Hearings to examine the future of United States Black Sea strategy.

1[Senate Hearing 119-311]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34                                                        S. Hrg. 119-31156                             THE FUTURE OF7                        U.S. BLACK SEA STRATEGY89=======================================================================1011                                HEARING1213                               BEFORE THE1415                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND16                     REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION1718                                 OF THE1920                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS21                          UNITED STATES SENATE2223                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2425                             FIRST SESSION2627                               __________2829                           SEPTEMBER 30, 20253031                               __________3233       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations3435               [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]3637                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov3839                               ______4041                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE424362-961 PDF                WASHINGTON : 20264445                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS4647                JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman48PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska                JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire49DAVID MCCORMICK, Pennsylvania          CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware50STEVE DAINES, Montana                  CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut51BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee                TIM KAINE, Virginia52JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming                 JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon53RAND PAUL, Kentucky                    CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey54TED CRUZ, Texas                        BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii55MIKE LEE, Utah                         CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland56RICK SCOTT, Florida                    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois57JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah                   JACKY ROSEN, Nevada58JOHN CORNYN, Texas5960             Christopher M. Socha, Staff Director61           Naz Durakoglu, Democratic Staff Director62                   John Dutton, Chief Clerk6364              SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND REGIONAL65                      SECURITY COOPERATION6667STEVE DAINES, Montana                  CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut68JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming                 TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois69PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska                CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey70RAND PAUL, Kentucky                    BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii71JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah7273                              (ii)7475                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S7677                              ----------78                                                                   Page7980                               Statements8182Daines, Hon. Steve, U.S. Senator from Montana....................     18384Murphy, Hon. Christopher, U.S. Senator from Connecticut..........     38586                               Witnesses8788Boyse, Matthew, Senior Fellow, Center on Europe and Eurasia,89  Hudson Institute, Washington, DC...............................     49091    Prepared statement...........................................     69293Starr, Dr. Stephen Frederick, Distinguished Fellow for Eurasia &94  Founding Chairman, Central Asia Caucasus Institute, Washington,95  DC.............................................................    139697    Prepared statement...........................................    149899Sendak, Catherine, Director of Tranatlantic Defense and Security,100  Center for European Policy Analysis, Washington, DC............    16101102    Prepared statement...........................................    18103104                                 (iii)105106                 THE FUTURE OF U.S. BLACK SEA STRATEGY107108                              ----------109110                      TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 2025111112                               U.S. Senate,113                         Subcommittee on Europe and114                     Regional Security Cooperation,115                            Committee on Foreign Relations,116                                                    Washington, DC.117    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:50 p.m., in118room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Steve Daines,119chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.120    Present: Senators Daines and Murphy.121122            OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. STEVE DAINES,123                   U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA124125    Senator Daines. The hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations126Committee will come to order.127    First, I want to thank our three witnesses for being here128today to share their expertise on such an important topic, and129I also want to take a moment to thank my ranking member,130Senator Murphy, for his partnership on these issues, as well as131the work we are doing together to repeal the Jackson-Vanik132trade restrictions in Central Asia. It is time to put these133antiquated Soviet-era trade restrictions to bed and further134strengthen U.S. relations with the region. I am very135appreciative of his work on this issue. I am looking forward to136continuing to work with him on it.137    The Black Sea holds many of the keys for European security138and U.S. national interests. A clearly defined Black Sea139strategy is imperative to the United States effectively140countering Russian aggression in Europe and elsewhere.141    Matthew Boyse is a retired career Foreign Service officer,142who served as deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of143European and Eurasian Affairs and has extensive experience as144Charge d'Affaires in Switzerland, Finland, Romania, and the145U.S. Mission to NATO. In addition to his service as a Foreign146Service officer, Mr. Boyse has written extensively about the147Black Sea and its importance to the U.S. national interests.148    Frederick Starr is a longtime expert on the Caucasus,149Central Asia, and the Black Sea. Dr. Starr is the founding150chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and the Silk151Road Studies Program, and is a distinguished fellow for Eurasia152at the American Foreign Policy Council. Starr also served as153founding chairman at the Keenan Institute, vice president of154Tulane University, and president of Oberlin College. He has155written numerous books about Central Asia and the Caucasus.156    Catherine Sendak joins us from the Center for European157Policy Analysis, where she is the director of the Transatlantic158Defense and Security Program. Prior to this, Ms. Sendak was the159principal director for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia in the160Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, where she161led efforts on addressing national security priorities,162including great power competition with Russia instability and163security throughout Eastern Europe.164    Thank you again to each of our three witnesses for agreeing165to appear here today. Now to the matter at hand.166    Energy security is national security, and this fact was167made even more abundantly clear in the wake of Russia's168invasion of Ukraine. In some respects, Europe has made some169positive changes, but the fact of the matter is that170significant steps need to immediately be taken to protect171Europe's future. Reliance on Russia for energy supply is a172recipe for European acquiescence to Russian influence and173aggression.174    The Western side of the Black Sea presents a warning--a175warning for the rest of the continent. The nations who border176the Black Sea face profound challenges to their national177security due to unreliable energy flows and lack of baseload178power. They are all taking positive steps toward rectifying the179situation, and their proactive action to address their180insecurity should motivate the rest of Europe and encourage181them to take steps to avoid a similar outcome. Now is the182moment for practical energy solutions, which countries like183Moldova, Romania, and Bulgaria are pursuing.184    The recent peace deal in the Caucasus uncorks Central185Asia's vast energy resources and creates a future wherein these186resources, as well as other sources of power, can flow, be they187gas, oil, nuclear, hydro, or others, to build the reliable188baseload power necessary for their economies and their national189security.190    The Eastern side of the Black Sea holds many of the191solutions to problems found on the Western side. Now is the192moment for further engagement and for the Western world to193stand together and facilitate reliable energy flows that will194help ensure a bright and more secure future for the region.195Beyond energy, the Eastern shore of the Black Sea promises huge196opportunities for Western commerce.197    The Caucasus and Central Asia contain large amounts of198natural resources, much of which has not yet been fully199utilized or even developed. Joint investment in westward trade200flows will create a rising tide that truly lifts not just the201countries of origin, but those along the trade route, as well202as Europe and the broader Western world.203    What happens in Europe does not stay in Europe. Two world204wars have proven that fact. The United States must lead the205rest of the world in fighting back against the encroachment of206our adversaries. Without U.S. leadership and a secure Europe,207we may once again find ourselves fighting a war, cold or208otherwise, to protect the values of democracy and universal209human freedom.210    My sincere hope for this hearing is that we can openly and211honestly discuss U.S. Black Sea strategy, the importance of the212region for global security, and work toward truly a more213cohesive, comprehensive U.S. policy toward the region. This214critically important part of the world needs more attention215from the United States and our allies, and I hope today serves216as the beginning of that new conversation. And with that, I217would like to recognize the distinguished ranking member for218his comments. Senator Murphy.219220             STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER MURPHY,221                 U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT222223    Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Chairman Daines, and I224do look forward to continuing to work with you to draw us225closer to our allies in Central Asia through the amendment of226the antiquated restrictions built into the Jackson-Vanik227Amendment. I hope that we can move that bipartisan228legislation--that bipartisan effort through the Senate to the229President's desk quickly.230    Thank you to the witnesses who are joining us here today.231We are facing one of the most dangerous moments in U.S.-Russia232relations since the end of the cold war. Unable to militarily233conquer Ukraine, but emboldened, in part, by American inaction,234the Kremlin is pushing the boundaries with increasingly direct235threats to NATO members.236    Within the last month, Russia sent nuclear-capable fighter237jets into Estonia's airspace with their transponders turned off238and launched a swarm of over a dozen drones into Poland. The239aggression has now spread to the Black Sea with a drone240incursion into Romania.241    Putin is acting with virtual impunity, in part because he242knows he will likely face zero consequences from President243Donald Trump. The President, who should be leading this244response to show Putin these actions are unacceptable, is not245leading. The President has rolled out the red carpet for246Vladimir Putin in Alaska, but Putin happily pocketed that247diplomatic win and went right back to firebombing Kyiv and248declined requests to enter serious negotiation.249    The administration's deadlines for peace talks have just250come and gone, and yet they still refuse to support bipartisan251sanctions legislation that has been pending now in the Senate252for months, and there has been no new request for additional253funding for Ukraine in Congress.254    As Britain's MI6 chief noted recently, Russia does not have255the wherewithal to fully subjugate Ukraine by force. So, the256only way that Moscow at this point can achieve its objectives257is by weakening the United States' and European support for258Ukraine and exploiting divisions within and among NATO nations,259and this is where our conversation today about the Black Sea260Region becomes so key.261    Russia is pursuing an aggressive strategy to undermine pro-262Western, democratic governments throughout Europe, and the263Black Sea Region (BSR) is especially vulnerable. Moscow is264pouring billions into bribery, propaganda, subversion, and265energy bullying in order to install governments in this region266that are friendly to Moscow, but the administration's response267has been, basically, to unilaterally disarm. In Moldova, where268a pro-Western government was facing a barrage of hybrid attacks269from Russia ahead of the elections last weekend, the270administration's response was to pull two-thirds of our271assistance programs. While Russia is pouring billions into272propaganda and influence campaigns, the administration shut273down the capacity at the State Department to fight back against274Russian propaganda, the Global Engagement Center.275    This Department of Justice has slashed anticorruption276programs and stopped enforcing the Foreign Corrupt Practices277Act, which prevented American companies from paying bribes at278the same time that we know bribery is one of the main pathways279for Russia to gain influence in this region.280    In Romania, a key NATO frontline State, the Trump281administration is signaling they may draw down our military282presence, once again, weakening the argument for why citizens283should back a pro-Western, pro-American government.284    History shows us that Russia does not respond to285concessions or mixed signals. It responds to strength and to286clear red lines. U.S. policy in the Black Sea Region must287reflect this reality. I thank our witnesses. I look forward to288your testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.289    Senator Daines. Senator Murphy, thank you. Our first290witness is Matthew Boyse, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute291Center on Europe and Eurasia. Mr. Boyse, the floor is yours.292293STATEMENT OF MATTHEW BOYSE, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER ON EUROPE AND294           EURASIA, HUDSON INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC295296    Mr. Boyse. Chairman Daines, Ranking Member Murphy,297distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the298opportunity to testify before you today.299    The Black Sea and the broader Black Sea Region (BSR) are300more important to the U.S. national interest than is often301appreciated. This hearing adds impetus to important work the302SFRC has done, including by pressing the State Department and303the Interagency to develop a Black Sea strategy by holding304hearings, by traveling to the area, and by shining a light on a305region of great geopolitical importance.306    Thank you so much for organizing this important307conversation. The BSR is also important in the context of the308ongoing debate within the United States' foreign policy309community about it. Given the centrality of the BSR to the310balance of power in Europe and Eurasia, and the negative trends311there, the region should remain a major focus of U.S. foreign312policy, even as the administration focuses on the paramount313threat from communist China, challenges in the Western314Hemisphere and the Middle East, and other