J.Hrg.119

1[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 119 Congress]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34                SECURING SYRIA'S TRANSFORMATION BY5                   DIMINISHING RUSSIA'S INFLUENCE6=======================================================================78                                HEARING910                               BEFORE THE1112                       COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND13                          COOPERATION IN EUROPE1415                        U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION1617                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES1819                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2021                             SECOND SESSION2223                               __________2425                            February 3, 20262627                               __________2829 Printed for the use of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in30                                 Europe3132                              [CSCE119-1]3334[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]3536                       Available via www.csce.gov3738                                __________3940                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE4162-752                     WASHINGTON : 202642=======================================================================4344            COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE4546                        U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION4748            U.S. SENATE4950                                                 U.S. HOUSE5152ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi         JOE WILSON, South Carolina Co-53    Chairman                             Chairman54SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island     STEVE COHEN, Tennessee Ranking55    Ranking Member			Member56JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas		     ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama57KATIE BRITT, Alabama		     EMANUEL CLEAVER II, Missouri58JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania	     LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas59RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona		     JAKE ELLZEY, Texas60MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota	     RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina61JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire	     GREG MURPHY, North Carolina62THOM TILLIS, North Carolina	     MARC VEASEY, Texas6364                            EXECUTIVE BRANCH65                 Department of State - to be appointed66                Department of Defense - to be appointed67                Department of Commerce - to be appointed6869                        C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S7071                              ----------72                                                                   Page7374                             COMMISSIONERS7576Hon. Joe Wilson, Co-Chairman, from South Carolina................     17778Hon. Jeanne Shaheen, from New Hampshire..........................     97980Hon. Jake Ellzey, from Texas.....................................    128182Hon. Emanuel Cleaver, from Missouri..............................    168384                          OTHER MEMBER PRESENT8586Hon. Chrissy Houlahan, from Pennsylvania.........................    148788                               WITNESSES8990Anna Borschevskaya, Harold Grinspoon Senior Fellow, The91  Washington Institute for Near East Policy......................     49293Michael Doran, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Peace and94  Security in the Middle East, The Hudson Institute..............     69596Richard Outzen, Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Atlantic Council..     79798   SECURING SYRIA'S TRANSFORMATION BY DIMINISHING RUSSIA'S INFLUENCE99100                              ----------101102 COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN103                                    EUROPE,104                          U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION,105                                  HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,106                                         Tuesday, February 3, 2026.107108    The hearing was held from 2:33 p.m. to 3:40 p.m., Room 360109Cannon House Office Building, Representative Joe Wilson [R-SC],110Co-Chairman, Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe,111presiding.112113    Committee Members Present: Representative Joe Wilson [R-114SC], Co-Chairman; Senator Jeanne Shaheen [D-NH]; Representative115Jake Ellzey [R-TX]; Representative Emanuel Cleaver [D-MO];116Other Member Present: Representative Chrissy Houlahan [D-PA].117    Witnesses: Anna Borschevskaya, Harold Grinspoon Senior118Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Michael119Doran, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Peace and120Security in the Middle East, The Hudson Institute; Richard121Outzen, Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Atlantic Council.122123OPENING STATEMENT OF JOE WILSON, CO-CHAIRMAN, U.S. HOUSE, FROM124                         SOUTH CAROLINA125126    Co-Chairman Wilson: Grateful to be here with our colleagues127from the Senate, Senator Jeanne Shaheen from New Hampshire.128Grateful we have Chrissy Houlahan from Pennsylvania and129Congressman Jake Ellzey from Texas, so we cover the country.130    With that in mind, the hearing today is ``Securing Syria's131Transformation by Diminishing Russia's Influence.'' With that132as the topic, we will begin with opening statements by myself133and Senator Shaheen, and then we will proceed with the134presentation of our witnesses. Each one of our witnesses is135really just very distinguished individuals who are136knowledgeable on what we are facing today and look at the137opportunities that we face today. Then, following your138presentations--the five-minute presentations we will have, so I139am maintaining the time properly, so this is good--then we will140go to questions by each member of the panel.141    The fall of the Assad dictatorship was a Berlin Wall moment142for the Middle East. For years, Bashar al-Assad, a murderous143dictator propped up by war criminal Putin and the regime in144Tehran, remained in power only because of their military145intervention. War criminal Putin's airstrikes devastated Syrian146cities, most infamously Aleppo, creating a refugee crisis that147overwhelmed Europe and served as a rehearsal in the mass murder148for war criminal Putin's later destruction of Ukrainian cities149from Bucha to Mariupol.150    One year after Assad fled to Moscow, President Trump made151the decision to give Syria a chance and is producing real and152measurable results. Through the leadership of his special envoy153to Syria, Tom Barrack, and under the leadership of President154Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria is moving to a relationship with the155United States that would have been unimaginable just a few156years ago. For the first time in decades, for the first time157ever, for the first time in 250 years of America and 8,000158years of Syria, there has been a Syrian president visiting the159White House.160    I particularly have a keen interest. November a year ago,161the Assad dictatorship identified me as an enemy of the State.162Three weeks later, he fled to Moscow. Then, eight months later,163Senator Jeanne Shaheen took me to Assad's office in Damascus to164be with the new president. What a change in history, the165ultimate change.166    I have seen the transformation firsthand. Last August,167traveling with Senator Jeanne Shaheen and Ambassador Barrack,168the envoy that the president has named as Ambassador to169Turkiye, to be envoy to Syria, we met with President al-Sharaa,170senior ministers, and religious leaders. Since then, I have met171with President al-Sharaa twice, in New York and Washington. I172have also hosted the Syrian foreign minister, finance minister,173central bank Governor, and economic minister in my office. A174highlight for me, in New York, I got to introduce the president175to Marco Rubio, our secretary of State. What a rare176opportunity.177    The direction is unmistakable. President al-Sharaa wants to178work with the United States. Under his leadership, Syria has179joined the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and is now working180directly with the U.S. military in joint operations against181this terrorist threat. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps182and Hezbollah have withdrawn from Syria. Syria is no longer183threatening Lebanon, and for the first time in decades is184engaged in direct negotiations with Israel. Syria is also open185for business to American companies creating jobs in Syria and186America.187    None of this would have happened without President Trump's188historic decision to engage with the new Syrian leadership,189lift sanctions, and pursue a stable and unified Syrian State. I190was grateful to lead the bipartisan effort in Congress with191Senator Shaheen to repeal the Caesar Act, and I am hopeful that192remaining sanctions, including Syria's designation as a State193sponsor of terrorism, will soon be lifted.194    The fall of Assad presents another historic opportunity.195That is the focus of this hearing: Removing war criminal196Putin's bases from Syria. Despite Assad's fall, war criminal197Putin still maintains two major military bases in Syria: The198Khmeimim Base near Latakia and Tartus Naval Base on the199Mediterranean. These bases are war criminal Putin's only200official military outposts outside of the former Soviet Union201and serve as a critical platform for projecting Russian power202well beyond Syrian borders. From these facilities as a transit,203Russia sustains logistics, command and control, and force204projection that enables the Wagner Group operations across205Africa and helps prop up the authoritarian regimes of Central206Africa, often at the expense of U.S. and allied interests, and207really just enslaving the people.208    President al-Sharaa has already taken meaningful steps to209limit their presence. His government has suspended all pre-2025210agreements with war criminal Putin, including those governing211the bases, and placed them under review. Russian forces now212face strict limits on movement, patrols outside their base213perimeters require Syrian approval, off-duty personnel are214restricted from nearby towns, and Russian naval vessels at215times have been denied access to Tartus. Syria has also216canceled a 2019 contract allowing a Russian company to manage217the commercial port at Tartus. Just last week, war criminal218Putin fully withdrew from all bases and outposts outside of219Syria's coastal region, including the Qamishli Airport in the220northeast.221    Let us all be clear: Removing war criminal Putin's forces222from Syria should be done, and it may take time and create223security negotiations, but it is achievable. In every single224meeting that many of us have had with Syrian government225leaders, we have pushed for the full removal of war criminal226Putin's bases from Syria, as well as ending the Assad227dictatorship's recognition of the Russian occupation of228Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which actually are integral parts229of the Republic of Georgia.230    In our discussions with President al-Sharaa and Foreign231Minister Shaibani, I found a clear willingness to expel Russian232forces if the United States can provide the right support and233protection. Foreign Minister Shaibani told me bluntly, despite234the new Syrian authorities' engagement in realpolitik with235Moscow, the Syrian people, who suffered from years of Russian236airpower devastating Aleppo, will never be friends of Moscow.237This view is shared by our NATO ally Turkiye. Last year,238Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan told me directly that Turkiye239supports the removal of war criminal Putin's bases from Syria.240An increased military presence by Turkiye in northern Syria241naturally puts the Russian presence under pressure and on path242for total removal, which is dangerously close to the vital243American NATO base of Incirlik.244    However, Syria will not take the final step of removing245Russia without credible military and economic alternatives.246Much of the defense infrastructure still relies on Russian247equipment, which Moscow continues to exploit for leverage.248Russian compounds that pressure by working through remnants of249the former regime, including Assad's cousin Rami Makhlouf, who250regularly broadcasts from Moscow promising renewed Russian251backing. Russia also maintains ties to former officers and252regime elements concentrated on the Syrian coast.253    Against this backdrop, sadly, President al-Sharaa last week254explored in talks in Moscow whether war criminal Putin could255provide increased economic and military assistance, including256rebuilding the Syrian army, in exchange for allowing war257criminal Putin's bases to stay. To our Syrian friends: This258would be insanity. Syrians of all people should know that war259criminal Putin cannot be trusted to live up to agreements.260    I am confident that closer engagement between President261Trump and Syria will naturally diminish Russian influence. With262strong U.S. leadership and close coordination with our NATO263ally Turkiye, we can provide Syria with the assurances it264need[s] to break from Russia entirely and to negotiate a265durable understanding between Turkiye and Israel, one that266protects Israel's security while advancing America's strategic267objective of removing Russia from Syria.268    Unfortunately, not all regional actors understand the269urgency of removing Russia. Sadly, some in Israel prefer a weak270and divided Syria, and view an extended Russian presence as a271buffer against Turkiye. I believe this is suicidal for Israel.272We should work to, in partnership with Turkiye, a NATO ally,273and other regional allies and partners, and welcome long-term274but limited Turkish military and economic presence in Syria.275The correct balance of security guarantees would give Syria the276confidence it needs to remove war criminal Putin's footprint,277and this will only be possible if Israel and Turkey--Turkiye--278deescalate and reach a detente in Syria.279    I am encouraged that President Trump and Special Envoy Tom280Barrack are doing exactly that--engaging both sides, lowering281tensions, and working toward a pragmatic understanding that282assuages Israeli security concerns while advancing American283strategic interests in removing war criminal Putin from Syria284once and all.285    I am grateful to welcome Dr. Anna Borschevskaya of the286Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Dr. Michael Doran of287the very respected Hudson Institute; and Dr. Richard Outzen of288the Atlantic Council.289    We will now proceed with comments by our very esteemed290member of the U.S. Senate, Senator Jeanne Shaheen.291    Senator Shaheen: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am292between votes in the Senate, so I am just going to agree with293your opening statement and look forward to the very important294remarks from our witnesses.295    Thank you all for being here.296    Co-Chairman Wilson: With this, we will now proceed directly297with Dr. Borschevskaya.298299   TESTIMONY OF ANNA BORSCHEVSKAYA, HAROLD GRINSPOON SENIOR300     FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY301302    Dr. Borschevskaya: Chairman Wilson, honorable members,303thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am the304daughter of Jewish refuseniks. Many families like mine were305living with anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union. For us, America306was a ray of light, a light that shone through the Iron307Curtain. Even as a child, I knew that America was different.308Vladimir Putin's message to us for over two decades has been309that there is no democracy in America, that Russia is no310different from the United States. Even as a child, I knew that311could not be true.312    Given where I came from, it is a particular honor for me to313testify, to speak in front of this legislative body. You play314such an important role in elevating human rights.315    With your permission, I am submitting my written testimony316that I am going to summarize.317    We are here today to discuss Russia in Syria. I am here318specifically to talk about why it is so important for us to get319Syria right. Of course, I am no longer a child, so I know that320the issues before us are highly complex. But as we talk about321Syria, I am a reminder that America's unique purpose and322position in the world is still to shine that light.323    We are now one year into the fall of Assad, and I think we324can all agree that the outcome is not quite what many of us had325hoped. Russia's position in Syria temporarily weakened with the326fall of Assad, but this brief window may now be closing.327Assad's fall itself was not the turning point for Russian328influence in Syria many in the West thought it might be.329    There are things we can do to counter Russia's influence330there, and I would like to preface those with three key points.331First, Russia is reconsolidating influence in Syria as it plays332the long game. Second, there is no indication that Damascus333will abandon Russia. Third, it is not too late to take concrete334action.335    Syria is a vital link between the Middle East and Europe,336and we all understand