J.Hrg.119

1[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 119 Congress]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34119th Congress                                 Printed for the use of the51st Session              Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe6_________________________________________________________________________78                  The MAX App: Russia's Pocket-Sized9                      Approach to Mass Surveillace1011    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]1213                          DECEMBER 2, 20251415                          Briefing of the16      Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe17__________________________________________________________________________1819                           Washington: 20262021                       Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe22                                234 Ford House Office Building23                                     Washington, DC 2051524                                         202-225-190125                                     csce@mail.house.gov26                                     http://www.csce.gov27                                     @HelsinkiComm2829                                       Legislative Branch Commissioners3031              SENATE                                                   HOUSE3233ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi Chairman                  JOE WILSON, South Carolina34SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island                        Co-Chairman35  Ranking Member                                       STEVE COHEN, Tennessee Ranking Member36JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas                                 ROBERT ADERHOLT, Alabama37KATIE BRITT, Alabama                                   EMMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri38JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania                           LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas39JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire                          JAKE ELLZEY, Texas40TINA SMITH, Minnesota                                  RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina41THOM TILLIS, North Carolina                            GREG MURPHY, North Carolina42MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota                              MARC VEASEY, Texas4344                                 Executive Branch Commissioners4546                             DEPARTMENT OF STATE, to be appointed47			     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, to be appointed48                             DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, to be appointed4950                                      [II]5152   ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE5354    The Helsinki process, formally titled the Conference on Security55and Cooperation in Europe, traces its origin to the signing of the56Helsinki Final Act in Finland on August 1, 1975, by the leaders of 3357European countries, the United States and Canada. As of January 1,581995, the Helsinki process was renamed the Organization for Security59and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE].60    The membership of the OSCE has expanded to 57 participating States,61reflecting the breakup of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and62Yugoslavia.63    The OSCE Secretariat is in Vienna, Austria, where weekly meetings64of the participating States' permanent representatives are held. In65addition, specialized seminars and meetings are convened in various66locations. Periodic consultations are held among Senior Officials,67Ministers and Heads of State or Government.68    Although the OSCE continues to engage in standard setting in the69fields of military security, economic and environmental cooperation,70and human rights and humanitarian concerns, the Organization is71primarily focused on initiatives designed to prevent, manage and72resolve conflict within and among the participating States. The73Organization deploys numerous missions and field activities located in74Southeastern and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The75website of the OSCE is: .7677ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE7879    The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as80the Helsinki Commission, is an independent U.S. Government commission81created in 1976 to monitor and encourage compliance by the82participating States with their OSCE commitments, with a particular83emphasis on human rights.84    The Commission consists of nine members from the United States85Senate, nine members from the House of Representatives, and one member86each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce. The positions87of Chair and Co-Chair rotate between the Senate and House every two88years, when a new Congress convenes. A professional staff assists the89Commissioners in their work.90    In fulfilling its mandate, the Commission gathers and disseminates91relevant information to the U.S. Congress and the public by convening92hearings, issuing reports that reflect the views of Members of the93Commission and/or its staff, and providing details about the activities94of the Helsinki process and developments in OSCE participating States.95    The Commission also contributes to the formulation and execution of96U.S. policy regarding the OSCE, including through Member and staff97participation on U.S. Delegations to OSCE meetings. Members of the98Commission have regular contact with parliamentarians, government99officials, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and100private individuals from participating States. The website of the101Commission is: .102103The MAX App: Russia's Pocket-Sized Approach to Mass Surveillance104105                            December 2, 2025106107                                                                         Page108                        COMMISSION STAFF PRESENT109110Alanna Novetsky, Communications Director, Commission on Security111and Cooperation in Europe ................................................................  1112113                              PARTICIPANTS114115Anastasiya Zhyrmont, Policy Manager, Eastern Europe & Central Asia, Access Now ...........  2116Laura Cunningham, President, Open Technology Fund ......................................... 4117Justin Sherman, Founder and CEO, Global Cyber Strategies .................................. 5118119The MAX App: Russia's Pocket-Sized Approach to Mass Surveillance120121                              ----------122123                            December 2, 2025124125           Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe126                    Washington, DC127128    The briefing was held from 2 p.m. to 3:08 p.m., Room 2358-C,129Rayburn House Office Building, Alanna Novetsky, Communications130Director, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding.131132    Ms. Novetsky: Good afternoon. My name is Alanna Novetsky, and I am133the communications director with the U.S. Helsinki Commission. I am134pleased to welcome you to this briefing on ``The MAX App: Russia's135Pocket-Sized Approach to Mass Surveillance.'' Thank you all for joining136us.137    Before I turn it over to our esteemed members of our panel, I will138share a few words about why we are choosing to focus on this issue now.139On a trip to Kyiv in September, my colleagues and I met with members of140civil society who support and help evacuate Ukrainians living under141Russian occupation. They discussed how the information environment142there has made every aspect of their jobs more difficult. Occupation143authorities flood Ukrainians with propaganda, and search their devices144and homes for any tools to connect with the open internet and145communicate freely. Ukrainians live in a constant State of fear. They146do not know who to trust or what to believe.147    For the Kremlin, creating an information bubble in occupied Ukraine148is central to their genocidal project to erase the Ukrainian State. By149purging occupied territories of any means of connection with the150outside world, authorities believe they can isolate and dishearten the151population, discourage resistance, and brainwash the next generation.152    Yet, despite relentless pressure, Ukrainian parents and153grandparents continue to risk everything to find virtual and physical154pathways out of this hell for their children. They teach their children155Ukrainian in secret and use VPNs to give them a Ukrainian education.156They find ways to talk to their neighbors undetected to help avoid157conscription into the Russian army. In some cases, they find routes