issues.315    Putin's war against Ukraine has higher stakes than just316reincorporating that country into the Russian Federation. The317BSR is indispensable to his efforts to restore status and318project power regionally and globally. The BSR is also the319primary battlefield for his efforts to reshape a new320international order, together with Communist China, Iran, and321others, and is an important laboratory for hybrid war against322NATO.323    In recent years, Russia has been scoring successes on the324Eastern Littoral of the Black Sea via its creeping State325capture of Georgia. On the Northern Littoral, how Russia's war326ends will affect the Black Sea Region in a major way, and the327Kremlin has been in a full-court press mode in Moldova, even if328on Sunday voters dodged a bullet and chose the West.329    On the Western Littoral, the Kremlin has been using its330many assets in Bulgaria to turn that critical country away from331NATO and has been exploiting societal discontent in Romania,332long a bulwark of Atlanticism. Russia's efforts in these States333via State capture, weakening key institutions, or supporting334pro-Moscow forces could create an arc of--or corridor of335instability, from Southeast Europe and the Balkans into the336heart of Europe, including from Northern Macedonia through to337Serbia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Austria, all with governments338amenable to Russian interests. Of course, this may not happen339and should be strongly opposed, but it shows that trends in the340BSR could ease Kremlin inroads into what Putin no doubt sees as341potential soft underbelly of NATO. The Southern Littoral, of342course, is a different case as Turkey is both opposed to many343and open to some Russian interests.344    A comprehensive Black Sea strategy is necessary but345insufficient to advance U.S. security interests and to counter346Russian malign influence in the Black Sea Region and its energy347markets. Other political, diplomatic, military or economic348steps are necessary, which I will touch on briefly in a minute,349but just on energy, the USG should ramp up its engagement with350BSR States to diversify further away from Russian sources, such351as by supporting more LNG sales and nuclear energy cooperation,352including SMRs.353    Now, the State Department strategy presented to this354committee in October 2023 was a start, but it was not whole-of-355government. It was more a laundry list of intentions, and it356was not that focused on energy, it did not contain a timeline,357and it was not resourced. A strategy that focuses more on358energy and includes these issues could very well advance U.S.359goals, but blunt language as we recently saw from President360Trump also reminds allies and friends that the U.S. cannot want361European energy security more than they do.362    For trade and commerce to flourish in the Black Sea Region,363the Black Sea must remain free and open. Freedom of navigation364is essential. That is not currently the case. Yes, maritime365trade takes place, but the war negatively affects commerce and366economic relations in the BSR role as a trade crossroads over367the millennia. Crimea, under Russian control, considerably368increases Moscow's ability to mess with the Black Sea Region,369and if Russia were ever to control the entire Northern370Littoral--part of what Putin calls Novorossiya--it would371strangle Ukraine's maritime access to global markets. This must372not happen. The optimum outcome for trade, economic growth, and373peace and prosperity in this broad region is a demilitarized374Black Sea, as it was the case for a time after the Crimean War375in the 19th century.376    The USG has many tools--many ways to advance its strategic377interests in the Black Sea Region. I will only mention a few378here as I am running out of time, but happy to go into more379detail on the discussion. I think the USG should look at the380BSR holistically--as a geopolitical region of major importance381to NATO and, thus, to the United States. I think the EU should382be urged to focus much more on the Black Sea Region now that383the Commission in May finally adopted a Black Sea Strategy.384    I think allies should be pressed to further reduce the flow385of funds to the Russian war machine. NATO should be seized with386the BSR. A whole-of-government USG strategy is needed, as you387have called for. I believe that Black Sea security should be388mentioned in the Trump administration's National Security389Strategy. I believe that USG must not recognize Crimea as390Russian territory.391    And of course, there are many other issues, for example,392vigorously engaging with Turkey as steward of the Montreux393Convention to prevent Russia from returning the Black Sea fleet394to pre-war status after hostilities end, and, of course, there395are also such issues as the Three Seas Initiative, revitalizing396that, working with our great Romanian allies.397    Perhaps I should stop here. There is much more that can be398said, and my time is up. I have submitted a statement for the399record that goes into greater detail. Thank you again for the400opportunity to speak with you today, and I look forward to your401questions.402    [The prepared statement of Mr. Boyse follows:]403404                  Prepared Statement of Matthew Boyse405406    Chairman Daines, Ranking Member Murphy, distinguished members of407the subcommittee: thank you for the opportunity to testify before you408today.409    Before I joined the Hudson Institute, I served in the Foreign410Service for 35 years and spent much time dealing with the post-Soviet/411Warsaw Pact space, including as Deputy Assistant Secretary overseeing412U.S. policy toward Central Europe during most of the first Trump413Administration and early months of the Biden Administration. During414that time, I was also the Sherpa for the Three Seas Initiative and415served briefly as Charge d'Affaires in Romania in the Fall of 2021. I416was a Fulbright Scholar in Bulgaria in summer 2024 researching Black417Sea security.418The National Interest419    The Black Sea and the broader Black Sea Region (BSR) are more420important to the U.S. national interest than is often appreciated. This421hearing adds impetus to important work the SFRC has done on this issue422in recent years, including by pressing the State Department to develop423a Black Sea strategy, by holding hearings, as well as by traveling to,424and shining light on, a critical region that needs more U.S. attention.425    The BSR is also important in the context of the ongoing debate426about U.S. foreign policy priorities and where policy attention and427resources should be focused. Given the centrality of the BSR to the428balance of power in Europe and Eurasia, and trends there that are not429advantageous to the United States, the region should remain a major430focus of U.S. foreign policy, even as the Administration prioritizes431the threat from Communist China, as well as challenges in the Western432Hemisphere and other regions.433Strategic Backdrop434    When I was responsible for policy toward Central Europe at the435State Department 2018-2021, USG policy regarding the Eastern Flank of436NATO tended to focus more on its NE than the SE sector; the latter of437course includes the Black Sea as an area of major geopolitical438importance. While the USG has in recent years assigned substantial439resources to the SE sector and thus the BSR, the historically heavy440concentration of Russian forces in the NE and extraordinary importance441of our Polish, Baltic and Nordic allies tended to produce more focus442there. Persistent and increasing Russian violations of Baltic, Polish,443and Nordic sovereignty in recent months and days continue to highlight444the ongoing Russian threat to this region. So a strong focus on that is445totally logical.446    The NATO Summits after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in447February 2022 upgraded the attention to the SE region according to the448general idea of ``one flank, one threat, one presence,'' a phrase I449coined that became the title of an excellent study led by LTG (ret) Ben450Hodges, former Commanding General, U.S. Army Europe. NATO fixed this451anomaly after February 2022, deploying more forces in the SE and452investing more in Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey, but also supporting453Ukraine in its titanic struggle against Kremlin efforts to wipe it off454the map. This increase in USG attention has been welcome, but there455appears to be a lingering difference between how NATO and EU Member456States look at the NE and SE regions, even as both institutions pay457increasing attention to the BSR. SE Europe often remains in the lower458right-hand corner of mental maps of Europe, away from the center of459gravity, even as it is squarely in the center of current geopolitical460struggles.461    The SE, which for the sake of simplicity I will refer to as the462BSR, is exceptionally important geopolitically, not only because it has463been the only region in the European theater that has seen major464kinetic activity in the last several decades--mostly since the 2008465Georgia War and in Ukraine, but before that as well. Some 10 conflicts466have played out in the BSR in the post-cold war era. Indeed, security467trends in the BSR have been trending negatively for many years, and it468is high time to devote more USG attention to it. In 2020, my team in469the Bureau of Europe and Eurasia at the State Department was drafting a470Black Sea strategy to address this State of affairs when the clock ran471out on the first Trump Administration. It took some time for the Biden472Administration to collect its thoughts and draft one, which was an473important improvement, if ultimately insufficient.474    Putin's war against Ukraine has higher stakes than his Stated goal475of reincorporating the country into the Russian Federation. Ukraine is476also at the center of Kremlin efforts to dominate the Black Sea and the477broader BSR, a strategy that Putin considers indispensable to his478efforts to restore Russian status and project power into adjacent479theaters and onto the world stage. Ukraine and the BSR are also the480primary battlefield in his efforts to shape a new international order,481together with Communist China, Iran--another potentially larger player482in the BSR--and others. Russia sees the BSR as the most strategic and483vulnerable region on its borders, and thus a particularly valuable and484promising ``zone of privileged interest,'' as it calls its ``near485abroad.'' The BSR has been contested space for some three decades, but486particularly since 2014, and it remains the most important laboratory487for the Kremlin to practice its hybrid war against NATO and the West.488    The Kremlin started to challenge the post-Soviet order in the BSR489in the 1990's, even as it also concluded agreements with Ukraine and490other former Soviet ``republics'' and did not pursue an aggressive491policy toward other neighbors, including in the BSR. Western statesmen,492experts, and commentators tended to ignore or play down those signs493until Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, and even then many did not react494robustly until Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. It is495unrealistic to expect the United States to care more about Black Sea496security than European countries, but Putin upended the European497security order and what happens in the BSR does not stay in the BSR--498and matters to the United States.499    In recent years, Russia has been scoring successes on the eastern500littoral of the Black Sea via its creeping State capture of Georgia. On501the northern littoral, how Russia's war ends will have a major effect502on the BSR and the Kremlin has been in full court press mode in503Moldova, even if on Sunday voters dodged a bullet and chose the West.504Moscow is using its many assets in Bulgaria to turn that critical505country away from the West and has been exploiting societal discontent506in Romania, long a bulwark of Atlanticism. Russian efforts in these507States via State capture, weakening key institutions, or supporting508pro-Moscow forces could create an arc or corridor of instability from509SE Europe/the Balkans into the heart of Europe--from Northern Macedonia510and Serbia into Hungary, Slovakia, and Austria--with governments511amenable to Moscow. Of course, this may not happen and should be512strongly opposed, but it shows that negative trends in the BSR could513ease Kremlin inroads into what Putin no doubt sees as a potential soft514underbelly of NATO. The southern littoral is a separate case, as Turkey515is open to some, and opposed to other, Russian interests.516    In the last several weeks alone, a Russian Geran-2 drone breached517Romanian airspace September 14, the 11th such case since February 2022.518The MoD noted that Russian drones have conducted about 50 strikes near519the Ukrainian border since 2022, including 30 in which drone debris520fell on Romanian territory. On August 28, a Russian naval drone struck521a Ukrainian vessel on the Danube River, on the Romanian-Ukrainian522border. These incidents receive much less attention than Russian523provocations against Polish, Baltic, and Nordic sovereignty, but they524are no less concerning--however serious the other cases are.525A Comprehensive Strategy and Furthering American Interests526    A comprehensive Black Sea strategy has the potential to advance527U.S. security interests and counter malign influence from Russia in BSR528energy markets. Such a strategy is a necessary element in the U.S.529policy toolbox, but it is insufficient to move the needle significantly530without other political, diplomatic, military, or economic tools. The531USG should continue to support BSR States as they diversify away from532Russian energy, such as by supporting LNG sales and ramping up already533good cooperation on nuclear energy, including SMRs, by reengaging in534the Three Seas Initiative, and by countering the malign influence that535accompanies heavy dependence on Russian energy. There is room for536growth in this sector even as recent U.S. administrations have537prioritized it because results have not been quick to materialize. Some538EU member States have taken the goal of energy diversification very539seriously, but others have not, and the USG has also faced resistance540from the EU Commission, individual member States, and market realities,541which have slowed results.542    The reasons for this vary from country to country, but the543unfortunate fact is that it took most EU member States too much time,544even after Putin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, to prioritize energy545diversification and weaning themselves from their addiction to Russian546fossil fuels. Gas and oil imports are down considerably, but it has547taken blunt language from President Trump to accelerate the cutoff of548oil and gas imports that have pumped billions of Euros into Putin's war549machine since 2022. The Commission's proposal in the recent 19th550sanctions package to move up the deadline for cutting off Russian gas551by 1 year, to the end of 2026, is a major step forward but some member552States have Stated they will not abide by it. Hungary and Slovakia have553both pushed back on the Commission's recent proposal to incentivize a554decoupling from Russian sources. President Trump's recent pressure on555PM Erdogan in the White House may bear some fruit but Turkish firms556earn so much from their refining business and the world market demands557its products that it is difficult to imagine how that relationship will558end.559    While the State Department strategy, which Assistant Secretary560Robert O'Brien presented to this committee in October 2023, was a561start, it was: 1) not a whole-ofgovernment; 2) not a roadmap but rather562more of a laundry list of intentions; 3) not focused on energy, whose563section was relatively modest and linked to climate, which the Trump564Administration will not support; and 4) not resourced. A greater energy565focus in a whole-of-government strategy that addresses weaknesses in566the 2023 paper has the potential to advance U.S. energy goals in the567BSR, but at times blunt language as we recently saw from President568Trump that our European friends need to do even more care necessary to569generate results.570Energy and Infrastructure Connectivity571    It is in the U.S. interest that the large natural gas reserves in572the Black Sea be developed--in Romanian, Bulgarian and Turkish waters--573because they will grow their economies, reduce their