J.Hrg.119

1[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 119 Congress]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34119th Congress                                Printed for the use of the561st Session             Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe7________________________________________________________________________89                 From Production to Procurement: How10                 Europe and Ukraine Are Transforming11                          Defense Supply Chains1213    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]1415                       DECEMBER 10, 20251617                         Briefing of the18         Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe19                        Washington: 20262021           Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe22                  234 Ford House Office Building23                        Washington, DC 2051524                            202-225-190125                       csce@mail.house.gov26                       http://www.csce.gov27                         @HelsinkiComm2829          Legislative Branch Commissioners3031         SENATE                                         HOUSE32ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi Chairman        JOE WILSON, South Carolina33SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island                 Co-Chairman34  Ranking Member                             STEVE COHEN, Tennessee Ranking Member35JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas                       ROBERT ADERHOLT, Alabama36KATIE BRITT, Alabama                         EMMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri37JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania                 LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas38RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona                       JAKE ELLZEY, Texas39JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire                RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina40THOM TILLIS, North Carolina                  GREG MURPHY, North Carolina41MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota                    MARC VEASEY, Texas4243                       Executive Branch Commissioners4445                       DEPARTMENT OF STATE, to be appointed46                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, to be appointed47                     DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, to be appointed4849ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE5051    The Helsinki process, formally titled the Conference on Security52and Cooperation in Europe, traces its origin to the signing of the53Helsinki Final Act in Finland on August 1, 1975, by the leaders of 3354European countries, the United States and Canada. As of January 1,551995, the Helsinki process was renamed the Organization for Security56and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE].57    The membership of the OSCE has expanded to 57 participating States,58reflecting the breakup of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and59Yugoslavia.60    The OSCE Secretariat is in Vienna, Austria, where weekly meetings61of the participating States' permanent representatives are held. In62addition, specialized seminars and meetings are convened in various63locations. Periodic consultations are held among Senior Officials,64Ministers and Heads of State or Government.65    Although the OSCE continues to engage in standard setting in the66fields of military security, economic and environmental cooperation,67and human rights and humanitarian concerns, the Organization is68primarily focused on initiatives designed to prevent, manage and69resolve conflict within and among the participating States. The70Organization deploys numerous missions and field activities located in71Southeastern and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The72website of the OSCE is: .7374ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE7576    The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as77the Helsinki Commission, is an independent U.S. Government commission78created in 1976 to monitor and encourage compliance by the79participating States with their OSCE commitments, with a particular80emphasis on human rights.81    The Commission consists of nine members from the United States82Senate, nine members from the House of Representatives, and one member83each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce. The positions84of Chair and Co-Chair rotate between the Senate and House every two85years, when a new Congress convenes. 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The website of the98Commission is: .99100From Production to Procurement: How Europe and Ukraine Are Transforming101Defense Supply Chains102103                           December 10, 2025104105                                                                   Page106107                        COMMISSION STAFF PRESENT108109Viktor Olah Sallai, Policy Fellow, Commission on Security and110Cooperation in Europe ...........................................    1111112                              PARTICIPANTS113114Major General Karsten F. Jensen, Defense Attache, Royal Danish115Embassy in the United States ....................................    2116117Kateryna Bondar, Fellow, Wadhwani AI Center at the Center for118Strategic and International Studies .............................    4119120 Sophia Besch, Senior Fellow, Europe Program at the Carnegie121Endowment for International Peace ...............................    6122123From Production to Procurement: How Europe and Ukraine Are Transforming124Defense Supply Chains125126                              ----------127128                           December 10, 2025129130           Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe131                         Washington, DC132133    The briefing was held from 2 p.m. to 3:07 p.m., Room 2358-C,134Rayburn House Office Building, Viktor Olah Sallai, Policy Fellow,135Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding.136    Mr. Sallai: Good afternoon, everyone. My name is Viktor Olah, and I137am a policy fellow at the U.S. Helsinki Commission. I want to thank138everyone for joining us for today's briefing on how Europe and Ukraine139are transforming defense supply chains.140    As Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine enters its fifth year,141Kyiv faces an increasingly stark challenge. Ukraine's armed forces are142struggling to supply their troops and push back against the relentless143violence and destruction inflicted by Moscow.144    Yet, at the very same time, Ukraine is home to one of the most145innovative and adaptive defense industrial sectors in Europe, an146ecosystem that has demonstrated remarkable ingenuity under fire but147continues to operate far below its full capacity. Through my148colleagues' and I's discussions with Ukrainians, we have learned that149what they lack is not ideas or talent but capital, predictability, and150scalability.151    Over the past years, Europeans, led by Denmark, have pioneered new152responses to that challenge. Rather than relying on ad hoc donations153and purchases from national stockpiles, the Danish model identified new154ways to invest directly in Ukrainian firms. The mechanism empowered155Ukrainians to expedite procurement and production of urgently needed156systems, from artillery and ammunition to drones and electronic warfare157equipment. Many European nations followed suit, including through158variations that include joint production with Ukrainian companies.159    Today's panel will help us understand how these mechanisms work,160what is required to scale them, and how they can be adapted by other161allies, including the United States, and what role they might play in162securing a peace that lasts.163    We have the great pleasure of hearing from three panelists whose164expertise spans the operational, industrial, and strategic dimensions165of this challenge. Their testimonies illuminate not only how Europe and166Ukraine are transforming defense supply chains today but also how these167innovations can shape the future security architecture of the168continent.169    After I introduce them, they will deliver their remarks, and we170will continue with questions.171    Speaking first, we will have Major General Karsten F. Jensen. Major172General Jensen assumed the position of Danish defense