out158of the occupied territories and lead their families through treacherous159escapes. Through their kids, using the limited resources and technology160they have, these parents and grandparents keep hope alive for a future161in which Ukraine is free and united.162    Over the past several months, the Kremlin has doubled down on its163efforts to digitally monitor and isolate those under its thumb in164Russia, Ukraine, and elsewhere. They are implementing a novel approach165to censorship and surveillance that pairs old-school authoritarian166tactics with software solutions that allow authorities to police167people's digital lives on their personal devices. As part of this168strategy, they have launched MAX, a super app that gives Russian169officials wide-ranging access to users' messages, contacts, internet170usage, and location--which is the topic of this briefing.171    With that, I am honored to introduce our panelists, who will172discuss the implications of Russia's approach to wide-scale digital173surveillance, the potential for Russia to export this paradigm further174beyond its borders, and strategies to circumvent and counter this175approach to repression.176    First up, we will have Anastasiya Zhyrmont. She spearheads Access177Now's Eastern Europe and Central Asia policy work, building coalitions,178influencing stakeholders, and bringing digital rights issues in179restrictive environments into the international spotlight. Anastasiya180previously worked as an advocate for the rights of people with181disabilities and currently serves as a board member for Inclusion182Europe.183    Laura Cunningham is the president of the Open Technology Fund, a184nonprofit organization supporting the counteraction of repressive185censorship and surveillance globally. Laura has over a decade of186experience working on internet freedom across a variety of donor,187nonprofit, and government organizations. Prior to joining OTF, Laura188was the senior advisor for internet freedom in the U.S. State189Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, where she190led the Department's internet freedom programs focused on technology191development, digital security, internet policy advocacy, and research.192    Last but not least, we have Justin Sherman, who is the founder and193CEO of Global Cyber Strategies, a D.C.-based research and advisory194firm, an adjunct professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign195Service, and a distinguished fellow at Georgetown's Law Center on196Privacy and Technology. He was previously a fellow at Stanford's U.S.-197Russia Forum, where he participated in track-two dialogs with Russian198counterparts on international security issues. Justin has consulted for199and advised CEOs, government officials, investors, attorneys, product200managers, communications strategists, and threat intelligence teams,201including volatile, complex, and high-risk scenarios. He has consulted202on projects and programs for organizations ranging from HBO to DARPA.203    Now I will turn it over to Anastasiya for her opening statement.204Once everyone has had an opportunity to give their opening remarks, I205will ask a round of questions, and then we will open it up to audience206questions. So, Anastasiya.207    Ms. Zhyrmont: First of all, thank you so much for the opportunity208to appear before you today. Of course, it is an honor for me to address209the issue of accelerating crisis of digital censorship and surveillance210in the Russian Federation, including the growing role of MAX messenger,211a state-controlled tool that exposes users to State surveillance,212undermines their privacy, exposes them to State propaganda, and further213limits access to independent information.214    Well, first of all, let me start by outlining the current status of215the digital space within Russia and how authorities are driving the216country into the complete shutdown and informational blockade from the217rest of the world. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian218authorities have blocked access to almost all websites of independent219media, NGO's, and global social media platforms. Facebook and220Instagram--whose parent company, Meta, was declared extremist221organization in 2022--are banned, as TikTok, X, Discord, and even222Signal. YouTube is heavily throttled, so it is barely functional for223many users within Russia. Starting this summer this year, authorities224went as far as they also disabled voice calls on Telegram and WhatsApp,225which are the two last remaining accessible platforms in Russia. Recent226reports indicate that WhatsApp is experiencing dysfunctions. It is not227functioning well in many regions of Russia, and this has led some228experts to believe that it soon will be blocked as well.229    Adding to all of this, since May this year, millions of Russians230and people in the occupied territories have been experiencing mobile231internet shutdowns. What started as sporadic outages has now escalated232to frequent, in some regions even daily disruptions of mobile and233cellular data services. Since September this year, Russia has also234begun whitelisting during the internet shutdowns, meaning that only a235narrowly approved list of websites, usually state-controlled, is236accessible during the shutdowns. Usually, it includes services such as237Yandex, state-controlled media outlets, et cetera.238    It has been done to promote MAX messenger, not only a messenger in239itself but a comprehensive surveillance tool, which now comes240preinstalled on all the devices sold in Russia starting September 1st.241According to independent assessments, MAX does not merely record user242messages and metadata; it embeds deep tracking analytics and compiles a243wide--a wide digital dossier on the user, mixing personal identifiers244like gender, age, your email, your phone number with external account245IDs linked to other social media and the usage data.246    Also, precise geolocation tracking is built in, so if247granted``Always On'' location permission, MAX can report your real-time248movements. In repressive conditions, as you can imagine, this can249expose attendance at political protests, political gatherings, or250simply trace your mobility and all of your contacts.251    Another feature of MAX is also the collection of your search252history within the app, linked to your identity. In light of the recent253legislation that targets people who are not only searching for254extremist material--including materials by independent media--the app255can potentially expose such users to heavy fines or even tougher256penalties. The app is reportedly capable of more invasive operations257like secretly switching on your microphone, your camera, or even screen258recording.259    Despite all of those risks, it is becoming more and more popular260due to the combination of aggressive promotion by the authorities, but261also the way essential services are funneled in ways through it. Many262of our partners on the ground, parents and students, report their263school group chat, for instance, often circulates official reminders264that you need to install this app. Beyond schools, regional authorities265in some areas went as far as tying access to critical public safety266notifications, such as air raid alerts or emergency alerts in the app.267Since November 5, the MAX app has also been launched in Belarus,268Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Armenia, and269Azerbaijan.270    At the same time, it is very difficult for users to still make271resistance and escape such a type of control because of the ongoing272crackdown on circumvention tools and privacy tools, such as VPNs. In273recent years, Roskomnadzor, the censorship body in Russia, has274pressured major big tech companies to remove VPNs from the App Store in275Russia. Unfortunately, Apple, for instance, succumbed to this276censorship request. As a result, more than 100 VPNs are right now277unavailable in the App Store in Russia.278    Just let me underline that without VPN and other security tools,279people in Russia and in the occupied territories are deprived of ways280to securely access independent information, to communicate privately,281or to evade digital surveillance. This is why we as Access Now, but as282civil society as a whole, we call on the governments to condemn the use283of mandatory or state-controlled and preferred apps that collect284invasive privacy data under the guise of national sovereignty, support285civil society and digital rights group in exposing such invasive286practices, but also providing resilience tools and digital security287tools for the users in order to increase their safety; and to recognize288that shutting down or reengineering the whole internet to