reliance on574Russian sources, and strengthen European energy security. The Black Sea575is also the central transit region through which Russian gas and oil576reach Europe, the Mediterranean, and beyond and needs to remain577peaceful. Romania will become the largest gas producer in the EU in5782027 when it starts to exploit the 7,500 square km Neptun Deep field,579which contains an estimated 100 bcm, for yields of 7-8 bcm per year.580Romania has been producing gas from the Midea project (with U.S.581investment) for several years. When Bulgaria begins to exploit the582estimated 60 bcm in its Khan Tervel and Khan Asparuh fields, it will be583able to cover its entire domestic production and export to the region.584The Sakarya field in Turkey contains an estimated 540 bcm, the largest585of the Black Sea gas reserves. Turkey also serves as a transit route586for Russian gas and oil, which it refines at three locations. It is an587open secret that these molecules are Russian, but the fact that they588continue reflects market forces while European consumers have generally589not cared where their oil products originate. Russia controls much of590Ukraine's huge gas reserves, which Ukraine cannot exploit, and uses the591drilling platforms it has seized as much for military as energy592purposes. Georgian Black Sea reserves are unknown.593    Romanian and Bulgarian officials expect the Kremlin to use hybrid594measures to interfere with exploitation of their reserves, as many are595located in their EEZs, and are thus not subject to NATO Article 5 and596easier to disrupt. Russia has intruded into drilling perimeters in the597past, and neither country has the naval forces to prevent interference598in the development of these resources, which are very expensive to599exploit and especially vulnerable when drilling and other600infrastructure is being built. Moscow is less likely to interfere with601the exploitation of Turkish Black Sea energy resources because of that602special relationship.603    The Black Sea also can support European energy security via the604submarine electricity cable to be laid with participation by605Azerbaijan, Georgia, Hungary, and Romania. Two Turkstream gas pipelines606and several data cables cross the Black Sea and strengthen607connectivity. Bulgaria's recent decision to end Russian gas transit608contracts on January 1, 2026, to fully exit the Russian gas market by6092028, and to switch to LNG imports is a major step forward in reducing610Moscow's ability to blackmail Sofia.611U.S. Engagement in the BSR to Promote Trade and Enhance Security612    For trade and commerce to flourish and contribute to prosperity in613the BSR, the Black Sea must remain free and open. Freedom of navigation614is essential. That is not currently the case, as it is negatively615affected by Russia's war against Ukraine. Of course, ships ply the616waters and trade takes place, but Russia's hot war and creeping617takeover of Georgia and hybrid measures against other littoral States618have dampened the enormous potential the region has as a crossroads and619center of trade and exchange through the millenia.620    Commentators have asserted in recent years that Russia has lost the621battle of the Black Sea, citing Ukraine's extraordinary success in622sinking, disabling, or damaging some one-third of the Black Sea Fleet623(BSF), forcing the rest from Crimea to Novorossiysk and elsewhere, and624largely preventing it from interfering too directly in the larger Black625Sea. This not incorrect, but is to conclude that the battle for the626Black Sea is over. Crimea bristles with offensive systems and continues627to be a platform for attacking Ukraine and threatening the Black Sea,628and missile and other attacks against Ukraine regularly originate from629Crimea and the Black Sea itself. Hundreds of naval mines are a factor630in maritime commerce and keep insurance rates higher than they should631be while Russia regularly interferes with GPS signals and has used the632pretext of naval exercises to close large parts of the Black Sea even633in NATO member State EEZs.634    Russian rhetoric has become so shrill that it is easy to imagine635that the Kremlin will continue to interfere with trade and other636economic activity on the Black Sea after the guns fall silent.637Locations such as Snake Island and drilling towers can also affect638economic development and secure trade lines. Romanian experts consider639Snake Island as important to Black Sea security as Gotland is to the640Baltic Sea. A Russian reoccupation of Snake Island would have negative641consequences for navigation on the Danube and sea lanes along the642Istanbul-Odesa corridor. The BSF could deploy ISR and Electronic643Warfare systems to monitor and disrupt communications along the644Romanian coast, including where U.S. forces are deployed. NATO member645States would not welcome Iranian vessels traversing the Caspian Sea,646the Volga-Don Canal, and the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea for joint647naval exercises with Russia--a scenario that is not impossible to648imagine. The Kremlin has been using Crimea as a platform, an unsinkable649aircraft carrier, to launch attacks against Ukraine and to project650power.651    Russian control of the northern littoral, which is part of what652Putin calls ``Novorossiya,'' must be prevented, as it would strangle653Ukraine's maritime access to global markets, making it difficult for654the country to survive, let alone thrive economically and function as655an independent, sovereign State--even if, for now, Moscow has been656unable to subjugate and occupy the country. It is not well known that657Moldova's southernmost tip is located just miles from the Black Sea, so658Moldova is also a Black Sea State. The optimum outcome for trade,659growth, and prosperity in the BSR is a demilitarized Black Sea, as was660the case for a number of years after the Crimean War.661Recommendations to Enhance the U.S. Strategic Posture in the BSR662    The United States has a wide variety of concrete political,663diplomatic, military, and economic options that can advance its664strategic posture in the BSR. A few recommendations:665Conceptual/Political/Diplomatic666    The USG national security bureaucracy should look at the BSR667wholistically as a geopolitical region of major importance to NATO and668the Global West. Most agencies divide the region into as many as four669or more parts, creating policy silos and stove piping that complicates670efforts to treat the region in a comprehensive manner.671672      Urge the EU to focus much more on the BSR, now that the673Commission in May finally adopted a Black Sea Strategy, in order to674improve regional resilience against Russian and Chinese malign675influence. The USG should pay closer attention to the correlation of676forces and security-related trends and developments in the BSR, but the677USG also cannot care about them more than our European Allies.678679      Press Allies to further reduce the flow of funds to the680Russian war machine. If the outcome of the war is as important to681European security as European leaders say it is, they should be doing682even more.683684      Ensure that NATO is seized with the BSR. NATO is unlikely685to adopt a BSR strategy, but the recommendations in the NATO October6862023 ``Troubled Waters'' Black Sea report should be implemented,687especially following Allies' formal recognition of the importance of688the region at the July 2023 Vilnius Summit. More robust efforts by NATO689member States will demonstrate to the Trump Administration that690European Allies take Black Sea security seriously.691692      A whole-of-government USG BSR Strategy is needed. The693paper that State Department EUR Assistant Secretary Robert O'Brien694presented to the SFRC in October 2023 was a start and overcame years of695mixed messaging and what might be considered benign neglect, but it696offered rather modest goals, was declarative in tone, only covered the697State Department, and did not advocate for additional resources. The698Biden Administration did not present a government-wide strategy before699the end of its term, as Congress had requested.700701      Revisit S. 804, the Black Sea Security Act of7022023,d pass an updated version in 2026. The Senate showed703strategic leadership by advocating for this legislation. The recent704introduction of the Eastern Flank Strategic Partnership Act is another705excellent Senate initiative, but separate Black Sea-focused legislation706is desirable.707708      Congress should appropriate funds explicitly for efforts709related to the BSR. A strategy that sets forth additional requirements710without resources will not succeed.711712      USG strategic interest in Black Sea security should be713reflected in the Trump Administration's National Security Strategy. The714Department of War's annual report to Congress on Freedom of Navigation715(FON) should also include language on Russia restricting FON in the716Black Sea.717718      The USG must not recognize Crimea as Russian territory.719The consequences of such a decision would go far beyond the BSR and720encourage further Russian aggression, as well as aggression from other721States that might see border changes by force as possible. The 1940722Welles Declaration regarding the three Baltic States can serve as a723guide, and former Secretary Pompeo's statement in 2020 should remain724operative.725726      Prioritize relations with Romania among U.S. Black Sea727Allies. Turkey and Bulgaria are also critical Allies, but Romania is728the most active on BSR issues.729730      Engage vigorously with Turkey as steward of the Montreux731Convention to prevent Russia from returning its BSF to pre-war status732after hostilities end. The Kremlin will likely attempt to restore the733BSF to its former size and composition as it has been so significantly734weakened. With Ankara, pursue a ``free and open'' strategy for the735Black Sea as the best long-term model for this strategic crossroads736(``Middle Corridor'') between Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe,737while ensuring FONOPs can be conducted, as necessary. Russia can be738expected to condition a cease-fire or end to the war on a return to the739status quo ante, but a demilitarized Black Sea, as was the case for a740number of years after Russia's defeat in the Crimean War, remains the741optimum end State.742743      Revitalize USG engagement with the Three Seas Initiative744(3SI) as a vehicle to support Eastern Flank countries politically,745strengthen them economically, and improve their resilience. During his746first term, President Trump visibly supported 3SI, but momentum slowed747after he left office. The USG should increase its attention to the 3SI,748provided 3SI countries themselves participate at significant levels.749The United States is the strongest non-member 3SI supporter, but it can750also not want 3SI more than the member States.751Military752      Greater military engagement with the three NATO littoral753States can strengthen deterrence and ``sea denial'' strategy, including754air defense, mine sweepers, uncrewed surface vehicles, ISR, mobility,755Anti-Submarine Warfare infrastructure, and long-range anti-ship756missiles that can hold the BSF at risk should Russia behave757aggressively on the Black Sea itself.758759      The BSR theater will become more difficult if Putin's war760ends favorably for him. Russia will interpret any reduction in U.S.761forces in the BSR as a strategic retreat and increase its probes of762NATO territory via its toolbox of hybrid measures such as drones,763electronic warfare, GPS interference (jamming and spoofing),764infrastructure sabotage, etc.765766      Resource exportable defense packages for Black Sea767littoral harbors (e.g. radar, jammers, hard-kill defensive systems).768Enable NATO/USN to rotate mobile harbor-defense detachments. Work with769NATO member States to ensure that A2AD can protect coastlines,770commercial assets, and infrastructure arteries.771772      Respond more resolutely to Russian provocations against773sovereign NATO territory. NATO policy has tended to prioritize774``escalation avoidance,'' which has emboldened Russia to test NATO775territory repeatedly without sanction. This includes using NATO assets776to down air and sea drones and other provocations.777778      U.S. investment in Mihail Kog?lniceanu air base in779Constanta, Romania is a strategic use of U.S. taxpayer funds. It should780be increased to the extent that Allies participate similarly and781budgets allow.782783      Greater USG focus on the military relationship with784Bulgaria would also help strengthen resilience against further Russian785inroads into that key ally.786787      Continue military support for Kyiv via the788Administration's Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List mechanism so789that Ukraine can better defend itself and put Russian military assets790on Crimea and elsewhere at risk.791792      Support the NATO Mine Measures Group, including via793Countermeasure Vessels as urged by some littoral State Defense794Ministers to remove floating mines and enhance a collaborative795intervention force that would also safeguard energy infrastructure and796trade routes.797798      Improve ``unblinking eye'' assets such as the Varna Black799Sea Regional Naval Coordination Center to enhance maritime domain800awareness, develop a better Common Operating Picture, and NATO's801Maritime Situational Awareness platform. Urge NATO to review the802division of labor between Varna and NATO Maritime Command (Northwood,803UK).804805      Direct DHS/Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security806Agency (CISA) to deepen partnerships with Romania and Bulgaria's cyber807centers. Fund joint ``red team'' exercises on ports and rail IT808infrastructure.809810      Consider conveying smaller ships to Romania that can811traverse the Danube and to Bulgaria that can bolster its coastal812forces.813814      Support Ukraine in ensuring it retains control of major815strategic territory such as Odesa, the northern littoral, as well as816Snake Island near the mouth of the Danube and drilling platforms in the817Black Sea.818Economic819      Implement economic and energy measures in the State820Department's 2023 Black Sea Strategy and other strategies that are821compatible with the Trump Administration's approach to the region.822823      Engage Turkey regarding reciprocity for Russian shipping.824Russia should not receive free passage for ships carrying oil and grain825if it restricts the freedom of navigation of commercial vessels from826other nations.827828      Assist Romania in expanding the Danube as a transport829corridor, for example via the Three Seas Initiative infrastructure830program.831832      Engage more robustly on the Middle Corridor to diversify833trade Europe-Asia trade routes further away from Russia.834835      Encourage DFC and/or EXIM to finance hardened grain836silos, backup power for port IT, and digital customs systems. Encourage837World Bank co-financing on Danube logistics resilience.838Additional U.S. National Interests in the Black Sea839    It would be a much better outcome for the United States if Putin840were to fail in Ukraine. If he ends the war on his terms, the841consequences will be very negative not only for Ukraine but are also842likely to seep into the other three NATO littoral States as well as the843arc or corridor stretching from North Macedonia, Serbia, into Hungary,844Slovakia, and Austria. This would continue to erode U.S. influence in845the region and demonstrate to adversaries that Russia can challenge846NATO interests and get away with it. This would also send a clear847signal to Communist China, our most important adversary that is also848increasingly active in the BSR.849    In S. 804 from 2023, the Senate set forth its sense of the Congress850regarding national interests connected with the BSR. These tended to851focus on security, but economic issues were also a part, and they852remain as valid today as when the legislation was introduced. The853United States has an interest that the BSR be a benign, free and open,854positive, and stable security environment. A free and open Black Sea855will foster economic and other connectivity between Europe, Central856Asia, Asia Minor, and the Eastern Med and assure global food security,857which is seriously affected by grain and other food shipments via the858Black Sea.859    The Kremlin has made it very clear that it will continue to treat860the Black Sea as a region of special and preponderant interest after861the guns fall