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Hearings to examine made in China and paid by seniors, focusing on stopping the surge of international scams.
Meeting•Senate Aging (Special)•Jan 14, 2026 · 3:30 PM
Summary
Senate Aging (Special) held a meeting on Jan 14, 2026 at 3:30 PM in Hart Senate Office Building, Room 216.
Record
The meeting has its transcript on the record.
Transcript
The transcript runs to 1,809 lines and 88,478 characters, as the Government Publishing Office printed it.
senate-hearing-62924.txt1[Senate Hearing 119-303]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34 S. Hrg. 119-30356 MADE IN CHINA,7 PAID BY SENIORS: STOPPING8 THE SURGE OF INTERNATIONAL SCAMS9=======================================================================1011 HEARING1213 BEFORE THE1415 SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING1617 UNITED STATES SENATE1819 ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2021 SECOND SESSION2223 __________2425 WASHINGTON, DC2627 __________2829 JANUARY 14, 20263031 __________3233 Serial No. 119-223435 Printed for the use of the Special Committee on Aging3637[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]3839 Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov4041 __________4243 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE4462-924 PDF WASHINGTON : 202645=======================================================================4647 SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING4849 RICK SCOTT, Florida, Chairman5051DAVE McCORMICK, Pennsylvania KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York52JIM JUSTICE, West Virginia ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts53TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama MARK KELLY, Arizona54RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia55ASHLEY MOODY, Florida ANDY KIM, New Jersey56JON HUSTED, Ohio ANGELA ALSOBROOKS, Maryland57 ----------58 McKinley Lewis, Majority Staff Director59 Claire Descamps, Minority Staff Director6061 C O N T E N T S6263 ----------6465 Page6667Opening Statement of Senator Rick Scott, Chairman................ 168Opening Statement of Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand, Ranking69 Member......................................................... 27071 PANEL OF WITNESSES7273Nathan Picarsic, Senior Fellow, the Foundation for Defense of74 Democracies, Washington, DC.................................... 375Kathy Stokes, Senior Director, Fraud Prevention Programs, AARP,76 Washington, DC................................................. 577Jacqueline Burns Koven, Head of Cyber Threat Intelligence,78 Chainalysis, New York, New York................................ 779Seto Bagdoyan, Director, Audit Services, Forensic Audits and80 Investigative Service, Government Accountability Office,81 Washington, DC................................................. 98283 APPENDIX84 Prepared Witness Statements8586Nathan Picarsic, Senior Fellow, the Foundation for Defense of87 Democracies, Washington, DC.................................... 2888Kathy Stokes, Senior Director, Fraud Prevention Programs, AARP,89 Washington, DC................................................. 3490Jacqueline Burns Koven, Head of Cyber Threat Intelligence,91 Chainalysis, New York, New York................................ 4392Seto Bagdoyan, Director, Audit Services, Forensic Audits and93 Investigative Service, Government Accountability Office,94 Washington, DC................................................. 619596 Questions for the Record9798Kathy Stokes, Senior Director, Fraud Prevention Programs, AARP,99 Washington, DC................................................. 85100Seto Bagdoyan, Director, Audit Services, Forensic Audits and101 Investigative Service, Government Accountability Office,102 Washington, DC................................................. 86103104 Statements for the Record105106National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys Statement................ 89107Social Security Administration Statement......................... 91108Stop Scams Alliance Statement.................................... 96109.................................................................110111 MADE IN CHINA,112 PAID BY SENIORS: STOPPING113 THE SURGE OF INTERNATIONAL SCAMS114115 ----------116117 Wednesday, January 14, 2026118119 U.S. Senate120 Special Committee on Aging121 Washington, DC.122 The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:32 p.m., Room123216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Rick Scott, Chairman of124the Committee, presiding.125 Present: Senator Scott, Johnson, Moody, Gillibrand, and126Warren.127128 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR129 RICK SCOTT, CHAIRMAN130131 The Chairman. The U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging132will now come to order. Today, we're here to discuss a growing133threat to American seniors and our families. The surge of134international scams rooted in Communist China and its regional135criminal networks. Scams targeting seniors are stealing136billions of dollars from hardworking Americans, and we here in137Congress have a responsibility to confront them head on.138 The scope of this problem is staggering. In 2024, older139Americans lost more than $4.8 billion to fraud according to the140FBI. These are retirees who spend decades working, saving, and141planning for their futures, only to have their lives upended by142monsters operating criminal networks overseas.143 As our Committee reports, age of fraud makes clear these144are not small-time criminals. These are highly organized145transnational enterprises, many of them directed or enabled by146the Chinese Communist Party. We know how these groups work.147They rely on Chinese platforms, Chinese payment channels, and148scam compounds in Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and elsewhere,149compounds built and staffed by trafficked workers forced to150carry out scams, targeting our friends Americans.151 Not only is this a disgusting display of our national152failures to protect human rights, dignity, and security, it's153also another way Communist China is undermining our country and154targeting the American people. Beijing has allowed this155criminal infrastructure to grow and thrive. No matter what you156believe; indifference, lack of enforcement, or strategic157tolerance, Communist China is the epicenter of the global scam158industry that drains American savings and destabilizes159families.160 I decided to make this the first hearing of the year to161send a clear message that we will not tolerate any further162inaction as the CCP seeks to hurt our seniors in what should be163their golden years. Communist China and criminal enterprise164network must be stopped. We have common-sense legislation ready165to go that would make a real difference in combating scams and166holding those responsible accountable.167 At the end of last year, Ranking Member Gillibrand and I,168along with our fellow committee members, Senators Ashley Moody169and Mark Kelly, introduced the National Strategy for Combating170Scams Act. This bill would finally require a coordinated whole-171of-government response to fight fraud, recognizing that after172billions upon billions of dollars are being lost every year,173it's time we finally get federal, state, and private sector174partners together under a unified strategy.175 I'm also proud that my Scam Compound Accountability and176Mobilization, or SCAM Act, was passed by the Senate last month.177This bill would give the Treasury Department the authority to178sanction scam compounds and the criminal networks behind them.179Criminals shouldn't be free to hide behind foreign compounds,180use Chinese infrastructure, and still access the U.S. financial181system.182 Additionally, Ranking Member Gillibrand and I are also183pushing for the GUARD Act. This bill strengthens penalties184against criminals who target older Americans, and gives law185enforcement more tools to prevent these crimes.186 These three bills are bipartisan, they're common-sense, and187they're designed to protect the American people. It's time we188all come together and get this legislation passed so we can189stop the bleeding of American dollars to international190criminals.191 Here's the reality: There isn't a person alive who isn't192susceptible to Communist China scams. They won't stop unless we193do something. We cannot continue to sit idly by as these194criminals harm Americans. Now is the time to take action to195protect our seniors and every American.196 I look forward to a productive discussion today with our197witnesses, and now I'd like to recognize Ranking Member198Gillibrand for opening statement.199200 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR201 KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, RANKING MEMBER202203 Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Chairman Scott, and thanks204for calling today's hearing. Welcome, witnesses. I appreciate205you all being here today.206 In recent years, scams targeting older adults have grown207more sophisticated and widespread because of the rise of scam208centers. These centers are fueled by the labor of human209trafficking victims, new developments in technology, and the210use of cryptocurrency. Older Americans everywhere are211vulnerable to the rise of these scams, including my own212constituents.213 For example, a senior in Jefferson County, New York, was214convinced through a romance scam to withdraw most of his 401(k)215funds and transfer the money into cryptocurrency. That is a216loss that stings. It can derail retirement plans, pull apart217families, and subject seniors to emotional and material harm.218Unfortunately, victims can struggle to report scams due to219stigma and shame. Some communities may face additional barriers220related to language or fear.221 This hearing focuses on transnational scams that are222facilitated by Chinese criminal organizations. It is worth223remembering that Asian immigrants, including many Chinese224Americans, can be preferred targets for transnational scammers225because of a common language and culture, as well as their226familial ties to China.227 We must remember that international scams are worldwide,228and this phenomenon requires robust and coordinated prevention,229enforcement, and protection efforts. One positive development230has taken place in New York. The state's Department of Aging,231the Association on Aging in New York, and the Silver Shield232Partnership empower older New Yorkers with tools that allow233them to instantly perform scam checks via email, text, and234online to report scams to the FBI and the FTC in one click.235 However, there is still much more work to be done. Last236year, the Government Accountability Office published a report237on federal efforts to combat scams. GAO noted an alarming lack238of coordination amongst federal agencies. Based on239recommendations from GAO's report, I introduced the National240Strategy for Combating Scams Act with Chairman Rick Scott, and241Senators Mark Kelly, and Ashley Moody. Our legislation would242require the FBI to lead a multi-agency working group to create243a national strategy to combat scams.244 Last July, I introduced the bipartisan Guarding Unprotected245Aging Retirees from Deception, or GUARD Act, with Senator Katie246Britt and Chairman Scott. The GUARD Act will increase resources247for law enforcement to utilize blockchain technology for248investigating financial fraud.249 I appreciate the willingness of my