attache to the173United States in 2025. He has previously served as a national deputy in174the F-35 Joint Program Office and as a branch head for Allied Command175Transformation in Norfolk. In addition to his service abroad, Major176General Jensen has a distinguished service history in the Danish air177command and in the Danish joint defense command. He has been deployed178to Cyprus, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Iraq.179    He will be followed by Dr. Sophia Besch. Dr. Sophia Besch is a180senior fellow in the Europe program at the Carnegie Endowment for181International Peace, her area of expertise being European defense182policy. Prior to joining Carnegie, Sophia was a senior research fellow183at the Center for European Reform in London and Berlin. She has also184spent time at the American German Institute researching transatlantic185defense industrial relations. Earlier in her career, she worked as a186Carlo Schmid Fellow in NATO's policy planning unit and as a researcher187for the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. She holds a doctorate in European188studies from King's College London and degrees in international189relations and international security from Sciences Po Paris and the190London School of Economics.191    Rounding out the panel, we have Kateryna Bondar. Kateryna Bondar is192a fellow with the Wadhwani AI Center at the Center for Strategic and193International Studies. Before joining CSIS, she was an advisor to the194government of Ukraine, where she was responsible for the implementation195of reforms in defense, the financial sector, and the innovation196ecosystem. Prior to that, she also managed technical assistance197projects implemented in the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and worked198in the National Reforms Council under the president of Ukraine. She has199a bachelor's and master's degree in international relations from Taras200Shevchenko National University of Kyiv.201    Now I will turn it over to Major General Jensen to give his opening202statement. Once everyone has had the opportunity to give remarks, I203will ask a round of questions, and then we will open it up to the204audience.205    Mr. Jensen: Thank you, Viktor. Thank you for the introduction, and206good afternoon, everybody.207    I would like to thank you for hosting and inviting me to this208briefing on a matter which is very important to Ukraine, to Europe, to209the alliance, and to Denmark. Since the beginning of the Russian full-210scale invasion, the Danish government and the Danish people have been211steadfast in their support for Ukraine.212    As such, Denmark is one of the countries with the highest monetary213level of donations per capita. We consider a robust Ukrainian defense214to be integral to Danish security. Therefore, while increasing our own215military spending to reach the five percent pledge, we simultaneously216support the Ukrainian defense.217    From a Danish perspective, strengthening our own defense and218supporting Ukraine is not mutually exclusive but part of the same219solution to strengthen European defense and security. In support of and220in cooperation with Ukraine, last year, we initiated the so-called221Danish model for procurements. The model has proved to be a defense222industrial success, delivering capabilities to the Ukrainian defense223effectively, in time, and boosting the Ukrainian defense industry at224the same time.225    This model is, in large, successful due to its novel approach to226procurements and its combination of solidarity with long-term strategic227thinking. Through the model, Denmark donates directly to the Ukrainian228defense industry instead of relying solely on purchasing military229equipment from third countries or donating from national stockpiles.230    The model can finance either existing contracts, reimburse expenses231held by the Ukrainian authorities, or new contracts entered by the232Ukrainian Defense Procurement Agency. This allows Denmark to support233Ukraine with donations based on the priorities and needs of Ukrainian234security and defense forces.235    The model is based on a government-to-government-to-business236framework. Such a framework enables the Ukrainian Defense Procurement237Agency to use Danish donations and acquisitions directly from the238Ukrainian industry. This does more than deliver weapons and239capabilities here now. It helps build an industrial foundation that240Ukraine can rely on for many years to come, while it keeps the241Ukrainian society going during the war.242    The result-based model proved successful in its pilot project,243which delivered 18 Bohdana artillery pieces solely funded by Denmark.244The order was placed in July 2024, and all pieces were battle-ready in245September of the same year.246    In 2024, the model supported Ukraine with approximately six hundred247twenty seven million, and in 2025, we expect the level of support to248reach close to two billion. However, the success of the model is not249measured by its amount of funding, but the fact that all provided250donations were delivered and integrated at the expected cost and on251time.252    The model leads to faster and more targeted deliveries while253strengthening Ukraine's industrial capacity. At the same time, the254model ensures appropriate levels of transparency with Danish255authorities closely monitoring each project, ensuring traceability,256documentation, and robust anti-corruption mechanisms.257    These include validation processes, Danish authorities verifying258deliveries, and audit procedures. To underscore the Danish approach259regarding concerns for potential corruption in our donations, let me be260frank.261    Yes, with respect to approving the Danish model in the Danish262parliament, corruption has been a concern. Nevertheless, our parliament263approved the model unanimously, not accepting corruption but accepting264risk, realizing that doing nothing is not an option.265    As highlighted by the NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte last week,266the continuous flow of weapons and support to Ukraine is important. To267this end, the Secretary General highlighted the Danish model as a268useful approach to address the needs of the Ukrainian defense forces.269    While this model is called the Danish model, our allies have270supported Ukraine through the same framework. This includes donations271from the European Union, from Canada, Sweden, Norway, and Iceland, all272of which were donated through the mechanisms and procedures of the273Danish model. We will continuously encourage other allies and partners,274nations, to join and improve the existing model.275    In conclusion, I will reiterate the Danish model is not just276military support; it is a partnership, a partnership in which Denmark,277along with allies and the EU, invests in Ukraine's ability to defend278itself, strengthen its economy, and build a more resilient future.279    It demonstrates how targeted support can be both principled and280practical, and how partners can help Ukraine while also preparing for281the security challenges of tomorrow. I look forward to your questions,282and thank you again for the opportunity to speak.283    Mr. Sallai: Thank you very much, General.284    Sophia?285    Ms. Besch: Thank you very much, Viktor, and thank you for the286invitation to this briefing.287    Let me take a step back. In its support of Ukraine, I do see Europe288now moving beyond emergency assistance and toward the long-term289integration of Ukraine into its defense industrial ecosystem. Early on290in the war, European governments were focused on rapid response, on291keeping Ukraine supplied from national stocks or emergency procurement.292What began in 2022 as a set of reactive crisis instruments is now293starting to evolve into something more strategic.294    Defense industrial partnership with Ukraine offers a path to move295from episodic aid to structured rearmament of both Ukraine and Europe.296Collaboration can create predictable and scalable ways of rebuilding297Ukrainian military capacity while embedding the country more deeply in298European supply chains and its broader innovation ecosystem.299    The strategic logic behind this is fairly straightforward. A300capable and rearmed Ukraine is Europe's first line of defense and301strengthens deterrence against Russia, and industrial capacity is302central to that goal. A Ukraine that can equip, repair, and sustain its303own forces offers the most