“Securing Global Communications: An Examination of Foreign Adversary Threats to Subsea Cable Infrastructure”

1[House Hearing, 119 Congress]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34                  SECURING GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS: AN EXAM-5                   INATION OF FOREIGN ADVERSARY THREATS6                   TO SUBSEA CABLE INFRASTRUCTURE7=======================================================================89                             JOINT HEARING1011                               BEFORE THE1213                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON14                  TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY1516                               AND THE1718                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON19              CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION2021                                 OF THE2223                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY24                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES2526                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2728                             FIRST SESSION2930                               __________3132                           NOVEMBER 20, 20253334                               __________3536                           Serial No. 119-283738                               __________3940       Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security4142[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]4344        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov4546                               __________4748                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE4962-706 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 202650-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------5152                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY5354                Andrew R. Garbarino, New York, Chairman55Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice       Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,56    Chair                                Ranking Member57Michael Guest, Mississippi           Eric Swalwell, California58Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida           J. Luis Correa, California59August Pfluger, Texas                Shri Thanedar, Michigan60Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island61Tony Gonzales, Texas                 Daniel S. Goldman, New York62Morgan Luttrell, Texas               Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois63Dale W. Strong, Alabama              Timothy M. Kennedy, New York64Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma              LaMonica McIver, New Jersey65Elijah Crane, Arizona                Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking66Andrew Ogles, Tennessee                  Member67Sheri Biggs, South Carolina          Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico68Gabe Evans, Colorado                 Nellie Pou, New Jersey69Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania         James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia70Brad Knott, North Carolina           Troy A. Carter, Louisiana71Vince Fong, California               Al Green, Texas72Vacant73                     Keighle Joyce, Staff Director74                  Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director75                       Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk76                                 ------7778          SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY7980                  Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida, Chairman81Michael T. McCaul, Texas             LaMonica McIver, New Jersey,82Elijah Crane, Arizona                    Ranking Member83Sheri Biggs, South Carolina          Timothy M. Kennedy, New York84Andrew R. Garbarino, New York (ex    Troy A. Carter, Louisiana85    officio)                         Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi86                                         (ex officio)87               Hannah Hagen, Subcommittee Staff Director88           Alex Marston, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director89                                 ------9091      SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION9293                   Andrew Ogles, Tennessee, Chairman94Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida           Eric Swalwell, California, Ranking95Morgan Luttrell, Texas                   Member96Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania         Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island97Vince Fong, California               LaMonica McIver, New Jersey98Andrew R. Garbarino, New York (ex    James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia99    officio)                         Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi100                                         (ex officio)101             Roland Hernandez, Subcommittee Staff Director102           Moira Bergin, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director103104                            C O N T E N T S105106                              ----------107                                                                   Page108109                               Statements110111The Honorable Carlos A. Gimenez, a Representative in Congress112  From the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on113  Transportation and Maritime Security:114  Oral Statement.................................................     1115  Prepared Statement.............................................     3116The Honorable LaMonica McIver, a Representative in Congress From117  the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on118  Transportation and Maritime Security:119  Oral Statement.................................................     4120  Prepared Statement.............................................     4121The Honorable Andrew Ogles, a Representative in Congress From the122  State of Tennessee, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity123  and Infrastructure Protection:124  Oral Statement.................................................     5125  Prepared Statement.............................................     6126The Honorable James R. Walkinshaw, a Representative in Congress127  From the State of Virginia:128  Oral Statement.................................................    12129  Prepared Statement.............................................    14130The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress131  From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on132  Homeland Security:133  Prepared Statement.............................................     7134135                               Witnesses136137Mr. Matthew Kroenig, Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for138  Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council:139  Oral Statement.................................................     9140  Prepared Statement.............................................    11141Mr. Timothy Stronge, Chief Research Officer, TeleGeography:142  Oral Statement.................................................    15143  Prepared Statement.............................................    16144Mr. Alexander Botting, Senior Director, Global Security and145  Technology Strategy, Venable LLP:146  Oral Statement.................................................    17147  Prepared Statement.............................................    19148Mr. Kevin Frazier, AI Innovation and Law Fellow, University of149  Texas School of Law:150  Oral Statement.................................................    28151  Prepared Statement.............................................    30152153                                Appendix154155Supplemental Material Submitted by Matthew Kroenig...............    61156Supplemental Material Submitted by Timothy Stronge...............    97157Supplemental Material Submitted by Kevin Frazier.................   122158159  SECURING GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS: AN EXAMINATION OF FOREIGN ADVERSARY160                 THREATS TO SUBSEA CABLE INFRASTRUCTURE161162                              ----------163164                      Thursday, November 20, 2025165166             U.S. House of Representatives,167                    Committee on Homeland Security,168                        Subcommittee on Transportation and169                                 Maritime Security, and the170                         Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and171                                 Infrastructure Protection,172                                                    Washington, DC.173    The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m.,174in room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Carlos A.175Gimenez [Chairman of the Subcommittee on Transportation and176Maritime Security] presiding.177    Present from the Subcommittee on Transportation and178Maritime Security: Representatives Gimenez, Crane, Biggs,179McIver, Kennedy, and Carter.180    Present from the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and181Infrastructure Protection: Representatives Ogles, Gimenez,182Luttrell, Magaziner, McIver, and Walkinshaw.183    Also present: Representatives Mackenzie and Fong.184    Mr. Gimenez. The Committee on Homeland Security185Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security and186Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection187will come to order.188    Without objection, the Chair may declare the committee in189recess at any point.190    The purpose of this hearing is to examine the potential191national security, economic, and resilience risks associated192with subsea cables--crucial telecommunications infrastructure.193    We will also evaluate how foreign actors, particularly194China and Russia, could leverage subsea cable infrastructure195for espionage, coercion, and sabotage and explore legislative196and policy options to strengthen subsea cable resilience,197enhance public-private partnerships, and ensure continuity of198global communications amid physical or cyber disruptions.199    I would like to thank our colleagues from the Cybersecurity200and Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee for partnering with201us for this joint hearing.202    I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for an opening203statement.204    Good morning. Good morning, and thank you all for being205here today. After the longest Government shutdown in American206history, it is great to be back in Congress.207    First off, I want to begin by congratulating Chairman Ogles208on his recent appointment to the Chairman of the Subcommittee209on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection.210    Congratulations.211    Mr. Ogles. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.212    Mr. Gimenez. I also want to thank the Cybersecurity213Subcommittee for partnering with us to hold this important214hearing on a matter critical to U.S. national security.215    Resting quietly on the ocean floor, submarine216telecommunications cables commonly known as ``subsea cables''217are among the most strategically significant and increasingly218vulnerable components of the world's digital infrastructure.219    Right now, roughly 750,000 miles of undersea cables220traverse the world's oceans, forming a complex and221interconnected network that enables the rapid flow of large222data sets across continents.223    These fiber-optic cables are the arteries of our global224telecommunications network, connecting nearly every corner of225the world to the internet. Without subsea cables, we would not226have the digital network we so desperately rely on today.227    Although largely invisible and unknown to most Americans,228subsea cables carry more than 99 percent of international229communications. They not only support global commerce and230technological innovation but serve as the operational systems231for U.S. intelligence and defense. Protecting their integrity232is essential to safeguarding both our economy and our national233security.234    Yet, despite their vital role, subsea cables remain235vulnerable to malicious attacks from our greatest foreign236adversaries--and none other than Russia and China. These237adversaries will stop at nothing to track, control, and exploit238vulnerabilities in our subsea cable networks to advance their239economic, technological, and strategic goals.240    In particular, the Chinese Communist Party mobilizes its241state-backed companies to pursue coercive economic tactics and242aggressive cyber espionage on subsea cables. As we know, China243will stop at nothing to tap, disrupt, or dominate subsea cable244systems across the Indo-Pacific and beyond.245    This is not speculation. It is strategic intent, openly246stated through China's civil-military policies and reflected in247its global push to build and operate key segments of the248world's data network.249    As such, the subsea environment is an increasingly critical250front of the U.S. competition with China. These targeted251attacks inflict costly damage not only on our maritime252transportation system but upon the foundation of our global253communications network.254    Subsea cable management has faltered not just through the255Indo-Pacific but across key areas around the globe. If Congress256fails to act, we risk allowing an authoritarian adversary257gaining unprecedented access to the data flows underpinning our258markets, our alliances, and our national defense. That is a259risk we cannot accept.260    Today's discussion will focus on how the United States must261lead, not follow, in securing this critical infrastructure. We262will hear from expert witnesses on these evolving subsea cable263threats and discuss the gaps in U.S. regulatory and national264security posture.265    In this hearing, we should evaluate how the Department of266Homeland Security, apart from other Federal agencies, could267best serve as the lead agency to protect and secure subsea268cable infrastructure.269    I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. I look270forward to hearing your insights as to what Congress should271consider to best protect this increasingly critical yet272vulnerable network of infrastructure.273    [The statement of Chairman Gimenez follows:]274                Statement of Chairman Carlos A. Gimenez275                           November 20, 2025276    Good morning, and thank you all for being here today. After the277longest Government shutdown in American history, it's great to be back278in Congress.279    First off, I want to begin by congratulating Chairman Ogles on his280recent appointment to Chairman of the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and281Infrastructure Protection. I also want to thank the Cybersecurity282Subcommittee for partnering with us to hold this important hearing on a283matter critical to U.S. national security.284    Resting quietly on the ocean floor, submarine telecommunications285cables, commonly known as subsea cables, are among the most286strategically significant and increasingly vulnerable components of the287world's digital infrastructure.288    Right now, roughly 750,000 miles of undersea cables traverse the289world's oceans, forming a complex and interconnected network that290enables the rapid flow of large data sets across continents. These291fiber-optic cables are the arteries of our global telecommunications292network, connecting nearly every corner of the world to the internet.293Without subsea cables, we would not have the digital network we so294desperately rely on today.295    Although largely invisible and unknown to most Americans, subsea296cables carry more than 99 percent of intercontinental communications.297They not only support global commerce and technological innovation but298serve as the operational systems for U.S. intelligence and defense.299Protecting their integrity is essential to safeguarding both our300economy and our national security.301    Yet, despite their vital role, subsea cables remain vulnerable to302malicious attacks from our greatest foreign adversaries, and none other303than Russia and China. These adversaries will stop at nothing to track,304control, and exploit vulnerabilities in our subsea cable networks to305advance their economic, technological, and strategic goals.306    In particular, the Chinese Communist Party mobilizes its state-307backed companies to pursue coercive economic tactics and aggressive308cyber-espionage on subsea cables. As we know, China will stop at309nothing to tap, disrupt, or dominate subsea cable systems across the310Indo-Pacific and beyond. This is not speculation--it is strategic311intent, openly stated through China's civil-military policies and312reflected in its global push to build and operate key segments of the313world's data network.314    As such, the subsea environment is an increasingly critical front315of the U.S. competition with China. These targeted attacks inflict316costly damage not only to our maritime transportation system, but upon317the foundation of our global communications network.318    Subsea cable management has faltered not just through the Indo319Pacific, but across key areas around the globe. If Congress fails to320act, we risk allowing an authoritarian adversary gaining unprecedented321access to the data flows underpinning our markets, our alliances, and322our national defense. That is a risk we cannot accept.323    Today's discussion will focus on how the United States must lead--324not follow--in securing this critical infrastructure. We will hear from325expert witnesses on these evolving subsea cable threats and discuss the326gaps in U.S. regulatory and national security posture. In this hearing,327we should evaluate how the Department of Homeland Security, apart from328other Federal agencies, could best serve as the lead agency to protect329and secure subsea cable infrastructure.330    I want to thank our witnesses for being here today, and I look331forward to hearing your insights as to what Congress should consider to332best protect this increasingly critical yet vulnerable network333infrastructure.334335    Mr. Gimenez. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the336gentlewoman from New Jersey, Mrs. McIver, for her opening337statement.338    Mrs. McIver. Thank you so much, Chairman.339    Good morning to everyone, and thank you to our witnesses340for joining us today.341    Subsea cables are critical to U.S. national security, the342global economy, and the daily lives of people around the globe,343as they carry approximately 99 percent of the world's344intercontinental internet traffic.345    The extent to which we all rely on the data traveling346through these cables is almost hard to fathom. For example,347every day, an estimated $22 trillion of financial transactions348are processed through subsea cables.349    Internet traffic is only expected to increase in the coming350decades, as the global economy turns increasingly digital. The351demand of increased internet capacity will require the352installation of hundreds of thousands of miles of new subsea353cables, which must be protected from both accidental damage and354intentional sabotage.355    Failing to invest in subsea cable infrastructure could cede356market control to global competitors and adversaries. Likewise,357failing to adequately protect these cables could lead to358significant adverse impacts to the U.S. economy and national359security.360    Already, Russia, China, and other actors have shown a361willingness and ability to target subsea cables, as several362cable breaks have been attributed to them over the past few363years.364    In addition, the development of undersea vehicles may365decrease the cost of attacks, while the cost of cable repairs366remains high.367    As the United States formulates strategies to mitigate368threats posed to subsea cables, the Department of Homeland369Security must play a critical role. The Cybersecurity and370Infrastructure Security Agency, or CISA, serves as the sector371risk management agency for both the communications and372information technology sectors, each of which play a role in373the subsea cable environment. Additionally, the U.S. Coast374Guard maintains responsibilities for maritime law enforcement375and domain awareness in U.S. waters.376    DHS and the U.S. Government as a whole must seek377opportunities to increase its ability to deter, detect, and378respond to threats to these cables. I look forward to hearing379proposals from our witnesses for how the United States can380address these pressing security issues.381    I thank the witnesses again for joining us.382    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.383    [The statement of Ranking Member McIver follows:]384              Statement of Ranking Member LaMonica McIver385                           November 20, 2025386    Subsea cables are critical to U.S. national security, the global387economy, and the daily lives of people around the globe, as they carry388approximately 99 percent of the world's intercontinental internet389traffic.390    The extent to which we all rely on the data traveling through these391cables is almost hard to fathom. For example, every day, an estimated392$22 trillion of financial transactions are processed through subsea393cables. Internet traffic is only expected to increase in the coming394decades, as the global economy turns increasingly digital.395    The demand for increased internet capacity will require the396installation of hundreds of thousands of miles of new subsea cables,397which must be protected from both accidental damage and intentional398sabotage. Failing to invest in subsea cable infrastructure could cede399market control to global competitors and adversaries. Likewise, failing400to adequately protect these cables could lead to significant adverse401impacts to the U.S. economy and national security.402    Already, Russia, China, and other actors have shown a willingness403and ability to target subsea cables, as several cable breaks have been404attributed to them over the past few years. In addition, the405development of autonomous undersea vehicles may decrease the costs of406attacks, while the costs of cable repairs remains high. As the United407States formulates strategies to mitigate threats posed to subsea408cables, the Department of Homeland Security must play a central role.409    The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, or CISA,410serves as the Sector Risk Management Agency for both the communications411and information technology sectors, each of which play a role in the412subsea cable environment.413    Additionally, the U.S. Coast Guard maintains responsibilities for414maritime law enforcement and domain awareness in U.S. waters. DHS--and415the U.S. Government as a whole--must seek opportunities to increase its416ability to deter, detect, and respond to threats to these cables.417    I look forward to hearing proposals from our witnesses for how the418United States can address these pressing security issues.419420    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Ranking Member McIver.421    I now recognize the Chairman for the Subcommittee on422Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection, the gentleman from423Tennessee, Mr. Ogles, for his opening statement.424    Mr. Ogles. Thank you, Chairman Gimenez, for convening this425joint hearing and for your leadership on these critical issues.426    This is my first hearing as Chairman of the Cybersecurity427and Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee, and I appreciate428the opportunity to begin this work with a topic that carries429enormous consequences for our national security and for the430ability of the modern economy that we depend on.431    Today, we are examining the security of the subsea cable432systems that carry the vast majority of the world's433international data. These subsea cables stretch across the434ocean floor in nearly every corner of the globe. They deliver435the connectivity that supports the daily operations of the U.S.436Government, global financial markets, cloud services used by437businesses and families, and the data that powers an expanding438artificial-intelligence ecosystem. Without them, the modern439world would slow to a crawl.440    Yet they often receive the attention only after something441goes wrong. Recent events have shown how exposed the442infrastructure truly is.443    Some disruptions were the result of accidents involving444fishing vessels, anchoring, or natural events. Others occurred445in areas where foreign-adversary vessels were present under446questionable circumstances, where investigations raised447concerns about possible nation-state involvement. We have seen448this pattern not only in the Baltic Sea but also near Taiwan449and in high-traffic chokepoints from the Red Sea to West450Africa.451    Even when incidents are unintentional, they reveal452structural weakness in a system the world depends on.453    At the same time, the United States is entering a period of454extraordinary growth and bandwidth demand. Major technology and455cloud providers are building new subsea cables on a historic456scale. Yet the number of ships and crews capable of repairing457damaged cables remains extremely limited. Many regions depend458on a single route for critical connectivity. Repairs can take459weeks or months. These delays are more than a simple460inconvenience. They represent serious vulnerabilities for461countries and companies that rely on uninterrupted access to462global networks.463    Foreign adversaries are watching these dynamics closely.464The Chinese Communist Party is expanding its footprint in the465construction, maintenance, and oversight of global cables in466ways that raise serious national security concerns. Russian467vessels have engaged in repeated and suspicious activity near468key subsea cable routes, raising a clear question about their469intent.470    Both governments have repeatedly used gray-zone aggression471to intimidate their neighbors and probe Western defenses472without triggering open conflict. Subsea cables present a473strategic vulnerability tailor-made for this type of coercion,474and the United States cannot afford to treat the threat475lightly.476    This hearing is also an opportunity to examine the role of477the Department of Homeland Security in addressing the478challenges. DHS should be working with industry to identify479risks, share threat information, and support efforts to480strengthen resilience.481    Private companies own and operate nearly every subsea cable482that serves the United States. That reality demands close483coordination between Government and industry and a clear484understanding of roles and responsibilities.485    Today, we will hear from experts who understand the486technical, geopolitical, and operational realities of securing487this infrastructure. We will examine what the Federal488Government is doing and where improvements are required.489    We will also seek to determine whether industry has the490support and information it needs to protect its networks, and491we will consider what actions Congress should take to492strengthen resilience, promote trusted supply chains, and493ensure that American data is not placed at risk by foreign494adversaries.495    As I begin my time as Chairman, I want to be clear that496safeguarding the digital infrastructure of the United States497will be a central focus of the subcommittee. This issue cannot498be pushed aside or left to future Congresses. The security of499subsea cables is tied directly to our national strength, our500economic resilience, and our ability to operate in an501increasingly competitive world.502    I want to thank our witnesses for being here, for your work503on this critical issue. I look forward to your testimony and a504thoughtful discussion.505    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.506    [The statement of Chairman Ogles follows:]507                   Statement of Chairman Andrew Ogles508    Thank you, Chairman Gimenez, for convening this joint hearing and509for your leadership on these critical issues.510    This is my first hearing as Chairman of the Cybersecurity and511Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee, and I appreciate the512opportunity to begin this work with a topic that carries enormous513consequences for our national security and for the ability of the514modern economy that we depend on.515    Today, we are examining the security of the subsea cable systems516that carry the vast majority of the world's international data. These517subsea cables stretch across the ocean floor in nearly every corner of518the globe. They deliver the connectivity that supports the daily519operations of the U.S. Government, global financial markets, cloud520services used by businesses and families, and the data that powers an521expanding artificial intelligence ecosystem. Without them, the modern522world would slow to a crawl.523    Yet they often receive the attention only after something goes524wrong. Recent events have shown how exposed the infrastructure truly525is.526    Some disruptions were the result of accidents involving fishing527vessels, anchoring, or natural events. Others occurred in areas where528foreign adversary vessels were present under questionable529circumstances, where investigations raised concerns about possible530nation-state involvement. We have seen this pattern not only in the531Baltic Sea but also near Taiwan and in high-traffic chokepoints from532the Red Sea to West Africa.533    Even when incidents are unintentional, they reveal structural534weakness in a system the world depends on.535    At the same time, the United States is entering a period of536extraordinary growth and bandwidth demand. Major technology and cloud537providers are building new subsea cables on a historic scale. Yet the538number of ships and crews capable of repairing damaged cables remains539extremely limited. Many regions depend on a single route for critical540connectivity. Repairs can take weeks or months. These delays are more541than a simple inconvenience. They represent serious vulnerabilities for542countries and companies that rely on uninterrupted access to global543networks.544    Foreign adversaries are watching these dynamics closely. The545Chinese Communist Party is expanding its footprint in the construction,546maintenance, and oversight of global cables in ways that raise serious547national security concerns. Russian vessels have engaged in repeated548and suspicious activity near key subsea cable routes, raising a clear549question about their intent.550    Both governments have repeatedly used gray zone aggression to551intimidate their neighbors and probe Western defenses without552triggering open conflict. Subsea cables present a strategic553vulnerability tailor made for this type of coercion, and the United554States cannot afford to treat the threat lightly.555    This hearing is also an opportunity to examine the role of the556Department of Homeland Security in addressing the challenges. DHS557should be working with industry to identify risks, share threat558information, and support efforts to strengthen resilience.559    Private companies own and operate nearly every subsea cable that560serves the United States. That reality demands close coordination561between Government and industry and a clear understanding of roles and562responsibilities.563    Today, we will hear from experts who understand the technical,564geopolitical, and operational realities of securing this565infrastructure. We will examine what the Federal Government is doing566and where improvements are required.567    We will also seek to determine whether industry has the support and568information it needs to protect its networks, and we will consider what569actions Congress should take to strengthen resilience, promote trusted570supply chains, and ensure that American data is not placed at risk by571foreign adversaries.572    As I begin my time as Chairman, I want to be clear that573safeguarding the digital infrastructure of the United States will be a574central focus of the subcommittee. This issue cannot be pushed aside or575left to future Congresses. The security of subsea cables is tied576directly to our national strength, our economic resilience, and our577ability to operate in an increasingly competitive world.578    I want to thank our witnesses for being here, for your work on this579critical issue. I look forward to your testimony and a thoughtful580discussion.581582    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Chairman Ogles.583    I want to welcome the two newest Members of the Committee584on Homeland Security.585    The gentleman from California, Mr. Fong, welcome.586    The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Walkinshaw, welcome.587    Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening588statements may be submitted for the record.589    [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]590             Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson591                           November 20, 2025592    Subsea cables serve as the backbone for nearly all global commerce593and communication, carrying 99 percent of the world's data traffic.594    For the United States, this infrastructure is vital to national595security and economic interests, supporting an estimated $9 trillion596worth of trade every day. Dependency on subsea cables continues to597increase as demand for internet traffic capacity grows. Despite their598important function, subsea cables are a vulnerable component of our599infrastructure.600    While most damage to subsea cables is accidental, caused primarily601by fishing and anchoring, the threat of deliberate sabotage by state602and non-state actors is of growing concern due to recent incidents and603geopolitical tensions.604    The past few years have seen China and Russia investing in605capabilities required to target subsea infrastructure, and each has606been implicated in recent incidents in which subsea cables were607sabotaged.608    Disruptions to subsea cables can have wide-spread impacts on609internet traffic capacity. Subsea cable disruptions are also very610costly to repair, with costs ranging from $1.5 million to $24 million611per repair.612    As the United States seeks to compete in the increasingly digital613global economy, we must ensure subsea cables are secure and disruptions614are minimized. The United States must develop a strategic approach to615protecting subsea cables that addresses both cyber and physical616security threats.617618    Mr. Gimenez. I am pleased to have a distinguished panel of619witnesses before us today on this critical topic.620    Pursuant to committee rule VIII(C), I ask that our621witnesses please rise and raise their right hands.622    [Witnesses sworn.]623    Mr. Gimenez. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have624answered in the affirmative.625    Thank you, and please be seated.626    I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses.627    Dr. Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director628of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the629Atlantic Council. He is currently a professor at Georgetown630University and a commissioner on the Congressional Commission631on the Strategic Posture of the United States. Previously, he's632served in the Department of Defense and the intelligence633community under the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations.634    Tim Stronge is the chief research officer at TeleGeography,635an industry-leading telecommunications data provider known for636independent analysis. His responsibilities span across637TeleGeography's research practices, including network638infrastructure, bandwidth demand modeling, cross-border data639flows, and pricing of telecommunications services.640    Alexander Botting is an international policy expert with641experience leading technology and cybersecurity advocacy642efforts in more than 50 countries across 5 continents. He643previously served as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce director for644global regulatory cooperation, where he led initiatives on645cybersecurity, emerging technology, and digital trade646practices.647    Kevin Frazier is an AI innovation and law fellow at the648University of Texas School of Law, focusing on artificial649intelligence, technological innovation, and regulatory650structures. His publications appear in leading law journals and651major policy outlets, such as Lawfare, Reason, and the MIT Tech652Review.653    I thank each of our distinguished witnesses for being here654today.655    I now recognize Dr. Kroenig for 5 minutes to summarize his656opening statement.657658STATEMENT OF MATTHEW KROENIG, SENIOR DIRECTOR, SCOWCROFT CENTER659          FOR STRATEGY AND SECURITY, ATLANTIC COUNCIL660661    Mr. Kroenig. Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Ogles, Ranking662Member McIver, distinguished Members of the committee, thank663you for the opportunity to testify on the important topic of664foreign-adversary threats to subsea cable infrastructure.665    I want to assist your work by sharing insights gleaned in666my more than two decades of experience working on national667security policy at the Central Intelligence Agency, Department668of Defense, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic669Posture of the United States, and now as a professor at670Georgetown and vice president and senior director at the671Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center.672    I lead a center responsible for global security and673strategy, so I'll focus my remarks on the geopolitical and674national security dimensions of this challenge.675    My message today is simple: China and Russia's threats to676subsea cables present a serious challenge to the global677communications and energy systems that underpin U.S. and allied678security, prosperity, and way of life, and the United States679needs a more effective strategy to deter and defeat adversary680threats to subsea cables.681    Since World War II, the United States and its allies have682built an international system that has led to unprecedented683peace, prosperity, and freedom for the United States and its684allies. The design of the global undersea cable infrastructure685was established in a more peaceful time, in which it was686assumed that major powers had shared interest in cooperation687and would behave responsibly.688    Unfortunately, the global security environment has greatly689deteriorated in recent years. The People's Republic of China690may pose the greatest threat the United States has ever faced.691It's a comprehensive challenge that includes economic,692technological, ideological, diplomatic, and military693dimensions. Moreover, China is working closely with an axis of694aggressors including Russia, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela.695    China seeks to dominate the digital infrastructure of the69621st Century, including in subsea cables, to provide it with697economic espionage and geopolitical advantages. China and698Russia wage gray-zone warfare to coerce vulnerable U.S. allies699and partners and to induce caution in Washington about700intervening on their behalf.701    Tactics in this war include Russia's likely involvement702with the bombing of a rail line in Poland just earlier this703week, China's almost-daily military incursions into Taiwan's704territorial waters and air space, and, increasingly, the705possible cutting of subsea cables.706    Russian-linked vessels have cut undersea cables in the707Baltic Sea in recent years. On Christmas day last year, for708example, an oil tanker crossed the Gulf of Finland, damaging 4709cables. In 2023, Chinese-registered ships severed 2 undersea710cables, forcing Taiwan's Matsu Islands off line. The islands'71114,000 residents spent weeks with limited connectivity. Sending712a simple text message, for example, took hours.713    The United States is not immune. As tensions escalate with714Venezuela, a Maduro-linked vessel could drag an anchor off the715U.S. coast, cutting cables in shallow water. There's nothing716technologically difficult about this scenario.717    Moreover, as tensions escalate, there is a risk of major718conflict with China or Russia or both simultaneously. In the719event of such a conflict, China and Russia could undertake a720more systematic and deliberate campaign to sever cables to the721United States or its more vulnerable allies.722    As you mentioned in your opening statements, more than 95723percent of global internet traffic relies on undersea cables.724Attacks on these cables disrupt connectivity and, with it, the725functioning of modern society, including communications,726financial and business transactions, energy supplies, global727supply chains, military operations, and daily life in general.728    Currently, the United States and its allies lack a729coordinated and effective strategy to deal with this threat. As730a starting point, Congress could task the Executive branch with731developing a strategy to secure subsea cables. It could also732designate the Department of Homeland Security as a single hub733to coordinate and manage undersea cable protection.734    Such a strategy could include 3 pillars.735    The first pillar is resilience. The United States and its736allies need to develop a more resilient subsea cable737infrastructure. This could include de-risking from Chinese-738owned or -maintained cables and cables that route to mainland739China. This could include building redundancy by laying740additional cables and by establishing back-up sources of741connectivity, such as satellite and microwave links. This could742also include enhanced repair capacity to bring damaged cables743back on line more quickly.744    A more effective approach to resilience cannot only limit745the negative impact from severed cables but also contribute to746deterrence by signaling to adversaries that we can bounce back747from any attack.748    The second pillar is monitoring. The United States and its749allies need to maintain presence near vulnerable cables to750monitor, attribute, interdict, and deter potential attacks. If751adversaries understand that attacks are likely to be752interdicted or attributed, they're less likely to make the753attempt in first place.754    NATO's new ``Baltic Sentry'' mission and Taiwan's stepped-755up Coast Guard patrols show the value of increased presence.756Finnish authorities took physical control of the above-757mentioned oil tanker in December, preventing additional damage.758The Coast Guard could likewise step up patrols. This could be759multidomain and include new technology such as unmanned760systems.761    The third pillar is accountability. If foreign commandos762were to sabotage infrastructure in the United States, we763wouldn't just repair the infrastructure; we'd hold them764accountable. The same logic applies to attacks on subsea765cables. The United States and its allies must find creative766ways to impose costs on states that attack subsea cables as a767tool of statecraft and those who help them carry out attacks.768    I'm honored that the Committee on Homeland Security has769invited me to share my views on these challenges, and I look770forward to taking your questions.771    [The prepared statement of Mr. Kroenig follows:]772                 Prepared Statement of Matthew Kroenig773                           November 20, 2025774    Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Ogles, Ranking Member McIver, Ranking775Member Swalwell, distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for776the opportunity to testify on the important topic of foreign adversary777threats to subsea cable infrastructure.778    I want to assist your work by sharing insights gleaned from my more779than two decades of experience working on U.S. national security policy780at the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, the781Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States,782and now as a professor at Georgetown University, and vice president and783senior director of the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy784and Security.785    I lead a center responsible for global strategy and security, so I786will focus my remarks on the geopolitical and national security787dimensions of this challenge.788    My message today is simple: China's and Russia's threats to subsea789cables present a serious challenge to the global communications and790energy systems that underpin U.S. and allied security, prosperity, and791way of life. The United States needs a more effective strategy to deter792and defeat adversary threats to subsea cables.793    Since World War II, the United States and its allies have built and794defended an international system that has delivered unprecedented795peace, prosperity, and freedom to the American people. The design of796global undersea cable infrastructure was established in a more peaceful797time in which it was assumed that major powers had a shared interest in798cooperation and would behave responsibly.799    Unfortunately, the global security environment has greatly800deteriorated in recent years. The People's Republic of China may pose801the greatest threat the United States has ever faced. It is a802comprehensive challenge that includes economic, technological,803ideological, diplomatic, and military dimensions. Moreover, China is804working in coordination with an Axis of Aggressors, Russia, Iran, North805Korea, and Venezuela.806    China seeks to dominate the digital infrastructure of the 21st807Century, including in subsea cables, to provide it with economic,808espionage, military, and geopolitical advantages.809    China and Russia wage gray zone warfare to coerce vulnerable U.S.810allies and partners and to induce caution in Washington about811intervening on their behalf. Tactics in this war include Russia's812likely involvement with the bombing of a rail line in Poland earlier813this week, China's almost daily military incursions into Taiwan's814territorial waters and air space, and, increasingly, the cutting of815subsea cables.816    Russian-linked vessels have cut many undersea cables in the Baltic817Sea in recent years. On Christmas Day last year, for example, an oil818tanker crossed the Gulf of Finland, damaging four cables. In 2023, PRC-819registered ships severed two undersea cables, forcing Taiwan's Matsu820Islands off-line. The Islands' 14,000 residents spent weeks with821limited connectivity. Sending a simple text message took hours.822    The United States is not immune. As tensions escalate with823Venezuela, for example, a Maduro-linked vessel could drag an anchor off824the U.S. coast, cutting cables in shallow water. There is nothing825technologically difficult about this scenario.826    Moreover, as tensions escalate, there is a risk of major conflict827with China, or Russia, or both simultaneously. In the event of war,828China and Russia could undertake a more systematic campaign to sever829cables to the United States and its allies.830    Roughly 95 percent of global internet traffic relies on undersea831cables. Attacks on these cables disrupt connectivity and with it the832functioning of modern society, including: communications, financial and833business transactions, energy supplies, global supply chains, military834operations, and daily life in general.835    Currently, the United States and its allies lack a coordinated and836effective strategy to deal with this threat. As a starting point,837Congress could task the Executive branch with developing a strategy to838secure subsea cables. It could also designate the Department of839Homeland Security as a single hub to coordinate and manage undersea840cable protection.841    Such a strategy could include three key pillars:842    The first pillar is resilience. The United States and its allies843need to develop a more resilient subsea cable infrastructure. This844could include de-risking from Chinese-owned or -maintained cables and845cables that route to mainland China. This could include building846redundancy by laying additional cables and by establishing back-up847sources of connectivity, such as satellite and microwave links. This848could also include an enhanced repair capacity to bring damaged cables849back on-line more quickly.850    A more effective approach to resilience cannot only limit the851negative impact from severed cables, but also contribute to deterrence852by signaling to adversaries that we can bounce back from any attack.853    A second pillar is monitoring. The United States and its allies854need to maintain presence near vulnerable cables to monitor, attribute,855interdict, and deter potential attacks. If adversaries understand that856attacks are likely to be interdicted or attributed, they are less857likely to make the attempt in the first place. NATO's new Baltic Sentry858mission and Taiwan's stepped-up coast guard patrols show the value of859increased presence. Finnish authorities took physical control of the860above-mentioned oil tanker last December, preventing additional damage.861The U.S. Coast Guard could likewise step up patrols and exercises near862vulnerable subsea cables, especially off the coasts of New York, New863Jersey, Florida, and Southern California. These patrols can be864multidomain and enhanced with new technology, such as unmanned systems865and AI platforms, to help monitor threats to subsea cables.866    The third pillar is accountability. If foreign commandos were to867sabotage infrastructure on the U.S. homeland, Washington would not868limit its response to repairing the damage. It would hold the869perpetrators accountable. The same logic applies to attacks on subsea870cables. The United States and its allies must find creative ways to871impose costs on states that attack subsea cables as a tool of872statecraft and those who help them carry out attacks. Effective873deterrence requires that perpetrators understand that their actions874carry consequences.875    Appended to this statement is a copy of Cyber defense across the876ocean floor: The geopolitics of submarine cable security, an Atlantic877Council report that explores these issues in greater detail and878provides actionable recommendations.879    I am honored that the Committee on Homeland Security has invited me880to share my views on these challenges, and I look forward to taking881your questions.882883    Mr. Ogles [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Kroenig.884    Representative Swalwell is the Ranking Member on the885Cybersecurity Subcommittee. He is unable to attend, so I'm886going to turn to Mr. Walkinshaw to offer an opening statement887on behalf of Ranking Member Swalwell.888    Mr. Walkinshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.889    Thank you to our witnesses for being here today to discuss890an issue that sits at the core of U.S. national security and891economic interests.892    I'll note, this is my first hearing as a Member of the893Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Subcommittee, and I look894forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, and the other895Members of the committee.896    Approximately 97 percent of global data traffic travels897through subsea cables. Those cables support $9 trillion worth898of trade each day, carry sensitive communications for national899defense and intelligence operations, and ensure critical900functions continue to seamlessly operate.901    However, as we've heard, many of those cables are poorly902protected and vulnerable to accidents or negligence. As the903price of uncrewed underwater vehicles decreases, the vehicles904may fall into the hands of non-state actors, enabling them to905dismantle essential global networks.906    The urgency of better securing undersea cables hits close907to home for me. According to a recent study by the Joint908Legislative Audit and Review Commission in Virginia, an909estimated 70 percent of global internet traffic passes through910networks in northern Virginia, including Virginia's 11th911District that I represent.912    That makes our region one of the most important digital913exchange points in the world, connecting Federal agencies,914critical industries, and global communication pathways. The915information moving through these networks depends on the steady916and secure operation of subsea cables that come ashore along917the East Coast. When those links are disrupted, the strain is918felt here at home.919    As we've heard, U.S. adversaries continue to seek920mechanisms to disrupt the system and ensure their targets921remain vulnerable to threats. Russia has invested to develop922platforms to target undersea infrastructure, and the People's923Republic of China has targeted subsea cables to sabotage924Taiwan.925    In late 2024, as we heard from Dr. Kroenig, 2 subsea cables926in the Baltic Sea were severed in close succession, cutting927connections between European nations. Officials in the region928described the events as ``hybrid attacks'' and pointed to929suspicious activity by vessels tied to Russia's shadow fleet.930The interruption triggered rerouting of data traffic across931alternative paths, which produced congestion on major routes932that ultimately connect to the communications infrastructure in933northern Virginia.934    Soon after, another rupture between Estonia and Finland935affected both telecom and energy transmission. Authorities936identified abnormal maritime behavior by another Russian-linked937vessel as the likely cause.938    Earlier this year, Taiwan detained the crew of a Chinese-939operated ship after one of its critical cables near the Matsu940Islands was cut. That incident followed recurring patterns of941anchor-dragging and location-spoofing by vessels operating near942sensitive undersea infrastructure.943    These events reveal a troubling pattern: Foreign944adversaries with both capability and intent are increasingly945probing or threatening these networks.946    The United States must ensure that our defenses and947preparedness match the scale of the threat. The Department of948Homeland Security, CISA, the Coast Guard, and our interagency949partners all have essential roles. But current efforts are950fragmented, and responsibilities are divided across multiple951entities and private operators, which complicates coordination952and slows action during emergencies.953    In considering the roles of these agencies, it's also954important to acknowledge the strain placed on their mission955when resources are diverted from core security956responsibilities. I'm concerned about proposed cuts to957critical-infrastructure programs, including proposed cuts to958Coast Guard operations that are responsible for monitoring959unusual maritime activity around sensitive infrastructure. At a960time when foreign adversaries are probing undersea cables and961testing our resilience, we can't afford to divert attention or962resources away from these priorities.963    This hearing provides an opportunity for bipartisan964leadership. Protecting the systems that carry our965communications, financial transactions, and public safety966information is a shared priority. Every community in our Nation967relies on secure connectivity, and regions like mine in968northern Virginia have especially high stakes and are home to969key stakeholders.970    I look forward to working with my colleagues on both sides971of the aisle to strengthen Federal coordination, support972responsible investments, and ensure that the United States is973prepared to protect this critical infrastructure against974emerging threats.975    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.976    [The statement of Hon. Walkinshaw follows:]977                   Statement of Hon. James Walkinshaw978                           November 20, 2025979    Approximately 97 percent of global data traffic travels through980subsea cables. Subsea cables support $9 trillion worth of trade each981day, carry sensitive communications for national defense and982intelligence operations, and ensure critical functions continue to983seamlessly operate.984    However, many subsea cables are poorly protected and are primarily985vulnerable to accidents or negligence. Although a limited number of986malign actors can deliberately disrupt cables, as the price of uncrewed987underwater vehicles decrease, these vehicles may fall into the hands of988non-state actors enabling them to dismantle essential global networks.989    The urgency of better securing undersea cables hits close to home.990According to a recent study by the Joint Legislative Audit and Review991Commission in Virginia, an estimated 70 percent of global internet992traffic passes through networks in Northern Virginia.993    That makes our region one of the most important digital exchange994points in the world, connecting Federal agencies, critical industries,995and global communication pathways. The information moving through these996networks depends on the steady and secure operation of subsea cables997that come ashore along the East Coast. Regardless of the cause, when998those links are disrupted abroad, the strain is felt here at home. U.S.999adversaries also continue to seek mechanisms to disrupt the entire1000system and ensure their targets remain vulnerable to threats.1001    Russia has spent money to develop platforms to target undersea1002infrastructure and the People's Republic of China has targeted subsea1003cables to sabotage Taiwan. In late 2024, two subsea cables in the1004Baltic Sea were severed in close succession, cutting connections1005between several European nations.1006    Officials in the region described the events as hybrid attacks and1007pointed to suspicious activity by vessels tied to Russia's shadow1008fleet. The interruption triggered rerouting of data traffic across1009alternative paths, which produced congestion on major routes that1010ultimately connect to the communications infrastructure serving1011Northern Virginia. Soon after, another rupture between Estonia and1012Finland affected both telecommunications and energy transmission.1013Authorities identified abnormal maritime behavior by a Russian-linked1014vessel as a likely cause.1015    And earlier this year, Taiwan detained the crew of a Chinese-1016operated ship after one of its critical cables near the Matsu Islands1017was cut. That incident followed recurring patterns of anchor-dragging1018and location-spoofing by vessels operating near sensitive undersea1019infrastructure. These events reveal a troubling pattern. Foreign1020adversaries with both capability and intent are increasingly probing or1021threatening these networks. Some incidents may have been deliberate1022acts, while others may represent reckless behavior intended to signal1023strategic pressure. In either case, the vulnerabilities exposed are1024clear.1025    The United States must ensure that our defenses and preparedness1026match the scale of the threat. The Department of Homeland Security,1027CISA, the Coast Guard, and our interagency partners all have essential1028roles, but current efforts remain fragmented. Responsibilities are1029divided across multiple Federal entities and private operators, which1030complicates coordination and slows action during emergencies. In1031considering the roles of these critical agencies, it is also important1032to acknowledge the strain placed on their missions when resources are1033diverted away from core security responsibilities.1034    The Trump administration has repeatedly proposed cuts to critical1035infrastructure protection programs within the Department of Homeland1036Security and is shifting personnel and funding toward large-scale1037deportation efforts. Those proposals include reductions to CISA's1038cybersecurity programs and cuts to Coast Guard operations that are1039responsible for monitoring unusual maritime activity around sensitive1040infrastructure.1041    This administration's singular and cruel focus on ripping apart1042families is jeopardizing the very capabilities to protect our Nation's1043communications networks. At a time when foreign adversaries are probing1044undersea cables and testing our resilience, we cannot afford to divert1045attention or resources away from these priorities.1046    This hearing provides an opportunity for bipartisan leadership.1047Protecting the systems that carry our communications, financial1048transactions, and public safety information is a shared priority. Every1049community in this country relies on secure connectivity, and regions1050like Northern Virginia have especially high stakes and are home to key1051stakeholders.1052    I look forward to working with my colleagues on both sides of the1053aisle to strengthen Federal coordination, support responsible1054investments, and ensure that the United States is prepared to protect1055this critical infrastructure against emerging threats.10561057    Mr. Ogles. Thank you, Mr. Walkinshaw. Welcome to Congress1058and to the Cybersecurity Subcommittee.1059    Dr. Kroenig, thank you for your testimony.1060    Mr. Stronge, you're recognized for 5 minutes.10611062  STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY STRONGE, CHIEF RESEARCH OFFICER, TELE1063                           GEOGRAPHY10641065    Mr. Stronge. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished1066Members of the committee, thank you for your time today.1067    My name is Tim Stronge, and I'm the chief research officer1068at TeleGeography. We provide the independent data that the1069global communications industry relies on to map and measure the1070internet.1071    I'm here to talk about the physical backbone of the modern1072U.S. economy, submarine fiber-optic cables.1073    The strategic importance of this network boils down to 31074characteristics: They are vulnerable, they are critical, and1075they are irreplaceable.1076    First, vulnerability.1077    I've brought a cable sample with me. Encased inside are1078thin strands of glass, each about the width of a human hair. If1079this looks fragile to you, it's because it is. Individual1080cables are especially vulnerable to damage from fishing gear1081and anchor drags. The global network experiences roughly 2001082faults every year, an average of 4 per week.1083    Second, criticality.1084    My son Kaz is away at college right now in Connecticut, and1085one of our favorite ways of staying connected is to share funny1086videos with each other. Fiber-optic networks make that1087possible.1088    Chairman Ogles, perhaps you already lay awake at night1089fretting over how we must protect our Nation's strategic1090reserve of cat videos. But even if not, it's important to1091understand that cables carry far more than social media and web1092content. They are the backbone of global finance.1093    More than $12 trillion in financial transactions flow over1094these cables each day. Millions of American jobs now depend on1095access to digital infrastructure. The U.S. Government itself is1096heavily reliant on commercial submarine cables.1097    Third, irreplaceability.1098    A common misconception is that satellites are a viable one-1099for-one replacement. They are not. Satellites are a vital back-1100up for mission-essential use, but they cannot replace the sheer1101capacity and cost-efficiency of fiber. Cables carry over 991102percent of all intercontinental data for a simple reason: The1103cost per unit of cable capacity is 2,800 times cheaper than1104satellites.1105    Collectively, these 3 conditions--physical vulnerability,1106high criticality, and economic irreplaceability--might seem1107like a scary mix, but I'm here today with some good news. For a1108cable operator, the loss of revenue streams during down time is1109financially catastrophic. That means that these private1110companies are already powerfully self-incentivized to secure1111their cables.1112    So let's return to that vulnerability. The vast majority of1113those 200 annual faults are accidents. This constant threat has1114compelled the private sector to invest billions of dollars in a1115tangible, layered defense. Companies have built dozens of new1116cables and geographically diverse landing stations to ensure1117that their data always has a back-up path. They've invested in1118costly cable burial. They are innovating with new detection1119technology that uses the fiber itself to sense threats. The1120industry has funded a global fleet of 2 dozen repair vessels on112124/7 standby.1122    Crucially, the strategies built to defend against routine1123accidents will also help to secure the network against1124malicious attacks. However, there are critical gaps where1125Government action is needed.1126    First, designate a single point of contact. We need one1127Federal lead with the dual mandate to shepherd new cable1128projects through the permitting maze and to build a coherent1129national strategy for resilience.1130    Second, strengthen deterrence. Current penalties for cable1131damage date back to an 1884 treaty on telegraph cables, and1132they are woefully, almost comically, insufficient.1133    Finally, help fast-track cable repair abroad. The global1134average delay to begin a repair is now a month-and-a-half. Much1135of that is due to complex permitting in foreign waters. We need1136a diplomatic push to cut the foreign red tape that keeps repair1137ships at port.1138    The industry has already demonstrated its deep commitment1139to cable security. It now looks to Government as a partner to1140help clear the path.1141    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.1142    [The prepared statement of Mr. Stronge follows:]1143                 Prepared Statement of Timothy Stronge1144                           November 20, 20251145    Chairmen, Ranking Members, and distinguished Members of the1146committee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today.1147    My name is Tim Stronge, and I am the chief research officer at1148TeleGeography. We provide the independent data that the global1149communications industry relies on to map and measure the internet.1150    I am here today to talk about the physical backbone of the modern1151U.S. economy: submarine fiber-optic cables. The strategic importance of1152this network boils down to three characteristics: these cables are1153vulnerable, they are critical, and they are irreplaceable.1154    First, vulnerability. I've brought a cable sample with me. Encased1155inside are thin strands of glass, each about the width of a human hair.1156    If this looks fragile to you, that's because it is. Individual1157cables are especially vulnerable to damage from fishing gear and anchor1158drags. The global network experiences roughly 200 faults every year--an1159average of 4 per week.1160    Second, criticality. My son Kaz is away at college in Connecticut.1161One of our favorite ways to stay connected is to share funny videos.1162Fiber-optic networks make that possible. Perhaps you already lay awake1163at night, worrying about how we must protect our Nation's strategic1164reserve of cat videos. But even if not, it's important to understand1165that cables carry far more than social media and web content.1166    They are the backbone of global finance. More than $12 trillion in1167financial transactions flow over these cables each day. Millions of1168American jobs now depend on access to digital infrastructure. The U.S.1169Government, itself, is heavily reliant on commercial submarine cables.1170    Third, irreplaceability. A common misconception is that satellites1171are a viable one-for-one replacement. They are not. Satellites are a1172vital emergency back-up for mission-essential use, but they cannot1173replace the sheer capacity and cost-efficiency of fiber. Cables carry1174over 99 percent of all intercontinental data for a simple reason: the1175cost-per-unit of cable capacity is 2,800 times cheaper than satellites.1176    Collectively, these three conditions--physical vulnerability, high1177criticality, and irreplaceability--might seem like a scary mix.1178    But I am here today with good news. For a cable operator, the loss1179of revenue streams during down time is financially catastrophic. That1180means that these private companies are already powerfully self-1181incentivized to secure their cables.1182    Let's return to that vulnerability. The vast majority of those 2001183annual faults are accidents. This constant threat has compelled the1184private sector to invest billions of dollars in a tangible, layered1185defense.1186    Companies have built dozens of new cables and geographically-1187diverse landing stations to ensure data always has a back-up path.1188Cable operators are innovating with new detection technology that uses1189the fiber itself to sense threats. And they have funded a global fleet1190of two dozen repair vessels on 24/7 standby.1191    Crucially, the strategies built to defend against routine accidents1192will also help to secure the network against malicious attacks.1193    However, there are critical gaps where Government action is needed:1194    1. First, designate a single point of contact for cables. The1195        existing inter-agency permitting process can be confusing and1196        painfully slow. The industry needs one specific Federal lead to1197        shepherd new cable projects.1198    2. Second, strengthen deterrence. Current penalties for damage to1199        cables date back to an 1884 treaty on telegraph cables and are1200        woefully--almost comically--insufficient.1201    3. Third, help fast-track cable repair abroad. The global average1202        delay to begin a repair is now a month and a half. Much of that1203        is due to complex permitting in foreign waters. We need a1204        diplomatic push to cut the foreign red tape keeping repair1205        ships in port.1206    The industry has already demonstrated its deep commitment to cable1207security. It looks to Government as a partner to help clear the path.1208    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.12091210    Mr. Ogles. Mr. Stronge, thank you for your testimony. I,1211too, have a young one, or my oldest, away at college, and I do1212rely on the technology to communicate with her.1213    I now recognize Mr. Botting for 5 minutes to summarize his1214opening statement. Thank you.12151216    STATEMENT OF ALEXANDER BOTTING, SENIOR DIRECTOR, GLOBAL1217         SECURITY AND TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY, VENABLE LLP12181219    Mr. Botting. Chairman Ogles, Ranking Member McIver,1220distinguished Members of the subcommittees, thank you for the1221invitation to appear before you today to discuss the critical1222issue of subsea cable infrastructure security.1223    My name is Alex Botting, and I serve as senior director for1224global security and technology strategy at Venable and as a1225global fellow at NYU's Wahba Institute for Strategic1226Competition.1227    For the past decade, I've worked on issues at the1228intersection of digital technology, telecommunications, and1229security, promoting policies that will make foundational1230digital technologies more secure.1231    Over the past 2 years, I've devoted considerable time to1232the issue of subsea cable security and recently offered a white1233paper on the topic, ``Shoring Up Subsea Cable Security.'' My1234full testimony incorporates the key findings and1235recommendations from that white paper.1236    If I could leave you with just 2 takeaways from today's1237hearing, they would be:1238    No. 1, redundancy is resilience. If cables are abundant and1239repairs are swift, the impact of any incident is limited. This,1240in turn, significantly reduces the incentive for our1241adversaries to engage in sabotage.1242    Accordingly, we should pursue more efficient and1243transparent approval processes for laying and repairing subsea1244cables, while of course maintaining high security standards.1245    Second, our investigations into disruptions to subsea1246cables today are insufficient. Roughly 70 percent of subsea1247cable disruptions are caused by human activity, yet in almost1248all cases we fail to investigate and determine whether the1249damage was due to negligence or malicious intent.1250    If we believe that our adversaries may intend to engage in1251sabotage, we must develop the means to distinguish between1252accidental and intentional disruption and proactively1253investigate human-induced disruptions.1254    As we seek to insulate ourselves against threats from1255adversaries, we should note that the continental United States1256is relatively well-protected against a major outage. We're1257served by almost 100 subsea cable landings, more than any other1258country. These cables land at diverse points across the East1259and West Coasts, markedly reducing the risk that a single1260incident, accidental or intentional, could wipe out our access1261to the global internet. Moreover, in contrast to the radio1262access network market, trusted vendors are today the dominant1263players.1264    But because subsea cables are part of a globally-connected1265ecosystem and because our force projection depends on1266deployments beyond our shores, it's critical that we work not1267only at home but with international partners to promote the1268implementation of best practices in those countries and enhance1269one another's understanding of the threat environment.1270    Subsea cables underpin the global internet, and in an era1271where critical infrastructure is increasingly networked, they1272are foundational to the operation of critical services upon1273which Americans rely every day. Given their criticality, we1274should not take today's security for granted. It is essential1275that we stay ahead of emerging security threats and resilient1276against incidents.1277    My full written testimony provides recommendations for the1278U.S. Government across 3 areas: enhancing the resilience of the1279global ecosystem, protecting individual cables, and1280implementing appropriate legal and institutional frameworks.1281    The implementation of some of these will be led by other1282parts of the U.S. Government that fall outside of the1283committee's jurisdiction, so I'd like to draw your attention to12842 specific recommendations which the Department of Homeland1285Security would be well-positioned to lead as a member of Team1286Telecom and the Sector Risk Management Agency for1287communications, IT, and maritime transportation.1288    First, DHS should collaborate with industry and other U.S.1289Government stakeholders to conduct a comprehensive mapping of1290the submarine cable supply chain to identify potential1291chokepoints or areas of reliance on untrusted vendors and1292advise industry of appropriate risk mitigations.1293    Second, DHS should manage a two-way--sorry--a proactive,1294two-way threat-intelligence-sharing mechanism with trusted1295cable providers and vendors to preempt potential attacks and1296support the evidentiary body needed to prosecute criminal1297activity.1298    I hope that the committee will consider and implement these1299recommendations, which will better position us to address1300threats to subsea cable infrastructure as they arise from1301foreign adversaries.1302    Thank you.1303    [The prepared statement of Mr. Botting follows:]1304                Prepared Statement of Alexander Botting1305                            opening remarks1306    Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Ogles, Ranking Member McIver, and1307Ranking Member Swalwell, distinguished Members of the subcommittees,1308thank you for the invitation to appear before you today to discuss the1309critical issue of subsea cable infrastructure security.1310    My name is Alex Botting and I serve as senior director for global1311security & technology strategy at Venable LLP and as a global fellow at1312NYU's Wahba Institute for Strategic Competition. For the past decade,1313I've worked on issues at the intersection of digital technology,1314telecommunications, and security--promoting policies that will make1315foundational digital technologies more secure.1316    Over the past 2 years, I've devoted considerable time to the issue1317of subsea cable security and recently authored a white paper on the1318topic entitled ``Shoring Up Subsea Security.'' My testimony1319incorporates the key findings and recommendations from that white1320paper.1321    If I could leave you with just two takeaways from today's hearing,1322they would be:1323    1. Redundancy is resilience. If cables are abundant and repairs are1324        swift, the impact of any incident is limited. This, in turn,1325        significantly reduces the incentive for our adversaries to1326        engage in sabotage. Accordingly, we should pursue more1327        efficient and transparent approvals processes for laying and1328        repairing subsea cables, while of course maintaining high1329        security standards.1330    2. Our investigations into disruptions to subsea cables are1331        insufficient. Roughly 70 percent of subsea cable disruptions1332        are caused by human activity. Yet, in almost all cases we fail1333        to investigate negligence or malicious intent. If we believe1334        that our adversaries may intend to engage in sabotage, we must1335        develop the means to distinguish between accidental and1336        intentional disruption and proactively investigate human-1337        induced disruptions.1338    The following testimony provides recommendations for the U.S.1339Government across three areas: enhancing the resilience of the global1340subsea cable ecosystem; ensuring the security of individual submarine1341cables against known threats; and implementing appropriate legal and1342institutional frameworks.1343    The implementation of some will be led by U.S. Government agencies1344which fall outside of this committee's jurisdiction. I'd like to draw1345your attention to two specific recommendations which the Department of1346Homeland Security (DHS) would be well-positioned to lead as a member of1347Team Telecom and the Sector Risk Management Agency for Communications,1348IT, and Maritime Transportation.1349   DHS should collaborate with industry and other U.S.1350        Government stakeholders to conduct a comprehensive mapping of1351        the submarine cable supply chain to identify potential choke1352        points or areas of reliance on untrusted vendors and ensure1353        that appropriate risk mitigations are in place.1354   DHS should manage a proactive two-way intelligence-sharing1355        mechanism with trusted cable developers and vendors to pre-empt1356        potential attacks, and support the evidentiary body needed to1357        prosecute criminal activity.1358    As we seek to insulate ourselves against threats from our1359adversaries, we should note that the continental United States is quite1360well-protected against a major subsea cable outage. We are served by1361almost 100 subsea cable landings, more than any other country. These1362cables land at diverse points on the East and West coasts, markedly1363reducing the risk that a single incident inhibits our access to the1364global internet. Moreover, in contrast to the Radio Access Network1365market, trusted vendors are the dominant players.1366    Because subsea cables are part of a globally-connected ecosystem,1367and U.S. force projection depends upon deployments beyond our shores,1368it's critical that we work with international partners to promote the1369implementation of policy best practices, and enhance one another's1370understanding of the threat environment.1371    Subsea cables underpin the global internet and, in an era where1372critical infrastructure is increasingly networked, they are1373foundational to the operation of critical services upon which we rely1374every day. Given their criticality, we should not take today's security1375for granted. It is essential that we stay ahead of emerging security1376threats and resilient against incidents. Doing so will require robust1377multi-stakeholder and multi-country cooperation.1378                    why subsea cables are essential1379    There are few technologies more foundational to the modern economy1380than subsea cables. As of 2024, 5\1/2\ billion people had access to the1381global internet and the associated economic benefits. A network of 5971382subsea fiber optic cables,\1\ largely operated by the private sector,1383enable them to do so by carrying more than 95 percent of1384intercontinental data traffic.\2\ Beyond use by individuals, subsea1385cables are essential to the operation of critical sectors including1386financial services, defense, and telecommunications.1387---------------------------------------------------------------------------1388    \1\ TeleGeography, Submarine Cable Map 2025, https://submarine-1389cable-map-2025.telegeogra- phy.com/.1390    \2\ TeleGeography, ``Submarine Cable Frequently Asked Questions,''1391(last accessed Nov. 17, 2025). www2.telegeography.com/submarine-cable-1392faqs-frequently asked-questions.1393---------------------------------------------------------------------------1394    Today the most advanced cables can transmit more than 350 terabits1395per second along the ocean floor, equivalent to ``the entire digitized1396Library of Congress three times every second.''\3\ This achievement is1397driven by investments in technological innovation and the global1398economy's insatiable demand for data, which has risen from roughly 1001399gigabytes of traffic per day in 1992,\4\ to an estimated 495.89 million1400terabytes per day in 2025.\5\1401---------------------------------------------------------------------------1402    \3\ Chris Ciauri, ``The Dunant subsea cable, connecting the US and1403mainland Europe, is ready for service,'' Google, Feb. 3, 2021,1404cloud.google.com/blog/products/infrastructure/googles-dunant-subsea-1405cable-is-now-ready-for-service.1406    \4\ UNCTAD, Global efforts needed to spread digital economy1407benefits https://unctad.org/news/global-efforts-needed-spread-digital-1408economy-benefits-un-report-says.1409    \5\ https://www.statista.com/statistics/871513/worldwide-data-1410created/.1411---------------------------------------------------------------------------1412    With advanced-AI workloads introducing new demands for the movement1413of data, global demand will continue to grow significantly in the years1414ahead. There is no feasible pathway to meet this demand that does not1415include significant investment in subsea cable infrastructure.1416    The rapid deployment of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites is an1417impressive technological feat, but as of 2024 the combined capacity of1418every SpaceX satellite was a little under 350 terabits per second.\6\ A1419single cutting-edge cable such as the ``Grace Hopper'', meanwhile, can1420transmit 352 terabits of data per second.\7\ As modern societies come1421to depend ever more on data and computing capabilities, the ``cloud1422under the sea'' is indispensable to the operation of a modern economy.1423---------------------------------------------------------------------------1424    \6\ Universe Space Tech, ``SpaceX presents Starlink V3 satellites1425with 1 Tbps speeds,'' Jan 7, 2025, https://universemagazine.com/en/1426spacex-presents-starlink-v3-satellites-with-1-tbps-speeds/1427?srsltid=AfmBOor-h6nkfdYkNrl-hH5gyGg_XH6PFBeM00ZrWa_FyOtc4ecNdVBE.1428    \7\ Federal Communications Commission, Report No. SCL-00352 Actions1429Taken Under Cable Landing License Act, Jan. 14, 2022, https://1430docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-22-143144A1_Rcd.pdf#::text=Cable%20Design%20and%20Capacity:%20Grace%20Hopper%214320will- ,system%20design%20capacity%20of%20approximately%20352%20Tbps.1433---------------------------------------------------------------------------1434    Given the critical function that they fulfill, submarine cables1435should be, and in many countries are, categorized as critical1436infrastructure themselves. This designation affords them additional1437attention from industry and Government stakeholders to ensure their on-1438going security and resilience.1439         the threat environment for subsea cable infrastructure1440    Owing to the vast distances that they cover, subsea cables are1441inherently vulnerable to accidental damage, natural disasters, or1442malicious interference. Across the 597 cables in operation today,1443roughly 150-200 incidents impact their operations during a typical1444year, according to the International Cable Protection Committee1445(ICPC).\8\1446---------------------------------------------------------------------------1447    \8\ International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), Media1448Enquiries & Frequently Asked Question, May 16, 2025, https://1449www.iscpc.org/news/media-enquiries/.1450---------------------------------------------------------------------------1451    Recent disruptions to cables and rising geopolitical tensions have1452spurred governments to intensify scrutiny of submarine cable accidents.1453Public reporting that China has developed a cable-cutting device1454capable of severing highly-fortified cables at a depth of 4,000 meters1455has amplified concerns.\9\ As has the discovery of ``Project Harmony'',1456a seabed sensor network established by Russia.\10\ Concerns have been1457amplified further by high-profile instances of cable disruptions in the1458Baltic Sea \11\ and the Taiwan Strait,\12\ the latter of which saw more1459cable disruptions in January 2025 than in either 2023 or 2024.1460---------------------------------------------------------------------------1461    \9\ The Diplomat, ``China's new deep-sea cutting tool exposes1462vulnerability of undersea cables,'' April 16, 2025, https://1463thediplomat.com/2025/04/chinas-new-deep-sea-cutting-tool-exposes-1464vulnerability-of-undersea-cables/.1465    \10\ International Consortium of Investigative Journalists,1466``Russia secretly acquired Western technology to protect its nuclear1467submarine fleet,'' Oct. 23, 2025, https://www.icij.org/investigations/1468russia-archive/russia-secretly-acquired-western-technology-to-protect-1469its-nuclear-submarine-fleet/.1470    \11\ Associated Press, ``Sweden seizes vessel suspected of1471`sabotage' after undersea data cable rupture in Baltic Sea,'' Jan. 27,14722025, https://apnews.com/article/latvia-denmark-underwater-cable-1473damage-investigation-63da5ef0d577bca12bbe118d527d3a14.1474    \12\ ABC News, ``Taiwan detains China-linked cargo ship after1475undersea cable disconnected,'' Feb. 25, 2025, https://www.abc.net.au/1476news/2025-02-25/taiwan-detains-china-linked-ship-after-undersea-cable-1477incident/104981932.1478---------------------------------------------------------------------------1479    In an era of deep mistrust, it is easy to overstate the extent of1480exploitation occurring today. Yet, while sabotage may occur, it is in1481all likelihood rare. According to ICPC, the vast majority of1482incidents--approximately 70 percent in any given year--are caused by1483physical damage from fishing activity or anchoring.\13\ The remainder1484result from natural events (such as storms or earthquakes), abrasion,1485or internal system failures. These incidents are longstanding and1486typically well-managed.1487---------------------------------------------------------------------------1488    \13\ ICPC, ``Charting submarine cables is critical for maritime1489safety & infrastructure protection,'' June 25, 2025, https://1490www.iscpc.org/publications/icpc-viewpoints/charting-submarine-cables-1491is-critical-for-maritime-safety-and-infrastructure-protection/.1492---------------------------------------------------------------------------1493    Beyond cuts to subsea cables, there is a theoretical risk of data1494interception on a subsea cable. As noted on pages 12-13, at this time1495this is unlikely to be implemented in practice without detection.1496Nevertheless, while the risk of exploitation is low today, public and1497private-sector stakeholders should continue to assess the capabilities1498of adversaries, informed by government intelligence where possible, and1499adjust their assessment of the risk accordingly.1500    Finally, there is the risk that untrusted vendors in subsea cable1501supply chains could compromise the confidentiality of data, or1502availability of networks. This issue parallels the challenges faced1503during the rollout of 5G communications when Chinese companies like1504Huawei and ZTE leveraged government subsidies to dominate the1505telecommunications market, especially in emerging economies.1506    China continues to lead in advanced optical communications1507research, producing 37.7 percent of the field's research compared to1508just 12.8 percent from the United States, underscoring the urgency for1509democratic nations to restrict untrusted vendors from developing and1510controlling optical core network infrastructure.\14\ Today, trusted1511vendors maintain a technological advantage and a leading market1512position, but we should not take this for granted.1513---------------------------------------------------------------------------1514    \14\ Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Critical1515Technology Tracker, March 1, 2023, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/1516critical-technology-tracker/#6a5a9bb3-c58e-4909-85f4-78bd8- 75c0a80-1517link.1518---------------------------------------------------------------------------1519                 promoting resilience in the ecosystem1520Cable Redundancy1521    Building redundancy into submarine cable routes is vital for the1522resilience and reliability of global communications. If cables are1523abundant and repairs are swift, cuts will have limited practical1524impact. This significantly reduces the incentive for our adversaries to1525engage in sabotage.1526    To enhance resilience, companies design networks such that each1527node connects to at least two others, allowing traffic rerouting. They1528also seek to ensure that the supply of capacity stays ahead of demand1529at both a local and global level. The building of new cables is1530resource-intensive, however, often requiring hundreds of millions of1531dollars in investment.1532    Cumbersome and opaque permitting and licensing regimes add to1533expense and extend the time line for deployments, discouraging1534investment. In the United States, permitting time lines have stretched1535from under a year to over 3 years, involving up to 11 agencies with1536overlapping mandates for environmental, historical, and national1537security concerns.\15\ Moreover, national security reviews are often1538slow and can result in the denial of a landing license after years of1539investment, where Government guidance earlier in the process could have1540redirected cable operators to more palatable routes or partners.1541---------------------------------------------------------------------------1542    \15\ Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Priorities for DHS1543Engagement on Subsea Cable Security & Resilience, Dec. 18, 2024,1544www.dhs.gov/publication/priorities-dhs-engagement-subsea-cable-1545security-resilience.1546---------------------------------------------------------------------------1547    This lack of coordination, transparency, and predictability creates1548uncertainty, deters investors, and can even increase vulnerability1549through geographic clustering. Enhancing transparency with trusted1550private-sector partners and streamlining permitting and licensing1551processes, while maintaining security standards, is thus critical to1552enhancing resilience.1553    In instances where laying additional subsea cables isn't1554commercially feasible, such as in remote islands, governments and1555development partners should explore alternative financing mechanisms or1556satellite-based alternatives to subsea cables to ensure resilience1557against single points of failure.1558Recommendations1559    1. The U.S. Government should ensure that permit requirements for1560        the installation and repair of submarine cables are transparent1561        and establish clear time frames for approvals that are as short1562        as possible, without undermining security.1563    2. The U.S. Government should enhance clarity and predictability of1564        rules, partners, and geographies that will factor into1565        approvals decisions, and promote transparency between national1566        security agencies and submarine cable developers about security1567        risks.1568    3. The U.S. Government should establish and communicate clear1569        security and resilience requirements which are aligned with1570        international standards and harmonized with national security1571        review processes.1572Effective route planning1573    At a global level, route diversity is a common best practice as it1574allows data to reroute around damaged segments, reducing disruption and1575deterring sabotage. Within a given country's EEZ, however, governments1576and industry may decide between diversifying cable routes and landings1577or concentrating them in Cable Protection Zones (CPZs).