silent, and Crimea will remain a platform from which862Moscow conducts hybrid war, interferes in the region, and projects863power beyond it. In other words, the BSR is unlikely to not return to864anything like its pre-2014 State. All Allies must do more to ensure865that Putin does not end the war on his terms. It is positive that866President Trump has spoken forthrightly on Ukraine recently, even if867the BSR itself has not figured directly in his public statements. As868Ukraine goes, so goes the Black Sea Region.869    Thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you today. I look870forward to your questions.871872                           Additional Reading873874    One Flank, One Threat, One Presence: A Strategy for NATO's Eastern875Flank. Ben Hodges, Ray Wojcik, and Carsten Schmidl, Center for European876Policy Analysis (CEPA), May 26, 2020.877https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/one-flank-one-threat-one-878presence/879880    2023--Report--Troubled Waters--How Russia's War in Ukraine Changes881Black Sea Security, Lord Mark Lancaster (United Kingdom), October 7,8822023.883https://tinyurl.com/5n8ebswp884885    Understanding Russia's Black Sea Strategy, Natalie Sabanadze and886Galip Dalay, Chatham House,July 28, 2025.887https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/07/understanding-russias-black-sea-888strategy889890    Security Challenges in the Black Sea: NATO, the Wider Region and891the Global Order, George Scutaru and Peter Watkins, New Strategy892Center/LSE Ideas, 2024.893https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/Research-Reports/2024-894ResearchReport-BlackSea-NSC-FinalV-DIGITAL.pdf895896    Romania Becomes Second NATO Country To Report Russian Drone In Its897Airspace, Ian Casey and Alex Boyd, BBC, 14 September 2025.898https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c80g7g5rmlno899900    Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, Jessica Sobieski et al.,901Institute for the Study of War, September 14, 2025.902https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-903campaign-assessment-september-14-2025/904905    Ukraine Alert: Why Black Sea Could Emerge as the World's Next Great906Energy Battleground, Aura Sabadus, Atlantic Council, March 30, 2021.907https://tinyurl.com/y245ma9b908909    Black Sea's Offshore Energy Potential and Its Strategic Role At A910Regional and Continental Level, George Scutaru, New Strategy Center,911Bucharest, 2024.912https://newstrategycenter.ro/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Studiu-Kas-913Black-Sea-final-version.pdf914915    Russia Lost the Battle of the Black Sea, Brent M. Eastwood,916National Security Journal, August 26, 2025917https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/russia-lost-the-battle-of-the-918black-sea/919920    The Battle for the Black Sea is Not Over, Matthew Boyce, et. al,921Hudson Institute, April 16, 2024922https://www.hudson.org/security-alliances/battle-black-sea-not-over-923matthew-boyse-george-scutaru-mykhailo-samus-antonia-colibasanu924925    The Strategic Importance of the Black Sea: Regional Cooperation for926Energy and Defense, George Scutaru, et al.927https://tinyurl.com/3yp4m93b928929    Assessing the Department of State Strategy for Security in the930Black Sea Region, Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,931Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation, 118th Cong932(2023) (statement of Hon. James O'Brien, Assistant Secretary, European933and Eurasian Affairs).934https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/assessing-the-department-of-935states-strategy-for-security-in-the-black-sea-region936937    Black Sea Security Act of 2023.938https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-bill/804/text939940    Revisiting the Welles Declaration, Brian Whitmore, July 24, 2020.941https://cepa.org/article/revisiting-the-welles-declaration/942943    Crimea Is Ukraine, (press statement), Michael R. Pompeo, U.S.944Secretary of State, February 26, 2020.945https://2017-2021.state.gov/crimea-is-ukraine-3/946947    A Compact for a Free and Open Black Sea, Kaush Arha, et al., The948National Interest, May 18, 2024.949https://nationalinterest.org/feature/compact-free-and-open-black-sea-950211076951952    The Middle Corridor: A Renaissance in Global Commerce, Hunter953Stoll, The Rand Corporation/Research & Commentary/Commentary, March 12,9542024.955https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/03/the-middle-corridor-a-956renaissance-in-global-commerce.html957958    Senator Daines. Mr. Boyse, thank you.959    Dr. Fred Starr, Chairman of the Central Asia Caucasus960Institute and Silk Road Studies Program. Dr. Starr, the floor961is yours.962963STATEMENT OF DR. STEPHEN FREDERICK STARR, DISTINGUISHED FELLOW964    FOR EURASIA & FOUNDING CHAIRMAN, CENTRAL ASIA CAUCASUS965   INSTITUTE, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC966967    Dr. Starr. Thank you. Thank you very much. First, I would968like to applaud the chairman and ranking member for their969attention to this issue. That yours is a bipartisan initiative970makes your attention all the more important, attention both to971the Black Sea Region, and, I should say, Jackson-Vanik. Bravo.972    Let me start with a note on the geographic--geopolitical973context. Our focus on the Baltic countries is urgently needed974for they are under existential threat from Mr. Putin. However,975the entire Black Sea Region is also in crisis and for the same976reason. The difference is that Washington has yet fully to977acknowledge Black Sea issues.978    Like the Baltic area, the Black Sea Region includes three979members of NATO: Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. NATO and the--980and the U.S. maintains three military bases in Turkey and an981important one in Romania. Like the Baltic, the Black Sea plays982an important economic role as a gateway to the world's oceans.983Without it, Europe's second-longest river, the Danube would be984cutoff from world shipping lanes.985    Russia seeks to militarize and monopolize both the Baltic986and the Black Sea, challenging Europe and the United States. It987uses the Black Sea to control access to the West by the three988countries of the Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.989For the five Central Asian countries, it--the Black Sea is990crucial for their access to the West and the West's access to991their energy, oil, gas, and also minerals. Beyond this, Russia992still maintains the most powerful military presence on the993Black Sea and continues to be able to use its assets there to994project power into the Middle East, Africa, and beyond.995    Now, my written testimony details existing U.S. strategy996for the region and identifies some areas where updating and997change are called for. Here, however, let me focus on what a998strategy embracing current realities might include. A revised999strategy should be based on this committee's 2023 document on1000the region but has to comb out its irrelevancies and be more1001blunt in identifying and addressing threats. So, let me offer1002six possible elements of a revised U.S. strategy for the1003region.1004    First, add Ukraine, Moldova, and the three countries of the1005Caucasus--Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia--to the list of1006States with direct vital interests in the Black Sea. Also,1007acknowledge the critical importance of a free and open Black1008Sea for Western access to the resources of the five countries1009of Central Asia, and for those countries to--enable those1010countries to build economic ties with the West that can balance1011the tide of investment that is coming to them from China and1012Russia.1013    Second, affirm the United Nations General Assembly's1014resolution of 27 March 2014, declaring that Crimea belongs to1015Ukraine and help Ukraine to implement it.1016    Third, consistent with NATO's forward posture, strengthen1017the naval capacities of Bulgaria and Romania, and work with1018other countries to assist non-NATO members Ukraine--non-NATO1019member Ukraine to strengthen its navy.1020    Fourth, establish a rotating NATO naval presence in the1021Black Sea.1022    Fifth, to ensure regional buy-in through regular1023consultations, establish a permanent Black Sea Council, and1024six, acknowledge Turkey's special relevance and interest in1025Black Sea security and engage Turkey more actively in advancing1026the above goals.1027    Now, these are just suggestions of how our current strategy1028might be updated to confront current realities, but let me1029conclude with a very different note. These suggestions identify1030today's Russia as a malign force in the Black Sea Region.1031However, President Putin's assault on Ukraine is faltering1032badly, and Russia is on the brink of bankruptcy.1033    We grossly underestimate the significance of both these1034developments, which are disgracefully underreported in the1035American press and in American political discourse. A post-1036Putin Russia is already dawning, but its contours remain1037totally unknown. I, therefore, urge your committee as a whole1038to begin now to review U.S. strategy in light of all the most1039likely lines of Russia's further evolution. Thank you very1040much.1041    [The prepared statement of Dr. Starr follows:]10421043           Prepared Statement of Dr. Stephen Frederick Starr10441045    First, I would like to applaud the Chairman and Ranking Member for1046their attention to an issue that warrants more focus by the United1047States than it has received to date.1048    Allow me to start with a note on the geopolitical context and1049existing U.S. strategy in the region.1050The Context1051    Due to Russian military and economic pressure both the Baltic area1052and the Black Sea regions are in acute crisis but in the case of the1053Black Sea the crisis is less acknowledged than in the Baltic lands and1054hence inadequately addressed. Like the Baltic area, the Black Sea1055Region includes three members of NATO: Rumania, Bulgaria, and Turkey.1056The U.S. maintains three military bases in Turkey and in Rumania. Like1057the Baltic, the Black Sea plays an important economic role as a gateway1058to the world's oceans; in the case of the Black Sea it is also the only1059access to world shipping lanes for shipments on Europe's second longest1060river, the Danube. And unlike the Baltic, on its shores are the homes1061of the two largest and best equipped forces in Eurasia besides Russia,1062i.e. Turkey and Ukraine. Finally, Russia has attempted to militarize1063both the Baltic and the Black Sea, directly challenging Europe and the1064United States. And Russia uses its Black Sea assets to project its1065power into the Middle East, Africa, and beyond. For these and other1066reasons, the Black Sea Region warrants the same level of attention as1067the Baltic zone.1068Existing U.S. Strategy1069    Washington's existing strategy for the Black Sea Region is serious1070and multi-sided but falls short in several areas:10711072 1. Because the Black Sea littoral states are less developed and1073        coordinated than their Baltic counterparts, they need a higher1074        level of initiative from Washington than they now receive.10751076 2. Further, the U.S. approach to the Black Sea zone fails to1077        acknowledge that the fates of all three countries of the1078        Caucasus--Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan--see free access to1079        the Black Sea as key to their escaping complete control by1080        Moscow or Beijing. Two of these countries (Armenia and1081        Azerbaijan) have recently pivoted towards the West while1082        Georgia, with two ports on the Black Sea, will likely relaunch1083        its long-term positive relations with the U.S. once its current1084        government expires, as is likely once Moscow's backing flags,1085        as appears inevitable. Under any circumstances, control of the1086        Black Sea will determine the outcome of two important frozen1087        conflicts, in Georgia's Abkhazia and in Moldova's Transnistria.1088          For the five countries of Central Asia, rich with energy and1089        minerals, free access to the Black Sea is essential to1090        preventing domination by Russia and China. If they are denied1091        access to world ports via the Black Sea they will have no1092        choice but to return to Moscow's fold and submit to China's1093        economic dominance.10941095 3. Finally, as with the Baltic countries, they main threat to all the1096        Black Sea states, the Caucasus, and Central Asia arises from1097        Putin's Russia. Taking advantage of western passivity following1098        the collapse of the USSR, Russia today aspires to restore its1099        colonial domination of the Black Sea. Russia's war on Ukraine1100        is a failure but it has greatly increased its exclusive1101        economic zone in the Black Sea and gained control of four1102        fifths of the ports by which Ukraine sent grains to world1103        markets.1104U.S. Strategy to Now1105 1. Down to 2023 Washington's approach to the Black Sea Region can be1106        characterized as casual. It failed to respond decisively to1107        Russia's seizure of an entire region of Georgia in 2008 and to1108        Russia's seizure of Crimea in 2014. Since then, two documents1109        have defined Washingtons strategy: first, the terms of the 20161110        Three Seas initiative involving the Baltic, Adriatic, and Black1111        Sea, and, second, a 2023 statement by Congress on the Black1112        Sea.1113          The Three Seas initiative calls for increasing the cross-1114        border links, economic development. While laudable in many1115        respects, this project has focused more attention on the Baltic1116        than the Black Sea, and does not include two of the three main1117        littoral states, Turkey, and Ukraine, let alone the Caucasus.1118        And it is all but silent on security.1119          Acknowledging these lacunae, your committee in 2023 set forth1120        a more comprehensive strategy on the Black Sea and littoral1121        states. It calls for the U.S., NATO, and the EU to deter Russia1122        in the Black Sea by developing a permanent NATO base there,1123        initiating a rotating maritime presence, and fostering U.S.1124        investment in the region. This led to the creation of a NATO1125        base in Rumania at a cost of $2.7 billion. But the 20231126        document, along with the 2024 National Defense Authorization1127        Act, was a Christmas tree with too many ornaments and too few1128        focused commitments and actions. And it was soon overtaken by1129        events, which gave rise to a reactive and improvisational1130        approach to the Black Sea Region.1131What Is Needed Today?1132    A revised strategy should draw on the 2023 document but comb out1133its irrelevancies, be more blunt in identifying threats, expand the1134number of countries with which to partner, and engage Turkey in a more1135active role. It must recognize that even though the Russian Navy has1136been gravely wounded, it remains the most powerful force on the Black1137Sea and uses its presence there to project its power into the Middle1138East. Africa, and beyond. Hence Russia remains the greatest threat to1139the goals of the U.S. and NATO.1140    The main elements of a revised strategy should include:11411142 1. Adding Ukraine, Moldova, and the three countries of the Caucasus to1143        the list of states with recognized and compatible interests in1144        the Black Sea.11451146 2. Consistent with NATO's forward posture, strengthening the naval1147        capacities of Bulgaria and Rumania, and also working with other1148        countries to assist non-NATO member Ukraine.11491150 3. Establishing a rotating NATO naval presence in the Black Sea.11511152 4. Affirming the UN General Assembly's resolution 68/262 of 27 March1153        2014 declaring that Crimea belongs to Ukraine and supporting1154        efforts by the U.S. and its partners to help Ukraine implement1155        it.11561157 5. Assuring regional buy-in through regular consultations with1158        relevant governments in a Black Sea Council.11591160 6. Acknowledging Turkey's special relevance and interest in Black Sea1161        security and engaging Turkey more actively in advancing the1162        above goals.1163Concluding Note1164    These suggestions identify today's Russia as a malign force in the1165Black Sea Region. However, President Putin's assault on