“Beijing’s Air, Space, and Maritime Surveillance from Cuba: A Growing Threat to the Homeland”

1[House Hearing, 119 Congress]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34            BEIJING'S AIR, SPACE, AND MARITIME SURVEIL-5             LANCE FROM CUBA: A GROWING THREAT TO THE HOMELAND67=======================================================================89                                HEARING1011                               before the1213                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON14                  TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY1516                                 of the1718                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY19                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES2021                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2223                             FIRST SESSION2425                               __________2627                              MAY 6, 20252829                               __________3031                           Serial No. 119-133233                               __________3435       Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security3637[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]3839        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov4041                               __________4243                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE4461-305 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 20254546-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------4748                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY4950                 Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman51Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice       Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,52    Chair                                Ranking Member53Clay Higgins, Louisiana              Eric Swalwell, California54Michael Guest, Mississippi           J. Luis Correa, California55Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida           Shri Thanedar, Michigan56August Pfluger, Texas                Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island57Andrew R. Garbarino, New York        Daniel S. Goldman, New York58Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois59Tony Gonzales, Texas                 Timothy M. Kennedy, New York60Morgan Luttrell, Texas               LaMonica McIver, New Jersey61Dale W. Strong, Alabama              Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking62Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma                  Member63Elijah Crane, Arizona                Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico64Andrew Ogles, Tennessee              Nellie Pou, New Jersey65Sheri Biggs, South Carolina          Troy A. Carter, Louisiana66Gabe Evans, Colorado                 Robert Garcia, California67Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania         Vacancy68Brad Knott, North Carolina69                    Eric Heighberger, Staff Director70                  Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director71                       Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk72                                 ------7374          SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY7576                  Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida, Chairman77Andrew R. Garbarino, New York        LaMonica McIver, New Jersey,78Elijah Crane, Arizona                    Ranking Member79Sheri Biggs, South Carolina          Timothy M. Kennedy, New York80Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex     Troy A. Carter, Louisiana81    officio)                         Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi82                                         (ex officio)83             Roland Hernandez, Subcommittee Staff Director84           Alex Marston, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director8586                            C O N T E N T S8788                              ----------89                                                                   Page9091                               Statements9293The Honorable Carlos A. Gimenez, a Representative in Congress94  From the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on95  Transportation and Maritime Security:96  Oral Statement.................................................     197  Prepared Statement.............................................     398The Honorable LaMonica McIver, a Representative in Congress From99  the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on100  Transportation and Maritime Security:101  Oral Statement.................................................     3102  Prepared Statement.............................................     5103The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress104  From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on105  Homeland Security:106  Prepared Statement.............................................     5107108                               Witnesses109110Dr. Ryan C. Berg, Director, Americas Program, Center for111  Strategic and International Studies:112  Oral Statement.................................................     7113  Prepared Statement.............................................     9114Mr. Andres Martinez-Fernandez, Senior Policy Analyst, Latin115  America, Allison Center for National Security:116  Oral Statement.................................................    16117  Prepared Statement.............................................    18118Mr. Leland Lazarus, Associate Director, National Security119  Program, Gordon Institute for Public Policy, Florida120  International University:121  Oral Statement.................................................    21122  Prepared Statement.............................................    23123124                             For the Record125126The Honorable Elijah Crane, a Representative in Congress From the127  State of Arizona:128  Article, Florida Center for Government Accountability..........    37129130 BEIJING'S AIR, SPACE, AND MARITIME SURVEILLANCE FROM CUBA: A GROWING131                         THREAT TO THE HOMELAND132133                              ----------134135                          Tuesday, May 6, 2025136137             U.S. House of Representatives,138                    Committee on Homeland Security,139                        Subcommittee on Transportation and140                                         Maritime Security,141                                                    Washington, DC.142    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in143room 310, Cannon House Office building, Hon. Carlos A. Gimenez144(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.145    Present: Representatives Gimenez, Garbarino, Crane, Biggs,146McIver, Kennedy, and Carter.147    Mr. Gimenez. The Committee on Homeland Security148Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security will come149to order.150    Without objection, the Chair may declare the subcommittee151in recess at any point. Today's hearing continues the important152oversight work we began in February by taking a closer look at153the Chinese Communist Party's growing footprint in Cuba and154implications for U.S. homeland security.155    But Beijing wrapping up its economic military and156intelligence operations just 90 miles from our coastline, this157is no longer a distant challenge. It is an immediate concern158for the security of the American people. The United States must159urgently understand the full extent of this threat, ensure that160the Department of Homeland Security and its interagency161partners are equipped to address it and take a hard look at our162broader strategic partner throughout the Caribbean and Western163Hemisphere.164    I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for an opening165statement. Good morning, today's subcommittee convenes to166examine an alarming threat developing just 90 miles off our167coast. Mounting evidence suggests that the Chinese Communist168Party is expanding its strategic partnership with a169totalitarian communist regime in Cuba to build advance170surveillance infrastructure capable of targeting the United171States. This collaboration represents one of the most brazen172intelligence operations ever attempted near the American173mainland. And places our military operations, commercial174activity, and communications squarely the in the crosshairs of175a hostile foreign power.176    Recent satellite imagery and open-source analysis suggests177the presence of several Chinese-funded signals and intelligence178facilities across Cuba. The possibility that these sites are179capable of monitoring U.S. military operations, commercial180shipping, space launches, and sensitive communications is181deeply troubling.182    The southeastern United States is home to some of the most183critical assets in our Nation's infrastructure. From the space184launch center at Cape Canaveral to the headquarters of U.S.185Southern Command in Miami, this region plays a critical role in186our defense posture.187    This region includes my own district, which has long been188on the front lines of threats emerging from the Cuban regime.189If the Chinese government is in fact leveraging a growing190partnership with Cuba to collect intelligence on our191activities, that is a threat that we can no longer ignore.192    Cuba's government has a long history of working with193foreign adversaries to undermine the United States. What we are194potentially witnessing today is a new and dangerous phase of195that cooperation that is fueled by Havana's economic196desperation and Beijing's strategic ambition.197    The Cuban regime remains a state sponsor of terrorism,198harbors fugitives from the U.S. justice system and relentlessly199suppress the rights of its own people. Its growing reliance on200foreign authoritarian powers like China only adds to the201danger.202    Over the past several months, I've taken steps to raise203alarms about the malign activities of the communist government204of Cuba. In March, I sent a letter to the Department of205Homeland Security requesting an investigation into individuals206in the United States suspected of links to Cuban intelligence207and the Communist Party.208    These networks have long operated on U.S. soil and may now209be intersecting with China's activities in the region. Shortly210after, in April I sent a letter to the Department of Treasury211calling for full suspension of U.S.-Cuba travel and212remittances, with appropriate humanitarian exceptions. It213should not be funding a regime that turns around and opens its214doors it our greatest adversaries. If reports of rising Chinese215activity in Cuba are accurate, and it is no longer just a216diplomatic issue, it is a direct security risk to the American217people.218    This hearing is the first step in understanding the scope219of this threat. Today our witnesses will help us assess the220potential scale of the threat and what measures the Federal221Government should take to stay ahead of it. We need to be222clear-eyed about the risk and both swift and unified in our223responses.224    The United States cannot afford to overlook the possibility225that a hostile foreign power is working hand-in-hand with a226Communist dictatorship in Cuba to employ advanced surveillance227capabilities on our door step. It is our responsibility to228ensure that the homeland remains secure and not just from what229we can see, but from what may be gathering just out of sight.230    I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before the231subcommittee. I look forward to a productive discussion on how232the United States can counter the Chinese Communist Party and233their suspected surveillance efforts in Cuba and prevent our234adversaries from gaining a strategic foothold so close to our235homeland.236    [The statement of Chairman Gimenez follows:]237                Statement of Chairman Carlos A. Gimenez238                              May 6, 2025239    Good morning. Today, the subcommittee convenes to examine an240alarming threat developing just 90 miles off our coast. Mounting241evidence suggests that the Chinese Communist Party is expanding its242strategic partnership with the totalitarian communist regime in Cuba to243build advanced surveillance infrastructure capable of targeting the244United States.245    This collaboration represents one of the most brazen intelligence246operations ever attempted near the American mainland, and places our247military operations, commercial activity, and communications squarely248in the crosshairs of a hostile foreign power.249    Recent satellite imagery and open-source analysis suggest the250presence of several Chinese-funded signals intelligence facilities251across Cuba. The possibility that these sites are capable of monitoring252U.S. military operations, commercial shipping, space launches, and253sensitive communications is deeply troubling.254    The southeastern United States is home to some of the most critical255assets in our Nation's security infrastructure. From the space launch256center at Cape Canaveral, to the headquarters of U.S. Southern Command257in Miami, this region plays a critical role in our defense posture.258    This region includes my own district, which has long been on the259front lines of threats emerging from the Cuban regime. If the Chinese260government is in fact leveraging a growing partnership with Cuba to261collect intelligence on our activities, that is a threat we cannot262ignore.263    Cuba's government has a long history of working with foreign264adversaries to undermine the United States. What we are potentially265witnessing today is a new and dangerous phase of that cooperation that266is fueled by Havana's economic desperation and Beijing's strategic267ambition.268    The Cuban regime remains a state sponsor of terrorism, harbors269fugitives from the U.S. justice system, and relentlessly suppresses the270rights of its own people. Its growing reliance on foreign authoritarian271powers like China only adds to the danger.272    Over the past several months, I have taken steps to raise alarms273about the malign activities of the Communist government of Cuba. In274March, I sent a letter to the Department of Homeland Security275requesting an investigation into individuals in the United States276suspected of links to Cuban intelligence and the Communist Party. These277networks have long operated on U.S. soil and may now be intersecting278with China's activities in the region.279    Shortly after, in early April, I sent a letter to the Department of280the Treasury calling for a full suspension of U.S.