colleagues to work with250me on legislation to combat scams, and I look forward to our251discussion today. Thank you.252 The Chairman. Thank you, Ranking Member.253 I'd like to welcome our expert witnesses who are here to254talk about how serious this issue is, and the steps we can take255to protect our seniors. First, I'd like to introduce Nathan256Picarsic, Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defensive257Democracies. He's a leading expert on Communist China's global258economic and strategic ambitions, with more than a decade of259experience analyzing how the CCP weaponizes technology,260economic leverage, and military/civil fusion to expand its261influence.262 He was the first Western analyst to document Beijing's263China Standards 2035 plan. His insights grounded in primary264source research have informed policymakers and appear in major265publications including The Wall Street Journal, The Washington266Post, Bloomberg, and CNBC.267 Thank you for being here. Please begin your testimony.268269 STATEMENT OF NATHAN PICARSIC, SENIOR270271 FELLOW, THE FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE272273 OF DEMOCRACIES, WASHINGTON, DC274275 Mr. Picarsic. Thank you, Chairman Scott, Ranking Member276Gillibrand, and committee members, for the opportunity to offer277testimony alongside my esteemed co witnesses.278 As Senator Scott noted, international scams targeting279elderly populations in America already account for billions of280dollars of harm annually. Chinese-linked operations play an281outsized role in executing and supporting these scams, and as282testimony, I hope to convey three points.283 State-backed scam operations support China's broader284approach to great power competition. The Chinese government285plays a role in the proliferation of international scams and286last, there's opportunity for the Federal Government to lead287and empower coordination that can disrupt and deter Chinese288state-backed scams.289 International scams are directly relevant to strategic290competition. Social cohesion is a pivotal battleground.291Defending against external attacks on our vulnerable, including292our elderly, is a fundamental requirement for succeeding in293long-term peacetime competition. China understands this, and294China deliberately positions foment, fissures within American295society, and to tease at American vulnerabilities.296 We know and talk a lot about China's state-backed hacking,297industrial espionage, foreign information campaigns. Those298create national security risks for the United States by299activating a united front that subverts markets captures elites300and does the bidding of the Chinese State through obscured and301direct channels.302 The same Chinese campaign also enables the transnational303criminal forces that execute and redeem profits from elder304scams in the United States. There's growing awareness of305China's leading role as evidenced by this hearing, but306recognition of the full scope of this threat lags, so too does307marshaling a right-sized response, one they impose of the308Chinese government for its role and deter attacks on America's309elderly moving forward.310 State-backed scam has emerged from China, just like state-311backed industrial espionage efforts. China plays a leading role312in scams that originate both in China itself and outside in313hotspots across southeast Asia, for example, where scam314operations exist and scam compounds operate under Chinese315leadership.316 China's criminal networks are permitted, and at times,317abetted by the Chinese State in its ruling Communist Party. The318leaders of the Chinese Communist Party would much rather see319criminal acts perpetrated against foreign targets than against320China's own aging population. Accordingly, the Chinese321government has allowed China's cottage industry of scam322operations, including those to target elder victims to exist323and to excel.324 China's criminal networks offer several fundamental325advantages. First, China's criminal networks benefit from326advanced technology. Second, China's banking and sector has327globalized, allowing China's criminal networks to transfer328money across borders, obfuscate the flow of funds, and evade329regulatory authorities. Those advantages fuel Chinese criminal330underground that is already global.331 Elder scams is a key revenue source for their broader332criminal ecosystem, and Chinese criminal networks lead the way333in refining tactics. Pig butchering, for example, has emerged334as a term to describe cyber-enabled scams that frequently drain335elderly victims of their savings over a sequence of courtship336and scamming.337 The practice of pig butchering and its dehumanizing framing338originated in China. The term was first coined in Chinese. The339power of the Chinese financial system compounds the threat340posed by those Chinese tactics and by the Chinese perpetrators.341 The problem isn't just that there's an internationalized342Chinese banking system. The problem is that the Chinese State343makes it nearly impossible to reclaim stolen funds. Victims344often have little recourse after funds have been offshore. The345systemic nature of China's state-backed scamming amounts to346great power stakes.347 The United States cannot afford to stand by as Chinese348criminal networks deplete American social trust and the bank349accounts of countless Americans. A whack-a-mole response will350not solve this challenge. State-backed scam networks can outfox351their targets and the authorities that are invariably playing352catch up.353 To offset this imbalance, the United States needs to erect354protections and increase sensing, invest in coordination355between local, federal, and private sector forces, and enforce356aggressively against Chinese criminal networks in the arms of357the Chinese State, including its financial apparatus that358support them to be able to send a clear deterrent signal to359Beijing.360 Americans should not be surprised by the Chinese government361whatsoever. This is the same international actor that decimated362global public health through their negligence with COVID-19,363the same actor that hacks the U.S. Government and critical364infrastructure that maliciously fuels the fentanyl crisis365ravaging America's heartland, and is building a military to366challenge the United States and to bully America's allies and367partners.368 This is not a responsible stakeholder. This is an369adversary. We should take no pride in treating China with kid370gloves, or endlessly hoping that they'll mature into a371responsible actor and worse yet, the state-backed scamming that372they propel proves that China is an enemy keen to target our373vulnerable populations. America needs to respond forcefully to374protect our elders, to support our social fabric as well as our375chances in long-term competition.376 Thank you again for the opportunity to contribute to this377hearing and for the work of the Committee to protect America's378aging population.379 The Chairman. Thank you. Next, I'd like to recognize Kathy380Stokes, Senior Director of Fraud Prevention within the Fraud381Watch Network at AARP. It's nice to see you again. Ms. Stokes382is one of the Nation's leading experts on financial383exploitation targeting older adults, and she has spent years384studying the tactics criminals use, the vulnerabilities they385exploit, and the long-term impact fraud has on seniors and386their families.387 This Committee has welcomed AARP several times over the388years. I just want to take a second and say thank you for your389organization's leadership in this space. Helping educate your390members helps millions of Americans stay up to date on the391latest fraud trends and saves innumerable amounts of money.392 Thank you for being here and please begin your testimony.393394 STATEMENT OF KATHY STOKES, SENIOR DIRECTOR,395 FRAUD PREVENTION PROGRAMS, AARP, WASHINGTON, DC396397 Ms. Stokes. Thank you, Chairman Scott, for inviting me to398testify, and I want to express my appreciation to you Ranking399Member Gillibrand and all of the Committee members for holding400this timely and important hearing.401 My name is Kathy Stokes, Senior Director of Fraud402Prevention Programs, AARP Fraud Watch Network. I'm here on403behalf of AARP, and we represent 125 million Americans, aged 50404and older, and their families, and we deeply appreciate your405attention to the surge of international scams that are406targeting our seniors.407 Now, fraud is a national crisis but bigger than most of us408recognize. The Federal Trade Commission reported $12.8 billion409stolen in 2024, but the true cost is far, far higher. They went410back to that $12.8 billion and revised it in December to $196411billion leaving our economy in a single year to fraud, $81412billion of that from our Nation's seniors. They robbed victims413of savings, of independence and security.414 Now, the Fraud Watch Network is on the front lines of415educating millions of consumers supporting victims and driving416systemic change. Our helpline receives 500 calls a day from417those reporting scams, to victims seeking help, and we also418offer support groups to help victims rebuild their lives.419 We hear from people like Lori, an oncology account420specialist for a pharmaceutical company. A few years ago, she421fell in love with a man whom she first met when he reached out422to her on LinkedIn to ask for advice about moving to her area.423He then spent months carefully grooming her.424 As her caring and trust deepened, he asked for Lori's help.425She ended up loaning him $675,000, nearly all of her savings,426including funds from her 401(k) plan and loans and of course,427when she finally discovered it was a scam, she was devastated428and then, she learned that she'd have to pay $225,000 in429federal taxes on the money that was stolen that she no longer430has. The massive tax bill forced Lori to file for bankruptcy,431and the IRS was first in line for payment.432 In addition to fraud prevention through education, AARP is433leading an effort to change how we talk about and think about434fraud victims. Our Words Matter campaign shows that blaming435victims deprioritizes fraud as a crime, and we're seeing real436movement among consumers, media, industry, policymakers toward437understanding that fraud is a crime and it's not the victim's438fault.439 AARP is also proud to be a founder of the National Elder440Fraud Coordination Center, which aggregates intelligence441related to elder fraud, to support law enforcement and NEFCC442recently revived a stalled transnational federal fraud443investigation when it was able to identify a network of 24444U.S.