why. Failure to counter Russia in Syria337will harm U.S. strategic interests and perhaps for a long time.338    Syria has always been heavily dependent on Moscow. Not only339has Assad's fall failed to change that, but Russia is looking340to deepen those connections. I am talking about military,341economic, and diplomatic dependence, and to some extent even342cultural ties. I give examples of each one in my submitted343written testimony.344    As I said, while many were hoping for a different result,345there is no indication that Damascus is moving away from346Russia. In fact, we now know that Sharaa negotiated a secret347deal to keep Russia's foothold in Syria if they abandoned348Assad. Russia and Syria need each other, although it is clear349that Syria needs Russia more. Leaders may come and go in both350countries, but Russia's long game is to hold onto power and351influence there.352    For years, American policymakers said that Russia cannot353profit from war crimes in Syria, but Russia is already354profiting from war crimes in Syria. Russia is well-positioned355for a resurgence in Syria if nothing changes. In short, despite356our hopes, Russia remains part of the problem in Syria, not a357solution.358    Let me conclude by outlining what the United States can do359about this.360    First, we need to reexamine what our engagement in Syria361looks like. When we think about Syria, we automatically think362of military involvement. Instead, we should be focusing on363expanding economic, diplomatic, and cultural ties. We need to364broaden the scope of our engagement. I think earlier calls for365a full-time Syrian envoy, for instance, are wise. If Syria is366now heading to a status to be at least a pseudo-U.S. ally, why367would we treat it differently than we treat other countries?368    I suggest we need to bolster our ties with Syria for a369whole host of other reasons, and among those is helping Syria370strengthen guardrails to help restrain Russian involvement and371to give the Syrian government additional reasons to limit its372dependence. For instance, we can bolster the role of Ukrainians373in Syria and all across the Middle East. That would help add374other alternatives to Russian wheat and weaponry, among others.375These are the kinds of measures we can take all across the376Middle East and North Africa to serve as a counterweight to377Russia's likely resurgence in this region.378    Russia's presence in Syria does not exist in a vacuum. The379U.S. cannot and should not cede that space to Russia.380    Thank you.381    Co-Chairman Wilson: [Off mic.]382383TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL DORAN, SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR, CENTER384FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE HUDSON INSTITUTE385386    Mr. Doran: [Off mic]--agree with you, Chairman Wilson, but387I do not want to miss this opportunity to speak for five388minutes. I have never--I have never missed an opportunity to389speak.390    I would like to make five points. The first one is that391since I began following Syria in 2005, when I was the senior392director in the White House for the National Security Council,393I noted that the United States has a tendency to--not to see394Syria, to ignore Syria. This is sort of deep in our nature as395Americans. When I was in the White House, we sent up to the--to396the National Security Council about every four or five months397the same memo for a decision, and we never, ever got a398decision. We would change the memo each time by describing the399events that had taken place between the last time we sent the400memo up and the last time we did not get a decision. When our401Syria director left, the joke in the office was that we would402replace--we were asking who should we replace him with, and the403joke was we would just replace him with a copy machine.404    The experience has taught me since then that this was not405something peculiar to the Bush administration; it is really406just in our nature, because the--because Syria during the cold407war was in the Russian or the Soviet sphere of influence. We do408not have a major four-star asset there like oil, and so we tend409just not to see it.410    What has happened is that this tendency of us not to have a411Syria policy has conspired with the geography and the interests412of our adversaries to make it the place where they contest our413position in the--in the Middle East. We saw that dramatically414during the Obama administration when the Iranians and Russians415allied to prop up the Assad regime, and they engaged in a major416intervention in Syria, and we did not contest them. The results417for us were very--were very damaging. They sent--they sent418millions of people--of refugees out of the country. Of course,419they went to Europe. The Russians and the Iranians weaponized420the refugees, and they created tensions in Europe for our421allies.422    Something else there happened as well, which is that both423the Turks and the Israelis were forced to accommodate the424Russians on their doorstep in Syria. We felt that dramatically425when the Russians went into Ukraine and suddenly Washington426turned to our allies--not just to the Turks or the Israelis,427but also to the Saudis and others--and demanded that they line428up with us against the Russians, and they found that our Middle429Eastern allies were reluctant to take as hard a line against430Russia as we were because we had--our policy had forced them to431accommodate the Russians in the past. I think we need to really432remember that experience when we are--when we are thinking433about the Russians--the Russians now because we are--if we are434not--if we are not careful we will--we will forget the role435that this country plays for Russia. It is absolutely crucial to436the whole Russian position in the Mediterranean and, Chairman437Wilson, as you said, in Africa.438    The Russian Mediterranean fleet is based in Crimea, in439Sevastopol. The Russians do not have a Mediterranean fleet440without the port at Tartus. It is from Tartus that they moved441on to Libya, and it is from Libya that they extended their442influence into Africa.443    I think if we want to--if international politics today is444the United States versus China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea--445that is the way I see it--then we want to--we want to expel the446Russians from the Middle East, as we did at the end of the cold447war. The place to do that, really, is in Syria.448    The problem we have in Syria today, the difficulty of doing449that, is the needs--the tremendous needs of the--of the Sharaa450government. The Russians have things to offer them, including451arms, including infrastructure, and so on. We also have the452tremendous tension between the Turks and the Israelis. I think453that we have to see that the--our ability to expel the Russians454from Syria in the end is going to be dependent on our ability455to strike a balance between the Turks and the--the Turks and456the Israelis, and this is going to take a very sustained457commitment on our part. I do--as you, Chairman Wilson, believe-458I think this is absolutely possible, but it takes sustained459commitment at the highest level.460    Thank you.461    Co-Chairman Wilson: [Off mic.]462463  TESTIMONY OF RICHARD OUTZEN, NONRESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW, THE464                        ATLANTIC COUNCIL465466    Mr. Outzen: Chairman Wilson, distinguished members, it is a467great honor to be here with you. My experience with the Syria468problem set goes back in one sense about 10 years, when I469started working Syria policy as a uniformed as a U.S. Army470member, and then later at State Department, but really back to4711990 when I was first deployed to the Middle East. It is a472wicked problem set.473    It is a fragmented country, and there has been a lot going474on. The last 18 months have been particularly momentous. Of the475various frames or lenses that we can apply to Syria and have476been trying to apply for the last ten years, the geopolitical477really comes to the forefront now.478    My own views on Syria have been shaped by my experiences in479the military--deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq, also480negotiations with the Turks and the Israelis and other folks in481the Middle East trying to get a workable set of security482arrangements and a working, really, U.S. alliance. In my view,483what happened right about the time I came into Army service in4841989 and 1990--it is not my fault; I am not saying that--we had485a very workable regional system, and then we stopped making it486work. A lot of that was because of overly ideological and487overly ambitious, but really because of poor policy processes,488in my view, in Washington.489    Some of those things have come around now to the