-Cuba travel and281remittances, with appropriate humanitarian exceptions. We should not be282funding a regime that turns around and opens its doors to our greatest283adversaries. If reports of rising Chinese activity in Cuba are284accurate, then this is no longer just a diplomatic issue. It is a285direct security risk to the American people.286    This hearing is the first step in understanding the scope of this287threat. Today, our witnesses will help us assess the potential scale of288the threat and what measures the Federal Government should take to stay289ahead of it. We need to be clear-eyed about the risks, and both swift290and unified in our response.291    The United States cannot afford to overlook the possibility that a292hostile foreign power is working hand-in-hand with a communist293dictatorship in Cuba to employ advanced surveillance capabilities on294our doorstep. It is our responsibility to ensure the homeland remains295secure, and not just from what we can see, but from what may be296gathering just out of sight.297    I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee298today.299    I look forward to a productive discussion on how the United States300can counter the Chinese Communist Party's suspected surveillance301efforts in Cuba and prevent our adversaries from gaining a strategic302foothold so close to the homeland.303304    Mr. Gimenez. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the305gentlewoman from New Jersey, Mrs. McIver, for her opening306statement.307    Mrs. McIver. Good morning, thank you, Chair. Thank you to308our witnesses for joining us today.309    The threats posed by the People's Republic of China toward310the United States requires serious attention, as China works311aggressively to gain foothold within the Caribbean.312    In Cuba, China has provided almost $8 billion in monetary313incentives over the past 20 years seeking to strengthen ties314with a country just 90 miles from U.S. shores. China has315invested heavily in Cuba's infrastructure, technology,316communications, and biotechnology. Within the transportation317and maritime sectors, Cuba has benefits from China's318partnership by gaining security equipment for airports,319seaports, and customs facilities. Nuctech, a company, a Chinese320state-owned company has provided inspection technology to be321installed throughout much of Cuba's transportation networks.322    The Department of Homeland Security has assessed that323Nuctech's screening systems likely have deficiencies in324detection capabilities and China--I'm sorry, excuse me. The325Department of Homeland Security has assessed that Nuctech326screening systems likely have deficiencies and detection327capabilities and that China could potentially access the328systems remotely to gather intelligence on shipping manifest329and the passenger information.330    In 2021, Cuba signed on to China's Belt and Road Initiative331and now China is further developing sites in Cuba to collect332intelligence on the United States through monitoring of ship333movement, emails, phone calls, and radio and satellite334transmissions.335    The knowledge of these sites is not new, as U.S. security336officials have confirmed awareness of their existence since at337least the first Trump administration. The United States and our338partners face tremendous challenges in responding to China's339aggression. A solid partnership among the United States and340Latin America allies aids in advancing U.S. interests in the341region and strengthening our national security.342    Unfortunately, the Trump administration is actively343undermining those efforts by suspending foreign aid and344dismantling USAID, the Trump administration has weakened our345national security, allowing China to apply influence within346Latin America without competition.347    In year 2023, USAID dedicated $1.8 billion in funding to348the Western Hemisphere, including funding to support349independent Cuba media organizations providing objective,350uncensored journalism. The dismantling of foreign aid programs351benefits authoritarian governments, like the Cuban regime, by352undermining groups working to advance human rights and353Democratic ideals. To make matters worse, President Trump has354ceded significant power to an unelected billionaire in Elon355Musk, whose deep ties to the PRC are cause for great concern. I356am glad there is bipartisan agreement on the need to counter357China's aggressive activity in Cuba and Latin America.358    That said, I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle359to join me in speaking out about how the Trump administration360is actively undermining efforts to counter the PRC and advance361U.S. interests around the globe.362    Thank you again for our witnesses joining us here today.363With that, I yield back.364    [The statement of Ranking Member McIver follows:]365              Statement of Ranking Member LaMonica McIver366                              May 6, 2025367    The threats posed by the People's Republic of China toward the368United States requires serious attention, as China works aggressively369to gain a foothold within the Caribbean.370    In Cuba, China has provided almost $8 billion dollars in monetary371incentives over the past 20 years, seeking to strengthen ties with a372country just 90 miles from U.S. shores. China has invested heavily in373Cuba's infrastructure, technology, communications, and biotechnology.374Within the transportation and maritime sectors, Cuba has benefited from375China's partnership by gaining security equipment for airports,376seaports, and customs facilities.377    Nuctech Company, a Chinese state-owned subsidiary company, has378provided inspection technology to be installed throughout much of379Cuba's transportation networks. The Department of Homeland Security has380assessed that Nuctech screening systems likely have deficiencies in381detection capabilities and that China could potentially access the382systems remotely to gather intelligence on shipping manifests and383passenger information.384    In 2021, Cuba signed onto China's Belt and Road Initiative, and385now, China is further developing sites in Cuba to collect intelligence386on the United States through monitoring of ship movements, emails,387phone calls, and radio and satellite transmissions.388    The knowledge of these sites is not new, as U.S. security officials389have confirmed awareness of their existence since at least the first390Trump administration. The United States and our partners face391tremendous challenges in responding to China's aggression. A solid392partnership among the United States and Latin American allies aids in393advancing U.S. interests in the region and strengthening our national394security.395    Unfortunately, the Trump administration is actively undermining396those efforts. By suspending foreign aid and dismantling USAID, the397Trump administration has weakened our national security, allowing China398to apply influence within Latin America without competition.399    In fiscal year 2023, USAID dedicated $1.8 billion dollars in400funding to the Western Hemisphere, including funding to support401independent Cuban media organizations providing objective, uncensored402journalism. The dismantling of foreign aid programs benefits403authoritarian governments, like the Cuban regime, by undermining groups404working to advance human rights and democratic ideals.405    To make matters worse, President Trump has ceded significant power406to an unelected billionaire in Elon Musk, whose deep ties with the PRC407are cause for great concern. I am glad there is bipartisan agreement on408the need to counter China's aggressive activities in Cuba and Latin409America.410    I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to join me in411speaking out about how the Trump administration is actively undermining412efforts to counter the PRC and advance U.S. interests around the globe.413414    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you to the Ranking Member.415    Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening416statements may be submitted for the record.417    [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]418             Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson419                              May 6, 2025420    Spy stations established in Cuba with Chinese support have the421potential to collect valuable intelligence on the United States, as422well as our allies in the region. Unfortunately, the Trump423administration's reckless actions and idiotic policies are exacerbating424the challenges posed by China and Cuba.425    In just a short few months, Donald Trump and his Republican minions426have done tremendous damage to the United States' reputation as a427trusted ally and partner. Trump's cuts to foreign aid within Latin428America and across the globe have decimated essential programs aimed at429reducing hunger, corruption, poverty, and inequality. Trump's cuts have430undermined efforts to support U.S. national security and assist non-431governmental organizations that help counter autocratic regimes and432advance democratic values.433    Currently, the Cuban government is undergoing one of its most434severe crises in decades, with increased repression and crackdowns435against political dissent. Under the Biden administration, the U.S.436Agency for International Development provided funding to support437independent media in Cuba, which is essential to pushing for democratic438reforms. Now, the Trump administration has illegally canceled that439funding.440    Under the Biden administration, the ``CHNV'' parole program legally441allowed over 110,000 Cubans to flee their authoritarian government and442seek asylum in the United States. Now, the Trump administration has443tried to terminate that program.444    Cubans who legally migrated to the United States are now445potentially facing orders of deportation and denial of asylum requests,446which will place them in danger. Thankfully, the rule of law has so far447prevailed, as a Federal district court has issued a nationwide448temporary order halting the termination of this program. The Trump449administration should focus on why these migrants are leaving Cuba450instead of blocking them from coming to the United States. Cuba is451facing its worst economic crisis since gaining independence in 1902.452    It is high time for the United States to take a more surgical,453humanitarian approach to relations to Cuba, rather than the Trump454administration's chainsaw tactics of cutting any and all programs that455advance U.S. soft power in the region. The termination of humanitarian456programs and other foreign aid allows China to fill the void through457economic, diplomatic, and potential military support. The PRC is using458Cuba in its geopolitical strategy against the United States and seeking459to make inroads with other Latin American countries as well.460    Trump's tariff wars and foreign policies will cause many461international partners to turn away from the United States and seek the462possibility of a more stable partnership with China. I hope my463colleagues across the aisle will open their eyes and recognize the464Trump administration is placing America last.465466    Mr. Gimenez. I am pleased to hold a distinguished panel of467witnesses before us today on this critical topic. I ask that468our witnesses please rise and raise their right hand.469    [Witnesses sworn.]470    Mr. Gimenez. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have471answered in the affirmative. Thank you and please be seated.472    I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses. Dr.473Ryan Berg is the director of the Americas program and the head474of the future of Venezuela initiative at the Center for475Strategic and International Studies. Dr. Berg specializes in476U.S. Latin America relations, strategic competition, defense477policies, and transnational organized crime. Previously he was478a research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a479visiting fellow at Oxford's changing character of war program.480He holds a doctor of philosophy and master of philosophy in481political science, a master of science in global governance482from Oxford, as well as a bachelor of arts in government and483theology from Georgetown.484    Andres Martinez-Fernandez is the senior policy analyst for485Latin America with the Heritage Foundation's Allison Center for486the National Security. In this role he leads the Heritage487Foundation's work on U.S. policy toward Latin America488conducting research and engaging audiences on topics such as489economic development, foreign aid, transnational organized490crime, and the maligned activities of communist China and other491extra regional actors.492    Before joining Heritage, Andres was a leading analyst at a493leading global market intelligence firm where he advised top494executives from multinational companies on political and495macroeconomic risks in Latin America. He received his master's496degree in Latin American studies in international economics497from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and498his bachelor degree is in history from Florida International499University, a university which I represent.500    Leland Lazarus serves as associate director of national501security at Florida International University's Jack D. Gordon's502Institute for Public Policy. He's an expert on China-Latin503America relations and manages a team of researchers and interns504that collect data analysis on U.S. national security and505governance in Latin America and the Caribbean.506    From 2021 to 2022, Leland served as a special assistant and507speech writer to the commander of U.S. Southern Command. Before508that, Leland was a State Department Foreign Service officer509serving as deputy public affairs officer at the U.S. Embassy510Barbados and Eastern Caribbean. Council officer at the U.S.511counsulate general in Shenyang, China and Pickering fellow at512U.S. Embassy Beijing and at the China desk in the District of513Columbia. Fluent in both Mandarin and Spanish, he holds a514master of arts in U.S.-China foreign policy from the Fletcher515School of Law and Diplomacy and a bachelor of arts in516international relations from Brown University.517    I want to thank each of our distinguished witnesses for518being here today. I now recognize Dr. Berg for 5 minutes to519summarize his opening statements.520521 STATEMENT OF RYAN C. BERG, DIRECTOR, AMERICAS PROGRAM, CENTER522            FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES523524    Mr. Berg. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you525Ranking Member McIver, distinguished Members of the526subcommittee. I am honored to share my views with you on this527important topic this morning.528    Near 90 miles off our shores, the United States' most529formidable 21st Century competitor, the People's Republic of530China, has found fertile soil to deploy its arsenal of531espionage, digital surveillance, and maritime competition. In532many ways, a moribund socialist system in Havana is Beijing's533perfect partner for threatening U.S. homeland, especially as a534response to U.S. posture in the Indo-Pacific.535    Mr. Chairman, I'm going to focus my oral testimony on536China's signals intelligence capabilities, while recognizing537that the relationship between Beijing and Havana runs much538deeper. I know my colleagues on this panel will cover other539aspects of the relationship, maritime telecommunications and so540on. I'm happy of course to discuss in our question period.541    When Soviet influence diminished on the island following542the end of the Cold War, eyes, ears and antennas stayed. In543many ways, China filled the void. On June 8, 2023, the Wall544Street Journal first reported that Cuba hosted secret Chinese545spy bases in return for billions of dollars for the Cuban546regime. That same day, the Biden administration's defense547department denied the Wall Street Journal's reporting,548characterizing the report as quote, ``inaccurate.'' Three days549later however the NSC spokesperson, John Kirby, reversed course550and admitted that China's spy base is in Cuba, but said that551its presence had existed since 2019 out of the first Trump552administration, implying that the Biden admin had inherited553this challenge. Around the same time reports surfaced that554China was pursuing the construction of a military training base555in Cuba. CSIS then published a groundbreaking report called556Secret Signals, encoding China intelligence activities in Cuba.557The CSIS team scoured the island using commercially-available558satellite imagery, identifying 4 likely sites for signals559intelligence collection in that process. This was followed by a560Wall Street Journal exclusive confirming its earlier reporting561on the spy stations.562    CSIS published another updated set of images in December 2,5632024 and has tracked China's progress at these 4 sites.564    As part of this hearing, Mr. Chairman, we are pleased to565release some updated imagery. I think we have a slide show for566you to see. As you can see on this first side, Mr. Chairman,567CSIS has positively identified about 4 specific facilities as568highly likely sites supporting Chinese intelligence operations569targeting the United States. Three of these sites--Bejucal,570Wajay, Calabazar--are located around Havana. The fourth site,571El Salao, is a previously-unreported facility located on the572opposite side of the island, just east of Santiago de Cuba. In573response to reporting on the Cuba-China SIGINT nexus, high-574level Cuban communist officials either outright denied any575relationship or attempted to disarm our criticism with humor.576    To coincide with this hearing, Mr. Chairman, we have some577updated imagery we can show you. Next slide please. After the578publication of our initial reports, construction progress at El579Salao, the site by Santiago de Cuba seems to have ceased,580according to the image captures dated April 18, 2025.581    You can go to the next slide, please. The CDAA site appears582to have been abandoned for the moment, as evidenced by hitherto583well-trimmed and graded areas being taken over by grass.584    On the next slide, the PRC appears to be enhancing its585SIGINT at a previously-identified facility at Bejucal. On the586next slide you can see an antenna field from the original CSIS587image captures. On our last slide, Mr. Chairman, you can see588the latest CSIS image capture shows those antennas have been589removed to make way for a large CDAA site, very similar to the590one that was originally visible at El Salao. The Bejucal591facility is very, very active, as evidenced by multiple image592captures in this process.593    So as you can see, Mr. Chairman, our adversaries are at our594doorstep. I want to use the rest of the time remaining to595mention some brief recommendations for the committee to596consider.597    First, I think a Classified briefing to every Member of598Congress should be given, given the significance of these599developments to U.S. national security.600    Second, the United States should consider strategic601declassification of images in its possession, given that El602Salao appears to have been abandoned after the CSIS publication603of its report. You may reasonably believe that transparency604efforts and public criticism do have the potential to derail605some of the PRC's ambitions.606    Third, develop and articulate red lines. It may be607difficult to displace some of these existing facilities from608the island. The United States should be crystal clear that the609permanent installation of offensive military capabilities in610Cuba, or the basing of PLA combat assets would be seen as a611significant escalation and a red line for the United States. An612inability to deter a SIGINT facility should not be interpreted613by Havana as a green light for China.614    Fourth, I think we need to harden sensitive infrastructure615against SIGINT collection by China. The CISA should spearhead616an effort to review which companies and facilities in the area617are most vulnerable to intelligence-gathering operations.618    Last, Mr. Chairman, I think we need to enlist neighbors and619allies. These facilities do not just snoop on the United620States. CDAAs collect information omnidirectionally, meaning621that other countries in the Caribbean, including those that622Secretary of State Marco Rubio met on his recent successful623trip to the Caribbean, are also implicated.624    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield. I look forward to the625committee's questions.626    [The prepared statement of Mr. Berg follows:]627                   Prepared Statement of Ryan C. Berg628                          Tuesday, May 6, 2025629    Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver, and distinguished Members630of the subcommittee, I am honored to share my views with you on this631important topic. CSIS does not take policy positions, so the views632represented in this testimony are my own and not those of my employer.633In my testimony, I would like to reflect on the People's Republic of634China's historical and burgeoning role in Cuba, the Cuban Communist635Party's repressive tactics and China's role in regime security, as well636as China's use of Cuba as a staging ground for espionage activities637against the United States, including its signals intelligence.638639``In my recent trip to Santiago, I heard reports from several sources640of big military installations under construction in mountains of641Oriente Province.''--Graham Greene, Our Man in Havana.642643                     peering into the united states644    Cuba has long served as a perch for great power rivals to the645United States. Indeed, the memory of those fateful days in October 1962646when the United States and Soviet Union came perilously close to a647nuclear exchange over the latter's stationing of nuclear-tipped648missiles in Cuba has tinged discourse about the island ever since. The649question of Chinese bases in Cuba touches on some of the same650sensitivities--that a rival of the United States might clandestinely651exploit the strategic position of Cuba to build up a military presence652directly under the nose of the United States, to the detriment of the653entire Western Hemisphere's security. A brief history of the PRC's654partnership with Cuba reveals worrying patterns.655    When Soviet missiles left the island, eyes, ears, and antennas656stayed. From bases across the island, Soviet and Cuban intelligence and657military personnel worked together to gather information on the United658States. Of particular note was the Lourdes Signal Intelligence Complex659located near Havana. At its peak, the facility was reportedly home to660an estimated 1,500 operatives and supplied the USSR with 75 percent of661its military intelligence.\1\ But Lourdes was one of many such662facilities, all dedicated to gathering and processing the firehose of663signals coming from the southeastern seaboard of the United States. It664is telling that of the facilities identified and surveyed in CSIS's665analysis, just one, the new Circular Disposed Antenna Array in El666Salao, was not a preexisting signals intelligence (SIGINT) site left667over from the Cold War.668---------------------------------------------------------------------------669    \1\ https://irp.fas.org/congress/1996_hr/s960222d.htm.670---------------------------------------------------------------------------671    After the fall of the Soviet Union, however, Cuba's strategic672importance for Moscow diminished, and finally in 2002, Lourdes was673shuttered as an intelligence facility and converted into the University674of Informatic Sciences.\2\ Along with a decrease in military presence,675the Soviet collapse engendered economic turmoil for Cuba, known as the676``special period,'' where a lack of subsidized fuel and economic aid677brought about shortages of critical goods and near-economic collapse678for the island. By the end of the 1990's, Cuba was desperately seeking679new partners to fill the void its former communist ally had left.680---------------------------------------------------------------------------681    \2\ https://www.uci.cu/en/university/history.682---------------------------------------------------------------------------683    Into this breach stepped, partially, the Chinese Communist Party684(CCP). The CCP and the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) had enjoyed strong685relations since the latter's inception, and as one of the few remaining686communist parties at the turn of the century, fell into China's foreign687policy category of both ``good friend'' and ``good comrade.'' While688Cuba's economic turmoil meant that it had little to offer by way of689trade, its strategic geography remained unrivaled. In February 1999,690China's Minister of Defense, General Chi Haotian, visited Cuba, where691he met with his counterpart, then-Defense Minister Raul Castro.692According to an article in El Nuevo Herald, the 2 reportedly signed an693agreement granting China access to a number of former Soviet listening694stations across the island, including the Bejucal base less than 10695miles from the old Lourdes station.\3\ Coverage also cited a leaked696Federal Communications Commission report claiming China had facilitated697the transfer of jamming equipment to help block signals from Radio698Marti reaching the island.699---------------------------------------------------------------------------700    \3\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-intelligence-footprint-701cuba-new-evidence-and-implications-us-security.702---------------------------------------------------------------------------703    China-Cuba ties have continued to grow apace over the past decades.704In 2005, Raul Castro traveled to China to meet with President Hu705Jintao, and President Xi Jinping toured Cuba in 2014 as part of his706first official trip to Latin America as President of China and General707Secretary of the CCP.\4\ The PCC has been the No. 1 recipient in Latin708America of International Liaison Department Engagements, the CCP's709organ for foreign party-to-party diplomacy, helping further cement ties710between Cuban and Chinese leadership.\5\ In the military domain, China711and Cuba have continued to fortify their ties through high-level712delegations and at times more active measures. Havana was home to a713rare PLAN port call in the Western Hemisphere when 3 warships docked in714November 2015 to commemorate 50 years of China-Cuba relations. As715recently as April 2024, He Weidong, Vice Chairman of China's Central716Military Commission, and Cuban general Victor Rojos Ramos, proclaimed717an ``unbreakable friendship'' between the 2 nations. On January 1,7182025, Cuba officially joined the BRICS as an associate member, a major719boost for Havana as the alliance's efforts to weaken the hold of the720U.S. dollar over the global financial system are a boon to the721embargoed island.\6\722---------------------------------------------------------------------------723    \4\ https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-cuba-spy-sigint/.724    \5\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/exporting-autocracy.725    \6\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-are-latin-american-dictators-726seeking-membership-brics.727---------------------------------------------------------------------------728    Cuba has received an estimated $369 million in development finance729from the PRC, but this pales in comparison to the island's true730financial needs.\7\ Venezuela's collapse has also made Cuba's other731historical partner unable to fill the void. Today, Cuba is in the midst732of its worst economic crisis since the Special Period, registering 30733percent inflation and a 2 percent decline in GDP in 2023. Last fall,734island-wide blackouts underscored the fragility of Cuba's dilapidated735energy infrastructure. Privately, Chinese officials have even736reportedly expressed frustration that the Cuban government has not737introduced more market-oriented reforms to ameliorate its deep economic738woes.\8\ Without much to offer China in terms of trade and raw739materials, Cuba has played one of its only cards: its strategic740location and relationships with senior CCP officials for support as the741regime seeks to weather the present crisis.742---------------------------------------------------------------------------743    \7\ https://thedialog.org/china-latin-america-finance-databases.744    \8\ https://www.ft.com/content/9ca0a495-d5d9-4cc5-acf5-74543f42a9128b4.746---------------------------------------------------------------------------747                    china and cuba's regime security748    In addition to general financial and development support for the749Cuban regime, China has played a critical role in sharing authoritarian750best practices and transplanting those tactics in a phenomenon known as751``authoritarian export'' or ``authoritarian diffusion.'' For instance,752China built the island's telecommunications infrastructure. The primary753providers to Etecsa, Cuba's sole internet provider, are exclusively754Chinese: Huawei, TP-Link, and ZTE.\9\ The Swedish organization Qurium755discovered that Cuba uses Huawei network management software eSight to756help filter web searches.\10\ In doing so, China has built757telecommunications infrastructure capable of surveillance and758repression. This was visible in the July 2021 protests, when the Cuban759regime shut off the internet and telephone services, blocking the760island's protestors from communicating with the outside world. This is761just one example of how China supports the Cuban regime through the762diffusion of authoritarian practices and tools.763---------------------------------------------------------------------------764    \9\ https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/how-china-helps-the-cuban-765regime-stay-afloat-and-shut-down-protests/.766    \10\ https://www.qurium.org/alerts/internet-blocking-in-cuba-767silencing-dissent-in-the-name-of-moral-and-good-manners/.768---------------------------------------------------------------------------769                         strategic battleground770    On June 8, 2023, the Wall Street Journal first reported that Cuba771hosted secret Chinese spy bases in return for billions of dollars for772the Cuban regime.