serve State289propaganda and surveillance is tantamount to curtailing freedom,290dissent, and democracy. We also call on big tech companies and Apple291not to concede to the Russian government's attempts and efforts to292suppress freedom of expression and to, instead, restore all of the293blocked and deplatformed VPNs in the App Store in Russia.294    Thank you. I would love to answer any questions that you might295have.296    Ms. Novetsky: Thank you so much.297    Yes, Laura, go ahead.298    Ms. Cunningham: Wonderful. Thanks again for having us here today,299Alanna. I am really excited to talk about such an important issue. I300think, just kind of taking off of what Anastasiya started with, I think301MAX really does represent a significant evolution in the Kremlin's302approach to information controls. Obviously, has hugely concerning303implications for freedom of expression, access to information, privacy,304and security for Russian citizens. However, in this context, I think it305is really important to remember that MAX, in and of itself, should not306be our primary concern. Rather, the aggressive model of internet307control that the implementation of MAX predicts is the true challenge308that we are confronted with today.309    As Anastasiya explained, since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine,310the Russian government has demonstrated both the will and the technical311capacity to implement a sophisticated model of total internet control.312We refer to this in the Chinese context as the Locknet. The Russian313government has not only brought a largely decentralized infrastructure314to heel, but also instituted a centralized censorship regime and made315significant strides toward even more totalitizing solutions, including316the much-discussed Runet, and more recently and potentially more317concerning, a Chinese-style Locknet supported in part by the318implementation of MAX.319    By capturing their citizens on a single app, the Kremlin, as320Anastasiya said, can leverage backend control to far more effectively321censor and surveil their citizens. Which serves to not only teach but322reinforce self-censorship among citizens themselves. Simultaneously,323the app provides all the information and services a citizen is supposed324to need in Russia, thereby prescribing the bounds of what should and325should not be permissible within the country. When that is combined326with significant impediments to accessing the global internet or327nonState platforms, such as censorship, meta-censorship, legal328consequences, and offline consequences that we know are common in329Russia, the stage is really set for near-complete information control.330    If this model of control is successfully implemented over a long331enough period of time, it is likely--and we have seen this happen in332China--to fundamentally reengineer how Russian citizens think about,333search for, and engage with independent media over the long term. I334think--kind of to put it most simply, I think the Kremlin really hopes335to force their people to choose between convenience and ease of a super336app over freedom--over freedom, until they no longer have any337meaningful conception of what the global internet looks like outside of338this walled garden that has been created by the State.339    In this context, I think it is really important that we not confuse340tactics with a longer-term strategy. Our goal should not be to compete341with Russia tool for tool. I do not think we should respond to MAX with342the anti-MAX app. Rather, to provide a compelling alternative343environment where Russian citizens can continue to actively connect to344the global internet and engage with a diversity of technologies and345information. In this formulation, success is not about eliminating MAX346entirely but, more importantly, rendering it just irrelevant to the347Kremlin's information control goals.348    I think, honestly, in these terms in this moment, we--the U.S.349Government has an upper hand. We are still able to offer Russian350citizens access to the entire global internet, something that they351clearly remember and desire. That is far more compelling than a single352app is going to be. Think we need to work to honor and channel the353desire that Russian citizens have to access tools and techniques to354easily reach the global internet, and to help them to avoid the ever-355increasing state-imposed friction and chokepoints designed by the356Kremlin to discourage their access.357    To do this, I think, from a technological perspective, there are358two things that we really need to focus on. We need to support a359diversity of tools and technologies, not that respond individually tool360for tool or app for app but instead work collectively to undermine the361Russian government's model as a whole. First, we should continue to362facilitate Russian citizens' access to the global internet and363independent information. This means continuing to support a range of364secure privacy-enhancing circumvention tools and secure communication365tools to empower Russian users and impede the Kremlin's ability to366force citizens onto apps like MAX.367    Second, we should simultaneously invest in new solutions to stay368ahead of quickly evolving Russian information controls. In preparation369for the next generation of Russian information controls, we should370invest now in forward-looking internet freedom solutions, such as371advanced circumvention techniques, novel security and privacy-enhancing372technologies, and innovative shutdown mitigation tools that are373becoming ever more critical in this environment, as Anastasiya pointed374out.375    I think the speed and scale with which the Russian government has376prioritized and is investing in information controls only raise the377stakes for the U.S. to support internet freedom and free expression in378Russia. Currently, the population of Russia still remembers how to379access independent information and connect to the wider world. Like I380said earlier, as we have seen in China, they risk losing this muscle381memory the longer the Russian government censorship remains unchecked.382    Ms. Novetsky: Thanks so much, Laura.383    Yes, Justin, go ahead.384    Mr. Sherman: All right. Thank you. Thank you to the Commission as385well for the chance to talk about an issue that, as my fellow panelists386have said, is not just critical for human rights in Russia and Ukraine387and the region, but also for U.S. and Western security as well.388Hopefully, this will dovetail well with what we have just heard.389    To step back for a second, over the past several decades, but390especially the last 10 to 15 years, the Russian government has built391out an extensive domestic surveillance apparatus. It spans phone and392internet monitoring, mobile device surveillance capabilities, cyber393actors that can break into devices and networks, facial recognition394systems, biometric surveillance data bases, censorship and web395blocking, and, among others, outright coercion. It is, as Julien396Nocetti has put it, a dictatorship of law approach to internet policy,397fused, I would add, with sophisticated State intelligence capabilities,398and what Masha Gessen has rightfully called ``the economy of terror''399approach to information control. The MAX app, developed by VK400[VKontakte], is therefore part of this broader surveillance ecosystem.401    The mixed origins of where this comes from, as we all know, we had,402you know, Soviet security apparatuses that were migrated to their post-403USSR collapse forms, keeping many of the same technology and404surveillance capabilities. You had law enforcement, you know, systems405that were set up in the 1990's that were then converted into what we406now see as the form of modern internet monitoring in Russia. All the407way to the paranoia and distrust of the internet, the internet408awakening of the Kremlin I call it sometimes, across 2008 Russo-409Georgian war, the 2010's Arab Spring, the 2013 Snowden leaks--coming to410view the internet as not just a threat to regime security but as a tool411of the U.S. Government--which, of course, many here would find412fanciful--but a tool of the U.S. Government to project power. All to413say, the Putin regime today views the internet both as a threat to414regime security and a weapon to wield against Russia's enemies. The MAX415app is a direct follow-on of this worldview.416    As we heard, MAX is built by the Russian tech company VK. As of417September 1st, it is required to be installed on every new phone sold418in Russia, implemented through coercive and legal pressure, both on419phone-selling companies as well as individuals who will use those420devices. MAX enables users to do all of the things