credible security guarantee.304    Collaboration also aligns closely with Europe's industrial self-305interest. Working with Ukrainian defense players provides Western firms306with operational insight and access to a combat learning environment307that is not available anywhere else in NATO right now.308    All this remains relevant beyond a potential cease-fire. Ukraine is309set to remain a military and defense industrial powerhouse and first310line of defense against Russia, and creating robust industrial311cooperation pathways now will serve European security for years to312come.313    European MODs and EU institutions absolutely recognize the value of314closer industrial ties with Ukraine, and the political will for greater315integration is strong. On the ground, however, firms do still face316regulatory ambiguity, financial constraints, administrative burdens,317and, of course, security risks, and these frictions have all slowed318progress and have so far prevented Europe and Ukraine from realizing319the full strategic payoff of cooperation.320    That said, it is my sense that 2025 has been a breakthrough year321that began to unlock many of the most persistent restrictions to322Europe-Ukraine defense industrial cooperation and that there is real323momentum building behind this effort now.324    Governments and firms in Europe are experimenting with several325pathways for industrial cooperation. The most prominent model of326industrial support has been the direct financing model, or the Danish327model, which you have already heard about in detail, so I will not go328into it too much.329    Let me just reiterate that this approach has become an extremely330effective way to arm Ukraine while strengthening its defense industrial331base. We have seen variations of the Danish model emerge recently, such332as the Dutch model, which channels payments directly to Ukrainian333manufacturers and is more focused on startups, whereas the Danish334initiative has focused more on heavy equipment.335    Direct financing is highly valued in Ukraine because it gives Kyiv336maximum flexibility and is responsive to the immediate operational337needs of the military, and in Europe, it is highly valued, especially338by those governments without a strong domestic defense industrial base339at home.340    The main caveat, aside from intense accountability burdens, is that341this remains a government-financed wartime emergency instrument. Unless342the direct financing models evolve into longer-term defense industrial343partnerships, they could, in theory, end fairly abruptly, which makes344sustainable planning more difficult.345    A second pathway of collaboration is production and co-production346inside Ukraine. We have seen some initiatives here, particularly in347ammunition production and in maintenance, repair, and overhaul of348European-donated equipment. The benefits are clear. Production in349Ukraine can lower costs, it can build up local knowledge and expertise,350and, crucially, it brings capabilities much closer to the front.351    Overall, however, collaboration inside Ukraine has fallen short of352wartime requirements because European firms, particularly in the353ammunition space, face financial constraints. Ukraine often cannot354sustain higher volume production.355    They also have to contend with persistent security challenges from356Russian strikes on industrial facilities to the practical hazards of357moving personnel and material in a war zone, and the cost of war risk358insurance for European employees.359    Then added to this are significant bureaucratic hurdles, a highly360decentralized Ukrainian defense ecosystem, and frequently shifting361capability requirements, which all complicate long-term planning.362    That said, there are examples of smaller, innovative European firms363successfully navigating this, especially in the one sector that stands364out as the most dynamic segment of defense-industrial partnership365between Europe and Ukraine. I am referring, of course, to uncrewed366platforms--drones--but also the broader electromagnetic warfare367ecosystem.368    As you know, battlefield learning cycles in Ukraine, the speed of369iteration is extraordinarily fast, and European firms that fail to do370the learning on the ground increasingly find themselves unable to meet371the emerging standards that are set by Ukrainian certification372procedures, and so collaboration in this area is essential for European373firms if they want to remain competitive. It is telling that military374leaders from NATO frontline states will now routinely ask whether375systems have been tested and proven in Ukraine rather than taking376industry claims at face value.377    For that reason, Ukraine has become a magnet for technology firms,378drone firms, and those providing enabling capabilities that are keen to379learn more from Ukraine's extremely successful model of civil-military380integration.381    Some European early mover firms have already successfully built382plants in Ukraine, hired a local workforce, and acquired stakes in383Ukrainian tech startups, often on their own initiative. Ukrainian drone384companies, for their part, are extraordinarily capable but heavily385capital-constrained.386    Many of them are operating far below capacity, and to support them,387Ukraine is now opening export facilitation offices in Berlin and388Copenhagen. The idea is to encourage not just the export of products389but also investment in Ukrainian production and joint facilities390abroad.391    That leads me to the third and last pathway for collaboration that392I wanted to discuss today, and potentially, this is the most scalable.393That is joint production/joint ventures on NATO soil. Collaboration394inside Europe provides far safer operating conditions and the ability395for Ukrainian firms to scale in ways that might not be possible inside396Ukraine during wartime.397    This pathway is still fairly new, but several Western partners have398initiated first joint ventures. Denmark, again, stands out as the first399mover under the ``Build with Ukraine'' initiative. They have recently400helped a Ukrainian rocket and drone fuel firm establish operations401domestically. The U.K. has recently launched a licensing deal for402interceptor drones that will become the first Ukrainian combat system403licensed for production in a NATO country, but others, I believe, are404set to follow.405    One last point to make before I close on a very recent EU406development, and that is on the EU's new defense loan facility, SAFE.407SAFE is designed to mobilize large-scale investment in European defense408production, and it explicitly allows and encourages participation by409Ukrainian firms.410    Most of the recently published member states' plans for SAFE411already include provisions for the involvement of Ukrainian firms, and412if it is implemented effectively, SAFE could accelerate defense413industrial integration, but it will require navigating significant414structural regulatory barriers to the European market.415    Let me end with this. We are now facing another inflection point416for the war in Ukraine, with negotiations both over a potential cease-417fire and over the reparations loan based on Russian frozen assets418ongoing. Quite apart from the results of these processes, for Europe,419the logic is clear. Ukraine is its forward line of defense, and420integrating Ukraine into Europe's defense industrial base is an421investment in the continent's long-term security.422    This is a long-term project. It will require years of commitment423and resources, but strengthening defense industrial partnerships with424Ukraine is how Europe turns today's crisis response into a lasting425strategic advantage.426    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.427    Mr. Sallai: Thank you, Sophia.428    Kateryna?429    Ms. Bondar: Dear Chair, members of the Commission, thank you so430much for the opportunity to testify today. The views I express here are431my own, and they do not reflect the views of CSIS or the Ukrainian432government.433    Over the past four years of Russia's full-scale invasion, the434Danish model has become one of the main innovations in sustaining435Ukraine's military readiness. Let me dig deeper a little bit on the436problem that the Danish model was designed to solve.437    Ukraine's defense industry has expanded at a pace few have438anticipated. Ukraine's annual defense production capacity skyrocketed439from about one