point490where we actually have the ability to sew together again, to491wicker together, the overlapping interests of many of our492allies in the Gulf; in Turkiye; with a little bit delicate493work, as Mike was saying, with Israel as well. That really494requires that we not rely on the go-to that we have done in495Washington for so long with Syria, which is pressure, coercion,496and trying to minimize their scope of maneuver. We need to work497more through engagement and through incentives.498    I did recently complete a doctorate looking at the record499of U.S. coercion in the Middle East but globally as well, and500the results are not great. I am not saying we should not501coerce; there are truly bad actors in the international system502that need a poke in the eye and a pinch in the wallet, and that503kind of coercion has its place. However, the logic that needs504to be applied, especially in stabilizing countries, is one of505engagement and one of incentives, because that is the better506way for us to actually shape outcomes. When we try to coerce507and destabilize, and especially a fledgling government like508what we are doing to some extent or have been--and again, I509praise the work to get the Caesar sanctions lifted. There are510still voices in Washington calling for essentially a511fragmenting and a coercing and a punitive approach to Syria.512Well, the empirical record of how that has worked out since5131990 is not great. It is especially ridiculous in Africa--that514is a whole `nother conversation for another time--but also in515the Middle East. The way that these sanctions should be used516and the coercion in general should be used is by exception,517with an off-ramp, and always with incentives so that things get518lighter as the cooperation gets better. In my view, that is519exactly the situation we have in Syria now.520    People are right to have their concerns about Ahmad al-521Sharaa. His background is checkered to say the least, and he522may well have American blood on his hands. That is nothing that523should be taken lightly. However, you cannot kill all the524terrorists. I think that is another lesson that we have taken525away from the history of the United States' engagement in526Afghanistan, Iraq, and the other places I served. The best path527is when you get aggrieved communities that have relied on528terrorism to follow a political path and a political process.529    Witness what we have seen just in the last--well, really530since January-February of last year with reconciliation not531just of HTS and, to some extent, the Alawite regions in Syria,532but also now with the YPG and the SDF, which, of course, is533highly concerning in Washington that we not abandon the Kurds.534The way to not abandon the Kurds is not to abandon Damascus.535The best way to do that is to remain engaged and to provide536pathways to regional roles for Turkiye, for the Gulf, and for537others, and not to give in to the voices that say we cannot538trust this, this man is untrustworthy, and we need to treat539them as if they are all still jihadists running the country.540    In that regard, both for Senator Shaheen and Congressman541Wilson, I want to really praise the efforts that you have done542personally in terms of making sure that it is responsible and543engaged U.S. policy that takes the fore.544    I want to also add that I think in a sense this shift in545U.S. policy is a test case for what I would consider to be sort546of a Trump doctrine. The Trump doctrine is in place of long-547term occupations, military actions--not that there is not a548room for that--but there should be an economic logic that549dictates stabilization in some of these places. Syria is a test550case. If, in fact, by enticing and engaging our allies like551Turkiye and the Gulf to come in, and also Japan and others, we552can get economic investment and economic stabilization and553reconstruction going, we start a virtuous cycle that actually554lowers the tension among the different Syrian groups, but also555among our occasionally fractious allies. I watch with great556concern, but also great support, and--as we go through this557experiment-it is really important that we do not fall back to558the default of just punish and coerce.559    With that, I just want to say it is--the geopolitical560moment is propitious for Washington. We are wise enough to561avoid some of the patterns that we followed in the last 20, 25562years. I think let us remember where we were two years ago,563three years ago, with the butcher Assad best buds with the war564criminal Putin. [Off mic]--this ends in a way that is very much565commensurate with U.S. interests.566    Thank you.567    Co-Chairman Wilson: Thank you very much, Doctor.568    We are so grateful that Senator Shaheen is here between569votes, and we really appreciate her energy.570    Thank you. Senator, would you please proceed?571572  STATEMENT OF JEANNE SHAHEEN, U.S. SENATE, FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE573574    Senator Shaheen: Well, thank you very much for giving me575the opportunity to go before I have to go back to vote.576    My question really follows up on your testimony, Dr.577Outzen, because I was proud to have worked on the repeal of the578Caesar sanctions. Congressman Wilson talked about that effort579in his opening remarks. I think it has been successful. As I am580sure most of you know, there is an effort now by some to call581for sanctions to be reimposed. I think there are real582questions, as you point out, about what that might mean. Can583you and others speak to what the risk is of reimposing584sanctions now, and what that would mean about driving Syria585into the hands of Vladimir Putin and the Russians at a time586when we particularly want to see investment flowing from other587countries in the Middle East and the West to help them rebuild?588    Mr. Outzen: Thank you for the question. It is an excellent589question. The empirical record shows that countries that we590sanction and try to coerce, if they are strong enough, will591bandwagon and will hedge against us, and try to find other592patrons. That is how Russia has a back door to get in here. I593am actually maybe a little more optimistic than Anna, but Anna594is more knowledgeable than I am on this issue, about the595residual Russian presence now. I think the overwhelming596sentiment among Syrians, those I know at least, is that the597Russians do not have a real place in the new Syria, or at598least, at best, a marginal place. The way we can change that is599if we convince Turkiye, who might be under the target of some600of the sanctions if they are imposed, as they have been601discussed, and other potential investors. If we scare them off,602then they are going to look for Chinese money and for Russian603managerial or military support.604    The second empirical finding in the study of U.S. coercion605is that, again, when you take a country that is already sort of606fractured and then you further undercut the sole basis for607centralized power and the restoration of State legitimacy and608sovereignty that we have right now, which is Ahmed al-Sharaa,609love him or hate him, what you do is you induce huge new610variables that lead to centripetal forces and then renewed611violence. We could look at a cycle of sanctions, reimposition,612with the naive thought that we can actually get what we want613and compliance out of it, that then leads to new cycles of614violence and a newly fragmented Syria as we had for over 15615years. That is what I would see as the risk, Senator.616    Senator Shaheen: Well, thank you very much.617    Thank you all. Thank you to the members of the Commission618for allowing me to go first so I can go back and vote.619    Co-Chairman Wilson: A wonderful situation, you need to be620aware, bipartisan, bicameral. This Commission is working621together. We have even extraordinary staff, so this is good. We622appreciate them.623    We have been joined by Congressman Emanuel Cleaver, all the624way from Missouri. Thank you for being here today too. What a--625it is bipartisan. As we are here, and I will be held in five626minutes too. With this, Dr. Outzen and Dr. Doran, both of you627emphasize that improved understanding between Turkey and Israel628is a prerequisite for pushing war criminal Putin out of Syria.629However, when I was in Israel last year, some of the leadership630there expressed opposition to a Turkish presence in northern631Syria and indicated a preference for Russia maintaining as a632counterweight to anchor a NATO ally. Which is startling to me633that that would ever occur. In your view, what can policymakers634encourage Israel to reconsider this approach and instead635explore coordination with Turkey, aimed at reducing the Russian636footprint in Syria?637    Dr. Outzen and then Dr. Doran.638    