\11\ That same day, the Biden administration's Defense773Department denied the Wall Street Journal's reporting, characterizing774the report as ``inaccurate.''\12\ Three days later, however, National775Security Council spokesperson, John Kirby, reversed course and admitted776to China's spy bases in Cuba, but insisted that its presence had777existed since 2019 under the first Trump administration, implying the778Biden administration had ``inherited'' the challenge.\13\ Around the779same time, reports surfaced that China was pursuing the construction of780a military training base in Cuba.\14\781---------------------------------------------------------------------------782    \11\ https://www.wsj.com/world/cuba-to-host-secret-chinese-spy-783base-focusing-on-u-s-b2fed0e0; see also, https://www.politico.com/news/7842023/06/08/china-spy-on-us-cuba-00100990.785    \12\ https://www.reuters.com/world/pentagon-dismisses-wsj-report-786china-spy-station-cubap-2023-06-08/.787    \13\ https://www.wsj.com/politics/white-house-says-china-has-had-788cuba-spy-base-since-at-least-2019-42145596; see also, https://789www.politico.com/news/2023/06/12/kirby-nsc-china-balloon-cuba-00101575.790    \14\ https://www.wsj.com/politics/beijing-plans-a-new-training-791facility-in-cuba-raising-prospect-of-chinese-troops-on-americas-792doorstep-e17fd5d1?mod=mhp; see also, https://www.politico.com/news/7932023/06/20/china-negotiating-with-havana-about-joint-military-training-794facility-in-cuba-00102636.795---------------------------------------------------------------------------796    Subsequently, CSIS published a groundbreaking report, ``Secret797Signals: Decoding China's Intelligence Activities in Cuba.'' The CSIS798team scoured the island using commercially-available satellite imagery,799identifying 4 likely sites for signals intelligence collection in the800process.\15\ This was followed by a Wall Street Journal exclusive801confirming its earlier reporting on the spy stations.\16\ CSIS802published another updated set of images in December 2024 as it tracked803China's progress at these 4 sites.\17\804---------------------------------------------------------------------------805    \15\ https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-cuba-spy-sigint/.806    \16\ https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/china-cuba-807suspected-spy-bases-da1d6ec9.808    \17\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-intelligence-footprint-809cuba-new-evidence-and-implications-us-security.810---------------------------------------------------------------------------811    Although open-source research and satellite imagery have fueled812speculation about nearly a dozen potential SIGINT sites in Cuba, CSIS813positively identified 4 specific facilities as highly likely sites814supporting Chinese intelligence operations targeting the United States.815Three of these sites--Bejucal, Wajay, and Calabazar--are located around816Havana.\18\ A fourth site, El Salao, is a previously-unreported817facility located on the opposite side of the island, just east of818Santiago de Cuba.\19\ In response to reporting on the Cuba-China SIGINT819nexus, high-level PCC officials either outright denied any connection,820or attempted to disarm criticism with humor (see appendix for the821responses of Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez and President Miguel822Diaz-Canel to CSIS's reports).823---------------------------------------------------------------------------824    \18\ https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-cuba-spy-sigint/.825    \19\ https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-cuba-spy-sigint/.826---------------------------------------------------------------------------827    To coincide with this hearing, CSIS is releasing brand new imagery828updates. First, after the publication of CSIS's initial reports,829construction progress at El Salao appears to have ceased according to830image captures dated April 18, 2025. Furthermore, the CDAA site appears831to be abandoned for the moment, as evidenced by hitherto well-trimmed832and graded areas being taken over by foliage. Second, the PRC appears833to be enhancing its SIGINT at a previously-identified facility near834Havana, Bejucal. On satellite imagery, a new area of the site, some835antennas have been removed to make way for a large CDAA. The facility836is also active, as evidenced by multiple image captures showing dishes837moving positions to different angles and targets. Interestingly, the838Soviets also operated a CDAA not far from this exact spot.839                       motivation and capability840    The CSIS open-source reports have brought unprecedented clarity to841the scope and capabilities of several suspected Chinese SIGINT sites in842Cuba, offering fresh insights into how they may be used to monitor843sensitive military, commercial, and government activity across the844region, but especially in the United States. Given its proximity to845both the wider Caribbean and the southern United States, Cuba holds846significant strategic value for signals intelligence collection in the847region. The United States maintains critical military installations848concentrated in States like Florida and Georgia, so Cuba's location849just 93 miles from the Florida Keys gives adversaries such as China a850prime vantage point to peer into the United States and intercept851sensitive communications.852    Both China and Cuba stand to gain significantly from this853arrangement. Mired in a socialist nightmare, Cuba is currently facing854its worst economic crisis in decades. Presently, the government855presides over a moribund economy, daily power outages, and an exodus of856over 10 percent of the island.\20\ For Cuba, China's financial support857represents an important lifeline. For China, the proximity to the858United States and potential to access critical military and commercial859intelligence strongly incentivizes the PRC to engage in this strategic860arrangement with Cuba. Beyond the intelligence efforts, collaborating861with Cuba in this domain expands China's military and intelligence862footprint across the globe.\21\ By pursuing these objectives in863partnership with Cuba, China also reinforces the presence of a864communist ally in close proximity to the United States.\22\865---------------------------------------------------------------------------866    \20\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-intelligence-footprint-867cuba-new-evidence-and-implications-us-security.868    \21\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-intelligence-footprint-869cuba-new-evidence-and-implications-us-security.870    \22\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-intelligence-footprint-871cuba-new-evidence-and-implications-us-security.872---------------------------------------------------------------------------873    From a capability standpoint, SIGINT plays a pivotal role in874contemporary spy craft and intelligence gathering.\23\ Through the use875of antennas and specialized equipment, actors can configure SIGINT876systems for maximum effectiveness.\24\ As the technology leverages877antennas and gathers signals, distance and geography are essential.878Depending on the objective and scope of the intelligence-gathering879mission, facilities can be configured in various ways to maximize data880collection and operational effectiveness.\25\881---------------------------------------------------------------------------882    \23\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-intelligence-footprint-883cuba-new-evidence-and-implications-us-security.884    \24\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-intelligence-footprint-885cuba-new-evidence-and-implications-us-security.886    \25\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-intelligence-footprint-887cuba-new-evidence-and-implications-us-security.888---------------------------------------------------------------------------889    For optimal success, SIGINT systems rely on the beamforming890technique to ensure the antennas are properly assembled for the mission891efforts. The technique behind beamforming is used to enhance the892effectiveness and precision of antenna arrays.\26\ A single isotropic893antenna radiates energy in all directions, resulting in limited range894and greater vulnerability to interference. With just 2 antennas,895signals can be synchronized to constructively interfere, producing a896stronger, more focused beam. With more antennas, operators can fine-897tune the phase and amplitude of signals for even greater directional898control. When arranged in a grid, these arrays can steer the beam899electronically without physically repositioning the antennas, allowing900for flexible and efficient signals interception.\27\ Because these901antennas are gathering signals, it is imperative that SIGINT operations902are within range of their target, meaning Cuba is an ideal partner for903China's espionage efforts.\28\904---------------------------------------------------------------------------905    \26\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-intelligence-footprint-906cuba-new-evidence-and-implications-us-security.907    \27\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-intelligence-footprint-908cuba-new-evidence-and-implications-us-security.909    \28\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-intelligence-footprint-910cuba-new-evidence-and-implications-us-security.911---------------------------------------------------------------------------912    Due to Cuba's proximity to Florida, these facilities grant China913SIGINT coverage of around 20 key bases and installations on the914peninsula.\29\ The most significant military installations in and915around Florida include Naval Air Station Pensacola, Tyndall Air Force916Base, MacDill Air Force Base, Naval Air Station Key West, King's Bay917Submarine Base, Cape Canaveral, and of course, the United States918Southern Command.\30\919---------------------------------------------------------------------------920    \29\ https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-cuba-spy-sigint/.921    \30\ https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-cuba-spy-sigint/.922---------------------------------------------------------------------------923                         policy recommendations924    Offer Classified Briefing to Every Member of Congress.--This925development is significant enough to national security to justify926briefings for Members of Congress. All Members of Congress should be927able to receive a Classified briefing on the topic of China's SIGINT928operations in Cuba. Importantly, this should be made available to929Members of Congress on an on-going basis, to ensure updates on imagery930are also briefed.931    Consider Selective and Strategic Declassification of Images.--Given932that El Salao appears to have been abandoned since the publication of933CSIS's reports, we may reasonably believe that transparency efforts and934public criticism have the potential to derail China's ambitions. The935United States should consider the strategic declassification of select936images at moments that could derail China's operations and apply select937pressure to these operations.938    Develop and Articulate Red Lines.--Given Cuba's historically939outsized role in U.S. national security calculations and its close940cooperation with U.S. adversaries, ensuring clear communication is of941the utmost importance to reduce potential misperceptions. If the United942States believes China or Cuba to be credibly cooperating to share943intelligence with one another, the United States should make this clear944to both Havana and Beijing. Simultaneously, while it is difficult to945displace existing facilities from the island, the United States should946be crystal clear that the permanent installation of offensive military947capabilities in Cuba (as was reported as a possibility by the Wall948Street Journal around the same time as the original reporting on spy949bases), or the basing of PLA combat assets, would be seen as a950significant escalation and a redline for the United States. Passivity951in the face of SIGINT facilities should not be interpreted by Havana as952a green light to deepen Cuba-China cooperation.953    Harden Sensitive Civilian Infrastructure Against SIGINT.--So long954as China's SIGINT facilities operate in Cuba, the United States cannot955be completely certain that no sensitive information will be obtained by956an adversary. While modern military communications are encrypted and957designed to prevent vital intelligence from leaking, civilian firms may958lack the knowledge, means, or resources to safeguard their own959infrastructure. Additionally, some private entities like SpaceX, which960launch rockets from Cape Canaveral within theoretical range of some of961the equipment observed in the CSIS reports, engage in highly strategic962activities. The Chinese are top competitors of the United States in963space. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency should964spearhead an effort to review which companies operating in range of965Cuban SIGINT sites are most vulnerable to this form of intelligence966gathering and develop a plan to help these firms bolster their967operational security. This could include training, basic encryption, or968financing to help acquire necessary security equipment.969    Enlist Neighbors and Allies.