billion [dollars] in 2022 to over thirty-five billion440[dollars] by mid-2025, meaning that the country can now produce thirty-441five times more weapons and equipment each year.442    Production capacity does not matter if the government does not have443funds to buy that equipment. Just to give you an example, by early4442024, Ukraine could afford to procure only six billion [dollars] worth445of equipment despite having closer to twenty billion [dollars] of446available capacity.447    In other words, two-thirds of possible production sat idle because448the State simply did not have funding to procure that equipment. At the449same time, partner nations were running out of equipment they could450transfer from their stockpiles, and their industrial bases could not451scale quickly enough to meet Ukraine's growing operational needs.452    It was in this context that the Danish government pioneered a new453approach. Denmark began paying Ukrainian manufacturers directly to454build systems for the Ukrainian armed forces. The effect has been455transformative.456    In 2024, partners spent about $400 million through a family of457mechanisms, which were called the Danish model. I will expand on this a458little bit later, and it was mentioned before already.459    In 2025, the number rose to six billion [dollars]. To put that in460context, Ukraine's entire weapon procurement budget this year is ten461billion. The Danish model and its variants added another six462billion[dollars] on top of that.463    The mechanism works because it is fast, structured, and highly464accountable. The process begins with battlefield need. The Ukrainian465general staff identifies operational gaps, and the minister of defense466vets domestic manufacturers based on product maturity, codification467according to NATO standards, combat performance, ownership,468transparency, and delivery history.469    The proposed portfolio is then reviewed by joint counsel within the470Ministry of Defense, after which partner governments conduct their own471due diligence, including onsite inspections of factories in Ukraine.472Once approved, the contracts function almost like government-to-473government and business-to-business agreements. Finally, the funds flow474into dedicated accounts on Ukraine's UNITED24 platform, where companies475are paid directly from these accounts.476    Denmark physically verifies every batch delivered and the477documentation accompanying those deliveries. Such details as serial478numbers, quality certificates, and delivery logs are shared with479partner governments in real time. The entire system was recently480audited by Deloitte Denmark and Ukraine's minister of defense's481internal audit and successfully passed it.482    Importantly, the Danish model has now evolved into a broader family483of mechanisms. As was mentioned before, the Netherlands, for example,484signs contracts directly with Ukrainian companies, starting with the485one-billion [dollars] procurement of Ukrainian drones.486    Norway is adopting the same approach right now. Germany uses a487version in which the Ukrainian Defense Procurement Agency signs a488contract with a company, but the German government pays the invoice.489The variant is especially valuable for the Ukrainian government because490it strengthens Ukraine's own procurement institutions and reinforces a491transparent and rules-based procurement system.492    Taken together, these mechanisms are reshaping Ukraine's defense493ecosystem in several critical ways. First, they unlock Ukraine's494manufacturing capacity at scale. Ukrainian companies can expand their495production, hire workers, invest in new technologies, and increase496output systems for the armed forces, which they actually and urgently497need.498    Second, they support Ukraine's economy under wartime conditions.499Direct foreign procurement helps maintain industrial activity, tax500revenues, and employment, creating resilience well beyond the defense501sector.502    Third, they reduce corruption risks. This mechanism embeds multiple503layers of oversight. As I mentioned before, internal Ukrainian review,504partner government scrutiny, physical inspections, and independent505audits--these are all mechanisms helping to control corruption issues506related to government procurement in Ukraine.507    The result is a procurement system where decisions are based on508battlefield priorities and verifiable performance, not personal509networks and political pressure.510    Finally, they create a sustainable foundation for long-term511European and transatlantic security architecture. As partners exhaust512their own stockpiles, financing Ukrainian production directly is513becoming the only scalable path to ensuring a continuing flow of514systems Ukraine needs.515    In conclusion, the Danish model is not just a funding instrument.516It is a structural innovation in how international partners can support517the country at war while simultaneously building a more resilient,518transparent, and modern defense industrial ecosystem. It is one of the519most effective mechanisms we have for strengthening Ukraine's military520readiness and ensuring it can sustain its defense in years to come.521    Thank you so much, and happy to answer your questions.522    Mr. Sallai: Thank you very much, everyone, for your remarks.523    My first question will be for General Jensen. Could you briefly524walk us through the selection, verification, and procurement process of525the Danish model and explain how the specific anti-corruption526mechanisms function in practice, particularly how Denmark balances the527need for accountability with speedy weapon production?528    Mr. Jensen: Thank you for that question. I can try.529    I think my colleague here, Kateryna, just pretty well explained the530mechanisms to make sure that we have a good oversight of how the money531is spent. The practical way of selecting candidates for this system is532that it is built on the needs from Ukraine, so that it is the Ukrainian533MOD who recommends companies and systems built by that company--same534system weapons, et cetera. Denmark has a setup where we review, screen,535and validate these companies and procurement proposals and the prices536related to that; compare that with market prices and stuff; and after537contracts are made, weapons delivered, as mentioned before by Kateryna,538we perform physical inspections, review delivery certificates, and539verify that everything is delivered as agreed.540    Afterwards, there is even an audit on top of that, an external541audit with external auditors that audit the audit of the whole thing,542so I think we are trying to have safeguards and ways to protect that.543    With regard to the balance between speed and accountability, we try544not to make those two compete. We should not impact accountability545because of speed, and vice versa. It is built upon the requirement for546speed, but at the same time, ensuring a maximum level of accountability547and transparency.548    Even though you could argue that you cannot have speed and good549oversight, we try to do both at the same time.550    Mr. Sallai: Thank you very much.551    Sophia, my next question is for you. You touched upon this in your552testimony, but could you expand on how the different defense industrial553capabilities of European governments shape their approach to554cooperation with Ukraine when it comes to procurement?555    Ms. Besch: Yes, absolutely.556    As I mentioned in my testimony, there are all these different557pathways for collaboration that are emerging, and you might wonder why558certain European governments stick to one, and others stick to another,559and I think the starting point here is to just look at countries' own560industrial base and stock depth.561    For example, the Danish model is particularly attractive for562European countries that do not host their own major defense firms and563that may have limited stocks to draw from. Germany, at the beginning of564the war, looked at its own strong defense industry and instead chose a565model where the German MOD finances contracts--facilitates contracts566with German firms. That reduces the accountability burden for Germany,567and it also benefits German defense companies.568    Finland, which entered this war with particularly deep stocks569because the Finns have been preparing for the exact war that Ukraine570has been fighting for years, was able to draw from their own stockpiles571for a long