Ukraine and the1166region is faltering badly and Moscow's finances are on the brink of1167bankruptcy. A post-Putin Russia is dawning but its contours remain1168unknown. Your committee must therefore prepare now to revisit U.S.1169strategy in the Black Sea Region in light of Russia's further1170evolution.11711172    Senator Daines. Dr. Starr, thank you for your testimony.1173Catherine Sendak, director of the Transatlantic Defense and1174Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis.1175Ms. Sendak, the floor is yours.11761177   STATEMENT OF CATHERINE SENDAK, DIRECTOR OF TRANSATLANTIC1178  DEFENSE AND SECURITY, CENTER FOR EUROPEAN POLICY ANALYSIS,1179                         WASHINGTON, DC11801181    Ms. Sendak. Thank you so much, Chairman Daines, Ranking1182Member Murphy, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on1183Europe and Regional Security Cooperation. It is an honor to1184address you today on this critical and timely matter of U.S.1185national Security and policy. I should note that the views1186expressed in this testimony do not reflect those of the Center1187for European Policy Analysis or its staff and fellows.1188    CEPA, for the past 20 years, has spent a lot of time1189focusing on the Black Sea, producing a lot of analysis and1190recommendations, looking how to highlight the importance of the1191region to both European and global security. While much of the1192policy focus has centered on the war inside Ukraine, rightfully1193so, the broader regional strategy, particularly concerning the1194Black Sea, as was Stated before, remains severely ill defined1195and underdeveloped. This gap in a comprehensive, well-defined,1196and well-resourced Black Sea strategy puts long-term prospects1197for stability and security at risk, not only in Ukraine, but1198across the European continent. We have a real opportunity to1199seize the momentum to set forward a path for tangible policy1200and achievable sustainable security in the Black Sea Region.1201    There are reasons to approach security challenges in the1202region with some optimism and some pragmatism. In the wake of1203what looks like to be a majority victory for the Party of1204Action and Solidarity--the pro-EU party in Moldova--a1205concentrated Western attention on Black Sea security in light1206of Russia's full-scale invasion in Ukraine and its ongoing1207aggressive actions in the region, increased investment on1208defense technology and capabilities, and plussed-up defense1209resources across the West, the time is now.1210    I had the opportunity to lead a year-long study on Ukraine1211long-term security cooperation and assistance published earlier1212this year. As a part of that study, we assessed the critical1213requirements for stability and security in Ukraine with1214reaching effects of security in the broader region.1215    In order to achieve long-term stability and security on the1216European continent, the U.S. and NATO should undertake the1217following in the Black Sea Region. One, we must enable Ukraine1218to defend its territorial sovereignty over the long term. That1219has far-reaching impacts to the security of the entire region.1220We must draft, resource, and implement clear, concise, and1221cohesive Black Sea strategies, both in the United States, NATO,1222and we need to take a look at U.S.-Russia policy. And finally,1223we need to provide sustained U.S. leadership in the region,1224including engagement, presence, and assist our Black Sea NATO1225allies to further cooperation to bring unified security.1226    As we know, the Black Sea Region sits at the crossroads of1227Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and Central Asia, with a1228contested and competitive security environment, and we know1229crucial to Russian's foreign policy objectives is to control1230the methods and means of commerce and trade in the Black Sea1231and enjoy unhampered access to project power to other theaters,1232including the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, and1233Africa.1234    The threats from Russia, as we know, in the Black Sea1235Region and all over Europe, are well known: militarily in1236Ukraine, Transnistria, and Georgia; politically as we have seen1237over the weekend in Moldova in their attempts to derail that1238democratic process; and, of course, hybrid actions that are1239continuing day by day.1240    I would be remiss if I did not mention the connections of1241everything else happening on the European continent with Russia1242hybrid actions and connecting those dots to what is happening1243in the Black Sea Region. As was mentioned before by the ranking1244member and others here, the drone incursions, the air1245incursions in Poland and Estonia, both triggering Article 41246sessions at NATO, the potential drone incursions in Denmark and1247Norway going on right now, the bombing of the EU building in1248Kyiv, the GPS jamming of President von der Leyen's plane, these1249are all cumulative in nature, Russia testing what Europe and1250the West will actually respond to and react to and try to deter1251against.1252    Let me briefly just go over my recommendations again, and I1253welcome any questions you all have about these. Enabling1254Ukraine to defend its territorial sovereignty over the long1255term. So, our study took a look at multiple-year authorities1256and multiyear funding for consistent and sustained support and1257assistance from Congress. We also suggested a 5-year memorandum1258of understanding between the U.S. and Ukraine, providing a full1259set of objectives and goals and resources to solidify the1260partnership.1261    That partnership and solidifying that partnership over the1262long term, will provide consistency and have ripple effects1263throughout the region. Security cooperation and assistance1264programs spanning the spectrum of issue sets--military,1265civilian, reforms, education--creating the opportunity for1266substantive, generational capacity building and change1267throughout the region. Drafting, resourcing, and implementing1268Black Sea strategies and a U.S.-Russia policy are clear. We1269need to re-look at the U.S. Black Sea Strategy and how to1270implement that further.1271    We need to create a Black Sea strategy at NATO, and the1272U.S. must examine a comprehensive U.S.-Russia policy moving1273forward. And then finally, U.S. leadership is so critical in1274this space, including engagement and presence in assisting our1275Black Sea NATO allies--Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey--to work1276together further, taking their Mine Countermeasures Task Group1277and expanding it into other domains, including maritime domain1278awareness and intelligence sharing. The opportunities are1279great, and we look forward to those opportunities.1280    If the U.S. and NATO do not take these actions, then Russia1281and other potential adversaries will have the unfettered1282ability to continue to destabilize Ukraine and Black Sea1283nations and control the strategic terrain, to include the1284commerce that flows through it, not only putting European1285stability at risk, but also the global economy. Thank you for1286the opportunity, and I look forward to your questions.1287    [The prepared statement of Ms. Sendak follows:]12881289                 Prepared Statement of Catherine Sendak12901291    Chairman Daines, Ranking Member Murphy, distinguished members of1292the Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation, It is an1293honor to address you today on this critical and timely matter of U.S.1294national security and foreign policy. I should note that the views1295expressed in this testimony do not reflect those of the Center for1296European Policy Analysis (CEPA) or its staff and fellows.1297    Since CEPA's founding 20 years ago, we have focused on the security1298of the Black Sea Region. CEPA publishes extensive analysis and1299recommendations on the region, we have a robust set of experts and1300fellows focusing on the region, and we continually seek ways to1301highlight the importance of the Black Sea to European and global1302security.1303Framing Statement1304    While much of the policy focus has centered on the war inside1305Ukraine (rightfully so), the broader regional strategy--particularly1306concerning the Black Sea--remains severely ill-defined and1307underdeveloped. This gap in a comprehensive, well-defined, and well-1308resourced Black Sea strategy puts long-term prospects for stability and1309security at-risk not only in Ukraine but across the European continent.1310    I had the opportunity to lead a year-long study on Ukraine long-1311term security assistance published earlier this year. As part of the1312study, we assessed the critical requirements for stability and security1313in Ukraine with reaching effects of security in the broader Black Sea1314Region.\1\ The region is a critical juncture of commerce, trade,1315energy, and agriculture--Russia's war in Ukraine and its long-term goal1316of manipulation and control of the Black Sea have far reaching effects1317to European and global security.1318---------------------------------------------------------------------------1319    \1\ Catherine Sendak and Ilya Timtchenko, ``Between Now and NATO: A1320Security Strategy for Ukraine,'' (Center for European Policy Analysis,1321January 2025),1322    https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/betweennow-and-nato-a-1323security-strategy-for-ukraine/1324---------------------------------------------------------------------------1325    To ensure long-term stability and security on the European1326continent, the U.S. and NATO should undertake the following in the1327Black Sea Region (BSR): (1) enable Ukraine to defend its territorial1328sovereignty over the long term; (2) draft, resource, and implement1329clear, concise, and cohesive Black Sea security strategies; and (3)1330provide sustained U.S. leadership in the region including engagement,1331presence, and assisting Black Sea NATO allies to further cooperation to1332bring unified security. If the U.S. and NATO do not take these actions,1333then Russia and other potential adversaries will have the unfettered1334ability to continue to destabilize Ukraine and Black Sea nations and1335control the strategic terrain--to include the commerce that flows1336through it--not only putting European stability at risk but also the1337global economy.1338    I will proceed by describing the strategic importance of the Black1339Sea and then further outline my three recommendations for U.S. policy.1340Strategic Importance of the Black Sea1341          ``Wishful thinking will not keep U.S. safe . . . hope is not1342        a strategy.'' \2\ (Rutte 9 June 2025)1343---------------------------------------------------------------------------1344    \2\ NATO News, ``Building a better NATO''; NATO Secretary General1345speech at Chatham House, 9 JUN 2025,'' June 9, 2025,1346    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lYiE82ufdHM13471348          ``We see the Black Sea being weaponized.'' \3\ (Kallas 28 May1349        2025)1350---------------------------------------------------------------------------1351    \3\ European External Action Service, Black Sea Strategy: Press1352remarks by High Representative/VicePresident Kaja Kallas, (Brussels,1353Belgium: EEAS Press Team, 2025)1354    https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/black-sea-strategy-press-remarks-1355high-representativevice-presidentkaja-kallas--en13561357    At the crossroads of Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and1358Central Asia is the BSR--a vital region of economic, commerce,1359agricultural, and energy resources, with a contested and competitive1360security environment. Economically, the region serves as a link between1361Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. It is the center for vital regional1362trade routes, with the EU, the largest trading partner for most of the1363region, having an overall trade volume of ?310 billion/$360 billion.\4\1364Agriculturally, grain production for the next season across the region1365is projected at 225 million tons, slightly below record levels--1366critical to global food supplies.\5\ As it relates to energy, Turkey is1367ramping up its flagship Sakarya natural gas field in the Black Sea.\6\1368And alternative energy corridors are being explored and seen as a step1369for regional collaboration and green energy production, developing both1370economic and strategic benefits for the region.\7\1371---------------------------------------------------------------------------1372    \4\ Delegation of the EU to Armenia, Questions and answers on the1373European Union's strategic approach to the Black Sea Region, (Yerevan,1374Armenia: Delegation of the EU to Armenia, 2025),1375    https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/armenia/questions-and-1376answers-european-unions-strategicapproach-black-sea-region--en1377    \5\ Grains Prices, ``Black Sea Region Grain Market Analysis,''1378GrainPrices, May 9, 2025,1379    https://grainsprices.com/article/189241380    \6\ Nevzat Devranoglu, ``Turkey eyes regional energy expansion as1381Black Sea gas output rises,'' Reuters, April 21, 2025,1382    https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/turkey-eyes-regional-1383energy-expansion-blacksea-gas-output-rises-2025-04-21/1384    \7\ Natia Gamkrelidze, ``Can the Black Sea Energy Corridor Power1385Europe's Green Future?'' Belfer Center for Science and International1386Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, September 17, 2024,1387    https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/can-black-sea-1388energy-corridor-power-europes-greenfuture1389---------------------------------------------------------------------------1390    Crucial to Russia's foreign policy objectives is to control the1391methods and means of commerce and trade in the Black Sea\8\ and1392unhampered access to power project to other theaters including the1393Middle East unto Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Africa.\9\1394---------------------------------------------------------------------------1395    \8\ Daniel Hamilton and Angela Stent, ``Russia's Imperial Black Sea1396Strategy,'' Foreign Affairs, August 19, 2025,1397    https://www.foreignaffairs.com/georgia/russias-imperial-black-sea-1398strategy1399    \9\ Catherine Sendak and Ilya Timtchenko, ``Between Now and NATO: A1400Security Strategy for Ukraine,'' (Washington, DC: Center for European1401Policy Analysis, 2025),1402    https://cepa.org/comprehensivereports/between-now-and-nato-a-1403security-strategy-for-ukraine/; Samer al-Ahmed, ``Russia's military1404presence in post-Assad Syria: A growing security liability undermining1405stability,'' (Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 2025),1406    https://www.mei.edu/publications/russias-military-presence-post-1407assad-syriagrowing-security-liability-undermining1408---------------------------------------------------------------------------1409    For decades NATO allies and partners have confronted Russia in an1410ad hoc fashion in the BSR including, but not limited to, the decades-1411long presence in Transnistria, the Russo-Georgian War in 2008, the1412illegal annexation of Crimea and subsequent Russian-led separatists in14132014, and the closing of the Kerch Strait in 2018, severely restricting1414access to the Sea of Azov for Ukraine--the list is long. And in still1415other cases, we have ignored their intent in the region to our own1416peril allowing Russia to exert its influence and its ability to sow1417chaos to destabilize the region with minimal to no reaction including1418consistent cyber-attacks, sabotage, and corruption.1419    As President von der Leyen laid out in her 2025 State of the Union,1420Europe is in a fight.\10\ And a frontline of that fight is the Black1421Sea.1422---------------------------------------------------------------------------1423    \10\ Ursula von der Leyen, ``2025 State of the Union Address by1424President von der Leyen,'' (European Union, September 2025)1425    https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech--25--142620531427---------------------------------------------------------------------------1428Threats to U.S. Interests in the Black Sea1429    Threats include: 1) Russia's military activity; 2) Russian hybrid1430operations; 3) Chinese and other actors.1431    First, Russia's war in Ukraine and ripple effects in the region are1432felt by all nations. Russia's relentless attempts at dismantling1433Ukrainian democracy, seeking a puppet state under the Kremlin's1434control, is decades in the making. By sea, the Kremlin's efforts to1435limit freedom of navigation impact global trade, food supplies, energy,1436and commerce. Ukraine has shown undeniable success in thwarting the1437Russian navy in the Black Sea, eliminating 30% of its Black Sea fleet1438and pushing its basing to the Novorossiysk and the Abkhazia region of1439Georgia given the vulnerability of Crimea.