Mr. Outzen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I had the pleasure to639serve as a military attache in Israel for three years, and then640also with something referred to as the Dayton mission, working641with Palestinian security forces. I take the security of Israel642very seriously. I have many friends in the IDF. I disagree with643them on some of the takes that they have had on Syria, because,644frankly, many of the security establishment and the strategic645thinkers in Israel have seen a fractured, weak Syria as646preferable to having a strong Syria allied with Turkiye. That647is not everybody in Israel, though. There are folks now that648are realizing, and I have heard this outreach from some folks649in the think tank world talking with Israeli counterparts, who650say, you know, this is too important. We realize that we do not651like the Turks right now, and they do not like us, but they are652a NATO ally, and they are on very good terms with the Trump653administration. We know there has to be a modus vivendi.654    I think one of the biggest temptations, if you will, for655Jerusalem to say, well, maybe we should keep it broken, was,656one, there was this dual specter of both continued fighting657between the SDF and the Damascus regime, and the thought that658al-Sharaa's government, the Syrian transitional government,659might engage in wholesale slaughter or atrocities against the660Kurds if and when that part of the country is reunited. Well,661what we have seen since early January is actually a very662delicate negotiation. There is some military activity with some663loss of lives on both sides, and also still a lot of fear and a664lot of anxiety remaining. Also, the offering by Ahmad al-665Sharaa's government of the best deal the Kurds of Syria have666ever had from a Syrian government-that is amazing. It is a667strong reason for both Israel and Turkiye to take notice and668say, actually, these forces that are pulling the country apart669are not as strong as the forces that are bringing them back670together, and on reasonable terms.671    I think a dialogue, which obviously we have been trying672to----I think the efforts of the special envoys, I think Tom673Barrack, but also Steve Witkoff, have been involved with trying674to talk to the Netanyahu folks and say, look, there has got to675be a way that you can do this in a way that's consistent with676the Trump administration's priorities and policy. I think that677needs to be reinforced. I think that the security dialog678between Israel and the United States, especially U.S. CENTCOM,679which has been so strong as they face the Iranian threat, we680need to find a way to also bring together security figures from681Israel and Turkiye and say, look, regional security is United682States security. We cannot have you guys seeing each other as683targets and as enemies if we are part of the same umbrella.684Really, leadership within the alliance is what I think both685countries need to see now, and Syria is ground zero for it.686    Co-Chairman Wilson: Thank you very much. Dr. Doran.687    Mr. Doran: Thank you. I could not agree more with what Rich688just said. I think American leadership in pulling the Turks and689the Israelis together and encouraging them--almost forcing them690to talk to each other, is, I think, the starting point for691solving this problem. In my discussions with Turks and692Israelis, I am struck by the tremendous gulf between them. They693do not--they no longer have the kind of regular contacts with694each other. Of course, they do have the--they do have intel-to-695intel relations and so on, but a kind of regularized696interaction across the board in the government is no longer697there. The expertise on either side is weak about the other,698but more than that, the world views are starkly discordant.699    When the Turks look at Syria, they want Syria to be France.700Meaning they want--you know, the French football team has701Africans, and Moroccans, and Algerians, but they all--they all702stand up and pledge allegiance to France and sing the French--703the French anthem at the games. The Turks want Syria to be704unified, and they want all ethnic groups in Syria to be seen as705Syrians. They do not care if there is a Kurdish general or a706Druze general in the army, but they want them to be--they want707them to be Syrians. This is both from a pragmatic point of708view, because they do not want a Turkish or a PKK autonomous709statelet on their border. It is also deeply ingrained in710Turks--in the way that they see their own country and how they711think the world should be organized.712    The Israelis, when they look at--and, the Turks fear that713the Israelis want to crack Syria up and keep it fragmented.714This is happening when the--at a moment when the Turks are715seeing competition with Israel elsewhere, places like716Somaliland and so forth. They are increasingly seeing the717Israelis as a rival. The Israelis, when they look at Turkey,718see an ideological Islamist power which they fear is going to719take over the vacuum left by the retreating Iran. They see the720government in Damascus as an Islamist power that wants to721destroy them, and that is also hostile--is hostile to them, the722Israelis, in the same way that it is hostile to the non-Muslim723minorities, or heterodox Muslim minorities, in Syria.724    I think the greatest fear of the Israelis, more than the725ideological onslaught of the Islamist against--against Israel726and the Syrian minorities, is that Syria will become a Turkish727military base, and a front--the front lines in an effort to728annihilate Israel. I think we have a major role to play here in729getting the two sides to come to an accommodation. I think it730is possible to turn Syria into a buffer State, or to help it731emerge as a buffer State, much as Jordan is a buffer State732between Iraq and Israel. As I said to you in my--earlier in my733testimony, this really requires commitment from the White House734and a lot of serious work to bring the two together so that735they get to know each other better, and learn that they--that,736as I believe, they can actually live together in the same737neighborhood without friction.738    Co-Chairman Wilson: Dr. Doran, thank you. Indeed, they have739in the past, so hopefully that can be restored. With that in740mind also, I would like to introduce for the record a statement741from the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy supporting the742Holding Accountable Russian Mercenaries Act 2.0. The reason for743that is that war criminal Putin is recruiting troops in Syria744to be used as human fodder to join the 1.2 million other troops745that--Russians--that he sacrificed.746    With that, we now proceed to Congressman Ellzey.747748        STATEMENT OF JAKE ELLZEY, U.S. HOUSE, FROM TEXAS749750    Representative Ellzey: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you751all for being here today.752    Anne, I am going to start with you. How do we get Syria to753move away from--I mean, economic stability is a foundation for754how a government--their stability. How we get Syria to stop755using Russian wheat and oil? How do we involve Ukraine? How do756we involve the United States for a stable food and energy757supply?758    Dr. Borschevskaya: Thank you very much. I think we can759start by facilitating, starting conversations, starting to see760how we can move forward on exactly that. How can we--what can761the United States do, perhaps through U.S. businesses? What, in762practical terms, can the United States provide to facilitate763Ukrainian wheat, other types of Ukrainian goods? Let us not764forget that much of Russian wheat that Russia sells is actually765stolen from Ukraine to begin with, and Ukrainians are our best766allies. They know Russia. They know Russian military. They know767how Russian businesses work. They have so many reasons to serve768as a counterweight to Russia. I think the best way to do this769is to start conversations. Again, I think at the highest770levels, as Michael had mentioned in his earlier remarks.771    The point is that Syria needs our attention. We need to772prioritize it. We need to understand why we need to do this,773that this is in our own long-term strategic interest. We also,774I think, need to understand that this is going to be incredibly775challenging, that there are going to be many questions for776businesses that come into Syria when there is so little777physical infrastructure in terms of how to conduct financial778transactions. I think we need to have conversations with the779Syrian government as well about how to facilitate that. I think780it starts with American engagement at all levels and really781prioritizing this issue.782    Representative Ellzey: Thank you for that. Of course, as we783have discussed, the war in Ukraine is both a genocide and an784imperial