time. Incidentally, both Germany and Finland are now hitting572the limits of their own domestic production capacity and also of their573stocks, and so now are eyeing deeper integration with Ukraine as well.574    I will also say that this has implications beyond just which model575you choose. If you are a small European defense firm right now, there576are a lot of advantages, and it is potentially lucrative to align577yourself with Ukrainian firms and align, you know, yourself with these578kinds of projects that integrate Ukrainian defense firms more closely579in European defense industrial bases because it positions you well to580possibly access future EU funding, for instance.581    The SAFE mechanism, which I mentioned explicitly, wants to fund582projects that include Ukraine. If you have those pathways set up, if583you are a smaller company, that might be lucrative for you.584    Whereas for the larger primes, some of them are wary of opening the585European market to competition from Ukrainian defense firms right now.586What I will say, though, is that talking to European MODs, they are587looking forward to some competition because we are currently in a588moment where European MODs, lots of them have a lot of money to spend589and they have to spend it very quickly, and that means that a lot of590that money is getting spent on domestic primes right now, which that is591not great for production time lines. It is not great for price points.592    A little bit more competition from Ukrainian firms that could593potentially do things faster and more cheaply, I think, will restore594European competition and, in the end, improve the projects, too.595    Mr. Sallai: Thank you very much.596    Kate, we have discussed these various models cooperating with the597Ukrainian government and Ukrainian businesses. How do these models598interact with Ukraine's own internal domestic procurement frameworks?599This is really both when it comes to their export control regulations,600as well as any type of bottlenecks that have been created when601integrating foreign financing and co-production with Ukrainian domestic602production pipelines.603    What policy adjustments have been made to mitigate these issues,604and what potential options do we have to alleviate these issues in the605long run?606    Ms. Bondar: Yes. On the Ukrainian side and its procurement system,607the Danish model and its variations exist as a parallel system, I would608say, so they do not replace or substitute the Ukrainian procurement609system. What they do is add a kind of additional layer on top of it,610and it started with the Danish model.611    Now we have around five to six different variations, and it creates612a little bit of difficulty in managing these projects, basically,613because there is a lot of paperwork, there is a lot of communication614with foreign procurement agencies and ministers of defense. Basically,615what could be done and what is the bottleneck is this project616management and accountability.617    The Ukrainian government would suggest, and that is kind of the618vision for 2026, to standardize this, all procedures, probably direct619them more to the Defense Procurement Agency, because this is what it620was created for. It was one of the demands within collaboration with621NATO, and that is the best practice of defense procurement.622    Streamlining all these procedures through the Defense Procurement623Agency of the Ministry of Defense, standardizing approaches, and that624would probably create more transparency for our partners, an easier625process of traction and monitoring procurement procedures, and626basically streamlining the process when everyone's aligned, and627everyone knows the rules of the game.628    Mr. Sallai: Thank you very much.629    General Jensen, the next question is yours. You have highlighted630that countless nations have joined the Danish model and various631variations of it. As the volume of partner contributions and demand for632these models to collaborate with Ukraine increases, what adaptations633would the Danish model need to be scaled up for greater production as634well as multilateral collaboration?635    Mr. Jensen: None, but maybe I should elaborate. [Laughter.]636    Ukraine needs funding, not production capabilities. As we just637heard, there is plenty of production capacity, and we have already, or638Ukraine has already, scaled production, so few adaptations are needed639for the increased multilateral support through the model. Other nations640are already participating and transferring funds through it, so we have641the model. It can also work with other nations, and we can easily642include donations from more nations.643    Of course, if it becomes really big and a lot of procurements644through that system, we probably need to just scale the model, but not645change it, is the idea. None.646    Mr. Sallai: Thank you very much.647    Sophia, given how Ukrainian firms must navigate both wartime648pressures as well as European regulations when it comes to interacting649through these procurement processes, how can Europe, the European650Union, and European national governments ensure that their own defense651regulations do not shut and bar Ukrainian industry out of their652collaboration opportunities both now and in the long run?653    Ms. Besch: Yes, there is a real regulatory burden challenge now654that Ukrainian defense firms are looking to enter and integrate with655the European market more. When I say regulations, those are broader ESG656regulations, EU regulations, anti-corruption and governance standards,657of course, but also sustainability and labor protections, strict supply658chain integrity rules, and human rights compliance.659    These rules are hard to meet for any defense firm in Europe right660now, but wartime due diligence and site checks for Ukrainian defense661firms are, obviously, particularly hard. The good news is that there is662a broad recognition in Europe of this challenge, of this problem, and663there is real momentum right now to reduce unnecessary regulatory664barriers.665    We see this shift in all European MODs toward spiral development666rate, good enough systems, fast iterations, rather than these artisanal667NATO standard systems of the past, and so there is a real will and668drive to get the regulatory burden down.669    The Commission has been in the lead on this. They have published670their--it is called the defense omnibus package that tries to671streamline procedures, accelerate production. It is also important to672say that while European MODs will be quick to blame Brussels, a lot of673these bottlenecks are national bottlenecks that come from national674procurement systems, and often it is not just a question of, you know,675a bonfire of regulations; it is also a question of increasing676administrative capacity.677    For instance, if you need many security clearances, and that is one678of the reasons that processes are being slowed down, the solution might679not be to get rid of the requirement for security clearances, but to680hire more people who can give you those security clearances.681    That is currently also a learning process that is happening in682European MODs, and, ultimately, this is in Europe's own interest. I683think Ukraine's integration can serve as a catalyst and accelerator684here.685    Mr. Sallai: Thank you very much.686    Kate, as we know, these new, fast-evolving technologies tend to687have much faster innovation cycles than traditional procurement688timelines, especially when it comes to drones and electronic warfare689systems.690    How can governments, both the Ukrainian government and European and691American governments, ensure that safety and accountability standards692are maintained while also innovating their procurement mechanisms to693accommodate these fast-evolving technologies?694    Ms. Bondar: Yes, that is a very good question, and it's really hard695to find this balance, and we are still trying to figure it out on the696Ukrainian level, and with European governments, it is even harder697because we have multiple opinions and legal systems and procurement698systems.699    My general recommendation would be to lower the level of risk700aversion, to accept risks related to adopting and using systems that701are not tested, like, according to all usual acquisition procedures, so702basically to shorten the cycles of testing and evaluation and adoption703into service, and usually, what happens in Ukraine, the battlefield704shows