given the authorities and we have a fragmented2982defense system against drones.2983    There's 2 levels really. There's the reckless, the reckless2984drone operator that puts life in danger, not because they're2985nefarious, but because they're reckless. They're flying2986somewhere they shouldn't be flying. Then there's nefarious.2987There's different ways to deal with each one.2988    Will you help this subcommittee identify the different2989agencies or different even committees of jurisdiction that we2990need to bring into focus so that we have a comprehensive policy2991in defense of our homeland? Would you commit to do that?2992    Mr. Hutton.2993    Mr. Hutton. Absolutely.2994    Mr. Gimenez. Mr. Walker.2995    Mr. Walker. Yes, sir.2996    Mr. Gimenez. Mr. Feddersen.2997    Mr. Feddersen. Yes, sir.2998    Mr. Gimenez. Mr. Robbins.2999    Mr. Feddersen. We recommend a tiger team so those3000jurisdictions can actually coordinate in a rapid manner.3001    Mr. Gimenez. Mr. Robbins.3002    Mr. Robbins. Absolutely, yes, sir.3003    Mr. Gimenez. Look, I put this hearing together, but I don't3004know every single committee that has jurisdiction on this. I'm3005sure the FAA, which is part of Transportation and3006Infrastructure, and maybe Judiciary has it. But somehow we've3007got a disjointed defense mechanism here, and we need to bring3008it together.3009    This committee was formed in the aftermath of 9/11 to3010provide for the security of the homeland. We don't have all the3011jurisdiction to provide for that. Absent that, we need to make3012sure that we coordinate that with the other committees.3013    So I'm afraid that--and I hope not--but I hope that we3014don't have to have an incident similar to 9/11 for us to come3015together as a Congress and say these are the things that we3016need to do to counter this threat, these are the things that we3017need to do to counter cybersecurity threats that we have that3018also can be quite devastating also.3019    So I want to thank you for volunteering. The staff of this3020subcommittee will get with you all. Then we'll also have some3021other--we'll contact other folks.3022    What it is that this subcommittee, this committee needs to3023do in order to coordinate this so that we do come up with a3024strategy and an adequate defense of the homeland? Because, as3025you can tell, I'm really scared about this, and I think it's3026just a matter of time.3027    Since we've already--9/11, you can say, ``Gee, nobody3028thought about that.'' Well, we've thought about this now. If we3029fail in this, it's our failure. We can't just sit in a room and3030think about it. We are thinking about it and we need to do3031something about it.3032    I yield the rest of my time back. I now yield to the3033Ranking Member.3034    Mrs. McIver. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.3035    This gives me the opportunity to talk about drones flying3036over New Jersey.3037    As many of you know, last year we had the situation where3038there were tons of drones flying over different parts of New3039Jersey, which honestly sent people in a frantic. You can3040understand why. Even to this day, there are still drones flying3041over New Jersey.3042    My sister was driving down the Garden State Parkway the3043other day, and she literally freaked out because she said she3044saw like a drone flying so close to the parkway, and it was3045just very scary. Honestly, it kind-of gave people a feeling3046where it's like an aircraft out of space somewhere. You're3047like, ``What is happening?'' because people are not used to3048seeing drones just flying over them. So it continues to be a3049problem in New Jersey.3050    We have been given information from the Government about3051how these drones were not dangerous, they were OK, nothing.3052But, honestly, I'm not even quite sure if they understood where3053the drones--where they belong to, who they belong to, and can3054say that they weren't dangerous. We just don't know.3055    It doesn't seem confident that there is concrete, really3056good information coming from the Government about these drones3057flying, especially when you have so many and you can't really3058pinpoint where they are coming from.3059    So we've spent the last hour-and-a-half talking with you3060all, all of you sharing your expertise of what we should be3061doing, where we should be focused at. Hopefully, we lead this3062committee to really put some meat to the bone on this matter.3063    When we come out of it, I think one of the things that one3064of you said was about the oversight, having oversight. But I3065just think we need a more in-depth situation and process of how3066we are countering, especially these drones that we just cannot3067determine where they are coming from.3068    So I would love to learn more or learn more from you, for3069you to discuss--and anyone--honestly, I would love to hear from3070each of you of what we've learned from these incidents in terms3071of the Government's domain awareness and the public's3072understanding, shall I say, with drone rules and regulations,3073because that's a problem too.3074    Many people, if