action; that is an attempt, and actually have been785successful, in stealing 25 percent of the world's wheat supply786from the Ukrainians, as well as--the goal is to get their gas787fields as well. This is--this is, that that genocide that they788are conducting there is about money and power, as it is789everywhere else, including Africa, that they go to. We do not790have time to address all those things, but getting them out of791Syria is absolutely a priority.792    Colonel and Doctor, I have got a question about President793al-Sharaa. You know, he fought against us in Iraq and794Afghanistan. Colonel, I am sure he was in Afghanistan--in Iraq,795when you were. Can he be trusted? As you well know, the796Israelis referred to him by his nom de guerre al-Julani. It is797a--Syria has a lot of different ethnic groups, and we have798already seen two of those get attacked from the nominal799government as it is. Is he playing both sides against the800middle, in allowing, yet condemning, these attacks on the Druze801and on the SDF? Can he be trusted?802    We will start with you, Colonel.803    Mr. Outzen: As my favorite president used to say, trust but804verify, right? I do not think actually trust comes into play805when we are talking about the Middle East much at all. Somebody806who has his background should not be trusted in the absolute807sense. However, we should trust what we see as observed808behaviors. What we saw as the observed behavior with nom de809guerre Julani, Ahmed al-Sharaa, is that after spending time, I810believe, at Camp Bucca in Iraq, in a U.S. prison facility for811having attacked against U.S. forces and Iraqi forces, he came812to Syria. Very shortly thereafter joined with al-Qaida in813Syria, which then became ISIS over time. He broke with both of814these groups because he started to focus both what he was815saying internally, and the people who have known him and816academically studied him for a long time, he said, my jihad is817the Syrian jihad. My jihad is the jihad against Assad. Now,818does that forgive him for all his past acts of aggression and819enmity? No, but it is an important step in an evolution.820    Representative Ellzey: Well, while it is restrained to821Syria, can he be trusted to protect those ethnic groups within822Syria, now that he is in charge?823    Mr. Outzen: I would say that it is not so much whether we824should trust his intentions, but his ability to control his825forces. Because many of the people that he has working with826him, especially the ones that were with him in Idlib, are what827we would consider to be jihadists. The quickest way to828strengthen and protect the people--the Druze in Suwayda, the829Kurds in the northeast, and even the Alawites, who were the830oppressors, in many ways, of the Syrian people, at least the831leadership was drawn from the Alawites--the quickest way to832protect all of them is to institutionalize and reform the833Syrian military.834    That comes with a stabilized State. Frankly, it probably835comes with the U.S. providing oversight, whether that is U.S.836forces or some sort of a contract mechanism, to insist on837reforms so that the sort of people that have been responsible838for atrocities fighting on that side are weeded out quickly839and, if they are not Syrians, are sent out of the country. Then840we can trust. We have to verify, and we have to go through this841reform process. We cannot take our hands off the wheel.842    Representative Ellzey: Well, I am curious--my time has843expired--but I wonder what that kind of a mechanism is. Because844there is a whole bunch of folks behind you that are shaking845their heads whenever asked if he can be trusted or not. I am846concerned about it too, specifically what that mechanism is.847What--how do we force them to protect those groups?848    Thank you for the answer. It is a great answer.849    Chairman, I yield back.850    Co-Chairman Wilson: Thank you very much, Congressman Jake851Ellzey.852    We now proceed to Congresswoman Chrissy Houlahan.853854  STATEMENT OF CHRISSY HOULAHAN, U.S. HOUSE, FROM PENNSYLVANIA855856    Representative Houlahan: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you857all for your testimony today.858    Mr. Doran, you mentioned that international politics now in859the U.S. is us versus Russia, us versus China, and us versus860Iran. Dr. Outzen, you also mentioned that your thesis, your861doctorate, apparently, is on applying less pressure and862coercion on Syria and rather engaging them instead. My question863has to do with the fact that the current administration has864suggested that our oldest allies in Europe should operate with865more independence from the United States. I guess what I am866trying to find out is how we can do all of these things, which867is to address whether or not--how to be more aggressively868inclusive with Syria-while also not necessarily engaging our869allies in that outreach? What has NATO been doing, if anything?870If you all would be helpful in filling in the blanks there.871    What more could the United States be doing that would be872the opposite of sanctions? Because it seems like sanctions are873your collective definition of coercion. You mentioned, Doctor,874that you might have forces-I do not know if you meant forces on875the ground or what you meant-to be that kind of helpful force.876I am looking for meat on the bones of what it is that you are877actually talking about when you say that we cannot coerce, but878we need to cooperate more with Syria. Also, at the same time,879our administration is turning its--itself away from the allies880that might actually help us execute on that.881    Mr. Doran: Thank you. I think the European allies, in this882scenario, are going to play a secondary role, and NATO as well.883Simply because of their capabilities and their history in this884part of the world. There has been a pretty clear distinction885since the Suez crisis that Europeans take care of European886security and the United States and its Middle Eastern allies887take care of Middle Eastern security. The key countries are888Turkey and Israel, because the United States is pulling back889somewhat from the--from the Middle East. I do not think we are890leaving the Middle East, but we want to be less engaged891militarily on the ground. I think that has been true of every892president since President Bush. There has been this inclination893to pull back.894    If we still have interests in the region but we are pulling895back militarily, then logically all we have to rely on are our896regional allies. The two most capable allies in this case are897the Turks and the Israelis. The problem is that the friction898between them is so significant right now that it could--it899could actually end up destabilizing Syria, and offering, as900Chairman Wilson said, an opportunity for our adversaries to use901the destabilization against us. I think there is the--with902regard to the Islamists, extremists that are surrounding903Sharaa, this is the--this is the biggest problem I think, more904than whatever he has in his heart. He has a cadre of people905around him who are quite happy to go out and slaughter906minorities. They need to be kept on a short leash. There need907to be trained up other forces that can provide security in908those areas that are not influenced by them.909    I think the key partner here is the Turks. They are the--910they are the--they are the arm of NATO into Syria. They have911the capability of building those kinds of forces. Given the912tensions now between the Israelis and the Turks, and the fears913that the Israelis have that the Turks might use this to create914forward basing against Israel, that is precisely the area in915which I think we need the greatest intervention in the shortest916amount of time, to come up with formula that will not provoke917the worst fears of the Israelis but will allow the Turks to918actually play a mediating role on the ground in Syria. Building919up security forces that are NATO-compatible, and not under the920control of Islamist extremists.921    Mr. Outzen: On my research into coercion, it is not that I922do not think we should ever coerce. We have given Syria a923massive dose of coercion for about the last 15 years. I just do924not think that is the right tool right now. Now you want to925keep your powder dry. There may be certain things that we926should have a snapback or the ability to reimpose if things go927off the rails. When you are talking about a stabilizing928country, should not lead with that. What do we lead with? I can929think of, especially based on my time in Afghanistan, multiple930situations where we had actually done a pretty good job. Kabul931had 24 hours of electricity for the first time, female932education, girls in schools. A lot of progress was made in933stabilizing. Now, that was a bigger challenge in