we heard, messaging,421and much more. The Kremlin's vision is much more expansive--talking422about replacing physical documentation, enabling people to verify their423identities entirely through the app, both for business and government424purposes, replacing, as we heard, State alerts, forms of communication,425and other document-sharing systems that currently exist on State426servers, or in less-centralized fora.427    At the same time, as we heard, as the Kremlin has required MAX's428installation on devices in Russia, it has also blocked alternatives.429Again, something we have seen time and time again as a means of pushing430people onto a particular platform. I will also add that VK, much like431Kaspersky and other Russian tech companies, may have had the432opportunity 25 years ago to exist fairly independently from the433Kremlin. That is obviously not the case today. These companies have434long ago more than willingly bent the knee to the Putin regime.435    When past Russian domestic tech or digital surveillance efforts436have failed in recent years, it is typically fallen victim to at least437one of three factors. [A], terribly built, dysfunctional technology.438[B], a lack of political will, meshed with bureaucratic incompetence.439Or, [C], both. We will put corruption under the incompetence umbrella,440right? The problem here, at least from my vantage point, is MAX may be441poised to avoid all three of these stumbling blocks. You have a product442from a fairly successful consumer-facing technology company. You have,443as we have heard, seemingly enforced legal requirements in Russia on444device manufacturers, on individuals to use it. The technical445throttling of alternatives. We see that political will. We see that446capability there now.447    Further complicating the challenge ahead is Russia's growing448techno-isolationism, leaving Russians with fewer technological systems449in general that are not heavily Russian state-monitored and controlled.450If they are not Russian these days, they are more, in fact, in some451cases, from China than they are from Europe, or the U.S., or Japan, or452elsewhere. You have persistently growing Kremlin paranoia, as453mentioned, about Western tech platforms. You had Meta designated as a454terrorist organization 3 years ago, as an example of that view. You455also have suboptimal or harmful policy decisions from U.S. tech456companies. In some of these cases, U.S. tech firms, such as with457YouTube, are dealing with highly complicated tradeoffs, decisions,458often more so than the public might appreciate, in terms of information459access, censorship, and content requests.460    At the same time, you have other firms making disastrous decisions,461such as with Apple and Google a couple of years ago, deciding to open462local offices in Russia, which, of course, demonstrates some degree of463naivety about the risk. All to say, as we have heard, MAX threatens464human rights in Russia. As was mentioned, I recently wrote in The465Atlantic about this as well. Russian forces are stopping individuals466entering and leaving temporarily occupied territories to do technical467inspections of devices, the details of which we will not get into, but468to include looking for the MAX app on people's phones. As mentioned, it469is also now permeating the near abroad.470    Then the second set of concerns really, to me, relates to broader471U.S. and Western security, which is, as Laura was just saying, not472every country has the political will, the intelligence sophistication--473as in intelligence agency sophistication--the policing apparatus, the474tech talent to control and surveil in the way China does. Not every475country has the same underlying digital infrastructure layout as China476does, which is quite centralized. In many other countries, like Russia,477it is much more diffuse. Enter then an approach that requires less478technical centralization, that requires less of a broader tech talent479base to implement, and that may require less financial investment to480carry out. Yet, as some, you know, have already analogized MAX to481China's WeChat, as an attractive means of conducting State482surveillance, of trying to suppress dissent and free expression, or--483this was not mentioned yet--of trying to root out Western spies, and484adverse Ukrainian spies, and an adversarial and authoritarian regime,485through this messaging app.486    Looking forward, there are several solutions that Congress can487undertake in this area. These include renewed funding, as was488mentioned, for anticensorship circumvention capabilities, privacy-489forward encrypted messaging systems, to continue engagements or renew490engagements, we will say, in some cases, with European partners on this491issue set, and, importantly, continuing to study the problem and to492conduct effective oversight of executive branch activities in this493area. I look forward to your questions. I will stop there.494    Ms. Novetsky: Thank you so much.495    Yes, so I will ask the first round of questions, and then following496that, we will open it up to audience questions, so you can ask497questions from that podium and that microphone over there. Just make498sure to introduce yourself when you do so.499    I will start with you, Anastasiya. Historically, as Justin500mentioned, Russian attempts to create an isolated internet for those501under Russian control have made life worse for users in many ways. You502have written extensively about how local and regional internet503blackouts, for example, make it difficult for Russians to complete504daily tasks, like withdrawing money from ATMs. However, it seems like505recently Moscow has shifted its approach and is prioritizing user506experience. It did so, you know, including through the MAX app. Do you507think that Russians will mind using the censored internet if the user508experience is improved? What further steps could Moscow take to ease509the discomfort of using this censored or restricted internet and quell510resistance to surveillance and censorship?511    Ms. Zhyrmont: Well, thank you for the question. It is a very512justifiable concern indeed that users in Russia, but also in the513occupied territories, will, as Laura said, lose the muscle memory to514use the independent internet, and will somehow get used to this all515limited possibilities. We have seen this with YouTube. Several years516ago, two or 3 years ago, it was difficult to imagine the daily life of517Russian people where YouTube played a huge role in their daily life,518that even if blocked, they would not search for opportunities to519circumvent this. The throttling of YouTube, which made it extremely520inconvenient for Russians to watch YouTube, actually switched many of521them to alternatives, like RUTUBE and other, like, ways to receive this522content.523    Which, of course, makes us believe that the same will happen with524MAX. Indeed, Alanna, not only is it all the entertainment and ability525to, well, basically call your friends and relatives, because on other526platforms, as I said, video calls are blocked, but also, as you said,527it is more and more user-friendly. All the content is in there. All the528State services are embedded and funneled through it. If not in the529repressive environment, just imagine--all platforms in one app, and you530do not need to switch. You do not need to choose. Like, all your531friends, all your work-related contacts are in there. Yes, Russian532authorities are investing a lot, not only in advertisement of the MAX533app, but also in increasing its usability and user friendliness. Russia534is a tech-savvy country that can actually compete, at the moment, with535all of this.536    People also have no choice. We are hearing reports that employers537are forcing their employees to install the app. You are somehow banned538from the community in those parent or student group chats if you are539not using it. You are simply receiving no reports, no updates. It is540very difficult not to use it. Even people who are well-aware of all the541risks prefer to minimize them through acquiring a new device and542installing MAX on it. It is a temporary solution. One way--first of543all, not all people can afford to buy a second phone. Of course, one544way or another it will become--[phone rings]--oh, I am so sorry--545impossible not to use it. So sorry. [Laughs]Alert. [Laughter.] MAX app.546[Laughter.] Yes.547    Ms. Novetsky: Thank you so much.548    Laura, so you discussed how the Russian government has549systematically increased its online information control since the full-550scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the deployment of the MAX is551sort of the latest step in this progression. What do you think this552progression