-based shell companies receiving victim funds. Indeed,445transnational criminal organizations drive the expansion and446the funds they amass represent a national security threat.447 In the sophisticated scam we've already talked about448originating in Southeast Asia, these Chinese organized crime449rings are using human trafficking for frontline scammers450targeting and devastating Americans, forcing many to rely on451government safety nets in their retirement.452 We're pleased to see solutions proposed by Congress,453including the introduction of the GUARD Act and the National454Strategy for Combating Scams Act by the chair, and ranking455member, and other Senators. These bills seek to improve the456state and local response to fraud, and better coordinate agency457efforts, and ensure law enforcement has the tools needed to458combat these crimes.459 We also advocate for reinstating the personal casualty and460theft loss deduction as the tax relief for Victims of Crimes,461Scams, and Disasters Act would do. Victims like Lori who end up462owing taxes on stolen funds, they no longer end up stuck with a463bill that they don't deserve and have no way to pay.464Essentially, they're being re-victimized by the Federal465Government.466 There is no single solution and every sector has a role to467play. Individuals can certainly take steps to protect468themselves and their loved ones. Industry must innovate on469fraud controls. Tech companies and telcos must build security470into products so they're secure by design and safe by default471and the financial services industry must do its part to stop472their customers from being defrauded.473 Addressing fraud does require a whole-of-society response.474We can't educate, or engineer, or regulate, or arrest our way475out of this crisis alone but altogether, we can disrupt the476fraud business model, protect millions of Americans, and477safeguard our economy.478 Thank you for your leadership and commitment to protecting479older Americans, and I look forward to your questions.480 The Chairman. She never met him, right? It was just all481online.482 Ms. Stokes. Well, they had video. Yes.483 Senator Gillibrand. Oh, he had video chats?484 Ms. Stokes. Oh, yes. He was no stranger in that sense. Yes.485 The Chairman. I wonder if it was really him.486 Ms. Stokes. Oh, it was probably transnational criminal487organization and they were using deepfake.488 The Chairman. Yes. All right. Now, I'd like to recognize489and introduce Jacqueline Burns Koven, Head of Cyber Threat490Intelligence at Chainalysis. Ms. Koven leads the company's491analysis of cyber-enabled crime, including cryptocurrencies,492scams, ransomware, and transactional fraud networks targeting493victims in the United States.494 Her work focuses on tracking illicit financial flows, and495identifying how overseas criminal organizations, including496China-linked networks, move and launder stolen funds through497digital assets. She regularly supports U.S. law enforcement498policymakers with data-driven insights that help disrupt scam499operations that recover stolen funds.500 Thank you for being here.501502 STATEMENT OF JACQUELINE BURNS KOVEN,503504 HEAD OF CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE,505506 CHAINALYSIS, NEW YORK, NEW YORK507508 Ms. Burns Koven. Thank you, Chairman Scott, Ranking Member509Gillibrand, and distinguished members of the Special Committee.510Thank you for inviting me to testify on the pressing issue of511international scams targeting older Americans as an urgent512matter of national security.513 My name is Jacqueline Burns Koven, and I'm the head of514Cyber Threat Intelligence for the blockchain data platform515Chainalysis where we harness the transparency of blockchain so516that banks, businesses, and governments have the data, and517investigations, compliance, and security solutions they need518for this new digital economy to thrive.519 We track cryptocurrency used by illicit actors such as520those carrying out investment and impersonation scams and521provide data on their financial activity to private and public522sector customers include, including the Federal Government.523 Through Chainalysis' unique visibility into the crypto524economy and illicit fund flows, we see how seemingly small scam525payments from individual victims are pooled and funneled into526industrial scale fraud conglomerates. We know that behind these527transactions, are real people, often seniors who are being528manipulated into sending their life savings through529technologies they may not fully understand.530 These scam syndicates are incredibly well-resourced.531According to Chainalysis data, 2025 was a record year for532scammers stealing an estimated $17 billion in cryptocurrency.533Chinese scam conglomerates are undeniably the global market534leaders in fraud, in large part to their abuse of innovations,535including crypto and AI, to make their schemes more convincing536and scalable.537 Everything from social media profiles, mass calling and SMS538spamming tools, deepfake, and voice cloning, to laundering is539available in Chinese language underground marketplaces, and540they leverage cryptocurrency as a form of payment.541Cryptocurrencies are often the financial rails of choice for542scammers for the same reasons legitimate users use them.543Transactions are cross-border and instantaneous.544 I'm here today to emphasize that fraudsters use of545cryptocurrency should place them at a fundamental disadvantage546given the traceability and feasibility of many of these assets.547At Chainalysis, we analyze transaction data from the blockchain548networks to provide clear information into scam networks and549laundering at a level of transparency that isn't possible in550traditional forms of value transfer.551 Blockchain intelligence should be considered foundational552for understanding the fraud problem at both strategic and553tactical levels. Law enforcement and regulatory bodies can554disrupt these networks, cut them off from the global financial555institutions and make it harder for them to profit by targeting556illicit entities and networks on the blockchain with sanctions557and asset seizure.558 Blockchain analytics offers unique opportunities to trace559proceeds of crime, identify additional victims, and partner560with the private sector to disrupt illicit networks and pursue561restitution rather than relying on one-off criminal562investigations.563 However, despite this huge potential for disruption,564scammers are exploiting the disjointed and reactive nature of565how public and private sectors respond to their schemes. This566crisis requires a unified and technology-enabled response567preventing Americans from engaging with scams altogether, and568identifying and dismantling enterprises responsible for569perpetrating scams.570 As such, my recommendations include, first, the creation of571a national counter scam strategy, orchestrating a comprehensive572response, including centralizing scam reporting, streamlining573coordinated action to dismantle scam conglomerates, and return574funds to victims in facilitating information sharing between575the public and private sectors.576 Today's scam victims have multiple agencies they can report577to, yet, there's no easy mechanism for these agencies to share578with each other or the private sector of what whose best579positioned to prevent for additional victims. We need a580coordinated approach using all levers of government to target581the scam ecosystem holistically from the money launderers, to582the fishing kit developers, and data brokers.583 Second, we need to leverage advanced technologies to combat584scammers' growing sophistication. Too often, scam victims are585turned away from authorities who are ill-equipped to properly586assist crypto cases. This challenge also demands a paradigm587shift from reactive enforcement to proactive disruption through588AI-powered fraud prevention technology to identify scammers589before they meet their victims, and empower law enforcement to590move decisively upstream and take the fight directly to591scammers.592 Third, we need to provide financial institutions with593guidance to help them intervene when customers attempt to send594funds to scams. Clear consistent guidelines could help firms595navigate when and how they can slow-block, scrutinize scam596transactions and what form of friction are appropriate without597overreaching.598 Last, we need to close gaps in AML/CFT standards599implementation, especially countries that host services600scammers rely on to launder funds defrauded from Americans and601in the absence of cooperation, more pressure is needed to602disrupt the offshore financial networks and the digital asset603services flagrantly abusing laws and regulatory norms.604 Once again, thank you for the opportunity to provide605testimony on this important topic, and continue to be a helpful606partner on initiatives by Congress to better protect Americans,607especially the most vulnerable. I look forward to your608questions.609 The Chairman. Thank you. Now, I'd like to recognize Ranking610Member Gillibrand to introduce the next witness.611 Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to move612to introduce Seto Bagdoyan. Mr. Bagdoyan is Director for Audit613Services at The Government Accountability Office's Forensic614Audits and Investigative Service mission team.615 Mr. Bagdoyan previously served in a variety of positions at616GAO, including as an advisor in GAO's Office of congressional617Relations, and as Assistant Director for Homeland Security and618Justice. He's also served as an congressional detail with the619Senate Finance Committee, and the House Committee on Homeland620Security, and in private consultancy positions focusing on621political risk and homeland security.622 Mr. Bagdoyan, you may begin your testimony.623624 STATEMENT OF SETO BAGDOYAN, DIRECTOR,625626 AUDIT SERVICES, FORENSIC AUDITS &627628 INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE, GOVERNMENT629630 ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, WASHINGTON, DC631632 Mr. Bagdoyan. Thank you, Chairman Scott, Ranking Member633Gillibrand, Senator Johnson. I'm pleased to discuss today GAO's634April 2025 report about scams targeting consumers, including635older adults and the federal response.636 Scams are a method of committing fraud by employing637deception or manipulation enabled by technology such as AI to638achieve financial gain. They involve scammers, often operating639from foreign countries, as we've heard today, engaging targeted640victims with a type of scam and requesting payment under false641purposes.642 One example highlights the scope and reach of scams and643their financial toll on consumers. A 2023 international police644operation against online financial crime, including scams,645yielded over 3,000 arrests and seizures of $300 million in646assets across 34 countries, including the United States.647 However, the full extent of losses and the risks that648underpin them is elusive, since these estimates often are based649on under-reported consumer complaints rather than systematic650assessments of scam risks and their financial and other651implications.652 In our report, we noted that given the scope, scale, and653nature of scams and the risks they pose, the federal response654falls short on risk management fundamentals. Especially, it655lacks a governmentwide strategy and a lead agency to organize,656coordinate, and target multiple activities by individual657agencies.658 Importantly, and this is very important, there is no common659definition of what constitutes a scam, and no systematic660assessment of scams and the risks they pose to consumers.661Accordingly, there's no assurance that the federal response as662it is now - is addressing the right risks and the right663priorities in the right manner.664 A government-wide strategy would introduce risk management665fundamentals to help ensure that the federal response to a666significant, dynamic, and sophisticated risk is integrated,667prioritized, targeted, and adaptable. We made 16668recommendations to FBI, FTC, and CFPB, the federal agencies669best positioned to lead the federal response.670 To date, these agencies' responses are mixed. They've671agreed with some recommendations and disagreed with, or took no672explicit positions on, others. For example, FBI agreed to673assume the lead for the governmentwide strategy and outlined674related