--The presence of SIGINT facilities in970Cuba does not pose a risk to the United States alone. Tools like CDAAs971collect information omnidirectionally, meaning anything within range is972liable to be picked up. Regional allies may be even more vulnerable, as973they lack the same sophisticated encryption and stealth technology as974the United States, possibly allowing Cuba and any of its partners a975window into critical national security functions. As CISA works976domestically with private-sector actors, the State Department should977engage countries like the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, and Jamaica,978to highlight risks and steps these countries can take to reduce their979vulnerability to Cuba's SIGINT facilities.980                           Appendix of Images981public response of the cuban president and foreign minister to initial982                              revelations983[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]984985us military and sensitive installations within range of china's sigint986                                in cuba987[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]988989                 imagery updates from the el salao site990[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]991992                 imagery updates from the bejucal site993[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]994995    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Dr. Berg.996    I recognize Mr. Martinez-Fernandez for 5 minutes to997summarize his opening statement.998999STATEMENT OF ANDRES MARTINEZ-FERNANDEZ, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST,1000      LATIN AMERICA, ALLISON CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY10011002    Mr. Martinez-Fernandez. Thank you, Chairman Gimenez,1003Ranking Member McIver. I appreciate the invitation and1004apologize for my tardiness.1005    My name is Andres Martinez. I run the Latin America1006portfolio at the Heritage Foundation. Since its inception, the1007Cuban dictatorship has repeatedly proven itself to be a willing1008partner and staging ground for anti-American extra-hemispheric1009powers. Today, Havana offers itself as a partner for a new1010patron, the Chinese Communist Party. Reporting by CSIS and1011other organizations have once again unmasked the maligned1012nature of the Beijing-Havana nexus, particularly the growing1013footprint of Chinese intelligence-gathering facilities in Cuba.1014    China's accelerating espionage partnership with Cuba poses1015a major threat for U.S. and hemispheric security, bringing1016together Beijing's resources and technology with Havana's1017troubling capacity to penetrate U.S. agencies and security1018institutions.1019    The growth of China's spying footprint in Cuba is also1020indicative of Beijing's broader maligned presence in the1021Americas. While economic engagement has led the way for China's1022advance in much of Latin America and the Caribbean, Beijing's1023influence has spread quickly into the political, clandestine,1024and the military spheres.1025    China's broader influences also allowed it to expand its1026regional intelligence-gathering capacities beyond Cuba,1027including in Democratic nations. Indeed, Beijing has even1028secured unusually sprawling embassies in the Caribbean such as1029in Antigua, the Bahamas, and beyond with sites that are widely1030considered to be active intelligence centers for China.1031    In Argentina and elsewhere in South America, Beijing has1032also established deep-space monitoring facilities with worrying1033military implications. China's strategic focus around dual-use1034and critical infrastructure in the Americas highlights the1035intrinsic military and security nature of China's hemispheric1036encroachments. Chinese infrastructure projects across Latin1037America and the Caribbean offer Beijing crucial vectors for1038espionage and disruptive operations in and around the United1039States. Control over ports and other infrastructure can even be1040leveraged to impede the movement of U.S. warships, military1041resources, or directly target U.S. assets and supply chains.1042    Beijing's inroads in the Caribbean may be the most1043concerning aspect of its hemispheric encroachment. Geographic1044proximity to the United States and around crucial U.S. maritime1045routes make the Caribbean an outsized strategic importance for1046the United States. China appears to recognize the strategic1047importance, given the relative attention and engagement Beijing1048has given to the region, both economically and politically. As1049with specific islands, Beijing seeks to consolidate its1050influence over strategically important island chains in the1051Caribbean. The end goal of this effort is apparently1052counterbalancing the U.S. presence in Asia and empowering China1053to destabilize the United States through asymmetric means.1054    As Beijing grows increasingly belligerent against Taiwan1055and U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, the United States must1056assume that China will operationalize its presence and1057influence in Latin America and the Caribbean against the United1058States.1059    China's gains in the Caribbean and beyond pose an urgent1060challenge for U.S. national security. The Trump administration1061has clearly moved to confront the hemispheric vulnerablility1062posed by China and its partnership with the communist1063dictatorship in Cuba, among other actors. Confronting these1064threats requires rallying pressure against Beijing and Havana1065while bolstering partnerships with regional democracies across1066economic, political, and security spheres. The United States1067should bolster its security operation in capacities, in1068particular within Latin America and the Caribbean, prioritizing1069initiatives that mitigate risks posed to vital infrastructure1070and other vulnerabilities.1071    At the same time, the United States should leverage its1072under-appreciated territorial presence in the Caribbean. U.S.1073territories, particularly including Puerto Rico can be better1074used to counterbalance Chinese and Cuban maligned activities in1075the Caribbean and across Latin America. Bolstering the U.S.1076Coast Guard presence capacities in Puerto Rico, for example,1077will support U.S. security in the broader Caribbean region amid1078these growing threats.1079    U.S. territories can also be used as force multipliers in1080bolstering broader U.S. economic engagements in Latin America1081and the Caribbean through targeted measures that offset1082regional dependence on China.1083    Thank you very much for the time. I look forward to your1084questions.1085    [The prepared statement of Mr. Martinez-Fernandez follows:]1086            Prepared Statement of Andres Martinez-Fernandez1087                              May 5, 20251088    My name is Andres Martinez-Fernandez. I am the senior policy1089analyst for Latin America at The Heritage Foundation. The views I1090express in this testimony are my own and should not be construed as1091representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation.1092                           havana's hostility1093    Since its inception, the Cuban dictatorship has repeatedly proven1094itself to be a willing partner and staging ground for anti-American,1095extra-hemispheric powers. During the Cold War, Cuba was an active1096partner for the Soviet Union, even hosting Soviet nuclear arms and1097military forces to target the United States. Much has changed in the1098United States since the end of the Cold War, however unfortunately the1099same cannot be said of Cuba.1100    The communist dictatorship in Havana remains as repressive as ever,1101controlling every major aspect of Cuba's economy and the lives of the1102Cuban people while denying their basic political freedoms and human1103rights. Cuba's dictatorship also remains actively hostile to the United1104States. Havana continues to launch clandestine operations and espionage1105against the United States in an effort to harm U.S. interests. Indeed,11062 of the most damaging spies in U.S. history both worked as agents of1107Havana and were both operating well after the collapse of the Soviet1108Union. Indeed, Manuel Rocha, who reached the top rungs of the U.S.1109State Department while acting as a Cuban agent, was only arrested in11102023.\1\1111---------------------------------------------------------------------------1112    \1\ Martinez-Fernandez, Andres. ``Cuba Spy Scandal Reveals U.S.1113Vulnerabilities.'' The Heritage Foundation, 9 Apr. 2024, https://1114www.heritage.org/americas/commentary/cuba-spy-scandal-reveals-us-1115vulnerabilities.1116---------------------------------------------------------------------------1117    Today, Cuba's communist dictatorship also offers itself as a1118partner for a new extra-hemispheric patron, the China's Communist1119Party. Analysis of the Center for Strategic International Studies and1120others have revealed the growing footprint of Chinese intelligence-1121gathering facilities in Cuba to undermine U.S. security. Indeed,1122China's accelerating espionage partnership with Cuba poses a major1123threat for U.S. and hemispheric security, bringing together Beijing's1124resources and technology with Havana's unsurpassed experience in1125penetrating U.S. agencies and security institutions.1126    The growth of China's spying footprint in Cuba is indicative of1127Beijing's broader malign presence and operations in the Americas.1128Washington should take note and respond to the anti-American alliance1129between Havana and Beijing is consolidated just 90 miles off the U.S.1130coast.1131                         china in the americas1132    It is no secret that China has aggressively bolstered its presence1133and influence across the Western Hemisphere in recent years. The1134principal avenue for Chinese influence in Latin America is undoubtedly1135economic engagement. Through substantial infrastructure investments,1136offering market access, attractive financing offers, and more, China1137has displaced the United States as the primary economic partner in1138South America and increasingly Central America and the Caribbean.1139    While economic engagement has led the way for China's regional1140approach, Beijing's influence has spread quickly into the political and1141security spheres. Across the hemisphere, China's offering to the region1142erodes sovereignty and stability while empowering the Chinese1143government. Indeed, China's economic influence has secured for Beijing1144important levers of influence in the Western Hemisphere, including1145expanding strategic control of critical infrastructure while also1146allowing China to increasingly use its economic power to influence1147regional policies.1148    China's strategic focus around dual-use and critical infrastructure1149in the Americas highlights the intrinsic military and security nature1150of China's hemispheric encroachment. As Beijing grows increasingly1151belligerent against Taiwan and U.S. forces in the Indo Pacific, China's1152is likely to operationalize and militarize its presence and influence1153in Latin America and the Caribbean against the United States. This1154includes leveraging dual-use infrastructure such as ports for military1155purposes.1156    Chinese infrastructure projects across Latin America and the1157Caribbean offer Beijing crucial vectors for espionage and disruptive1158operations in and around the United States. Control over ports and1159other infrastructure can even be leveraged to impede the movement of1160U.S. warships and military resources or directly target U.S. assets.1161    While some downplay the security threats posed by China's economic1162presence, Beijing's own actions highlight the operational and even1163military dimensions of its approach to Latin America and the Caribbean.1164In Panama, for example, President Trump has highlighted the worrying1165presence of Chinese-controlled infrastructure, including 2 ports1166proximate to the Panama Canal. Given U.S. vulnerabilities to potential1167disruption of the Panama Canal, through which over a third of U.S.1168container traffic flows, the Trump administration has wisely sought to1169extract the Chinese presence there.1170    In March, the Chinese firm CK Hutchinson agreed to sell the ports1171to the U.S. firm Blackrock, however the Chinese Communist Party stepped1172in to halt the sale. While the Chinese firm CK Hutchinson determined1173that the sale of the ports was in its financial interests, Beijing1174decision to halt the sale shows the Chinese government is clearly has1175non-economic motivations to its presence in Latin America. Tellingly,1176Chinese state media had called the sale of the Chinese ports,1177``tantamount to handing a knife to an opponent.''\2\1178---------------------------------------------------------------------------1179    \2\ Jackson, Lewis, and Jenny Su. ``Chinese State Media Blasts CK1180Hutchison's Panama Port Deal in Soon-Deleted Post.'' Reuters, 29 Mar.11812025, https://www.reuters.com/markets/deals/chinese-state-media-likens-1182ck-hutchison-panama-port-deal-handing-knife-opponent-2025-03-29/.1183---------------------------------------------------------------------------1184    Unfortunately, these vulnerabilities for the United States are not1185limited to Panama. Elsewhere in Latin America and the Caribbean, China1186has leveraged its influence and investments to secure worrying control1187over dual-use infrastructure and vital trade arteries with little to no1188oversight by local governments.1189                      beijing's caribbean strategy1190    Beijing's inroads in the Caribbean and Central America may be the1191most concerning aspect of its hemispheric encroachment. Geographic1192proximity to the United States and around crucial U.S. maritime routes1193makes the Caribbean of outsized strategic importance for the United1194States. China appears to recognize this strategic importance given the1195relative attention and engagement Beijing has given to the region, both1196economically and politically. As with Pacific Island nations, Beijing1197appears to seek the consolidation of its influence and presence over1198strategically important island chains in the Caribbean with the goal of1199counterbalancing U.S. presence in Asia and empowering China to even1200destabilize the United States through asymmetric means.1201    In the Caribbean, China is also applying its ample experience at1202consolidating influence over small island nations with strategic1203importance for the United States. Indeed, China's Communist Party has1204been waging wars of influence in small island nations across the world1205for years, effectively leveraging a mix of economic engagement,1206corruption, and subversion to assert its control.\3\1207---------------------------------------------------------------------------1208    \3\ Harding, Andrew. ``Time to Act: Strategic Benefits of Funding1209the Compacts of Free Association (COFA).'' The Heritage Foundation,12102024, https://www.heritage.org/china/report/time-act-strategic-1211benefits-funding-the-compacts-free-association-cofa.1212---------------------------------------------------------------------------1213    Weak institutions and small and stagnant economies in the Caribbean1214offer easy geopolitical gains for Beijing's influence, an opportunity1215which the Chinese government has seized upon. In 2018, Trinidad and1216Tobago opened a new path for Beijing in the Caribbean, becoming the1217first island country in the world to join China's Belt and Road1218Initiative. Today, over half of CARICOM member states are signatories1219to the Belt and Road Initiative and China's economic engagement with1220the Caribbean has seen dramatic growth.1221    As of 2023, Chinese investments in the Caribbean have surpassed $301222billion, with a broad presence across multiple industries, particularly1223infrastructure.