\16\1578---------------------------------------------------------------------------1579    \16\ International Cable Protection Committee, Government Best1580Practices for Protecting and Promoting Resilience of Submarine1581Telecommunications Cables Version 1.2, (last accessed Nov. 17, 2025),1582pg. 3, https://www.iscpc.org/documents/?id=3733.1583---------------------------------------------------------------------------1584    While diversification minimizes the impact of an individual1585incident, it's not always feasible for countries with limited1586coastline, crowded marine environments, or facing hostile maritime1587disputes, such as the South China Sea. Where diversification isn't1588possible, Cable Protection Zones (CPZs) can safeguard concentrated1589routes by restricting anchoring and fishing. Governments must, however,1590enforce protection measures and penalize violations to reduce the risk1591that one event could damage multiple systems.1592    Ultimately, the United States' current approach of diversifying1593cable routes and landings is the most appropriate for its1594circumstances.1595Recommendations1596    4. The U.S. Government should foster commercial and regulatory1597        conditions that support the development of diverse submarine1598        cable landing sites and pathways, including streamlining1599        permitting approvals processes.1600    5. The U.S. Government should establish regulatory frameworks that1601        embed submarine cable considerations into marine spatial1602        planning processes, ensuring early-stage coordination with1603        submarine cable stakeholders during the planning and1604        development of other marine activities.1605    6. The U.S. Government should coordinate with trusted international1606        partners to harmonize (to the extent possible) licensing and1607        permitting requirements.1608Facilitating timely cable repairs1609    Fast, efficient repairs limit the disruption from security1610incidents, yet cabotage laws, permitting delays, customs fees, high1611costs, and limited repair vessels slow recovery efforts on many cables1612today. Although most systems can be repaired within 2 weeks, recent1613data show average repair times now go beyond that, owing to delays1614caused by permitting, weather, or backlogs.\17\1615---------------------------------------------------------------------------1616    \17\ Recorded Future, Submarine Cables Face Increasing Threats Amid1617Geopolitical Tensions and Limited Repair Capacity, July 17, 2025,1618https://assets.recordedfuture.com/insikt-report-pdfs/2025/ta-2025-16190717.pdf.1620---------------------------------------------------------------------------1621    The imposition of cabotage requirements, which mandate the use of1622locally-built and crewed vessels, is a problem at a global level. These1623rules increase costs, delay urgent repairs, and conflict with1624international law under UNCLOS, which affirms freedom to maintain1625cables in international and exclusive economic zones.\18\1626---------------------------------------------------------------------------1627    \18\ ICPC, Government Best Practices, pg. 9.1628---------------------------------------------------------------------------1629    Likewise, mandatory port calls and customs duties add unnecessary1630delays and costs. Streamlining entry procedures and eliminating taxes1631and tariffs on repair operations accelerates service restoration.1632Establishing free ports with bonded storage facilities further reduces1633friction, allowing secure, duty-free storage of repair materials until1634needed.1635    Recommendations:1636    7. The U.S. Government should actively engage with international1637        partners to address barriers to cable repair, which not only1638        impair local capacity but also undermine the resilience of the1639        global ecosystem. This includes:1640     7.1 Refraining from classifying submarine cable1641            installation and repair activities as cabotage and from1642            imposing cabotage or crewing restrictions on repair1643            vessels.1644     7.2 Eliminating port entry requirements for cable ships1645            engaged in installation or repair operations.1646     7.3 Avoid imposing customs duties, taxes, and fees on1647            submarine cable installation and repair activities, by1648            enabling the establishment of Free Ports with bonded1649            storage facilities at vessel base ports to facilitate1650            deployment and expedite repairs.1651Global repair ship capacity1652    The global fleet of repair ships is limited in size and distributed1653across the globe, which can cause delays in remote or high-traffic1654areas. Although most repair operations are handled by trusted entities,1655we do rely on a narrow vendor base that includes as least one untrusted1656vendor--China's S.B. Submarine Systems (SBSS)--which participates in1657repair efforts in the North Pacific region.\19\1658---------------------------------------------------------------------------1659    \19\ The Wall Street Journal, ``U.S. Fears Undersea Cables are1660Vulnerable to Espionage from Chinese Repair Ships,'' May 19, 2024,1661https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/china-internet-cables-1662repair-ships-93fd6320?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqfyEGd0IiscfyyxW9hIWjo-166381A0KIhm6vclhvq9qX5Dqz5-1664zFdPBaDY037Uqm0Y%3D&gaa_ts=691b909c&gaa_sig=pdns- 4KMa_RE6jXl2cxwWTF-1665glzZzsrrZRQAdpCfsf6n2ZsYAsMqHUR5gu_R7fatAnf8Qg4vv_GmY-H4O3q3gtw%3D%3D.1666---------------------------------------------------------------------------1667    The U.S. established the Cable Security Fleet (CSF) in 2021, to1668ensure rapid response and repair capacity during emergencies. While1669this program strengthens U.S. capabilities, each new repair ship costs1670over $100 million, requiring a long-term commitment.\20\1671---------------------------------------------------------------------------1672    \20\ Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS),1673Safeguarding Subsea Cables: Protecting Cyber Infrastructure amid Great1674Power Competition, August 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/1675safeguarding-subsea-cables-protecting-cyber-infrastructure-amid-great-1676power-competition. Governments should ensure private-sector involvement1677in developing public policy initiatives to boost repair, to ensure that1678they do not inadvertently reduce incentives for private industry to1679invest in and maintain commercial repair capacity.1680---------------------------------------------------------------------------1681    Instead, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security should1682collaborate with industry to develop an emergency response capability,1683designed for targeted interventions in exceptional circumstances, such1684as major natural disasters or acts of sabotage.1685Recommendations:1686    8. The U.S. Government should co-develop a strategy with industry1687        for emergency cable repair capacity, to enable additional1688        Government resources to be deployed in the event of a wide-1689        spread disruption to cables.1690    9. The U.S. Government should streamline regulatory frameworks to1691        ensure efficient cable repair, while maintaining security and1692        transparency. This includes improving permitting and liability1693        regimes.1694Secure and trusted supply chains1695    Resilience is dependent upon access to uninterrupted provision of1696the trusted components necessary for laying, repairing, and maintaining1697submarine cables. Today, global repair and installation capacity is1698concentrated among a few providers, leaving little room for expansion1699and creating potential chokepoints. Because no single country has1700enough repair demand to sustain its own market, operators rely on1701regional maintenance agreements to share ships and resources.1702    Within subsea cable infrastructure supply chains, potential market1703dominance by untrusted vendors, especially Chinese state-backed firms,1704poses a strategic risk. As seen during the 5G rollout with Huawei and1705ZTE, such control can enable authoritarian influence over global1706communications.1707    While trusted vendors lead the market today, China's leadership in1708optical communications research, producing nearly 38 percent of global1709output versus 13 percent from the United States, underscores the need1710for the United States to invest in innovation, strengthen domestic R&D,1711and avoid dependency on Chinese vendors.\21\ Collaboration between1712cable operators and governments to mitigate these risks is critical.1713---------------------------------------------------------------------------1714    \21\ Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Critical1715Technology Tracker, March 1, 2023, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/1716critical-technology-tracker/#6a5a9bb3-c58e-4909-85f4-78bd875- c0a80-1717link.1718---------------------------------------------------------------------------1719Recommendations:1720    10. DHS should collaborate with industry to conduct a comprehensive1721        mapping of the submarine cable supply chain to identify1722        potential choke points or areas of reliance on untrusted1723        vendors and ensure that appropriate risk mitigations are in1724        place.1725    11. The U.S. Government should maintain a published list of1726        untrusted providers which will guide industry in the1727        development of their supply chain partnerships.1728    12. The U.S. Government and trusted industry partners should1729        cooperate on sharing risk and incident data to identify1730        protection gaps, enhance resilience, and detect and prevent1731        malicious activities by state and non-state actors.1732             enhancing the security of cable infrastructure1733    Submarine cables are engineered to withstand extreme underwater1734conditions, protected by multiple layers of insulation and armoring.1735While they rest along the seabed in deeper waters, they are typically1736buried 0.5-3 meters deep when at less than 1,500 meters to protect1737against damage.\22\ Despite these measures, cables remain vulnerable to1738natural, accidental, and intentional harm.1739---------------------------------------------------------------------------1740    \22\ ICPC, Government Best Practices, pg. 2.1741---------------------------------------------------------------------------1742    Events such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, and1743underwater landslides occasionally damage cables, though less1744frequently than human activity. The most prevalent cause of disruption,1745however, is human disruption caused by fishing and anchoring, which1746accounts for roughly 70 percent of cable breaks annually.\23\1747---------------------------------------------------------------------------1748    \23\ ICPC, Government Best Practices, pg. 1.1749---------------------------------------------------------------------------1750    Several mitigations are available and are being utilized to address1751these risks, particularly those related to accidental and intentional1752human activities. The most obvious measure is armoring cables for1753tensile and impact resistance.1754    Beyond physical reinforcement, Automated Identification Systems1755(AIS) or Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) can be used to provide real-1756time alerts regarding vessel movements, which facilitates better cable1757protection.\24\ It also aids the investigation of incidents after they1758occur.1759---------------------------------------------------------------------------1760    \24\ ICPC, Government Best Practices, pg. 2.1761---------------------------------------------------------------------------1762Recommendations:1763    13. Industry should continue to armor cables deployed shallower1764        than 1,500 meters.1765    14. The U.S. Government should ensure the use of AIS tracking1766        devices by vessels is mandatory in national law and enforce its1767        use in accordance with IMO regulations.1768    15. Governments should explore making the use of VMS tracking1769        mandatory within their EEZ to enhance visibility of activity1770        near submarine cables, and enforcement against negligent1771        activities.1772Physical Security of Landing Stations1773    Of the world's 1.5 million kilometers of submarine fiber-optic1774cables, all connect to land through roughly 1,400 Cable Landing1775Stations (CLS). These shoreline facilities link subsea cables to1776terrestrial infrastructure--such as fiber-optic networks and1777satellites--that carry data to users and data centers. Like other1778critical infrastructure, CLS facilities face risks from natural hazards1779such as hurricanes, wildfires, and earthquakes, as well as intentional1780threats from malicious actors. A 2017 U.S. Government report identified1781landing stations as ``the most accessible and impact-rich targets''\25\1782within global communications systems.1783---------------------------------------------------------------------------1784    \25\ CRS, Protection of Undersea Telecommunication Cables, pg. 6.1785---------------------------------------------------------------------------1786    While internet traffic can often be rerouted through other1787terrestrial or subsea pathways, damage to a major CLS that connects1788multiple cables can still cause widespread outages.\26\ For this1789reason, network designers build redundancy by diversifying cable routes1790and landing points.1791---------------------------------------------------------------------------1792    \26\ Data Center Dynamics, ``What is a cable landing station?''1793---------------------------------------------------------------------------1794    Protection of CLS sites is relatively comprehensive due to their1795fixed locations and clearer jurisdictional control. Standard safeguards1796include physical security measures--such as surveillance, access1797control, and intrusion detection--as well as resilience planning for1798energy supply and disaster impacts. Together, these practices form a1799mature framework for protecting critical coastal infrastructure that1800underpins global connectivity.1801Recommendations:1802    16. The U.S. Government should work with industry to define clear1803        security best practices for cable landing stations and work1804        cooperatively to implement risk-based measures that enhance the1805        overall resilience and security.1806Interception of Data on Cables1807    Given the technical complexity of this type of espionage, the1808theoretical risk is unlikely to be implemented effectively at this time1809for three reasons: it requires enormous technical and financial1810resources, the sheer data volume makes useful extraction nearly1811impossible, and any physical interference will create detectable1812anomalies in the cable's performance.1813    Interfering with active cables post-deployment, however, is highly1814complex and limited to nation-states with advanced resources. There are1815reasonable concerns about Chinese-operated vessels like SBSS \27\ and1816research ships such as Tan Suo Yi Hao \28\ conducting suspicious1817activities near major cable routes. Yet much of the data that traverses1818networks today is encrypted. Even attempts to pursue a ``harvest now,1819decrypt later''\29\ strategy would require sufficient storage to retain1820up to 352 TBPS of data, overwhelming the resources of even the most1821well-resourced actors and creating a ``needle in a haystack'' problem.1822Moreover, any attempts to tamper with the cable undersea would likely1823create anomalies in the light passing through the cable, which would be1824captured by the modems.1825---------------------------------------------------------------------------1826    \27\ Daniel Runde et. al., Safeguarding Subsea Cables: Protecting1827Cyber Infrastructure amid Great Power Competition, CSIS, Aug. 2024, pg.18284., www.csis.org/analysis/safeguarding-subsea-cables-protecting-cyber-1829infrastructure-amid-great-power-competition.1830    \28\ Samantha Dick and Stephen Dziedzic, ``Dutton says Chinese1831research ship is collecting intelligence, mapping undersea cables,''1832ABC News, Mar. 31, 2025, www.abc.net.au/news/2025-04-01/dutton-says-1833chinese-research-ship-mapping-undersea-cables/105122068.1834    \29\ K.F. Hasan et al., A Framework for Migrating to Post-Quantum1835Cryptography: Security Dependency Analysis and Case Studies, IEEE1836Access, Feb. 16, 2024, pg. 23431.1837---------------------------------------------------------------------------1838    To mitigate future threats, data owners should implement strong1839encryption in transit and plan migration to post-quantum cryptography.1840Ultimately, however, given the vast resources required and without a1841clear path to generating usable information, the risk associated with1842cable `tapping' remains very low and the efforts of adversarial nation-1843states are likely to be directed toward more accessible targets.1844    Vulnerabilities could, however, be introduced during manufacturing1845or storage. Cable components kept in depots, such as China's Wujing1846Depot, may face higher tampering risks due to weaker security controls.1847While there is currently limited public evidence of exploitation, the1848long-term storage of components in jurisdictions of strategic concern1849warrants continued vigilance and mitigation of risks.1850Recommendations:1851    17. Industry owners of data should continue to implement1852        comprehensive data risk mitigation frameworks including, where1853        feasible, encrypting data in transit.1854    18. The U.S. Government and industry owners of data should ensure1855        timely transition to quantum-resistant algorithms when1856        encrypting sensitive data.1857    19. DHS should work with industry to map potential supply chain1858        risks, to include those to the repair supply chain.1859Emerging Detection Capabilities1860    One emerging technology--fiber sensing--can also play a role in1861improving real-time incident detection. Fiber sensing leverages the1862optical transmission technology used by modern cables to send1863information between endpoints. The oscillation direction of the1864electric field, known as the State of Polarization (SOP), changes as1865the light propagates. The SOP is sensitive to external stimuli, such as1866the pressure and physical movements experienced by the fiber, enabling1867fiber sensing technologies integrated into modems to monitor and detect1868variations to the SOP.\30\1869---------------------------------------------------------------------------1870    \30\ Brian Lavallee, ``Detecting Undersea Earthquakes with Cross-1871Industry Collaboration,'' Ciena, Feb. 22, 2024, https://www.ciena.com/1872insights/articles/2022/detecting-undersea-earthquakes-with-cross-1873industry-collaboration.1874---------------------------------------------------------------------------1875    By analyzing these changes, operators can gain valuable insights1876into the physical movements or disturbances affecting the cable,1877enabling real-time detection of tampering or damage. Beyond detecting1878damage to cables after they have gone off-line, fiber sensing can1879provide insights into underwater activity in the vicinity of submarine1880cables. This could improve investigations, support attribution of1881incidents, and increase accountability, thereby enhancing deterrence.1882    Additionally, fiber sensing can serve as an early warning system1883for natural hazards. For example, changes in the SOP of a particular1884submarine cable caused by an underwater earthquake could provide1885information to early warnings of tsunamis, allowing governments to1886mitigate harms to populated areas.1887    While fiber sensing may enhance situational awareness and cable1888protection, however, its deployment raises important legal1889considerations. Adding fiber sensing to a cable may reclassify it from1890a purely telecommunications cable to a measurement device. To enable1891the wide-spread use of fiber sensing on cables crossing such1892jurisdictions, further clarification of UNCLOS provisions will be1893necessary to ensure continued compliance with international law.1894Recommendations:1895    20. The U.S. Government and industry should continue to invest in1896        research and development (R&D) to advance fiber sensing1897        capabilities and establish clear guidance on the approvals1898        process for, and use of, fiber sensing solutions.1899    21. The U.S. Government and industry should explore potential1900        information-sharing agreements to leverage real-time data1901        regarding imminent natural disasters.1902             implementing legal & institutional frameworks1903Domestic Legal Frameworks1904    Legal and institutional frameworks play a critical role in1905reinforcing risk mitigation and deterrence. If designed effectively,1906they will catalyze security and resilience efforts by promoting1907awareness of risks, enhancing multi-stakeholder coordination, reducing1908instances of unintentional disruption, and adequately deterring acts of1909aggression.1910    Governments can play a constructive role first by enhancing1911transparency around national security priorities. For example,1912publishing clear guidance on high-risk countries, prohibited equipment,1913and entities and countries of concern would help infrastructure1914operators make informed decisions.1915    Second, by implementing national obligations under 1884 and UNCLOS.1916Article II of the former states that it's ``a punishable offence to1917break or injure a submarine cable, willfully or by culpable negligence,1918in such a manner as might interrupt or obstruct telegraphic1919communication.''\31\ Article 113 of UNCLOS, meanwhile, requires1920countries to adopt laws to punish people or ships under its1921jurisdiction for damaging or breaking submarine cables on the high1922seas, whether ``done willfully or through culpable negligence.''\32\1923Yet while on the surface this provides a robust enforcement framework,1924in reality it is enforced sporadically.1925---------------------------------------------------------------------------1926    \31\ 1884 Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph1927Cables, Mar. 14, 1884, p. 2, https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/19282019/02/1884-Convention-for-the-Protection-of-Submarine-Telegraph-1929Cables-1.pdf.1930    \32\ United Nations, Convention on the Law of the Sea, pg. 64.1931---------------------------------------------------------------------------1932    Third, by enforcing IMO-required use of Automatic Identification1933Systems (AIS). AIS is required to be fitted on most large ships. Yet1934according to a recent study, enforcement is poor and ``sanctions are1935not severe enough to act as deterrents.''\33\ Many vessels deactivate1936AIS to evade detection while illegally fishing in protected areas or to1937avoid revealing lucrative fishing areas to competitors.\34\1938---------------------------------------------------------------------------1939    \33\ Priyal Bunwaree, The Illegality of Fishing Vessels `Going1940Dark' and Methods of Deterrence, Cambridge University Press, Jan. 11,19412023, pg. 1911942    \34\ Oceana, ``Avoiding Detection Global Case Studies.''1943---------------------------------------------------------------------------1944    Finally, governments should ensure coordinated use of the1945territorial seabed. This can be done by mandating educational programs1946for maritime employees via local marine and fishing authorities, to1947ensure they are aware of key cable pathways, charting requirements, and1948measures to avoid accidental disruption.1949    Where fishing vessels are negligent in applying these measures,1950penalties should be enforced, even in cases of accidental disruption,1951to incentivize compliance. Due to the inherently cross-border nature of1952this infrastructure, the United States should also promote their1953implementation by foreign governments.1954Recommendations:1955    22. The U.S. Government should implement national obligations under1956        1884 and UNCLOS, where applicable.1957    23. The U.S. Government should ensure IMO-required use of Automatic1958        Identification System (AIS) tracking.1959    24. The U.S. Government should ensure that charting authorities1960        update nautical charts regularly; ensure implementation of the1961        amended IHO Resolution 4/1967; and mandate educational programs1962        for employees of maritime vessels.1963    25. The U.S. Government should establish and rigorously enforce1964        penalties for the disruption of cables through negligence and1965        encourage international partners to do the same.1966International Collaboration1967    Effective deterrence necessitates the ability to monitor,1968intercept, and penalize vessels that may cause disruption within the1969territorial sea. The cable ecosystem covers such vast territory,1970however, that it would require an unfeasible number of resources for1971countries to patrol the high seas individually.1972    The U.S. Government should work with international partners,1973leverage existing security mechanisms such as NATO or the Quad, to1974establish a multilateral mechanism for conducting patrols, focused on1975high-risk areas. These include regions that are experiencing acute1976geopolitical instability (e.g. Baltic Sea), have cables that are more1977physically exposed (e.g. Red Sea), or are key fulcrums for the global1978ecosystem (e.g. Straits of Malacca).1979    Supporting these efforts, governments should establish or expand1980mechanisms for intelligence sharing with trusted partners to pre-empt1981potential attacks, adapt patrol activities accordingly, and support the1982evidentiary body needed to convict saboteurs. While the private sector1983has proven itself adept at ensuring continuity of service during past1984outages, only governments can conduct the kind of operational1985activities needed to deter acts of international negligence or1986aggression.1987    Beyond operational collaboration, there are critical gaps in the1988existing international legal architecture for submarine cables. Even if1989like-minded countries enforce their obligations under 1884 and UNCLOS1990at a domestic level, state actors can opt not to impose penalties on1991ships bearing their flag that engage in sabotage on the High Seas. As1992recent disruptions in the Baltic Sea and Taiwan Strait have1993demonstrated, existing legal frameworks in many countries make it1994highly challenging to intercept, investigate, or prosecute security1995incidents, even where governments suspect intentional foul play.\35\1996Whether these incidents are deemed to be accidental or intentional acts1997of sabotage, our inability to address acts of sabotage if and when they1998occur inhibits our ability to deter such behavior.1999---------------------------------------------------------------------------2000    \35\ Miranda Bryant, ``Sweden says China denied request for2001prosecutors to board ship linked to severed cables,'' The Guardian,2002Dec. 23, 2024.2003---------------------------------------------------------------------------2004Recommendations:2005    26. The U.S. Government should leverage existing security2006        cooperation agreements to conduct patrols in high-risk areas2007        and share intelligence about potential threats.2008    27. DHS should manage a proactive two-way intelligence-sharing2009        mechanism with trusted cable developers and vendors to pre-empt2010        potential attacks, and support the evidentiary body needed to2011        prosecute criminal activity.2012Multi-Stakeholder Coordination2013    Government and industry have a shared interest in promoting the2014security and resilience of submarine cable infrastructure, yet2015mechanisms for public-private coordination are limited. To remedy this,2016governments should take steps to formalize their private-sector2017engagement. These efforts should initially focus on: establishing a2018Single Point of Contact (SPOC) for private-sector engagement;2019establishing two-way threat intelligence sharing with private2020stakeholders; and enhancing transparency around trusted vendors.2021    In most governments, multiple agencies have responsibility for some2022aspect of submarine cable resilience. Their remit may cut across2023environmental, commercial, or security considerations and their2024authorities may encompass new cable approvals, repair activities, or2025critical infrastructure protection. Governments can reduce2026inefficiencies, while meeting desired security outcomes, by appointing2027a SPOC responsible for engaging companies as they navigate regulatory2028processes. Their role would not prevent direct engagement with2029individual agencies. Rather, this office would serve as the primary2030external liaison to private entities and internally drive maximum2031efficiency and transparency of the process.2032    The important role of private companies in deploying, maintaining,2033and securing these assets also necessitates multi-stakeholder threat2034intelligence sharing. This enables public and private organizations to2035benefit from information, analysis, and context that they would not be2036privy to individually and provides an early warning system against2037potential threats. Beyond direct information about tactics, techniques2038and indicators of compromise, this creates a common understanding of2039the threat environment and what steps need to be taken to mitigate2040risks.2041    Untrusted vendors have been successful in winning contracts for2042subsea cable infrastructure. While this is less acute than in Radio2043Access Networks, organizations like HMN continue to leverage2044significant Chinese government subsidies to undercut bids from2045competitors by up to a third.