what works, what is not. It helps to refine systems and to pick705the best ones and to select the best ones.706    Cutting the red tape in procurement process that would also be707helpful so basically what happened in Ukraine is that the minister of708defense and the government sat and analyzed what are the critical and709crucial points in acquisition and procurement process and which stages710can be basically skipped, so leaving only the most necessary and711crucial stages and accepting more risk in procurement and acquiring712systems that are new and not known to the military yet. Those would be713my two recommendations that could be done.714    Mr. Sallai: Thank you very much. I have one last question for all715the witnesses, and then if anyone else has questions, feel free to walk716over to the podium.717    I have a question for anyone or whoever would like to answer this.718With the recent peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia719continuing to struggle, how do you see these procurement mechanisms720contributing to a future, durable peace in Europe?721    What aspects of these mechanisms are essential to ensuring that the722West is negotiating from a position of strength, as well as acting as a723deterrent against future Russian aggressions?724    Anyone? Yes, sorry.725    Ms. Besch: Now, I am really glad that you are asking this question726because, in a way, it is sort of the main message of my testimony727today. I think as the peace negotiations are going on, these emerging728procurement and co-production models are central to a durable peace729because any settlement is going to have to rest on real military730resilience.731    Europe and Ukraine are now building the industrial depth that732underpins credible deterrence through direct financing, through joint733manufacturing, through co-production. We do see this shift from ad hoc734to predictable and scalable rearmament. The effects of that are so735enormous, with Europe gaining a forward defense line that is integrated736into European supply chains and integrated into our own defense737industrial ecosystem. That gives us negotiating leverage as well,738right? Russia takes talks seriously only if Ukraine's capability and739Europe's support appear non-exhaustible.740    There is a long-term deterrent value here. Ukraine is not going to741return to a position of industrial vulnerability if we commit to a742defense industrial partnership. Its defense sector is going to be tied743into Europe's. Its production is going to be diversified across Europe744and Ukraine.745    That also allows a broader integration of Europe into the--of746Ukraine into the EU sector by sector--defense is just one of them--and747Ukrainian battlefield learning is going to continue to shape European748capability development, which is going to empower European rearmament749efforts, too.750    To me, the bottom line really is that industrial cooperation is a751foundation for any sustainable peace.752    Ms. Bondar: I will probably add to that that I also do research on753Russia a lot, and I am trying to understand what their leverage is and754what they are better at, and what they are better at is at scale--scale755of production and mass deployment of new systems.756    Unfortunately, none of the European countries can counterbalance757Russia alone. Only working together, European countries and Ukraine can758offer something against Russia, and I think that will be the biggest759leverage in any negotiations.760    Second, this process of approach in the Ukrainian industry and761European industry is crucial and important because when we get into the762weeds of the process, when we get into details, we see things like763differences in doing business practices, for example, why the Dutch764model faced many obstacles in the beginning. Just because the Dutch765were not prepared to do advancement payment in the beginning, the766amount of 50 [percent] to 70 percent to Ukrainian companies. It is767unknown practice in Europe, which is pretty common for Ukrainians.768    If we start integration on this practical level, very tangible769integration, I think it will be easier to build up later political and770other types of integration. You know, to be strong in negotiations, we771need to integrate Ukraine into the European security architecture and772community first, and then we will be able to counterbalance Russia in773terms of its scale.774    Mr. Sallai: Thank you.775    General?776    Mr. Jensen: Agree. Maybe I should add, anyway, since I pressed the777button here, that we went from initially lots of nations donated778weapons and systems and material, partly because Ukraine needed it, but779partly because that is what we could spare.780    Ukraine ended up with a myriad of systems and weapons and stuff,781and some of it was really good and useful, and some of it is still in782its boxes because nobody could train it or you could not sustain it or783anything, and that is not a way of helping Ukraine that will last past784any peace agreement. That will die out the day there is a peace785agreement.786    By this system, the Danish model, we facilitate processes as well787as industry, as well as society, to continue, no matter where the money788comes from, internally from tax revenue in Ukraine or from donations789from allies. This is a more durable and sustainable model, war or790peace.791    Thank you.792    Mr. Sallai: Thank you very much, everyone.793    With that, we can turn to questions from our audience. If you would794like to ask a question, please walk over to the podium and introduce795yourself.796    Question: Hi. I am Maggie. I work for the U.S. Helsinki Commission797as an intern.798    My question for anyone who wants to answer it is, as we watch799Europe utilize these models and sort of perfect them, what should the800U.S. be learning from this, and what role could or should the U.S. play801now and in the future?802    Ms. Bondar: Okay. I can start.803    Basically U.S. can leverage the experience of working with the804Ukrainian defense industry either by financing or co-developing805military systems because what is happening in Ukraine will have its806effects across the globe.807    In every conflict, in every theater, we need to learn the lessons,808we need to analyze the patterns that are present there. By involving809into Ukrainian defense industry and working with Ukrainian companies810that have firsthand access to the battlefield and constantly811communicate with warfighters on the frontline and with the Ukrainian812Special Forces and intelligence, they can gain what is most valuable,813experience, and then integrate this experience into the U.S. military.814Co-production/collaboration with the defense industry is one of the815ways to do that.816    My suggestion would be to look a little bit broader, so to still817look into joint training, joint exercises, just to practice and to see818how Ukrainians fight--what patterns are on the battlefield, what819tactics they use, what doctrine. Because Ukrainians also have a very820deep knowledge of Russian tactics and doctrine, that should also be821integrated into the U.S. TTPs and doctrine, et cetera.822    Because China is learning from Russia. Because Putin went to India823just recently and established military collaboration with India. These824are big powers, and the U.S. should be prepared, and Ukraine is the825entry point--is this starting point where they can--where the U.S.826military can have a look and glance into what is happening on the enemy827side, basically.828    Ms. Besch: Let me just add to that, because I think I agree with829everything that was just said. I think looking across the various830European initiatives that we discuss here today, there are a few831practices that stand out as relevant for the U.S., but I would also say832that not all of them are directly transferable, right?833    Europe's mantra, ``if the Ukrainians are not using it, we are not834interested''--that is the mantra of defense planners right now--that is835really rooted in Russia-focused defense and deterrence planning, and836the U.S., as you all know, faces a broader set of contingencies and is837not going to adapt the European way of warfare wholesale.838    Similarly, you know, Europe's political goal of integrating Ukraine839into the EU's single market sector by sector, it seems to me from what840I hear from this administration, that the U.S. posture currently is841shaped more by industrial onshoring and a desire to end the war842quickly, which, you know, also limits the depth of U.S.