tells us about the Kremlin's longer-term strategy for553internet control, both in Russia and in the occupied territories of554Ukraine? What do you think is next?555    Ms. Cunningham: Yes. I think what we are starting to see is a very556similar kind of Chinese Locknet model being deployed in Russia as well.557Obviously, given the differences between kind of the starting points of558Russia's infrastructure and China's infrastructure, kind of, that path559is going to look very different. I think ultimately the goal that the560Russian government is pushing toward right now looks very similar to561where China is headed as well. What that is to say is creating, rather562than, I think, for a long time, many people thought of, you know, in563China they had a great firewall and kind of censorship happened at the564border. That was kind of the only impediment to access to the global565internet.566    What we have seen in China instead is creating these kinds of567concentric circles of control, making it more difficult, basically at568every step, for a user to access the global internet. Starting with, we569see in China a kind of WeChat being this walled garden providing all570the information you could possibly want, being, in fact, very content-571rich. A place that people are not necessarily dying to escape, so you572start with this kind of platform substitution that really captures the573audience. Then, adding layers of meta-censorship, making it impossible574to even kind of search for or know about circumvention. Even if you575wanted to get beyond WeChat, like, what would be the process for that576and how? Then seeing VPNs themselves blocked and disabled, so that by577the time--you know, even to get to the great firewall, you have had to578go through so many barriers and steps of unknown information that is579difficult to ascertain even to get there.580    What that does, I think, is two things. One, it obviously581disincentivizes many users from seeking out--knowing about, frankly,582and then going above and beyond to seek out that information. To the583kind of muscle memory point, you have a whole generation in China that584has started to forget what the global internet looks like. They are no585longer compelled by that desire to connect with the international586community, to connect with the global internet. I think--I think why587MAX feels like such an inflection point for us in the Russian model is588because it is starting to create those layers of control, and starting589to create a situation where you might actively capture a population on590a single app or platform, and start to wither that muscle memory of the591global internet.592    Which is why I think it is especially critical we have this593conversation right now, and we are trying to engage in this topic in594this moment. Because you still do have, you know, the majority of the595Russian citizenry who remembers the global internet, who still596remembers YouTube, who still is eager to access this type of597information. I think we will start to see that go away unless we are598really actively engaged quickly in the short term to make sure those599connections remain open.600    Ms. Novetsky: Thank you.601    Before I open it up, just one more question for Justin. As you602mentioned, in recent years, Russian authorities have cracked down on603tech developers and other companies that demonstrate any reticence to604comply with State orders or try to assert any independence. It seems605relatively unlikely that any company like VK would resist government606efforts to use and abuse user data collected by MAX. What about607American and international companies operating in Russia? Are there608ways we can reasonably expect them to resist or refuse to comply with609orders and laws that infringe on people's freedoms and violate their610privacy?611    Mr. Sherman: Yes, it is a good--I was going to say, if it is the VK612one, that is a short answer. [Laughter.] It is a good question. We have613seen--it has been interesting to see--and I, you know, worked on some614of these issues as this was unfolding--but companies that, you know,615completely immediately left Russia in 2022, that I think did it for616good reasons and in a good way. Companies that left for good reasons617but did it very poorly, such as--I will not name, although folks will618know who I am referring to--but certain telecom companies that left619immediately, and immediately the State seized control of the620telecommunications fibers and other things that they left there. Which621was not good.622    Then we have this complicated category, I think like we are talking623about, where, you know, a company like Google or Apple does not624maintain any more--even though they did and it was used to coerce--they625do not maintain a local office anymore in Russia. There is still626product presence. There are still questions of, you know, even if, let627us say, Apple is not opening up a new store in, you know, St.628Petersburg next week to sell the new iPhone, are they still providing629security updates to the many, many people in Russia who own existing630Apple products, right? All to say, there are all kinds of complex touch631points that I think are underappreciated when we just look at headlines632that say: This many companies left Russia, or this company does not633operate in the country. As we are all talking about, it is a lot more634complicated.635    In terms of levers, I would say app stores removing VPN tools in636particular countries is especially problematic. Even more so, I think--637at least, based on what we can see publicly--what might appear to be638the absence of real, robust corporate policy around when to do that. I639am not saying you should never do that. You know, there have been bad640actors known to create VPN apps that are malware. I am not saying you641should never take down a VPN, per se. You know, at the whim of the642Kremlin, without a robust policy, is not exactly a good framework, so643that would be the first thing.644    The second, I think, as we are talking about, is that Russia is645making a push toward a much more autarkic, maybe the right word,646technology ecosystem. In some areas, it is failing miserably.647Microelectronics, as we all know, has been one area for years. Russia648has basically no manufacturing capacity. All this stuff's either still649stolen from the U.S., Japan, the Netherlands, or it comes from China650now, but software, as Laura was just saying, is an area where Russia is651making a lot of progress. That is another space where we need to think652about U.S. companies that touch those firms. For example, if VK--as MAX653app spreads throughout parts of Europe--what are U.S. companies' and654other companies' positions on working with it, interoperability? You655get into all these questions that, you know, unsurprisingly, but I do656not think a lot of companies have thought through and will ultimately657have serious impacts on the very issues that we are talking about658today.659    Ms. Novetsky: Great. Thank you so much.660    If anyone has any questions, I am sure--yes, please. Francois will661help with the mic.662    Question: Thank you very much. Ray Celeste with Congressman Dr.663Murphy.664    I wrote a question that was very similar to the one that was just665asked, but I think it bears to be asked again. This is what I wrote:666Are the tech giants--such as Meta, Apple, Alphabet, and others--doing667all they can to combat these shutdowns done under the order of the668Russian government? Or are they just hanging back due to fears the669Russian government will find ways to hurt their bottom line in other670places around the world?671    You know, I do not know what the Congress can do. I know this672administration maybe they could do more in this area. What that is, I673do not know. Maybe you all can talk about that. I do not know if674throwing more dollars at it--I mean, we already, you know, throw lots675of dollars. I mean, these companies have huge contracts. I remember at676one time--you know, I am old enough to remember the BlackBerry.677    Well, now everybody in the Pentagon carries what? An iPhone. Who678are these trillion-dollar companies? There are all these Meta and679Google and, unfortunately, they are making--I do not know if they have680a moral compass in that they are making tons of money, these big giant681centers that they are building all across the United States, that the682administration has brought back all this money, and yet I think they683are getting it in both ways.684    I hate to say this--they do not care if they get money from685democracies or China or these--you know, these dictatorships. They just686like money.687    Thank you. That is a pretty complicated question.688    