initial steps. However, its disagreement with other675recommendations essential for an effective strategy, such as676adopting a common definition, is concerning.677 While we acknowledge agencies' positions on these678challenging undertakings, it's imperative for them to implement679all recommendations. Otherwise, the governmentwide strategy680will ultimately be ineffective.681 In closing, scams, including those of foreign origin, pose682immediate risks of harm to consumers. Accordingly, these risks683require a decisive, expeditious federal response. The response684is underpinned by adopting a common definition of scams.685 This serves as the organizing principle for assessing and686quantifying the risks posed by scams, and crafting and687implementing a governmentwide strategy to counter them,688including those of foreign origin. In this regard, legislative689actions such as S. 3355 would charge the federal response, and690importantly, establish oversight and ensure accountability.691 Chairman Scott, this concludes my remarks. I welcome the692Committee's questions. Thank you.693 The Chairman. Thanks for coming, and thanks for your694testimony. Now, we'll go to the questions. Senator Johnson, if695you want to start us off.696 Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Stokes, being697the accountant here, you caught my attention when we talked698about, is it Lori? She emptied what, her 401(k) account, or699whatever, $600,000-and-some?700 Ms. Stokes. Yes. It was primarily from her 401(k).701 Senator Johnson. How in the world did she have a greater702than $200,000 tax liability? I mean, was it gift tax, or was703it, you know, 10 percent early withdrawal from--I mean, I don't704understand how the tax penalty could be that high705 Ms. Stokes. I'm not an accountant, so I don't know. I just706know that it was $225,000, and that was what forced her to file707Chapter 13.708 Senator Johnson. I would ask you to go back to Lori. I'd709like to get the details because that makes no sense. I mean, if710they considered she shouldn't have had to pay anything, I can711maybe see a penalty for earlier withdrawal, but that'd be712cruel.713 I mean, she made a loan and she lost her money. If714anything, she'd get a tax refund on something like that. It715literally makes no sense to me. I'd really appreciate that.716 Ms. Stokes. Absolutely.717 Senator Johnson. In a number of testimonies, you have laid718out some of these scams, but we didn't really, other than719Lori's romantic scam. I'm just asking each of you, what is it?720What's the hook? Can you give anybody watching this, you know,721be aware when you see this.722 I'll start with Mr. Picarsic. I mean, what are the two or723three most common hooks? I'll just go right down the line.724 Mr. Picarsic. Yes. I mean, I think the pig butchering,725which is similar to the Lori attack sort of confidence scheme,726and recurring outreach from an actor that you're unfamiliar727with or that is showing some sort of romantic or unprompted728solicitation.729 Senator Johnson. You'd say that the romantic one is kind of730 Mr. Picarsic. It's really big. Yes.731 Senator Johnson. Okay. Ms. Stokes, what would you say other732than a romantic one? I kind of understand that one. What are733some other ones? Because I want people watching this being734alert when you see this, when somebody says, you know, like--go735ahead.736 Ms. Stokes. A big one is a tech support scam where you're737on your device and you get a popup, and it says that there's a738horrible problem with your device, and you have to call the739number that they give. You react immediately because you're740scared, and you call someone and it's the scammer. It goes from741there, and it ends up involving accounts and getting money out742of accounts through wires. It's very, very complicated, but to743try to echo a little bit of what Nathan said, there are so many744scams. Like, let's say, there are 80 scams, and each scam has745red flags, like, say 10 red flags. That's 800 things to746remember. It's exhausting for educators and for consumers who747think that they're not going to be able to help themselves,748right?749 We take it up a level. It's sort of like the stop, drop,750and roll for fire but this time, it's about recognizing three751things that come with most scams, and that's a contact out of752the blue that yields heightened emotion and contains urgency753and if we can train on that, we can also train how to take an754active pause.755 Senator Johnson. I would add a fourth. The one that if they756ask you to call a number, or if they ask you to click on this757site, would that also be----758 Ms. Stokes. I'm trying to bring it up to a higher level759there, because there's a million of those.760 Senator Johnson. I mean, that you need to contact them,761right? I mean, they need you to do something like open up this762link, or.763 Ms. Stokes. Yes. Click on a link, respond to a call, a764phone number. We educate millions of people. I would say765education is critical, but we're not educating our way out of766this crisis. We need to be doing things to actually stop the767scam from getting to the consumer to begin with.768 Senator Johnson. Right. Ms. Koven?769 Ms. Burns Koven. Yes. I'll say from our perspective,770Chainalysis just published research that found that771impersonation scams have increased 1,400 percent in the last772year. They're impersonating trusted individuals and entities,773law enforcement, a known tech company, a cryptocurrency774platform, or financial institution. Those are the hardest to775weed out because those are--they are leveraging someone's trust776in an entity that already exists.777 I would absolutely echo Ms. Stokes' comments that the sense778of urgency, especially. We're also finding increased payments779from scammers in cryptocurrency to bulk SMS tools. They're780coming for Americans on every platform that we rely on coming781right to our phones and they're buying data lists with names,782emails, phone numbers of Americans to target in the hundreds of783thousands.784 Senator Johnson. Okay. Thank you. Mr. Bagdoyan?785 Mr. Bagdoyan. Yes. Thank you, Senator Johnson. I think my786fellow witnesses have covered most of the space here, but I787would say investment scams that promise exorbitant returns with788little or no risk, such as 1,000 percent. I get them by mail or789text almost on a weekly basis. "Send us $1,000, you'll have790$1,000,000 by the end of the year."791 Well, that's great, but you know, it goes into the in the792garbage bin. You have to be alert, if that's just too good to793be true.794 Senator Johnson. Okay. Well, thank you very much. Thank795you, Mr. Chairman.796 The Chairman. Senator Warren.797 Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank798you and Ranking Member Gillibrand for holding this hearing. You799know, falling victim to a scam is devastating for anyone, but800it can be especially hard for seniors. When older Americans are801taken advantage of, it's important for them to have someone to802turn someone who will be on their side, someone who will help803out, and that's where the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau804comes in.805 The CFPB is a financial cop on the beat for American806consumers since 2011. It has saved over $21 billion for807hardworking families, $21 billion, and that's not all it's808done. The CFPB has a dedicated office to protect older809Americans from financial fraud. It also has a consumer810complaint database where people who've been ripped off can811report scams and get their money back.812 Mr. Bagdoyan, the Government Accountability Office, GAO,813just conducted a review of federal scam prevention efforts. Can814you explain how the CFPB protects Americans from scams,815including seniors?816 Mr. Bagdoyan. Sure. As you know from our report, we817identified CFPB as one of the three entities that are best818positioned to lead the governmentwide strategy that we are819advocating for. CFPB has the resident expertise. It has the820legislative charge and mission, if you will. It has the821experience since the early 2010's, as you noted, so, combined,822those things are important.823 We made five recommendations to CFPB to further its ability824to counter scams in coordination, as we mentioned, as part of825the governmentwide strategy to create the definition of scams,826to gather better data, to analyze data and find out what the827real risks are.828 This is a very dynamic environment, but what it has been829doing--I think it does all 11 categories of activities that we830identified among the 13 agencies that were in our universe. It831is well positioned to react through regulatory actions, through832education, advocacy, and analytics. Again, it justifies them833being well positioned to----834 Senator Warren. Yes. A lot of opportunities there in the835way it's structured both to catch the bad guys and to be able836to respond----837 Mr. Bagdoyan. That's right.838 Senator Warren [continuing]. and to be able to help people839who've been cheated and get their money back for them. One of840the points you make, though, is CFPB does not act alone, and841that the three principal actors in this area are the CFPB, the842FBI, and the FTC. I think I have that right?843 Mr. Bagdoyan. That's correct.844 Senator Warren. Three of them working together. I think one845of your recommendations was that they should coordinate even846more----847 Mr. Bagdoyan. Oh, absolutely.848 Senator Warren [continuing]. in their efforts. Is that849right? Would you like to just say a word more about that?850 Mr. Bagdoyan. Yes, absolutely. That would be one of the key851components of a governmentwide strategy. What we found was, of852course, the 13 agencies that were working independently,853coordinating on an ad hoc basis, but not systematically. That854sort of fragmentation really undermines the effectiveness of855anything any of these agencies do.856 Senator Warren. Not enhancing effectiveness, not more857efficient when they fragment.858 Mr. Bagdoyan. That's right.859 Senator Warren. Based on what you've said here, you'd think860that to protect seniors from scams that President Trump should861leverage the CFPB. Unfortunately, that is not what he is doing.862Instead, he is systematically dismantling the agency, cutting863funds, cutting staff, and preventing the agency from doing its864job.865 Mr. Bagdoyan, let me just ask you, does cutting staff,866cutting funds, issuing stop-work orders at the CFPB make867seniors more safe about the same or less safe?868 Mr. Bagdoyan. Well, thank you for your question. I'm glad869you asked it. It's very timely. As you may know, you submitted870a request to us for follow-on work on staffing and871organizational restructurings at the agencies. We may identify872what kind of impact this would have on agencies' abilities to873implement our recommendations, for example, and do a better job874of protecting seniors and others against scams. Ranking Member875Gillibrand is also a party to that request, and also, Senator876Hassan, I believe, has joined recently. We staffed that review877this morning.878 Senator Warren. Oh, good.879 Mr. Bagdoyan. We'll be starting that in several weeks. By880spring, we should have a decent idea what our strategy to881pursue that will entail. CFPB is one of the agencies that we882will review for impacts any of these restructurings, including883staff reductions, diversions, and other things. Thank you for884your timely question.885 Senator Warren. Well, thank you very much. I appreciate the886work you're doing. I want