-Ukraine defense843industrial ties.844    What lessons are transferable, I think, are the embrace of845battlefield learning and co-development, especially in drones, and846there is a strong U.S. interest in this, too. There is this line of847drones--CEO of Quantum Systems, and he said that, you know, innovation848in drones right now is coming from the Donbas, not Silicon Valley. That849is something that U.S. firms have understood, too. We are seeing early850U.S.-Ukraine industrial integration steps with joint drone production851deals, you know, the joint venture for high-speed interceptors that was852just announced. These kinds of mutually beneficial partnerships are853tied to real battlefield requirements and rapid iteration. I think that854is the best avenue for deeper U.S.-Ukrainian defense-industrial855cooperation.856    Then, just to end with another lesson, I think that is relevant for857the U.S., is just the enormous number of systems that are being used up858in this war. You know, on certain phases we have had thousands and859thousands of drones being deployed by both sides in just a month and860that has to lead to considerations of how deep your stockpiles need to861be in order to sustain such an effort, not just of drones and862ammunitions but also of all the materials that it would take to build863these things--chips, sensors, batteries, all sorts of things that are864not necessarily built in the U.S. anymore.865    Securing those strategic supply lines is a big challenge for866Ukrainians, Europeans, and I would think that is also a lesson that867American defense planners can adopt.868    Mr. Jensen: Yes, I also agree, and I think depending on what the869strategy is for the U.S. I agree with what you have said, that it seems870like there is a slightly different, or not a slightly--there is a871different strategy from the U.S. perspective that is more global than872just the European AOR and so--and also the U.S. perspective on U.S.873defense industry needs to be part of this.874    If that was not the case, just adapt the Danish model, but I think875it is the case, so to be realistic, I think it is more--in a different876arena, the U.S. could learn from this.877    I think the speed of innovation in Ukraine is unique, the speedy878introduction of new capabilities, and also that, you know, the best is879good enough's worst enemy so you need to deliver at time--just enough880at time instead of, you know, the very best all the time because you881cannot afford--you do not have--you cannot afford to have enough mass882when you do that.883    I think that is where we all could learn something from the war in884Ukraine.885    Mr. Sallai: Thank you. Any other questions?886    Question: I used to do this, so you would think I would know, but I887am Jared Smith from With Honor.888    I think that the West, and especially the U.S., is starting to889learn that so much innovation can potentially be hamstrung by our890inability to diversify and secure our supply chains. You know, I am891just wondering from either the Danish or, you know, Ukrainian892perspective what are the best practices that we can do now in order to893make sure that any of these drones that we are building; the sensitive,894you know, critical minerals or magnets, are being gotten from friendly895nations as opposed to China so that we are not put in a position where,896you know, one day we are launching drones that can be turned off with a897flick of a button from Beijing.898    Ms. Bondar: Again, no silver bullet solution for that--[laughs]--899unfortunately, and as Ukrainians are saying, Russians and Ukrainians900are eating from the same bucket, which means the components come from901China.902    Ukraine recently, just a couple of weeks ago, launched separate903initiatives called Local Components, and for a reason. They realized904that strategically, if you want to be a leader in the industry and if905you want to be able to protect yourself, let us put it simply, you have906to be independent in supply chains.907    Ukrainians took this approach, actually, as Russians did as well.908They want to localize starting with the simplest components and then909going deeper and deeper. That is the approach countries at war take.910    We know that resources are not placed equally in the world. We need911to find them, basically, and we need to invest in extraction and912refinement. That is what Russia does. They analyze the whole supply913chain for Shahed drones, for example, and they start to localize with914the easiest products, and now they want to substitute Chinese batteries915with local production. They started with an investigation where they916have resources and how they can build a supply chain independently from917China or diversify the supplies, including India.918    That is why I think it shows us what could be done and also what is919useful in this case to look into as a model, how these two countries920build their defense ecosystems. Ukraine is an example of a921decentralized ecosystem where we have lots of manufacturers. They922produce different types of systems. Ukraine uses 400 types of drones923monthly. It is a zoo of technology, and imagine how many manufacturers924exist.925    Russia has a centralized and very different approach. They pick a926champion, so Shahed drones were a champion for long-range capability.927Now they have selected a couple of manufacturers for [FPV] First Person928View drones in Groups one and two, and Kalashnikov, their biggest929state-owned military enterprise, is investing in those companies to930scale their production, and what they do, they put all resources behind931these national champions and winners, so basically they want to grow932their own DJI, for example.933    I know it is an unpopular opinion in the West, where we have free934market and competition and lots of companies, but maybe a way to solve935the issue with supply chain independence and being able to build at936least the most necessary types of systems locally is to pick those937champions and to put all resources behind them.938    If we identify and we find a solution for small but local, you939know, rare earth and the whole supply chain built from there, maybe we940should give those resources to companies that are able to produce at941scale for the U.S. or European military.942    That is one of the ideas. I am not saying it is the best idea, but943this is what we can see, again, from the analysis of the ongoing war.944    Mr. Jensen: That is a great question, and actually, I do not have945an answer. I have another question. [Laughs.]946    I think what you are mentioning is the result of globalization947through many years. We all thought that this was a God-given way to948create the best value for money, and we will all be richer in that949manner, which is correct. That is what happened.950    We are paying the price now, so we need to figure out how to still951get the best value for money but still have sovereign control of952strategic resources, and those two are, you know, a contradiction953competing about the same answer. There is no one answer to those two954problems.955    I do not think protectionism is the answer, but I do not have the956right answer, so sorry.957    Mr. Sallai: Thank you. We have time for one or two more questions.958    Question: Hello. Thank you. My name is Kyle Parker with the959Helsinki Commission.960    I have a couple of questions related to the kit involved, and then961a couple of questions related to a contingency in the future of sort of962supplying, sustaining Ukraine, in the event that the United States963walks away from supporting Ukraine as has been threatened.964    On the question of the kit, how much, roughly, percentage of the965kit that Ukraine is using on the battlefield is being produced by966Ukraine? Not just by Ukraine with these funds, with funds through967things like the Danish model, but just generally. Then also a very968rough estimation of how much of that kit is actually of interest to969European NATO states in terms of their own defense, something that970could be ultimately sold or transferred.971    Then my second pair of questions, and these are--and I understand972we are short on time, so these can be for whoever feels is best capable973of answering them. In the event that the U.S. walks away from974supporting Ukraine as has been threatened recently, even very recently,975and by walking