“From Cartels to Coastlines: An Examination of U.S. Federal Efforts to Confront Illicit Maritime Activities in U.S. Waters”

1[House Hearing, 119 Congress]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34               FROM CARTELS TO COASTLINES: AN EXAMINA-5                TION OF U.S. FEDERAL EFFORTS TO CONFRONT6               ILLICIT MARITIME ACTIVITIES IN U.S. WATERS78=======================================================================910                             JOINT HEARING1112                               BEFORE THE1314                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON1516                         TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME17                                SECURITY1819                                AND THE2021                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON22                    BORDER SECURITY AND ENFORCEMENT2324                                 OF THE2526                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY27                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES2829                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS3031                             FIRST SESSION3233                               __________3435                             JUNE 10, 20253637                               __________3839                           Serial No. 119-184041                               __________4243       Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security4445[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]4647        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov4849                               __________5051                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE5261-341 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 20255354-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------5556                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY5758                 Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman59Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice       Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,60    Chair                                Ranking Member61Clay Higgins, Louisiana              Eric Swalwell, California62Michael Guest, Mississippi           J. Luis Correa, California63Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida           Shri Thanedar, Michigan64August Pfluger, Texas                Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island65Andrew R. Garbarino, New York        Daniel S. Goldman, New York66Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois67Tony Gonzales, Texas                 Timothy M. Kennedy, New York68Morgan Luttrell, Texas               LaMonica McIver, New Jersey69Dale W. Strong, Alabama              Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking70Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma                  Member71Elijah Crane, Arizona                Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico72Andrew Ogles, Tennessee              Nellie Pou, New Jersey73Sheri Biggs, South Carolina          Troy A. Carter, Louisiana74Gabe Evans, Colorado                 Robert Garcia, California75Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania         Al Green, Texas76Brad Knott, North Carolina77                    Eric Heighberger, Staff Director78                  Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director79                       Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk80                                 ------8182          SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY8384                  Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida, Chairman85Andrew R. Garbarino, New York        LaMonica McIver, New Jersey,86Elijah Crane, Arizona                    Ranking Member87Sheri Biggs, South Carolina          Timothy M. Kennedy, New York88Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex     Troy A. Carter, Louisiana89    officio)                         Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi90                                         (ex officio)91             Roland Hernandez, Subcommittee Staff Director92           Alex Marston, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director93                                 ------9495            SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER SECURITY AND ENFORCEMENT9697                  Michael Guest, Mississippi, Chairman98Tony Gonzales, Texas                 J. Luis Correa, California,99Elijah Crane, Arizona                    Ranking Member100Andrew Ogles, Tennessee              Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois101Sheri Biggs, South Carolina          Julie Johnson, Texas102Brad Knott, North Carolina           Vacant103Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex     Vacant104    officio)                         Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi105                                         (ex officio)106                Natasha Eby, Subcommittee Staff Director107       Brieana Marticorena, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director108109                           C O N T E N T S110111                              ----------112                                                                   Page113114                               Statements115116The Honorable Carlos A. Gimenez, a Representative in Congress117  From the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on118  Transportation and Maritime Security:119  Oral Statement.................................................     1120  Prepared Statement.............................................     3121The Honorable LaMonica McIver, a Representative in Congress From122  the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on123  Transportation and Maritime Security:124  Oral Statement.................................................     4125  Prepared Statement.............................................     5126The Honorable Michael Guest, a Representative in Congress From127  the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Border128  Security and Enforcement.......................................     6129The Honorable Delia C. Ramirez, a Representative in Congress From130  the State of Illinois, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on131  Border Security and Enforcement:132  Oral Statement.................................................     8133  Prepared Statement.............................................    10134The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress135  From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on136  Homeland Security:137  Prepared Statement.............................................    11138139                               Witnesses140141Mr. Jonathan P. Miller, Executive Assistant Commissioner, Air and142  Marine Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection:143  Oral Statement.................................................    13144  Prepared Statement.............................................    14145Rear Admiral Adam A. Chamie, Assistant Commandant for Response146  Policy, U.S. Coast Guard:147  Oral Statement.................................................    18148  Prepared Statement.............................................    19149Mr. James C. Harris, III, Assistant Director, Countering150  Transnational Organized Crime, Homeland Security151  Investigations:152  Oral Statement.................................................    22153  Prepared Statement.............................................    23154Ms. Heather MacLeod, Director of Homeland Security and Justice,155  U.S. Government Accountability Office:156  Oral Statement.................................................    26157  Prepared Statement.............................................    28158159 FROM CARTELS TO COASTLINES: AN EXAMINATION OF U.S. FEDERAL EFFORTS TO160          CONFRONT ILLICIT MARITIME ACTIVITIES IN U.S. WATERS161162                              ----------163164                         Tuesday, June 10, 2025165166             U.S. House of Representatives,167                    Committee on Homeland Security,168                            Subcommittee on Transportation169                             and Maritime Security, and the170           Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement,171                                                    Washington, DC.172    The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m.,173in room 360, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Carlos Gimenez174[Chairman of the subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime175Security] presiding.176    Present from the Subcommittee on Transportation and177Maritime Security: Representatives Gimenez, Crane, Biggs,178McIver, Kennedy, and Carter.179    Present from the Subcommittee on Border Security and180Enforcement: Representatives Guest, Crane, Biggs, Correa,181Ramirez, and Johnson.182    Mr. Gimenez. The Committee on Homeland Security's183Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security, and184Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement will come to185order. Without objection, the Chair may declare the committee186in recess at any point.187    The purpose of this hearing is to examine the evolving188tactics, geographic patterns, and operational strategies189employed by transnational criminal organizations, including190Mexican cartels, to exploit U.S. maritime borders for drug191smuggling, human trafficking, weapons trafficking, and other192illegal activities. We will also evaluate the Department of193Homeland Security's interagency efforts, operational posture,194and resource allocations for maritime interdiction, with195particular emphasis on the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and196Border Protection, Air and Maritime Operations, and Homeland197Security Investigations.198    I would like to thank our colleagues from the Border199Security Enforcement Subcommittee for partnering with us on200this joint hearing, and I recognize myself for an opening201statement.202    Good morning. I want to thank everyone for being here203today. I especially want to thank Chairman Guest and the204Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement for working205with us to hold this joint hearing on a matter of growing206importance and security for the American homeland.207Transnational criminal organizations, or TCOs, remain agile and208persistent adversaries. For years, these groups have exploited209vulnerabilities at our Southern Border, our southern land210border, where drug smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal211immigration surged to historic levels under the Biden212administration. Since the beginning of 2025, however, public213data suggests a notable decline in many of these illegal flows.214That progress is due in large part to the renewed focus and215decisive actions being taken under the current Trump216administration to restore control and enforce our laws.217    But as we improve security on land, we must not allow our218maritime domain to become the next weak point. Increasingly,219criminal networks are turning to the sea, where vast distances,220patchwork jurisdictions, and limited real-time visibility offer221TCOs a lower risk of detection and a high reward for moving222contraband. Though maritime routes account for a smaller share223of illegal migration and narcotics trafficking compared to land224routes, the threat remains serious. TCOs and other criminal225actors are leveraging everything from go-fast boats, fishing226vessels, and narco submarines to container ships and commercial227cargo fleets to move cocaine, synthetic drugs, weapons, and228human cargo into the United States. The first half of this229fiscal year alone, the U.S. Coast Guard has already seized and230offloaded more cocaine than it did in all of fiscal year 2024,231a clear indicator that illicit maritime activity remains a232persistent challenge despite improved enforcement efforts.233    The scale and sophistication of these operations require an234equally coordinated and capable response. As a representative235of the Florida Keys and much of South Florida, I know first-236hand how vulnerable our maritime borders can be. From the237Caribbean to the Straits of Florida and up to the Atlantic238coast, our region has long been a strategic target for239smugglers and cartels seeking to enter the United States240undetected. The threat to our ports, shipping routes, and241coastal areas is not theoretical. It directly affects the day-242to-day security and economic viability and stability of South243Florida.244    Moreover, while most fentanyl still enters the United245States through land ports of entry, we cannot ignore the246possibility that maritime routes are being used to transport247precursor chemicals or synthetic opioids manufactured abroad.248This is particularly concerning given the well-documented role249that entities based in the People's Republic of China continue250to play in supplying the chemical building blocks used to251manufacture fentanyl in Mexico. These synthetic opioids are252then trafficked into American communities, often with253devastating results. Tens of thousands of Americans are dying254each year from fentanyl.255    Beijing is complicit in incentivizing the distribution of256these chemicals world-wide, which is responsible for the crisis257that now claims the lives of tens of thousands of Americans258each year. It is unknown what role, if any, the Mexican259government has had in this crisis as they have failed to stop260the flow of these deadly chemicals into the United States.261    To its credit, the Trump administration has made maritime262security a greater priority by investing in interdiction263efforts, revitalizing partnerships with key regional allies,264and applying needed pressure on adversarial regimes that265threaten the safety of the Western Hemisphere. These steps mark266a welcome shift in our posture. But as this hearing will show,267we must do more. We need a comprehensive maritime security268strategy that includes enhanced detection capabilities, more269robust interagency coordination, and expanded use of advanced270technology to monitor, interdict, and deter illicit maritime271activity. Today's hearing is an opportunity to access how272Federal agencies are responding to these evolving maritime273threats. We will hear from those on the front lines about what274is working, where the challenges remain, and what resources or275authorities may be needed to close remaining gaps.276    Thank you again to our witnesses for being here today. I277look forward to your insights and a productive discussion of278how we can better protect our coasts, our communities, and our279country from illicit activity at sea.280    [The statement of Chairman Gimenez follows:]281                Statement of Chairman Carlos A. Gimenez282                             June 10, 2025283    Good morning. I want to thank everyone for being here today. I284especially want to thank Chairman Guest and the Subcommittee on Border285Security and Enforcement for working with us to hold this joint hearing286on a matter of growing importance to the security of the American287homeland.288    Transnational criminal organizations, or TCOs, remain agile and289persistent adversaries. For years, these groups have exploited290vulnerabilities at our southern land border, where drug smuggling,291human trafficking, and illegal immigration surged to historic levels292under the Biden administration.293    Since the beginning of 2025, however, public data suggests a294notable decline in many of these illegal flows. That progress is due,295in large part, to the renewed focus and decisive action being taken296under the current Trump administration to restore control and enforce297our laws.298    But as we improve security on land, we must not allow our maritime299domain to become the next weak point. Increasingly, criminal networks300are turning to the sea, where vast distances, patchwork jurisdictions,301and limited real-time visibility offer TCOs a lower risk of detection302and a high reward for moving contraband.303    Although maritime routes account for a smaller share of illegal304migration and narcotics trafficking compared to land routes, the threat305remains serious. TCOs and other criminal actors are leveraging306everything from go-fast boats, fishing vessels, and narco-submarines to307container ships and commercial cargo fleets to move cocaine, synthetic308drugs, weapons, and human cargo into the United States.309    In the first half of this fiscal year alone, the U.S. Coast Guard310has already seized and offloaded more cocaine than it did in all of311fiscal year 2024, a clear indicator that illicit maritime activity312remains a persistent challenge despite improved enforcement efforts.313The scale and sophistication of these operations require an equally314coordinated and capable response.315    As the Representative of the Florida Keys and much of South316Florida, I know first-hand how vulnerable our maritime borders can be.317From the Caribbean to the Straits of Florida and up the Atlantic coast,318our region has long been a strategic target for smugglers and cartels319seeking to enter the United States undetected. The threat to our ports,320shipping routes, and coastal areas is not theoretical. It directly321affects the day-to-day security and economic stability of South322Florida.323    Moreover, while most fentanyl still enters the United States324through land ports of entry, we cannot ignore the possibility that325maritime routes are being used to transport precursor chemicals or326synthetic opioids manufactured abroad. This is particularly concerning327given the well-documented role that entities based in the People's328Republic of China continue to play in supplying the chemical building329blocks used to manufacture fentanyl in Mexico. These synthetic opioids330are then trafficked into American communities, often with devastating331consequences.332    Whether through negligence or indifference, Beijing has failed to333stop the flow of these chemicals, contributing to a crisis that now334claims the lives of tens of thousands of Americans each year.335    To its credit, the Trump administration has made maritime security336a greater priority by investing in interdiction efforts, revitalizing337partnerships with key regional allies, and applying needed pressure on338adversarial regimes that threaten the safety of the Western Hemisphere.339These steps mark a welcome shift in our posture. But as this hearing340will show, more must be done.341    We need a comprehensive maritime security strategy that includes342enhanced detection capabilities, more robust interagency coordination,343and expanded use of advanced technology to monitor, interdict, and344deter illicit maritime activity.345    Today's hearing is an opportunity to assess how our Federal346agencies are responding to these evolving maritime threats. We will347hear from those on the front lines about what is working, where the348challenges remain, and what resources or authorities may be needed to349close remaining gaps.350    Thank you again to our witnesses for being here today. I look351forward to your insights and to a productive discussion on how we can352better protect our coasts, our communities, and our country from353illicit activity at sea.354355    Mr. Gimenez. I recognize the Ranking Member, the356gentlewoman from New Jersey, Mrs. McIver, for her opening357statements.358    Mrs. McIver. Thank you so much, Chairman. Thank you to our359witnesses for being here today. Good morning to everyone.360    Today's hearing provides an opportunity to discuss how361Trump's reckless orders are undermining homeland security and362making our communities less safe. Over the weekend, we saw363Trump Federalize the National Guard to respond to protests in364Los Angeles and threaten to deploy Marines on U.S. soil against365Americans. Trump is using every possible excuse to escalate the366situation and manufacture unnecessary confrontations.367    In January, Trump and Homeland Security Secretary Kristi368Noem ordered the Coast Guard to triple its presence at U.S.369borders in an attempt to carry out their reckless immigration370policy. This redirection of troops to the border comes at great371cost to the Coast Guard's other critical missions. At a time372when levels of maritime migration are already down due to this373administration's essential ending asylum in the United States,374the Coast Guard is pulling assets and personnel from around the375globe to sit at the U.S. border. Critically, the Coast Guard376has redirected deployments from Indo-Pacific and Arctic377regions, from Congress has invested heavily on a bipartisan378basis in the Coast Guard's capacity to counter aggression from379China and Russia. Reducing our activities in the Indo-Pacific380and the Arctic undermines our long-term strategic interests and381ultimately makes us less safe.382    Worse yet, the Trump administration is diverting the Coast383Guard's limited aviation fleet to assist with deportations. The384Coast Guard is flying immigrants internally within the United385States to relocate them to staging areas for deportation. This386is not the Coast Guard's mission. I repeat again, this is not387the Coast Guard's mission. These flights place major strain on388our Coast Guard aviation fleet, which already struggles to meet389the service's needs. Many Coast Guard aircrafts are from the3901980's and 1990's and suffer major maintenance and reliability391issues. Instead of replacing the oldest planes and helicopters392in the fleet, Secretary Noem is looking to acquire a new $50393million Gulfstream jet to replace 1 of 2 she already has394available for her use. Coast Guard aircraft were already395available for the service to use less than 70 percent of the396time before accounting for the new demands this administration397is making.398    These planes and helicopters are essential to the Coast399Guard's mission from search and rescue to drug and migrant400interdictions. Operating flights in service of other agencies'401missions is the last thing the Coast Guard needs. Of course,402the Coast Guard is not the only agency diverting resources to403deportations above all else. The list of agencies reportedly404taking personnel away from their primary mission to focus on405deportation goes on and on, from Customs and Border406Protections; Homeland Security Investigations; the Federal407Bureau of Investigation; the U.S. Marshals Service; the Drug408Enforcement Administration; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,409Firearms, and Explosives; the State Department's Diplomatic410Security Service; and the Internal Revenue Service. These411agencies are all pulling resources from their missions to help412deport immigrants, the vast and vast majority who are413nonviolent contributing members of our communities.414    When it comes to undocumented immigrants, it does not415matter if they are elderly grandparents, sick children, or416Cubans, Haitians, or Venezuelans seeking refuge from violence.417Trump's orders are to try to deport them all, no matter the law418and no matter the cost. Is this really what the American people419want? I have my doubts for sure.420    To those watching this hearing, I ask you, are you hoping421the Government will find and save you if you are stranded on a422roof during a hurricane season? I think you do. But sorry,423under Trump, the Coast Guard plane that would otherwise help424might be busy flying law-abiding immigrants away from their425communities.426    Are you hoping the Government will investigate wealthy tax427cheats and make them pay their fair share? I am sure you hope428so. But sorry, under Trump, many of the agents who are supposed429to do that are busy deporting local farmers, construction430workers, community leaders, and caregivers.431    Are you hoping Federal agents will investigate and stop the432worst of the worst, drug traffickers, armed smugglers, human433traffickers, and even child abusers? I am sure you do. But434sorry, under Trump, many of the agents who are supposed to do435that are busy deporting your friends and your neighbors. Those436are apparently the Federal Government's priorities with Trump437and Republicans in charge.438    I want to thank our witnesses again for being here and I439look forward to today's discussion. With that, I yield back.440    [The statement of Ranking Member McIver follows:]441              Statement of Ranking Member LaMonica McIver442                             June 10, 2025443    Today's hearing provides an opportunity to discuss how President444Trump's reckless orders are undermining homeland security and making445our communities less safe. Over the weekend, we saw President Trump446nationalize the National Guard to respond to protests in Los Angeles447and threaten to deploy Marines on U.S. soil. Trump is using every448possible excuse to inflame the situation and manufacture unnecessary449confrontations.450    In January, President Trump and Secretary Noem ordered the Coast451Guard to triple its presence at U.S. borders. This surge comes at great452cost to the Coast Guard's other critical missions.453    At a time when levels of maritime migration are already down due to454this administration effectively ending asylum in the United States, the455Coast Guard is pulling assets and personnel from around the globe to456sit at the U.S. border. Critically, the Coast Guard has redirected457deployments from the Indo-Pacific and the Arctic--regions where458Congress has invested heavily on a bipartisan basis in the Coast459Guard's capacity to counter aggression from China and Russia.460    Reducing our activities in the Indo-Pacific and the Arctic461undermines our long-term strategic interests and ultimately makes us462less safe. Worse