to say a very special thank you.887Thank you to Senator Gillibrand and to Senator Hassan for888joining in this effort. You know, if President Trump really889cared about seniors, he would stop these illegal efforts to890shut down the CFPB. CFPB is on the front lines trying to891protect our seniors, and we need to offer its support so that892it can do that important work.893 Thanks very much. Appreciate it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.894 The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Warren. Mr. Picarsic,895based on your research, would you say that the Chinese896Communist Party is actively benefiting from the billions being897stolen from American families?898 Mr. Picarsic. Yes. They disproportionately flow back into899the Chinese banking system, so, yes.900 The Chairman. All right. If we don't stop this, what's901going to happen over the next five years? Are they going to--do902you think they'll just continue to get bigger and bigger?903 Mr. Picarsic. Yes. We've seen exponential scaling over the904past couple years that will continue. Worse, still, will be the905fact that the cost of capital in the Chinese ecosystem will906decrease and funds will flow into criminal enterprises, but907also into the other nefarious efforts that the Chinese908Communist Party pursues, including modernizing its military,909modernizing its ecosystem for abusing other human rights.910 The Chairman. It's a pretty good profit center for the911Chinese.912 Mr. Picarsic. Absolutely.913 The Chairman. Yes. Kathy, how much do you think it is now?914You think it's almost $200 billion?915 Ms. Stokes. Yes. That's based on the Federal Trade916Commission's own analysis of underreporting.917 The Chairman. Put that in perspective. We only have about a918$28 trillion economy.919 Ms. Stokes. I can tell you that if it was a Fortune920company, it would be Fortune 17 in revenue.921 The Chairman. It's hard to believe. What do you think is922the single biggest failure in our current federal response that923allows foreign criminals to keep targeting American seniors?924 Ms. Stokes. Thank you, Senator, for asking that. I would925say there are so many, but I would start with we need a926national fraud strategy. We don't have that. We're seeing some927good indications of having one, having some success in England928and in Australia, and they look to the United States and say,929"Okay, who's my counterpart?"930 We have nobody. We need essentially a fraud czar in the931administration coordinating efforts across the many agencies,932but also coordinating with a private sector, law enforcement933using data-driven means of being able to understand how these934crimes individually tie together to get that organized crime935connection to make the cases big enough to actually936investigate, pursue, and prosecute.937 The Chairman. Is there any federal agency that has a938dedicated group of people doing this?939 Ms. Stokes. I believe there are, yes.940 The Chairman. Okay, but they're not coordinated.941 Ms. Stokes. We could use some better coordination, yes.942 The Chairman. Okay. Ms. Koven, when y'all track stolen943funds from pig butchering and investment scams, where does the944money typically flow, and how quickly does it move out of the945reach of the individual and law enforcement?946 Ms. Burns Koven. Thank you for your question. The funds947typically aggregate in consolidation wallets. One victim in948Iowa's funds are commingled with a victim in Florida, with a949victim from Illinois and we see these smaller payments950aggregate in these larger consolidation clusters, which signal951the centralized efforts of these scam conglomerates, and then952they offboard into Chinese money laundering networks.953 We see the yuan, which had special measures applied to it954by the Federal Government, as well as other successors,955guarantee services mostly Chinese language money laundering956services. We do see a degree of centralized exchanges in DeFi957services that do receive some of the funds.958 While these movements are pretty rapid, we do have959opportunities at these consolidation wallets that hold funds960for longer periods of time. One of the challenges is that961communication between private sector and public sector,962connecting that victim in Illinois to that victim in Florida to963see the bigger picture.964 The beauty of blockchain intelligence is that you're able965to unravel that entire picture without filing a single subpoena966and working with private sector law enforcement has had967stunning successes in seizing funds. Just this year, $15968billion seized from the Prince Group. We've had examples of969hundreds of millions seized with the help of cryptocurrency970exchanges and stablecoin issuers.971 There's a lot of potential, but timing is on the line.972Timing is at the essence. That's why we advocate for also a973preventive strategy moving upstream so that scammers never974interact with a human being.975 The Chairman. When they get the money back, where's the976money go? How much of it gets back to a victim?977 Ms. Burns Koven. That's a long legal process of you have to978establish that you were a victim. Thankfully, the blockchain979has a very clear trail of where a victim withdrew their funds980in order to deposit it into a scam. I think there could be more981clarity around that process to streamline it so that victims982can be made whole.983 The Chairman. How central are overseas networks984particularly those linked to Communist China and Southeast Asia985to the cryptocurrency scams targeting American seniors?986 Ms. Burns Koven. Yes. There are several data points from987the cryptocurrency perspective pointing to China and Southeast988Asia. The off ramps where these stolen funds are going are989primarily offshore APAC-based services, Chinese money990laundering networks where they have mules guarantee services.991We're also seeing them reinvest their scam profits into992additional AI tools, additional SMS scamming.993 The Chairman. It's a business model.994 Ms. Burns Koven. Absolutely. It is a corporation. It is a995well-oiled machine. We also see dips in cryptocurrency scam996activity during Chinese public holidays and Chinese New Years,997very much in line with China-based actors.998 The Chairman. When people are working.999 Ms. Burns Koven. Absolutely.1000 The Chairman. Okay. Ranking Member Gillibrand.1001 Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Mr. Bagdoyan, in a report,1002the GAO recommended that the FBI be the lead effort to develop1003a national strategy on scams. The legislation that Chairman1004Scott and I introduced, the National Strategy for Combating1005Scams Act, reflect GAO'S recommendation, and it would require1006FBI to lead the interagency effort.1007 However, while working on the report, you talked to 131008agencies that engage in efforts to combat scams, including the1009CFPB and the FTC. Conceivably, one of the other agencies could1010also lead the effort to develop the national strategy. Can you1011explain the GAO recommendation that the FBI lead the effort1012instead of the other agencies like the FTC?1013 Mr. Bagdoyan. Sure. Thank you for your question, Ranking1014Member Gillibrand. The FBI, on balance, given all the factors1015that we reviewed, is best positioned to take the lead. They1016actually volunteered to do that while other agencies basically1017demurred either explicitly or implicitly. We took that into1018consideration.1019 We did make 16 recommendations to three agencies, as you1020know, but we thought that the FBI, has its scope, scale, its1021investigative capacity, its financial crime section _ which is1022a key unit within the Bureau to tackle these types of crimes,1023including scams _ its authorities and its global networks1024coordinating with other law enforcement. It's a multiplicity of1025factors that position them well to do this.1026 Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Ms. Koven, in furtherance of1027Senator Scott's question about getting remuneration for the1028victims because of the blockchain, what tools would be useful1029in the Federal Government to have to be able to actually recoup1030some of that money? For example, do we need to augment the1031capabilities of FinCEN? Do we need to have a special directed1032unit to do cryptocurrency blockchain investigations for quick1033return of funding?1034 What recommendations do you have for us to specifically1035have more tools to use the benefits of the clarity and the1036transparency of the blockchain, but also to create better1037oversight and enforcement?1038 Ms. Burns Koven. Thank you for your question. I can't speak1039to any specific agency, but I will say in my experience, there1040definitely needs to be more training and tools using blockchain1041analytics to be able to see the full spectrum of the crime, and1042so that we can holistically tackle the scam ecosystem, not just1043the scammed funds, but the services and infrastructure that are1044that are supporting and underlying these scams, from AI tech to1045data brokers.1046 We need to beat them at their own game. We can do that by1047incorporating AI-enabled fraud prevention strategies.1048Chainalysis' Alterya, for example, leverages AI to identify1049scam activity across platforms, payment system domains, social1050media accounts and blockchains. This enables financial1051institutions and law enforcement to identify more victims,1052build a bigger case, identify targets for disruption.1053 Frankly, this also allows this data to be integrated with1054financial institutions so that they can prevent scammers from1055even interacting with a human being before they even engage1056with the scam itself. In addition to recovering funds and1057restitution, prevention should absolutely be part of the1058strategy.1059 Senator Gillibrand. We frequently hear about the growing1060use of AI, including generative AI in scams that target older1061adults. However, the same technology that helps scammers may1062also be used to combat these scams, as you said. The Australian1063telecommunications firm, TPG, recently used AI chatbots to1064waste the time of scammers. You also discussed in your written1065testimony how Chainalysis has an AI tool that can help block1066scams.1067 Can you please discuss further how AI can be used in1068identifying and blocking scams? Do you foresee any new1069opportunities for tools to combat scams based on new1070developments of AI?1071 Ms. Burns Koven. Absolutely. Thank you for that question.1072In our recent research, we found that scams leveraging AI are10734.5 times more profitable than scams that don't. We're rapidly1074approaching a future where virtually all scams will incorporate1075AI to some extent, which is pretty scary stuff when you think1076about the numbers they're pulling in today.1077 We do need to fight fire with fire. AI-enabled fraud1078prevention technologies like Chainalysis' Alterya, it leverages1079AI to identify scam activities across domain, social media1080accounts, and blockchains. This can enable financial1081institutions and blockchain companies to be able to integrate1082this into their platform so that they can identify mule1083accounts, victim accounts, and really have a holistic picture1084of the whole scam supply chain.1085 Furthermore, law enforcement also needs to have this1086prevention capability and this insight to be able to target1087their efforts against different components of the scam supply1088chain.1089 Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1090 