\11\1440---------------------------------------------------------------------------1441    \11\ Rayhan Demytrie, Paul Brown and Joshua Cheetham, ``Russia's1442new Black Sea naval base alarms Georgia,'' BBC, December 12, 2023,1443    https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-676254501444---------------------------------------------------------------------------1445    This denial has increased the ability for Ukraine and the rest of1446the BSR to conduct business but constant threats remain.\12\ By air,1447for example, Romania is impacted regularly, by air incursions and drone1448sightings including drone debris.\13\ While these actions span the1449European continent, Russia has been using these methods for decades in1450the Black Sea.1451---------------------------------------------------------------------------1452    \12\ Natalie Sabanadze and Galip Dalay, Understanding Russia's1453Black Sea strategy, (London, United Kingdom: Chatham House, 2025),1454    https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/07/understanding-russias-1455blacksea-strategy/02-russias-use-conflicts-black-sea-region1456    \13\ ``Romania could partner Ukraine to make drones under EU-funded1457defence scheme,'' Reuters, September 26, 2025,1458    https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/romania-could-1459partnerukraine-make-drones-under-eu-funded-defence-scheme-2025-09-26/1460---------------------------------------------------------------------------1461    Secondly, Russia's hybrid operations include a litany of misdeeds1462and dangerous confrontations testing the region and alliance's resolve.1463It is clear Russia views the Black Sea in their sphere of influence and1464their ``. . . imperial ambitions aim to transform the Black Sea into a1465``Russian lake'' through military occupation, economic coercion, and1466hybrid warfare.'' \14\1467---------------------------------------------------------------------------1468    \14\ Tamas Harangozo, 2025--Revised--The War in Ukraine and1469Mounting Economic Challenges in the Greater Black Sea Region,1470(Brussels, Belgium, 2025),1471    https://www.nato-pa.int/document/2025-black-seareport-harangozo-1472017-esctd1473---------------------------------------------------------------------------1474    Politically, at the time of this hearing, as we see from this past1475weekend, the world is watching the outcomes of Moldova's elections.1476Moldova, containing Transnistria, a region with approximately 15001477Russian troops and `peacekeepers', is on the frontlines of Russian1478hybrid and kinetic tactics. Russia has long targeted Moldova with1479political interference and influence operations, supporting pro-Russian1480parties, financing illicit networks, and weaponizing energy dependence.1481Since the election of pro-European leaders in 2020-21, the Kremlin has1482intensified efforts to destabilize Moldova's democratic institutions1483and derail its EU trajectory-most recently by financing largescale1484vote-buying, engineering energy crises, and preparing to disrupt this1485past Sunday's parliamentary elections. \15\ With the victory of the1486pro-EU party, Moldova has shown a small nation can confront and deny1487Russian tactics to influence and derail democratic principles.\16\ It1488is a testament to the strength of those systems and of the Moldovan1489people.1490---------------------------------------------------------------------------1491    \15\ Sarah E. Garding and Cory Welt, Moldova: Background and U.S.1492Policy, CRS Report No. R48664, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research1493Service, 2025)1494    https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R486641495    \16\ Sarah Rainsford and Paul Kirby, ``Moldova's pro-EU party wins1496vote mired in claims of Russian interference,'' BBC, September 29,14972025,1498    https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2rdlj8ejgo1499---------------------------------------------------------------------------1500    Extending beyond the BSR, we must take into account the cumulative1501effort of the Kremlin's campaign on European security including NATO1502allies over just the past few months. Since August, the bombing of the1503EU building in Kyiv; GPS jamming of European Commission President1504Ursula von der Leyen's aircraft; 21 drone incursions in Polish airspace1505in a single evening; Estonian air incursion (both of which triggered1506Article 4 sessions at NATO); potential drone incursions in Danish and1507Norwegian commercial and military airspace and the incidents go on and1508on. And it is time to confront these challenges in a cohesive, timely,1509and effective way.1510    Other actors, including China, Iran, and the Gulf States continue1511to seek to expand their influence in the region. We clearly see1512Russia's policy aims of dominance of the BSR but we must not ignore the1513efforts by the PRC to exude influence including buying up critical1514infrastructure, investing in energy corridors, and signing free trade1515agreements not to mention its attempts at purchasing military1516industrial assets like Ukraine's Motor Sich,\17\ interest in leading1517the brokering of a peace deal in Ukraine, and eyeing opportunities to a1518perceived easing of Western influences and engagement.\18\ In addition,1519the Gulf States, Iran, and others are either increasing their influence1520efforts in the BSR and/or working directly with Russia on its war in1521Ukraine.\19\1522---------------------------------------------------------------------------1523    \17\ William Echols, ``Chinese Intrigue Behind Ukraine's Seizure of1524Aviation Firm Motor Sich,'' Voice of America, November 10, 2022,1525    https://www.voanews.com/a/fact-check-chinese-intrigue-behind-1526ukraine-sseizure-of-aviation-firm-motor-sich/6829005.html1527    \18\ Michael Cercire, ``China's Black Sea Play,'' RAND, August 5,152820251529    https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/08/chinas-black-sea-1530play.html; Nino Lezhava and Leon Hartwell, ``Russia and China at Odds1531Over Black Sea Ambitions,'' Center for European Policy Analysis,1532September 20, 2024, https://cepa.org/article/russia-and-china-at-odds-1533over-black-sea-ambitions/1534    \19\ Iulia-Sabina Joja, ``Iran's growing influence in the Black Sea1535Region: Consequences and Western responses,'' Middle East Institute,1536December 6, 2024,1537    https://mei.edu/publications/irans-growinginfluence-black-sea-1538region-consequences-and-western-responses; Natia Seskuria, ``A Strategy1539Long Overdue: The EU's New Vision for the Black Sea,'' Royal United1540Services Institute, August 22, 20251541    https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/1542strategy-long-overdue-eus-newvision-black-sea15431544Recommendations Section1545    
 Enable Ukraine to defend itself providing capabilities,1546        platforms, training, and continue programs including the1547        ability for European allies to purchase U.S. platforms to1548        provide to Ukraine. These recommendations will have a far-1549        reaching effect on the entire region increasing regional1550        deterrence, capability, and stability.\20\ To do that, the U.S.1551        should consider the following:1552---------------------------------------------------------------------------1553    \20\ Catherine Sendak and Ilya Timtchenko, ``Between Now and NATO:1554A Security Strategy for Ukraine,'' (Center for European Policy1555Analysis, January 2025),1556    https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/betweennow-and-nato-a-1557security-strategy-for-ukraine/15581559       The U.S. Congress should provide sustained, multiyear1560            funding and authorities for partnership with Ukraine1561            including the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative1562            (USAI). Providing the tools, support, and assistance1563            Ukraine needs to confront the Russian threat is a necessary1564---------------------------------------------------------------------------1565            step in obtaining a secure region.15661567       Demonstrating a long-term commitment and partnership to1568            Ukraine and regional security, the U.S. should enter into a1569            5-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Ukrainian1570            government to outline and formalize the priorities and1571            objectives of a long-term security partnership.15721573       The U.S. has played and can continue to contribute1574            heavily to the democratic resilience programs and measures1575            to address corruption, further develop democratic1576            institutions and checks and balances, and reforms to many1577            Black Sea nations including the allied and partner1578            militaries and industrial bases. Security cooperation and1579            assistance programs as well as other U.S. government1580            efforts including programs focused on institutional1581            capacity building, government reforms, and educational and1582            exchange opportunities have the capacity to assist1583            generational changes in Ukraine and the region.\21\1584---------------------------------------------------------------------------1585    \21\ Education and exchange programs including, but not limited to,1586International Military, Education, andTraining (IMET), Professional1587Military Education (PME), and State Partnership Programs (SPP).15881589    
 Develop, resource, and implement comprehensive security1590---------------------------------------------------------------------------1591        strategies for the Black Sea and Russia.15921593       The U.S. Black Sea Security Strategy, authorized and1594            required in the fiscal year 2024 National Defense1595            Authorization Act (PL 118-31), was delivered to Congress in1596            June 2024.1A\22\ The strategy laid out five priorities1597            including engagement and relationship building, regional1598            security cooperation, economic assistance to combat Russian1599            and Chinese influences, energy and security, and democratic1600            resilience.\23\ As many know from drafted strategies, the1601            more specificity and direct resources directed at1602            implementing the strategy are imperative. But the status of1603            implementation is not clear. As we learned in our study1604            published earlier this year, Ukraine and many regional1605            neighbors consistently look to the U.S. for leadership and1606            guidance to understand policy objectives and goals in the1607            BSR. The U.S. has an opportunity to put forward pragmatic1608            policy to increase regional security.1609---------------------------------------------------------------------------1610    \22\ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, Pub.1611L. No 118-31 1247, 137 Stat. 462-463(2023).1612    https://www.congress.gov/118/plaws/publ31/PLAW-118publ31.pdf1613    \23\ Hearing on U.S. Black Sea Strategy: Testimony before the1614Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 118thCong. (2023) (Statement of1615James O'Brien, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian1616Affairs from 2023-2025)1617    https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ac0fdbbe-cf96-dd04-16185958-6d40af5b63ef/102523--O%27Brien--Testimony.pdf16191620       Alternatively, NATO does not have a Black Sea strategy.1621            There have been calls to examine what the alliance should1622            prioritize to increase the security of allies and partners1623            of the BSR. Any strategy should include a set of1624            recommendations to increase non-BSR allied presence in the1625            Black Sea. Working with Turkey, in line with the Montreux1626            Convention, and foreseeing a potential ceasefire and/or1627            negotiated settlement between Ukraine and Russia, those1628            discussions and planning can begin now.1629            U.S. and NATO Russia Strategies16301631       Hand in glove to well drafted and resourced Black Sea1632            and Ukraine strategies is a U.S./Russia policy. It is time1633            to develop a comprehensive and clear strategy and1634            objectives related to the U.S. relationship with Russia.16351636       Additionally, at the NATO Washington Summit in 2024, a1637            key aspect of the communique included the alliance to1638            ``develop recommendations on NATO's strategic approach to1639            Russia.'' \24\ But at the 2025 Hague Summit, there was no1640            mention in the communique, and no strategy has been1641            delivered to the alliance.\25\ NATO work on these issues1642            and policies should continue.1643---------------------------------------------------------------------------1644    \24\ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Washington Summit1645Declaration, (Washington, DC: North AtlanticTreaty Organization, 2024),1646    https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official--texts--227678.htm1647    \25\ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Hague Summit1648Declaration, (The Hague: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2025),1649    https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official--texts--236705.htm16501651    
 Channel U.S. leadership to take full advantage of momentum and1652        resources to enable Black Sea allies and partners to cohesively1653        and collaboratively work towards to achieving long term1654---------------------------------------------------------------------------1655        stability and prosperity. o16561657       Utilize key programs and markers to strengthen the1658            region's defenses. There are many positive and substantial1659            new programs, initiatives, and funds for increasing1660            European security including NATO's 5% GDP on defense1661            spending commitment, regional defense plans, critical1662            capability targets, innovation programs and procurement1663            targets. The EU published a defence white paper,\26\ a1664            Black Sea Strategy, and established the ReArm Europe Plan/1665            Readiness 2030 program including Security Action for Europe1666            (SAFE) funding mechanism opportunities for production and1667            procurement for EU nations, with the intent of spending1668            over ?800 billion in the coming years on defense.\27\ But1669            there is concern the deluge of opportunities will result in1670            lack clarity, efficiency, and cohesion. U.S. leadership can1671            play a vital role in cohering programs across organizations1672            and capitals to streamline efforts.1673---------------------------------------------------------------------------1674    \26\ Strategic Communications, ``White Paper for European Defence--1675Readiness 2030,'' (European Union External Action, March 2025)1676    https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/white-paper-for-european-1677defencereadiness-2030--en1678    \27\ European Union, ``SAFE Security Action for Europe,'' (European1679Union, July 2025)1680    https://defenceindustry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/1681safe-security-action-europe--en16821683       Black Sea NATO allies have an opportunity to align on1684            key security priorities in terms of capability and1685            capacity. Using the template of the Black Sea Mine1686            Countermeasures Task Group, NATO allies Romania, Bulgaria,1687            and Turkey should expand cooperation on regional security1688            challenges.