the sense that934it was a much bigger country. We ended up not seeing that935through past the 20 years.936    We also did not have the kind of proximate help from937countries like Turkiye, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia that are938willing to pour resources, money, and so forth, into the939economic development of Syria. What I would like to see is the940U.S. embassy open as quickly as possible. I would like to see a941major U.S. intelligence operation cooperating and942collaborating. I would like to see CENTCOM there. I would also943say that security sector reform is incredibly important. I944think that we talked a little bit about that with the previous945question. We have countries like Turkiye that can do the946shooter training, so to speak. That will go in and do your947platoon-level, your tactical training, and things like that.948What the United States does that nobody else does as well is949security sector reform.950    We have a small number of companies in the private sector,951and I am not talking about the kind that go in and, again, are952doing shooting courses and the physical security. I am talking953about how to run a ministry of defense, how to do a budget, how954to make sure that you are doing your intake procedures and your955human resources procedures so that you are filtering out people956with extremist tendencies. We have those skills. We have those957companies. There were over 70 companies within the first week958that the U.S.--this is a friend at the U.S. Chamber told me--959that once the U.S. Chamber restarted a Syria program, 70960companies signed up in the first week. There is a massive961appetite. A lot of it is in energy, defense, construction, but962massive appetite for U.S. private sector to get involved with963Syria. I think that is what we should be looking at:964Incentivizing and helping to guide the reconstruction and965security.966    Representative Houlahan: I appreciate the answers, and I967have many more questions, but I have definitely run out of968time.969    I yield.970    Co-Chairman Wilson: Thank you very much, Congresswoman971Crissy Houlahan, of Pennsylvania. We can get back to your972question, another.973    We are really grateful to have Congressman Emanuel Cleaver974of Missouri.975976    STATEMENT OF EMANUEL CLEAVER, U.S. HOUSE, FROM MISSOURI977978    Representative Cleaver: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.979    I would like to follow through on the discussion you were980just having. I happen to agree with you. That is why I have981been trying to find out how active USAID is in Syria, if, in982fact, it is. Clearly that would be the U.S.' soft diplomacy,983and maybe even give us a stronger hand in the future of Syria.984Do you have any information about USAID, or anything?985    Mr. Doran: I do not think any of us do. Do you? No, we are986USAID knowledge-free zone here.987    Representative Cleaver: [Laughs.] Yes. Well, it is all over988the world, because I have been able--I have been hunting it989down, and I have not gotten any answer. Which is a concern. I990just--991    Mr. Outzen: If I can throw in just one comment, based on my992time in Afghanistan. We had a massive USAID presence. Because993of the sort of tentative security situation, in many cases we994could not get out to check on the projects. That was a--you had995power stations and schools that were built in remote provinces996that the USAID folks--and this is all laid out in the Special997Inspector General's Report for Afghanistan. That model of how998to help reconstruction and stabilization had its pathologies.999    Of course, under the current administration, there has been1000a major reform of how we do foreign assistance. I have to1001admit, I am not certain, since we do not have, to my knowledge,1002an embassy up and running--fully running in Damascus; I am not1003sure we have a mission set up yet for the--and I believe USAID1004has been resubordinated under a different bureau of the State1005Department. I do think there needs to be a lot of thought given1006to that, and I think there is a role. Obviously, I emphasize1007private sector in my view. There has to be some guiding hand1008and some rationalization coming from State Department and the1009aid agencies as well.1010    Representative Cleaver: Yes. I agree with that. I am a big1011believer in USAID. I have seen it in action around the world.1012It is one of the things that I think we may have pulled back1013on, to our detriment. What other ways--or are there other1014ways--for either of you--either of the three of you--for the1015U.S. to be more engaged in Syria? What do we need to do? We1016need a larger footprint, economically, militarily; what do we1017need?1018    Dr. Borschevskaya: Oh, I would absolutely agree we need a1019larger footprint, and I agree with both--both what Mike and1020Richard have said. I mean, the fact that the U.S. embassy is1021not up and running is a problem, because the Russian embassy is1022still operating in Damascus. It is still open, to my knowledge.1023I think, you know, I mentioned that we need to reexamine how we1024look at our engagement with Syria. We need to broaden our1025definition of that engagement. That should not--that should not1026be only military, but it should include economic, diplomatic,1027and certainly cultural. Russia, for its part, has a long1028history of cultural engagement in Syria, with intermarriages1029and Russian language instruction. I think more--the more1030people, full-time staff we have on the ground, the more1031information we have, the more we have the ability to shape the1032outcome.1033    Mr. Doran: If I can add one specific idea, Congressman. The1034discussions with our Turkish friends, there's an organization,1035an industrial organization, called TOBB, the Turk Odalar ve1036Borsalar Birligi. It is basically a large chamber of commerce-1037type organization. They have a plan right now to go into1038northern--mostly on the northern side of Turkiye, and establish1039industrial zones. They're looking for a signal from the United1040States that we think this is a good idea. They have lots of1041companies that want to go in. By the way, one of the things1042they would do is take Syrians--because there have been four1043million Syrians living in Turkiye during most of the war. Some1044of them have gone back. They want to take some of these Syrians1045with skills, with their own businesses already in Turkiye, and1046incentivize them to go back to Syria and start a virtuous cycle1047of job creation and prosperity in those regions. I think the1048U.S., to the extent that we can do this through State1049Department or Commerce, and incentivize our companies to jump1050in on that, to build these industrial zones, would be a1051tremendous way to have an engine for reconstruction.1052    Representative Cleaver: Thank you. Chairman Wilson has1053great power, strength, and vision. He will be able to do all1054the things you just mentioned. [Laughter.]1055    Co-Chairman Wilson: Hear, hear. Thank you.1056    Representative Cleaver: I yield back.1057    Co-Chairman Wilson: Thank you so much, Congressman Cleaver.1058    We now--I am really grateful that Congresswoman Houlahan1059has a question. Then I will have a final question. Again, what1060you are presenting is so important for the people of Syria. We1061want them to have opportunity. What a benefit it would be to1062all of the Middle East. Congresswoman.1063    Representative Houlahan: This is for Ms. Borchevskaya. I1064was wondering if, with your knowledge of the region and your1065knowledge of the history of the region, you might be able to1066prognosticate what might happen. What are you seeing for the1067future of Syria, and the role and influence of Russia? What can1068we, the United States, do to counter that? If there is a1069historical analogy or something that is in the past that looks1070a lot like this, what would it be?1071    Dr. Borschevskaya: Sure. My concern is that--because Russia1072is playing the long game in Syria, they are taking their time--1073my concern is that we will not--we will not sustain this effort1074to prioritize Syria, to engage with Syria, and Russia will take1075advantage of that. In the military realm in particular, Syria1076will have a very hard time weaning itself off of Russian1077military hardware, in the absence of other alternatives. This1078is such a deep dependence for which it is--from a very1079practical level, Syria has no other alternatives. Thus far,1080this government in Damascus is being very pragmatic. Remember,1081the Russian forces bombed al-Sharaa, but they had no qualms1082making a deal. Putin welcomed Sharaa twice in Moscow.1083    I worry also that if we do not provide other guardrails for1084the Syrian government, for alternatives in other fields--like1085printing Syrian