\4\ In some parts of the Caribbean, Chinese investments1224come to dominate sectors, reflecting Beijing's long-term predatory1225approach. Indeed, much of China's investments in the Caribbean are1226dubious business propositions for any traditional lender or firm.\5\1227However, Beijing's political impetus pushes these investments forward,1228again revealing their geopolitical and strategic nature.1229---------------------------------------------------------------------------1230    \4\ Hernandez, Carlos. ``China in the Caribbean: A Two-Faced1231Dragon.'' Dialogo Americas, 4 Apr. 2025, https://dialogo-americas.com/1232articles/china-in-the-caribbean-two-faced-dragona8/.1233    \5\ Baker, Peter. ``U.S. Warned That the Caribbean Is Becoming a1234`Chinese Lake'.'' Newsweek, 2 May 2025, https://www.newsweek.com/us-1235warned-caribbean-becoming-chinese-lake-2041296.1236---------------------------------------------------------------------------1237    While returns on investment may be lacking for China's Caribbean1238investments, they have bought important influence for Beijing, as well1239as control over infrastructure such as maritime ports and special1240economic zones with little to no local oversight.1241    China's broader influence has also allowed it to expand its1242regional intelligence-gathering capacities beyond Cuba, including in1243the democratic Caribbean nations. Indeed, Beijing's has even secured1244unusually sprawling embassies in the Caribbean, such as in Antigua, the1245Bahamas, and elsewhere, with cites that are widely considered to be1246active intelligence centers for China.\6\1247---------------------------------------------------------------------------1248    \6\ Baker, Peter. ``China's Growing Influence in the Caribbean: A1249Challenge for the U.S.'' Newsweek, 3 May 2024, https://1250www.newsweek.com/2024/05/03/china-caribbean-united-states-antigua-belt-1251road-diplomacy-debt-chinese-xi-jinping-rivalry-1891668.html.1252---------------------------------------------------------------------------1253                  a path forward for the united states1254    The approach of China in the Americas highlights a set of worry1255strategic goals that regional governments fail to recognize and that1256even the United States has failed to fully appreciate. The Trump1257administration has clearly prioritized addressing these hemispheric1258vulnerabilities posed by China and its partnership with the Cuban1259dictatorship, among other actors. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has1260wisely prioritized engagement with the Caribbean, traveling twice1261already to the region. Concerted political and economic engagement such1262as this is a crucial element of confronting the hemispheric threat1263posed by Beijing and Havana.1264    Conditioning economic engagement and investment on regional1265cooperation to limit malign Chinese influence, for examples, should1266help guide this renewed hemispheric engagement. At the same time, the1267United States can and should bolster its security partnerships and1268capacities in the Caribbean and more broadly across the Americas in1269order to mitigate risks posed to vital infrastructure and other1270vulnerabilities. To this end, Department of Homeland Security1271partnerships that increase local oversight capacities and oversight1272over port facilities and similar infrastructure should be prioritized.1273    At the same time, the United States should leverage its1274underappreciated territorial presence in the Caribbean. U.S.1275territories, particularly including Puerto Rico, can be better used to1276counterbalance Chinese and Cuban malign activities in the Caribbean.1277Bolstering the U.S. Coast Guard presence and capacities in Puerto Rico,1278for example, will support U.S. security in the broader Caribbean region1279amid these growing threats. At the same time, U.S. territories can be1280force multipliers in bolstering economic engagement in the Caribbean1281through targeted measures that offset regional dependence on China.1282    Confronting China's hemispheric encroachment poses a substantial1283challenge for the United States. However, by recognizing the importance1284of U.S. engagement and defending U.S. interests, the Trump1285administration is already making substantial shift toward protecting1286U.S. national security in our hemisphere.1287                                 ______12881289    The Heritage Foundation is a public policy, research, and1290educational organization recognized as exempt under section 501(c)(3)1291of the Internal Revenue Code. It is privately supported and receives no1292funds from any government at any level, nor does it perform any1293government or other contract work.1294    The Heritage Foundation is the most broadly supported think tank in1295the United States. During 2023, it had hundreds of thousands of1296individual, foundation, and corporate supporters representing every1297State in the United States. Its 2023 operating income came from the1298following sources: Individuals, 82 percent; Foundations, 14 percent;1299Corporations, 1 percent; Program revenue and other income, 3 percent.1300    The top 5 corporate givers provided The Heritage Foundation with 11301percent of its 2023 income. The Heritage Foundation's books are audited1302annually by the national accounting firm of RSM US, LLP.1303    Members of The Heritage Foundation staff testify as individuals1304discussing their own independent research. The views expressed are1305their own and do not reflect an institutional position of The Heritage1306Foundation or its board of trustees.13071308    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Martinez-Fernandez.1309    I now recognize Mr. Lazarus for 5 minutes to summarize his1310opening statements.13111312   STATEMENT OF LELAND LAZARUS, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL1313 SECURITY PROGRAM, GORDON INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, FLORIDA1314                    INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY13151316    Mr. Lazarus. Thank you, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member1317McIver, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank1318you for the privilege to speak today. My name is Leland1319Lazarus. I'm the associate director of Florida International1320University's Gordon Institute for Public Policy and nonresident1321fellow at the Atlantic Council's global China hub.1322    I come to you today not just as a researcher, but as1323someone who has observed this threat to evolve first-hand.1324First, from my time as a Fulbright scholar, studying the1325Chinese Diaspora in Panama, to serving as the State Department1326Foreign Service officer in China and the Caribbean, to serving1327as a special assistant and speech writer to 2 combat commanders1328at U.S. Southern Command.1329    So let me be clear, Cuba is not just an outpost of Chinese1330influence, it's a strategic beach head. As my colleagues have1331said time and time again, just 90 miles off Florida where I1332live, where I reside, the Chinese Communist Party is executing1333a 21st Century playbook of espionage, port infrastructure,1334space surveillance, and digital authoritarianism. Havana is the1335perfect laboratory for China. China has built signals1336intelligence outposts aimed at Florida, as the CSIS report has1337shown, but it has also installed airport scanners and1338surveillance equipment using Chinese firms like Nuctech, as1339Ranking Member McIver had mentioned. It's a state-owned1340company, sanctioned by the United States for ties to the1341Chinese military.1342    Nuctech systems are deployed across Cuban airports,1343seaports, and customs facilities, giving Beijing privilege1344access to sensitive data flows right on our doorstep. But1345what's happening in Cuba is just one chapter in a much larger1346story. Next week on May 13, Beijing will host the China CELAC1347summit with nearly every country in Latin America and the1348Caribbean represented in Beijing. It is a reminder that China1349has a long-term strategy for this hemisphere, built on patient1350investment, diplomatic cultivation, and evolving security ties.1351The United States unfortunately by contrast still too often1352operates from a crisis-to-crisis mindset in this region and has1353yet to provide an affirmative long-term agenda for the region1354at large.1355    The Chinese military and military scholars call countries1356like Cuba strategic support points or Zhan lue Zhi dian in1357Mandarin to sustain their far seas naval posture. They don't1358need permanent basis, they need leverage. Cuba gives them1359exactly that. It's close, politically reliable, and already1360outfitted with Chinese tech.1361    When the United States sends warships through the Taiwan1362Straits, Chinese academics now reply with references to their1363own right to operate near Florida. That's strategic reciprocity1364Beijing style. You touch our waters, we have the right to touch1365yours.1366    China also aspires to build its Sitian space program to1367expand its global space domain awareness. But space is also1368crucial for signals intelligence and Cuba is a prime location1369for China to target the United States. That's why we at Florida1370International University have created the Chinese activities in1371Latin America dashboard in order to track and expose China's1372moves in almost real time. It maps everything, and I mean1373everything from dual-use ports and signals intelligence1374listening stations to companies like Nuctech that quietly1375expand China's operational footprint across the region.1376    Our dashboard that we built is really built for you all,1377U.S. policy makers, to make the best decisions about our1378greatest strategic competitor. But it's also a warning. China's1379not just coming to Latin America and the Caribbean--it's1380already here and it's here to stay.1381    Members of the subcommittee, we cannot win a global1382competition with China if we lose sight of our own hemisphere.1383Strategic neglect is not just dangerous, it is a gift we give1384to Beijing. We must meet this challenge together with our1385allies and partners to make America and the Americas safer,1386stronger, and more prosperous.1387    Thank you, I look forward to your questions.1388    [The prepared statement of Mr. Lazarus follows:]1389    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]13901391    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Lazarus.1392    Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their13935 minutes of questioning and I will recognize myself for 51394minutes of questioning. I'll start out with a comment in that1395the United States for far too long, both Republican and1396Democrat administrations have not paid close enough attention1397to what's happening in our own hemisphere. It's allowed China1398to make the inroads that it has and now we're just waking up to1399the fact. So this hearing is part of that to try to awaken the1400American people and the administration to the fact that we need1401to pay close attention to what's happening in our own1402neighborhood.1403    So with that, this is an open question. It's my estimation1404that the Cuban regime itself is actually in one of the most1405weakest positions that it has been in the past 60 years. Do any1406of you share that opinion or do you disagree with that opinion?1407I'll start with you Dr. Berg.1408    Mr. Berg. Thanks for the question, Chairman. I do share1409that opinion. I think the Cuban regime is incredibly weak at1410this point in time. We've seen that not just in protests from1411the island but in rolling blackouts that occur seemingly on a1412monthly basis, sometimes weekly basis, Mr. Chairman.1413    Mr. Gimenez. Mr. Fernandez.1414    Mr. Martinez-Fernandez. Yes, I agree. I think economically,1415politically as well the regime is in a period of vulnerability.1416I think also increasingly hemispheric as well as U.S. political1417consensus is moving toward a recognition of the maligned nature1418of the Cuban dictatorship as past attempts however poorly1419conceived at engagements as we have seen from the United States1420have fallen flatly and been rebuffed. The Cuban dictatorship1421has at the same time again as we have discussed acted as an1422active partner for enemies of the United States within our1423hemisphere.1424    Mr. Gimenez. Mr. Lazarus, do you share that opinion that1425the Cuban regime is at one of the weakest points in the last 61426years?1427    Mr. Lazarus. Sir, I would absolutely agree. Inflation is1428over 30 percent for of the Cuban regime. There has been an1429increased outflow of refugees coming out of Cuba and there has1430been an increase in Cuban officials traveling to Beijing trying1431to get more investment. I understand that now China is Cuba's1432either largest or second-largest trading partner, counting from1433roughly 30 percent of Cuba's imports and exports.1434    I think that Cuba's decreasing economic situation is1435allowing it to become even more and more dependent1436economically, increasingly security and political standpoint on1437China.1438    Mr. Gimenez. I would like to discuss with the 3 of you off-1439line and how we can accelerate Cuba's dictatorship their demise1440so we can turn Cuba from a platform and a base for China and1441make it actually a friend of the United States. I think we are1442close to that. I also think that Cuba is the head of the snake.1443When we talk about all the unrest that's happening in our1444hemisphere in Venezuela and Nicaragua, Cuba is the head of the1445snake and we need to do everything in our power to set the1446Cuban people free but also turn Cuba from an enemy into friend.1447    Now lets talk about Cuba and the threat and the Chinese1448threat in Cuba. The Russians have been operating there for1449years, decades. Are the Chinese supplanting the Russians or are1450they adding to the Russian threat?1451    Mr. Berg. I'm happy to take that, Mr. Chairman. I think1452that they are both supplanting but also adding to. There is1453still a residual Russian presence of course in Cuba. We saw1454last year at the tail end of the Biden administration how the1455Russians sailed a vessel through the Florida strait, ported1456both in Cuba and in Havana. Importantly before porting in Cuba1457displayed one of the Zircon hypersonic missiles in the1458Atlantic.1459    But I would say in terms of the presence, Mr. Chairman, the1460Chinese have supplanted them in terms of the more important1461partner and quite literally some of these sites that we showed1462were former Russian sites but are now occupied we believe by1463the Chinese.1464    Mr. Gimenez. They have added to the capability, a new more1465modern infrastructure, et cetera.1466    Mr. Berg. That's correct.1467    Mr. Gimenez. OK. So maybe some of my