Mr. Sherman: Happy to start. I think it is a really good point.689    Sam Bresnick and some others at CSET have written papers on this. I690will just say the number of these companies that have pulled out of the691Russian market or, as I said, left Russia in some way and signaled a692lot about that.693    Well, actually, when you look at it, of course, their dependencies694in certain other autocratic areas or their dependencies in Taiwan or695other places are very, very different, and so this notion that, you696know, they would always do that, I think you are right that that is not697a correct assumption.698    I would say that--can the companies do more to help circumvent?699Absolutely. I will kick that to some of the experts here, but the700answer is yes, right? We have had cases before where companies have,701for example, leaned pretty far forward on domain fronting and other702ways of getting around censorship mechanisms and then backed off703because of pressure from that government.704    Again, we probably know one of the examples I am talking about, but705that is an example where if the company really wanted to do more there,706they could. What are their pressure points? In Russia's case, it is707going to be less market--small market to begin with.708    How many users do they have there? You know, we are thinking broad709spectrum. If the Kremlin really was mad about that, obviously, there710are lots of other ways, including hacking and other kinds of things711that you could do to apply pressure to a U.S. tech company.712    Again, I think the point stands that, back to your question of713incentives, how do we ensure that if they have the capability to lean714further forward on censorship circumvention, which technically they715absolutely do, and in corporate policy they absolutely do, what are716those incentives? I think it is the right question to ask.717    I will let my fellow panelists weigh in.718    Ms. Cunningham: Yes, I will maybe add a little bit more fuel to719that fire, even.720    To take a step back here on OTF, OTF is a U.S. government-funded721nonprofit. We receive our resources from Congress. The majority of our722resources go to support VPNs that are used by tens of millions of723people in authoritarian contexts to access the global internet around724authoritarian censorship.725    Those exact VPNs that are funded by U.S. Government dollars have726been taken out of the Apple store--the Apple app store in China, out of727the Apple app store in Russia. I think to Justin's point, certainly the728answer should not be never take a VPN out of an app store, but when729there are apps actively being funded by the U.S. Government to advance730human rights in authoritarian contexts to support our foreign policy731and our national security, to see American companies removing them from732those app stores and making it difficult if not impossible for those733exact users that we are attempting to support to actually access those734technologies, I mean, frankly, we are just working against ourselves.735    Also, to Justin's point, I mean, it seems like the bare minimum736should be allowing those applications to be available to the737beneficiaries who need them, to the beneficiaries that those resources738are being provided.739    Certainly, there are ways to go beyond that in terms of technical740support, in terms of public-private collaborations that could help741bring down the per-user cost of VPNs. There is a lot of work that could742be done proactively once we get over the hurdle of actually being743prevented from doing that work and providing those services.744    Ms. Zhyrmont: Well, just adding my two cents in all of this, well,745of course, we do understand the pressures that big tech companies might746receive from Russia, and it includes not only economic pressure but747sometimes, like, physical safety of their former staff or present staff748in the country.749    It does not mean that there is no way out. Let us see. Like, Google750received the very same censorship request to delete all the VPNs, yet751they did not follow. Now they are facing this hilariously big fine in752Russia. I do not even know how to pronounce this number in English.753    It does not mean that I know how to pronounce it in Russian--754[laughs]--because it is, like, just a joke. They did not, and as a755matter of fact, they are very transparent what requests they are756receiving. They are making this public.757    At least Apple might follow the steps of their peers, but also,758like, this is a slippery slope. Like, first VPNs, but what if later on,759Russia asks Apple and Google to delete all the apps of independent760media?761    Later on, it will follow to further requests. Context is very much762important, and a human rights assessment within the context is very763much important as well, and, of course, Apple and big tech need to764support civil society and digital resilience.765    They need to invest their resources into--like, into progress of766circumvention tools and finding new creative solutions. This is how767they can compensate for some wrongdoings, in a way, but also pulling768out completely of the market is not the solution also.769    Like, stop providing updates to their own devices, will be the end770of the security of users in Russia, because what gives us a little hope771that the security features within iPhones will somehow cope with the772ability of MAX to gather information from other apps on your devices.773Probably in the future, with no support, it will not be the case774anymore.775    Ms. Novetsky: Thank you. Jordan, go ahead.776    Question: Thank you so much, Alanna, and to all of you. This is a777really interesting briefing, so I appreciate you.778    My name is Jordan Warlick. I am a policy advisor at the Helsinki779Commission. I can imagine that the MAX app surveillance has probably780resulted in a certain amount of self-censorship, which, obviously, can781be hard to measure those invisible consequences.782    I wanted to ask if there are reports yet of, you know, raids,783arrests, or fines, or any other consequences like that imposed on784individuals based on information gathered from surveillance on the MAX785app or through, as you mentioned, the technical inspections and failure786to download the app.787    Mr. Sherman: Yes. I mean, you mentioned this, Alanna; there was788some conversation around the inspections in the occupied territories in789Ukraine. I will let Alanna weigh in, too. We were talking about this.790I, at least, was not able to discern a particular case yet where791someone was arrested.792    There were rumors of different kinds of consequences, but certainly793the stops are happening. I do not know if others want to weigh in on794the Russia piece.795    Like, I will just say, you know, VK broadly we know for many years,796of course, is a huge source of--your post was flagged, FSB data797requests submitted to VK that are, you know, complied with their eyes798shut, so, otherwise wide open. They do not really care.799    I will just say so, I do not know necessarily. I have not seen any800reports of that. I, obviously, do not think that is dispositive of the801fact that probably this is already an information source, but I will802let--yes, Okay.803    Ms. Zhyrmont: No, we did not receive any reports yet, but I think804this is only a matter of time because it is very difficult to promote a805new app within the users and to reach this critical amount of users806needed if you start with the massive arrests for all who are using MAX.807    I think they created the necessary infrastructure. Later on, they808will first target people that they want to target among civil society--809journalists, opposition leaders, and et cetera, where probably some of810them are still in Russia. I doubt that it will reach out massive scale811because, like, even with this new law who target people for searching812extremist materials, of course, at the moment, many people are still813using Instagram, so if you start, like, arresting all Instagram divas814in Russia, it will be a bad start. [Laughs.]815    Yes, the point is that they can target anybody at a certain point,816so yes, I will stop there.817    Ms. NOVETSKY: Okay, good. Yes, Max, go ahead.818    Question: Thank you for--thank you for being here and for the work819that you do. It is really important, and it is really eye-opening for820me.821    I am kind of cursing my parents at the moment. My name is Max--822[laughter]--and I am Max Undeland. I work for Senator Boozman. I do not823work for VK. [Laughter.]824    I was just wondering what the likelihood is that this app rolls out825in countries where maybe there has been a little bit of a Russian lean,826maybe in countries that might