The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Bagdoyan, the GAO said that1091the federal agencies aren't really coordinated. How does that1092impact somebody that's--you know, if they had better1093coordination, how would it save seniors money?1094 Mr. Bagdoyan. Oh, that's a good question. There might be a1095way to cross reference approaches by a particular older1096American who goes to the FBI, because that makes sense to them,1097when the FTC might be better positioned to help them, or the1098CFPB for that matter, or some other agency.1099 There isn't a close-knitted approach to doing that, for1100example. I mean, that is a basic service that should be1101available. It isn't available. There are some agencies that1102accept consumer complaints, but they will refer the consumers1103to their own online educational materials, for example, rather1104than saying, "Well, thank you for your call, but you should1105have gone to X." I don't think that's happening.1106 The Chairman. Mr. Picarsic, given your research on CCP, is1107it fair to say that the Communist China, the party, tolerates1108or turns a blind eye to these scam compounds because they want1109to weaken the United States?1110 Mr. Picarsic. That's the most generous interpretation, that1111they turn a blind eye. I think more nefariously, they actively1112support and abet whenever they have a chance to.1113 The Chairman. How can you describe the level of1114coordination between these Chinese criminal networks and1115Communist China's broader geopolitical goals?1116 Mr. Picarsic. They look to produce profits that can flow1117back into the Chinese ecosystem. They look to generate the1118capacity to project misinformation, and to sow dissent, and1119divide in the societies that they target. That may be the ones1120where they're operating from and maybe the ones that they're1121targeting.1122 We see from the layout, the geographic layout, the places1123that get populated with scam compounds tend to coincide with1124the places that dot the Belt and Road Initiative that have1125presence of Chinese international banking operations and all of1126these work together, perhaps not with smoking guns appearing at1127every turn, but with a whole host of loaded guns that can be1128pulled when they need to be.1129 I think the recent case that's been cited of the Prince1130Group is a telling example of a massive operation that was able1131to evade scrutiny in Cambodia for a long time. We recently1132indicted the leader. He was extradited not to the United1133States, not to our authorities, but to the Chinese.1134 He was able to be extradited to China because the Chinese1135government is active in courting Cambodian business and1136political elites. These channels all overlap, and when, and if1137they're needed to coordinate and work together, they do.1138 The Chairman. If Beijing wanted to shut this stuff down,1139could they do it?1140 Mr. Picarsic. They absolutely could. For better or worse,1141they respond only to shows of strength and declarations of the1142capacity to control escalation dominance. For that reason, I1143think that American strategy needs to target the international1144presence of Chinese banks.1145 It's commendable that several pieces of legislation that1146the Committee's advanced cite IEEPA authorities, those1147authorities should be invoked and they should be used to target1148seizure of Chinese banking and Chinese banking leadership1149assets present in the United States.1150 The Chairman. Based on what you're saying, you would not1151suggest we ever buy things or do any business with China, is1152that----1153 Mr. Picarsic. Absolutely. I think we have a consensus1154around strategic goods and the national security supply chains.1155Across the board, American societies depend on Americans1156working together and American businesses thriving at all1157levels. If we allow even our most non-strategic assets to be1158fully offshore to an adversary, we're imposing on ourselves,1159for no reason, that opportunity cost.1160 It's not just the cost of that sector. It's the opportunity1161cost of that sector thriving somewhere else and not1162contributing directly to American society.1163 The Chairman. Kathy, can you talk about you--I know AARP's1164putting a lot of effort into this. Can you give a success1165story?1166 Ms. Stokes. Well, we probably talk to about 100,000 people1167every year through our helpline and we're not in a position--1168we're not law enforcement, we're not social workers, but we are1169able to talk to people in a sort of shame-free zone. We can't1170get their money back, but we can offer emotional support and we1171created a fraud support Zoom session, small group Zoom1172sessions, several years ago. Some of the people that have come1173through are here with me today.1174 What we do see in the success is that people begin to1175understand that it wasn't their fault, that they're not alone.1176They rebuild a sense of self. They build a sense of agency, and1177then they want to do something about it. We have victims1178telling their own narratives to law enforcement, to industry,1179to try to help people understand from that victim impact stance1180how nefarious these are.1181 The Chairman. Yes. Probably if somebody was a victim, it's1182probably better opportunity than somebody would listen to them1183also. Right?1184 Ms. Stokes. Well, we have a YouTube series called Fraud1185Wars that we just launched at the end of--well, actually, it1186was last summer. It's like these little 11 or 12 minute very1187highly produced videos, and it's the first-person narrative.1188They're very captivating.1189 The Chairman. Ms. Koven, based on your analysis, can you1190describe the lifecycle of a typical crypto-enabled scam1191targeting seniors from the first contact to a final launder in1192the funds? Give us an insight of how it happens. Let's say I'm1193the victim and you're trying to take advantage of me.1194 Ms. Burns Koven. Thank you for the question. We don't often1195see the full lifecycle. Sometimes, we get information after the1196scam has already occurred. I can say that we are able to use1197our analysis to find when a victim makes recurring payments,1198and we've been able to do analysis on specific scam typologies,1199separating out pig butchering, versus blackmail, and extortion1200scams, from other scam typologies to understand which scams1201elicit recurring payments from a victim so we can see how1202effective they are in continuing to bleed out victims of their1203life savings versus ones that are shorter-term.1204 We are seeing a growing number of scam typologies, which I1205think is really interesting in the conversation of defining1206what a scam is because these scammers are relentless in1207capitalizing on new technologies, new flavors of the day. We're1208seeing different typologies leveraging working from home, for1209instance, which is a different on chain presence than maybe an1210impersonation scam, and we see the typical services recurringly1211used for laundering.1212 The blockchain shines a bright light on these services that1213continue to operate and process scammed funds. While the1214special measures on huawan, for example, are very encouraging,1215as the largest, most prominent service that facilitated scams,1216there are others there are definitely successors waiting in the1217wings and know that scammers hedge their bets and are present1218on multiple different underground forums and guarantee youth1219platforms to continue their operations.1220 Anything that injects friction in these conversations,1221injects friction in their laundering, their trust in the1222different services, and imposes cost on all the key components1223of the supply chain are welcome and should be part of a1224national strategy.1225 The Chairman. Is China and Southeast Asia, are they a1226majority of the scammers?1227 Ms. Burns Koven. I would say it's certainly a model that is1228highly effective. Not all scams originate from China or1229Southeast Asia, but it is setting the model for what we fear1230other jurisdictions, other scammers, other organizations could1231adopt.1232 The Chairman. Is information sharing helpful?1233 Ms. Burns Koven. Absolutely. I appreciate this Committee's1234attention on ways we can streamline information sharing. There1235are so many different entities where a victim can report their1236scam, but also many don't.1237 The blockchain is effective in highlighting payments of1238victims that may have not reported. We should use that1239intelligence to drive our mission to be able to instead of one-1240off investigations, we grow the amount of funds that are1241feasible and reduce friction amongst these agencies.1242 Overall, we have to increase a public-private sector1243information-sharing too. Because a private sector entity, say a1244financial institution, that files a suspicious activity report1245about a scam on their platform, the bank next door will never1246get wind of what was in that scam.1247 They're encountering the same adversaries. Their customers1248are being targeted by the same adversaries, yet, they cannot1249share information. Private sector is best positioned to prevent1250future scam victims. We need that quick information-sharing,1251and the whole-of-government, as well as whole-society approach.1252 The Chairman. Ranking Member Gillibrand.1253 Senator Gillibrand. Ms. Stokes, can you talk a little bit1254about the proposal to have local elder justice task forces?1255What effect do you believe these task forces could have on1256efforts to combat scams?1257 Ms. Stokes. Thank you, Senator, for the question. I think1258they're critical. The elder justice task force model allows for1259coordination among local, state, federal law enforcement,1260prosecutors, also agencies of adult protective services, things1261like that. It helps the ability for data to be gathered and1262assessed to be able to start to see patterns. That's that1263pattern that we're missing right now because we're not looking1264at it through an organized crime lens.1265 I have many examples from the San Diego Elder Justice Task1266Force that they've done some amazing things, very much because1267they are an elder justice task force, and they are looking at1268data and being able to understand tying things together and1269going after big cases. I think it's really important.1270 Senator Gillibrand. What are the biggest barriers for1271seniors to come forward to report when a scam has happened?1272What are their barriers for seeking help, and what are the best1273ways to help them rebuild their lives after a scam? You1274mentioned the relationships and the communities you're creating1275throughout AARP. I think that's really terrific.1276 I do think we should, for example, the person that you1277talked about who lost all that tax money, I could get that tax1278money back for her. I think we should have lawyers who can make1279the case that through artifice and fraud, they do not owe1280taxes. At least she'd get that $200,000 back, so she'd have1281part of her savings. Maybe even having legal services available1282for scam victims to get some kind of recuperation.1283 Ms. Stokes. Yes. Thank you, Senator. She's certainly not1284alone. We have many victims that come through this process, and1285because the money was taken from a tax deferred retirement1286plan, they end up owing the taxes because the IRS looks at it1287as income.1288 Senator Gillibrand. We can probably change that law.1289 Ms. Stokes. We would like to see that changed. There's