currency, economic engagement--Russia's ability1086also to talk to conflicting sides within Syria and present1087itself as a mediator. I worry that over time Russia will take1088over. Perhaps that is why I am a little bit more cautious in1089terms of my outlook on Syria, and in terms of Russia's position1090there. I think our best strategy is to also play the long game1091and to recognize that this is going to take a long time. We1092need a sustained effort. We need to do what the Russians do. We1093need to prioritize this country. If we are able to do that--we1094were able to do that during the cold war--then I--then I think1095we do have a chance. I worry that we will not sustain this1096effort.1097    Co-Chairman Wilson: Thank you very much, Congressman1098Houlahan.1099    A final question from me for Dr. Doran and Colonel Outzen.1100Since February 2022, Russian forces have suffered nearly 1.21101million casualties in Ukraine, more losses than any other major1102power in any war since World War II. Its economy is actually1103less than two-thirds of the Baltic republics in Poland, just1104those four countries. Just two-thirds. I wish Congressman1105Ellzey was here; it is also less than Texas. With a small1106economy, which I believe can be collapsing with international1107sanctions being enforced, we know that these are the factors1108that led to the collapse of the Assad dictatorship in 2024, and1109the Soviet Union in 1990. How does the war in Ukraine continue1110to affect Russian operations in Syria? Also, it is misleading,1111but there is online advertising by Russian recruiters to bring1112Syrians to die on the battlefield in Ukraine. And they are1113transiting through the Russian bases. Again, reminding us how1114bad this is and what a tradition Putin has. We know he sent his1115troops into Ukraine with their dress uniforms because they were1116going to be welcomed by the Ukrainians. In fact, he was1117sacrificing young Russians to die for his power.1118    This week, I will be introducing a bipartisan Holding1119Accountable Russian Mercenaries Act that will designate the1120successors of the Wagner Group as a foreign terrorist1121organization. Are you aware of these reports? If accurate, what1122implications do they have for assessing the strategic1123importance of the Russian Syrian bases? How can we work with1124our Syrian friends to--for the best of the people of Syria? Dr.1125Doran.1126    Mr. Doran: Thank you. I think it is vitally important that1127we understand the strategic connection between--from the1128Russian point of view--between Ukraine and Syria. If the1129Russians do not succeed in Ukraine, if they fail in Ukraine,1130then Russia is no longer an empire. It becomes a--it becomes1131something closer to being a Russian ethnic nation-State.1132Ukraine is really the key element that allows it to function as1133an empire. It is through Ukraine, through Crimea, that it has1134access onto the Mediterranean. As I mentioned in my opening1135remarks, there is a bridge--a naval bridge from Crimea to1136Syria. We should see this as Vladimir Putin does, as a complex,1137and work in both areas simultaneously.1138    Having said that, we do also have to be very much aware of1139the fact that the Sharaa project in Damascus is very, very1140fragile, and it could go wrong in many--in many ways. I think1141Sharaa himself is fearful that the Russians may become a1142destabilizing force. He has made a clear distinction between1143the Iranians and the Russians. He defines Iran as an absolute1144enemy, and he will not have any--any thought of negotiations1145with the Iranians about their position in the country, but not1146so with--not so with Russia. As Anna mentioned, he is dependent1147on the Russians for equipment. That is not just, you know, hard1148military equipment. Just radars that you need to run a normal--1149a normal airport. It is all Russian--it is all Russian1150equipment, so there is the fear of destabilization. There is1151the desire for aid on infrastructure, also military equipment.1152    If I could say one issue--one point on a different subject1153before I close. I just want to emphasize, in terms of the1154importance of finding a modus vivendi between the Turks and the1155Israelis, how important the Druze question is in the south. The1156Israelis want some kind of guarantee for the well-being of the1157Druze, who suffered a horrible slaughter at the hands of1158Sharaa's extremist security forces just a few months ago. Their1159fears about the Druze are legitimate. They are very well--they1160are very well-established. They also--they also intersect with1161Israel's concerns about threats on their own border to Israel.1162From the Turkish point of view, the Turks look at this, and1163they see a desire on the part of Israel to fragment Syria. I1164think that is another area where the United States really has1165to put in sustained--sustained diplomacy to find a formula that1166will assuage the Israelis and also convince the Turks that this1167is not an effort to fragment the whole country.1168    Thank you.1169    Co-Chairman Wilson: Thank you very much, Dr. Doran. Now,1170Colonel Outzen.1171    Mr. Outzen: Sir, the Russians are opportunistic. They will1172look for any hole in any polity, in any State in the region.1173They will worm their way in. They will try to break it apart,1174and hollow it out, and maximize their own influence. They have1175done this in Georgia. They have done it in parts of Ukraine.1176They have done it in Belarus, and they did it in Syria. We made1177a huge mistake, in my view--the United States did--in1178overestimating their staying power and their strength. For--you1179know, I remember, going back to 2013, 2014, 2015, when there1180was bipartisan support to do something stronger--more strongly1181to support the Syrian opposition. We bought this idea that, oh,1182the Russians will never let it happen, and their air defense is1183too strong. The Iranians will never let it happen. Well, the1184Syrian people suffered for 10 years because of that1185overestimate. I think we should avoid making that same mistake1186in the case of Ukraine.1187    Now, we also cannot count on the Russians giving up anytime1188soon. What they have shown is that even with an economy smaller1189than that of Texas, they are willing to squeeze every little1190bit out of their people to keep fighting these wars. It is a1191very strong combination of deterrence, strengthening our1192allies--and that means, in my view, Ukraine, which we have done1193a pretty good job, I think, after a bad start, of helping1194Ukraine. My view is we should do more. We also have to see1195Syria as an analogous position to that. If Syria is left on its1196own, if we do not--and I am not saying write blank checks to1197Al-Sharaa or anybody else. I have my own doubts about the man.1198Through engagement and through strengthening the Syrian State,1199and nesting it in with our regional allies, we will leave no1200room for the Russians to do what they have previously done in1201Syria, and what they continue to try to do in Ukraine. Then we1202will have sewn together a very strong regional network of1203alliances that restores American credibility. That is the1204direction I think we need to take it.1205    Co-Chairman Wilson: Well, thank each of our witnesses for1206being here today. I am grateful for our colleagues, and again,1207I hope people notice. I am so grateful for the staff here too.1208The Commission for the Organization of Security and Cooperation1209in Europe, it is very bipartisan and very bicameral, because we1210want the best for the American people and we want the best, in1211this hearing, for the people of Syria and for the Middle East.1212With that, we are adjourned.1213    [Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the hearing ended.]12141215                                 [all]12161217[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]12181219         The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent1220       federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in1221            implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords.12221223          The Commission, Created in 1976, is composed of nine1224     Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the1225              Department of State, Defense, and Commerce.12261227         All Commission publications may be freely reproduced,1228          in any form, with appropriate credit. The Commission1229   encourages the widest possible dissemination of its publications.12301231                              WWW.CSCE.GOV12321233                     youtube.com/HelsinkiCommission12341235                    facebook.com/helsinkicommission12361237                  flickr.com/photos/helsinkicommission12381239                           x.com/HelsinkiComm