yet, the Trump administration is diverting the Coast463Guard's limited aviation fleet to assist with deportations. The Coast464Guard is flying immigrants internally within the United States to465relocate them to staging areas for deportation. This is not the Coast466Guard's mission.467    These flights place major strain on the Coast Guard aviation fleet,468which already struggles to meet the service's needs. Many Coast Guard469aircraft are from the 80's and 90's and suffer major maintenance and470reliability issues. Instead of replacing the oldest planes and471helicopters in the fleet, Secretary Noem is looking to acquire a new472$50 million dollar Gulfstream jet to replace 1 of the 2 she already has473available for her use.474    Coast Guard aircraft were already available for the service to use475less than 70 percent of the time before accounting for the new demands476this administration is making. These planes and helicopters are477essential to the Coast Guard's missions, from search and rescue to drug478and migrant interdictions. Operating flights in service of other479agencies' missions is the last thing the Coast Guard needs.480    Of course, the Coast Guard is not the only agency diverting481resources to deportations above all else.482    The list of agencies reportedly diverting personnel away from their483primary mission to support deportations goes on and on:484   Customs and Border Protection485   Homeland Security Investigations486   The Federal Bureau of Investigation487   The U.S. Marshals Service488   The Drug Enforcement Administration489   The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives490   The State Department's Diplomatic Security Service491   The Internal Revenue Service.492    These agencies are all pulling resources from their missions to493help deport immigrants--the vast, vast majority of whom are non-494violent, contributing members of our communities. When it comes to495undocumented immigrants, it does not matter if they are elderly496grandparents, sick children, or Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, or497Venezuelans seeking refuge from violence. President Trump's orders are498to try to deport them all, no matter the law and no matter the cost.499    Is this really what the American people want? I have my doubts. To500those watching this hearing, I ask:501    Are you hoping the Government will find and save you if you are502stranded on a roof during hurricane season?503    Sorry--under President Trump, the Coast Guard plane that would504otherwise help just might be tied up with flying law-abiding immigrants505away from their communities.506    Are you hoping the Government will investigate wealthy tax cheats507and make them pay their fair share?508    Sorry--under President Trump, many of the agents who are supposed509to do that are busy deporting your local farmers, construction workers,510cleaners, and cooks.511    Are you hoping Federal agents will investigate and stop the worst512of the worst drug traffickers, arms smugglers, human traffickers, and513child abusers?514    Sorry--under President Trump, many of the agents who are supposed515to do that are busy deporting your friends and neighbors.516    Those are apparently the Federal Government's priorities with517President Trump and Republicans in charge.518519    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you to Ranking Member McIver.520    I now recognize the Chairman for the Subcommittee on Border521Security Enforcement, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr.522Guest, for his opening statement.523    Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to start by524responding to the opening statement of Mrs. McIver. I want the525record of this committee to be crystal clear that I and my526fellow Republicans, that we strongly condemn the senseless527violence and lawlessness that we have watched unfold in528California since last week. I want to commend the brave men and529women of our State, Federal, and local law enforcement, as well530as our National Guardsmen and our United States Marines who531have stepped up at a moment's notice to restore order and to532protect America from chaos while we reaffirm the rule of law.533It is a sad state of affairs when simply enforcing longstanding534immigration law is used to justify violent riots. Even more sad535that the far left is standing not with law enforcement, but536with rioters and with illegal aliens.537    Today's hearing provides an opportunity to examine the538Department of Homeland Security's efforts to deter, detect, and539disrupt illicit maritime activities that have threatened our540national security and have undermined the rule of law. I want541to thank each of our witnesses for appearing today. Your542expertise in your field is vital as we examine the challenges543and as we seek to find solutions in securing America's vast544maritime domain.545    From the Gulf of America to the shores of Alaska, the546United States' maritime border spans thousands of miles of547coastland. It is comprised of waterways, shipping routes, and548ports that facilitate commerce and play a vital role in our549national security defense. While our national maritime550geography is a strength, it also presents challenges. The551Caribbean and Pacific regions in particular have become prime552targets for cartels and criminal organizations. They use fast553boats, fishing vessels, semi-submersibles to evade detection554while moving narcotics, weapons, and human cargo into the555United States.556    While President Trump has strengthened security along our557land border, achieving a remarkable 95 percent decrease in558daily border encounters within the administration's first559hundred days, we must continue to remain vigilant to the fact560that cartels are agile, they are adaptive. As enforcement561strengthens on land, these criminal networks are shifting their562operations to the sea. To counter these threats, the Department563of Homeland Security employs a whole-of-Government approach,564incorporating its Federal law enforcement partners on joint565maritime border security operations. Each of the components566with us today play a critical role in that effort.567    The Coast Guard is our Nation's oldest continuous seagoing568service and is a cornerstone of maritime border security. With569a unique blend of military, law enforcement, regulatory, and570humanitarian roles, the United States Coast Guard is often the571first and only presence in remote maritime areas. It interdicts572vessels far from the United States' shore, often before threats573reach the homeland, and seize hundreds of thousands of pounds574of illicit drugs each year.575    CBP's Air and Marine Operations is the Nation's only576Federal agency dedicated to aviation and marine law577enforcement. With a fleet of high-speed interceptors, coastal578patrol vessels, fixed-wing surveillance aircraft, and unmanned579aerial systems, AMO conducts complex interdiction missions580across the air and sea. Its mission is to safeguard the581American people and AMO is on the front lines of maritime582border security, providing critical intelligence and rapid-583response capabilities.584    Homeland Security Investigation also plays a critical role585in maritime border security, primarily serving as the586investigative arm for transnational criminal activity. HSI587investigates transnational criminal organizations involved in a588broad range of crimes, such as trafficking narcotics and human589smuggling. This is truly a team effort with each agency590bringing in a unique skill set.591    Success also relies on us working with our international592partners. To enhance these efforts, I have been working with593committee staff and intend to introduce legislation that would594enhance the presence and operation of CBP in foreign countries595working alongside other law enforcement agencies. This bill596would greatly expand CBP's capability for targeting threats597abroad before they reach our shore.598    Let me be clear, border security does not stop at our land599border. DHS maritime operations have resulted in an untold600number of vessels being interdicted with aliens attempting to601illegally enter our country, as well as hundreds of thousands602of pounds of illicit drugs seized annually at our maritime603border. Securing our maritime border is essential to protecting604our national security. Confronting these threats protects the605safety of our families and communities across this great606Nation. I look forward to today's discussion and working with607my colleagues to find solutions that enhance and prioritize608maritime border security.609    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.610    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Chairman Guest. I now recognize the611Ranking Member for the Subcommittee on Border Security612Enforcement, the gentlewoman from Illinois, Mrs. Ramirez, for613her opening statement.614    Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you, Chairman Gimenez. Good morning. I615want to first start by thanking our witnesses for being here616today.617    Despite the administration having so much to answer for,618today in our committee it is one of our first hearings with619Government officials outside of Secretary Noem that was with us620a couple weeks ago. I find it shameful that it took until June621for my colleagues to request that administration officials622appear before us, but I am certainly glad that you are finally623here.624    Look, I agree that maritime security is important and we625certainly should be discussing how we are redirecting resources626to use them outside of the mission, as Mrs. McIver so627eloquently stated in her opening remarks. I would support628having a full hearing to discuss that if we were not in629extraordinary times. However, we are in extraordinary times.630    Our communities, and I want to make sure we visualize this631because I know my colleagues are going to try to say the632opposite here, are being terrorized by the weaponization of the633Government and the military against U.S. citizens. The Trump634administration is using authoritarian tactics to incite fear635and chaos in our communities. Why? So they can further636weaponize the Government to exert control and suppress dissent.637    Let's look at Los Angeles. Heavily-armed, masked agents638conducted military-style raids at places like Home Depots, a639donut shop, and a clothing wholesaler. These are purposely640inflammatory tactics meant to escalate violence and justify641further violations of our Constitutional rights and our civil642liberties. These kidnappings are targeting mothers, children,643and law-abiding neighbors who have contributed to our644communities for years and have complied with the course645requirements, attending check-in appointments when asked to do646so.647    Do you know why I can tell you this with confidence?648Because that is what is happening in Chicago. I texted law-649abiding members of our community for unscheduled check-ins and650were told that within days they had to present themselves for a651check-in. When they showed up, many of them mothers, their case652was immediately dismissed, followed by ICE agents waiting for653them at the door to handcuff them, put them in freight654elevators, and rush them out in order to shove them into vans655while wearing masks. Can you imagine that was happening to one656of your family members? They are using text messages to call657people in to arrest the exact immigrants who are demonstrating658their commitment to the law by complying with ICE's659instructions. To me, that runs counter to every claim the Trump660administration has made, but it is consistent with reporting661that the administration's actual intent is to simply maximize662arrest.663    For this administration let me be very clear, the terror is664the point. They are kidnapping people. They are tearing665families apart. They are deporting United States citizens,666including United States citizen children with cancer. They are667ignoring our right to due process and, in doing so, are making668mistakes they call administrative errors as they arrest and669deport people. Just last week, DHS had to return a Guatemalan670man wrongfully deported to Mexico, despite fearing he would be671persecuted there. They finally returned Kilmar Abrego Garcia to672the United States, who now faces what could be trumped-up673charges.674    We have all heard about the others disappeared to a prison675in El Salvador based on allegations of being in a gang,676including Andry Hernandez Romero, a gay makeup artist, who677legally arrived to the United States the way many others have678for generations, seeking asylum. The only so-called evidence679this administration has given of him being in a gang is tattoos680of his parents' names with crowns.681    But this administration's obsession with persecuting682immigrants and achieving their mass deportation means they are683using every resource they can, instead of keeping their684community safe, to terrorize them. We are seeing the CBP and685law enforcement agencies like FBI, DEA, and ATF focus on686rounding up law-abiding, contributing immigrants in their687communities. The message sent to our communities through these688actions are the Trump administration does not care if you are689complying with the law because they don't respect the rule of690law. They don't care if you have Constitutional rights because,691let's be honest, they don't respect the Constitution. They only692care about the arbitrary deportation quotas that have been set693by who? Stephen Miller.694    Not only are these officers not doing the jobs they were695hired to do, you know, like pursuing child abusers,696investigating sex trafficking, or weapons smuggling, they are697terrorizing our communities while wearing masks. You know who698else wears? People committing crimes, executioners, prison699guards in CECOT, Klansmen, people who don't want to be held700accountable for what they do because they know their actions701violate the foundations of our shared humanity.702    So, yes, we need oversight of this administration. The most703urgent need is to rein in the abuses of power that make all of704us less safe all over this country. Today, let me be clear,705they are violating immigrants' Constitutional rights. They are706stripping our communities of due process, and they are seeking707to separate us from our humanity. But here is what is708happening. They are testing our limits now because they intend709to use the same playbook next on anyone they deem undesirable.710This committee's responsibility is to oversight, not to the711President of the United States of America.712    With that, I yield back.713    [The statement of Ranking Member Ramirez follows:]714                Statement of Honorable Delia C. Ramirez715                             June 10, 2025716    Despite the administration having so much to answer for, today is717one of our committee's first hearing with Government officials, outside718of Secretary Noem a few weeks back. It is shameful that it took until719June for my colleagues to request that administration officials appear720before us. I am certainly glad that you are finally here.721    I agree that maritime security is important. And we certainly722should be discussing the resources are being redirected outside of the723mission. And I would support having a full hearing to discuss this if724we were not in extraordinary times. However, we are in extraordinary725times. Our communities are being terrorized by the weaponization of the726Government and the military against U.S. citizens.727    The Trump administration is using authoritarian tactics to incite728fear and chaos in our communities so they can further weaponize the729Government to exert control and suppress dissent. Let's look at Los730Angeles: Heavily-armed, masked agents conducted military-style raids at731places like Home Depot, a donut shop, and a clothing wholesaler. These732are purposefully inflammatory tactics meant to escalate violence and733justify further violations of our Constitutional rights and civil734liberties.735    And these kidnappings are targeting mothers, children, and law-736abiding neighbors who have contributed to our communities for years and737have complied with the courts' requirements, attending check-in738appointments when asked to do so. Do you know why I can say that with739confidence? Because that's what is happening in Chicago.740    ICE texted law-abiding members of our communities for unscheduled741check-ins and were told that within days they had to present themselves742for a check in. When they showed up, many of them mothers, their cases743were immediately dismissed followed by ICE agents waiting for them at744the door to handcuff them, put them in freight elevators, and rush them745out in order to shove them into vans while wearing masks. Can you746imagine if that happened to one of your family members?747    They are using text messages to call people in to arrest the exact748immigrants who are demonstrating their commitment to the law by749complying with ICE's instructions. This runs counter to every claim the750Trump administration has made--but is consistent with reporting that751the administration's actual intent is to simply maximize arrests. For752this administration, let me very clear--the terror is the point.753    They are kidnapping people. They are tearing families apart. They754are deporting U.S. citizens, including U.S. citizen children with755cancer. They are ignoring our right to due process and, in doing so,756are making mistakes they call administrative errors as they arrest and757deport people. Just last week, DHS had to return a Guatemalan man758wrongfully deported to Mexico despite fearing he would be persecuted759there.760    And they finally returned Kilmar Abrego Garcia to the United761States, who now faces what could be trumped-up charges.762    We've all heard about the others disappeared to a prison in El763Salvador, based on allegations of being in a gang--including Andry764Hernandez Romero, a gay makeup artist who legally arrived to the United765States seeking asylum. The only so-called evidence this administration766has given of him being in a gang is tattoos of his parents' names with767crowns.768    But this administration's obsession with persecuting immigrants and769achieving their mass deportations means they are using every resource770they can to, instead of keeping our communities safe, to terrorize771them. We're seeing the CBP and law enforcement agencies like the FBI,772DEA, and ATF focus on rounding up law-abiding, contributing immigrants773in our communities.774    The message sent to our communities through these actions are:775    The Trump administration does not care if you are complying with776the law because they do not respect the rule of law. They do not care777if you have Constitutional rights because they do not respect the778Constitution. They only care about the arbitrary deportation quotas set779by Steven Miller.780    Not only are these officers NOT doing the jobs they were hired to781do--like pursuing child abusers, investigating sex trafficking, or782weapons smuggling--they are terrorizing our communities while wearing783masks . . . You know who else wears masks--people committing crimes,784executioners, prison guards in CECOT, Klansmen. People who don't want785to be held accountable for what they do because they know their actions786violate the foundations of our shared humanity. So, we need oversight787of this administration. And the most urgent need is to rein in the788abuses of power that make all of us less safe all over this country.789    Today, they are violating immigrants' Constitutional rights,790stripping our communities of due process, and they are seeking to791separate us from our humanity. They are testing the limits now because792they intend to use this same playbook next on anyone they deem793undesirable. This committee's responsibility is to oversight and not to794the President of the United States of America.795796    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Ranking Member. Other Members of797the committee are reminded that opening statements may be798submitted for the record.799    [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]800             Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson801                             June 10, 2025802    I am glad the subcommittees are holding this hearing to help803examine how the Trump administration's policies and practices are804affecting illicit maritime activities. I have sat on this committee805since its inception. I believe deeply in the Department of Homeland806Security's mission statement which states, ``With Honor and integrity,807we will safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our values.''808I wish the Trump administration believed in this mission as strongly as809my fellow Democrats and I do.810    The actions of this administration are completely devoid of honor811and integrity, and our homeland is less safe as a result. Just this812past weekend, we witnessed President Trump send the military to the813streets of Los Angeles to stop protests against immigration raids.814    This is the same President who, in 2021, sat on his hands and815laughed as actual insurrectionists stormed the Capitol Building, beat816cops with weapons, broke windows, destroyed property, and looked to817capture and kill elected officials. Trump would not call the National818Guard when the police who protect this Capitol were being beaten to a819pulp, but he did not hesitate to unnecessarily send them to Los820Angeles.821    Additionally, over the weekend, the Ranking Member of our Border822Security and Enforcement Subcommittee, Congressman Correa, along with823several other Members, were turned away from an ICE facility when they824arrived to conduct oversight, in yet another example of the Trump-Noem825DHS not following the law.826    We are also witnessing the Trump administration pulling agents and827officers off their regular duties to focus on deporting non-criminals--828which takes them away from investigations into actual criminals and is829making us less safe. Under this administration, HSI agents have less830time to investigate child traffickers, gun smuggling, drug running, and831other crimes because they are dedicated to deportations. The832administration's direction for the Coast Guard is likewise misguided.833    Secretary Noem stated in the Coast Guard's new Force Design 2028834plan that the Coast Guard ``is fragile, in crisis, and on a path to835failure . . . The Service is in a downward readiness spiral that is836unsustainable. Without change, the Coast Guard will fail''. So, what837changes has Secretary Noem implemented to address this crisis and keep838the Coast Guard from failing?839    Most immediately, Secretary Noem is trying to have the Coast Guard840fund a new $50 million Gulfstream V jet for her to use, even as the841service has many older aircraft in more urgent need of replacement. For842an administration that is supposedly uncovering waste, fraud, and843abuse, this request reeks to high heaven. Beyond that request,844Secretary Noem has directed the Coast Guard to surge its limited845resources away from its many critical missions, including in the Indo-846Pacific and the Arctic.847    Instead of using all available resources to counter Russia and848China, the Coast Guard is now in the shuttle service business, flying849gardeners, cooks, farmhands, and housecleaners from ICE detention850centers to deportation staging facilities. It is a disservice to our851constituents to divert our brave Coast Guard service members from life-852saving missions to make them operate the Greyhound of the sky.853    The Trump administration is placing deportations above all else,854which undermines our homeland security and makes us all less safe. This855administration does not represent the values on which this country was856built, nor those on which the Department of Homeland Security was857founded. To put it in maritime terms, President Trump and Secretary858Noem have missed the boat. We in Congress need to help DHS correct859course to meet its mission.860861    Mr. Gimenez. I am pleased to have a distinguished panel of862witnesses before us today on this critical topic. I ask that863our witnesses please rise and raise their right hands.864    [Witnesses sworn.]865    Mr. Gimenez. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have866answered in the affirmative. Thank you, and please be seated.867    I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses.868Jonathan Miller is the executive assistant commissioner for Air869and Maritime Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection.870Mr. Miller brings over 28 years of Federal law enforcement and871leadership experience. He began his career with U.S. Border872Patrol in San Diego, serving on the Special Response Team and873Border Patrol Tactical Unit before transferring to the Miami874sector for maritime patrols. That is a pretty nice sector. In8752007, he joined Air and Marine Operations in Miami, advancing876through various roles, including vessel commander, marine877instructor supervisor, marine interdiction agent, and several878senior executive positions before assuming his current role.879    Rear Admiral Adam Chamie assumed the role of Coast Guard880assistant commandant for response policy in May 2024,881overseeing strategic doctrine and policy for 7 of the Coast882Guard's 11 operational missions, including law enforcement and883maritime security. A 1996 graduate of the Coast Guard Academy,884Rear Admiral Chamie has commanded 3 Coast Guard cutters and885served on 3 others, conducting operations from the Bering Sea886to the Arabian Gulf. His prior ashore assignments include887commander of Sector Key West, chief of Congressional affairs,888and Coast Guard liaison to the House of Representatives.889    James C. Harris is the assistant director, Countering890Transnational Organized Crime at Homeland Security891Investigations. In this position, he develops and executes892strategies aimed at disrupting and dismantling criminal893networks and works alongside policy makers to improve laws and894regulations that strengthen HSI's efforts in combating895transnational organized crime. Prior to this assignment, Mr.896Harris served as the director of the U.S. Department of897Homeland Security's Center for Countering Human Trafficking.898    Heather MacLeod is a director in the Government899Accountability Office, Homeland Security and Justice Team. She900oversees Coast Guard and maritime security issues, including901Coast Guard work force and strategic planning efforts, and902maritime port and supply chain cargo security. Heather joined903GAO in 2002, and has led projects examining aviation safety,904airline competition, transit programs, and highway bridge905management.906    I thank each of our distinguished witnesses for being here907today.908    I now recognize Mr. Miller for 5 minutes to summarize his909opening statement.910911     STATEMENT OF JONATHAN P. MILLER, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT912   COMMISSIONER, AIR AND MARINE OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND913                       BORDER PROTECTION914915    Mr. Miller. Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Guest, Ranking916Member McIver, Ranking Member Ramirez, and distinguished917Members of the subcommittees, it is an honor to appear before918you today on behalf of the men and women of Air and Marine919Operations, or AMO, to discuss our critical role in the U.S.920Customs and Border Protection's comprehensive approach to921maritime border security.922    The maritime domain presents unique national security923challenges. Unlike air and land environments, coastal waters924are vast and less restricted. Countless vessels enter or925operate in U.S. territorial waters every day, making detection926of illegal activity and apprehending associated smugglers927challenging. Many smuggling crafts hide in plain sight amongst928legitimate traffic while others transit remote areas far929offshore, trying to elude detection altogether.930    Smugglers also use a variety of vessels tailored to the931area and amounts of contraband they are smuggling to best evade932detection. Vessels are also much faster than they were 20 years933ago today, often leaving law enforcement little time to934interdict them before reaching our shores.935    Immediately following the President's declaration of a936national emergency at the Southern Border, AMO, in concert with937other CBP and DHS partners took action, realigning vessels and938aircraft patrols in anticipation of increased maritime activity939due to the decrease in illegal crossings at the land borders.940In Southern California, we've seen a 30 percent increase in941vessel seizures and over 100 percent increase in maritime942apprehensions since January compared to the same time frame943last year.944    Additionally, maritime drug smuggling activity is a945perpetual and dangerous threat to U.S. border security. Of the946234,000 pounds of drugs AMO seized in 2024, approximately 76947percent occurred in the maritime environment.948    In addition to high maritime drug interdiction rates,949smuggler aggression and violence has also been on the rise.950Noncompliant boardings and instances where we forcibly disabled951the engines of smuggling vessels to get them to stop has952exponentially risen in the past few years. In November 2022, 3953of my Marine agents were shot and one of them, Michael Maceda,954was killed during a vessel stop of smugglers off the coast of955Puerto Rico.956    AMO deploys a fleet of some of the most powerful law957enforcement marine interceptors in the world. Evolving to meet958today's threats, we've recently repowered these vessels and959made other modifications to this platform for a perfect mix of960speed, agility, and agent safety. I appreciate the committee's961support in these recapitalization efforts.962    AMO also maintains a fleet of aircraft functionally963designed and outfitted for maritime detection and surveillance.964Our P3s, -8s, and MQ-9 UAS aircraft are capable of long-range,965high-endurance CONUS and OCONUS patrols, while the Super King966Air 350 further expands aerial surveillance in the littorals of967the United States and the Caribbean. AMO is heavily invested in968a variety of tethered aerostats, towers, and tactical systems969providing radar and sensor capabilities, significantly970increasing our domain awareness along our littoral borders, and971the maritime approaches around the continental United States,972Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.973    Artificial intelligence and machine learning play a974critical part in filtering nefarious from legitimate traffic975activity and we've had success in using this technology to976build algorithms identifying patterns to filter the sheer977volume of traffic.978    Once again, I'd like to thank the Members of this committee979for supporting these critical efforts and further acquisitions980that will ultimately enable 24/7 domain awareness of981prioritized maritime littoral approaches.982    The scale and complexity of countering drug trafficking and983human smuggling in the maritime environment requires984partnerships and collaboration. In addition, to the U.S. Coast985Guard, AMO routinely works with Federal, State, local, and986foreign partners, and has been one of the largest contributors987of flight hours to Joint Interagency Task Force South,988supporting counter narcotics operations and the vast 42 million989square mile sourcing transit zones.990    With few exceptions, AMO's maritime law enforcement991authority is limited to Customs' waters or 12 nautical miles992from the coastline of the United States. CBP continues to work993with Congress on legislative changes to extend the Customs'994waters from 12 to 24 nautical miles. This extension of law995enforcement authorities would enable AMO to expand patrols,996increasing our ability to save lives at sea, conduct997counternarcotics operations, support our partners, and carry998out the border security mission.999    Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I look1000forward to answering your questions.1001    [The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:]1002                Prepared Statement of Jonathan P. Miller1003                             June 10, 20251004                              introduction1005    Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Guest, Ranking Member McIver, Ranking1006Member Correa, and distinguished Members of the subcommittees, it is a1007privilege to appear before you today to discuss U.S. Customs and Border1008Protection (CBP), Air and Marine Operations' unwavering commitment to1009interdicting illegal drugs, preventing human smuggling, and securing1010our Nation's borders, maritime domain, and approaches. As a front-line1011law enforcement component of CBP, Air and Marine Operations operates in1012source and transit zones, between ports of entry, in coastal waters,1013and interior waterways.1014    Born out of the legacy U.S. Customs Service, Air and Marine1015Operations was established in 2006 as an integral part of CBP's1016comprehensive border security mission and the Department of Homeland1017Security's (DHS) risk-based and multi-layered approach to national1018security. Air and Marine Operations agents are Federal law enforcement1019officers \1\ with a broad range of legal authorities, specialized1020assets, and unique operational capabilities that enable them to detect1021and interdict illegal activity at and beyond our Nation's borders in1022the land, air, and sea domains, providing a critical layer of1023continuity in border security operations.1024---------------------------------------------------------------------------1025    \1\ 6 U.S.C.  211(f); 19 U.S.C.  1589a; 8 U.S.C  1357.1026---------------------------------------------------------------------------1027                      state of the maritime border1028    While CBP reasserts control of our borders \2\ in accordance with1029President Trump's directives, transnational criminal organizations and1030foreign terrorist organizations continue their efforts to smuggle1031people and contraband into our country. These organizations operate1032with immense capability, capacity, and nearly unlimited resources.1033Their smuggling operations are sophisticated, and they continually1034adjust their tactics, techniques, and routes to circumvent detection1035and interdiction by law enforcement.1036---------------------------------------------------------------------------1037    \2\ https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/04/28/100-days-most-secure-1038border-american-history.1039---------------------------------------------------------------------------1040    Illicit activity in the maritime environment is a threat to U.S.1041border and national security. The maritime domain is generally less1042restricted than the air and land environments. Thousands of vessels1043enter or operate in U.S. territorial waters every day. Detecting1044illegal activity can be challenging, as many smuggling craft hide in1045plain sight among legitimate traffic, while others transit remote areas1046far offshore to try to elude detection. Additionally, smugglers use a1047variety of craft tailored to the area and cargo they are smuggling,1048including modified fishing boats, go-fast vessels, pangas,\3\ low-1049profile vessels, and semi-submersibles. Vessels are much faster than1050they were 20 years ago, often leaving law enforcement little time to1051interdict them before reaching our shores.1052---------------------------------------------------------------------------1053    \3\ A small boat, often used for fishing, and typically powered by1054an outboard motor.1055---------------------------------------------------------------------------1056    Encounters with smugglers can also be extremely dangerous. Since1057its creation in 2006, Air and Marine Operations has used disabling fire1058on the engines of fleeing smuggler vessels nearly 350 times.1059Additionally, in November 2022, 3 Air and Marine Operations Marine1060Interdiction Agents were shot--and one of them, Michel Maceda,1061tragically killed--during a vessel stop off the coast of Puerto1062Rico.\4\ Precise engagement and rapid neutralization of risk is key to1063safely resolving water-based law enforcement actions. Air and Marine1064Operations continually refines its maritime interdiction capabilities1065and tactics to meet ever evolving threats.1066---------------------------------------------------------------------------1067    \4\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/speeches-and-statements/cbp-1068marine-interdiction-agent-dies-line-duty-near-puerto-rico.1069---------------------------------------------------------------------------1070     air and marine operations' maritime border security operations1071    Air and Marine Operations remains at the forefront of the Nation's1072efforts to combat drug smuggling and illegal immigration through the1073maritime domain. Immediately following President Trump's declaration of1074a national emergency at the Southern Border, Air and Marine1075Operations--in concert with our other CBP and DHS partners--took action1076to expand its maritime enforcement efforts and safeguard the American1077people.1078    With the historic decrease in illegal crossings in the land1079environment, Air and Marine Operations realigned maritime aircraft and1080increased patrols, resulting in a 90 percent increase in maritime1081apprehensions of illegal aliens in Southern California.\5\ Since1082January 21, 2025, Air and Marine Operations enforcement efforts across1083all our maritime operational environments have led to the apprehension1084of over 750 aliens, with 60 percent occurring in South Florida and the1085Caribbean Sea.1086---------------------------------------------------------------------------1087    \5\ From January 21, 2025-May 19, 2025, compared to the same date1088range in 2024.1089---------------------------------------------------------------------------1090    Aliens attempting to make the journey to the United States along1091maritime routes take an enormous risk, putting their lives in the hands1092of transnational criminal organizations, foreign terrorist1093organizations, or other human smuggling networks and often in unsafe,1094rustic vessels. The weather at sea is unpredictable, and the vessels1095that make it far enough for Air and Marine Operations to encounter are1096often dangerously overloaded with illegal aliens. Air and Marine1097Operations encounters with these vessels typically become rescue1098missions in addition to apprehension actions. Just last month, Air and1099Marine Operations responded to reports of an overturned panga-style1100boat that washed ashore in San Diego.\6\ At least 3 people died,1101including 1 child. Another child on board was never recovered and is1102presumed dead. Not only was the vessel unsuitable for the quantity of1103people on board, but it was also incapable of handling the perilous sea1104conditions. This event was another tragic reminder of how smugglers1105operate with total disregard for human life. Secretary Noem is seeking1106capital punishment for these crimes.\7\1107---------------------------------------------------------------------------1108    \6\ https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/five-charged-human-1109smuggling-event-led-least-three-deaths.1110    \7\ https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/05/06/secretary-noem-requests-1111death-penalty-against-alleged-human-smugglers-whose-actions.1112---------------------------------------------------------------------------1113    In addition to responding to increasing numbers of maritime alien1114encounters, Air and Marine Operations continues to intercept tons of1115dangerous illicit drugs, keeping them from reaching our shores and1116communities. In fiscal year 2024, Air and Marine Operations enforcement1117efforts led to the seizure of 233,662 pounds of illegal drugs.\8\1118Approximately 76 percent of these drugs--including more than 160,0001119pounds of cocaine, 15,000 pounds of marijuana, and 170 pounds of1120methamphetamine--were intercepted in the maritime environment.1121---------------------------------------------------------------------------1122    \8\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics/1123air-and-marine-operations-statistics.1124---------------------------------------------------------------------------1125    Air and Marine Operations remains vigilant and continually adjusts1126our operations as transnational criminal organizations, foreign1127terrorist organizations, and human smugglers seek to shift their1128criminal activities from long-standing land-based pathways to1129alternative maritime routes.1130                    maritime enforcement authorities1131    Despite Air and Marine Operations' unique cross-domain law1132enforcement capabilities, in the maritime environment, Air and Marine1133Operations' maritime law enforcement authority \9\ is generally limited1134\10\ to areas within the historical ``customs waters''\11\--or 121135nautical miles from the coastline--of the United States. This1136constraint limits Air and Marine Operations' ability to effectively1137counter current and evolving modern threats in the maritime1138environment. Specifically, as modern technology continues to change and1139advance rapidly, the performance and speed of maritime vessels1140improves, including those used to violate U.S. law or evade U.S. law1141enforcement. These advancements render Air and Marine Operations'1142authority to operate only within the 12-nautical-mile zone inadequate,1143placing our law enforcement capability at a significant disadvantage1144and often preventing Air and Marine Operations' interdiction of vessels1145in time to prevent their escape.1146---------------------------------------------------------------------------1147    \9\ See, e.g. 19 U.S.C.  1581, 1587, 1589a.1148    \10\ In certain circumstances, Air and Marine Operations is1149authorized to operate on the high seas, for instance when enforcing1150laws on U.S. registered vessels (19 C.F.R.  162.3), hovering vessels1151(19 U.S.C.  1401(k); 19 U.S.C.  1587(a)), and vessels subject to hot1152pursuit (19 U.S.C.  1581(d)). Additionally, beyond the customs waters,1153Air and Marine Operations may enforce the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement1154Act (46 U.S.C.  70501-70502), where appropriate.1155    \11\ 19 U.S.C.  1401(j), 1709(c).1156---------------------------------------------------------------------------1157    CBP appreciates our continuing collaboration with Congress on1158legislative changes that would extend the limits of customs waters.1159Expansion of Air and Marine Operations' authority to operate, through1160the extension of the 12-nautical-mile customs waters, would enable Air1161and Marine Operations to better leverage its cross-domain authorities,1162enhance its detection of and response to the modern and sophisticated1163capabilities of smugglers and transnational criminal organizations, and1164better support its law enforcement partners in the maritime1165environment.1166           interdiction assets, capabilities, and technology1167    Air and Marine Operations is committed to its maritime security1168mission and continues to make investments in its highly-trained agents,1169vessels, aircraft, and technological capabilities to advance the1170effectiveness of its operations. These investments not only support Air1171and Marine Operations' on-going ability to effectively respond to1172illegal drug activity in the maritime environment but also contribute1173to other Air and Marine Operations enforcement actions, including those1174that led to over 1,000 arrests as well as the seizure of 1,500 weapons1175and $12.6 million in U.S. currency in fiscal year 2024.1176    Specialized law enforcement personnel are essential to Air and1177Marine Operations' maritime border security mission. These highly-1178skilled agents must be capable of not only enforcing a broad range of1179U.S. laws, but also safely and effectively doing so in the complex--and1180often dangerous--maritime environment. While recruitment for these1181positions can be challenging, Air and Marine Operations is actively1182pursuing opportunities to attract and onboard qualified talent at all1183levels of experience. We are focused on maximizing the capacity of our1184marine units in the Caribbean, South Florida, and Southern California1185where we have a high tempo of maritime activity.1186    Vessels tailored for Air and Marine Operations' specific law1187enforcement operations are a key aspect of its maritime border security1188mission. For example, Air and Marine Operations deploys a fleet of1189high-speed Coastal Interceptor Vessels engineered for rapid pursuit and1190interdiction of non-compliant vessels. These vessels are crewed by1191highly-trained agents authorized to use all necessary force, including1192warning shots and disabling fire, to stop fleeing vessels.1193    In addition to our maritime interdiction efforts with our marine1194interceptors on the water, we also contribute a significant amount of1195air assets to these operations. Air and Marine Operations' fleet of1196maritime patrol aircraft are functionally designed and outfitted for1197maritime detection and surveillance. The P-3s and1198DHC-8 aircraft provide long-range, high-endurance capabilities in1199remote source and transit zones while the Super King Air 350 Multi-Role1200Enforcement Aircraft further expand aerial surveillance, closing1201detection and enforcement gaps in the Caribbean. Equipped with advanced1202sensors, communications, and radar systems, these aircraft are credited1203with the interdiction of 150,380 pounds of cocaine and 11,670 flight1204hours within the Western Hemisphere Transit Zones in fiscal year 2024,1205which equated to 13 pounds of narcotics interdicted per flight hour.1206    The use of unmanned aircraft systems in the maritime environment1207has also increased Air and Marine Operations' ability to effectively1208identify, detect, monitor, and track conveyances involved in illegal1209activity. In partnership with DHS's Science and Technology Directorate,1210Air and Marine Operations modified 2 MQ-9s to Big Wing variants,1211significantly increasing fuel capacity and flight endurance. These Big1212Wing aircraft have the added ability to surveil surface targets much1213longer while awaiting interdiction surface forces to arrive. Air and1214Marine Operations has been employing unmanned aircraft systems in the1215maritime environment since 2020, contributing to the seizure of over121681,000 pounds of cocaine and 46,000 pounds of marijuana.1217    Air and Marine Operations is heavily invested in a variety of1218ground-based radars and sensors increasing maritime domain awareness1219along our littoral borders. We strategically deployed several maritime1220approach surveillance towers in the Caribbean Basin that overlap to1221provide persistent wide-area surveillance and detection capabilities in1222high-risk areas. Additionally, we've taken tethered aerostats1223traditionally used for air detection and integrated maritime surface1224radars to utilize them in support of maritime interdiction operations.1225These tools have significantly increased our situational awareness of1226the maritime approaches around Puerto Rico, South Texas into the Gulf1227of America, and the Florida Straits. Other tower and ground-based radar1228systems have provided additional radar detection around Puerto Rico and1229U.S. Virgin Islands, South Florida, and the Great Lakes. Over the last12303 years, these systems have cumulatively contributed to the seizure of1231over 17,200 pounds of cocaine, 15,600 pounds of illegally obtained1232marine life from illicit fishing practices, and $2 million in U.S.1233currency.1234    Advanced technology, including the BigPipe real-time video system1235and the Minotaur mission integration system, link Air and Marine1236Operations' tactical assets, aircraft, and vessels, thereby providing1237Air and Marine Operations with a streamlined and efficient information-1238collecting and -sharing capability. The Air and Marine Operations1239Center simultaneously tracks, processes, and integrates multiple sensor1240feeds and sources of information to provide comprehensive domain1241awareness in support of CBP's border security mission.1242    Artificial intelligence and machine learning initiatives at Air and1243Marine Operations are improving threat detection efforts by processing1244vast amounts of surveillance data in real time. By leveraging1245artificial intelligence, Air and Marine Operations is advancing the1246efficiency and effectiveness of our maritime domain awareness. In areas1247where there is a high concentration of recreational vessels, Air and1248Marine Operations uses artificial intelligence technology to assist in1249filtering nefarious from recreational traffic. We have had success in1250using this technology to build algorithms that can identify patterns1251among a high volume of tracks on the radar.1252    Air and Marine Operations will continue to modernize its fleet and1253sensor systems to enhance its data analysis capabilities and1254operational performance in diverse marine environments and increase its1255ability to adapt to the challenges of securing the maritime border and1256approaches to the United States.1257                        operational coordination1258    Using a whole-of-Government approach, Air and Marine Operations1259leverages interagency partnerships through the Global Maritime1260Operational Threat Response Coordination Center including the U.S.1261Coast Guard, Department of State, Department of Defense, as well as1262collaborations with other State, local, Tribal, and foreign partners.1263Air and Marine Operations works closely with DHS Joint Task Force East1264and is one of the largest contributors of flight hours to Joint1265Interagency Task Force South, supporting counternarcotics operations in1266the 42 million square miles of source and transit zones spanning the1267Pacific, Atlantic, and Caribbean. Frequent cooperation with foreign1268partners is imperative. Over the last few years, Air and Marine1269Operations has increased its focus on the Eastern Caribbean and1270strengthened partnerships in the Lesser Antilles, creating a force1271multiplier of surveillance and interdiction assets throughout the1272southern approaches to Puerto Rico.1273                               conclusion1274    Since its creation in 2006, Air and Marine Operations has evolved1275into one of the world's largest civilian forces for aviation and1276maritime law enforcement. A critical component of CBP's border security1277mission, Air and Marine Operations monitors and patrols vast areas of1278air, sea, and land around the clock, defending the United States1279against threats at and beyond our borders.1280    Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to1281answering your questions.12821283    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Miller.1284    I now recognize Rear Admiral Chamie for 5 minutes to1285summarize his opening statements.12861287STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL ADAM A. CHAMIE, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT1288             FOR RESPONSE POLICY, U.S. COAST GUARD12891290    Admiral Chamie. Good morning, Chairman Gimenez, Chairman1291Guest, Ranking Member McIver, Ranking Member Ramirez, and1292Members of the committee. I request my written testimony be1293submitted for the record.1294    Mr. Gimenez. Without objection.1295    Admiral Chamie. Thank you, sir. Thank you for your enduring1296support for the Coast Guard and the