you see this thing flying over your3075backyard, people just don't even understand what is happening,3076what is the process, what is the procedure that these drones3077should just be flying? Who should they call? Like who should I3078call if I see this drone? First, they're getting on Facebook,3079first of all, like tagging me and everyone else that they can3080think of about what is happening.3081    But what is your input on that?3082    Mr. Feddersen. I appreciate the question.3083    I'd like to start with the idea that these processes are3084already in place. Again, if anybody has issues in the3085community, they call their local law enforcement. If there's a3086security issue at a private site, security knows who to kind-of3087call and kind-of run into it.3088    So, again, if State and local law enforcement or private3089security would have had the technology in place at that point3090and the authority to detect and the authority to mitigate, they3091can identify drones and are able to call the FAA and find out3092whether or not they're authorized or not authorized.3093    There is equipment, including ours, where you can whitelist3094drones so you know whether a drone is actually authorized to3095fly in a certain area or not authorized to fly in a certain3096area. You can deconflict and focus your security efforts that3097way.3098    But it has to be decentralized, it has to be pushed to the3099lowest level in order for the process to work.3100    Mrs. McIver. Thank you so much for that.3101    Mr. Walker. Here is what you didn't know, and this is part3102of the problem. Right now we have no integrated system which3103ties the operator and their qualifications and their3104certifications to operate digitally to the platform that they3105are operating and to their intent where you can immediately3106identify who that is operating. That's the point that we've3107been trying to make for a long time, is, yes, it's great that3108we can go out and we see that drone.3109    But to your point, you should have had no concern as a3110Member of Congress or as a member of the general public that3111that drone is operating appropriately and is authorized. There3112should not be that fear.3113    If you go back to what happened earlier in New Jersey, the3114answer was nobody knew because there was no system that3115provided the regulators and the air space policy managers a way3116to determine whether those flights were appropriate or3117inappropriate. We have to start there.3118    Mrs. McIver. Thank you so much for that, Mr. Walker.3119    Mr. Robinson.3120    Mr. Robbins. Yes, I'd just add to that.3121    I think it also speaks to that erosion of public trust3122around drones. The drones that are still flying in New Jersey3123are more than likely doing some sort of important mission--3124infrastructure inspection, public safety, package delivery,3125things of that nature.3126    Compare the erosion of public trust in New Jersey, though,3127to north Texas, where drone operations have been authorized in3128a trial program by the FAA to do significant operations in the3129north Texas area.3130    People are--like communities are fighting over who gets3131drone delivery next, whose public safety agency is going to get3132the drone operations to help extend the operational reach of3133their local police.3134    So the inverse of that is when drones are authorized and3135the community becomes familiar with them, they become a huge3136asset to the community and a boost to public safety.3137    Mrs. McIver. Thank you so much for that.3138    Mr. Robbins. I wanted to call you Mr. Robinson. Again, I'm3139sorry.3140    Mr. Robbins. It's OK, ma'am.3141    Mrs. McIver. I'm out of time. So forgive me, Mr. Hutton.3142    Thank you.3143    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you. The Ranking Member yields back.3144    I now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Pfluger.3145    Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for holding3146this. This is a continuation of multiple hearings that we've3147had, and I have been personally concerned about this for a3148number of reasons.3149    But I'll start with just a statement about the fact that3150the weekend's and last week's tragedies that happened in Texas,3151which we were involved in, had several local and State law3152enforcement officials reach out and say, ``What are we going to3153do?'' Because the Chinese-made technology is allowing them to3154do things like search and rescue. But, obviously, we're3155concerned about that, and we have stated those concerns in this3156hearing and for at least 2, maybe 3 or 4 years.3157    So not really a question so much as a statement of, like,3158how do we go faster? How do we get to a point where we can keep3159up with that technology?3160    Then I'll go to Mr. Hutton on the conversation of Ukraine,3161which I've spent a lot of time studying.3162    The iterative nature of the drones that we are seeing in3163that conflict is quite alarming. I'm not sure that we're3164keeping up. So it's kind-of in the same vein as what I've3165mentioned about some of our law enforcement