a1290bill out there now, as a matter of fact.1291 Senator Gillibrand. Yes. Well, I'll work on that, and I'll1292also work on your task force bill.1293 Ms. Stokes. Thank you very much. In terms of the barriers1294for victims, one of the barriers is sort of internal. They're1295so ashamed, so embarrassed, they think it only happens to them.1296That comes from a society that has tended to blame victims for1297the crime that has happened and we've done that for years, and1298we've allowed ourselves to believe that it's only old people1299who aren't tech savvy, who may have cognitive issues and so1300it's sort of a them problem.1301 Now we're starting to understand that it's an all-of-us1302problem because everybody is being targeted. You don't have to1303have cognitive decline because of the sophistication of the1304playbook that the criminals use. We're seeing some change1305there, and then the other is there's just too many calls to1306action. You know, you could report it to the FBI, and FTC, and1307the Social Security Administration, and everything else. We1308need a single door that consumers can go to, victims can go to,1309not only to be able to report, but to report it into a law1310enforcement system where the data are going to be connected to1311other reports so that we can begin that be better at the1312organized crime connections there.1313 Also importantly, so many people that report they never1314hear anything, especially if they report something online.1315They're expect--they're hoping for a call. We need a system1316where people are treated with dignity and respect, and that1317there is some outreach that lets them know what's going on,1318even if nothing's going on, to make them feel less like it was1319their fault.1320 Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Picarsic, can you talk a little bit1321about what type of international joint ventures we should be1322trying to have with our allies? I'm certain it's not just1323American seniors who are being targeted. I'm sure it's true1324across the whole globe but I can imagine if we had1325international coordination with the UK, or some of our EU1326allies, or Asian or Middle Eastern allies, we could crack some1327of these criminal networks a lot quicker.1328 Do you have any recommendations for us with regard to1329coordination of investigations?1330 Mr. Picarsic. Thank you very much for the compelling1331question. I think it tracks with the way that we've been able1332to share information, increase early warning, and coordinate1333action in similar realms of criminal activity, including cyber1334threats. The way that across our international relationships,1335we've been able to build multilateral fora and support law1336enforcement.1337 I think it starts with information-sharing and we have1338existing fora from cyber, and counterfeit, drug, and counter1339smuggling activities that can be activated the same way. I1340think it's a compelling priority, and one that we have1341infrastructure to pipe the right information through.1342 Senator Gillibrand. Then last, can you just explain why1343human trafficking is often associated with these types of1344scams?1345 Mr. Picarsic. Yes. Chairman Scott has mentioned just how1346profitable and good a business these operations are. Part of1347their fundamental orientation is that they're leveraging1348trafficked humans so that they don't even have a payroll. They1349tend to be populated, again, in these territories where there1350may be lax oversight and are hotspots for human trafficking.1351 Then there's overlap with the actual people leading1352compounds and moving money with human trafficking. They're able1353to take forced labor and employ them in compounds, and also, to1354shield themselves from any scrutiny from local as well as1355Chinese authorities.1356 Senator Gillibrand. Terrible. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes,1357I'm done.1358 The Chairman. Senator Moody.1359 Senator Moody. Thank you, Chairman Scott, and Ranking1360Member Gillibrand. Such an important topic to all seniors in1361America, especially my home State of Florida. We are a premier1362destination state for seniors moving there in retirement. We1363often call ourselves not just the Sunshine State, but the1364Silver State and as technology has advanced so rapidly the1365tools that criminals will use to scam our seniors has1366multiplied.1367 I realized this very quickly in my background. I served as1368a federal prosecutor, as attorney general. I understood very1369quickly that the federal standards sometimes for investigation1370and prosecution in terms of monetary loss, the bar to reach1371that becomes so high that we're often, if we're not aggregating1372smaller amounts to show these larger losses in the aggregate,1373sometimes those fall through the cracks.1374 It's oftentimes those lower amounts and I say lower only1375because it's relative to the sometimes hundreds of millions of1376dollars we might see in one scam compared to if you aggregate,1377let's say numerous seniors get taken advantage of. It could be1378their life savings and even when you aggregate that, it could1379be a lot, but if you don't know that they're related, it might1380seem not to reach the federal levels of investigation.1381 What I found very quickly, a huge gap in enforcement1382investigations, prosecutions, bringing criminals to justice, is1383the inability of states to match sometimes the manpower and1384coordination at the federal level, the capabilities to go after1385these people.1386 As Florida's AG, one of the first things I did was put1387together a cyber fraud enforcement team to start looking at1388these things to cooperate with the federal officials, but start1389bringing in experts into the investigation side and the1390prosecution side because both are so important, and it does1391require a specified expertise.1392 We saw results immediately, not only in going after those1393that might have fallen through the cracks, those specific cases1394but also recovering funds, freezing assets, even1395cryptocurrency.1396 I think this is so important, and I'm so glad, Chairman1397Scott, thanks to have these hearings because oftentimes it's1398foreign nationals that are using this advancing technology to1399victimize Americans, Floridians, and they're never brought to1400justice because they're overseas and we become put in a1401position where we're just trying to prevent, educate and that's1402so important, but we have to have the teeth to come back and1403hold these people accountable.1404 I have totally foregone anything I planned to ask, but I1405would just like to get from you. We did this as kind of it was1406an initiative in Florida. It is now bearing fruit. It's still1407in existence. They're freezing funds. They're going after1408people.1409 In fact, just recently that that same cyber fraud1410enforcement unit that I started seized $1.5 million connected1411to an internet-based investment scheme that was perpetuated by1412a Chinese national. I'm so proud of what we were able to1413accomplish there.1414 I would like to open this up, with the chairman's1415permission. If any of you could comment on how I often am very1416reluctant as an idea to just throw more money at a problem but1417if the goal is to get more states to start their own cyber1418fraud enforcement units that can coordinate with the feds, but1419also begin to bring their own expertise to bear and start these1420units to help their state, their county and city.1421 If you have a state cyber fraud enforcement unit that can1422lay over expertise in rural counties and cities that might not1423have that. It was so effective in Florida and I'm wondering if1424any of you believe or have recommendations on how we, as a1425Federal Government, might encourage more state cyber fraud1426enforcement groups.1427 I saw how effective that was at filling the gap in Florida.1428Anyone want to chime in on this? Do you have any1429recommendations, for us as Senators, on how we can make that1430happen?1431 Ms. Burns Koven. Thank you for your questions, Senator. I'm1432delighted to hear about some of the successes you've had.1433That's fantastic. Because you've laid out some vast challenges,1434right, which is information-sharing, connecting a victim in1435Florida to the same scam of somebody out of state or even out1436of the country.1437 Blockchain analytics has been the common language and1438visibility for so many successes for scam funds recovery,1439putting crossing that bridge between private and public sector1440so that a private sector can prevent additional scam victims1441from falling prey but I think more so we need to make sure1442state, local, and federal law enforcement, and regulators have1443the tools and training they need to be able to understand1444crypto cases.1445 We hear often that victims are turned away because they1446don't know how to investigate crypto cases, or that the case is1447too small to meet a threshold, when in reality, that one scam1448victim sends funds to a multimillion-dollar scam conglomerate1449where there's a ripe opportunity for intervention and asset1450seizure.1451 In addition to recovering funds and restitution, we also1452have to bring the fight to the scammers. We need to focus on1453prevention, making sure those scammers never interact with a1454human and we can do that through AI, which Chainalysis'1455Alterya, for example, leverages AI-enabled fraud prevention to1456be able to collect scam identifiers from across online1457infrastructure, from platforms, from payment systems, from1458domains, to social media.1459 Being able to connect victims but also identify scam1460infrastructure so that financial institutions and crypto1461businesses don't even permit that activity on their platform.1462It also is enabling for law enforcement to better target for1463disruption, what are the key nodes that are underlying this1464scam ecosystem.1465 Senator Moody. Thank you. I have to say, my staff told me1466you would know a lot about that. I appreciate it. Thank you for1467making them look really good. I wish I could show you. It says1468right here, "Ask Ms. Burns Koven." Thank you very much and to1469all of you for being here today. We really appreciate it.1470 The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Moody. I want to thank1471everybody for coming today, being and participating. I also1472want to remind seniors and families watching that the Senate1473Aging Committee operates a fraud hotline for anyone who1474believes they may have been targeted or victimized. The number1475is 1-855-303-9470. Nice, easy number to memorize.1476 If any seniors or any Senators have additional questions1477for the witnesses or statements to be added, the hearing record1478will be open until next Wednesday at 5:00 p.m. Thanks,1479everybody.1480 [Whereupon, at 4:48 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]14811482 [all]14831484=======================================================================14851486 APPENDIX14871488=======================================================================14891490?14911492=======================================================================14931494 Prepared Witness Statements14951496=======================================================================14971498?14991500 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.02415011502 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.02515031504 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.02615051506 