men and women who volunteer1297to serve. The Coast Guard is busier than ever and laser-focused1298on border security. Following the President's declaration of a1299national emergency at the Southern Border, the Coast Guard1300surged aircraft, cutters, boats, and people. We tripled our1301force laydown and we made it clear that our highest mission1302priority was to achieve full operational control of the1303maritime border.1304    The Coast Guard works closely with the DOD, Joint Force,1305DHS components, and the U.S. interagency. Together, we1306synchronize operations with the singular goal to protect our1307territorial integrity and our Nation's sovereign interests. I'd1308like to highlight 3 ways we control, secure, and defend our1309U.S. borders and maritime approaches.1310    First, we deter and interdict illegal aliens attempting to1311reach the United States by sea. The aliens typically depart1312countries like Haiti, Cuba, the Bahamas, and Mexico, but they1313vary in nationality from across the globe. They use everything1314from handmade wooden boats to sail freighters to speedboats to1315sport fishers to jet skis. Frequently, these smuggling ventures1316are organized by transnational criminal organizations or1317cartels. In the past 5 months, we've interdicted almost 1,0001318illegal aliens.1319    The second way we defend our U.S. borders is by going toe-1320to-toe with the cartels who smuggle drugs into our country.1321This fiscal year, our crews have removed 160 metric tons of1322cocaine and detained over 300 smugglers. This past February, we1323surpassed the amount of drugs we removed in all of fiscal year13242024. The cartels are working hard, but our Coast Guard crews1325are working harder.1326    The interdiction of cocaine matters because the same1327cartels who smuggle cocaine produce and smuggle fentanyl. Once1328we detain the smugglers, we work with our partners and the1329intelligence community to determine who these criminals are and1330how and where these cartels operate. Cocaine is the cash crop1331for cartels. Their huge profits from cocaine fund other1332nefarious activities like human trafficking, weapons smuggling,1333and production of synthetic drugs. Fentanyl remains the leading1334cause of drug-related deaths in our country, but cocaine still1335kills upwards of 25,000 Americans every year.1336    The third way the Coast Guard defends our border is at our1337ports and waterways in both physical space and cyber space. The1338United States is home to 361 commercial ports that facilitate1339$4.6 trillion in commerce--correction, $4.6 trillion in1340commerce each year. Our ports create incredible economic1341opportunity, but they also present a significant risk if not1342properly hardened. We work across the intelligence community1343and with partners, like Customs and Border Protection, to1344identify and mitigate those threats.1345    Our Coast Guard men and women are doing a great job, but1346our efforts are not sustainable. We are at the lowest state of1347readiness since World War II. To overcome this crisis Secretary1348Noem has directed us to transform the Coast Guard into a more1349agile, capable, and responsive force. Without change, the Coast1350Guard will fail. We will not fail.1351    The Secretary's plan to revolutionize the Coast Guard is1352called Force Design 28. Under this plan and with the support of1353Congress and the administration, we will transform from the top1354down. We will establish a service secretary like the other1355military services. We will streamline command and control to1356make us more agile, a more agile fighting force that empowers1357our operators to make decisions.1358    We will grow our service by at least 15,000 people to1359restore readiness and operate new ships, aircraft, and1360technology to improve operations and deliver mission results.1361Finally, we will streamline our contracting and acquisitions to1362deliver the capabilities our crews need at speed.1363    The Coast Guard is extremely grateful to this Congress for1364their support to include the $21.2 billion in reconciliation1365passed by the House. The Coast Guard's future depends on1366reconciliation and an increase in our top-line budget. Since13671790, the Coast Guard has ensured our national sovereignty and1368protected our shores. With your support, we will do it for1369another 235 years.1370    Thank you and I look forward to your questions.1371    [The prepared statement of Admiral Chamie follows:]1372           Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral Adam A. Chamie1373                              introduction1374    Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Guest, Ranking Member McIver, Ranking1375Member Correa, and distinguished Members of the subcommittees, thank1376you for the opportunity to testify today. I am thankful for your1377enduring support of the United States Coast Guard and honored to be1378here today to discuss the Service's role in controlling, securing, and1379defending America's maritime border.1380    The United States is a maritime nation with 95,000 miles of1381shoreline and 361 commercial ports connecting 25,000 miles of navigable1382channels facilitating the flow of $5.4 trillion dollars of maritime1383economic commerce. More than 90 percent of overseas trade cargo enters1384or leaves the United States by ship. As a vital instrument of national1385power within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Coast Guard1386is 1 of the 6 military services, a Federal law enforcement agency, and1387member of the intelligence community. We control, secure, and defend1388the U.S. border and maritime approaches from maritime threats; ensure1389the safe and secure flow of commerce; respond to natural disasters; and1390save lives. I am pleased to share with you how we leverage our unique1391authorities, capabilities, and relationships with international,1392Federal, State, local, and Tribal partners, and how we operationalize a1393layered approach to securing our maritime border and protecting our1394communities from Transnational Criminal Organizations and other1395maritime threats.1396    Transnational Criminal Organizations pose a significant threat to1397our Nation's maritime border security, as they operate across national1398boundaries, smuggling illicit drugs like cocaine, fentanyl, heroin, and1399methamphetamine into the United States, bringing violence, death,1400destruction, and crime into our communities. These commodities provide1401lucrative revenue streams that fund terrorism and other nefarious1402activities such as the trafficking of people, weapons, and illicit1403goods, destabilizing the region and promoting illegal migration--we1404must continue to take action against these organizations. No single1405agency can dismantle this threat alone.1406     u.s. coast guard authorities, responsibilities, & capabilities1407    The Coast Guard is the lead Federal agency for maritime law1408enforcement, including drug interdiction on the high seas; we share the1409lead for drug interdiction in U.S. territorial seas with the U.S.1410Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The Coast Guard partners with the1411Department of Defense through Joint Interagency Task Force--South for1412detection and monitoring of illicit drugs bound for the United States.1413Coast Guard drug interdictions historically focused on cocaine and1414marijuana, and serve the whole-of-Government effort to combat1415Transnational Criminal Organizations. Cocaine interdictions at sea cut1416off a critical source of funding for the same Transnational Criminal1417Organizations that produce and smuggle fentanyl, and in turn impair1418their efforts to produce and smuggle fentanyl into the United States.1419Furthermore, our Coast Guard Intelligence personnel work closely with1420our Intelligence Community partners to combat Transnational Criminal1421Organizations that threaten the United States.1422    Coast Guard forces deploy to the 2 major drug transit corridors in1423the Western Hemisphere, the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean, to deter,1424detect, and interdict maritime drug trafficking events. Coast Guard1425deployments are complementary to U.S. Navy, Canadian, British, and1426Dutch naval deployments with embarked Coast Guard Law Enforcement1427Detachments, capitalizing on the Coast Guard's authorities and1428expertise to interdict narcotics before they approach our borders.1429    These surface assets are supported by Coast Guard, CBP Air and1430Marine Operations, U.S. Navy, and Dutch fixed-wing aircraft, and are of1431critical importance to the detection and monitoring of these1432Transnational Criminal Organizations. This has proven to be a1433successful approach and asset composition.1434    In addition to our at-sea assets and Law Enforcement Detachments,1435the Coast Guard maintains a physical presence in 30 countries around1436the world to serve in various capacities to include security1437cooperation officers, maritime advisors, attaches, liaisons,1438interdiction and prosecution team support, or technical experts.1439Through these integrated touchpoints, we work with our partners to1440identify challenges to overcome and opportunities to increase their1441capabilities to combat Transnational Criminal Organizations inside1442their own borders and maritime jurisdictional zones. The Coast Guard1443maintains more than 40 bilateral maritime law enforcement agreements1444that enable operations on partner-nation-flagged vessels suspected of1445illicit trafficking on the high seas and in waters subject to their1446jurisdiction. These types of international activities enable partner1447nations to increase the expertise of their workforce, enhance their1448maritime capabilities, and empower regional countries to lead1449coordinated efforts to combat Transnational Criminal Organizations at1450the source.1451    Along the U.S. coast, the Service's sectors, boat stations, air1452stations, and patrol boat fleet provides an integrated law enforcement1453capability that protects our shores from invasion. These assets and1454skilled personnel work closely with interagency partners to identify1455and interdict illegal smuggling activities that seek to traffic drugs1456and aliens across the border.1457    Approximately 80 percent of drug seizures each year occur in the1458maritime domain in operations executed by the Coast Guard and its1459interagency and international partners. Year-over-year, seizures by1460Coast Guard personnel account for roughly 50 percent of all drug1461seizures by U.S. law enforcement conducted in the transit and arrival1462zones. In fiscal year 2024, the Coast Guard removed over 106 metric1463tons of cocaine, bringing our 6-year total to 873.5 metric tons1464removed. To date in fiscal year 2025, the Coast Guard has removed 1351465metric tons of cocaine from the maritime domain, including a February1466offload of over 16.9 metric tons of cocaine worth over $275 million1467that will never hit the streets and poison the American people. Our1468layered approach to combat Transnational Criminal Organizations as far1469away from U.S. shores as practical is successful only through security1470cooperation and integrated deployments and engagements.1471                 southeast border & maritime approaches1472    The southeast maritime approaches to the United States experience1473significantly higher levels of irregular maritime migration than other1474maritime vectors and present the greatest risk of a mass migration1475event. Primary nationalities encountered in this region are Cubans,1476Haitians, and Dominicans. Cuban and Haitian aliens primarily use1477transit routes into Florida directly or via the Bahamas. Dominican and1478some Haitian aliens tend to transit routes across the Mona Passage to1479Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Common conveyances used in1480this region range from fishing vessels, coastal freighters, sail1481freighters, go-fast type vessels, or rudimentary vessels called1482``rusticas.'' With the leadership of the DHS Secretary, the Coast Guard1483maintains an increased and active presence in these regularly-transited1484vectors to quickly respond to reports of suspicious vessels by1485international, Federal, State, and local partners, and deter departures1486from countries of origin.1487                 southwest border & maritime approaches1488    The southwest maritime border vector continues to record above-1489average illegal maritime migration events, but not to the same1490historical magnitude as in the southeastern maritime approaches.1491However, human smugglers rely primarily on ``panga''-style personal1492watercraft and makeshift vessels with a capacity of approximately 301493aliens to continuously attempt illegal entries. Although aliens with a1494variety of nationalities are interdicted in this vector, the vast1495majority are Mexican. The Coast Guard relies heavily on CBP, our1496partners for processing.1497                          the gulf of america1498    In the Gulf of America, illegal maritime migration events are1499organized and facilitated by human smuggling networks. In response to1500the national emergency on the border, the Coast Guard surged assets to1501the Rio Grande and is leveraging the capabilities of our deployable1502specialized forces to assist the United States Border Patrol in1503detecting and deterring aliens attempting to illegally cross the river.1504In fiscal year 2025, the Coast Guard has interdicted or deterred over150550 illegal aliens in the region. In these cases, the Coast Guard works1506with regional interagency partners to transfer interdicted aliens1507ashore to CBP.1508    Due to a perceived lack of legal consequences, illegal fishing1509activity by Mexican small craft fishing boats (``lanchas'') in our1510Exclusive Economic Zone has continued to increase over the last 251511years, with the recidivism rate of many offenders exceeding 90 percent.1512One recently apprehended offender was previously caught by the Coast1513Guard more than 40 times. The Coast Guard has worked diligently with1514the interagency over the last several months to address this issue by1515enabling criminal prosecution of lancha crews. In one of the first1516cases pursued with this new approach, on May 13, 2025, a grand jury in1517Brownsville, Texas indicted 4 suspects for illegally harvesting red1518snapper in U.S. waters.1519                            northern border1520    The Northern Border is expansive and diverse, with numerous islands1521and waterways. The short distances between United States and Canadian1522territorial seas create unique opportunities for nefarious actors to1523exploit vulnerable maritime areas with a relatively small law1524enforcement presence. Maritime security threats along the Northern1525Border include both illegal maritime migration and drug trafficking.1526    To combat these threats and secure our Northern Border, the Coast1527Guard and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have developed a program to1528train and designate law enforcement officers to co-crew boats and1529aircraft to enforce Canadian and United States Federal laws on either1530side of the shared border. These operations provide the ability to1531share encrypted Automatic Identification System data to vastly improve1532cross-border domain awareness and provide a common tactical picture.1533Coast Guard and Royal Canadian Mounted Police teams conducted 1231534cross-border operations in fiscal year 2024, resulting in over 5001535boardings, 15 violations, and actively deterred illicit activity. This1536program exemplifies the collaborative efforts between the Coast Guard,1537Royal Canadian Mounted Police, CBP, and other State and local law1538enforcement working in concert to prevent Transnational Criminal1539Organizations from exploiting our Northern Border and endangering the1540American people.1541                          combatting fentanyl1542    Combatting Fentanyl and its illegal precursors is one of the1543administration's top priorities and the Coast Guard has taken1544significant action. Fentanyl has been the leading cause of U.S. drug-1545related deaths since 2016, accounting for approximately 70 percent of1546U.S. drug overdose deaths in 2023. Mexican Transnational Criminal1547Organizations are the primary source of synthetic opioid flow into the1548United States, predominantly across our Southwest Border. While bulk1549fentanyl has not been encountered in the maritime domain, the Coast1550Guard is leveraging our broad authorities, capabilities, and policies1551to seek out and interdict both fentanyl and illegal precursor1552chemicals. On January 31, 2025, the acting commandant directed1553immediate action to bolster operations to combat illegal fentanyl and1554the Service is seeking new ways to leverage our broad authorities and1555partnerships with other agencies.1556                               conclusion1557    The Coast Guard provides the Nation a tremendous return on1558investment. We control, secure, and defend the borders and maritime1559approaches in direct support of President Trump's Executive Orders. In1560order to conduct these vital missions, we must continue to invest in1561our workforce, re-capitalize aging assets and infrastructure, and1562integrate new technologies to position the Service to dismantle the1563Transnational Criminal Organizations that threaten our citizens and1564interdict aliens attempting to illegally enter our country. Thank you1565for your continued support of the Coast Guard and our work to ensure1566the safety and security of the American people.1567    Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to1568your questions.15691570    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Rear Admiral Chamie.1571    I recognize Mr. Harris for 5 minutes to summarize his1572opening statements.15731574    STATEMENT OF JAMES C. HARRIS, III, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,1575  COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME, HOMELAND SECURITY1576                         INVESTIGATIONS15771578    Mr. Harris. Good morning, Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Guest,1579Ranking Member McIver, and Ranking Member Ramirez, and esteemed1580Members. I appreciate the opportunity to present this vital1581topic here today.1582    It is an honor to represent the exceptional and unwavering1583efforts of the men and women of U.S. Immigration and Customs1584Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations, who are1585steadfast in their commitment to protecting our Nation's1586security, public health, and economy from criminal1587organizations that seek to exploit and compromise our great1588Nation, border security, economy, and critical infrastructure.1589As a criminal investigative arm of the Department of Homeland1590Security, HSI is firmly dedicated to safeguarding the United1591States by detecting and dismantling transnational criminal1592organizations that threaten our citizens, businesses, and1593financial institutions. HSI has a formidable work force of1594approximately 8,800 personnel across 243 domestic locations and1595over 93 international sites. We leverage the expertise of more1596than 4,500 task force officers from diverse Federal, State,1597Tribal, territorial, local, and international agencies.1598    Our special agents are on the front lines identifying,1599intercepting, and prosecuting those who exploit our maritime1600borders and supply chains. We work in tandem with U.S. Customs1601and Border Protection and the U.S. Coast Guard to execute this1602vital mission. Every successful interdiction enables us to1603leverage our investigative prowess to trace supply sources,1604target distribution hubs, and disrupt financial networks with1605the goal of dismantling the entire transnational criminal1606organization.1607    It's important to emphasize that narcotics and dangerous1608drugs are not the only contraband we confront in a maritime1609environment. Given that most cargo entering the United States1610arrive by sea, HSI routinely faces challenges from counterfeit1611and mis-manifested cargo, which can devastate public safety and1612the economy if allowed to enter our commerce.1613    Furthermore, maritime human smuggling poses a serious1614threat to national security and human life. With smugglers1615exploiting vulnerabilities along our maritime borders, they1616frequently utilize overcrowded, unseaworthy vessels that1617endanger the lives of migrants, with many being women and1618children. Through our border enforcement security task forces1619and transnational criminal investigative units, HSI is1620relentlessly targeting criminal networks in the maritime1621domain.1622    Globally, HSI leads 115 border enforcement security task1623forces across the United States, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Mariana1624Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, engaging over 1,500 task1625force officers and personnel from more than 200 Federal, State,1626local, Tribal, international law enforcement agencies.1627Additionally, we have over 600 foreign law enforcement officers1628and prosecutors assigned to 18 transnational criminal1629investigative units and 3 international task force units,1630magnifying our capacity to disrupt criminal activity and defend1631our homeland.1632    Executive Order 14159, signed by President Donald Trump on1633January 20, 2025, directs the Secretary of Homeland Security1634and the Attorney General to establish Homeland Security task1635forces in every State and U.S. territory. These task forces,1636spearheaded by HSI and the Federal Bureau Investigation, are1637empowered to investigate, prosecute, and dismantle criminal1638cartels, foreign gangs, and transnational criminal1639organizations operating within the United States, with1640particular focus on 8 newly-designated foreign terrorist1641organizations. The HSTFs represent a united Government effort1642to target the most dangerous and prolific transnational1643criminal organizations.1644    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and1645for your on-going support of HSI in our relentless pursuit to1646safeguard America and its citizens by disrupting and1647dismantling transnational criminal organizations globally. I'm1648standing by for any questions you may have. Thank you.1649    [The prepared statement of Mr. Harris follows:]1650               Prepared Statement of James C. Harris, III1651                             June 10, 20251652    Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Guest, Ranking Member McIver, Ranking1653Member Correa, and distinguished Members of the subcommittees, on1654behalf of Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), we wish to express1655our appreciation to you for inviting us to this hearing today as well1656as for your time, attention, and steadfast commitment to protecting our1657homeland security through your service in your respective committees.1658    I also thank you for the opportunity to discuss the exceptional and1659exhaustive efforts the men and women of U.S. Immigration and Customs1660Enforcement (ICE), Homeland Security Investigations perform to1661safeguard our Nation's security, public health, and economy against1662those criminals who seek to exploit, victimize, and compromise our1663great Nation, our industries, and our critical infrastructure. I am1664truly honored to represent their exemplary service to our Nation, which1665is proudly conducted in accordance with the principles of Honor,1666Service, and Integrity.1667         ice homeland security investigations history and role1668    As one of our country's premier Federal law enforcement agencies,1669Homeland Security Investigations stands dedicated to protecting the1670United States through detecting and dismantling Transnational Criminal1671Organizations targeting the American people, threatening our1672businesses, abusing our financial institutions, and exploiting our1673prosperity. With our unique authorities and footprint, Homeland1674Security Investigations is perfectly situated to investigate and1675dismantle Transnational Criminal Organizations through the enforcement1676of over 400 Federal laws. At Homeland Security Investigations, we are1677comprised of approximately 8,800 personnel across 243 domestic1678locations and more than 90 international locations, where we leverage1679more than 4,500 task force officers from various Federal, State,1680Tribal, territorial, local, and international partners. Homeland1681Security Investigation's mission, as the principal investigative1682component of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is to1683combat a wide range of transnational crimes, including terrorism,1684illicit drug trafficking, human trafficking, child exploitation, human1685smuggling, and cyber crimes.1686    Under the Trump administration, Homeland Security Investigations1687aggressively pursues investigations into criminal networks and1688activities which compromise the global supply chain. A key focus among1689these investigative efforts resides within the maritime environment.1690According to the U.S. Department of Transportation's Maritime1691Administration, ``about 99 percent of overseas trade enters or leaves1692the U.S. by ship. This waterborne cargo and associated activity1693contribute more than $500 billion dollars to the U.S. GDP, generates1694over $200 billion in annual port sector Federal/State/local taxes and1695sustains over 10 million jobs.''