needs.3166    But what features of these drones raise concern of similar3167tactics, techniques, and procedures being used here against us,3168whether it be critical infrastructure, military bases, or the3169like?3170    Mr. Hutton. You put your finger on it, Congressman. Not3171just the technology, but also the tactics, techniques, and3172procedures are iterating at an incredibly fast pace.3173    As has been mentioned already, prior to your arrival, the3174Operation Spiderweb in Ukraine demonstrated the control of3175small UAS with kinetic payloads at 2,000 miles distance,3176indicating that you wouldn't even have to be in the United3177States or even on this side of the planet to be able to conduct3178or execute a terrorist attack against U.S. critical3179infrastructure. We're there.3180    Mr. Pfluger. So with that statement, Mr. Feddersen, let's3181think about the truck, the 18-wheeler truck that the Ukrainians3182deployed against the Russian airplanes and fighter aircraft.3183    Is that a possibility here? Do we have a possibility of3184shipping containers being in our ports that have already those3185types of drones that are ready to go preprogrammed?3186    Mr. Feddersen. We do. It's a scenario that's been,3187obviously, discussed kind-of ad nauseam in the community as to3188how it can happen. It can be at the ports. It can be an 18-3189wheeler. But it can also just be a flatbed pickup truck or any3190other truck that's driving around.3191    Mr. Pfluger. What resources do we need that we do not have3192right now to both protect against some sort of critical3193infrastructure, military or even civilian-type attack? What do3194we need to think about legislatively? I will open that up. We3195can just go down the line. We have a minute and 40 seconds.3196    Mr. Hutton. I'll move quickly.3197    You need a common integrated air picture. Three companies3198before you all make competitive products in this space. There3199is a supply of this capability.3200    Mr. Pfluger. Who would run that air picture?3201    Mr. Hutton. Well, that would depend. Probably it would have3202to be delegated down to the operational users using a set of3203standards and certifications and valuations provided for by the3204Federal Government.3205    Mr. Pfluger. Mr. Walker.3206    Mr. Walker. I think the other thing that you need to think3207about, sir, is the fact that it's easier to hide in a crowd.3208Drones in our air space right now outnumber manned aircraft 43209to 1. That's going to double by 2027. That's going to double3210again by 2030.3211    So as we're talking about the ability to defend against3212these threats, we have to equally be thinking about, how do we3213quickly identify those threats?3214    I know I sound like a broken record on that, but that's3215going to become much more concerning and much more of a3216challenge because we have to remember, of those drones in the3217air, 99 percent or better of them are performing real valuable3218missions that are saving and protecting American lives.3219    Mr. Pfluger. Mr. Feddersen. We'll have 30 seconds. Split it3220with Mr. Robbins.3221    Mr. Feddersen. Yes, real quick on the whole concept.3222    It's integration. So we are collaborating to compete in the3223space. We just need the policies to open up so that individuals3224can figure out what they need--there is no one silver bullet--3225so all the systems can talk to each other and be able to cover3226each other in layers.3227    Mr. Pfluger. Last.3228    Mr. Robbins. As mentioned, the Congressional rules have not3229been updated since 2018. Expand air space awareness detection3230technology very broadly and expand the mitigation tools more3231narrowly with vigorous training and oversight of that program.3232    Mr. Pfluger. We have asked, Mr. Chairman, I have asked3233NORAD and NORTHCOM to come and testify. I think it's imperative3234that they do that. Because if we're going to delegate those,3235and we're going to integrate with the State and local level3236with the common air picture, which I agree with, then they're3237going to play a key role, and that positive identification is3238absolutely key.3239    Thanks for holding this hearing. Yield back.3240    Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman from Texas yields.3241    I now recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter,3242for a second round.3243    Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.3244    I'm going to follow up on the comments that my friend Mr.3245Pfluger started.3246    You state in your testimony that swarms of small drones are3247prevalent, like those that were used in Operation Spiderweb in3248Russia, and can be used to saturate enemy air space, overwhelm3249air defense systems, and execute lethal strikes.3250    How easy would it be for foreign governments to conduct3251similar attacks as Operation Spiderweb did here on U.S. soil?3252    Mr. Robbins. Well, I will say I have great confidence in3253our intelligence community and law enforcement that they're3254doing excellent work every day to keep us safe and prevent such3255an attack from happening in the United States.3256    