\36\ While matching China's bids dollar-2046for-dollar is not a feasible long-term solution, like-minded2047governments can reduce the strategic advantage of untrusted vendors by2048publishing clear guidance on high-risk equipment, entities of concern,2049and trusted suppliers. This transparency would help infrastructure2050operators make informed procurement decisions early in the planning2051process and ensure alignment with national security objectives. Such2052guidance can also deter the use of untrusted vendors by signaling2053potential risks, while supporting trusted vendors in producing2054competitive, security-enhancing bids.2055---------------------------------------------------------------------------2056    \36\ Joe Brock, ``US and China wage war beneath the waves--over2057internet cables,'' Reuters, Mar. 24, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/2058investigates/special-report/us-china-tech-cables/.2059---------------------------------------------------------------------------2060Recommendations:2061    28. The U.S. Government should serve as a single point of contact2062        to centralize information and serve as an initial liaison for2063        Government agencies and private parties regarding existing and2064        planned submarine cables.2065    29. The U.S. Government should publish clear guidance on high-risk2066        equipment, entities and countries of concern, and trusted2067        suppliers.2068    30. The U.S. Government should establish formal 1.5 track dialogs2069        with trusted industry partners through existing regional and2070        security groupings, such as the Quad and NATO, to support2071        aligned approaches to submarine cable security and resilience.20722073    Mr. Ogles. Thank you, Mr. Botting, for your testimony.2074    I now recognize Mr. Frazier for 5 minutes to summarize your2075testimony.20762077   STATEMENT OF KEVIN FRAZIER, AI INNOVATION AND LAW FELLOW,2078               UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SCHOOL OF LAW20792080    Mr. Frazier. Chairman Ogles, Ranking Member McIver, and2081distinguished Members of the subcommittees, thank you for the2082opportunity to testify.2083    My name is Kevin Frazier. I'm the AI innovation and law2084fellow at the University of Texas School of Law and a senior2085editor at Lawfare.2086    I study how the United States can realize the full benefits2087of AI. As the Chairman noticed, a robust undersea cable system2088is an essential part of that mission and, therefore, a target2089for our adversaries.2090    Inadequate attention to this critical infrastructure risks2091jeopardizing the investments being made in AI while also2092exposing the United States and its allies to significant2093disruptions. It follows that the scale and scope of our AI2094ambitions rise and fall with the responsiveness of the growing2095threats to the undersea cable system.2096    My testimony focuses on a simple principle: Deterrence2097should guide our undersea cable system.2098    Deterrence is a function of 3 variables: the cost of an2099attack, the likelihood of its success, and the magnitude of its2100success. Bad actors will have little reason to sabotage a2101submarine cable if doing so is expensive, difficult, or2102inconsequential.2103    Critically, the same tools to deter sabotage will also make2104the undersea cable system more resilient to the most common2105causes of cable faults, which also merit Congressional2106activity.2107    The first variable, the cost of attacking a cable, involves2108the actual expenses of locating and breaking a cable in2109addition to the probability of being caught multiplied by the2110punishment.2111    New technologies such as autonomous undersea vehicles will2112decrease the cost of attacks. The United States should respond2113by increasing its enforcement capabilities and punishments. To2114echo Mr. Stronge, Congress must amend the Submarine Cable Act2115of 1888 to adjust the fines for willfully or negligently2116breaking a cable to an amount that reflects the importance of2117the undersea cable system.2118    The current fines are $5,000 and $500, respectively. It's2119cheaper to break an undersea capable than to go on a holiday2120trip to Europe. In contrast, New Zealand imposes a $150,0002121penalty on any person who breaks a cable, regardless of their2122intent.2123    To increase the odds of detecting parties, Congress should2124condition any subsequent cable landing licenses on the cable2125operator implementing the latest sensing technologies or paying2126a fee to support the Coast Guard's ability to track ships,2127submarines, and AUVs. These 2 straightforward steps will alter2128the calculus of bad actors, who often turn to commercial2129vessels to carry out attacks on their behalf.2130    A more ambitious, though necessary, step involves2131designating cable protection zones. Such zones prohibit vessels2132from entering the areas where cable faults tend to occur and,2133assuming sufficient monitoring, ease detection and mitigation2134of threats.2135    Looking to the second variable, as Mr. Botting notes,2136Congress can also diminish the likelihood of a successful2137attack by imposing heightened responsibilities on cable2138operators to lay more attack-resistant cables.2139    The vast majority of cable breaks occur in shallow water,2140near shore, and in cable chokepoints. Cable operators can2141implement several safeguards against such breaks. First, they2142can increase the armoring of cables. Second, they can bury2143cables at a greater depth. Third, they can adhere to minimum2144separation standards. Fourth, in the event Congress does create2145cable protection zones, operators can lay cables in those zones2146to assist with monitoring and enforcement.2147    Each of these measures will frustrate efforts by bad actors2148to cause significant and prolonged outages. Operators that opt2149not to adhere to these defensive measures should face greater2150licensing fees.2151    Finally, with respect to the third variable, in the event2152that a bad actor manages to break a cable or, in a worst-case2153scenario, several cables, deterrence calls for policies that2154ensure network redundancy and rapid repair times.2155    A redundant undersea cable system includes a number of2156cables being laid along diverse routes. Congress should study2157various financial levers to support on-going cable building,2158especially in regions that will see many cables be retired in2159the coming years.2160    While hyperscalers race ahead with their own cable2161projects, the United States has an interest in ensuring2162redundancy across the entire system. Every cable has 2 landing2163points. It's pivotal that the United States--and not China--aid2164allies looking to increase their own cable connections.2165    Most importantly, Congress should swiftly pass legislation2166like the NEPTUNE Act that aims to bolster the number of cable2167repair ships. Across the global cable fleet, at least 152168maintenance ships will need to be replaced by 2040. If the past2169is prologue, foreign nations will likely develop those ships.2170Our cable operators should not have Chinese ships on speed-dial2171to patch cables carrying our sensitive communications. This is2172and must be a problem solved by U.S. ships and its allies.2173    I applaud you all for studying the underappreciated2174connection between America's AI aspirations and the fragility2175of the undersea cable system. We cannot lead on AI if we fail2176to secure the seas.2177    Thank you again for inviting me here. I look forward to2178your questions.2179    [The prepared statement of Mr. Frazier follows:]2180                  Prepared Statement of Kevin Frazier2181                           November 20, 20252182    A robust undersea cable system is an essential part of achieving2183the Nation's AI aspirations and, therefore, a target of adversaries2184also in pursuit of AI dominance. Inadequate attention to this critical2185infrastructure risks jeopardizing the substantial investments being2186made in AI and related technologies.\1\ Consider, for example, that2187U.S. hyperscalers spent around $371 billion on data centers and2188computing resources in 2025 alone and anticipate spending more in the2189future.\2\ As one representative of a major lab made clear, ``without2190the connectivity [via undersea cables] that connects those data2191centers, what you have are really expensive warehouses.''\3\ A failure2192to adequately maintain and protect the undersea cable system may also2193expose the United States and its allies to significant economic,2194political, and technological disruptions.\4\ It follows that the scale2195and scope of AI ambitions rises and falls with our attention and2196commitment to the numerous and growing threats to our undersea cable2197system.\5\2198---------------------------------------------------------------------------2199    \1\ See Tim Stronge, Do $10 Trillion of Financial Transactions Flow2200Over Submarine Cables Each Day?, TELEGEOGRAPHY: BLOG (Apr. 6, 2023),2201https://blog.telegeography.com/2023-mythbusting-part-1 [https://2202perma.cc/QQ3K-S2XT].2203    \2\ Martin Stansbury et al., Can US infrastructure keep up with the2204AI economy?, DELOITTE (June 24, 2025), https://www.deloitte.com/us/en/2205insights/industry/power-and-utilities/data-center-infrastructure-2206artificial-intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/Z8VV-GL7J]; Eli Tan,2207Meta Raises Its Spending Forecast on A.I. to Above $70 Billion, N.Y.2208TIMES (Oct. 29, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/29/technology/2209metaspending_ai.html [https://perma.cc/T8M6-W2FA].2210    \3\ See, e.g., Magdalena Petrova, Underwater cables are a vital2211piece of the AI buildout and internet--investment is booming, CNBC2212(Nov. 8, 2025), https://www.cnbc.com/2025/11/08/big-tech-ai-underwater-2213cables.html [https://perma.cc/Z2XE-G2PP] (quoting Alex Aime, vice2214president of network investments at Meta).2215    \4\ See JOCELINN KANG & JESSIE JACOB, CONNECTING THE INDO-PACIFIC:2216THE FUTURE OF SUBSEA CABLES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR AUSTRALIA 5 (2024),2217https://www.aspi.org.au/report/connecting-indo-pacific-future-subsea-2218cables-and-opportunities-australia/ [https://perma.cc/9CEQ-KGLN]2219(detailing how even a few undersea cable faults can wreak havoc on2220connected nations, especially those with comparatively fewer cables).2221    \5\ See Kevin Frazier, Wired for Failure: The Undersea Cable2222Emergency That Could Sink America's AI Aspirations, LAWFARE (Sept. 16,22232025), https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/wired-for-failure-the-2224undersea-cable-emergency-that-could-sink-america-s-ai-aspirations2225[https://perma.cc/ED9K-82PB] [hereinafter Frazier, Appendix A].2226---------------------------------------------------------------------------2227    There is no back-up plan. If all or even a significant number of2228the 20 or so cables connecting Europe to North America were2229disrupted,\6\ for example, satellites would not serve as a viable2230alternative. Internet traffic travels drastically slower via2231satellites.\7\ The satellite network also has significantly less2232bandwidth.\8\2233---------------------------------------------------------------------------2234    \6\ Alan Mauldin, Cutting off Europe? A Look at How the Continent2235Connects to the World, TELEGEOGRAPHY: BLOG (Oct. 13, 2022), https://2236blog.telegeography.com/cutting-off-europe-a-look-at-how-the-continent-2237connects-to-the-world?utm_source=chatgpt.com [https://perma.cc/M2CM-2238AGP2]; see MIKE CONSTABLE ET AL., THE FUTURE OF SUBMARINE CABLE2239MAINTENANCE: TRENDS, CHALLENGES, AND STRATEGIES 34 (2025) [hereinafter2240FUTURE OF SUBMARINE CABLES], https://www2.telegeography.com/hubfs/2241LPAssets/Ebooks/The%20Future%20of%20Submarine%20Cable%20Maintenance-2242%20Trends%2C%20Challenges- %2C%20and%20Strategies.pdf [https://2243perma.cc/7CQ2-Y26G] (forecasting as many of 25 trans-Atlantic cables by22442040).2245    \7\ Submarine Cable Frequently Asked Questions, TELEGEOGRAPHY,2246https://www2.telegeography.com/submarine-cable-faqs-frequently-asked-2247questions [https://perma.cc/5LTQ-UMPE] (last accessed Nov. 17, 2025);2248INSIKT GRP, Submarine Cable Face Increasing Threats Amid Geopolitical2249Tensions and Limited Repair Capacity, RECORDED FUTURE (July 17, 2025),2250https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/submarine-cables-face-2251increasing-threats [https://perma.cc/6VG5-UFP3] (``[A] trans-pacific2252fibre-optic call need only travel about 5,000 miles point-to-point,2253compared to a satellite call, which must travel 22,235 miles from the2254Earth to a satellite and then another 22,235 back.'') (internal2255citation and quotation omitted).2256    \8\ Alex Mauldin, Will New Satellites End the Dominance of2257Submarine Cables?, TELEGEOGRAPHY: BLOG (July 1, 2019), https://2258blog.telegeography.com/will-new-satellites-end-the-dominance-of-2259submarine-cables [https://perma.cc/3XP6-LXZC]; The Battle for2260Bandwidth: Submarine Cable and Broadband Satellite Data, NEW SPACE2261ECONOMY, https://newspaceeconomy.ca/2023/08/13/the-battle-for-2262bandwidth-submarine-cable-and-broadband-satellite-data/ [https://2263perma.cc/2GFT-TX2C] (last visited Nov. 17, 2025).2264---------------------------------------------------------------------------2265    This reality merits a two-prong response. The first is a ``sea2266shot'' that includes building 10 new cable repair ships explicitly for2267use by the Nation's allies, deploying 100 autonomous undersea drones to2268gather critical information to maintain the undersea cable system, and2269laying or retrofitting 100,000 miles of undersea cables.\9\ This prong2270is best thought of as an ``offensive'' strategy through which the2271United States can reassert its authority in this critical domain. It2272will require significant political buy-in, financial support, and time.2273Cable operators often take years to lay a new cable.\10\ Construction2274of a new undersea cable repair ship can take as many as 5 years.\11\2275---------------------------------------------------------------------------2276    \9\ See Frazier, Appendix A.2277    \10\ See Jurgen Hatheier, AI's role in revolutionizing submarine2278network connectivity, RCR (Aug. 9, 2024), https://www.rcrwireless.com/227920240809/network-infrastructure/ais-role-in-revolutionizing-submarine-2280network-connectivity-reader-forum [https://perma.cc/JA2W-D6QT]2281(``[T]hese are projects that cost in the hundreds of millions of2282dollars and take years to plan and deploy.'').2283    \11\ MIKE CONSTABLE ET AL., supra note 6, at 67.2284---------------------------------------------------------------------------2285    Those delays mean that the United States should pursue a second,2286``defensive'' prong of this strategy in the interim. This strategy2287involves immediate adoption of policy strategies that deter bad actors2288from attacking the undersea cable system.2289             increased deterrence as an immediate priority2290    Deterrence is a function of three variables: the costs of an2291attack, the likelihood of its success, and the magnitude of its2292success. Bad actors will have little reason to attempt to sabotage the2293undersea cable system if doing so is expensive, difficult, or2294inconsequential. Critically, the same tools to deter intentional2295sabotage will also make the undersea cable system more resilient to the2296more frequent causes of cable faults, which also merit due2297consideration. As recommended by the International Cable Protection2298Committee (ICPC), undersea cable policy should be driven by evidence,2299not speculation or exaggeration.\12\ Dragged anchors account for about230030% of all breaks.\13\ More generally, most breaks occur due to fishing2301and other human activities.\14\ Any short-term solution should be2302evaluated under its responsiveness to both emerging issues, such as2303sabotage, as well as these more common causes of breaks.2304---------------------------------------------------------------------------2305    \12\ Government Best Practices for Protecting and Promoting2306Resilience of Submarine Telecommunications Cables, ICPC (last accessed2307Nov. 15, 2025) (on file with author).2308    \13\ Damage to Submarine Cables from Dragged Anchors, ICPC:2309VIEWPOINTS (Feb. 24, 2025), https://www.iscpc.org/publications/icpc-2310viewpoints/damage-to-submarine-cables-from-dragged-anchors/ [https://2311perma.cc/Q4RX-XPPP] [hereinafter Dragged Anchors].2312    \14\ SUBMARINE TELECOMS F., Year in Review, 14 SUBMARINE TELECOMS2313INDUS. REP., at 166 (2025) [hereinafter INDUSTRY REPORT].2314---------------------------------------------------------------------------2315                    increasing the cost of sabotage2316    The costs of attacking submarine cables involve the actual expenses2317of locating and breaking a cable in addition to the probability of2318being caught multiplied by the punishment. New technologies, such as2319autonomous undersea vehicles or AUVs, will decrease the costs of an2320attack.\15\ For sake of illustration, it appears as though Iran has2321already developed uncrewed undersea vehicles (UUVs) that are precisely2322designed to attack static targets.\16\ What's more, Iran may have2323already made those tools available to the Houthi militant group.\17\2324Aerial drones have already transformed terrestrial conflicts by2325lowering the cost of destruction.\18\ Iranian advances and their2326willingness to pass technology along to non-state actors suggests the2327same may be true in the undersea domain--to the extent it is not2328already.\19\ The United States should respond by developing similar2329AUVs and UUVs--as called for under the ``sea shot'' described above,2330while also increasing its enforcement capabilities and punishments in2331the short run. To start, Congress must amend the Submarine Cable Act of23321888 to minimally bring the fines for willfully or negligently breaking2333a cable in line with international norms and, ideally, to specify fines2334of an ever-greater magnitude. The current fines are $5,000 and $500,2335respectively.\20\ It's likely cheaper to intentionally break an2336undersea cable than to go on a holiday trip to Europe. In contrast, New2337Zealand imposes a $120,000 penalty on any person who breaks a cable2338regardless of their intent.\21\ Singapore has imposed a penalty on that2339scale, too;\22\ in 2022, a private construction company faced $220,0002340in fines for causing multiple telecommunication cables to break while2341working on a nearby project.\23\ Australia may impose fines of nearly2342$27,000 for related offenses.\24\ The United States should not dilly2343dally in updating the Submarine Cable Act and sending a strong signal2344that it is ready and willing to hold bad actors accountable for their2345interference with this critical infrastructure. Many of the undersea2346cable breaks attributed to nations such as China and Russia have been2347carried out by commercial vessels in relatively shallow waters \25\--2348breaks that may fall within ambit of the Submarine Cable Act if2349committed near the U.S. coast.2350---------------------------------------------------------------------------2351    \15\ JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, SUBSEA2352TELECOMMUNICATIONS CABLES: RESILIENCE AND CRISIS PREPAREDNESS 2024-26,2353HC 723/HL 179, at 10 (UK); see id. at 14 (citing Professor Rowlands'2354observation that advances in AUVs may increase the odds of attacks on2355multiple cables at once); Yuval Eylon, The Challenge of Defending2356Underwater Communication Infrastructures, INSS (June 29, 2023), https:/2357/www.inss.org.il/publication/under-water/ [https://perma.cc/96RY-RRU2]2358(warning of ``[r]ecent state-of-the-art developments of underwater2359capabilities, such as long-range midget unmanned submersible vehicles2360and remotely controlled submarine robots[.]'').2361    \16\ Ash Rossiter, Cable risk and resilience in the age of uncrewed2362undersea vehicles (UUVs), 171 MARINE POL'Y, Jan. 2025, at 1, 1-5.2363    \17\ Id.2364    \18\ See, e.g., James Paterson, High-tech drones are changing2365warfare--terrorists may soon follow the same playbook, THE CONVERSATION2366(Aug. 12, 2025), https://theconversation.com/high-tech-drones-are-2367changing-warfare-terrorists-may-soon-follow-the-same-playbook-2626262368[https://perma.cc/N6BM-VEJU].2369    \19\ Margo Anderson, Protecting Undersea Internet Cables Is a Tech2370Nightmare, IEEE (Dec. 5, 2024), https://spectrum.ieee.org/undersea-2371internet-cables-protection-tech [https://perma.cc/U2KR-3P4Y].2372    \20\ 47 U.S.C.  22.2373    \21\ Protecting New Zealand's Undersea Cables, MINISTRY TRANSP.,2374https://www.transport.govt.nz/aboutus/what-we-do/queries/protecting-2375new-zealands-undersea-cables [https://perma.cc/CM8M-B3MH] (last visited2376Nov. 17, 2025)2377    \22\ William Yuen Yee, Laying Down the Law Under the Sea: Analyzing2378the US and Chinese Submarine Cable Governance Regimes, JAMESTOWN (Aug.23794, 2023), https://jamestown.org/laying-down-the-law-under-the-sea-2380analyzing-the-us-and-chinese-submarine-cable-governance-regimes/2381[https://perma.cc/WE83-J4CA].2382    \23\ Id.2383    \24\ Id.2384    \25\ John Dotson, Strangers on a Seabed: Sino-Russian Collaboration2385on Undersea Cable Sabotage Operations, JAMESTOWN (June 7, 2025),2386https://jamestown.org/strangers-on-a-seabed-sino-russian-collaboration-2387on-undersea-cable-sabotage-operations/ [https://perma.cc/BQ77-N3JC].2388---------------------------------------------------------------------------2389                    increasing the odds of detection2390    To increase the odds of detecting responsible parties, Congress2391should condition any grant or renewal of a cable landing license upon2392the cable operator installing the latest sensing technologies and2393timely reporting any threats or anomalous activity. In the alternative,2394the cable operator can agree to a greater licensing fee to contribute2395to the ability of the U.S. Government, including but not limited to the2396Coast Guard,\26\ to track ships, submarines, and AUVs and UUVs.2397---------------------------------------------------------------------------2398    \26\ Cf. Madison L. Long, Information Warfare in the Depths: An2399Analysis of Global Undersea Cable Networks, U.S. NAVAL INST. (May24002023), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/may/information-2401warfare-depths-analysis-globalundersea-cable-networks [https://2402perma.cc/9WTN-GEF5] (contending that the Coast Guard should lead in2403efforts to protect the undersea cable system).2404---------------------------------------------------------------------------2405    As an aside, fees collected by licensing authorities around the2406world should be explored as a means to gather funds necessary to solve2407some of the collective action problems that plague the undersea cable2408system.\27\2409---------------------------------------------------------------------------2410    \27\ Kevin Frazier, Pooling Responsibility: Incentivizing Cable2411Owners to Safeguard the Global Undersea Network, SSRN (Nov. 11, 2025)2412(forthcoming UNIV. CINN. L. INTELL. PROP. COMP. L.J.) [Appendix B].2413---------------------------------------------------------------------------2414    Every cable operator must secure a license from the Federal2415Communications Committee (FCC) prior to landing a cable in the United2416States. \28\ Applicants must provide relatively little information to2417the FCC to satisfy statutory obligations.\29\ Certain applications2418receive heightened scrutiny by the FCC and a number of other agencies2419with an interest in the Nation's telecommunications network--2420collectively known as ``Team Telecom.''\30\ This group broadly examines2421whether granting a license would ``pose[] a risk to national security2422or law enforcement interests of the United States.''\31\2423---------------------------------------------------------------------------2424    \28\ 47 CFR  1.767.2425    \29\ Id.2426    \30\ Exec. Order No. 13,913, 85 Fed. Reg. 19643 (Apr. 8, 2020)2427(Establishing the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation2428in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector).2429    \31\ Id. at 19645.2430---------------------------------------------------------------------------2431    Even under this heightened review, it's unclear if Team Telecom2432will surface meaningful information about an operator's plans to adopt2433specific safeguards and to share specific information. For example,2434while applicants must answer, ``What provision will be made to monitor2435suspicious activity occurring over the paths of the cables?'',\32\ the2436response may not detail the information called for here. It's also not2437clear whether the applicant's answer to that question would be2438determinative in the decision to grant, renew, or deny a license.2439Though the FCC is in the process of amending and streamlining this2440process,\33\ decisions by Team Telecom have been faulted as2441unpredictable for relying on a seemingly shifting set of standards and2442information.\34\ Amid these reform efforts, the FCC--at the direction2443or encouragement of Congress--should factor this information into its2444review of all licenses.2445---------------------------------------------------------------------------2446    \32\ Process Reform for Executive Branch Review of Certain FCC2447Applications and Petitions Involving Foreign Ownership, Second Report2448and Order, 36 FCC Rcd. 14848, 14873 (2021), https://docs.fcc.gov/2449public/attachments/FCC-21-104A1_Rcd.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8H5-43EV].2450    \33\ Ari Fitzgerald et al., FCC issues submarine cable rules, seeks2451comment on additional proposals, HOGAN LOVELLS (Sept. 16, 2025),2452https://www.hoganlovells.com/en/publications/fcc-issues-submarine-2453cable-rules-seeks-comment-on-additional-proposals [https://perma.cc/24546GX2-JU4G].2455    \34\ RICHARD SALGADO, UNDERSEA CABLES, HYPERSCALERS, AND NATIONAL2456SECURITY 9 (2023).2457---------------------------------------------------------------------------2458    Myriad new technologies can generate important information from2459undersea cables. Quantum sensing, for example, ``could transform subsea2460cable monitoring by enabling accurate detection of environmental2461changes, underwater seismic activity, and potential threats like2462fishing trawls or sabotage.''\35\ Acoustic sensors may perform a2463similar function.\36\ A German company has even developed a means to2464update existing cables with sonar-like technology that can determine if2465threats are nearby by ``sens[ing] vibrations traveling through the2466water[.]''\37\ Deciding which of these sensing technologies should be2467imposed on applicants warrants additional analysis by the FCC based on2468their costs and accuracy. The key is that ``dumb'' cables that provide2469little to no information to the operator and Government become a thing2470of the past. Any information gathered by the sensors, such as any2471indications as to the current functionality of the cables,\38\ then2472needs to be passed along to the relevant Government authorities.2473Provision of more information about cables can inform on-going policy2474decisions about how to increase the resiliency of the undersea cable2475system--decisions that are often made in the absence of full2476information.\39\2477---------------------------------------------------------------------------2478    \35\ Devon A. Johnson, INTO THE FUTURE: Quantum Technologies and2479the Impact on the Resilience of the Subsea Cable System, SUBMARINE2480TELECOMS FORUM (Dec. 2, 2024), https://subtelforum.com/into-the-future-2481quantum-technologies-and-the-impact-on-the-resilience-of-the-subsea-2482cable-system/ [https://perma.cc/Q9TL-2MVC].2483    \36\ OPTODAS: The Leading Technology for Distributed Acoustic2484Sensing, ASN, https://www.asn.com/fiber-sensing [https://perma.cc/C7MM-2485KMWY] (last accessed Nov. 17, 2025) (ASN opens a new era in subsea2486intelligent sensing based on advanced DAS technology).2487    \37\ Jowi Morales, New undersea cable tech listens for sabotage--2488can be retrofitted to existing fiber optic lines, TOM'S HARDWARE (Mar.248918, 2025), https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/new-undersea-2490cable-tech-listens-for-sabotage-can-be-retrofitted-to-existing-fiber-2491optic-lines [https://perma.cc/DX5MKZ4D].2492    \38\ See JOCELINN KANG & JESSIE JACOB, supra note 4, at 212493(recommending that Australia likewise mandate the provision of such2494information).2495    \39\ See, e.g., JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY,2496supra note 15, at 2 (highlighting the fact that additional information2497on how cable damage impacts cable operations would assist policy2498discussions).2499---------------------------------------------------------------------------2500    These two straightforward steps will alter the calculus of bad2501actors who often turn to commercial vessels to carry out attacks on2502their behalf. A more ambitious, though necessary step involves2503designating cable protection zones, which would prohibit activities2504that interfere with the seabed from occurring in specified areas with a2505high density of cables.\40\ Australia,\41\ New Zealand,\42\ and Denmark2506\43\ are among the nations with such zones. The efficacy of this2507strategy turns on whether the State allocates sufficient enforcement2508resources to what may be a very difficult task of monitoring several2509zones. The United States could start by creating cable protection zones2510where there is already a high number of cables in a relatively finite2511geographic area. One place to start may be the North Coast of Oregon.2512At least eight trans-Pacific cables go through that area.\44\ This area2513is also forecasted to be especially prone to breaks in the coming2514years.