\1\ This vast amount of cargo movement1696allows Transnational Criminal Organizations the ability to exploit the1697global supply chain to smuggle contraband into the United States and1698around the globe.1699---------------------------------------------------------------------------1700    \1\ U.S. DOT Maritime Administration updated February 21, 20251701(https://www.maritime.dot.gov/outreach/maritime-transportation-system-1702mts/maritime-transportation-system-mts).1703---------------------------------------------------------------------------1704    Homeland Security Investigations works to identify, intercept, and1705eventually prosecute those exploiting maritime transportation and cargo1706supply chains. We utilize critical industry, open source, and law1707enforcement data, along with collaboration and information sharing1708among other Federal, State, local, and international law enforcement1709agencies, to identify highly-effective information to support criminal1710and civil investigations and enforcement activities primarily focused1711on the smuggling of illicit narcotics, such as fentanyl and precursor1712chemicals, weapons, sensitive U.S. military equipment, and dual-use1713technology, and the prevention of human smuggling, human trafficking,1714and drug trafficking.1715    Illegal drug smuggling is a global crime with local impacts.1716Illegal drugs--such as cocaine, methamphetamine, and synthetic opioids1717including fentanyl--largely come from other countries. Drug cartels and1718other Transnational Criminal Organizations employ complex schemes to1719evade detection as they attempt to smuggle their deadly products into1720the United States. Once here, local networks distribute and sell those1721drugs in our cities and on our streets--to our communities, our fellow1722citizens, and our loved ones--with devastating effects. In fiscal year17232025 alone, HSI investigations are credited with the seizure of over1724501,036 lbs. of cocaine, 192,225 lbs. of precursor chemicals, 7,8971725firearms, and the arrest of over 23,972 individuals.1726    Homeland Security Investigations fights daily to stem this terrible1727threat. Thanks to our efforts and those of our colleagues within DHS,1728illegal border crossings at the U.S. Southern Border are at a historic1729low. This has caused fentanyl seizures at our Ports of Entry to1730continue to fall. And as DHS personnel tighten border security at our1731land borders--cartels will continue to look for new ways to smuggle1732contraband and people into the United States, including through1733maritime means.1734    To combat those who seek to exploit our maritime environment,1735Homeland Security Investigations special agents work closely with U.S.1736Customs and Border Protection, and the U.S. Coast Guard through1737interdiction and investigative efforts. With every successful1738interdiction--we leverage our expertise in conducting complex criminal1739investigations to identify the sources of supply, target the1740distribution hubs, and intercept financial networks to degrade and1741dismantle the entire transnational criminal organization.1742    As just one example of Homeland Security Investigation's1743prioritization of maritime investigations and our commitment to1744partnerships, Homeland Security Investigations is a steadfast partner1745in the Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force's Panama Express1746Strike Force. This prime example of a successful multi-agency operation1747is comprised of 7 signatory partner agencies. Additionally, Panama1748Express Strike Force collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of1749Defense's Southern Command Joint Interagency Task Force--South.1750    As an intelligence-driven, criminal enterprise combatting strike1751force, Panama Express Strike Force personnel have created and1752maintained one of law enforcement's most robust, productive, and1753reliable human intelligence networks ever operated in Central and South1754America. The daily collection, analysis, and dissemination of highly1755actionable intelligence targets Transnational Criminal Organizations1756linked to designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. This intelligence1757also identifies operators involved in large-scale drug trafficking,1758money laundering, and related activities, primarily using maritime and1759air transportation conveyances.1760    The cycle of human intelligence employed by Panama Express Strike1761Force identifies Transnational Criminal Organizations operating in the1762Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean, disrupts their operations through1763maritime and air interdictions, develops witnesses and intelligence,1764and dismantles the Transnational Criminal Organizations through1765strategic utilization of all developed evidence. This approach has1766produced historical law enforcement results.1767    It is important to note that drugs are not the only forms of1768contraband encountered in the maritime environment. Most of the cargo1769entering the United States from foreign countries arrives via maritime1770vessels. As such, Homeland Security Investigations routinely encounters1771counterfeit and mis-manifested cargo, which, if allowed to enter the1772commerce of the United States, can have devastating impacts on public1773safety and the U.S. economy.1774    Additionally, maritime human smuggling continues to pose a serious1775threat to both national security and human life. Human smugglers1776routinely exploit vulnerabilities along the United States' maritime1777borders, often utilizing overcrowded and unseaworthy vessels that place1778migrants, many of them women and children, at significant risk. These1779operations are frequently organized by Transnational Criminal1780Organizations operating off the coasts of California, Florida, and U.S.1781territories in the Caribbean. Homeland Security Investigations1782prioritizes the investigation of high-impact smuggling organizations1783through 2 key initiatives: Joint Task Force Alpha and the1784Extraterritorial Criminal Travel program. In coordination with U.S.1785Customs and Border Protection, the U.S. Department of Justice Criminal1786Division, Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section, and other law1787enforcement partners, these programs focus on dedicating investigative,1788analytical, and prosecutorial resources to dismantle the highest1789priority of human smuggling organizations and their affiliated1790networks.1791    A recent example underscores the heartbreaking human cost of these1792Transnational Criminal Organizations. On May 5, 2025, a panga-style1793vessel carrying 16 migrants, including 2 minors, capsized and washed1794ashore near Torrey Pines, San Diego. Rescue efforts managed to identify17956 survivors but tragically, 3 Indian nationals lost their lives and 71796others remain missing. Homeland Security Investigations is currently1797investigating this smuggling event.1798    During this investigation, as with our other investigations,1799Homeland Security Investigations targets every aspect of the criminal1800enterprise, from the recruiters and transporters to the organizers,1801financiers, and ultimately the leaders. This may include tracing the1802illicit funds used to purchase vessels, the freezing or forfeiture of1803connected bank accounts, the tracking of complicit commercial vessels,1804or the interceptions of communication devices.1805    These techniques, along with many others, are often most notably1806deployed through Homeland Security Investigation's capitalization of1807our unique authorities to employ a multi-layered strategy that1808integrates intelligence, operational coordination, and international1809cooperation within the task-force methodology. Traditionally1810exemplified through our Border Enforcement Security Task Forces units,1811and our Transnational Criminal Investigative Units, Homeland Security1812Investigations task forces bring together Federal, State, local, and1813international partners to target criminal networks along U.S.1814coastlines, among other threat areas. Additionally, we rely on U.S.1815Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Air and Marine1816Operations, and the U.S. Navy, to ensure the rapid response capability1817and maritime intelligence sharing. Globally, there are 115 Border1818Enforcement Security Task Forces units located across the United1819States, Puerto Rico, Guam, Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin1820Islands, comprised of more than 1,500 task force officers and personnel1821representing more than 200 Federal, State, local, Tribal, and1822international law enforcement agencies, and National Guard units. There1823are over 600 foreign law enforcement officers and prosecutors assigned1824to 14 Transnational Criminal Investigative Units and 3 International1825Task Force units operating in 17 countries worldwide. Together, these1826partnerships exponentially multiply Homeland Security Investigation's1827ability to affect investigative outcomes, disrupt criminal activity,1828and protect the homeland and our allies.1829    Building upon these 2 highly-successful programs, under Executive1830Order 14159, signed by President Trump on January 20, 2025, Homeland1831Security Investigation and partners from the U.S. Department of Justice1832have taken steps to establish Homeland Security Task Forces, in all1833States and U.S. territories. Homeland Security Task Forces are charged1834with investigating, prosecuting, and removing criminal cartels, foreign1835gangs, and Transnational Criminal Organizations operating in the United1836States. Homeland Security Task Forces coordination of activities comes1837through a national coordination center in collaboration with the1838Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration,1839other Federal law enforcement partners, U.S. Attorney's Offices, and1840relevant State, Tribal, territorial, and local law enforcement1841agencies. Each Homeland Security Task Force targets the most prolific1842Foreign Terrorist Organization targets. The Homeland Security Task1843Force network aligns with Executive Orders 14159 and 14157 and is1844focused on dismantling cross-border human smuggling and human1845trafficking networks, especially those involving children, and1846enforcing U.S. immigration laws.1847                               conclusion1848    Maritime security is especially challenging as the U.S. Government1849must protect over 12,400 miles of maritime borders. Transnational1850Criminal Organizations constantly probe maritime borders for gaps to1851smuggle people, hundreds of thousands of pounds of illegal narcotics,1852dangerous weapons, illicit proceeds, and other contraband into the1853United States. Homeland Security Investigations uses this challenge to1854embody the dedication and service the American people expect and1855deserve. Our employees strive daily to achieve our mission and to1856ensure the safety and security of this great Nation, its people, and1857its economic prosperity.1858    Chairman Guest, Chairman Gimenez, and esteemed committee Members,1859thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and for your1860continued support of Homeland Security Investigations and our efforts1861to safeguard America and its people by disrupting and dismantling1862Transnational Criminal Organizations throughout the world. On behalf of1863the men and women of Homeland Security Investigations, I would like to1864extend an invitation to the Members of both committees and their staff1865to visit our various facilities and engage with personnel from our1866headquarters components located here in the National Capitol Region as1867well as our domestic and international offices to garner first-hand1868knowledge of Homeland Security Investigations' operations and the1869diverse array of challenges we continuously face.1870    Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, I would1871be pleased to answer any questions you may have.18721873    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Harris.1874    I recognize Ms. MacLeod for 5 minutes to summarize her1875opening statements.18761877STATEMENT OF HEATHER MACLEOD, DIRECTOR OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND1878         JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE18791880    Ms. MacLeod. Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver,1881Ranking Member Ramirez, and Members of the subcommittee, thank1882you for the opportunity to be here to discuss GAO's work on1883Federal efforts to counter illicit maritime activities. My1884testimony today focuses on actions that DHS components could1885take to help ensure U.S. maritime border security.1886    The illegal movement of people, drugs, and weapons into the1887United States and the criminal organizations that traffic them1888pose significant threats to national security. Securing the1889Nation's borders is a key part of the Department of Homeland1890Security's mission. Within DHS, Coast Guard, CBP, and HSI, law1891enforcement efforts are vital to confronting and mitigating1892illicit maritime activity.1893    In addition to their typical missions, these agencies, in1894coordination with other Federal partners, also respond to1895national priorities or emergencies. For example, in recent1896years, Coast Guard and other Federal agencies were called on to1897respond to an unprecedented migrant surge at the Southern1898Border. This response impacted other missions. For example,1899during the surge, Coast Guard almost entirely redirected assets1900from its drug to migrant interdiction mission. Whether shifting1901priorities or surging to respond to a crisis or emergency,1902there is an impact on mission balance, assets, and personnel1903tied to these Federal efforts. Resources surged to respond to a1904crisis are not available for other missions, and people and1905assets can become stretched.1906    Additionally, GAO has identified coordination and1907operational challenges that may hinder these efforts. For1908example, we examined DHS task forces that coordinate to detect1909and monitor the trafficking of illicit drugs being smuggled on1910noncommercial maritime vessels, mainly on southern borders. Our1911work in 2019 and 2024 has shown that task forces have not1912consistently assessed their efforts. This is essential for1913making decisions about priorities and resource allocations. We1914have 7 recommendations pertaining to task forces that remain1915unaddressed.1916    Illicit maritime activities also occur in the Arctic1917region, including potential conflict with Russia or China or1918illegal fishing. The Coast Guard plays a key role in Arctic1919policy implementation and enforcement, but we found in August19202024 that the service does not have a way to measure progress1921on its Arctic efforts.1922    Our prior work has also found the Coast Guard faces1923significant operational challenges balancing tradeoffs among1924its assets and personnel across missions. As Coast Guard1925prioritized deploying assets for its migrant interdiction in1926recent years, it conducted fewer drug interdiction operations.1927Other missions were similarly impacted. The conditions of the1928assets the Coast Guard manages for all of its missions have1929been in a state of decline for decades. Our work has shown that1930the cost of maintaining these assets is increasing at the same1931time that their availability is decreasing. Declining1932availability of these assets and delays in acquisition of their1933replacements can affect Coast Guard's ability to conduct1934missions. Our recommendations address how Coast Guard can1935better manage asset challenges and acquisition programs for new1936vessels and aircraft.1937    DHS law enforcement components also face personnel1938challenges. The Coast Guard exceeded its recruiting goal in19392024 for the first time in 5 years by taking actions such as1940increasing recruiting offices, marketing, and outreach efforts.1941Despite these efforts, the Coast Guard remained about 2,6001942enlisted members short of its work force target. CBP has also1943fallen short of staffing targets for its law enforcement1944position in recent years. In September 2024, we reported that1945CBP has taken action to strengthen its recruitment, hiring, and1946retention efforts. For example, each of CBP's operational1947components have offered recruitment incentives for law1948enforcement positions.1949    In conclusion, while DHS and its components play a vital1950role in confronting and mitigating illicit maritime activities,1951it faces challenges in carrying out these missions effectively.1952Actions are needed to ensure effective oversight and management1953of assets and personnel. Addressing our open recommendations in1954these areas will help ensure that the Department and its1955components are operating effectively and efficiently, using1956available resources to carry out these missions.1957    This completes my prepared statement, and I'd be pleased to1958respond to any questions you may have at this time.1959    [The prepared statement of Ms. McLeod follows:]1960                 Prepared Statement of Heather MacLeod1961                         Tuesday, June 10, 20251962                             gao highlights1963    Highlights of GAO-25-108525, a testimony to the Subcommittee on1964Border Security and Enforcement and the Subcommittee on Transportation1965and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of1966Representatives.1967Why GAO Did This Study1968    Securing the Nation's borders against unlawful movement of people,1969illegal drugs and other contraband, and terrorist activities is a key1970part of DHS's mission. While there is increased attention to the1971southwest land border, criminal organizations continue to use maritime1972routes to smuggle people, drugs, and weapons into the United States.1973    The U.S. Government has identified transnational and domestic1974criminal organizations trafficking and smuggling illicit drugs as a1975significant threat to the public, law enforcement, and national1976security. In March 2021, GAO added national efforts to prevent, respond1977to, and recover from drug misuse to its High-Risk List.1978    This statement discusses (1) key DHS resources to counter illicit1979maritime activities and (2) DHS operational challenges related to its1980efforts to counter illicit maritime activities. This statement is based1981primarily on 15 GAO reports published from July 2012 to April 2025.1982What GAO Recommends1983    In prior work GAO made dozens of recommendations in the reports1984covered by this statement, including 23 to DHS. DHS generally agreed1985with the recommendations. As of May 2025, 4 of the recommendations have1986been implemented. GAO continues to monitor the agency's progress in1987implementing open recommendations.1988    maritime security.--actions needed to address coordination and1989            operational challenges hindering federal efforts1990What GAO Found1991    The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) employs assets--including1992aircraft and vessels--and personnel across the United States and abroad1993to secure U.S. borders, support criminal investigations, and ensure1994maritime security and safety. Relevant DHS components include the Coast1995Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Immigration1996and Customs Enforcement's Homeland Security Investigations.1997    In prior work, GAO identified coordination challenges that hinder1998U.S. efforts to confront illicit maritime activities and recommended1999actions to improve oversight, measure effectiveness, and build2000organizational capacity. For example:2001   In March 2025, GAO found that Homeland Security2002        Investigations had not fully implemented certain training2003        requirements due to disagreements over training content with2004        the Drug Enforcement Administration, with whom they coordinate.2005        Without doing so, the agencies cannot ensure that their agents2006        are properly trained to collaborate effectively on2007        counternarcotics investigations.2008   In February 2024, GAO found that DHS had not developed2009        targets for its coordinated efforts to combat complex threats2010        like drug smuggling and terrorism--limiting its ability to2011        assess the effectiveness of its efforts.2012   In April 2024, GAO found that the Coast Guard had not2013        assessed the type and number of helicopters it requires to meet2014        its mission demands, as part of an analysis of its assets.2015        Doing so could help ensure it has the necessary aircraft2016        capability to execute its missions in the coming decades.20172018    DHS components and their law enforcement missions are vital to2019confronting and mitigating illicit maritime activities. Addressing2020GAO's recommendations on setting targets and managing assets and2021personnel will help ensure that DHS efficiently uses its available2022resources to carry out its law enforcement missions to protect our2023maritime borders.2024    Chairmen Guest and Gimenez, Ranking Members Correa and McIver, and2025Members of the Subcommittees:2026    I am pleased to be here today to discuss Federal efforts to2027confront illicit maritime activities and challenges. Securing the2028Nation's borders against unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs and2029other contraband, and terrorist activities is a key part of the2030Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) mission. While there is2031increased attention on the southwest land border, criminal2032organizations continue to use maritime routes to smuggle people, drugs,2033and weapons into the United States.2034    The U.S. Government has identified trafficking of illicit drugs as2035a significant threat to the public, law enforcement, and national2036security. Use of these illicit drugs continues to impact tens of2037thousands of Americans each year. For example, provisional data from2038the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention show about 80,000 drug2039overdose deaths during the 12-month period ending in December 2024.\1\2040---------------------------------------------------------------------------2041    \1\ According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,2042reported provisional counts for 12-month ending periods are the number2043of deaths received and processed for the 12-month period ending in the2044month indicated. Drug overdose deaths are often initially reported with2045no cause of death (pending investigation) because they require lengthy2046investigation, including toxicology testing. As a result, reported2047provisional counts may not include all deaths that occurred during a2048given time and are subject to change.2049---------------------------------------------------------------------------2050    As shown in figure 1, multiple Federal departments and agencies2051coordinate on efforts to counter illicit maritime activities. Among2052them is DHS, which is responsible for, among other things, securing2053U.S. borders to prevent illegal activity while facilitating legitimate2054trade and travel.\2\2055---------------------------------------------------------------------------2056    \2\ The Department of Defense (DOD) is the single lead agency2057responsible for detecting and monitoring the aerial and maritime2058transport of illegal drugs like cocaine and fentanyl into the United2059States. 10 U.S.C.  124.20602061    The Coast Guard is a multi-mission, maritime military service2062within DHS. The Coast Guard describes itself as the lead Federal2063maritime law enforcement agency and the only agency with both the2064authority and capability to enforce national and international law on2065the high seas, outer continental shelf, and inward from the U.S.2066Exclusive Economic Zone to inland waters.\3\ Coast Guard2067responsibilities include detecting and interdicting contraband and2068illegal drug traffic; at sea enforcement of U.S. immigration laws and2069policies; enforcing our Nation's fisheries and marine protected areas2070laws and regulations; and other missions.\4\ It coordinates with DOD in2071joint task forces to carry out its drug interdiction mission.\5\ In2072particular, the Coast Guard is a major contributor of vessels and2073aircraft deployed to disrupt the flow of illicit drugs.\6\2074---------------------------------------------------------------------------2075    \3\ The term exclusive economic zone refers to an area up to 2002076nautical miles from the territorial sea baseline where a country has2077sovereign rights to natural resources such as fishing and energy2078production.2079    \4\ See 6 U.S.C.  468.2080    \5\ 10 U.S.C.  124 designates DOD as the single lead agency of the2081Federal Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and2082maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. The Coast2083Guard, within DHS, is the lead Federal agency for interdiction of2084maritime drug smugglers in international waters. This is because the2085Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches,2086seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the2087United States has jurisdiction to prevent, detect, and suppress2088violations of U.S. laws. See 14 U.S.C.  522.2089    \6\ Coast Guard aviation and vessel assets include a fleet of about2090200 fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, about 250 cutters, and more than20911,600 boats. GAO, Coast Guard: Aircraft Fleet and Aviation Workforce2092Assessments Needed, GAO-24-106374 (Washington, DC: Apr. 9, 2024).2093---------------------------------------------------------------------------2094    The Coast Guard shares maritime law enforcement responsibilities2095with other DHS components, including U.S. Customs and Border2096Protection's (CBP) Air and Marine Operations and U.S. Border Patrol,2097while U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Homeland Security2098Investigations (HSI) investigates the illicit movement of goods,2099including counternarcotics investigations, among other2100responsibilities.2101    According to the Coast Guard, in fiscal year 2023, the agency2102intercepted more than 212,000 pounds of cocaine and 54,000 pounds of2103marijuana.\7\ According to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),2104the majority of the cocaine shipped to the United States. travels on2105maritime routes from South America and through the eastern Pacific2106Ocean and Caribbean Sea.