\28\ The Task Group should seek to develop a1689            multi-year framework focused on common security goals1690            including domain awareness, information sharing, maritime1691            security, and training and exercising. This framework would1692            provide goals and objectives to use, in conjunction with,1693            security cooperation and assistance levers with NATO, the1694            EU, and the United States. It is an opportunity for the1695            NATO neighbors of the Black Sea to lead on executing the1696            region's security and speak and act with a common voice.1697---------------------------------------------------------------------------1698    \28\ Kate Tringham, ``MCM Black Sea Task Group starts operations,''1699(Janes, July 2024)1700    https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news/sea/mcm-black-1701sea-task-group-starts-operations1702---------------------------------------------------------------------------1703Conclusion1704    It is prudent for the US, NATO and other allies and partners to1705seize the momentum of international focus on the security situation in1706the BSR and deliver. Without a coherent, well-resourced strategy for1707the Black Sea Region, the U.S. and NATO risk ceding strategic advantage1708to Russia--allowing it to continue undermining Ukraine's sovereignty,1709threatening regional allies and partners, and jeopardizing European1710security and global commerce. Consistent support and partnership with1711Black Sea allies and partners, a strong, pragmatic, well-defined, and1712well-resourced Black Sea strategy anchored in clear policy objectives,1713and sustained commitment will deny Putin and his global partners the1714strategic leverage sought and ensure he cannot hold European security/1715stability and the global economy at risk.17161717    Senator Daines. Thank you, Ms. Sendak. I will start with1718Dr. Starr.1719    I was reflecting on our former colleague, Senator McCain's,1720famous comment he made in 2014 shortly, I believe, after Russia1721invaded Crimea when he said, ``Russia is a gas station1722masquerading as a country.'' When we look back on Russia's1723invasion of Ukraine, it has become undeniable that energy1724security and national security are intertwined. In fact, one1725could argue energy security is national security, and that1726Europe's reliance on Russian energy is both a regional security1727as well as economic risk.1728    My question, Dr. Starr, is, do you believe that the1729development of the Middle Corridor, as we saw what has occurred1730now with that historic August 8 signing of the peace agreement1731between Azerbaijan and Armenia when we had both President1732Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan here in Washington, that1733President Trump got that deal put together, do you see that as1734a means to uncork the energy potential of the Caucasus and1735Central Asia, and how that might change the landscape of1736European energy flow for the better, especially on NATO's1737eastern flank?1738    Dr. Starr. This is an Important issue that did not begin1739yesterday. It has been more than a decade since the Baku-Ceyhan1740pipeline was opened. There was so much skepticism about that in1741this country, that we organized a motorcycle run, from1742Azerbaijan on the Caspian, all the way to Turkish Port of1743Ceyhan in order to deliver the first oil from Central Asia to1744Europe by motorcycle.1745    My point is this: It is possible to send energy from1746Central Asia and the Caspian Region to Europe by land1747corridors. However, it would be better to have backups and1748multiple systems, including one that would cross the Black Sea.1749But if the Black Sea is dominated by Russia, which has its own1750energy interests, obviously that will not work. So, yes, the1751so-called Middle Corridor is very important, but at the same1752time, we cannot rely solely on the land route through the1753Caucasus. We should also have the alternative of a sea route1754across the Black Sea.1755    Senator Daines. Thank you, Dr. Starr, for your insights on1756that. It is appreciated. Mr. Boyse, I want to continue on this1757theme of energy security. In May of this year, Western States1758of the Black Sea Region began construction of a Vertical Gas1759Corridor as a means to push energy into starved parts of1760Europe. Mr. Boyse, do you believe that U.S. allies in countries1761like Romania would benefit from such a proposal, and could this1762idea succeed where the Nabucco pipeline and other energy1763projects have failed?1764    Mr. Boyse. That is a very important question because it1765gets to the root of the question of how to diversify sources,1766expand options, and increase energy security, so that the1767countries of that region do not need to rely on Russian1768sources--which brings all sorts of opportunities for malign1769influence, which we have seen over the course of many, many1770years.1771    Now, the main principle is that the more projects like this1772the better because they bring more sources of energy. Romania1773can contribute to this objective because it is blessed with1774enormous resources--fossil fuels in the Black Sea and on land.1775It is also a key corridor through which the resources from1776those countries that are not blessed with those resources need1777to go. This project has been long in the making, in the1778conceptual stage. It goes back almost 10 years when it was1779first a bright idea in some foresighted people's minds. It has1780taken quite a long time for it to get off the ground.1781    It is about time that it is happening. It will be a great1782resource when it finally starts to produce the sorts of diverse1783supplies that countries of the BSR region need--that Ukraine1784needs, that Moldova needs, that Hungary needs, that Slovakia1785needs. And so, we should welcome this and support it in every1786way we can.1787    Senator Daines. Thank you, Mr. Boyse. Ranking Member1788Murphy?1789    Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Ms.1790Sendak, we have seen both the capability and the limitations of1791Russian military force in Ukraine, and I mentioned intelligence1792estimates are that this will likely be some form of a stalemate1793for a long period of time.1794    Thus, Russia is going to be more reliant on non-military1795means, as they always have been, to try to undermine support1796for Ukraine and to undermine pro-Western governments. And we1797see all of the myriad ways that Russia uses, you know, funding1798for corrupt politicians, misinformation campaigns, just1799outright intimidation in order to get what it wants, and yet,1800as I mentioned in my opening testimony, this administration has1801effectively shuttered many of the tools that we use to fight1802Russian asymmetric warfare techniques.1803    The Trump administration has slashed funding for pro-1804democracy programs in the Black Sea Region, which are run by1805NDI and IRI. As I mentioned, it shut down the Global Engagement1806Center, which chased down a lot of Russian propaganda in and1807around the Black Sea Region. It has withdrawn from working1808groups with European countries to expose and counter anti-1809Western and anti-U.S. Russian-backed disinformation in the1810Black Sea Region.1811    Is there any way to support democracies--pro-Western1812democracies in the Black Sea if the United States is not1813actively engaged in trying to counter the non-military ways1814that Russia seeks to gain influence and undermine governments1815that are pro--are supportive of the West and supportive of a1816democratic future?1817    Ms. Sendak. Thank you, Senator Murphy. You know, it is an1818excellent question, I think, that one that the United States1819has tried to tackle for many years on how do we address this1820hybrid threat in a very holistic and tactical way. We have seen1821successes in some respects and, I would say, a lot of failures.1822We play reaction mode a lot when it comes to these things, and1823as you mentioned and I mentioned in my opening testimony,1824Russia is constantly testing the waters to see what they can1825get away with.1826    I would say holistic support and assistance for these1827democracies is really important, and understanding it is not1828just about mill-to-mill conversations or relationships. It is1829not just about civilian. It is not just about one sector. It is1830about all sectors, and I think we can see that in Ukraine.1831    Prior to the Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, we saw a1832majority of programs that we helped Ukraine with really not1833necessarily even being military, right? You know, standing up1834agencies, understanding budget processes, really weedsy things,1835so they understood capacity building and how to do this. I1836think it is very important that U.S. leadership is here.1837    The Black Sea Region is a nexus of many organizations and1838alliances, and the U.S. has an opportunity to lead that from1839various venues and various streams of effort to really have a1840holistic perspective. So, yes, sir, I agree that a holistic1841approach to these problems is necessary.1842    Senator Murphy. I would point to our support for1843independent media in Moldova. I know this becomes a fraught1844political issue, you know, support for countering propaganda1845overseas because a lot of conservatives worry that that is1846going to prejudice certain types of speech as propaganda. But1847in Moldova, there is really no way to have a fact-based1848narrative without there being some support for independent1849truth telling because Russia commands so much of that space,1850and so I appreciate that answer.1851    Mr. Boyse, I wanted to sort of stay on this thread of how1852we use non-military funds to support our allies in the Black1853Sea, and I agree with Senator Daines that energy independence1854is a key goal for the region. And it was always curious to me1855that in the wake of the early invasion of Ukraine by Russian1856proxies, we spent $4 billion on something called the European1857Reassurance Initiative, but it was, basically, all bread-and-1858butter military programming. Had we spent maybe $1 billion of1859that $4 billion helping Eastern Europe, Europe, and the Black1860Sea become energy independent of Russia, we might not be in the1861position that we are today.1862    And so, I always find it curious that--you know, I agree1863with Senator Daines that energy security is national security,1864and I guess my question is, should we be considering putting1865sort of hard U.S. national security dollars into regional1866energy independence projects? Should we start to fund energy1867independence in the same way that we fund military support for1868the region? A lot more projects could get done there if the1869United States was willing to put some muscle behind it.1870    Mr. Boyse. That is a question, Senator Murphy, that is near1871and dear to my heart because I was the Sherpa for the Three1872Seas Initiative during most of the Trump administration, and we1873were actually making a fair amount of progress on the principle1874you mentioned--and energy is one of the three pillars.1875    And much of the investment did, in fact, go into the Three1876Seas Investment Fund, a lot of it into the energy pillar. That1877initiative has a lot more potential than has been realized, and1878I hope the Trump administration takes it up again because there1879is a lot of goodness there, a lot of interest on the part of1880our allies in the region, the members of the Three Seas world.1881As you say, taxpayer dollars are available for this through the1882DFC.1883    So to the extent that the USG can get this going again,1884there would be a lot of receptivity in the Three Seas1885countries. Many of the countries in the BSR region have been1886the beneficiaries of U.S. investment via the DFC and via the1887Three Seas Investment Fund. There is so much more potential1888there.1889    The investment needs are enormous. The capital markets are1890also available for this, because a lot of the investment that1891is going into the Neptun Deep Field, for example, in offshore1892Romania, and has been going into the pipelines, and has been1893going into offshore wind farms and onshore wind farms, and1894would go into investment in Bulgarian EEZ as well, not to1895mention Turkey, could come from the private sector. There is a1896considerable financial resources available in the capital1897markets, too, because those projects will all be profitable.1898    This also raises the question of freedom of navigation1899because the peaceful nature of the Black Sea could be affected1900by--and the investments in infrastructure that will help these1901countries become more energy secure--could be impacted1902negatively if Russia's war against Ukraine ends in an1903unsatisfactory manner.1904    In other words, if Putin ends this war on his terms, it1905could negatively affect energy investments in the Black Sea and1906energy security. For example, a U.S. firm, Black Sea Oil & Gas,1907has been exploiting resources in Romanian waters, working with1908Romanian partners for a number of years. Their executives have1909talked about what it is like to be drilling in the Black Sea1910and then to be buzzed by Russian planes or to have Russian1911ships not far from their platforms.1912    And so, you can imagine when the vast energy resources that1913are in Romanian, Bulgarian, Turkish, and Ukrainian waters--much1914of that has been taken over by Russia--that when this enormous1915potential in the maritime domain is dominated by Russia and1916this threat exists, firms are less likely to invest or it1917becomes much more expensive, or it becomes much more risky.1918    And so, it is important that the maritime domain remains1919peaceful and stable, so that the vast energy needs in Europe1920can be supplied in part by the countries on the Black Sea--in1921addition to the other ways the USG, for example, could support.1922Thank you.1923    Senator Daines. I want to shift gears for a moment and talk1924about maritime security and, specifically, the Bosphorus. I1925know every time you fly in and out of Istanbul, if you are1926transiting or stopping there, you are coming in the final1927approach, you just look at all the ships, cargo, and the1928containers there that are backed up going in and through there,1929that very important part of the world.1930    I think most estimates suggests it is about 6 percent of1931global trade transits through the Bosphorus. It is an economic1932conduit, obviously, facilitating energy, agriculture, raw1933minerals, and the economic disruptions caused by the War in1934Ukraine impact truly the whole of the globe. It is kind of1935their Strait of Hormuz, pinch point, certainly, for the world.1936    My question for everybody, I would like each of you maybe1937to answer this, is, how do we work with our allies to invest in1938maritime security and to ensure that Russia or other1939adversaries do not stifle navigation and trade? Dr. Starr, I1940will start with you, but I am going to ask the whole panel to1941give some thought to that question. Dr. Starr?1942    Dr. Starr. It is a worthy question. The reality at the1943moment is that the Black Sea is closed because Russia has1944imposed a no-sail zone that covers the entire Sea except for a1945very narrow corridor along the Rumanian. This control has been1946cracked but not broken. How do you do this? Rather than give1947you a slick answer, let me instead suggest you do not do it by1948a bunch of bilateral deals or by a bunch of bilateral1949consultations.1950    There exists no Black Sea council that we could work with.1951Instead, we are trying to make a series of bilateral deals. In1952a sense, we divide and Russia conquers. What is needed is a1953more regional approach. I have also suggested expanding the1954Black Sea concept to include the Caucasus, to include Moldova1955and Ukraine, which are not yet members of NATO. Expand the1956group, and deal with this as a group problem that needs a group1957solution because, country by country, you cannot solve this1958Rubik's Cube, hence----1959    Senator Daines. Thank you for that insight.1960    Dr. Starr [continuing]. Excuse me. Hence, the need for a1961Black Sea council.1962    Senator Daines. Well, it is--thinking about the Caucasus,1963too, in terms of Georgia has----1964    Dr. Starr. Added to them.1965    Senator Daines [continuing]. Oceanfront property there on1966the Black Sea, absolutely. Ms. Sendak, your thoughts.1967    Ms. Sendak. Thank you so much, and tagging along to Dr.1968Starr's comments, you know, it is really critical. We have seen1969Ukraine be so successful in the Black Sea in terms of fighting1970back against Russia's Black Sea Fleet, down 30 percent,1971pushback off of Crimea, which is a huge success, but exactly to1972your point, how do we open this up consistently to commerce and1973economics?1974    This is why I think a great suggestion is