colleagues would be,1468you know, surprised to know that not only is it Russia and1469China but also Iran is here and North Korea is also here. So we1470need to also stand up to those threats.1471    The training range that's just outside of Florida, it's the1472largest training range that we have. It's the only training1473range that actually can simulate battling the Taiwan Straits.1474What kind of a threat do these facilities pose to those ranges1475and what kind of intelligence could the Chinese get from1476surveying those ranges in relation to our tactics, et cetera,1477of how we may operate in the Taiwan Straits?1478    Mr. Berg. Mr. Chairman, the first slide that I showed in my1479presentation showed just the number of facilities in your home1480State that are easily within range of these facilities. It's my1481understanding that military communications is of course1482encrypted and protected in certain ways. But it is scooped up1483by some of this equipment then it is available for the Chinese1484to try to crack that communication. So that's why one of my1485recommendations is doing an exercise to harden facilities and1486figure out what our vulnerabilities are so that we can make1487sure that we protect those very vulnerable secrets, both on the1488commercial side and on the military side, Mr. Chairman.1489    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you. My 5 minutes are up.1490    I recognize the Ranking Member, the gentlewoman from New1491Jersey Ms. McIver, for 5 minutes.1492    Mrs. McIver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1493    Mr. Lazarus, thank you once again for joining us today. In1494your testimony, you discussed how China will be hosting a1495summit with Latin America and Caribbean states next week. China1496and Cuba also both belong to the BRICS group along with Brazil,1497Russia, India and a total of 23 countries. BRICS has become a1498serious political force as the nations belonging to BRICS now1499account for almost 30 percent of the world's GDP, 40 percent of1500the oil production and almost half the world's population. We1501have seen what Trump's repeated tariff threats are doing to the1502economy both at home and globally while eroding trust in the1503U.S. dollar.1504    Trump's foreign policies are only making groups like the1505BRICS more powerful as our geopolitical rivals work to fill the1506void that President Trump has created with his America last1507policies.1508    Mr. Lazarus, as America recedes from the world's stage, how1509are BRICS and other multinationl groups exerting power and1510influence?1511    Mr. Lazarus. Ranking Member, thank you so much for the1512question. You're absolutely right, Brazil, Russia, India,1513China, South Africa when taken together they represent more1514than 30 percent of the global GDP. They have really been using1515that multilateral institution in order to create alternative1516financial institutions to the Western-built ones, built right1517after World War II. So you think the New Development Bank or1518the BRICS bank that could fund various projects in the1519developing world.1520    There is talk about them creating a BRICS currency that1521could mean that they could settle trade accounts, not using the1522U.S. dollars, which could potentially weaken the U.S. dollar's1523dominance in the globe. But it goes to a larger narrative that1524the Chinese and our other adversaries try to use in the global1525south which is that the United States doesn't necessarily care1526about the global south. All they care about is realist1527ideology, especially in this region in Latin America and the1528Caribbean there is this narrative that the Chinese try to say1529that the United States only wants to impose the Monroe Doctrine15302.0. I am concerned that certain things, certain policies could1531really allow the Chinese to continue to spread that narrative1532in Latin America and the Caribbean.1533    Mrs. McIver. Thank you for that. Just to follow up, in your1534opinion, do you think China ultimately stands to benefit from1535the pause in foreign aid underneath the Trump administration?1536    Mr. Lazarus. Well, we are seeing already on a global scale1537that China has already stepped up its foreign aid in countries1538like Cambodia, Nepal. As I mentioned, next week they are going1539to be hosting the fourth ministerial of the China-CELAC summit.1540I expect that after that summit there's going to be a joint1541action plan between China and CELAC on China increasing exports1542of renewable energy and electric vehicles and solar panels.1543Again, it is another way for China to project itself as a1544reliable partner at a time where other countries are perceiving1545potentially the United States' tariffing other countries. It's1546also a way for China to project itself as the defender of1547globalization and free trade going forward, that is a concern.1548    Ms. McIver. Thank you so much, Mr. Lazarus.1549    With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.1550    Mr. Gimenez. The gentlewoman yields.1551    I now recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane, for15525 minutes.1553    Mr. Crane. Thank you guys for coming today to talk about1554this very, very important topic. So just to get this straight,1555we have the Chinese partnering with Cuba, both Communist1556countries and Cuba's roughly 90 miles from the United States.1557Are we able to discern through these satellite imagery, human1558intel, and signal intel what the capabilities of this1559technology located on Cuba, the island of Cuba? Dr. Berg.1560    Mr. Berg. Chairman, we are able to speculate about it, but1561again, this was used--discovered using commercially-available1562satellite technology that we have the capability of using. I'm1563sure and this is why I recommended a Classified briefing for1564you all. On the high side, my guess is that there is a lot more1565analysis available on capabilities and vulnerabilities.1566    Mr. Crane. Do we have the ability to jam and block the1567surveillance technologies located on the island of Cuba, Dr.1568Berg?1569    Mr. Berg. Congressman, it's my understanding that we do1570have some of that capability. I'm not sure if it is being1571deployed. Also as I mentioned some of the communications that1572are sensitive in nature are also encrypted, but I'm happy to1573talk to you off-line or answer questions further after this1574hearing about those types' capabilities.1575    Mr. Crane. Thank you. Mr. Lazarus, you mentioned that the1576Chinese could use these basis to project digital1577authoritarianism, I believe that was the word you used. Can you1578expand on that?1579    Mr. Lazarus. Absolutely, Congressman. Well, first and1580foremost, Huawei and ZTE provide the digital backbone for1581Etecsa, the Cuban telecommunications company. We saw in July15822021 when there was the large massive protests in Cuba against1583the regime that the regime was able to really shut down the1584protesters' communications so that they couldn't necessarily1585collaborate with each other as easily as they otherwise would.1586Our assessment was that they were able to rely on technology of1587Huawei and ZTE or to shut that down. There's also again the1588idea of Nuctech being in various seaports, airports in Cuba.1589Nuctech is a state-owned enterprise. It is a subsidiary of1590Tsinghua University's Tongfang.1591    China's national nuclear corporation has a 21 percent stake1592in Nuctech and it provides all kinds of port scanning equipment1593and the concern is that all the kind of information, whether it1594be biometric, whether it be commercial, whether it be sensitive1595data about supply chain roots and cargo flows, all that1596information can go back to Beijing and that would constitute a1597national security threat for the United States.1598    Mr. Crane. Thank you.1599    Dr. Berg, is it true that a Chinese national was arrested1600in January of this year in Miami's airport for conducting1601espionage activities?1602    Mr. Berg. Congressman, I'll have to get back to you on1603that. I'm not aware of that particular----1604    Mr. Crane. Yes, I'd like to enter this into the record, Mr.1605Chairman. This is an article, ``Chinese National Targeted in1606Federal Spy Investigation Arrested At Miami International1607Airport''. According to the article, he had transmitted 471608pages that were schematics, graphs, diagrams related to nuclear1609weapons.1610    Mr. Lazarus, I want to come back to----1611    Mr. Gimenez. Without objection.1612    [The information follows:]1613     Article From the Florida Center for Government Accountability1614  chinese national targeted in federal spy investigation arrested at1615                      miami international airport1616By Izzy Kapnick1617January 17, 2025 at 4:54 PM ET1618    A Chinese traveler targeted in an FBI investigation of alleged1619high-level industrial espionage in the United States was detained1620Tuesday at Miami International Airport and charged with lying to1621customs agents.1622    Chengzhe Wang, 29, is in Federal custody after allegedly making1623false statements to Customs and Border Protection about his connection1624to the Chinese government and the nature of a past trip to the U.S.,1625according to an FBI affidavit obtained by the Florida Trident.1626    When a search of his electronic devices found he'd shared a nuclear1627weapons research document on a Chinese app, Wang told agents he sent it1628because he ``thought it contained porn pictures,'' according to the1629arrest affidavit.1630    Customs and Border Protection (CBP) intercepted the Chinese1631national when he flew from Mexico City to Miami on January 14. He was1632scheduled to board another flight, headed for Nicaragua, later that1633day, according to the affidavit.1634    Customs agents detained Wang on the basis of a June 2023 tip to1635Federal law enforcement that alleged operatives from Xugong Group, a1636large-scale Chinese construction-equipment firm, were entering the1637United States to ``conduct illegal activities,'' including ``spying on1638intelligence'' and ``obtaining confidential technology in the same1639industry.'' The tipster claimed those involved in the espionage1640``received training from China's Security Intelligence Agency on how to1641provide false information to deceive U.S. customs to enter the country,1642and how to obtain intelligence in the U.S.''1643    Wang's name and passport number were included in the tip, which1644specified he was an overseas product manager for a firm associated with1645the Xugong Group called XCMG Construction Machinery Co., according to1646the FBI. The Trident sent emails to both companies requesting comment1647prior to publishing and will update with any response.1648    Though the tipster--who wasn't identified but is known by Federal1649agents--detailed extensive spying activity, Wang is not currently1650charged with espionage. The criminal complaint centers on the FBI's1651claim that he concealed from customs agents that his firm is owned by1652the People's Republic of China and that he's a member of the Chinese1653Communist Youth League.1654    ``When asked why Wang initially lied to CBP officers, Wang stated1655that he initially denied any current association with the Youth League1656because officials at XCMG advised him not to disclose membership to1657U.S. authorities,'' FBI special agent Nolan Gallow wrote in the1658affidavit.1659    The affidavit alleges that during a search of Wang's electronics1660and cellphone, customs agents found that a document he shared in the1661Chinese messaging app WeChat ``contained 47 pages of schematics,1662graphs, and diagrams related to nuclear weapons research,'' with text1663in Mandarin.1664    ``An initial translation of the PDF document revealed the title as1665`Atomic Bomb,' '' Gallow wrote.1666    When customs officers asked him to explain the document, Wang1667claimed he was under the impression he was sharing a file with1668pornography images, the FBI says. But a search of the document by the1669FBI found no such material and Wang later admitted there was none,1670according to the affidavit.1671    The search also turned up a photograph of a badge or credential1672with Mandarin wording for ``Administrative Law Enforcement,'' according1673to the affidavit.1674    ``Based on my training and experience, this photograph appears to1675depict an official credential or badge case likely for use by [People's1676Republic of China] law enforcement or some other PRC government1677agency,'' Gallow wrote.1678    Wang further claimed he was on vacation during a visit to Dallas in1679September 2023. However, customs records showed he told agents at the1680time that he was in the United States for business purposes that1681included a visit to XCMG's warehouses in Houston, the FBI says.1682    ``Wang's statements about his connection to a foreign government,1683affiliation with the CCP, and purpose of his 2023 trip to Dallas were1684materially false,'' wrote the FBI's Gallow.1685    The charge brought against Wang carries a maximum sentence of 51686years in prison for the base count, with an 8-year maximum if convicted1687with aggravating factors.1688About the author: Izzy Kapnick is reporter and editor based in South1689Florida. He has worked as a journalist in the Miami metro area for more1690than 15 years, covering crime, high-profile litigation, environmental1691torts, politics, and public health.16921693    Mr. Crane. Thank you, sir.1694    Mr. Lazarus, I want to come back to you. Do you believe the1695Chinese are engaged in unrestricted warfare with the United1696States, i.e. economic warfare attacks on critical1697infrastructure, espionage, theft, et cetera?1698    Mr. Lazarus. Congressman, the--we've seen evidence time and1699time again, whether it be the FBI under former director1700Christopher Wray talking about how China-based hackers, whether1701it be Salt Typhoon, Volt Typhoon has infiltrated critical1702infrastructure throughout the United States. That would of1703course be a national security concern and that they are1704potentially prepositioning if there is ever a conflict with the1705United States, say over the straits of Taiwan or the South1706China Sea, that the Chinese could retaliate by shutting down1707some of that critical infrastructure. The concern is that many1708of the same tactics, some of the same companies that are1709concerned here in the United States are also operating in Latin1710America and the in the Caribbean.1711    Mr. Crane. Thank you. I yield back.1712    Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman yields back.1713    I recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Kennedy.1714    Sorry, he left.1715    OK. I recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter.1716    Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank our witnesses1717for being here today.1718    I'm deeply