But from a technology perspective, as mentioned, the3257technology is there, it could be in this country already, and--3258--3259    Mr. Carter. How easy is it for that to be conducted? Is it3260something that is just farfetched?3261    Mr. Robbins. No.3262    Mr. Carter. Is it something, as our Chairman has just3263suggested, something we really--let me try to finish first--3264that we should not find ourself flatfooted thinking, ``Oh, wow3265we know this has happened before''?3266    Chairman Gimenez has said very clearly shame on us if we3267fall prey to another attack. My suspicion is, as it was done3268there causing some $7 billion worth of damage, we are one3269accident away from being a victim of it ourselves.3270    Mr. Robbins. Absolutely. Completely agree with you, sir.3271    Mr. Carter. I know it's been said over and over again. What3272can we be doing? ISIS has actively encouraged lone-wolf attacks3273targeting public--to target public civilian spaces. I know none3274of these are easy questions, and I know neither of you have3275easy answers for us. But because we are on a fact-finding3276mission to determine how we can better empower you and others3277to protect our homeland, what else we can be doing?3278    Any of you can jump in.3279    Mr. Hutton, would you?3280    Mr. Hutton. Three of us here in front of you provide3281situational awareness and mitigation technologies. Those3282Government agencies who would be our customers at the State and3283local level--and often at the Federal level--cannot buy them,3284they cannot--they do not have a forum to deeply learn about3285them and understand what capabilities are there, and if they3286did buy them would not have the authority to employ them.3287    Mr. Carter. Given that there's so many of them in the air,3288you indicated, I think, Mr. Feddersen, that many of them are in3289fact providing useful tools. Are we able to easily identify3290those that have nefarious actions versus those who aren't?3291    The second part of the question is we know that--you3292mentioned DJI, which is a Chinese-owned-and-operated company3293that provides most of the commercial, I guess, recreational3294drones.3295    Do we know if those drones are able to capture photograph3296images, video, that an independent person is using perhaps just3297for fun? Do we know if they have access with their technology3298to actually use that information unbeknownst to the operator?3299    Mr. Feddersen. Every time they update the drone. Every time3300it touches the internet, they get a new update to it, new3301profile. All that information's in there.3302    Going back to the question, sir, about how easy is it. It's3303coding and algorithms. People are doing it all the time with3304Raspberry Pis, creating their own 3-D printed drones, putting3305the control systems in there and figuring it out.3306    We see it with drone-like displays on a regular basis. I3307mean, the technology to do those swarm attacks and things are3308being used commercially in here.3309    I think one of the things that we were could all benefit3310from, especially after all the testing and evaluation that the3311U.S. Government has done on systems like ours, is to publish a3312list of those that have already been deemed safe to operate,3313safe to use, so that individuals, especially critical3314infrastructure, can look at a menu of options as what they want3315and we know that it's safe in the National Airspace System.3316    Mr. Carter. Forty-six seconds. Anybody else want to weigh3317in on that?3318    Mr. Hutton.3319    Mr. Hutton. Federal agencies have to have a level of3320certainty about the safety and reliability and effectiveness of3321the systems. Without the authorities to employ the systems,3322they don't get to the point at which they can determine whether3323those systems are safe, effective, and reliable.3324    Mr. Carter. So the drone that looks like it's dropping off3325a package and the drone that looks like it's dropping off a3326bomb looks exactly the same, and that makes your job that much3327more difficult.3328    My time has expired.3329    Mr. Feddersen. But that is why, again, law enforcement and3330trained security professionals who go through training for3331physical security and threat assessment are the individuals3332that should have these tools in their hands today.3333    Mr. Carter. Well, I would encourage, Mr. Chairman, the3334joint committees that are working on joint legislation, that we3335step up our game, because every minute that goes by that we are3336paralyzed by analysis we are an accident waiting to happen.3337    I want to be on record, along with the Chairman in this3338committee, in urging that the joint committees truly push3339forward. We cannot wait for the next accident and American3340lives are lost.3341    I yield.3342    Mr. Gimenez. I fully agree. The gentleman yields.3343    I now recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane.3344    Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.3345    A couple months back, I pulled in, asked for a meeting with3346several of the agencies that were in charge of