\8\ Additionally, precursor chemicals may be2107shipped from Asia to Mexico, sometimes as legitimate commerce, where2108they may be combined into fentanyl or other controlled substances.\9\2109Figure 2 shows maritime and land routes for precursor chemical and2110illicit drug smuggling.2111---------------------------------------------------------------------------2112    \7\ Admiral Linda L. Fagan, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, The Coast2113Guard's Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Request, testimony before the House of2114Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,2115Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, 118th Cong.,21162d sess., May 23, 2024.2117    \8\ Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 2020 National Drug2118Threat Assessment, DEA-DCT-DIR-008-21 (March 2021). The majority of2119known maritime drug flow is conveyed via noncommercial vessels through2120the Western Hemisphere Transit Zone--a 6-million-square-mile area of2121routes drug smugglers use to transport illicit drugs that includes the2122eastern Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, among other areas. See2123GAO, Coast Guard: Resources Provided for Drug Interdiction Operations2124in the Transit Zone, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, GAO-14-2125527 (Washington, DC: Jun. 16, 2014).2126    \9\ Precursor chemicals are chemicals or substances that may be2127intended for illicit drug production.21282129    The U.S. Government has identified illicit drugs, as well as the2130transnational and domestic criminal organizations that traffic and2131smuggle them, as significant threats to the public, law enforcement,2132and the national security of the United States. Further, given2133challenges the Federal Government faces in responding to the drug2134misuse crisis, in March 2021, we added national efforts to prevent,2135respond to, and recover from drug misuse to our High-Risk List.\10\2136Specifically, we identified several challenges with the Federal2137Government's response to drug misuse, such as the need for more2138effective implementation and monitoring, and related on-going efforts2139to address the issue, including law enforcement and drug interdiction.2140---------------------------------------------------------------------------2141    \10\ See GAO, High-Risk Series: Dedicated Leadership Needed to2142Address Limited Progress in Most High-Risk Areas, GAO-21-119SP2143(Washington, DC: Mar. 2, 2021). We issue an update to the High-Risk2144List every 2 years at the start of each new session of Congress. The2145most recent update was issued in February 2025. See GAO, High-Risk2146Series: Heightened Attention Could Save Billions More and Improve2147Government Efficiency and Effectiveness, GAO-25-107743 (Washington, DC:2148Feb. 25, 2025).2149---------------------------------------------------------------------------2150    My statement today discusses: (1) key DHS resources to counter2151illicit maritime activities and (2) DHS operational challenges related2152to its efforts to counter illicit maritime activities. This statement2153is based primarily on 15 GAO reports published from July 2012 to April21542025. For the reports we cite in this statement, among other2155methodologies, we analyzed DOD, DHS, CBP, and Coast Guard policy,2156documentation, and data, and interviewed officials from agency2157headquarters and selected field units. More detailed information on our2158scope and methodology can be found in the reports we cite in this2159statement.2160    For this statement, we reviewed information on the status of agency2161implementation of selected recommendations through May 2025. In2162addition, we reviewed Coast Guard budget and performance documents2163since 2018 to determine the extent the service reported meeting its2164drug interdiction performance goals from fiscal years 2014 through21652024. We also analyzed Coast Guard operational hour data for each of2166its 11 statutory missions, from fiscal years 2015 through 2024. We2167found these data to be sufficiently reliable to report Coast Guard2168operational hours for aircraft and vessels by statutory mission. To2169determine the Coast Guard's operating expenses, we reviewed the2170service's Mission Cost Model operating expense estimates for its 112171statutory missions. We found these data to be sufficiently reliable to2172report Coast Guard operating expense estimates for its statutory2173missions.2174    We conducted the work on which this statement is based in2175accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those2176standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain2177sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our2178findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that2179the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and2180conclusions based on our audit objectives.2181    dhs deploys aircraft, vessels, and personnel to address illicit2182                          maritime activities2183Coast Guard Resources2184    DHS employs assets--including aircraft and vessels--and personnel2185across the United States and abroad to secure U.S. borders, support2186criminal investigations, and ensure maritime security and safety.2187Relevant DHS components include the Coast Guard, CBP, and HSI. Their2188air and marine missions vary depending on operating location.\11\2189---------------------------------------------------------------------------2190    \11\ Coast Guard and CBP also coordinate on the deployment and2191allocation of assets and specialized personnel with the DOD to reduce2192the availability of illicit drugs by countering the flow of such drugs2193into the United States.2194---------------------------------------------------------------------------2195    The Coast Guard is responsible for conducting 11 statutory2196missions, 3 of which are maritime law enforcement missions codified as2197homeland security missions--drug interdiction, migrant interdiction,2198and other law enforcement (which includes preventing illegal,2199unreported, and unregulated fishing). In some cases, the Coast Guard2200coordinates its law enforcement missions with interagency partners.2201    The Coast Guard operates a fleet of about 200 fixed- and rotary-2202wing aircraft, with more than 1,600 boats and 250 cutters.\12\ As of2203fiscal year 2024, it employs approximately 55,500 personnel--including2204active duty, reserve, and civilian.\13\ In addition, the Coast Guard's2205shore infrastructure is comprised of nearly 40,000 assets, which2206consist of various types of buildings and structures.\14\ For example,2207within its shore operations asset line, the Coast Guard maintains over2208200 stations along U.S. coasts and inland waterways to carry out its2209search-and-rescue operations, as well as other missions, such as2210maritime security.\15\ Figure 3 shows Coast Guard operating locations2211across the country, as of September 2020.2212---------------------------------------------------------------------------2213    \12\ GAO-24-106374 and GAO, Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address2214Persistent Challenges Hindering Efforts to Counter Illicit Maritime2215Drug Smuggling, GAO-24-107785 (Washington, DC: Sept. 19, 2024).2216    \13\ GAO, Coast Guard: Enhanced Data and Planning Could Help2217Address Service Member Retention Issues, GAO-25-107869 (Washington, DC:2218Apr. 23, 2025).2219    \14\ GAO, Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: More Than $7 Billion2220Reportedly Needed to Address Deteriorating Assets, GAO-25-1078512221(Washington, DC: Feb. 25, 2025).2222    \15\ GAO, Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Better Manage Shore2223Infrastructure, GAO-22-105513 (Washington, DC: Nov. 16, 2021).22242225    Our analysis of Coast Guard data showed more than a quarter of its2226total estimated operating expenses were for law enforcement missions2227related to homeland security. Specifically, from fiscal years 20152228through 2024, drug interdiction accounted for 15 percent of its average2229estimated operating expenses, migrant interdiction 9 percent, and other2230law enforcement (which includes preventing illegal, unreported, and2231unregulated fishing) 3 percent. Figure 4 shows that the operating2232expenses of these 3 missions annually averaged more than $2.1 billion2233over this period.22342235CBP Resources2236    Within CBP, Air and Marine Operations and Border Patrol are the2237uniformed law enforcement arms responsible for securing U.S. borders2238between ports of entry in the air, land, and maritime environments.\16\2239---------------------------------------------------------------------------2240    \16\ CBP's Office of Field Operations also has border security2241responsibilities, such as inspecting pedestrians, passengers, and2242cargo--including international mail and express cargo--at the more than2243320 air, land, and sea ports of entry.2244---------------------------------------------------------------------------2245    CBP's Air and Marine Operations operates a fleet of 250 fixed- and2246rotary-wing aircraft and about 300 vessels to secure U.S. borders, as2247of March 2023.\17\ The majority of CBP's Air and Marine Operations'2248activities support its law enforcement mission, including providing2249surveillance capabilities to detect and support the interdiction of2250illicit cross-border activity.\18\ For example, in May 2023, CBP Air2251and Marine Operations personnel and Puerto Rico police forces seized2252over 4,000 pounds of cocaine found inside a vessel that landed on the2253southeastern coast of Puerto Rico. In addition, as of March 2024, CBP's2254Border Patrol operates over 100 vessels along the coastal waterways of2255the United States and Puerto Rico and interior waterways common to the2256United States and Canada.\19\2257---------------------------------------------------------------------------2258    \17\ CBP Air and Marine Operations owns and maintains CBP's 2902259vessels, including riverine vessels that are operated by the U.S.2260Border Patrol, as of March 2023. Jonathan P. Miller, Executive Director2261of Operations, Air and Marine Operations, CBP, Securing America's2262Maritime Border: Challenges and Solutions for U.S. National Security,2263testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on Homeland2264Security, Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security, 118th2265Cong., 1st sess., March 23, 2023.2266    \18\ GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Assessment of Air and2267Marine Operating Locations Should Include Comparable Costs across All2268DHS Marine Operations, GAO-20-663 (Washington, DC: Sept. 24, 2020).2269    \19\ ``Border Patrol Overview,'' CBP, last modified: Mar. 4, 2024,2270https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/overview.2271---------------------------------------------------------------------------2272    In September 2024 we reported on staffing levels for CBP law2273enforcement positions, including for Air and Marine Operations and2274Border Patrol.\20\ We found that staffing levels for Air and Marine2275Operations positions varied from fiscal year 2018 through the first2276half of fiscal year 2024. In particular, staffing levels for the Air2277Interdiction Agent position generally decreased and staffing levels for2278Aviation Enforcement Agents and Marine Interdiction Agents generally2279increased during this period. Regarding Border Patrol, we found that it2280met its staffing targets from fiscal years 2018 through 2020 but fell2281short from fiscal year 2021 through the second quarter of fiscal year22822024. Figure 5 shows CBP's Air and Marine Operations field structure,2283which is divided into 3 regions--northern, southeast, and southwest--2284and operating locations in these regions.2285---------------------------------------------------------------------------2286    \20\ GAO, U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Efforts to Improve2287Recruitment, Hiring, and Retention of Law Enforcement Personnel, GAO-228824-107029 (Washington, DC: Sept. 25, 2024).22892290HSI Resources2291    HSI agents conduct Federal criminal investigations into the illegal2292movement of people, goods, money, contraband, weapons, and sensitive2293technology into, out of, and through the United States, including2294narcotics. Specifically, as it relates to counternarcotics2295investigations, HSI's mission includes tracking, intercepting,2296investigating, and stopping illicit narcotics from flowing into the2297United States through targeting criminal networks; strengthening global2298partnerships; and enhancing domestic collaboration. HSI is also2299involved in countering other illicit maritime activity. For example, in2300November 2024, HSI, in coordination with the Coast Guard and other2301Federal agencies, investigated the Gulf Cartel's involvement in2302criminal activities associated with illegal, unreported, and2303unregulated fishing, human smuggling, and narcotics trafficking in the2304maritime environment. Illegal fishing is often a revenue stream for2305criminal organizations, according to HSI, and is also a threat to U.S.2306maritime security, as criminal organizations may use the same vessels2307for smuggling narcotics and humans across borders.2308    As shown in figure 6, over a 7-year period--fiscal years 20172309through 2023--HSI initiated over 58,000 counternarcotics investigations2310and referred over 35,000 counternarcotics cases for prosecution (an2311annual average of over 8,000 initiated investigations and over 5,0002312cases referred for prosecution). During this period, HSI was annually2313staffed with about 5,600 special agents working on HSI's law2314enforcement activities, including activities that work to combat2315illicit drugs in the United States.23162317                        coordination challenges2318    Combating the trafficking of illicit drugs and other illicit2319maritime activities is a Government-wide priority that requires a2320coordinated effort by Federal departments and agencies. In prior work,2321we have identified coordination challenges that hinder U.S. efforts to2322confront illicit maritime activities and recommended actions to improve2323oversight, measure effectiveness, and build organizational capacity.2324    Improve oversight.--DOD and DHS lead and operate certain task2325forces--Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-South, JIATF-West, and DHS2326Joint Task Force-East.\21\ For example, DHS components, including the2327Coast Guard and CBP, coordinate with DOD on counterdrug missions2328through the Joint Interagency Task Force-South. For example, the task2329force is allocated assets, such as ships and surveillance aircraft,2330from DOD and DHS components, such as the Coast Guard, as well as from2331foreign partners. The task force coordinates these assets, in2332conjunction with available intelligence, to detect and monitor the2333trafficking of illicit drugs, such as cocaine, being smuggled north on2334noncommercial maritime vessels across its area of responsibility.2335---------------------------------------------------------------------------2336    \21\ An additional task force--Joint Task Force-North--consists2337solely of DOD personnel and does not generally operate in the maritime2338domain.2339---------------------------------------------------------------------------2340    In 2019, we reported that the task forces generally coordinated2341effectively using means that aligned with leading practices.\22\ These2342included working groups and liaison officers, which helped to minimize2343duplication of missions and activities. However, our recent work has2344shown that these task forces and DOD should improve coordination and2345assess their efforts.\23\ In 2024, we made 4 recommendations to improve2346agencies' assessment efforts, including 2 recommendations to DHS to2347improve oversight of Joint Task Force-East. DHS agreed with the2348recommendations, which remain open as of May 2025.\24\ Fully2349implementing them is essential for making decisions about priorities,2350resource allocations, and strategies for improvements.2351---------------------------------------------------------------------------2352    \22\ See GAO, Drug Control: Certain DOD and DHS Joint Task Forces2353Should Enhance Their Performance Measures to Better Assess Counterdrug2354Activities, GAO-19-441 (Washington, DC: Jul. 9, 2019). As established,2355the DHS task forces aimed to, among other things, combat terrorism2356threats, the smuggling of illicit drugs, unlawful migration, and other2357security concerns along the Southern Border and approaches to the2358United States.2359    \23\ GAO, Counternarcotics: DOD Should Improve Coordination and2360Assessment of Its Activities, GAO-24-106281 (Washington, DC: Apr. 16,23612024) and Department of Homeland Security: Additional Actions Needed to2362Improve Oversight of Joint Task Forces, GAO-24-106855 (Washington, DC:2363Feb. 7, 2024).2364    \24\ GAO-24-106855. DHS agreed with the 2 recommendations and2365identified on-going and planned steps to address them. Actions include2366plans to review its performance measures for the task force and2367document the methodology used calculate such measures, including2368performance targets. See also GAO-24-106281.2369---------------------------------------------------------------------------2370    Measure effectiveness.--The Coast Guard and DOD also collaborate to2371combat illicit maritime activities and mitigate risks in the Arctic2372region. According to the Coast Guard's Arctic Strategy these risks2373range from increased militarization of the Arctic region and potential2374conflict with Russia or China, to the increased risk posed by greater2375shipping traffic, and potential damage to the marine ecosystem from2376illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. Officials from the Coast2377Guard and DOD also told us they collaborate in several ways, including2378sharing relevant information and expertise, providing operational2379assistance and conducting joint exercises in the region. Further, they2380reported collaborating on the development of their respective Arctic2381strategies. However, we found in August 2024 that the Coast Guard's2382Arctic Strategic Outlook Implementation Plan generally does not include2383mechanisms to measure progress on its Arctic efforts. This may make it2384difficult for the Coast Guard to plan activities, determine resource2385needs, assess its progress toward strategic objectives, and ensure its2386efforts are aligned with national efforts. As a result, we recommended2387that the Coast Guard include performance measures with associated2388targets and time frames in its implementation plan. The Coast Guard2389concurred with our recommendation, and we continue to monitor its2390progress.\25\2391---------------------------------------------------------------------------2392    \25\ GAO, Coast Guard: Complete Performance and Operational Data2393Would Better Clarify Arctic Resource Needs, GAO-24-106491 (Washington,2394DC: Aug. 13, 2024).2395---------------------------------------------------------------------------2396    Build collaborative capacity through training.--While HSI agents2397may obtain Title 21 authority in order to collaborate with DEA on2398certain investigations of illicit activities, interagency disagreement2399on training has hindered effectiveness.\26\2400---------------------------------------------------------------------------2401    \26\ Under section 873 of Title 21 of the U.S. Code, DEA can cross-2402designate HSI agents with the authority to investigate the smuggling of2403controlled substances across U.S. international borders or through2404ports of entry.2405---------------------------------------------------------------------------2406    In March 2025, we made 3 recommendations, including that DEA and2407ICE develop and implement the training.\27\ Without jointly developing2408and implementing the training modules, DEA and HSI cannot ensure that2409their agents are properly trained to collaborate effectively with each2410other on counternarcotics investigations.2411---------------------------------------------------------------------------2412    \27\ See GAO, Combatting Illicit Drugs: Improvements Needed for2413Coordinating Federal Investigations, GAO-25-107839 (Washington, DC:2414Mar. 5, 2025). The agencies agreed with our recommendations. DHS2415described planned actions to address the recommendation to HSI, stating2416that HSI plans to work with DEA to develop and implement training2417modules.2418---------------------------------------------------------------------------2419Operational Challenges2420    DHS assets, such as aircraft and vessels, and Federal personnel are2421vital to confronting and mitigating illicit maritime activities.2422However, our prior work has found that the Coast Guard faces2423significant operational challenges balancing tradeoffs among its assets2424and personnel across its 11 statutory missions where more work needs to2425be done. By comparison, CBP has strategically addressed certain2426operational challenges, such as recruitment and retention, through2427incentive pay.2428    Coast Guard tradeoffs.--The Coast Guard faces challenges balancing2429its varied mission priorities which have grown as it is called on to do2430more with its resources. In particular, in recent years, the Coast2431Guard has prioritized deploying its assets for its migrant interdiction2432mission. In doing so, it has reduced its operational activities to2433support other missions. The Coast Guard has not met its annual primary2434drug interdiction mission performance target in any year from fiscal2435years 2014 through 2024. Most notably, from fiscal years 2021 through24362023, the Coast Guard increased its migrant interdiction operations2437considerably in response to the highest maritime migration levels in2438the Caribbean in nearly 30 years. This tradeoff further challenges the2439Coast Guard's ability to meet its drug interdiction mission demands.2440    As shown in figure 7, from fiscal years 2021 through 2023, the2441Coast Guard increased its operational hours for aircraft and vessels by244266 percent for its migrant interdiction mission, while decreasing its2443deployments for drug interdiction by 62 percent.\28\2444---------------------------------------------------------------------------2445    \28\ From fiscal years 2023 through 2024, Coast Guard resources2446deployed to support its migrant interdiction mission decreased, while2447Coast Guard resources deployed to support its drug interdiction mission2448remained at relatively low levels.24492450    Coast Guard assets.--Moreover, the condition of the assets the2451Coast Guard manages have been in a state of decline for decades. Our2452work has shown that the Coast Guard's aircraft and vessels have faced2453readiness and availability challenges in carrying out their statutory2454missions.2455    For example, the Coast Guard relies on its Medium Endurance Cutters2456for its drug interdiction mission. However, we reported in July 20122457that Medium Endurance Cutters did not meet operational hours targets2458from fiscal years 2005 through 2011 and that declining operational2459capacity hindered mission performance.\29\ In June 2023, we reported2460that Medium Endurance Cutters were not consistently meeting operational2461availability targets, and the Coast Guard noted that the declining2462physical condition of the cutters puts them at significant risk of2463decreased capability for meeting mission requirements.\30\2464---------------------------------------------------------------------------2465    \29\ GAO, Coast Guard: Legacy Vessels' Declining Conditions2466Reinforce Need for More Realistic Operational Targets, GAO-12-7412467(Washington, DC: Jul. 31, 2012).2468    \30\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter Program2469Needs to Mature Technology and Design, GAO-23-105805 (Washington, DC:2470Jun. 20, 2023).2471---------------------------------------------------------------------------2472    The Coast Guard's asset readiness challenges are not limited to its2473cutters. In April 2024, we reported that the Coast Guard's aircraft2474generally did not meet the Coast Guard's 71 percent availability target2475during fiscal years 2018 through 2022, as shown in figure 8.\31\2476---------------------------------------------------------------------------2477    \31\ GAO-24-106374. GAO found that the Coast Guard had not assessed2478the type and number of helicopters it requires to meet its mission2479demands, as part of an analysis of its assets, among other things.24802481    Coast Guard personnel.--Compounding deteriorating assets is a2482shortage of personnel to operate them. The Coast Guard exceeded its2483recruiting goal in fiscal year 2024 for the first time in 5 years by2484taking actions such as increasing recruiting offices, marketing, and2485outreach efforts. It also revised enlistment eligibility standards and2486took steps to address a significant increase in medical waiver requests2487in recent years. However, despite these efforts, the Coast Guard2488remained about 2,600 enlisted members short of its workforce target.2489    The Coast Guard has taken steps to address its retention challenges2490through monetary and nonmonetary incentives and in 2022 began to2491require service members to complete a career survey to help identify2492key issues affecting retention. However, survey response rates have2493been consistently low. In April 2025, we recommended that the Coast2494Guard take actions to address response rates and develop a clear plan2495to gauge the performance of its initiatives.\32\ The Coast Guard agreed2496with our recommendations, and we will monitor their implementation.2497---------------------------------------------------------------------------2498    \32\ GAO-25-107869.2499---------------------------------------------------------------------------2500    CBP personnel.