even be in NATO or Europe and--or to be827used in the developing world as sort of a--where there is Russian828action present or country where Russia--or countries like the U.S. or829Germany or others that Russia might want to influence elections and830have disinformation campaigns. What is the connection between them?831    Ms. Zhyrmont: Well, as I mentioned, MAX has been launched in a few832neighboring countries to Russia. It has also been launched in Moldova,833for instance, which is quite concerning.834    It will appear in Europe as well for one simple reason: You need to835stay in touch with the close ones in Russia. For them, the only836opportunity to be connected with you is through MAX app, especially in837the occupied territories.838    MAX will appear in Ukraine as well. It is, like, people who want to839keep in touch with their relatives in the occupied territories will840still need MAX in order to call them, tag them, et cetera. Yes, the841simple answer is yes.842    Mr. Sherman: Nothing to add other than I think Telegram is a843great--a different app, different situation, but a great example of844where an app that I am sure no one in here is using, perhaps, other845than to read Russian posts. You know, clearly backdoored and compliant846with the Kremlin and so forth, yet still is quite popular around the847world, including in Ukraine, which is an interesting phenomenon.848    Ms. Novetsky: Yes. Just maybe building on that a bit, like, could849you envision a world in which other authoritarian countries or, you850know, leaning authoritarian countries might adopt it as a model because851it is effective and store the data in their own countries or, you know,852use this model even if it is not necessarily the MAX app itself?853    Ms. Cunningham: Yes. I think, as Anastasiya has already said, I854think the MAX app is going to find its way to allied neighbors,855certainly.856    I think, maybe going back to kind of the broader picture on this857model-wise just beyond MAX, what I think is really interesting about858the Russia model in particular is the ability of other countries to859potentially adopt it in ways that other censorship models, particularly860the Chinese censorship model, just been too high a bar for most861countries.862    In the case of China, we see a country that had a centrally863controlled or centrally controlled internet infrastructure from the864very beginning. They made very few compromises on that and, as a865result, were able to kind of perpetuate their control very quickly and866centralize their control there.867    Most other countries around the world have pretty diverse internet868architecture, Russia included, and so there was always a theory that,869you know, no one could really follow in China's footsteps because870everyone else had kind of let a thousand flowers bloom when it came to871the internet.872    I think the Russian model is a really interesting counterpoint to873that now, where they have taken this--what was a very dispersed network874and found a way to actually implement very centralized control, and875they have kind of been slowly kind of pulling that control in.876    First we saw, you know, through many different laws that they were877implementing and then, you know, requiring ISPs to blacklist and then878they were requiring ISPs to actually install infrastructure to create,879like, centralized control over what is being blocked, and now they have880gone so far as to take what was, you know, thousands of ISPs down to881basically seven centrally owned ISPs, and that is one example of how882they have taken the infrastructure and slowly exerted control over it883in a way that has become more and more centralized.884    That model, to me, is really fascinating because it is one that885another government could replicate. You do not have to say, did you886make a decision 40 years ago to forever centrally control your887internet? No.888    You could take this and potentially replicate it in any kind of889environment with--you know, with an authoritarian who is eager enough890and has the resources to do it, to actually take something relatively891diversified and actually bring that centralized control.892    Again, I think MAX is an interesting indicator when it pops up of893what governments are thinking and the direction they want to go. The894fact that that is matched with a Russian model that might actually895enable them to do it, I think, is even more kind of concerning in896tandem.897    Ms. Novetsky: I think we have time for maybe one more audience898question and then--yes, Kyle?899    Question: Thank you. Kyle Parker, Helsinki Commission.900    Laura, I just wanted to clarify. You had mentioned something about901Russians losing muscle memory and kind of experience with the open902internet. By that, do you mean is it a loss of technical savvy or trade903craft, or is it more a loss of interest, initiative, motivation, even904hope? That is, I guess, the first question.905    The second question for anyone or whoever knows this best, how does906the framework and practice of engaging with--so by that I suppose907potentially some legislative framework, regulations, also habit and908practice, enforcement--differ between Russia, Belarus, occupied909territories?910    Last--and maybe I missed this at the outset--when we were talking911about complicity of Western companies, U.S.-based companies, if912Congress were to contemplate something like a foreign corrupt practices913act for tech, right, something that, you know, in a sense might914liberate them from saying, look, whether we want to do it or not we915have to do it and we all have to do it.916    Certainly, there would be the moral dimension of that and917complicity that could help uncomplicate. Are there enough alternatives918out there that its practical effect might just mean a loss of market919share for our own tech companies? Thanks.920    Ms. Cunningham: I am happy to start with the first question on921muscle memory and then go to others.922    On the question of muscle memory, is that kind of forgetting--you923know, being less tech savvy, or is it kind of giving up on the memory924of the global internet, or I think hope even, as you said. I think it925is both, but I think the second bit of that is what is even more926troubling.927    I am using a lot of China analogies today, but I will do one more928on this. There was a really interesting study that Stanford University929did with Chinese university students a couple of years ago, and they930gave about a thousand university students VPNs. Half of them gave a931VPN, said go do with it what you will.932    The other half, they gave a VPN and a specific assignment, go933research XYZ, and what they found was that the students who were given934a VPN and given a specific assignment knew how to use the VPN, went and935got the information, came back.936    The students who were given a VPN and free range most of them did937not use the VPN. Most of them did not know even what they would go938search for, given that kind of freedom, and I think that is the really939concerning bit, is that they have, like, forgotten even the potential940of what the global internet is, the potential of what independent941information might look like.942    They do not even have that incentive when given the opportunity943search something out or know what to look for. That is the kind of944muscle memory that I think is most detrimental to be lost in that945process. I think certainly there is a tech element to it, but946maintaining that connection, especially with Russian users right now to947the global internet to independent information, I think that is the948most critical bit.949    Tech, you can kind of always solve for. Trying to have people950understand what the outside world looks like and continue to be951incentivized for that, that is a lot harder to rebuild.952    Ms. Novetsky: Does someone want to talk about the tech company953piece of it?954    Ms. Zhyrmont: I can address the issue of how the framework will955work in different contexts, like in Russia, Belarus, and the occupied956territories.957    In the occupied territories, people are extremely vulnerable to958this kind of MAX installation and surveillance. We mentioned several959times the regular checks, but if not willing to install MAX, you can be960subject to further searches, investigations, and et cetera.961    Of course, people are willingly installing the MAX apps in order to962guarantee their own security. Same as they acquired SIM cards on963Russian numbers before because it was impossible to use Ukrainian ones964in the current conditions.965    In Russia, I might say they are seizing control step by step, so966like a frog in a kettle, people are adjusting. They