protecting the3347Capitol for Inauguration Day. I was very concerned about the3348President after 2 assassination attempts.3349    I was also concerned about just a drone attack here, or3350another type of attack when you've got all the Members of3351Congress, all the Cabinet executives, et cetera. That's a huge,3352juicy target.3353    One of the things I learned is that Capitol Police doesn't3354even have the authorization to mitigate and deal with drones.3355    So we introduced a bill. It's H.R. 3334. I would love it if3356the Chairman would consider supporting this effort to give3357Capitol Police the ability to take down drones. I realize there3358is the Secret Service as well that has the capability and the3359authorization to do so.3360    But if we're not even willing to give authorization to3361protect the Capitol, I think that's a pretty key indicator that3362we're not prepared to protect the rest of the country, which I3363think needs to happen.3364    So I appreciate, Mr. Walker, you bringing up the integrated3365air space management needed. I know you've been beating that3366drum today, and I definitely appreciate it.3367    Back to Operation Spiderweb that we've talked about a lot3368today where the Ukrainians flew drones over 2,000 miles--some3369of the reporting says 2,800 miles--to attack Russian bombers,3370very sophisticated operation.3371    I'm glad, Mr. Hutton, you brought up the fact that some of3372our adversaries could launch an attack like that that mimics3373that attack from outside the United States. Is that correct?3374    Mr. Hutton. Yes, it is.3375    Mr. Crane. They could do that from a country like--or a3376city like Monterrey in Mexico or Ottawa or Calgary in Canada?3377Is that correct?3378    Mr. Hutton. That's correct.3379    Mr. Crane. Have you guys done any assessments on--I talked3380about the average stadium for the World Cup holding about 7,5003381civilians. Have you guys done any analysis on what a drone3382swarm could do to that many citizens just watching a soccer3383game?3384    Mr. Hutton. We know from lessons learned in Eastern Europe3385exactly what would happen. You could put all of them at risk,3386every one of them.3387    Mr. Crane. Yes, absolutely. Absolutely.3388    Well, I appreciate you guys coming today. I want to--again,3389I know I've talked about this in my first round--but I want to3390publicly say that I think FIFA and Homeland Security should3391absolutely host all of these events coming up, for a short-term3392fix, in domes, because I think that that would greatly mitigate3393the threats that we're talking about today.3394    Because when you host it in a dome, then you start3395filtering people watching the games through magnetometers.3396There is a whole new level of threats that you have to deal3397with. But at least mitigate much of the drone capabilities that3398some of these nation-states and bad actors have as far as3399targeting large populations of people. We know that terrorist3400groups love to do that.3401    So I want to make sure it's stated publicly.3402    Mr. Carter, I think he left, but I hope that my other3403colleagues on the panel will consider sponsoring my bill and3404working with industry leaders like yourself in making sure that3405we're proactive and not reactive. Because as you guys know,3406this place moves at a snail's pace, and it almost seems as if3407most of the time we have to wait for a catastrophe to happen3408before we actually move on anything.3409    So thank you.3410    Mr. Feddersen. Sir, I applaud the bill you and Mr. Perry3411put forward. We wholeheartedly agree the critical3412infrastructure here inside the NCR should be protected. We urge3413that we should protect the other 50 State capitals in3414legislation.3415    Mr. Crane. Absolutely. Absolutely. Thank you.3416    Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman from Arizona yields.3417    I think we have really put a light on the issue and the3418fact that we in Congress need to focus in. We're kind-of spread3419out on our authorities. We need to kind-of focus this in.3420    You have my word that this subcommittee and the staff of3421the subcommittee are going to work with you to identify those3422areas and those other jurisdictions and other committees of3423jurisdictions will need to work on in order to really protect3424America, which is really what our job is.3425    As you also can see, this is a bipartisan effort. Both3426sides of the aisle see the threat, and both sides of the aisle3427are committed to try to resolve this problem before anything3428happens.3429    So I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable3430testimony and the Members for their questions. Members of the3431subcommittee may have some additional questions for the3432witnesses and we would ask the witnesses to respond to these in3433writing.3434    Pursuant to committee rule VII(E), the hearing record will3435be held open for 10 days.3436    Without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned.3437    [Whereupon, at 11:41 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]34383439                                 [all]