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.02715071508 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.02815091510 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.02915111512 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.03015131514 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.03115151516 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.03215171518 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.03315191520 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.03415211522 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.03515231524 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.03615251526 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.03715271528 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.03815291530 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.03915311532 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.04015331534 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.04115351536 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.04215371538 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.04315391540 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.04415411542 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.04515431544 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.04615451546 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.04715471548 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.04815491550 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.04915511552 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.05015531554 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.05115551556 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.05215571558 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.05315591560 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.05415611562 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.05515631564 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.05615651566 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.05715671568 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.05815691570 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.05915711572 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.06015731574 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.06115751576 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.06215771578 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.06315791580 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.06415811582 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.06515831584 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.06615851586 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.06715871588 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.06815891590 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.06915911592 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.07015931594 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.07115951596 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.07215971598 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.07315991600 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.07416011602 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.07516031604 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.07616051606 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.07716071608?16091610?16111612=======================================================================16131614 Questions for the Record16151616=======================================================================16171618?16191620 U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging16211622 "Made in China, Paid by Seniors: Stopping the Surge of International1623 Scams"16241625 January 14, 202616261627 Questions for the Record16281629 Kathy Stokes16301631 Senator Raphael Warnock16321633 Question:16341635 According to the Federal Trade Commission, financial fraud1636was more prevalent in Georgia than in any other state in 2023,1637with 437 incidents per 100,000 individuals. In 2023, Georgians1638aged 60 and older reported losses of over $92 million to the1639Federal Bureau of Information's Internet Crime Complaint1640Center. To address this issue, I co-introduced S. 2019, the1641Task Force for Recognizing and Averting Payment Scams Act,1642which would establish a multi-agency task force to examine1643fraud trends and lead prevention efforts. Last Congress, I also1644reintroduced the Empowering States to Protect Seniors from Bad1645Actors Act, which would create a new grant program to protect1646senior investors.1647 How would multi-agency coordination and federal grant1648programs focused on investigating fraud protect Georgia seniors1649from financial scams?16501651 Response:16521653 Multi-agency coordination is critical because today's fraud1654schemes rarely fall neatly within the jurisdiction of a single1655agency. Scams targeting older adults often involve online1656platforms, financial institutions, telecommunications1657providers, and, in many cases, actors operating across state or1658national borders. A coordinated task force, such as the one1659that S. 2019, the TRAPS Act, calls for, would bring together1660the expertise and authorities of agencies such as the FTC, DOJ,1661FBI, and state attorneys general to share data in real time,1662identify emerging scam trends, and respond more quickly when1663patterns of fraud begin to appear. This kind of coordination1664helps move the response from being reactive-after money is1665lost-to preventative, stopping scams before they spread widely1666in communities like those across Georgia.1667 Federal grant programs, such as contemplated in the 118th1668Congress' Empowering States to Protect Seniors from Bad Actors1669Act or 119th Congress' S. 2544, the GUARD Act, or H.R. 6426,1670the Stop Scams Against Seniors Act, play a critical role by1671ensuring that states have the capacity to act on that shared1672intelligence. Many state and local agencies, including those in1673Georgia, are on the front lines of protecting seniors but lack1674the dedicated resources to investigate complex financial fraud1675cases or to conduct sustained outreach and education efforts.1676Grant funding can support specialized task forces,1677investigators, partnerships with financial institutions to flag1678suspicious transactions, and community-based education programs1679that help older adults recognize red flags before they become1680victims.1681 Thank you for your leadership on this issue. We are1682experiencing a fraud epidemic and it is critical that we work1683together to prevent seniors from being exploited in the first1684place, as well as provide the necessary support when fraud does1685happen.16861687 U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging16881689 "Made in China, Paid by Seniors: Stopping the Surge of International1690 Scams"16911692 January 14, 202616931694 Questions for the Record16951696 Seto Bagdoyan16971698 Senator Raphael Warnock16991700 Question:17011702 A recent report from the Government Accountability Office1703identified the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Consumer1704Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), and the Federal Bureau of1705Investigation as the federal agencies best positioned to lead a1706government-wide strategy on anti-scam efforts. As you know,1707President Trump fired the two Democratic Party members of the1708five-member FTC in March 2025, and the administration has1709attempted to eliminate the CFPB.1710 How have these disruptions to the federal workforce1711affected the capacity of these agencies to combat scams1712targeting older adults?17131714 Response:17151716 In April 2025, GAO issued a report (GAO-25-107088)1717identifying federal efforts to prevent, detect, and respond to1718scams. We made 16 separate recommendations to the Consumer1719Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), Federal Trade Commission1720(FTC), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to better1721prevent, detect, and respond to scams. Specifically, we1722recommended that the FBI lead a U.S. government effort to1723develop and implement a governmentwide strategy to counter1724scams and coordinate related activities. We also made1725recommendations to CFPB, FTC, and the FBI related to improving,1726in collaboration with each other, how they collect and report1727data on scams.1728 Pursuant to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal1729Government, agency management is responsible for recruiting,1730developing, and retaining competent personnel to achieve the1731agency's objectives. A lack of competent personnel can result1732in skill gaps, which occur when agencies have an insufficient1733number of individuals or individuals without the appropriate1734skills or abilities to successfully perform their work. GAO's17352025 High Risk List notes that skills gaps within agencies1736impede agencies from cost effectively serving the public and1737achieving desired results. GAO has also previously issued work1738on assessing government reorganization efforts (GAO-18-427). As1739the report notes, strategic workforce planning should occur1740before any staffing changes to avoid creating skill gaps or1741other adverse effects that could impair agencies' ability to1742carry out their missions.1743 GAO has not yet evaluated the impact, if any, of recent1744administrative and personnel actions at CFPB, FTC, and the FBI.1745On July 7, 2025, Senators Kirsten Gillibrand and Elizabeth1746Warren-later joined by Senator Maggie Hassan-requested GAO1747examine the impact of recent administrative and personnel1748actions on the ability of the federal government to address1749fraud and scams and implement the recommendations from our1750April 2025 report. GAO recently staffed this engagement and1751will commence work very soon.17521753?17541755?17561757=======================================================================17581759 Statements for the Record17601761=======================================================================17621763?17641765 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.00117661767 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.00217681769 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.00317701771 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.00417721773 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.00517741775 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.00617761777 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.00717781779 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.00817801781 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.00917821783 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.01017841785 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.01117861787 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.01217881789 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.01317901791 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.01417921793 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.01517941795 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.01617961797 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.01717981799 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.01818001801 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.01918021803 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.02018041805 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.02118061807 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.02218081809 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2924.023