\45\ A combination of the Coast Guard, Air Force, Navy, and other2515authorities with resources to closely monitor ship traffic in that2516region could ensure a high enough degree of enforcement so as to deter2517bad actors from even attempting to sabotage those cables.2518---------------------------------------------------------------------------2519    \40\ See Pierre Thevenin, A legislative route to combat sabotage of2520undersea cables: A Q&A with Pierre Thevenin, SIPRI (Oct. 23, 2025),2521https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2025/legislative-2522route-combat-sabotage-undersea-cables [https://perma.cc/352U-NBUG]2523(including bottom trawling, dredging, and anchoring among such2524activities).2525    \41\ Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (Submarine Cable2526Protection) Bill 2014 (Cth) (Austl.).2527    \42\ Submarine Cables and Pipelines Protection Act 1996 (N.Z.).2528    \43\ Order no. 939 of 27 November 1992 on the protection of2529submarine cables and submarine pipelines (Den.).2530    \44\ Submarine Cable Map, TELEGEOGRAPHY, https://2531www.submarinecablemap.com [https://perma.cc/B87F-89UQ] (last accessed2532Nov. 17, 2025).2533    \45\ FUTURE OF SUBMARINE CABLES, supra note 6, at 51-52.2534---------------------------------------------------------------------------2535    Technological advances such as AI may make this monitoring all the2536easier \46\ and justify creating such zones in other areas.\47\2537---------------------------------------------------------------------------2538    \46\ Matthew Kastler, Move Beyond AIS for Maritime Domain2539Awareness, U.S. NAVAL INST. (Sept. 2025), https://www.usni.org/2540magazines/proceedings/2025/september/move-beyond-ais-maritime-domain-2541awareness [https://perma.cc/M8W6-MLMT].2542    \47\ See Kevin Frazier, Policy Proposals for the United States to2543Protect the Undersea Cable System, 13 CASE W. RSRV. J.L. TECH. &2544INTERNET, no. 1, 2022, at 30-32 (2022) (identifying the high number of2545undersea cables across two coasts as a barrier to the United States2546adopting cable protection zones) [Appendix C].2547---------------------------------------------------------------------------2548                        reducing odds of success2549    Congress can also drastically diminish the likelihood of a2550successful attack by imposing heightened responsibilities on cable2551operators to adopt best practices for laying more attack-resistant2552cables. The vast majority of cable breaks occur in shallow water, near2553shore, and in cable choke points.\48\ Cable operators can implement2554several safeguards against such breaks. First, they can increase the2555armoring of cables.\49\ Use of Kevlar to safeguard cables from sharks2556and other threats was once regarded as a novel tactic,\50\ though its2557use has since spread.\51\ New materials may soon promise even greater2558protection while not unduly burdening the cost and operational2559difficulties of coiling, then unspooling cables as they're laid on the2560seafloor.\52\ The FCC should expect that operators are continuously2561studying the availability of superior armoring and justifying to what2562extent they do or not use it. Second, operators can bury cables at a2563greater depth and further from the coast. As it stands, the norm is2564that cables lie on the surface when at a depth of 100 meters or2565more.\53\ This means that in some deepwater ports and high-trafficked2566areas cables may be especially susceptible to sabotage.\54\ Operators2567could additionally be obligated to at least consider the need to use2568mattress covering around the cable and assess the placement of nearby2569rocks, which may shift due to currents.\55\2570---------------------------------------------------------------------------2571    \48\ See NATO COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. EXCELLENCE, STRATEGIC2572IMPORTANCE OF, AND DEPENDENCE ON, UNDERSEA CABLES 3 (2019) [hereinafter2573NATO REPORT], https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/11/Underseacables-Final-2574NOV-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/98RV-46DK] (warning that terrorists are2575most likely to attack cables near cable landing stations).2576    \49\ CAMINO KAVANAGH, WADING MURKY WATERS, UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE2577FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH 12 (2023), https://unidir.org/wpcontent/2578uploads/2023/05/2579UNIDIR_Wading_Murky_Waters_Subsea_Communications_Cables_Responsible_Stat2580e- _Behaviour.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZP9-T4R7]; James Griffiths, The2581global internet is powered by vast undersea cables. But they're2582vulnerable, CNN (July 26, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/25/asia/2583internet-undersea-cables-intl-hnk [https://perma.cc/8KSY-BLXN].2584    \50\ NATO REPORT, supra note 48, at 3; Will Oremus, The Global2585Internet Is Being Attacked by Sharks, Google Confirms, Slate (Aug. 15,25862014), https://slate.com/technology/2014/08/shark-attacks-threaten-2587google-s-undersea-internet-cables-video.html [https://perma.cc/CX8D-25884T3S].2589    \51\ James Griffiths, supra note 49.2590    \52\ See Darren Orf, Scientists Created a Bulletproof Material 32591Times Stronger Than Kevlar--It's Already Breaking Records, POPULAR2592MECHANICS (Nov. 11, 2025), https://www.popularmechanics.com/science/2593a69268884/carbon-nanotube-kevlar/ [https://perma.cc/ZF4TQZS2].2594    \53\ Alex Botting & Ines Jordan-Zoob, How the US and its Partners2595can Ensure the World's Data Super-Highways Remain Reliable, Secure,2596Open & Free, WILSON CTR. (July 15, 2024), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/2597article/how-us-and-its-partners-can-ensure-worlds-data-super-highways-2598remain-reliable-secure-open [https://perma.cc/T2CJ-MMYJ].2599    \54\ Id.2600    \55\ The JRC explains: Subsea cables: how vulnerable are they and2601can we protect them?, Joint Rsch. Ctr. (Aug. 8, 2025), https://joint-2602research-centre.ec.europa.eu/jrc-explains/subsea-cables-how-vulnerable-2603are-they-and-can-we-protect-them_en [https://perma.cc/B3D5-T6PT].2604---------------------------------------------------------------------------2605    Third, operators can adhere to minimum separation standards to2606distance their cables from others. Additional spacing between cables2607can reduce the odds of single incidents causing numerous breaks. By way2608of example, in 2008, a single ship damaged 6 cables due to dragging its2609anchor along the sea floor.\56\ Some degree of spacing can make it less2610likely that one net, anchor, rock, or UUV can break several cables at2611once. Fourth, in the event Congress creates cable protection zones,2612operators can lay cables in those zones to ease the task of monitoring2613threats to cables. As the requisite authorities closely monitor these2614specific areas, they can quickly mobilize the forces necessary to stop2615a bad actor from ``lingering'' in that zone as that actor attempts to2616break several cables in quick succession.2617---------------------------------------------------------------------------2618    \56\ Dragged Anchors, supra note 13.2619---------------------------------------------------------------------------2620    Each of these measures will frustrate efforts by bad actors to2621cause significant and prolonged outages. Operators that opt not to2622adhere to these defensive measures should again face heightened2623licensing fees.2624            diminishing the damage from a successful attack2625    In the event that a bad actor manages to break a cable or, in a2626worst-case scenario, several cables, deterrence calls for policies that2627ensure network redundancy and rapid repair times. Put differently,2628adversaries will have less interest in attacking cables if traffic can2629easily be routed through other cables and damaged cables can be2630restored in days rather than weeks or months. A case study makes this2631point clear. When a series of minor accidents caused damage to several2632cables off the coast of Cote d'Ivoire, many internet users across2633Africa experienced diminished service.\57\ Comparatively, when 2 cables2634broke in the Baltic Sea, users experienced few to no issues because of2635the availability of alternative routes for internet traffic.\58\2636---------------------------------------------------------------------------2637    \57\ Paula Gilbert, Multiple cable failures impact Africa's2638internet, CONNECTING AFR. (Mar. 15, 2024), https://2639www.connectingafrica.com/connectivity/multiple-cable-failures-impact-2640africa-s-internet [https://perma.cc/CV2U-3PFD].2641    \58\ David Belson, Resilient Internet connectivity in Europe2642mitigates impact from multiple cable cuts, CLOUDFLARE: BLOG (Nov. 11,26432024), https://blog.cloudflare.com/resilient-internet-connectivity-2644baltic-cable-cuts/ [https://perma.cc/384B-86UZ].2645---------------------------------------------------------------------------2646    That's precisely why redundancy is a key part of a robust undersea2647cable system.\59\2648---------------------------------------------------------------------------2649    \59\ INSIKT GRP, supra note 7.2650---------------------------------------------------------------------------2651    A redundant undersea cable system includes a number of cables being2652laid along diverse routes. Congress should study various financial2653levers to support ongoing cable building both by the United States and2654its allies, especially in regions that will see many existing cables be2655retired in the coming years. A survey of industry stakeholders suggests2656that more than 800,000 km of cables will be retired by 2040.\60\ As2657cables reach the end of their operational or economic lives, the United2658States must pay attention to whether their allies are at a heightened2659risk of being susceptible to prolonged internet outages due to just a2660few breaks.\61\2661---------------------------------------------------------------------------2662    \60\ FUTURE OF SUBMARINE CABLES, supra note 6, at 2.2663    \61\ See, e.g., Commission Recommendation (EU) of 26 February 20242664on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures, 2024 O.J.2665(L779) at 1 (warning that some members of the European Union may2666already be in such a position).2667---------------------------------------------------------------------------2668    While hyperscalers are racing ahead with their own cable projects,2669the United States has an interest in ensuring redundancy across the2670entire system.\62\ If Google, Amazon, and other hyperscalers do not see2671an economic case for filling in gaps in the undersea cable system, it's2672unlikely other private actors will fill the void. Cable laying is a2673gamble. Only about half of announced undersea cable projects get2674completed.\63\ An increasingly bifurcated and concentrated supply chain2675is only making such projects costlier.\64\ For all those reasons, it's2676pivotal that allies look to the United States and not China to increase2677their own cable connections. Most importantly, the United States must2678ensure that any successful disruptions to a cable or cables are short-2679lived. This is yet another cost-intensive and logistically difficult2680task. Average repair times have varied over the last few years--taking2681nearly 3 months in 2022 (78 days) while falling to about a month (322682days) in 2025.\65\ As the number of cables increases over the next2683decade \66\ and the number of cable repair ships in need of replacement2684surges,\67\ a betting man would like the odds that the average undersea2685cable repair time is increasing. This will be especially true if a2686repair is required during a geopolitical conflict. One industry2687observer expected that a cable repair ship would demand a military2688escort prior to sailing to the repair point.\68\2689---------------------------------------------------------------------------2690    \62\ JOCELINN KANG & JESSIE JACOB, supra note 4, at 7 (estimating2691that hyperscalers such as Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Amazon have had2692at least some stake in nearly 25% of all undersea cable projects that2693launched between 2019 and 2023).2694    \63\ Big tech and geopolitics are reshaping the internet's2695plumbing, ECONOMIST (Dec. 20, 2025), https://www.economist.com/2696business/2023/12/20/big-tech-and-geopolitics-are-reshaping-the-2697internets-plumbing.2698    \64\ JOCELINN KANG & JESSIE JACOB, supra note 4, at 10-12.2699    \65\ FORUM INDUSTRY REPORT, supra note 14, at 100.2700    \66\ FUTURE OF SUBMARINE CABLES, supra note 6, at 47.2701    \67\ Id. at 61.2702    \68\ JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note270315, at 24.2704---------------------------------------------------------------------------2705    Congress should swiftly pass legislation like the Neptune Act that2706aims to bolster the number of cable repair ships.\69\ The number of2707cable repairs is forecasted to reach 287 by 2040.\70\ Our cable2708operators should not have Chinese ships on speed dial to patch cables2709carrying our sensitive communications. Nor should U.S. cable providers2710expect cable repair ships flying another nation's flag to prioritize2711repairs to U.S. cables over their own.\71\ This is and must be a2712problem solved by U.S. ships. We're woefully behind on this front.2713Minimally, Congress should amend the cable landing license to mandate2714that operators have at least a 10-year contract with a cable repair2715provider. This shift would address the financial uncertainty that often2716prevents cable repair ship owners from further investing in their2717fleets.2718---------------------------------------------------------------------------2719    \69\ Press Release, Max Miller, Congressman Max Miller Introduces2720NEPTUNE Act to Protect America's Critical Infrastructure (July 25,27212025), https://maxmiller.house.gov/posts/congressman-max-miller-2722introduces-neptune-act-to-protect-americas-critical-infrastructure2723[https://perma.cc/4NGA-8YBT].2724    \70\ FUTURE OF SUBMARINE CABLES, supra note 6, at 50.2725    \71\ See JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra2726note 15, at 25 (expecting French cable repair ships to respond to2727cables of French significance over cables of importance to the United2728Kingdom).2729---------------------------------------------------------------------------2730                               conclusion2731    The United States is entering an era in which AI will amplify every2732facet of national power--from scientific research and economic2733productivity to military readiness and diplomatic leverage. But AI's2734promise is only as strong as the physical infrastructure that2735undergirds it. Undersea cables are not a peripheral issue in the AI2736age. Instead, Congress must regard the undersea cable system as a2737foundational part of the emerging global economy. If these cables are2738compromised, our most advanced AI labs, high-performance computing2739clusters, and data-rich enterprises will be unable to operate at the2740scale that global leadership demands. Congress must therefore treat2741cable resilience not as a niche maritime concern but as a foundational2742pillar of American competitiveness.2743    Though Congress should move forward with a ``sea shot'' over the2744long term, a focus on deterrence in the short run can collectively2745reshape the incentives of adversaries and limit the consequences of2746disruptions. But as AI systems become more central to real-time2747intelligence analysis, financial markets, precision agriculture,2748disaster response, and critical infrastructure management, even brief2749outages will impose cascading harms. A cable system built for the pre-2750AI era--an era of slower data flows, fewer real-time applications, and2751limited global compute--cannot meet the demands we now face. Policy2752makers must recognize that strengthening undersea infrastructure is not2753just about preventing sabotage; it is about ensuring that the Nation2754can fully leverage AI to enhance the well-being and security of every2755American.2756    Ultimately, Congress has a rare opportunity to act before a crisis2757forces its hand. The investments and policy changes proposed here will2758not only strengthen our undersea cable network but also secure the2759connective tissue of the AI economy for decades to come. With2760deliberate action--guided by deterrence, informed by evidence, and2761executed with urgency--the United States can ensure that its cables,2762like its AI ambitions, are resilient, adaptive, and firmly under2763American control.27642765    Mr. Ogles. Thank you, Mr. Frazier.2766    Thank you to all of our witnesses.2767    You know, this is an incredibly important subject and,2768quite frankly, one of those handful of subjects in Congress2769that should not be partisan in any way but, rather, bipartisan,2770because we are talking about the future of our country.2771    Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their27725 minutes of questions.2773    I now recognize myself for 5 minutes.2774    Many of our closest allies have experienced suspected2775foreign interference with their subsea cables, where2776attribution took time, required extensive coordination across2777governments and industry.2778    U.S. operators worry about similar activity along routes2779connecting the United States to Europe and Asia, especially2780since no single Federal agency is clearly responsible for2781subsea cable security. Understanding how the U.S. Government2782should organize itself is essential for building a credible,2783responsible framework.2784    Mr. Botting, from the industry's perspective, what role2785should DHS play when operators detect potentially concerning2786PRC or Russian activity near cables, cable routes, landing2787stations, or what kind of support would make DHS more effective2788in that role?2789    Mr. Botting. Thank you for the question.2790    The main thing that stands out to me is, cable operators2791obviously have access to a certain set of information through2792operating those cables, but they don't have a holistic view of2793the adversary. The U.S. Government has access to what could2794potentially be a lot of valuable information that could help2795them to make appropriate risk determinations about potential2796future activities by adversaries.2797    So I think it's essential that we establish a two-way2798threat-intelligence-sharing mechanism that ensures that2799appropriate people within those companies--depending whether2800that has to happen at a Classified level, it could be people2801with security clearances; it could happen at the unclassified2802level--that they have access to information about the latest2803and greatest threats emerging from adversaries.2804    This isn't, sort-of, pie in the sky, this concept of two-2805way threat-intelligence-sharing. Our allies over in Australia2806are implementing something similar at the moment for Systems of2807Critical--SOCI, Systems of Critical Infrastructure, I believe2808it is.2809    Anyway, they are requiring that companies report incidents2810but also creating a mechanism for voluntary sharing of2811information by critical infrastructure into the Government,2812which the Government can then enrich with their own2813intelligence and share back out with critical infrastructure so2814that they are responding to the latest and greatest2815intelligence, as far as the threat profile.2816    For me, that is one of the key things that DHS2817specifically, I think, would be well-positioned to----2818    Mr. Ogles. It should be noted, you know, we have similar2819type of cooperative agreements with nation-states, whether it2820be the Five Eyes, Seven Eyes, Fourteen Eyes groups. Obviously,2821these are private companies, and so different protocols would2822be needed, but that being said, your point is well-taken.2823    Dr. Kroenig, based on recent cable incidents in Europe,2824what lessons should guide U.S. planning for attribution, public2825communication, and multinational coordination when foreign2826interference is suspected?2827    Mr. Kroenig. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.2828    I am struck by the commonality in the recommendations2829across the panelists.2830    First, how greater resilience can help to protect these2831cables; and, also, to deter. If adversaries know that any2832attack is going to cause minimal disruption, that should reduce2833their incentive to do it in the first place.2834    Second, attribution. As was pointed out, often we don't2835know who's responsible. Even in these cases of the Chinese2836attacks against Matsu Islands and these recent cases in the2837Gulf of Finland, questions about was this intentional, was it2838deliberate or not. So having better information to attribute2839the source of the attacks would be helpful.2840    Then, third, the ability to hold those responsible2841accountable. In this case of the Gulf of Finland, Finland tried2842to prosecute the seafarers in the Finnish courts throughout the2843case. So, if there's going to be no consequences for these kind2844of attacks, it obviously makes it easier for our adversaries to2845continue.2846    So I think those are the 3 areas where we need to focus.2847    Mr. Ogles. Well, Mr. Stronge, you know, we've seen where2848these disruptions have an immediate impact, but yet the2849recovery period is often slow, laborious, and then attribution2850is a problem.2851    If the PRC or Russia disrupted several U.S.-connected2852cables simultaneously, what sectors would experience problems2853first, what are the challenges, and what kind of repair ship2854capabilities, availability, do we have?2855    You've got about 30 seconds, sir.2856    Mr. Stronge. Thanks for the extra challenge there.2857    The United States is connected right now by 97 cables. We2858are really blessed as a Nation to have such resilience. If2859there were purposeful cuts to some of these cables, it likely2860would not be felt or even noticed by most Americans. It would2861take an incredibly concerted effort to simultaneously cut2862enough to cause noticeable damage.2863    I could say more later.2864    Mr. Ogles. We'll get back to it.2865    I now recognize the Ranking Member, the gentlewoman from2866New Jersey, Mrs. McIver, for her 5 minutes.2867    Mrs. McIver. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.2868    Good job, Mr. Stronge. That was right on time.2869    Mr. Frazier, thank you so much for your testimony. It's2870clear that a failure to safeguard subsea cables could result in2871significant economic, political, and technological instability2872for the United States.2873    Can you provide some great sugges---you've already provided2874some great suggestions for improving our defenses of these2875cables. In your view, what is the most--one critical, just one,2876critical step that Congress could take to mitigate these risks?2877    Mr. Frazier. Well, thank you for the question, Ranking2878Member.2879    I think the first thing we need to focus on is the cable2880landing stations. We don't talk as much about the dry plant2881aspect of the undersea cable system--this is in reference to2882everything that's not underwater--but these cable landing2883stations are often in places like Valdez, Alaska, and Bandon2884Dunes, which is great for golfing if you live in Oregon but2885easy to attack if you're looking to sabotage the Nation's2886submarine systems.2887    So I think an emphasis on securing these cable landing2888stations is of the utmost importance, because, as Mr. Stronge2889pointed out, we have a heck of a lot of them, which also means2890we don't necessarily have the physical security and2891cybersecurity mechanisms in place to safeguard each of those2892isolated stations.2893    Mrs. McIver. Thank you for that.2894    I would open it up to each of the witnesses of what you2895think the No. 1 step, you know, Congress could be taking at2896this point.2897    Whoever can jump in is fine.2898    Mr. Kroenig. Well, I think one that's maybe most relevant2899to this committee is the role that Department of Homeland2900Security and the Coast Guard can play.2901    You know, we don't like fragmentation in national security2902policy. We saw the dangers of fragmented intelligence before 9/290311. Right now it seems like there are several different parts2904of Government that have some responsibility here. So I think2905making Department of Homeland Security a coordinated hub to2906address this challenge could make sense.2907    Then, also, Congress, you can mandate that the Executive2908branch develop strategies to deal with an issue. I would2909recommend that you task the Executive branch with coming up--2910and Department of Homeland Security--coming up with a U.S.2911Government strategy for dealing with subsea cable security.2912    Mrs. McIver. Thank you, Mr. Kroenig.2913    Mr. Stronge. So I think some of the things we've talked2914about so far are essentially reactive in nature, a very2915defensive posture. I think we also need to think about being2916proactive.2917    That follows on with what you just said, Matthew.2918    I really love learning about cables, but something I'm even2919more passionate about is college football. I don't know if any2920of you Representatives are big football fans, but the one thing2921I hate is when my team pushes past the 50-yard line, stalls out2922with a fourth and short, and what do they do? They punt. To win2923the game, you have to score points.2924    Right now, we are really ahead in the game. Eighty percent2925of all intercontinental data flows through the United States.2926But that's down from 97 percent 20 years ago.2927    We also have a lot of cables that gives us a lot of2928resilience. But the industry, from what I can see, is running2929into a lot of permitting issues. The permitting time in the2930last 5 years has greatly gone up, dealing with Team Telecom. If2931it becomes too difficult, the industry may choose to start2932routing to other places in North America. Canada and Mexico are2933viable options. As an American citizen, that scares me.2934    I think what we do need is one agency that is a champion of2935cables, not in their own right, but realizing that cable2936security is national security. We need more resilience and2937someone in the Executive department that will help usher2938through these new, innovative plans.2939    Mrs. McIver. Thank you.2940    Mr. Botting. I'd like to reinforce that point, a specific2941statistic. I believe the time for cable approvals has gone from2942around 1 year, around 12 months, to about 3 years.2943    We are seeing fewer and fewer entities willing to invest in2944subsea cables globally, to a point where today it's a small2945handful of companies, typically the, sort-of, hyperscalers, who2946are laying cables.2947    In that environment, we are not driving toward abundance,2948and abundance is our real strength here. If we have more cable2949capacity than we need, then we can afford to have incidents on2950individual cables and we reduce the incentive for adversaries2951to engage in sabotage on those cables.2952    So I completely agree, I think some level of reform and2953greater efficiency and creating a single point of contact2954around that is very important.2955    Mrs. McIver. Wow. Thank you so much for that.2956    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.2957    Mr. Ogles. Thank you, Mrs. McIver.2958    I now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Luttrell, for2959his 5 minutes.2960    Mr. Luttrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.2961    Mr. Stronge, make sure I close out with you on that permit2962conversation, OK?2963    Mr. Botting, shoring up and securing our cables. At the2964classification level we have in this room currently--which is2965not one, so our conversation is going to be kind-of delicate2966here, OK? I have not read your publication yet, but I'm looking2967forward to doing that. But can you explain to me what you mean2968by that?2969    My colleague sitting to my right and I have a fair bit of2970experience with undersea cables from our previous career, so2971I'm very interested in what you're about to tell me, I think.2972    Mr. Botting. Sorry. I missed--missed the question.2973    Mr. Luttrell. You said ``shore up and secure.'' I want to2974know what you mean by that----2975    Mr. Botting. The security?2976    Mr. Luttrell [continuing]. When it comes to undersea cables2977and capabilities. Because I can appreciate depth of water; I2978can appreciate depth of the cable underneath the water. But,2979inevitably, it always gets shallow, and then it's touchable.2980    Now, when we talk about cable security, when we talk about2981breaking or cutting, that's the easy part. There's a lot of2982other things that exist that are far worse than that. So my2983question is, how do we prevent that from happening?2984    Mr. Botting. That question is in terms of cable tapping? Or2985it's in terms of----2986    Mr. Luttrell. We can go into that a little bit, I think, at2987a higher level.2988    Mr. Botting. So, I mean, as I would look at the risk2989profile to cables, I think cuts is the biggest concern in terms2990of frequency of what occurs----2991    Mr. Luttrell. Oh, I think the long-term damage is a lot2992worse if it's tapped. But that's my personal opinion.2993    Mr. Botting. Sure. So, I mean, happy to walk through that,2994because, like you, I would look at that as something our2995adversaries would very much like to do.2996    There are challenges to it. If you take a cutting-edge2997cable today like the Grace Hopper cable, which goes across the2998Atlantic, that will generate 352 terabytes per second of data,2999I believe. Over a year, that is about as much data, I believe,3000as the whole mobile internet usage globally. So it's a vast,3001vast amount of data.3002    You would need to tap that cable without creating a3003detected anomaly, right? Because people are monitoring, in3004theory, at either end. But let's say they can do that. You've3005then got to syphon that data off, so you've basically got to3006lay your own subsea cable to syphon that amount of data off.3007You've then got to store it somewhere in data centers that--we3008did a bit of back-of-the-napkin kind-of estimations--would3009probably be, those data centers would take up several times the3010size of a Central Park or something like that, and it could be3011as much as, say, a third the size of Manhattan. So huge3012infrastructure, possibly billions of dollars in----3013    Mr. Luttrell. That's on the new cabling system.3014    Mr. Botting. Correct, on a new cable.3015    Mr. Luttrell. The older cabling system's still in