away, it seems to be unclear what that means, but I976would suspect it could mean a lack of willingness on the part of the977United States to either continue selling its own kit to European states978to then transfer to Ukraine.979    I assume it could also mean a lack of willingness to continue980intelligence sharing with Ukraine, and I assume it could also mean,981potentially, you know, a lack of willingness to allow U.S. assets--982bases, logistics, infrastructure in Europe--to supply this.983    My question there is, you know, how reliant is Europe on U.S.984advanced weaponry to supply for Ukraine, you know, as well as how985replaceable is the intelligence component. Then I guess the other--yes,986I think the other question is lift, logistics, sustainment--how capable987is Europe in doing this itself without any U.S. involvement?988    That is probably enough. Thank you.989    Mr. Jensen: May I suggest that the first couple of questions will990be directed at Kate here? Then I would like to try the last part, but991if you want to start.992    Okay. Because I do not know the numbers. Where is the gentleman?993    Okay, sir. I do not know the numbers here, so I hope maybe you can994help with that, the ratio between Ukrainian-produced material and the995rest.996    I would like to address the last question that you have: What if997the U.S. walks away, and the top--the bottom line here is that that998would be a problem. It is a big problem today. I think the problem will999maybe be less over time since we are building up in Europe, but1000building up to the degree we are about to do takes not only weeks or1001months; it takes decades.1002    That will be a problem if that happens tomorrow. I do not think it1003is in the U.S. interest, though, to do so, but that is a political1004decision, of course. There is a reason that the U.S. is present in1005Europe because being present--you know, with that follows influence,1006like now, you see, and also allowing Europeans and the Ukrainians to1007buy U.S. equipment creates jobs and revenue, and tax and bonds go up,1008and stuff like that.1009    It is in the U.S. interest to stay involved, to allow weapons and1010systems to be delivered. You can say, okay, so what about the Intel1011support? Also, a big problem, but I think the Ukrainians, together with1012other European nations, are also upping that area with the introduction1013of more and more drones and stuff. Surely, the space area is maybe the1014biggest one where we in Europe are far behind, and that will take time1015if we need to catch up on that.1016    Again, I think you should not see the Intel thing in isolation. I1017think you should combine them with the other two things I mentioned. If1018you want influence, if you want to earn money, and if you want to buy--1019us to buy European equipment, well, we need to have a mutual trust.1020    We need to have businesses. We need to have operational and1021strategic cooperation. That drives us to buy stuff here and work with1022the U.S., and that sends money this way across the Atlantic. It would1023be a problem, but also for the U.S.1024    Ms. Bondar: I will try to answer your question real quick.1025    Unfortunately, I do not have numbers just because they are1026classified. It is not public information what Ukraine gets in which1027amounts and from where, but a couple of numbers I still have in my1028mind.1029    On drones, it is ninety-six percent produced locally, only four1030percent delivered from abroad, and according to the minister of1031defense, these are just experimental systems and, you know, small1032little batches, but ninety-six percent. Both small Groups one-two long-1033range capabilities, are produced in Ukraine.1034    Again, it is a little bit questionable because almost a hundred1035percent of Ukrainian small drones have Chinese cameras. Yes, these are1036locally produced drones, but they are produced from foreign components.1037That is why, you know, we do not have to dig very deep into this to1038keep it short.1039    On air defense systems, for example, Ukraine is a hundred percent1040dependent on our partners. Yes, now air defense has become multilayered1041and mobile groups, for example, and interceptor drones are produced in1042Ukraine, but it is way bigger dependence on foreign assistance. It is1043really hard to give an estimated number because part of the information1044is classified, and part is questionable.1045    On your second question, also real quick, you mentioned--well, I1046will talk about the Ukrainian side and what if the U.S. walks away.1047Yes, we need weapons, and there are very sophisticated systems that1048cannot be replaced by any other type of equipment, and we need to buy1049them from the United States, including air defense.1050    You mentioned intelligence information. That is also crucial. It is1051not that, you know, publicly discussed or obvious, but it is crucial1052because Ukraine makes its bet on long-range strikes, trying to destroy1053the Russian economy and to stop the war, if we can say so, by just1054disabling the Russian economy. To conduct deep strikes, Ukraine needs1055foreign intelligence, and it is impossible to replace or substitute1056with only Ukrainian means. That is basically crucial, because if that1057information sharing stops, Ukraine will not be able to conduct any deep1058strikes. That stops the Ukrainian war effort, because on the frontline,1059Russia, unfortunately, has an advantage, and we know about that.1060Ukraine's best hope is deep strikes and destroying the Russian economy1061first.1062    Ms. Besch: I will be super brief.1063    I think the way that you asked the question is exactly the right1064way to ask that question--what does stepping away actually mean--and1065that is how Europeans are currently trying to disentangle this as well.1066What steps can we expect when, right?1067    The way that you used the term kit, I think, is--sometimes that can1068be a little bit confusing because really it is not the hardware so much1069that is of interest for Europeans in terms of what we are learning from1070the Ukrainians. It is all the enabling capabilities of the electronic1071warfare around it, and this is also where we are still the most1072dependent on the United States, right?1073    This is, to me, how your questions interlock right now, and I will1074just say, while I agree with everything that the major general has1075said, I would never presume to know or to state the U.S.'s interests. I1076do think that there are clear messages that Europeans are currently1077getting about the U.S. being open for business, and PEARL is a good way1078and a good mechanism in that general vein.1079    There have been some really useful negotiations happening over what1080PEARL actually covers, for it to cover only those capabilities that1081Europeans cannot produce or do not currently have themselves, and that1082seems fairly--at least on a self-interest basis, a fairly sustainable1083way of going about it.1084    Then equally having that kind of more sort of staged conversation1085of, okay, you want us to stand on our own feet; these are the1086capabilities that we are currently investing in. We are going to need X1087amount of years to get there. I think that is the kind of more1088constructive conversation that is happening behind the scenes right1089now, and that is where Ukraine, again, plays such a crucial role as a1090catalyst and as an accelerator.1091    Mr. Sallai: Thank you very much to everyone who has attended, and1092especially to our witnesses. With that, the briefing has ended.1093    [Whereupon, at 3:07 p.m., the briefing ended.]10941095                               [all]10961097    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]10981099           The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent1100         federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in1101              implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords.11021103            The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine1104       Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the1105                Department of State, Defense, and Commerce.11061107                                www.csce.gov11081109                       youtube.com/HelsinkiCommission11101111                      facebook.com/helsinkicommission11121113                    flickr.com/photos/helsinkicommission11141115                             x.com/HelsinkiComm