did not ban VPNs967per se legally; VPNs are still allowed, but they banned the968advertisement of VPNs, so nobody will know about them eventually.969    They also did not persecute you before for reading, like, I do not970know, independent media, Meduza, or others, but now they will persecute971you for searching actively for extremist material, and they can call972extremist whatever these days.973    Same goes to--yes, VPNs are not banned, but since September this974year, it can be aggravated in circumstance in crime, so if you are975using a VPN, it can be considered a shady thing to do. People are not--976same as they did not shut down the internet all at once, they declared977Meta an extremist organization, but Instagram and Facebook were still978available.979    Then they shut down Instagram and Meta. Then they shut down the980other platforms, so people are, yes, adjusting to all of this, and they981are willingly switching to Russian alternatives.982    In Belarus, in Kazakhstan, in other contexts, it is a bit different983because, like, of course, MAX does not go preinstalled on all the984devices, and I suppose people want to be so actively downloading it.985    If Russian propaganda and Russian advertising come to these986countries, of course, they will be exposed to the very same risks. What987triggers me the most is also the export of Russian not only988technologies or apps, but techniques and authoritarian tactics.989    We see more and more how all the countries around Russia are copy-990pasting all those legislative innovations like the foreign agent law,991anti-extremist legislation, anti-LGBTQ legislation, and et cetera. All992this leads to further censorship.993    Mr. Sherman: I guess that leaves question three--[laughter]--and I994will say, too, right, in a country--like, obviously, as we know,995Belarus and Russia have very close intelligence cooperation, the SORM--996the actual physical SORM system that Russia uses for domestic internet997and data surveillance. There are analogs in a lot of those countries,998but Belarus is basically the same architecture, so there are all kinds999of other risks there.1000    FCPA for tech, interesting question. I think I would say we can1001think about the set of responsible practices that we have been talking1002about throughout this briefing, around, you know, do companies have1003policies for takedowns and so forth, and then maybe you could think1004about some bounds of what is acceptable and not acceptable there.1005    For example, you know, delete this Navalny app ahead of the1006election because I do not like opponents, maybe it would not be a real1007reason to take an app down, but there could be reasons, too.1008    I think the same thing with--which we have not talked much about,1009it is a bit outside the remit of the MAX app, I guess. If you own the1010app a little bit different. Data access requests as well are very1011complicated and, obviously, in pretty much any country on Earth, there1012would be data access requests from law enforcement or even from1013intelligence agencies that--whether every single person in this room1014would agree or not, I think generally the U.S. Government would agree1015with, right? Child sexual abuse material enforcement or other things1016that are criminalized rightfully in most countries, for example.1017    It is not to say that all data access requests should really be put1018through some absurd ringer or just denied on their face but, again, I1019think that is another category where some tech companies have done1020this, I think, in a thoughtful way over time of saying, we operate in1021countries that have very strong rule of law; we operate in countries1022that have very weak rule of law and so we are not going to equate those1023two.1024    There are others that do not really draw those lines, and I think1025that is another place where we can enter into, you know, regimes, sort1026of throwing around the market pressure as a reason to coerce compliance1027with outright, you know, dictatorial demands.1028    Ms. Novetsky: Yes, thank you so much, and I want to wrap up in just1029a minute.1030    Before we wrap up, I think, you know, it is obvious to many of us1031sitting in this room and certainly at this table why we care about1032this, and the human costs of it are obviously, you know, enormous.1033    I was hoping that someone could touch on why it should be in our1034interest as Americans and our strategic interests as the United States1035and the West to promote access to an open internet in Russia and around1036the world, as we have been talking about.1037    Mr. Sherman: We will go down the line. That is great.1038    As I mentioned, right, so there is the fact that--Laura can1039elaborate more on this but, you know, not every country can do the1040China approach, to be a bit simplistic about it, and so having other1041ways of approaching internet surveillance and control in other1042adversarial countries we should be worried about what Russia continues1043to experiment with and build out.1044    Two is that there are all kinds of complicated cyber questions--1045cybersecurity questions, cyber operations questions, et cetera--when an1046adversary is trying to develop a fairly autarkic technology ecosystem.1047We are not really going to get into that today, but that is really1048complicated and concerning from a U.S. military, intelligence, and1049national security standpoint.1050    The third, as I mentioned, is alongside undermining human rights1051and other important, you know, democratic values of free speech and so1052forth, this is also a way for, much like the biometric surveillance I1053mentioned, which they're starting to deploy more at the borders in1054every entry point in Russia, is to root out Western spies, root out1055Ukrainian spies, root out informants or people who cooperate with1056anyone to include talking to journalists.1057    There are lots of cases there where I think from a U.S.-EU-NATO1058standpoint, we should really be worried about that device-level1059surveillance and targeting capability.1060    Ms. Cunningham: I will reiterate one and then add one more.1061    I think the reason that most of us are here today, first and1062foremost, is just the human rights concern and our goal really to be1063able to empower Russian citizens in particular to be able to exercise1064their human rights online, and so I think that is first and foremost.1065    I also think that there are, just as Justin said, real national1066security concerns that go along with this. A government that is able to1067kind of fully co-opt their domestic population is going to be in a1068situation where their citizens are less likely to keep that government1069in check. It is going to perpetuate authoritarian power. It is going to1070embolden autocrats if they are able to maintain that type of almost1071universal control over their populations.1072    I think, in addition to the very concerning human rights impact on1073those citizens, the free rein that it gives an authoritarian government1074to have that level of control should be something that is very1075concerning.1076    Ms. Zhyrmont: Well, it is very difficult to add on top of that, but1077maybe just to summarize.1078    If we do not export human rights, access to free information, or1079creative tech solutions, freedom of expression, then autocrats will1080export their vision of how the world should work, and they will export1081those MAX messages, their restrictive legislation.1082    Ms. Novetsky: Thank you.1083    Thank you all so much for being here, to our panelists and to our1084audience.1085    Tune in, we will have another briefing next week on the European1086and Ukrainian defense supply chain and procurement innovations. Hope to1087see you all soon, and thanks again to everybody for being1088here.[Applause.]10891090    [Whereupon, at 3:08 p.m., the briefing ended.]10911092                                          [all]10931094    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]10951096           The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent1097         federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in1098              implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords.10991100            The Commission, created in 1976, is composed of nine1101       Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the1102                Department of State, Defense, and Commerce.11031104                                www.csce.gov11051106                       youtube.com/HelsinkiCommission11071108                      facebook.com/helsinkicommission11091110                    flickr.com/photos/helsinkicommission11111112                             x.com/HelsinkiComm