use.3016    Mr. Botting. Yes, and would have less bandwidth going3017through it----3018    Mr. Luttrell. Correct. Yes.3019    Mr. Botting [continuing]. But also then less valuable to3020tap, because you're getting access to less information.3021    You then have to decrypt that information, which--you know,3022most of the information travel is encrypted.3023    I guess where I'm going with this is, it would take a vast3024amount of resources to come away with anything useful. I3025suspect our adversaries would have other ways of getting to3026more, I guess----3027    Mr. Luttrell. I know where you're going with that, but it's3028where we are not looking is where they're going to go.3029    Mr. Botting. Potentially.3030    Mr. Luttrell. I can tell you how terrifying being3031underwater is, all right?3032    Mr. Botting. Yes.3033    Mr. Luttrell. Let me shift real quick. On mapping, you3034mentioned mapping the cabling system. For a defensive posture,3035is that a good idea?3036    It's not something that--for instance, right now, our3037cabling system's kind of a spider web or a scatter plot across3038the bottom of the water. If you're that specific corporation,3039you understand where your cables are running.3040    Defensively, I think it would be a bad idea--I can be3041talked out of this, but--if we were to populate what that3042infrastructure looked like underground.3043    Mr. Frazier, you mentioned--you said something about the3044same thing, where if we--oh--the cable areas, they don't allow3045ships to go across just in case. If we create that, that's3046kind-of a bull's-eye----3047    Mr. Frazier. Right.3048    Mr. Luttrell [continuing]. For nefarious actors.3049    Mr. Frazier. Thank you for that question.3050    I think the cable protection zone is a blessing and a3051curse, right? There's a huge tradeoff here of concentrating3052cables in any specific corridor, like we've seen New Zealand3053do, like we've seen Australia do, and Denmark.3054    The benefit of that is it tremendously eases the3055enforcement burden, right? Instead of having cables laid across3056the entire West Coast, if you concentrate them in a narrower3057environment, in terms of the actual enforcement and monitoring,3058that's made tremendously easier.3059    Mr. Luttrell. Right.3060    Mr. Frazier. But, of course, that does raise----3061    Mr. Luttrell. Yes, I think there's a good and a bad in3062there, unfortunately.3063    Mr. Frazier. Right, there's a good and a bad.3064    I think it's important to note, though, that the vast3065majority of breaks are from anchors----3066    Mr. Luttrell. Shallow water.3067    Mr. Frazier. Right.3068    Mr. Luttrell. Yep. I got you.3069    Mr. Frazier. Those are the issues. So that's where the real3070benefit----3071    Mr. Luttrell. OK.3072    Mr. Stronge, I've got to come back to you. I apologize.3073    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.3074    I will get back to you, sir, I promise--unless Mr. Crane3075helps me out on it.3076    Mr. Ogles. Thank you, Mr. Luttrell.3077    I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.3078Walkinshaw.3079    Mr. Walkinshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.3080    I just want to dig in a little bit, Mr. Stronge--and then3081maybe others want to weigh in--on the permitting process.3082    Someone mentioned a 3-year process. Obviously, the process3083isn't you fill out an application and drop that application off3084with one agency and your permit is approved 3 years later.3085    So can you give us the summary of what that permitting3086process might look like for an entity hoping to lay a new3087cable? Then I want to try to talk through how could it be3088streamlined.3089    Mr. Stronge. Sure. There's a whole industry attached to the3090cable industry just for permitting. I'm not a permitting3091expert. From what I understand, you usually have to go through3092municipal entities, State entities, and the Federal Government.3093    I think that's what your question is, the Federal. You3094would first file it with the FCC, who would refer it to Team3095Telecom, which is an interagency working group with DOJ as the3096head, DHS, and DOD.3097    The problem with the permitting that we've seen is that the3098Government obviously wants to make sure these cables are3099secure, but there's a complicated interagency process where3100each one has their own duplicative, at times, requirements and3101they're able to stop the clock on the permit to ask more3102questions. So, whereas things were 100 days 10 years ago to3103expect an answer back, there was one cable that had to wait 9083104days.3105    That injects a lot of risk, economic risk, in building3106these cables. You don't know--if the Government is not being,3107sort-of, precise and reliable with its time lines, it's3108confusing to the industry.3109    Mr. Walkinshaw. A number of you have recommended DHS as a3110coordinating agency or entity, and it's your hope that DHS3111could help more quickly cut through that interagency process to3112speed things up.3113    Mr. Stronge. Well, I think what we need is an agency that3114recognizes the need not just to secure a cable but that3115securing all cables is what gives us national security. That3116means more of a sense of urgency to assist the industry to3117build more protection.3118    Right now, the DOJ is leading the charge. They require3119individual cable operators to submit national security3120agreements, NSAs. These are secret, so the other--anything3121learned by that cable company can't be shared by other cable3122operators. It's very confusing.3123    So, essentially, instead of a coherent national policy,3124what we have is a thousand different rules by fiat by Team3125Telecom. This is at a time when France has a coherent seabed3126strategy--Italy, Norway, United Kingdom. Even Russia does. As3127far as I can tell, the United States doesn't really prosecute3128that kind of strategy.3129    Mr. Walkinshaw. Mr. Frazier, you're champing at the bit3130here, I can see. You've written about--I think it's still a3131proposed FCC rule. How far would that rule go, if adopted? What3132other actions are necessary to speed up the permitting process?3133    Mr. Frazier. Yes. Thank you. Thank you for the question and3134for the pun, champing at the bit. Well done.3135    So I think that it's critically important that we look also3136to the State level here. So most States are operating under3137delegated authority under the 1953 Submerged Lands Act to3138exercise control over the 3 nautical miles extending from their3139respective baselines. Some States have relatively3140straightforward permitting processes. Some States don't have3141really any established permit process to begin with. Then you3142have States like California, which has the California Coastal3143Commission and the California Lands Commission. Both of them3144conduct independent reviews at different stages, which add3145about 2 years to that permitting process.3146    So if I were in your shoes, I think, looking at the FCC's3147common role in narrow preemptions for sort-of critical3148infrastructure development like we've seen in the 5G space is3149something we could emulate here.3150    Mr. Walkinshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.3151    Mr. Ogles [presiding]. I thank the gentleman from Virginia,3152Mr. Walkinshaw.3153    I now recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane.3154    Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to say thank you3155to the panelists for coming.3156    Today in the Homeland Security Committee, we are talking3157about undersea cables. This isn't a topic that gets thrown3158around at a lot of dinner tables here in America, and it is3159actually a very important topic because, as you gentlemen have3160described in your opening statements, what--the vast majority3161of the data that we send across the world goes through these3162undersea cables. Is that correct?3163    [No verbal response.]3164    Mr. Crane. Satellites can't quite handle the load, is that3165correct, if these undersea cables are sabotaged or damaged,3166right?3167    [No verbal response.]3168    Mr. Crane. Now, when I was doing a little research--and3169maybe you guys can correct me--but while I was doing some3170research, the research that I did showed that most of these3171undersea cables, when they're sabotaged or intentionally3172damaged, are done in shallow water, about 200 feet of water or3173less. Is that correct?3174    [No verbal response.]3175    Mr. Crane. So there are things that we can be doing to make3176sure that we are protecting this critical infrastructure.3177    Mr. Kroenig, can you go into some of the things that we can3178be doing to protect these--this critical infrastructure?3179    Mr. Kroenig. Yes. I think we can learn some lessons from3180how our allies and partners are dealing with this. We have seen3181that NATO's set up this new Baltic Sentry mission with aircraft3182ships patrolling these areas using unmanned systems as well. We3183have seen a decrease in these incidents since they've started3184that. So, you know, you never know, is Russia deterred or did3185they just decide not to attack? But there is a pattern there.3186    Similarly, Taiwan has stepped up its patrols using the3187Coast Guard since some of these incidents. It seems that maybe3188the incidents are decreasing.3189    So I think for the United States, the Coast Guard has a3190role to play here and, obviously, within Department of Homeland3191Security. So having the Coast Guard do more patrols near3192vulnerable areas. My colleagues can speak to this, but there3193are some areas--Oregon, New Jersey, New York--where there is a3194concentration where they could focus their efforts.3195    Mr. Crane. Outside of just increasing patrols, though, Mr.3196Stronge, is there a way to harden these cables and bury them3197deeper which make them harder to access?3198    Mr. Stronge. Yes, there is. The industry has undertaken3199that over the last several years. The standard had been varying3200at 3 meters around 10 feet, and now it's going down to 93201meters, I believe--or at least it's tripled.3202    As--the effect of that has been that, over time, the number3203of faults over the last 10 years has remained constant or3204actually slightly going down, and this is at a time when the3205industry has actually put in 50 percent more miles of cable in3206the water. So, essentially, what we've seen is a big success.3207The--a number of incidents per cable mile has greatly3208decreased.3209    Mr. Crane. Can you tell the American people who, like I3210said, probably don't talk about this over the dinner table, how3211many cables are we talking about here?3212    Mr. Stronge. There are almost 600 in the world right now.3213About 100 connect to the United States, another 34 are3214connecting to the United States in the next 2, 3 years.3215    Mr. Crane. Thank you. How long does it take to repair one3216of these cables that gets damaged, and how much does it cost?3217    Mr. Stronge. Well, once you're at station, it takes 1 to 23218days to actually repair the actual cable. The problem is3219getting the permits, if you can believe it or not. That is the3220number----3221    Mr. Crane. You have to get a permit to repair one of these3222cables?3223    Mr. Stronge. Not if it's at the--at high seas. But if it's3224in territorial waters, you sure do, and sometimes it can be3225duplicative permits.3226    One of the worst areas of the world right now, if you have3227a cable break, is Indonesia, and that's because they have3228cabotage restrictions. They essentially require that their3229vessel be Indonesian flagged or crewed, or perhaps both; I3230can't recall. It can take months to get that permit.3231    I would caution the U.S. Government not to adopt similar3232laws because, right now, you never hear about American cables3233breaking. They actually do break all the time. It's just3234because we have so much resilience and we are able to repair3235effectively and quickly, that's why you never hear about it.3236But if it started taking months, it would be a problem.3237    Mr. Crane. You think it's safe to say for our foreign3238adversaries that might be listening to this hearing today that3239it is considered a deterrent, that we can play the same games?3240    Mr. Stronge. I don't know if I--I have enough information3241to speculate on that, but what I can say is that redundancy3242forms its own deterrence.3243    If you really wanted to attack 97 cables simultaneously, it3244would be a--require phenomenal effort, and I'm not sure it's3245really worth that effort.3246    Mr. Crane. Thank you. I yield back.3247    Mr. Ogles. I thank the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane.3248    I now recognize the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr.3249Magaziner.3250    Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chairman.3251    Since taking office, President Trump and Secretary Noem3252have eliminated one-third of the work force at the3253Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, CISA. The3254President's 2026 budget also calls for nearly half a billion3255dollars to be cut from CISA, and reports have indicated that3256staff at CISA have been reassigned, diverted to immigration and3257other matters. These actions weaken our cyber defenses and3258undermine Federal collaboration with industry and critical3259infrastructure organizations.3260    The administration has cut or withheld hundreds of millions3261of dollars in funding for terrorism prevention. Highly-trained3262counterterrorism analysts are being diverted away from3263investigating terrorist groups to focus on other work. Daily3264intelligence reports the top officials about terrorism and3265other threats are being directly impacted by the diversion of3266resources.3267    As our adversaries like Russia and China intensify their3268cyber attacks on the U.S. telecommunication system and our3269critical infrastructure, the administration instead is focused3270on deporting children with cancer, United States veterans who3271served our country honorably, even American citizens have been3272detained, green card holders; sending armies of masked men to3273terrorize neighborhoods. A 4-year-old U.S. citizen child with3274cancer is not a threat to the security of the United States.3275Attacks on subsea cables are.3276    So why is the administration diverting resources away from3277addressing real threats to our telecommunications3278infrastructure, to other critical infrastructure, and instead3279focusing on deporting children and grandmothers and landscapers3280and other people trying to make a living? Doesn't make America3281more safe.3282    We need to refocus on real national security threats,3283including the threats that we are talking about today.3284    Mr. Frazier, do funding and personnel cuts at CISA weaken3285our ability, impact our ability to detect and deter threats to3286subsea cables?3287    Mr. Frazier. Thank you for the question, Mr. Magaziner. I3288think there's a real need to make sure that we have a work3289force that's scaled to the threats we are facing on a daily3290basis.3291    As we've heard from a number of the panelists, the number3292of cables is going to increase over time. The interest in3293upsetting and perhaps tapping into just a fraction of those3294cables is going to increase. So making sure that we have a work3295force that's able to handle the increased volume and potential3296attacks is of paramount significance.3297    I'd also note that there are deeper or perhaps even less3298popular topics to discuss with respect to the work force3299efficiencies we are seeing. Cable repair ships, it's not a job3300you hear a lot about. You don't meet a cable repairman very3301frequently at Subway or wherever you go. So making sure that we3302are training the next generation of folks to staff those3303maintenance ships is another area of critical importance.3304    Mr. Magaziner. Yes, I'm glad you touched on that. You know,3305I come from Rhode Island, where we have a growing and thriving3306industry in underwater technology, including autonomous systems3307that I think are very relevant in this space, and we need to3308continue to invest real resources in this area, again, just to3309the point of investing to protect ourselves from the actual3310threats, not deporting kids.3311    I'll ask any of you, I mean, has the administration--I3312haven't seen it. I'm glad that our committees here--our3313subcommittees here are addressing this issue. But has the3314administration communicated to any of you any sort of a3315comprehensive plan for how the Federal Government is going to3316work with industry to address these threats?3317    Yes. See, you don't have to answer. I think the silence3318says it all.3319    So, again, I mean, this is about making sure that we as a3320Government are focused on where our greatest threats are. This3321is one, no doubt about it. I read all of your testimony. I3322think it's important. I think it's insightful. We absolutely3323need to be prioritizing this space, and I hope that the3324administration will listen.3325    With that, I'll yield back.3326    Mr. Ogles. I thank the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr.3327Magaziner, and also want to thank--your comment regarding3328strategic planning. I think this is an important conversation3329that we are beginning, and remind the gentleman this is just3330the beginning. I look forward to working with you on this issue3331and coming up with real solutions.3332    I now recognize Mr. Mackenzie, the gentleman from3333Pennsylvania.3334    Mr. Mackenzie. Absolutely. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman,3335and appreciate the fact that we are holding this hearing and3336focusing on this important topic in Congress. It's very3337important that we as Members don't get sidetracked and chase3338the shiny objects all the time instead of actually focusing on3339the issue that is at hand and right in front of us in a3340committee like this.3341    So do want to ask the testifiers and the members of the3342panel here today, what exactly is the role of the private3343industry participants that are out there and then their3344interplay with the Federal Government?3345    Mr. Stronge. I suppose I could start. I would say that the3346cable industry, the private industry is the first line of3347defense for the national security of these networks. They're3348the ones who first detect faults, then they are required to3349notify the FCC, which shares the information with Coast Guard3350and DHS. Then the industry itself is expected to repair the3351cables, which is what happens.3352    The industry has been around for about 150 years, and it's3353accustomed to failure. It's a fact, accidents happen all the3354time. So they've come up with multiple strategies for defeating3355this, not just denial or hardening the asset, but deterrence,3356with cooperation with other seabed users, detection3357technologies that I would like to talk about with you, Mr.3358Luttrell, and several other strategies as well.3359    Mr. Mackenzie. Now, the multiple companies that are in the3360private industry focusing on this type of work, is that what3361leads to the redundancy and resiliency for America, or is it3362multiple points of connection, or both? Can we talk about that?3363    Mr. Stronge. It's everything. There are multiple companies,3364fortunately. So there's a lot of competition in that space.3365There are multiple cables, there are multiple landing points.3366I'm sometimes asked what I worry about the most about single3367point of failure. There is no single point of failure. There's3368no kill switch for the American internet. Trusted vendors are3369installed for the most instances of equipment on these--on3370these cables.3371    But the landing--areas of the landing station has been a3372concern of the industry. In the--on the U.S. East Coast, just337310 years ago, so many cables were concentrated in the New York/3374New Jersey area, and they've spent billions of dollars of3375building landing stations up and down the East Coast since3376then.3377    Conversely, the West Coast is a potential problem. There's3378more herding of cables there. There are a lot of national3379marine sanctuaries up and down the coast of California that are3380essentially a no-go zone for the cable industry. If we are3381going to worry about a national strategy for resilience, that's3382an area where there should be some improvement.3383    Mr. Mackenzie. So what I'm hearing, though, is that the3384private industry, that their role in this subsea cable space is3385actually a huge benefit for us, probably a competitive3386advantage to other countries around the world that don't have3387the technology companies that are doing this type of work in3388this space.3389    So that's something we want to continue to foster. We don't3390want to impede that kind of private-sector activity. But there3391is, you're saying, a potential space for the Federal Government3392to step in.3393    So in a national strategy conversation, is it something3394that we should be looking at from a Government perspective on3395the whole or just in targeted areas where there are problems?3396    Mr. Frazier. Well, I'm a law professor, so I have to3397answer, it depends. So I think if you look at different3398components of the undersea cable issue, we'll see a different3399makeup of where we need to see private actors taking the lead3400and the Government taking the lead.3401    To start, I would recommend that, for the FCC licensing3402process, we need to see resiliency planning as a part of that3403application. If stuff does hit the fan, who are these cable3404owners going to turn to? It's still the case that we have3405Google, Meta, and other of our hyper-scalers turning to ships3406owned by China to repair their cables. We've seen proposals,3407for example, to ban Chinese-affiliated entities from laying,3408maintaining, repairing U.S. cables. I think that's a wise3409position to take because the odds, for example, of China, when3410they're repairing a repeater, installing some malicious add-ons3411to that, we don't know just how high or how likely that may be.3412    So I think having an explicit ban on Chinese intervention3413on this piece of critical infrastructure makes a lot of sense.3414    Mr. Mackenzie. Great. Well, thank you. I see my time's3415about to expire, but I appreciate the point of rebuilding and3416bringing back American shipbuilding that is critical to our3417national security in so many areas, not just here with the3418subsea cables, but I appreciate you raising that today. Again,3419thank you all for being here today.3420    Mr. Ogles. I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.3421Mackenzie.3422    I now recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter.3423    Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our3424witnesses for being here today.3425    Protecting our subsea cable infrastructure is critical to3426national security and to our U.S. economy, which increasingly3427relies on on-line markets. These lines are the quiet backbone3428of modern economy, and because they're largely invisible,3429they're easily taken for granted.3430    But foreign adversaries do not take them for granted.3431Nations like China and Russia have developed specialized3432vessels and undersea capabilities designed to tap, disrupt, and3433sever subsea cables. They understand that interfering with3434these networks can undermine America, without firing a single3435shot.3436    Off the coast of my district in South Louisiana, the Gulf3437of Mexico provides a stark example of the importance of this3438infrastructure. Subsea cables support offshore energy3439platforms, vessels, and critical industrial operations hundreds3440of miles from land. A significant disruption could halt3441production, spike energy prices, and compromise safety systems.3442That's why DHS must elevate this issue to the top of3443operational priority.3444    However, a recent New York Times investigative report found3445that Department of Homeland Security under President Donald3446Trump has reassigned large numbers of agents, including those3447from wings of homeland security investigations that investigate3448child abuse, exploitation, human trafficking, terrorism, and3449transnational crimes, to focus primarily on immigration3450enforcement and mass deportation efforts. Internal DHS3451documents and interviews show that this shift in priorities has3452diminished the capacity to investigate serious criminal3453national security threats.3454    Protecting subsea infrastructure is not optional. This is a3455national security priority we cannot shift our attention away3456from. Our economic stability, our energy sector, and the safety3457of millions of Americans depend on these networks functioning3458every hour of every day.3459    Mr. Frazier, about 20 or 30--20 to 30 U.S.-owned cables3460need repair each year, but repairing them is a challenge due to3461the limited number of specialized repair vessels worldwide.3462Only an estimated 80 ships exist to service nearly a million3463miles of subsea cable, creating high demand and delays that can3464last months for a single repair. Cable operators are also left3465with little choice but to rely on Chinese ships for repairs3466because alternatives are scarce.3467    In your opinion, what can Congress do to help with this3468problem?3469    Mr. Frazier. Thank you for that question.3470    I think we have to lean into America's shipbuilding3471capacity. The fact that we are still relying on ships built by3472foreign adversaries, in particular, to repair some of these3473critical cables is, in my opinion, a sign of our neglect to3474this issue. We have to pay attention to the fact that, again,3475every cable has 2 sides.3476    A lot of those cables land, for example, in Taiwan. Taiwan3477isn't blessed with 88 different cables like we are. Taiwan has347815. So making sure that there are ships in Guam, in Hawaii, and3479near Taiwan, for example, is very important, and those ships3480should be built by American companies.3481    Mr. Carter. As you know, as you may know, in Louisiana, I'm3482proud to have, within Louisiana, some of the best, strongest,3483and most reputable shipbuilders in the world within the State3484of Louisiana.3485    Mr. Frazier, you note the need for cable repair3486capabilities is likely to continue to grow as we use these3487cables more. Repair of these subsea cables is believed to cost3488the United States between $12- and $116 million annually.3489    Does the United States know what the true financial cost of3490repairs and disruptions of undersea cables really is every3491year? What kind of data sharing could help provide better3492insight in the impacts of these disruptions?3493    Mr. Frazier. I think this is where we really need to have3494that lead agency that's able to collect information from a3495variety of the private and public stakeholders who are3496gathering this information and to establish stronger ties with3497our allies.3498    For example, we know in Tonga, just a volcano caused the3499single line connecting Tonga to the rest of the world to go3500off-line. Tonga lost internet access for about 4 to 5 weeks. So3501we have to factor in also, how are our allies doing when the3502internet gets disrupted.3503    Mr. Carter. So $12- to $116 million. That's a pretty big3504gap. That means we really don't know. That means we have not3505been able to ascertain just how deep this problem is or how3506deep it is to fix.3507    What can we do to be more scientific, because we understand3508and know how important it is, No. 1, to understand the problem3509and, No. 2, to have a remedy to fix it? Any idea, Mr. Botting?3510You're shaking your head. Would you like to jump in on that? My3511time is up, so you got to do it quickly.3512    Mr. Botting. No. I think the--the other point that I wanted3513to make on repairs was----3514    Mr. Carter. Can you stay to this point? That's all I've got3515time for.3516    Mr. Botting. Oh, I'm sorry. I don't have an answer.3517    Mr. Carter. OK. Mr. Frazier.3518    Mr. Frazier. I would include in the FCC licensing3519provisions that companies have to share the information related3520to repairs and any service disruptions that are seen directly3521to DHS or the FCC.3522    Mr. Carter. Mr. Chairman, I yield.3523    Mr. Ogles. The gentleman's time has expired. I thank the3524gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter.3525    Now recognize the gentlewoman from South Carolina, Mrs.3526Biggs.3527    Mrs. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our3528witnesses for being here today.3529    I don't think there's any question about the critical role3530that the subsea cables play in the security and the daily3531functioning of the United States, yet responsibility for3532protecting these assets is fragmented across multiple Federal3533agencies with no single entity clearly designated as the3534Federal lead.3535    Someone mentioned earlier about maybe looking at the3536Executive Order for some direction for that. But the ambiguity3537creates doubts in the oversight, and actually it leaves the3538industry without a clear point of contact during emerging3539threats.3540    So as Members of Congress, we really need to understand3541whether the structure is adequate for today's risk environment.3542So I would like to hear from each one of you--I know we've3543kind-of danced around and made--kind-of hinted at ideas, but3544which Federal entity should be responsible for overseeing sea3545cable security as it relates to national security, and what3546core responsibilities should that agency hold?3547    Mr. Kroenig. Well, I think you're right, fragmentation is a3548problem. Having a single hub to coordinate subsea cable3549security would make a lot of sense. As I said in my opening3550testimony, I do think the Department of Homeland Security could3551make sense for that.3552    Mr. Botting. Yes. I'd say across 2 specific areas that DHS3553would be well-positioned. No. 1 is, as I mentioned earlier, the3554two-way threat intelligence sharing to make sure that industry3555has access to a more sophisticated understanding of the latest3556and greatest from our adversaries and what they might be3557intending to do.3558    The second is, we've talked about, you know, concerns3559within the supply chain, perhaps repair vehicles coming out--or3560vessels coming out of China. Supply chain's big, right. Most of3561these supply chains were developed at a time originally when3562China probably wasn't the biggest threat to the United States.3563    I think we need to take a more holistic approach than just3564calling on one piece of the puzzle and have DHS work with3565industry to map that supply chain so that we understand it, we3566understand where China may have access in other parts of the3567supply chain. If that poses a risk, then we propose mitigations3568for solving that.3569    I think doing this whack-a-mole is probably not a great3570strategy for us. I think DHS could play a really important role3571in looking at this holistically with industry and getting us to3572a place where we feel comfortable.3573    Mr. Stronge. Talking to people in the industry, I don't3574think they have a preference. They just want someone who knows3575what--who knows what the strategy is and can prosecute it.3576    DHS has been--proposed a few years ago--a Member of3577Congress I know--proposed that NTIA take over leadership of3578Team Telecom. That could also work.3579    But what we do need is something, as you've said, is a3580holistic approach. Right now I think supply chain mitigation is3581really well-managed. Team Telecom has done an excellent job at3582that.3583    Also, other strategies that would fall under the denial3584curtain of strategy of making sure that cable landing stations3585are hardened and they're not letting in potential bad actors.3586That's already well-covered under Team Telecom provisions, but3587that's only one aspect of protecting cables.3588    To have actual deterrence, you need to have a policy to3589prosecute companies that are damaging cables. You need to allow3590the industry to innovate with detection technologies. Most3591importantly, you need to promote physical diversity of these3592cables. Right now I'm not really seeing that a great deal.3593    DHS did put out a study a couple of years ago promoting3594this idea, but as best I can tell, nothing's really happened on3595that.3596    Mr. Frazier. I'll echo much of the same sentiments as my3597colleagues here. I do think that DHS can play a lead agency3598role in a lot of these domains.3599    One in particular that I would encourage you all to think3600creatively about is, you all have sponsored in the cyber3601domain, bug bounty problem--bug bounty programs, for example. I3602would love to see a boat bounty program where we identify3603members of the shadow fleet. I think you can get a lot of folks3604who would be excited to help identify Russian ships flying3605under flags of convenience. I would also encourage DHS to3606really lean into its role in terms of national emergency3607planning to assist in contingency plans in this domain.3608    Mrs. Biggs. Well, thank you very much for your insight on3609that.3610    With that, I yield back.3611    Mr. Ogles. I thank the gentlewoman from South Carolina,3612Mrs. Biggs.3613    We did run out of time with you, Mr. Carter, so I'll3614recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter.3615    Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I've got one quick3616question for each of our panelists.3617    The reconciliation bill which passed this summer included3618billions of dollars in funding for DHS agencies responsible for3619detecting, deterring, and responding to threats to subsea3620cables. How should these agencies utilize these funds better to3621protect subsea infrastructure?3622    Mr. Kroenig. Going back--thank you, sir. Going back to my3623previous points, I think making sure that the Coast Guard has3624the resources it needs to do patrols is an important piece of3625the answer.3626    Mr. Stronge. I would--I can't speak to the actual3627capabilities and whether they've been degraded or not,3628Representative Carter. But I do know that in other countries3629it's been shown that----3630    Mr. Carter. I didn't suggest it would degrade it. I said3631there was additional funds that have been allocated. How can we3632better use them to ensure that we are protecting subsea3633infrastructure?3634    Mr. Stronge. Thank you for that clarification. I was3635thinking of your earlier question to another witness.3636    What we have seen in other areas of the world is that3637aggressive deterrence by military or police activity really3638makes a difference. We've seen that in the Baltic. There is a3639huge media frenzy about cable breaks in the Baltic. Finland,3640Sweden, and Estonia really stepped up efforts, and since then,3641there have not been any cable breaks. That's anecdotal, but3642it's possible.3643    The actual last cable that has experienced a fault in the3644Baltic Sea was a Russian military cable. We've seen the same3645thing off the coast of Taiwan.3646    Mr. Carter. I don't want you to miss this great3647opportunity. I'm saying you just got a whole lot of money, and3648we are asking you to help us spend it. So I don't want you to3649look back and say, I blew this moment.3650    We want to make sure we hear from you, policy makers who3651are appropriating money, to make sure that we are doing and3652hitting the spots that you think as experts need to be hit. DHS3653has a lot more money that is in the reconciliation bill. We3654want to make sure it's being spent in a way that experts think.3655    So I don't want to put you on the spot, but I just want to3656give Mr. Botting a little bit of a runway on that.3657    Mr. Botting. Certainly. Thank you, sir.3658    Yes, I would go back to I think DHS should be the place3659where we do a comprehensive mapping of the supply chain. I3660think DHS should lead a two-way threat intelligence-sharing3661mechanism with industry so that we get information into their3662hands that can help them adjust their risk mitigation measures3663to better protect us against activity by our adversaries.3664    One more that I'll throw in there is engagement with3665international partners. A lot of the challenges that we face3666are mirrored, if not amplified, in foreign jurisdictions. So if3667we look at things like time for permitting approvals or repair3668ships getting in, we are not the worst offender in the United3669States, but we are impacted when capacity is taken out of the3670global interconnected cable ecosystem when others do not3671address those issues.3672    So I would strongly encourage engagement with international3673partners through DHS as well.3674    Thank you, sir.3675    Mr. Frazier. Thank you for the question. I would spend all3676that money on 2 things. I would create 10 new cable repair3677ships. Each cable repair ship costs about $300 million. So you3678can start allocating a lot of money to just building more cable3679repair ships.3680    I would then use any remaining funds after that to begin to3681create the same sorts of drones. They're called XLUUVs, Extra3682Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles, that China just paraded3683around in Beijing about 2 months ago. I think we need this3684similar set of drone capabilities that they're demonstrating3685undersea.3686    Mr. Carter. Mr. Chairman, thank you.3687    Mr. Ogles. I thank the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.3688Carter, and for your follow-up questions.3689    I welcome Mr. Fong to the Cybersecurity Subcommittee, and I3690recognize the gentleman from California for 5 minutes.3691    Mr. Fong. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to the witnesses.3692Thank you for the hospitality, and certainly excited to be part3693of this critical conversation on the Cyber and Infrastructure3694Subcommittee.3695    My first question to Mr. Botting. It was alluded by my3696colleague from Texas, but the PRC continues to expand its3697technical capabilities for intercepting and collecting global3698communications data, including data that travels across these3699subsea cables.3700    Given the PRC's rapid investment in quantum computing and3701its known practice of harvesting encrypted data for future3702exploitation, what steps should the United States and our3703allies take to ensure that the data moving through subsea3704cables remains protected, not only today, but also against3705future decryption attempts that could enable state-sponsored3706cyber operations years or decades from now?3707    Mr. Botting. Thank you very much for the question.3708    Certainly, it is not that I'm dismissing that threat out of3709hand, by any means. It's that, as I look at it, it is a very3710technically challenging way to get access to information. I3711think, certainly, if we look at the cybersecurity domain,3712they've proven themselves very adept to getting access to3713information through other means.3714    It is a very important point, though, that part of the kind3715of scenario I walked us through earlier was the idea that a lot3716of the data is encrypted, right. If we get to a point where3717China has a quantum event and is able to far easily decrypt3718that information, again, that would change the risk profile.3719    I guess, 2 direct answers to your questions. No. 1 is, we3720need to be ready to make that transition so that our financial3721transactions or other sensitive data are being transmitted with3722quantum-resistant algorithms ahead of the point in time when3723China is able to decrypt it. So that is an important thing that3724we drive forward.3725    I think that needs to happen primarily with the data3726owners, not on the cable itself, because if it's on the cable3727itself, then you create a single point of failure in the3728system, where if they tap it on a terrestrial cable, it's not3729encrypted. If they tap it on the subsea cable, it is encrypted.3730So you just redirect their efforts somewhere else in the3731system. It needs to be encrypted before it's sort-of traversing3732the cables and the global ecosystem.3733    So, yes, I think that is something that's important for us3734to work on. I know this committee could potentially help to3735drive forward.3736    Mr. Fong. Thank you very much.3737    To Mr. Stronge, over the past 2 years--and it's been3738alluded by some of the other witnesses--several cable breaks3739near Taiwan have demonstrated how vulnerable the region's3740communications infrastructure is to both accidental damage and3741deliberate interference. These cable systems, as mentioned, not3742only carry Taiwan's domestic internet and phone traffic, but3743they also carry and support a substantial volume of transit3744data that moves between the United States and key markets in3745Asia.3746    If the PRC intentionally disrupted cable segments near3747Taiwan, what would the immediate effects to the United States3748be? What would we experience in terms of slowed cloud services,3749delayed financial transactions, and interruptions to routine3750commercial data? Based on your industry insights, how quickly3751could alternate cable routes and backup systems realistically3752absorb the sudden shift in traffic without causing instability3753across U.S. networks?3754    Mr. Stronge. Well, it would--I would be more concerned for3755the Taiwanese, but I can say that it would be very difficult3756for the CCP to intentionally cause faults in these cables and3757then prevent repair ships without maintaining a blockade. Then3758we are in a situation of potential warfare.3759    In terms of the effects on the continental United States, I3760wouldn't say necessarily minor, but only a small proportion of3761trans-Pacific cables is routed through that area. Japan is a3762much larger hub for us through the Pacific, and there are a lot3763of new cables going in on a southerly route to provide more3764physical diversity.3765    Mr. Fong. OK. I have to ask you, Mr. Stronge, you mentioned3766California's specific challenges in one of your previous3767answers. Being a Californian now on this committee, I would--I3768want to, I guess, allow you to expound on what those3769California-specific challenges are.3770    Mr. Stronge. Sure. The way--as I understand it, the normal3771permitting process for going through U.S. territorial waters is3772applying for a permit with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,3773and that's pretty well-founded. Both for installation and quick3774repair, it generally has not been a huge problem.3775    However, NOAA is the administrator of the national marine3776sanctuaries. They have, instead of a 25-year license, as the3777FCC does for normal cables, they would only have a 5-year3778license. It's not known by cable operators of how quickly they3779would react to an emergency repair.3780    So, essentially, the cables have completely routed around3781that area. As a result, if you look at a map, they're all3782squeezed into a few landing stations in California, Oregon, and3783Washington.3784    Mr. Fong. Got you. Well, I certainly look forward to3785working with you.3786    My time has run out. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.3787    Mr. Ogles. I thank the gentleman from California, Mr. Fong.3788    I have a couple of follow-up questions, but before I do3789that, I'd like to recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr.3790Luttrell.3791    Mr. Luttrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.3792    Currently, what is--how do they find the breaks in the3793cable system? Is that a--are they pinging it with a sonar,3794side-scan sonar, underwater unmanned vehicle, or are they3795tracking where--is it repeaters?3796    Mr. Stronge. Thank you, Representative Luttrell.3797    Yes. It's essentially the light equivalent of a sonar. They3798have something called a reflectometer, shoots light down and3799sunlight can bounce back, and they measure the delay in the3800time. That's easiest if there's a clean break of the cable.3801They know precisely where that fault is.3802    Mr. Luttrell. OK. If not?3803    Mr. Stronge. It requires more investigation. There are3804problems with--called a shunt fault if the electricity fails on3805the cable. It's harder to pinpoint. But they investigate it3806further.3807    Mr. Luttrell. It's normally at a shallower depth?3808    Mr. Stronge. Yes, sir. It's normally----3809    Mr. Luttrell. At the deeper waters, the deeper depths, we3810are not having that problem?3811    Mr. Stronge. Less than 10 percent are at highest.3812    Mr. Luttrell. Any sort of vehicle unmanned tracking these3813cable systems to find breaks or faults before we have a loss?3814    Mr. Stronge. So that's a great question, detecting things3815before. This is an incredible new technology, if you don't mind3816me just telling you for a moment.3817    So you're talking about U.S. SEAL activity or other3818activity to--that, hypothetically, could cut a cable. Before,3819there's no way to hear that. You can use automatic3820identification system to see where a ship is, but you can turn3821that off.3822    The industry has developed something that allows the light3823signals and changes to the light to actually hear what's going3824on. So if you actually go and touch a cable that has this3825technology on, it sounds like this. [Indicating.]3826    You can actually hear it. You can also hear ships that are3827dropping the anchor near the cable. It's a remarkable new3828technology.3829    But the industry's kind-of afraid of adopting it widely3830because they don't know how that is going to be permitted. It3831could greatly complicate the permitting process.3832    So if we want the industry to adopt this incredible new3833technology, we need to give them a little bit more assurance of3834what would be allowed.3835    Mr. Luttrell. All right. Thank you.3836    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.3837    Mr. Ogles. I thank the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Luttrell.3838    You know, we've got about 15 minutes left in the hearing,3839and my guess is I think everyone has essentially been on the3840same page. So why don't we go down the line, roughly 4 minutes3841apiece, closing remarks, anything that you want to put a fine3842point on or, quite frankly, if there's something that we3843missed, I think it's been stated by both sides of the aisle3844that this is an incredible area of importance that's going to3845require bipartisan cooperation and, quite frankly, a lot of3846strategic planning, because we have both vulnerabilities here3847in the continental, under the sea, and, then, of course, with3848our foreign partners.3849    So, Mr. Kroenig, I'll begin with you. You're recognized for38504 minutes.3851    Mr. Kroenig. Well, I think one important issue we haven't3852spent enough time on is the Chinese-owned and -operated and -3853maintained cables. The internet developed in the 1990's, the38542000's, it was a more peaceful time, a time of globalization, a3855lot of economic interdependence between the United States and3856China in all areas, including in this one.3857    So as I think--as we think about a global strategy to3858derisk from China economically, this is another important part3859of that. I think the message has gotten to U.S. industry, and3860my colleagues can comment, that Chinese equipment is a problem,3861landing points in China is a problem. Google was blocked from3862having a landing point in Hong Kong recently.3863    So I think there are going to be costs to efficiency3864because of that, but it is worth it for national security. This3865gets back to this point. Industry, I think, is an asset for us.3866But industry left to its own devices is often going to make3867decisions based on profitability. So I think the U.S.3868Government does have an important role to play in national3869security.3870    Even though we are relatively protected here, our allies in3871the region do depend more on Chinese-owned and -operated3872cables. So that is something to be aware of and does get back3873to this espionage point. China doesn't have to tap into our3874cables if they're operating them theirselves.3875    So I'll stop there.3876    Mr. Ogles. Mr. Stronge, you have 4 minutes.3877    Mr. Stronge. Thank you. I think I'll use a few minutes to3878address a couple of questions that were left unanswered. I3879think--I hope both will provide some comfort to the committee.3880    First of all, Representative Luttrell asked me to convince3881him otherwise that mapping the infrastructure is not dangerous.3882Well, some things can't be hidden, and cables are one of those.3883If you think of other critical pieces of infrastructure, roads3884and bridges would--do you think it's a good idea to classify3885those? Well, no. We economically need them, and we'd be running3886into them if we didn't know where they were.3887    The same goes with the electricity grid. The first thing3888you do when you bury a line is notify and map where that is so3889that there's less risk of electrocution.3890    The same goes for submarine cables. The cable industry3891works very closely with the fishery industries to let them know3892where those cables are. Otherwise, the numbers of accidents3893would go way up over time, and it would also make it more3894difficult to discern what is malicious versus what is an3895accident. We'd be so overwhelmed with accidents.3896    My company does collect a lot of sensitive data. We don't3897show, however, the specific location of the cable landing3898stations or the specific location of the cables. We don't3899provide that at least to our normal clients.3900    The second thing that I hope is a little bit of comfort is3901I think there might be a misconception that the United States3902relies on Chinese repair vessels. That's simply not the case.3903We do rely on repair vessels from friendly countries, NATO3904partners, Japan, Korea.3905    There are a handful of ships in the sea that are Chinese-3906flagged and -operated. The United States does not tend to use3907those. In fact, U.S. operators have commitments with Team3908Telecom not to use those for repair. In fact, the only place3909where those ships operate are in the South China Sea and the3910coastal waters around China. So it's really not--that aspect3911doesn't scare me as much. That is being handled right now.3912    I think what I would just close with is that this is one of3913those rare opportunities or moments where the private sector is3914almost completely aligned with the public need. The last thing3915cable operators want is a cyber intrusion on their cables, so3916they have heavy cybersecurity. The last thing they want is3917physical security.3918    So they've already committed a lot of money to protect the3919cables, and I think they're really looking forward to having a3920continuing and more open dialog with the Government on how to3921move that forward.3922    Thank you.3923    Mr. Ogles. Thank you, Mr. Stronge.3924    Mr. Botting, closing remarks, I recognize you for 43925minutes.3926    Mr. Botting. Thank you, Chairman.3927    Yes, equally, I want to address a couple of points that we3928didn't delve into too deeply here.3929    No. 1 is on repair capacity. One aspect we've not talked3930about is what is the scenario in which we are needing rapid3931repair capability across multiple cables. I should say we in3932the United States or partners internationally with whom we are3933interconnected.3934    We had an example in the Red Sea where Houthi rebels were3935shooting at ships, and a ship had to drop an anchor, and that3936anchor sliced a whole bunch of cables. Commercial repair ships3937are not going into that scenario to repair those cables.3938    So I do think there's a question, if we believe that an3939adversary is going to engage in sabotage on our cables, the3940Government needs to work with industry to figure out when a3941commercial vessel's going in and when is it potentially the3942U.S. Navy or some other part of, you know, the U.S. military3943that's going in to repair these cables.3944    That kind of scenario planning, if you believe that that3945eventuality is a possibility, is incredibly important, and I3946would encourage the U.S. Government to work with industry on3947that.3948    Second, I want to reemphasize a point I made in my opening3949remarks. Around 200 incidents per year happen on those 6003950cables, and they don't get investigated very well. That leaves3951a huge opportunity for adversaries to engage in gray zone3952activities, cutting cables, and just say, sorry, it's an3953accident, happens all the time. We need to get better at3954investigating those incidents and understand why they happen.3955    There are perfectly normal, benign reasons why it happens.3956You know, being out at sea you get very bad weather, things3957like that, you need to drop anchor. You know, it will happen to3958some extent. But we actually need to find out if that is what3959happened or if a--member of the shadow fleet went through,3960dropped its cable and intentionally sliced key cables in the3961Baltics, for instance.3962    So I agree, I think a lot of our allies in the Baltic Sea3963are doing great work in starting to push that forward and3964actually seeking to prosecute some of these things.3965    To the point made earlier about cable protection zones,3966it's a reason why I'm skeptical about cable protection zones,3967because you are concentrating your risk, and the only way to3968offset that is to very actively investigate and prosecute when3969somebody does something bad in that cable protection zone. We3970are not seeing a lot of people doing that internationally at3971the moment.3972    Finally, I just go back to my two recommendations specific3973to DHS. We need a two-way threat-intelligence-sharing mechanism3974to ensure that the private sector is aware of threats and, you3975know, particular tactics that adversaries may use, and we need3976to do a good mapping of the supply chain, which I think DHS is3977well-positioned to do with the industry.3978    So with that, thank you.3979    Mr. Ogles. I do believe the gentleman from Arizona has a3980follow-up question. So I'll go to you, Mr. Crane, recognize you3981for 5 minutes.3982    Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.3983    As I'm thinking about this topic in how to defend our3984subsea cables, one of the things that I'm thinking about is,3985obviously, we can harden the cables along our shores a lot3986easier than we can, you know, defend and harden the--where they3987go to right across the sea to other countries, allies of ours.3988    Have any of you guys done a cost analysis regarding is it3989cheaper for us to actually harden these cables with everything3990that goes with that or is it cheaper for us to just build up3991our ability and our fleet to repair these cables? Mr. Stronge.3992    Mr. Stronge. Yes, sir. Thank you for that question.3993    About 12 percent of the world's cable mileage is buried,3994and that accounted for 60 percent of the time to lay it, or,3995essentially, the cost. It's hugely expensive to bury it. It's3996typically only done in shallow areas or areas with other seabed3997industries, like fishing.3998    Now, you could mandate that it gets buried even further,3999but it would--then you're thinking--you have to think through4000the economics of that. What is going to provide us more4001protection? If we say bury it the whole way, that's the cost of40023 cables. I would guarantee you that we are going to--you would4003have more resilience by building 3 cables rather than having 14004that has--is buried the entire way.4005    I also don't know of the physical constraints on armoring a4006cable at deep sea. There are limits to the winch, a power on4007the cable. So as it's laid, and certainly if it would need to4008be recovered, it might simply be impossible.4009    Finally, hardening always sounds like a great thing. These4010cables--this is an actual cable. This is what it is at deep4011sea. The shallow end you have steel armor around it, but really4012that's more to protect against environmental problems, like4013rock chafing. Steel armoring around the cable is not going to4014stop an anchor.4015    So you need diversity. That's the No. 1 way to protect.4016    Mr. Crane. Thank you. I yield back.4017    Mr. Ogles. I thank the gentleman from Arizona.4018    Mr. Frazier, if you'd like to offer some remarks. But also,4019I would love for you to touch on AI and what that's going to do4020with our need for additional bandwidth. Obviously, you know, if4021you want to touch on energy demand, but also, of course, the4022hardening that goes therein.4023    I recognize the gentleman for 4 minutes.4024    Mr. Frazier. Yes. Thank you for that question, Chairman.4025    I think, just to start--and I certainly will get to AI--I4026want to emphasize that, as you pointed out in your opening4027remarks, we've been here before. We've had reports from 2004,4028for example, from DHS basically enumerating every policy4029proposal we heard here today. We punted the issue to subsequent4030Congresses.4031    So I would just emphasize that, to me, the developments we4032are seeing in China with respect to their drone capabilities in4033particular should be regarded as a sort-of subsea Sputnik4034moment that we are living through right now. If we don't act4035and make sure that we are protecting Taiwan, and make sure we4036are protecting our allies, and make sure we are defending our4037own undersea cable infrastructure, we may be sitting in this4038room again in 2025--or excuse me--2035 having the same4039conversation.4040    So I do think this needs to be a priority because, in4041particular, we are going to see this increase in bandwidth4042demand only increase with our reliance on AI. If you talk to4043Meta officials, one of their main data center executives made a4044fantastic line, which is a data center without the undersea4045cable system is just a warehouse.4046    We are seeing billions, soon trillions, of dollars across4047the AI industry being spent on these data centers, and to not4048see the undersea cable system as a key component of the--as4049wisdom of those investments is missing out on just the4050essential role we have to make sure we are leaning into there.4051    Then, finally, I would say that we may not be as reliant on4052China and Chinese infrastructure today as we have been in the4053past, but that's certainly not true of strategic partners4054around the world. We need to be studying and paying close4055attention to the Digital Silk Road, specifically in the Middle4056East and North Africa where China is experiencing tremendous4057success in getting other countries to buy into its cable4058infrastructure and to broader economic and technological4059infrastructure.4060    Then I would emphasize that, perhaps outside of the4061confines of this meeting, paying greater attention to4062international law is something that we should lend support to4063with respect to countries like Estonia, Poland, and Finland.4064They are trying to see an expansion in our interpretation, for4065example, of what it means to defend national sovereignty in the4066EEZ and outside of territorial waters.4067    But finally, I would just say really taking the lowest-4068hanging fruit first and starting to make progress on these4069fronts by, for example, updating the penalties in the Submarine4070Cable Act of 1888 to make sure that people can actually be4071deterred.4072    Mr. Ogles. Well, I want to thank the witnesses. You know,4073to your point, this is certainly an area where we need to move4074and move swiftly, which is why the Cyber Subcommittee, we just4075moved and passed in Congress the PILLAR Act, which I was the4076author of, and then also the resilience to foreign entities.4077    So we'll continue to work in this space. My commitment to4078the panelists and everyone on this committee is that I will be4079a loud voice as we continue to expand, protect, and, quite4080frankly, better strategic plan around this very issue.4081    Again, I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony,4082the Members for their questions. The Members of the committee4083may have some additional questions for the witnesses and we4084would ask the witnesses to respond to these in writing.4085    Pursuant to committee rule VII(E), the hearing record will4086be open for 10 days.4087    Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank4088you all.4089    [Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the subcommittees were4090adjourned.]40914092                            A P P E N D I X40934094                              ----------40954096           Supplemental Material Submitted by Matthew Kroenig4097[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]40984099           Supplemental Material Submitted by Timothy Stronge4100[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]41014102            Supplemental Material Submitted by Kevin Frazier4103[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]41044105                                 [all]