concerned about the long-term consequences of1719the Trump-Musk administration's systemic dismantling of USAID,1720foreign aid, and other international development programs.1721Actions that have significantly weakened America's global1722influence, especially on our own hemisphere.1723    In the past several months, critical U.S. investments in1724diplomacy and development have been slashed, frozen, or1725redirected to serve narrow political goals. This isn't just bad1726policy, it was a strategic mistake that has had real1727consequences on a national security and regional stability.1728    In Latin America, these decisions have been nothing short1729of a gift to authoritarian regimes in Cuba, Venezuela, and1730Nicaragua. By retreating from our role as a champion of1731democracy and development we left a vacuum that autocrats have1732rushed to fill. We are tired of taking the lead instead of1733supporting reformers and pro-Democratic movements; we left them1734under-resourced and isolated, while despots like Nicholas1735Maduro tightened their grip. Foreign aid is not a charity. It a1736wise investment in stability, security, and American values.1737    When we help communities thrive and support Democratic1738institutions, we make it harder for authoritarianism,1739corruption, and extremism to take root. Cutting these programs1740undermines regional security and contributes to the very1741conditions violence, poverty, and political repression that1742drive migration to our Southern Border.1743    Rebuilding USAID and reaffirming our commitment to global1744development is not just morally right, it is strategically1745necessary. America must lead again, not just with the might of1746our military or the strength of our values and the reach of our1747engagement.1748    Dr. Berg, given that maritime shipping is heavily dominated1749by Chinese vessels, including those coming in and out of U.S.1750ports, what kind of insight does that give the Chinese into1751maritime traffic in the United States? How could China use this1752information to our detriment?1753    Mr. Berg. Thanks for the question, Congressman. I think1754we've seen multiple instances in which the Chinese have used1755ports as infrastructure, not just to have the PLA navy make1756port calls in some of the deep water ports, but all of that1757data, that information that is contained in a port is important1758for the Chinese. The comings and goings of ships, cargo1759manifest, with what frequency, this is all very important if1760we're talking about building safe and secure supply chains as1761well.1762    I had the privilege of being before this committee in1763February when we were talking about the very issue of ports.1764This issue also came up then, specifically with reference to1765the Panama Canal, that drew Hong Kong-based ports that are at1766the strategic approaches to the canal. Also a critical issue,1767Congressman.1768    Mr. Carter. In your testimony, you recommended enlisting1769neighbors like Bahamas, Dominican Republic, and Jamaica to1770combat intelligence gathering from China and Cuba. How can1771Federal international development system programs help achieve1772this goal?1773    Mr. Berg. Congressman, I would advocate that we build on1774Secretary of State Rubio's very successful visit to the1775Caribbean in recent weeks. I think it is important that the1776Secretary of State has already taken 2 trips to the region. In1777just over 2.5 months of his time in office. I think those1778countries once made aware of extent of Cuba's espionage1779activities and therefore their vulnerabilities would be quite1780willing to partner with us. It is in their interest just as it1781is in ours not to have Cuba snooping on their signal1782intelligence.1783    Mr. Carter. Thank you.1784    Mr. Lazarus, how can China use its investments in Cuba to1785disrupt shipping routes that lead to major U.S. ports? Like the1786Port of New Orleans or the Port of South Louisiana in my home1787State.1788    Mr. Lazarus. Well, I understand that those 2 ports in the1789United States represent about 20 percent--more than 20 percent1790of cargo entering the United States, and the concern is that1791whether it be a Nuctech, whether it be a China Harbor1792Engineering Company, because China Harbor and China1793Communication construction corporation also have key projects1794in Cuba.1795    Those companies that have direct ties to the People's1796Liberation Army can gather information about U.S. port1797operations, cargo flows, potentially see our supply chain1798vulnerabilities. They can also use those areas a way to issue1799cyber attacks or cyber disruptions in and around the port1800operations. They could of course create plausible deniability1801which is of course an MO that they've been doing for quite1802sometimes as well.1803    Mr. Carter. Thank you.1804    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.1805    Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman yields.1806    I recognize the gentlewoman from South Carolina, Mrs.1807Biggs.1808    Mrs. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our1809guests today for highlighting these important aspects of our1810topic today.1811    So I have personally been to Key West and involved in1812military training there so this topic really does catch my1813attention. Also I would like to say that I'm excited about our1814current administration, the idea of increasing our innovation1815and rebuilding our military and strengthening our defense, our1816very purpose of this.1817    U.S. intelligence officials, military strategists, and1818regional experts have drawn parallels between China's current1819activity and the Cold War-era use of Cuba by the Soviet Union1820as a forward surveillance outpost. Yet the tools of today,1821especially in digital surveillance, constitute a sophisticated1822threat of a different order.1823    So my first question is for Mr. Martinez-Fernandez. Are1824China's activities in Cuba more reminiscent of Cold War-style1825strategic encirclement or are they more aligned with a new1826model of digital influence and persistent surveillance?1827    Mr. Martinez-Fernandez. Thank you for the question,1828Congresswoman. I think that there are many aspects of China's1829engagement that are reminiscent of the Cold War-era engagement1830by the Soviet Union. They align primarily with or often with1831military and geo-strategic aims for those reasons.1832    I think certainly we're seeing an increased leveraging of1833biotechnologies, as well as the more deep economic ties that1834China has globally as compared to the Soviet Union. As part of1835what's being leveraged in Latin America and the Caribbean and1836with Cuba to create this broader surveillance and operational1837infrastructure for China.1838    That raises any concerns because obviously we saw the1839consequences and the risks during the Cold War of this presence1840from hostile extra-hemispheric actors just 90 miles off--on our1841shores. We're seeing that I think at a new level as I said1842because of these new and in some ways expanded capacities that1843the Chinese governments can employ because of its resources,1844because of its capacities.1845    Mrs. Biggs. Thank you.1846    So my next question is for Dr. Berg. Could China's posture1847in Cuba serve as a springboard for influencing or disrupting1848U.S. diplomatic or military efforts outside the region such as1849in the Indo-Pacific?1850    Mr. Berg. Congresswoman, thank you for the question. I1851think it's critical. We hope this never happens, but if there1852is conflict in a different theater of the world, let's say1853there is a conflict in the Indo-Pacific, the United States if1854it is to come for example to Taiwan's aid, will need to shift1855forces from the Atlantic to the Pacific. China's ability to1856disrupt that process could be done through its activities in1857Cuba or as we heard at the February hearing at this very1858committee through some of those controls of the ports of the1859strategic approach to the Panama Canal.1860    There are multiple important critical choke points in this1861hemisphere that would be a part of that surge, that transition1862of forces from the Atlantic to the Pacific theaters where1863China's presence in the Caribbean, as my colleagues have1864pointed out, would be incredibly important. So they would have1865the ability in my opinion to attempt at least to block some of1866that shifting of force from the Atlantic to the Pacific,1867Congresswoman.1868    Mrs. Biggs. Thank you so much. I yield back.1869    Mr. Gimenez. The gentlewoman yields.1870    I now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Garbarino.1871    Mr. Garbarino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1872    Mr. Berg, China's state-owned tech companies like Huawei1873and ZTE have played a key role in building Cuba's digital1874infrastructure. These companies are known to have deep ties to1875China's military intelligence services and their equipment has1876been flagged globally for creating back doors enabling1877surveillance. How likely is it that these Chinese-built1878networks are enabling Beijing to conduct the same cyber1879operations or espionage targeting U.S. Government or commercial1880entities, either directly or by proxy through Cuban servers?1881    Mr. Berg. Congresswoman, I think it's--Congressman, excuse1882me--I think it's very likely that that's what they are1883attempting. Excuse me.1884    Mr. Garbarino. That's OK. I've been called worse.1885    Mr. Berg. Excuse me again. Congressman, I think it is very1886likely that that is what's happening that Cuba is offering1887China some of the best real estate that it can possibly have,188890 miles off, off U.S. shores. We've seen in multiple other1889instances how Chinese state-owned enterprises like Huawei and1890ZTE have provided a back door in other contexts such on the1891African Union and other organizations. So I see no reason to1892believe why we shouldn't believe that they are trying to do the1893same against the United States, their principle competitor in1894the 21st Century.1895    Mr. Garbarino. Has there been credible analysis of1896confirmation that Chinese intelligence has used Huawei- or ZTE-1897connected infrastructure in Cuba to intercept sensitive U.S.1898communications or conduct cyber--I mean, we believe they are,1899but has there been any analysis or confirmation?1900    Mr. Berg. Congressman, not on the open-source side. What1901we've collected here is the facilities that we think are likely1902the Chinese are using and we've done this in conjunction with1903some of the public reporting that's been done.1904    In fact, going back to your previous question on Huawei and1905ZTE, Politico and the Wall Street Journal are the 2 who are1906first to report on this and felt that there was a high degree1907of confidence that some of the facilities were in fact being1908used by the PRC because our intelligence agencies, you know,1909this is reported in the open source, were tracking individuals1910from Huawei and ZTE coming and going at some of these1911facilities.1912    But I think the answer to your question is more likely to1913be found on the high side, which is again why I've recommended1914in my testimony that all Members of Congress should be able to1915get access to a Classified briefing on this topic.1916    Mr. Garbarino. Thank you very much.1917    Mr. Martinez-Fernandez. the deeper China's tech1918infrastructure is embedded in Cuban society, the harder it1919becomes on-line. I mean, true for anywhere just look at London,1920Huawei technology is all over London.1921    So this creates a long-term dependency that goes far beyond1922hardware itself. What strategic leverage does China gain over1923Cuba by controlling the architecture of its digital ecosystem.1924    Mr. Martinez-Fernandez. Thank you for the question. I think1925it's crucial. It's a central part of China's strategy, you1926know. In Cuba, there's the more willing partner that doesn't1927necessarily acquire this same level of active pressuring or1928maligned influence, but certainly building up capacities over1929critical infrastructure such as telecommunications for China1930puts countries like Cuba and Democratic nations across the1931Americas at a significant dependence on the Chinese Communist1932Party.1933    That's the kind of thing that I think is a significant1934vulnerability, particularly in the case of conflict, but as we1935move, we've seen elsewhere the realm of economic and1936infrastructure capacities and influence being leveraged beyond1937that sphere going into the political and into the military1938where this capacity is then used to push governments to make1939decisions that are more favorable to the Chinese Communist1940Party.1941    So it does create significant questions, particularly for1942the longer term. If we are blessed with seeing a shift in Cuba1943as far as a return to democracy, these would be challenges that1944a future Cuban government would have to confront.1945    Mr. Garbarino. You mentioned actually in your answer about1946how this could be in conflict. How could they leverage these1947vulnerabilities in a regional conflict or confrontation1948involving the United States?1949    Mr. Martinez-Fernandez. I think as far as1950telecommunications this feeds into the present1951telecommunication infrastructure, and this feeds into a broader1952intelligence capacity for China which is substantial as we've1953discussed as going into signals intelligence, even to deep fake1954monitoring.1955    We also see a worrying build-up around critical1956infrastructure, maritime routes where the capacity for1957disruptive action and submersion is substantial and could1958frankly cripple the U.S. economy in aspects of U.S. military1959planning, even limiting the capacity for example of transit for1960U.S. military resources and warships across for example, the1961Panama Canal or other key points. So it's substantial.1962    Mr. Garbarino. I ran out of time so I yield back. Thank1963you.1964    Mr. Gimenez. The gentleman yields back.1965    This hearing kind-of whets our appetite and I think we're1966going to take Dr. Berg's advice and we need to go into a1967Classified setting to look at the depth of this issue and how1968serious it is to American security and get us some folks that1969can give it to us in a Classified setting.1970    So I want to thank the witnesses for your time and1971testimony. Members of the subcommittee may have additional1972questions for the witnesses and we would ask the witnesses to1973respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee rule VII(E)1974the hearing report will be open for 10 days.1975    Without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned.1976    [Whereupon, at 10:58 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]19771978                                 [all]