--We reported in September 2024 that in recent years,2501CBP has also generally fallen short of staffing targets for its law2502enforcement positions, as shown in figure 9.\33\ We also reported that2503CBP has taken action to strengthen its recruitment, hiring, and2504retention efforts. For example, each of CBP's operational components--2505the Office of Field Operations, U.S. Border Patrol, and Air and Marine2506Operations--have offered recruitment incentives for law enforcement2507positions.2508---------------------------------------------------------------------------2509    \33\ GAO-24-107029.2510---------------------------------------------------------------------------2511    In particular, in 2024 Border Patrol offered recruitment incentives2512of $20,000 per recipient, with an additional $10,000 for recipients2513stationed in remote locations. CBP has also offered retention2514incentives, relocation incentives, and special salary rates as part of2515its efforts to improve retention of law enforcement personnel. For2516example, Air and Marine Operations has offered retention incentives for2517positions and locations experiencing high rates of attrition. CBP2518anticipates a steep increase in attrition rates across all positions2519starting in 2027 because a significant number of its law enforcement2520personnel will become eligible to retire. CBP has a strategic plan to2521address this expected retirement surge, and retention- and morale-2522related efforts will be increasingly important to help mitigate the2523loss of these personnel.25242525    In summary, DHS components and their law enforcement missions are2526vital to confronting and mitigating illicit maritime activities.2527Addressing our recommendations on setting performance measures and2528targets and managing assets and personnel will help ensure that DHS2529efficiently uses its available resources to carry out its law2530enforcement missions to protect our maritime borders.2531    Chairmen Guest and Gimenez, Ranking Members Correa and McIver, and2532Members of the subcommittees, this completes my prepared statement. I2533would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this2534time.2535Appendix I: Related Open Recommendations to the Department of Homeland2536                        Security as of May 20252537Coast Guard: Enhanced Data and Planning Could Help Address Service2538        Member Retention Issues, GAO-25-107869 (Washington, DC: Apr.2539        23, 2025).2540   Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should2541        ensure that the Office of Workforce Requirements, Systems, and2542        Analytics implements additional mechanisms to increase response2543        rates for its Career Intention Survey.2544   Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should2545        ensure that the Office of Workforce Requirements, Systems, and2546        Analytics analyzes the potential for nonresponse bias in its2547        Career Intention Survey results.2548   Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should2549        ensure that the Talent Management Transformation Program2550        Integration Office develops a clear plan, including how2551        retention initiatives align with strategic objectives and2552        timeframes and milestones for implementation, to track progress2553        and gauge program performance.2554Combatting Illicit Drugs: Improvements Needed for Coordinating Federal2555        Investigations, GAO-25-107839 (Washington, DC: Mar. 5, 2025).2556   Recommendation.--The director of ICE should work with the2557        DEA administrator to develop and implement the 2 training2558        modules in accordance with their January 2021 agreement, using2559        agreed-upon dispute resolution mechanisms as appropriate.2560Coast Guard: Complete Performance and Operational Data Would Better2561        Clarify Arctic Resource Needs, GAO-24-106491 (Washington, DC:2562        Aug. 13, 2024).2563   Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should2564        ensure that District 17 collects and reports complete2565        information about resource use and mission performance in2566        accordance with Coast Guard guidance.2567   Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should2568        ensure that the Coast Guard's Arctic implementation plan2569        includes performance measures with associated targets and time2570        frames for the action items described in the plan in accordance2571        with Coast Guard guidance.2572Coast Guard: Aircraft Fleet and Aviation Workforce Assessments Needed,2573        GAO-24-106374 (Washington, DC: Apr. 9, 2024).2574   Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should2575        establish procedures requiring the Coast Guard to uniformly2576        collect and maintain air station readiness data.2577   Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should2578        establish a process to regularly evaluate Coast Guard-wide air2579        station readiness data.2580   Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should2581        assess the type of helicopters the Coast Guard requires to meet2582        its mission demands, as part of an analysis of alternatives.2583   Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should2584        assess the number of helicopters the Coast Guard requires to2585        meet its mission demands, as part of a fleet mix analysis.2586   Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should2587        assess and determine the aviation workforce levels it requires2588        to meet its mission needs.2589Department of Homeland Security: Additional Actions Needed to Improve2590        Oversight of Joint Task Forces, GAO-24-106855 (Washington, DC:2591        Feb. 7, 2024).2592   Recommendation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security should2593        ensure the Office of the Military Advisor develops and2594        documents criteria for establishing a joint task force.2595   Recommendation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security should2596        ensure the Office of the Military Advisor develops and2597        documents criteria for terminating a joint task force.2598   Recommendation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security should2599        ensure the Office of the Military Advisor, as it finalizes2600        performance measures for Joint Task Force-East, establishes2601        targets for those measures, as required.2602   Recommendation.--The Secretary of Homeland Security should2603        ensure the Office of the Military Advisor develops and2604        documents the methodology used in establishing the performance2605        measures for Joint Task Force-East.2606Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter Program Needs to2607        Mature Technology and Design, GAO-23-105805 (Washington, DC:2608        Jun. 20, 2023).2609   Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should2610        ensure that Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program officials2611        develop a technology maturation plan for the davit prior to2612        builder's trials. This plan should identify potential courses2613        of action to address davit technical immaturity, including2614        assessing technology alternatives should the current davit2615        continue to face development challenges, and a date by which2616        the Coast Guard will make a go/no-go decision to pursue such a2617        technology alternative.2618   Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should2619        ensure that OPC program officials test an integrated prototype2620        of the davit in a realistic environment prior to stage 12621        builder's trials.2622   Recommendation.--The Commandant of the Coast Guard should2623        ensure that the OPC stage 2 program achieves a sufficiently2624        stable design prior to the start of lead ship construction. In2625        line with shipbuilding leading practices, sufficiently stable2626        design includes 100 percent completion of basic and functional2627        design, including routing of major distributive systems and2628        transitive components that effect multiple zones of the ship.2629                          Related GAO Products2630    Coast Guard: Enhanced Data and Planning Could Help Address Service2631Member Retention Issues, GAO-25-107869 (Washington, DC: Apr. 23, 2025).2632    Combatting Illicit Drugs: Improvements Needed for Coordinating2633Federal Investigations, GAO-25-107839 (Washington, DC: Mar. 5, 2025).2634    Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: More Than $7 Billion Reportedly2635Needed to Address Deteriorating Assets, GAO-25-107851 (Washington, DC:2636Feb. 25, 2025).2637    U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Efforts to Improve Recruitment,2638Hiring, and Retention of Law Enforcement Personnel, GAO-24-1070292639(Washington, DC: Sept. 25, 2024).2640    Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Challenges2641Hindering Efforts to Counter Illicit Maritime Drug Smuggling, GAO-24-2642107785 (Washington, DC: Sept. 19, 2024).2643    Coast Guard: Complete Performance and Operational Data Would Better2644Clarify Arctic Resource Needs, GAO-24-106491 (Washington, DC: Aug. 13,26452024).2646    Counternarcotics: DOD Should Improve Coordination and Assessment of2647Its Activities, GAO-24-106281 (Washington, DC: Apr. 16, 2024).2648    Coast Guard: Aircraft Fleet and Aviation Workforce Assessments2649Needed, GAO-24-106374 (Washington, DC: Apr. 9, 2024).2650    Department of Homeland Security: Additional Actions Needed to2651Improve Oversight of Joint Task Forces, GAO-24-106855 (Washington, DC:2652Feb. 7, 2024).2653    Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter Program Needs to2654Mature Technology and Design, GAO-23-105805 (Washington, DC: Jun. 20,26552023).2656    Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Better Manage Shore Infrastructure,2657GAO-22-105513 (Washington, DC: Nov. 16, 2021).2658    Department of Homeland Security: Assessment of Air and Marine2659Operating Locations Should Include Comparable Costs across All DHS2660Marine Operations, GAO-20-663 (Washington, DC: Sept. 24, 2020).2661    Drug Control: Certain DOD and DHS Joint Task Forces Should Enhance2662Their Performance Measures to Better Assess Counterdrug Activities,2663GAO-19-441 (Washington, DC: Jul. 9, 2019).2664    Coast Guard: Resources Provided for Drug Interdiction Operations in2665the Transit Zone, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, GAO-14-5272666(Washington, DC: Jun. 16, 2014).2667    Coast Guard: Legacy Vessels' Declining Conditions Reinforce Need2668for More Realistic Operational Targets, GAO-12-741 (Washington, DC:2669Jul. 31, 2012).26702671    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Ms. MacLeod.2672    Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their26735 minutes of questioning. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes2674of questioning.2675    I am going to go right to you, Ms. MacLeod. What I got from2676you is that the Coast Guard needs more ships and more people in2677order to carry out their missions because they are stretched2678thin right now. Pretty much?2679    Ms. MacLeod. Yes. The Coast Guard has a history of making2680do. There are acquisition programs that are in place, but, as I2681mentioned, those are currently delayed. There are work force2682shortages across the Coast Guard. Although they met their2683recruiting goals, there remains a work force shortage.2684    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you. Admiral Chamie, the reconciliation2685bill has how much more for the Coast Guard that will help, I2686guess, in this endeavor, try to give the Coast Guard the2687resources and the personnel it needs to carry out its mission?2688    Admiral Chamie. Yes, sir. We're grateful for the $21.22689billion in the House-passed reconciliation, sir.2690    Mr. Gimenez. You are confident that with that, and also the2691reconfiguring, reimagining of the Coast Guard, that the Coast2692Guard will be better able to carry out its mission in the2693future?2694    Admiral Chamie. Yes, sir. A combination of the2695reconciliation plus an increase in annual top line, that's2696critical for us to be able to get over some of the lingering2697issues, like shoreside infrastructure, the buildings that our2698crews operate out of.2699    Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough. Mr. Harris, the cartels. The2700cartels that--were the cartels the same cartels, are they2701involved both in drug trafficking and human trafficking?2702    Mr. Harris. Yes, the same cartels are involved in all2703those.2704    Mr. Gimenez. Is most of the human trafficking you are2705seeing, are they somehow paying the cartels in order to be2706trafficked or do you see people just ad hoc getting into a boat2707and trying to make it to the United States?2708    Mr. Harris. Both. Both. You see people going about it on2709their own, but you also see people utilizing transnational2710criminal organizations.2711    Mr. Gimenez. Are they the same cartels that were working on2712the Southern Border?2713    Mr. Harris. Yes, same cartels.2714    Mr. Gimenez. So they are now--they are in the Southern2715Border and they are also at sea. Are they Mexican in origin?2716Are they Colombian in origin? Where do they come from?2717    Mr. Harris. A lot of them are Mexico.2718    Mr. Gimenez. OK. But the cocaine is actually produced2719Colombia, Peru, you know, so--and it somehow gets to the2720Mexican cartels and they are the ones that distribute it? Is2721that the way that the operation works?2722    Mr. Harris. That is correct.2723    Mr. Gimenez. All right. During the Biden administration2724years, when we had thousands and thousands and millions of2725illegals crossing through the Southern Border, were most of2726those people paying the cartels to cross the border?2727    Mr. Harris. I don't think most of them. I think people were2728paying cartels, and people were doing it on their own through2729family, friends, or people in the community.2730    Mr. Gimenez. How much were the cartels making from the2731human trafficking during those years?2732    Mr. Harris. Investigations suggest that you can make a2733couple thousand per person.2734    Mr. Gimenez. So how much were they making? Were they--I2735mean, our estimation was they were making a billion dollars a2736month. Is that far off?2737    Mr. Harris. I'm not sure about that.2738    Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough. OK. So let's go now to China. The2739precursor drugs or chemicals are for fentanyl. What kind of2740success have we had in interdicting those precursor chemicals2741from reaching--I guess, it goes to Mexico, offloaded in Mexico?2742Then goes to the cartels who create the fentanyl and then ship2743it across the border. That fentanyl is killing Americans, is2744that right?2745    Mr. Harris. That is correct. We've had a lot of success in2746that area, seeing the chemical precursors coming from Asia to2747Mexico and then find its way into the United States.2748    Mr. Gimenez. Where's the success? I mean----2749    Mr. Harris. Success is the--we've decimated, at least in2750fiscal year 2025, I'll speak to that, in fiscal year 2025 we2751decimated 13 clandestine labs in Mexico that was ran by some of2752the cartels.2753    Mr. Gimenez. Yes, but those are the labs. I am talking2754about the ship that is coming with the chemicals from China. Do2755we interdict any of those at all or they all land in a Mexican2756port and then the chemicals are then shipped to the cartels?2757    Mr. Harris. No, we interdict those as well.2758    Mr. Gimenez. You do. But what percentage of that do you2759think you are interdicting?2760    Mr. Harris. I'm unaware. I can take that back.2761    Mr. Gimenez. OK. Well, would it surprise you if I tell you2762that the Chinese actually incentivize the companies that2763produce the precursor chemicals for fentanyl that kills tens of2764thousands of Americans? They incentivize them with tax breaks2765in China as long as they are for export, but they are actually2766illegal inside of China. So if they do that, would it lead you2767to believe that somehow this is done on purpose, that the2768Chinese are actually sending this stuff on purpose to kill2769Americans?2770    Mr. Harris. With China, they have been a good partner in2771this quest to stop the chemical precursors.2772    Mr. Gimenez. How can you say that when they are actually2773incentivizing the companies to create the chemicals that are2774only used for the creation of fentanyl?2775    Mr. Harris. We've had success working with them, the2776government of China, as well as Mexico, in trying to stop some2777of this.2778    Mr. Gimenez. In trying to stop them. We are not very2779successful at that, though, are we?2780    Mr. Harris. We've seen some success.2781    Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough. My time is up.2782    I now recognize the Ranking Member for her 5 minutes.2783    Mrs. McIver. Thank you so much, Chairman.2784    Admiral Chamie, in January, Trump and Secretary Noem2785ordered the Coast Guard to triple its presence at the U.S.2786Border. However, despite some of our requests, the Coast Guard2787has not provided us information on exactly where the service2788has redirected assets and personnel from. Would you please2789commit to providing us with the full accounting of all assets2790and personnel that have been redirected since January 20,2791including their home port or station, as well as a description2792of all deployments and missions that were canceled or2793redirected?2794    Admiral Chamie. Yes, Congresswoman. I'd be happy to come2795brief you on that.2796    Mrs. McIver. Perfect. Thank you so much.2797    I want to move to Ms. MacLeod. GAO has studied the Coast2798Guard's capabilities to carry out various missions, as well as2799its capacity to make resource allocation decisions effectively.2800In your estimation, does the Coast Guard fully understand the2801tradeoffs it is making when it redeploys assets and personnel?2802    Ms. MacLeod. We've found both data limitations in2803acknowledging those tradeoffs, as well as strategic. Everything2804cannot be a priority. The Coast Guard, as I said, has a history2805of making do. Without accounting for the various tradeoffs2806among these 11 missions and various national priorities, it's a2807scattershot approach.2808    Mrs. McIver. Thank you. What are some of the tradeoffs the2809Coast Guard needs to reconsider?2810    Ms. MacLeod. Well, among its missions, we saw in our recent2811data analysis as the Coast Guard has shifted more resources to2812the drug interdiction mission, a steep decline in the migrant2813interdiction mission, just as an example. Then there's the2814search-and-rescue missions and other missions that are also2815being affected at the same time.2816    Mrs. McIver. Got it. Thank you so much for that. Last year,2817GAO reported on the Coast Guard's aviation fleet and found that2818the service's planes and helicopters were only available 66 to281968 percent of the time on average in recent years. Since then,2820the Trump administration started using Coast Guard planes,2821obviously to fly deportation staging flights. Secretary Noem2822requested to spend $50 million on a new executive Gulfstream2823jet.2824    Given the existing challenges the aging Coast Guard2825aircraft fleet faces, how do these additional demands impact2826Coast Guard readiness?2827    Ms. MacLeod. The Coast Guard's aircraft are not meeting the2828availability target. Since our report last year, this has2829become even more acute with grounding of additional aircraft2830within the fleet.2831    Mrs. McIver. Thank you for that.2832    With that, I yield back.2833    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you to the Ranking Member McIver.2834    I now recognize the Chairman of the Border Security2835Enforcement, the gentleman from Mississippi, Michael Guest.2836    Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.2837    Admiral Chamie, I want to read a few headlines of some of2838the great work that the United States Coast Guard has done2839since just February of this year. ``United States Coast Guard2840offloads more than 275 million worth of illegal cocaine in San2841Diego.'' That was February 13. March 6, ``Coast Guard offloads2842over 141 million in illicit drugs interdicted in the Caribbean2843sea.'' That is from March the 6. ``Coast Guard offloads over2844517\1/2\ million in illicit drugs interdicted in Eastern2845Pacific Ocean,'' March the 20. ``Coast Guard Cutter Calhoun2846offloads more than 140.9 million in illegal narcotics at Port2847Everglades,'' May 16. ``Coast Guard offloads more than 2112848million in illicit drugs interdicted in the Eastern Pacific,''2849May 29 of this year. Then just earlier this month, on June the28506, ``Coast Guard offloads more than 138 million in illicit2851drugs interdicted in the Caribbean Sea.''2852    If my math is correct, that amount is roughly $1\1/2\2853billion in narcotic seizures just this year. So to the men and2854women who serve under your command, I want to personally thank2855them for the job that they are doing.2856    I want to ask you briefly, Admiral, can you talk about the2857importance of interdicting these drugs at sea before these2858narcotics come into the United States? Also talk a little bit2859about the impact that $1\1/2\ billion in seizures has on these2860transnational criminal organizations.2861    Admiral Chamie. Yes, sir. Thank you, Chairman Guest, and2862thanks for your words complimenting our crews. Our commandant2863and the rest of our leadership team are very proud of them.2864    To your question, sir, what we try to do is interdict the2865drugs in bulk quantity as far away from the shores of the2866United States as we can. Because the closer these bulk amounts2867get to the United States, they get broken up into smaller2868amounts that make them easier to smuggle in. So you could have2869a large load of, say, 2 tons that goes into the Dominican2870Republic, gets broken into small packages of 3 or 4 kilos that2871could fit in a backpack, and then they get smuggled further2872north. So that's one way. So we want to get them as far away2873from the shores as we can.2874    The value in that is that those billions of dollars that2875you said, sir, that's the cash that fuels the cartel. So all of2876the other nefarious activities that they're doing, human2877smuggling, weapons smuggling, sex trafficking, you name it,2878that cash fuels it. These are poly-crime organizations. They2879don't care what they're doing as long as it makes them money.2880    Mr. Guest. Mr. Miller, kind-of want to dovetail off of that2881a little bit. You say in your written testimony on page 3, you2882talk about the authority to operate the extension of the 122883nautical miles in custom waters. You know, the admiral just2884spoke a little bit about the benefit of interdicting these2885narcotics or those individuals who are smuggling individuals in2886the country. The greater that you can extend that outside the2887United States border, the more opportunity you are going to2888have to be successful. So want to talk a little bit and ask you2889to please speak on that, about the importance of that extension2890to the 12 nautical miles.2891    Mr. Miller. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you for your support2892in these efforts.2893    Yes, the Customs Waters Bill extending customs waters from289412 to 24 nautical miles, it modernizes customs law with the2895speed of vessels these days, increases the area that we could2896potentially patrol where we make interdictions and save lives.2897We've drafted this legislation in collaboration with the Coast2898Guard. It gives us interdiction parity at sea so we may better2899assist each other.2900    Mr. Guest. If Congress were to grant you that authority,2901would that make our community safer by the fact that you would2902be able to have an expanded area in which you have law2903enforcement, that authority?2904    Mr. Miller. Thank you, Chairman. Yes, it would. It would2905increase our interdictions. Like the admiral said, identifying2906and interdicting these narcotics loads before they get closer2907to shore and break up into smaller loads. Also with human2908trafficking as well, the farther out we can identify these2909before they get close to highly-congested areas is easier to2910interdict.2911    Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe I am out of2912time, so I yield back.2913    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Chairman Guest.2914    I now recognize the Ranking Member of the Border Security2915and Enforcement, the gentlewoman from Illinois, Mrs. Ramirez.2916    Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you, Chairman.2917    Mr. Harris, you represent ICE's Homeland Security2918Investigations as the assistant director for countering2919transnational organized crime, correct?2920    Mr. Harris. That is correct.2921    Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you. Mr. Harris, do you assess that2922Tren de Aragua is engaged in transnational organized crime? Yes2923or no?2924    Mr. Harris. Yes.2925    Mrs. Ramirez. Mr. Harris, is HSI responsible for2926investigating Tren de Aragua, which includes collecting and2927providing intelligence about who is and is not a gang member2928for ICE enforcement and removal operations?2929    Mr. Harris. Yes, we do investigate Tren de Aragua.2930    Mrs. Ramirez. OK. Yes or no, are the tattoos part of that2931assessment?2932    Mr. Harris. It can be.2933    Mrs. Ramirez. OK. So I want to ask you a few questions.2934These are some real-life examples. If someone has a tattoo with2935hands praying, are they a gang member? Yes or no?2936    Mr. Harris. I have to know more about that----2937    Mrs. Ramirez. OK.2938    Mr. Harris [continuing]. Than just a tattoo.2939    Mrs. Ramirez. So let me ask you then another question. What2940about someone with an autism awareness tattoo? Are they a gang2941member?2942    Mr. Harris. I would have to know more about the situation.2943    Mrs. Ramirez. I would also agree with that. So let me ask2944you a question. What about a crown tattoo? Yes or no? A crown2945with a soccer ball.2946    Mr. Harris. Same thing. I would not--have to know more2947about the situation.2948    Mrs. Ramirez. Mr. Harris, I am going to ask you again for2949the record here, what about a tattoo across their chest2950perhaps?2951    Mr. Harris. I'd have to know more about the situation.2952    Mrs. Ramirez. Our Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, OK.2953Mr. Harris, are you aware of any instances in which relying on2954tattoos has resulted in wrongful ICE arrest or deportations?2955Are you aware?2956    Mr. Harris. I oversee transnational organized crime. As far2957as deportations or removals----2958    Mrs. Ramirez. You are not aware?2959    Mr. Harris [continuing]. I'm not.2960    Mrs. Ramirez. Well, thank you, Mr. Harris. Well, according2961to several resources, including on occasion, the administration2962has demonstrated that they have not done enough research and2963investigation. In addition to Andry Hernandez Romero's wrong2964gang tattoos, they said, of his parents name with crowns, Neri2965Alvarado Borges had a colorful tattoo of an autism awareness2966ribbon for his 15-year-old brother. Jerce Reyes Barrios had a2967tattoo of a soccer ball with a crown, a tribute to the logo of2968his favorite soccer team, Rio Madrid from Spain. Like them,2969there were so many more. I just showed you a number of them.2970    DHS has wrongfully detained and deported immigrants and2971asylum seekers, all based on an arbitrary point system that DHS2972has created. They call it the Alien Enemy Validation Guide.2973Having a tattoo accounted for 4 points of the 8 needed deemed2974deportable. Their point system reflects a long legacy of using2975arbitrary criteria of predefined characteristics to be profile,2976criminalize, marginalize, and punish.2977    The HS tattoo system reflects the same racist, arbitrary,2978ignorant activities of this administration's forbearers. We2979make court decisions about the freedom of Black people based on2980hair. In Hudgins v. Wright, hair was determined to reveal Black2981identity more than skin color. We targeted children in2982indigenous communities who wore Native cultural attire and sent2983them to boarding schools. We said anyone with long hair in the29841960's was a radical and a communist. We identified gang2985members using baggy clothes, specific color combinations, and2986certain hat positioning in the 1990's.2987    You see over and over again, the Government has proven that2988it can't be trusted with expeditious systems of justice based2989on arbitrary criteria defined by bigoted assumptions about2990people. Each of these arbitrary systems end up reflecting the2991worst of our biases. That is the point this administration may2992revel in, but I for one, am not comfortable with sloppy,2993radicalized biases condemning people to a life in CECOT.2994    You see, we can have the Constitutional tool to do better.2995It is called due process. It is actually the only way to ensure2996that we minimize administrative errors and that arbitrary2997characteristics and bigoted assumptions do not ruin people's2998lives. It is why it is so important that when we are having2999these conversations in this committee that we understand that3000what we use to determine who we deport, who we don't, why we3001violate due process, when we violate due process, that it has3002real-life consequences and that our constituents, our children3003are watching.3004    The idea that they deported parents at a kindergarten3005graduation this past week is unconscionable. I want to make3006sure that I remind people of that.3007    With that, Chairman, I yield back.3008    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you to the Ranking Member.3009    I now recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane, for30105 minutes.3011    Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.3012    I want to thank the panelists for coming today. I know you3013guys came here to testify about maritime activities in U.S.3014waters. I also want to apologize to you guys for the rants you3015are hearing from my colleagues about anything but what you guys3016came here to testify. I also want to point out the fact that3017the hypocrisy and the insanity coming from my colleagues on the3018other side of the aisle who created this problem when it comes3019to the border invasion and now they are kicking and screaming3020that the Trump administration is actually trying to clean it3021up.3022    So now back to what we are here to talk about. Rear Admiral3023Chamie, last year, the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted a narco3024submarine in the Caribbean sea, seizing over 1,200 pounds of3025cocaine valued at more than 54 million. This semi-submersible3026vessel designed to evade detection is a stark reminder of the3027emergent sophisticated methods employed by drug cartels to3028infiltrate our border. My question to you, sir, is how many of3029these narco submarines has the Coast Guard encountered in the3030last 5 years?3031    Admiral Chamie. Good morning, Congressman. I'll have to get3032back to you on the exact number, but as you said, it is common.3033The cartels, the transnational criminal organizations, they get3034more sophisticated in the ways that they will try to smuggle3035drugs. So they use a variety of vessels, and one of those, as3036you said, is to use a submarine.3037    Mr. Crane. Are they buying these submarines from other3038foreign states? Are they making them on their own? Do you have3039any intelligence on that?3040    Admiral Chamie. They typically build them themselves on3041land and then push them into the water.3042    Mr. Crane. OK. Admiral, have you seen the cartels utilizing3043drones, either subsurface or aerial drones, out at sea?3044    Admiral Chamie. I have not seen them myself, but we are3045aware that the transnational criminal organizations do operate3046drones, and it also presents a threat to our crews at the land3047border.3048    Mr. Crane. Admiral, what new technologies, unmanned3049underwater vehicles, sonar nets, or satellite tracking are3050being deployed to detect these types of narco submarines before3051they make it to our shores?3052    Admiral Chamie. So we're using a couple different types of3053technologies right now. One of them is an unmanned aircraft3054that we fly off our National Security cutter. We've been using3055the ScanEagle for some time. We're still operating that. Then3056we're starting to field a new vertical lift system called the3057V-BAT. What that enables us to do is get that up in the air for3058anywhere from 12 to 18 hours longer than we could typically fly3059a manned aircraft. These aircraft have sensors that provide us3060an increased ability to be able to detect what's on the water.3061    Mr. Crane. Thank you. Mr. Miller, in your opening3062testimony, you talked about the increase in maritime3063interdictions. Do you believe what you are seeing with the3064increase in maritime interdiction is due to the adaptation of3065smuggling routes by the cartels to circumvent the work that3066this administration has done to secure our Southern Border?3067    Mr. Miller. Thank you, Congressman. Yes, I do. We've3068certainly seen that in the Southern California AOR, where we've3069seen the biggest surge in maritime migrant smuggling activity.3070We suspect that's primarily due to the difficulty to be3071smuggled across the land border.3072    Mr. Crane. OK, thank you. My next question is for the3073gentleman in uniform today. Have your organizations removed all3074DEI from training? I will start with you, Admiral.3075    Admiral Chamie. Yes, sir. We are in full compliance with3076the President's Executive Orders.3077    Mr. Crane. Mr. Miller.3078    Mr. Miller. Yes, to my knowledge, Congressman.3079    Mr. Crane. Is anyone in your organization that you are3080aware of in violation of President Trump's Executive Order on3081eliminating DEI?3082    Mr. Miller. Not that I'm aware of, Congressman.3083    Mr. Crane. Thank you. Ms. MacLeod, I want to go to you real3084quick. Your recent GAO report released on May 14 highlighted3085the Coast Guard's loss of more enlisted service members than it3086recruited from fiscal years 2019 to 2023, leading to a3087shortfall of approximately 2,600 enlisted personnel in fiscal3088year 2024. In your reporting, ma'am, and investigation, what3089was the major cause of the loss of enlisted sailors within the3090Coast Guard?3091    Ms. MacLeod. We found a number of reasons, some of them3092having to do with work force challenges that the Coast Guard3093faces, such as the frequent moves, living in remote or in3094vacation areas that can be very high-cost, access to health3095care, you know, challenges with the missions, a range of3096reasons.3097    Mr. Crane. Thank you. I yield back.3098    Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman yields back.3099    I recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter.3100    Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our3101witnesses today.3102    I want to just build on a little bit what my dear friend3103Mr. Crane mentioned. Just real rapid response, real quickly. Do3104any of you feel that diversity has hurt your operations?3105Starting on the far end, sir.3106    Mr. Miller. Thank you, Congressman.3107    Mr. Carter. Just a yes or no. Has diversity hurt your3108operations?3109    Mr. Miller. No, Congressman.3110    Mr. Carter. Thank you. Admiral.3111    Admiral Chamie. We're very proud of our diverse work force,3112sir.3113    Mr. Carter. Thank you.3114    Mr. Harris. I second that. Very proud of our work.3115    Mr. Carter. Ms. MacLeod.3116    Ms. MacLeod. We also are very proud of our diverse work3117force at GAO.3118    Mr. Carter. Thank you. So I just find it difficult when my3119colleagues on the other side of the aisle somehow demonize the3120word ``diversity'' as if it is a bad word, as if there is3121something wrong with having diversity, equity, or inclusion and3122creating a broad swath of opportunities for individuals of3123varied backgrounds. So I just wanted to put that the record3124that we have to stop demonizing diversity as if it is some kind3125of a bad word.3126    As a representative from New Orleans region, an area3127uniquely vulnerable to natural disasters and maritime3128disruptions, I want to stress how essential the Coast Guard is3129to our region's safety and economic strength. Rear Admiral, I3130want to personally thank you and the incredible work that the3131Coast Guard does in Louisiana, specifically. After Ida, you3132guys were instrumental. I can't say thank you enough for the3133incredible work of the men and women who were Johnny on the3134spot, who responded to the issues in the New Orleans region in3135the Louisiana region. So let me take this opportunity to say3136thank you to all of you for the incredible work that you do. We3137may not always agree on every single aspect of our discussions,3138but please know that the work that you do is appreciated.3139    The Mississippi River moves more than 500 million tons of3140cargo annually, supporting thousands of jobs and billions in3141economic activity. The Coast Guard ensures that this trade can3142flow safely and securely. From maintaining aids to navigation3143to responding to emergencies and inspecting vessels, the work3144maintains this engine of American commerce. A delay in3145reopening the river after a storm doesn't just affect3146Louisiana. It raises the prices and disrupts supply chains3147nationally.3148    In addition to relying on the Coast Guard for hurricane3149response and maintaining maritime commerce, the Coast Guard3150helps counter illegal, underreported, and underregulated3151fishing. Illegal international fishing undercuts U.S.3152fishermen, flooding the market with cheaper, untraceable, often3153unhealthy, sometimes through human trafficking and slave labor,3154undercutting our opportunities to provide resources to the3155world as our fisheries are the flow for the rest of the world.3156That is why we must be cautious about policies that shift or3157pull Coast Guard away from these core missions. Diverting3158personnel to other missions, this becomes a real issue.3159    Rear Admiral Adam Chamie, could you share with me how often3160do you use the NOAA forecasters to predict and to address3161storms that are coming or inclement weather on people that you3162may be out to save?3163    Admiral Chamie. Thank you, Congressman, and thanks for the3164kind words about our crews. We take great pride in responding3165to the hurricanes and being some of the first on scene.3166    So we partner with--across the interagency and across the3167Government to get our weather information. We don't get it from3168just one singular source. We monitor. We just started last week3169and we'll continue into the fall, till the end of hurricane3170season, to track storms when they first start forming close to3171Africa and in the South Caribbean, and make sure we're ready3172when they make landfall.3173    Mr. Carter. If we don't have an NOAA, I understand that3174there are multiple outlets that are used, how does that impact3175you?3176    Admiral Chamie. Sir, we certainly find value in working3177with NOAA. I would just say that we'll continue to do the best3178we can.3179    Mr. Carter. That is fair. Got it. We should always endeavor3180to give you more resources, not fewer.3181    Ms. MacLeod, according to GAO's research, what impacts can3182we expect the diversion of Coast Guard resources have on its3183efforts to affect hurricane response, countering illegal,3184underreported, and unregulated fishing? We are now in the3185middle of hurricane season, a time that arguably we should be3186giving you all the resources to protect life, property, and3187assets of the Federal Government, and most importantly of those3188most vulnerable people. I know that I am over. Can you quickly3189just share with us an answer to that?3190    Ms. MacLeod. The Coast Guard uses its assets and people for3191multiple missions, so any focus that they're shifting to would3192take away from other priorities.3193    Mr. Carter. Any mission----3194    Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman's time has expired.3195    Mr. Carter [continuing]. Takes away from the priorities of3196the Coast Guard.3197    Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman's time has expired.3198    Mr. Carter. My time has expired. Thank you very much.3199    Mr. Gimenez. I now recognize the gentlewoman from South3200Carolina, Mrs. Biggs.3201    Mrs. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our3202witnesses for being here today. I would just like to start off3203personally thanking each of you for your role and your3204dedication to your jobs and your duty.3205    My first question is for Mr. Harris. What impact do3206sanctuary jurisdictions have on maritime import security? Do3207you feel that cracking down and enforcing the law on sanctuary3208jurisdictions would help secure our land as well as our3209maritime borders?3210    Mr. Harris. Well, HSI investigative entity, we enforce any3211violations of U.S. customs laws and U.S. immigration laws. The,3212you know, the border, the sanctuary cities, we haven't seen,3213you know, from HSI--well, from a criminal investigator point of3214view, we haven't really seen any issues in what we're doing on3215our job. We have seen that on other parts of ICE enforcement3216removal operations, they're having some issues with enforcing3217some of their laws and in different jurisdictions.3218    Mrs. Biggs. OK, thank you. So given that, and this question3219is also for you, given that an estimated 80 percent of fentanyl3220seized at the U.S. ports of entry between fiscal years 2019 and32212024 was trafficked by U.S. citizens, and considering President3222Trump's recent designation of certain cartels as foreign3223terrorist organizations, what concrete actions are being3224implemented against those found to be aiding, abetting, or3225directly working for these terrorist organizations?3226    Mr. Harris. It's the same thing that we've always done as3227far as investigating people or threats. You know, I said we3228investigate violations of U.S. customs law and U.S. immigration3229law, and we go after those people. Whether we interdict3230shipments along with our partners, we trace funds, you know, we3231trace illicit proceeds that these criminal organizations or3232these people acquire from contraband, we do that, and we all--3233you know, we arrest them and prosecute them. So we do exactly3234what we've always done.3235    Mrs. Biggs. Thank you so much, Mr. Harris.3236    As a proud member of Border Security and Enforcement and3237Transportation and Maritime Security Subcommittees, I have seen3238first-hand the absolute necessity of fully equipping our3239Federal agencies with every tool that they need to secure our3240Nation. That is why I am introducing 2 vital pieces of3241legislation that directly confront the rampant involvement of3242U.S. citizens in cartel drug trafficking and the severe3243national security threats posed by radical sanctuary cities.3244    My first bill, the Mobilizing Against Sanctuary Cities Act,3245it is simple. No Federal taxpayer dollars will flow to3246jurisdictions that refuse to uphold American law. This empowers3247the Trump administration to restore law and order in places3248that have actively undermined our immigration system for3249decades. The recent events in Los Angeles are a perfect example3250of why we can't wait any longer. We have seen in real time the3251chaos that results when cities refuse to cooperate with Federal3252immigration enforcement.3253    We must also directly target the individuals who actively3254conspire with these cartels and terrorist groups. That is why I3255am also introducing the No Passport for Terrorists and3256Traffickers Act. It is critical legislation which will3257automatically revoke the passport of individuals found to be3258providing material support to these designated foreign3259terrorist organizations. By denying these individuals the3260ability to travel internationally, we strike a direct blow at3261their operational capacity and send an unmistakable message: if3262you choose to conspire with those who poison our Nation and3263threaten our security, you will lose the travel privileges of3264American citizenship.3265    This isn't just about policy debates. It is about the3266safety and security of everyday Americans, like in the Third3267District of South Carolina that I represent. This is why we3268can't wait any longer. I urge every one of my colleagues,3269anyone who believes in American sovereignty and the rule of3270law, to sponsor these vital bills. Let's stand united and send3271a clear message. We will put America first and we will secure3272our Nation.3273    With that, I yield back.3274    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you to the gentlewoman from South3275Carolina.3276    I now recognize the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Johnson.3277    Ms. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Over the past 53278months, we have seen high school graduates, doctors, children,3279and U.S. citizens detained and deported. These mass deportation3280efforts in the name of making America safe is only instilling3281fear and causing confusion and chaos for our local law3282enforcement, ultimately putting our communities at risk for3283greater harm. While the Trump administration is using valuable3284resources for your taxpayer dollars to make unlawful and3285unnecessary arrests, we have seen no serious effort to actually3286address our Nation's border crisis or the rising threats from3287our adversaries.3288    If the Trump administration was serious about cracking down3289on the cartels and protecting our border, they wouldn't be3290cutting $495 million in funding and firing nearly 30 percent of3291the employees at CISA and our cybersecurity work force. They3292wouldn't be using resources from our U.S. Coast Guard to assist3293with their deportation efforts as our Coast Guard faces a lack3294of funding, overused aircrafts, where Acting Commandant Admiral3295Kevin Lunday openly stated, even though we can operate aircraft3296to the level we have, we should not be. We should be investing3297in new aircraft for the Coast Guard. They wouldn't be wasting3298time renaming the Gulf of Mexico and they wouldn't be deploying3299the U.S. military on U.S. citizens.3300    If they were serious about the real border crisis, they3301would be going after gun dealers in States like Texas and3302Arizona that account for almost 50 percent of international3303firearms trafficking involving the cartels. There seems to be a3304lot of discussion, very concerned about the cartels, lots of3305messaging about that, but there is actually no real effort3306being done to actually rein them in. They wouldn't be calling3307to cut 1.2 billion to ATF that would terminate agents who have3308to work undercover in the gun trafficking rings connected to3309the cartel. They would be strengthening our relationships with3310our allies and not threatening trade wars, and would be3311providing the resources needed for agencies to execute their3312mission.3313    President Trump said he was going after migrant criminals,3314illegal monsters, killers, and gang members. But yet we are3315wasting resources terrorizing communities by showing up masked3316at elementary school graduation ceremonies, work, and court3317hearings where people are presenting themselves to the3318immigration system to follow the rules, to go get their3319hearing, to have the right process. They are going to the3320courts of law. They are supposed to be safe places. Instead3321they are turning these sacred spaces into spaces of terror. It3322is absolutely outrageous.3323    Mr. Harris, we have seen a drastic increase of ICE arrests3324at court hearings. I am a lawyer. I value the sanctity of the3325courtroom and people go to attend an immigration hearing and3326they are presenting themselves to go through the process3327legally. I have continued to voice my significant concerns over3328how ICE agents present themselves in the public. But this3329administration is content with ignoring the concerns of3330Congress and the American people.3331    I recently asked Secretary Noem on this issue when she came3332in front of this very committee. Since that time, we have3333continued to see ICE agents dressed in plain clothes, wearing3334masks regularly, and not properly identified. When you are3335sitting on a street and some masked man jumps out of a car and3336isn't properly identified as law enforcement and comes running3337to you, that is not OK to me.3338    My question to you, sir, is it OK with you and what are you3339going to do about it?3340    Mr. Harris. Well, thank you for the question. We enforce,3341you know, any violation of U.S. immigration and customs laws.3342As far as the employees doing that at court hearings, I'm not3343of--you know, I know that it happens or it has happened. I'm3344not aware of the specific details of any of those matters. I3345would have to know more about that.3346    Ms. Johnson. Well, it is all over the news. Every time in3347Texas, just even in Dallas a couple weeks ago, there were like334815 people arrested at the immigration court. People who were3349going through the process legally, had filed the application,3350had an immigration hearing, were following the law, were not,3351you know, abject, horrible, dangerous criminals. These are3352people who are working, who are working in grocery stores, who3353are working in farms, who are working in gas stations, who are3354working in hotels, who are doing their part to contribute to3355our economy, and who are showing up for their immigration3356hearing, as they are required to do, and then being tackled in3357the hallway by unidentified agents who are not properly marked3358as law enforcement. That is within your agency's jurisdiction.3359    I want to know, this has been widely reported, what are3360y'all doing to stop that?3361    Mr. Harris. Again, I don't know the facts of that matter or3362the matters at the court hearing, so I can't speak general--or3363speak specifically on what's going on. But I will say with3364facial coverings and markings, they should have markings on.3365Facial covers, I believe, are reasonable right now for what's3366going on. The assaults that's taking place, the doxing that's3367taking place, that's a significant rise. The threats to family3368members, to employees, to loved ones. You know, they have to do3369that for officer safety reasons. Assaults are 400 percent--have3370increased 400 percent this year because of what's going on.3371    Mr. Gimenez. The gentlewoman's time has expired.3372    I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony3373and the Members for their questions, especially the Chairman of3374the Border Security and Enforcement Subcommittee, Mr. Guest,3375and the Ranking Member Ramirez.3376    The Members of the subcommittees may have some additional3377questions for the witnesses, and we would ask the witnesses to3378respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee rule VII(E),3379the hearing record will be open for 10 days.3380    Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.3381    [Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the subcommittees were3382adjourned.]33833384                                 [all]