broadening what1975the NATO allies on the Black Sea can do. I do believe NATO1976should be talking now about how to start opening up the Black1977Sea to non-Black Sea allies. I think that is a really important1978step in a series of discussions that NATO should be having now,1979of course, in light of Turkey and the Montreux Convention.1980    But I would say the opportunities for Romania, Bulgaria,1981and Turkey to come together, agree on a list of items to push1982forward in a leadership position at the alliance, and really1983come at this from a position of this is our neighborhood, we1984are going to take these things on, much like what we have seen1985in the Baltic Sea.1986    I think what we have seen from our Baltic allies is the1987ability to speak with one voice on threat and speak with one1988voice about how they would like to see the security of their1989region look, and I think the opportunity is there for our NATO1990allies in the Black Sea to do the same. And that leadership1991should have the ripple effect that we might be seeking in terms1992of stability on the sea.1993    Senator Daines. Ms. Sendak, you brought up Turkey, and I1994think, when you look at the map, nobody has more square footage1995than Turkey in terms of front of--friends on the--on the Black1996Sea.1997    Your thoughts on Turkey?1998    Ms. Sendak. Yes. Well, you know, we have seen them pivot to1999a little bit more concentration on the Black Sea, which I think2000is a very positive step, and I see them having, obviously, a2001huge leadership role in the Black Sea. Given the Bosphorus,2002given the Montreux Convention, letting people in and out and2003ships in and out, it is a critical, critical role.2004    And I think the more that we can incorporate--I think Dr.2005Starr mentioned in his opening statement the more we can2006incorporate Turkey's role in this, in a leadership position2007with their other allies, I think, is absolutely critical. They2008are mentioned frequently in the EU Black Sea Strategy, knowing2009full well that their buy-in and leadership is absolutely2010critical to make any of this happen.2011    Senator Daines. Thanks, Ms. Sendak. Mr. Boyse.2012    Mr. Boyse. So, there is some activity already ongoing, but2013first hats off to the Ukrainian military for keeping the Black2014Sea relatively, or at least partly open, because the Russian2015Black Sea Fleet is pretty much bottled up and unable to operate2016freely, even if it is able to put at risk a lot ship traffic,2017maritime traffic. The fact that there is still commerce going2018on can be attributed, in large part, to them as well as to our2019Turkish allies who have helped to keep trade routes open.2020    A fair amount of activity has been going on for a number of2021months with the NATO Mine Measures Group that includes Turkey,2022Romania, and Bulgaria, that is trying to remove mines in the2023Black Sea. Nobody knows how many mines there are actually, but2024they threaten freedom of navigation because they raise2025insurance rates and they make it much more risky to ply the2026waters commercially.2027    This effort, which is a great start, needs more attention2028because there there are so many mines in the Black Sea. Some2029people talk about 400, some estimates are in the thousands.2030Nobody quite knows, but they wash up on shores and the Mine2031Measures Group finds them every so often. That is a very useful2032way of trying to keep these trade routes open and to support2033freedom of navigation.2034    Some of this also has to do with domain awareness and2035pushing back on intrusions. Russia has boarded commercial2036vessels in Bulgarian waters. I do not know if you want to call2037it piracy, but it is that, essentially. In cases like this with2038Russia testing and probing and pushing and engaging in illegal2039behavior according to maritime law, there needs to be a2040response. It cannot be ignored.2041    As long as NATO member-States do not react or do not impose2042some costs on Russia for behavior like this, that affects the2043freedom of navigation in a body of water that should be free2044and open. Russia will continue to do it. And so, reciprocity or2045pushing back in ways that demonstrate that this is not2046acceptable will have more effect on Russian behavior than other2047more diplomatic ways.2048    Senator Daines. Before I turn it back to Ranking Member2049Murphy, Dr. Starr, I can just tell you have got something else2050you want to say. You were scribbling some notes here.2051    [Laughter.]2052    Senator Daines. Did you want--did you want to add anymore2053because you led off on this round-robin. Do you have something2054else you want to add to it?2055    Dr. Starr. Thank you very much.2056    Senator Daines. It looks like you got something else you2057want to say.2058    Dr. Starr. I thank you. I was thinking about the comments2059you made, and I think we all agree about the absolute2060centrality of energy, oil, and gas, and crucial minerals, and2061so on. But if we only attend to them, we will not get to where2062we want to go. Senator Murphy has asked: What else do we need2063to do? Well, look what we are dealing with. We are dealing with2064the--many countries whose long-term fate is absolutely not2065clear at this point, of course Ukraine.2066    In Moldova, look at the situation there. Positive steps2067have been taken very recently. We will see. Georgia, my2068goodness, what a--what a complex mess that is at the moment.2069Armenia, Azerbaijan, well, they have recently taken very2070significant steps, but the issue is not clear there either, and2071I am--I am not even going to dwell on all of Central Asia,2072which is a region that is of much greater importance to us than2073merely energy--and to the West than merely energy and2074resources.2075    It is important because this is the--a new zone of2076independent and sovereign States that are doing remarkably2077well. After shuffling around for a generation or so after the2078collapse of the USSR, their post-colonial recovery has been2079remarkable, very impressive.2080    Now, the question is, are we going to do the things that2081are needed to enable them to continue that kind of progress2082toward relatively open societies, relatively participatory,2083with business--normal business relations with an increasing2084number of American firms? Are we going to advocate that and do2085what is necessary to develop it further, or are we going to2086just sit on the back--as observers and focus only on energy and2087resources?2088    I think we have got to do both, and that is a key to the2089Black Sea, because by focusing on these impressive countries--2090Moldova, my goodness, look what they just have been through.2091Ukraine, none--there is no need to discuss their heroism. This2092is--look how--look how Romania has emerged as a--as a regional2093leader. There are real developments, complex tendencies within2094Turkey today, but some very promising ones, too.2095    I think we have to keep in mind that not just the immediate2096concern over energy, but especially what is going to be the2097fate of these regions. And my assertion here and answer to your2098needling me a little bit, which I appreciate, my assertion is2099that I think we cannot do this on a country-by-country basis.2100We have to define a new region and institutionalize it in a way2101that makes sense to us.2102    Senator Daines. Dr. Starr, thank you for those comments.2103Appreciate it. I completely agree with the geopolitical2104importance of that part of the map of the world as you just2105articulated.2106    Ranking Member Murphy.2107    Senator Murphy. Thank you very much.2108    Ms. Sendak, this is 2025, not 1955. Europe is in a position2109to defend itself in a way that it was not when we made our2110initial commitment through NATO. I believe in that NATO treaty,2111I believe in Article 5, but I also think it is absolutely time2112for the members of NATO on the other side of the Atlantic to2113take more responsibility for their collective defense. At the2114same time, this is an incredibly fraught moment, I mean, the2115moment we are literally sitting in today as jets are flying2116over the heads of our European partners, as drones are being2117flown into Romanian airspace, into Polish airspace. And yet, we2118are hearing reports that the Trump administration is2119considering withdrawing some of our troop presence from2120Romania, the subject of today's hearing, and from Poland.2121    Again, I do not necessarily believe in a world where the2122United States permanently has to have 60,000, 70,000, 100,0002123troops in Europe, but at this moment, like right now, it would2124seem to be a curious time to send a signal that we are pulling2125out as drones and jets are flying in from Russia. What is your2126sense of the signal we would be sending to Putin if, in the2127next 30 days, we got an announcement from the Trump2128administration that they were pulling troops out of some of2129these frontline States?2130    Ms. Sendak. Thank you for the question, Senator Murphy.2131Obviously, U.S. presence in Europe has been tantamount to2132ensuring the security over the past 75 years. I had the2133privilege of working on the House Armed Services Committee2134several years ago at the start of 2015, where we were spending2135money on the European Reassurance Initiative, as you pointed2136out, then became European Deterrence Initiative, where we2137flooded the zone with pre-positioned equipment, rotational2138forces, training and exercises, which we are still doing today,2139which is completely and utterly necessary to increase2140deterrence value.2141    I agree with you completely. I think Europe has received2142the message and our NATO allies have received the message that2143they need to increase their capabilities and capacity, and they2144are doing that. But we are at a very critical juncture where2145that has not happened completely yet, and none of us have2146exactly what we need in a potential conflict.2147    I think as we look at this, U.S. presence is absolutely2148crucial, not just from the sense of what do we want to do in2149Europe, but that is power projection for ourselves. We are not2150just in Europe to train and exercise. We are there to be part2151of an alliance, we are there to ensure security and stability,2152and it has far reaches past the Black Sea, past the Caucasus2153into Central Asia, et cetera. So, I think it is absolutely2154critical that the U.S. remains a strong presence on the2155European continent.2156    Senator Murphy. I have one final question. I will pose it2157to you, Dr. Starr. I think one of the most extraordinary2158directives that has come out of this State Department is a2159prohibition on our embassies opining on the fairness of2160elections. So, our ambassadors have been told, even if you2161think that it is a rigged election, do not say it.2162    That seems to be an invitation for a country like Russia to2163come in and play games because they are just not going to be2164called out on their provocations, on their corruption. I think2165that is extraordinary and, I think, very damaging to the United2166States' reputation, our power around the world, and our aligned2167democracies.2168    You sort of teased the question of what is happening in2169Georgia today. This is a country that had made great progress2170that was, you know, a fraught, but working democracy with2171balance on both sides, and today we have a ruling party in2172Georgia that has reversed the progress on European integration,2173has moved dramatically backward away from democratic norms.2174    There have been huge protests, and yet they still have2175pushed forward laws that, you know, suggest this country is2176sliding into something very, very different than a democracy.2177There is a headline out of Georgia that reads, ``As USAID Dies,2178Many of Georgia's `Vibrant' Civil Society Organizations Face2179Extinction.'' Just like it would be a really bad moment right2180now for the United States to pull military support from a2181region of the world that is having Russian military incursions2182on a weekly basis, it seems like a really bad time for the2183United States to be pulling support for civil society and pro-2184democracy groups in Georgia while there is still an open2185question as to whether Georgian democracy survives. What is2186your recommendation on what this administration should be doing2187to try to push back against this really troubling trend line in2188the country of Georgia?2189    Dr. Starr. Well, first, hats off to the Georgians for what2190they have accomplished over the decades since independence. It2191has not been an easy path. Remember, they were invaded by Putin2192in 2008. We did next to nothing, and, therefore, our authority2193there, it was qualified by that neglect, just as our authority2194in Ukraine was qualified by our failure to do anything after2195Putin stole Ukraine 2014.2196    So, in general, though, I--it seems to me that we can be a2197little bit more optimistic than your question implies with2198regard to Georgia. Why do I say that? Because Putin is not a2199long termer. It is over. Exactly when and how it will be over,2200it is over. He does not have the resources. He does not have2201the manpower. He does not--he does not have the exports that he2202did have, and he has a society that is deeply, deeply2203alienated, not by the war, but by the economic hardship that is2204now felt by everyone outside of the two major cities. He is2205going to be out of there sooner than we think, and the minute2206that happens, Mr. Ivanishvili, even though he has moved his2207money out of Russia, he is out, and the whole situation in2208Georgia will change.2209    I think we should be concentrating on what is going on in2210Russia. I do agree with you that we served--we accomplished a2211lot through our support for various democratic institutions2212during that period. I also have to admit, having been an2213election observer several times in Central Asia, that there2214were--there have been cases where official--officially2215sponsored observers by the U.S. have actually missed the--2216missed the reality and distorted things, which is widely known2217locally.2218    So, I am for moderation on that--not elimination, but2219moderation--but concentrating on the dominant issue throughout2220the region, and that is, what is going to follow Putin in2221Russia. If it is more of the same or worse, we should be2222planning for it. If it is a dramatic change for the better, as2223occurred after the disastrous Russian defeat in the Crimean War2224in the 19th century--disastrous--that produced an age of2225reform. That is when they emancipated 90 million serfs before2226we freed slaves 2 years before Lincoln.2227    That is when they created a new legal system. I am not2228saying that is going to happen, but we have to consider all2229post-Putin possibilities because they are going to determine2230the validity of what we propose and do now.2231    Senator Murphy. Well, it is certainly true that throughout2232history, it is the overextension of Russian military power that2233has led to collapse of Russian regimes. It is probably also2234true that it has been generally a bad bet to bet on Russian2235enlightenment following those moments of leadership change, but2236I think it is an important caution.2237    We were told forever, for instance, that, you know, Assad2238was weak, it was just a matter of time. It seemed to be a2239fool's errand, and then all of a sudden, overnight he was gone,2240and maybe we did not spend enough time planning for that moment2241because we just did not believe that it was true. And so, it2242is, I think, wise counsel for us to think about how you would2243manage a post-Putin Russia, and maybe an opportunity for this2244committee to engage in important inquiry and a little bit of2245trolling at the same time.2246    Senator Daines. Noted there.2247    [Laughter.]2248    Senator Daines. OK. Well, thank you. A sincere thank you to2249a great back-and-forth and dialog on some very complicated2250issues in a complicated part of the world. A sincere thank you2251to all of our witnesses for attending today and providing us2252with the benefit of your testimony.2253    For the information of members, the record will remain open2254until the close of business tomorrow, October 1. We ask the2255witness to respond as promptly as possible. Your response will2256also be made a part of the record.2257    Senator Daines. With the thanks of this committee, the2258hearing is now adjourned.22592260       [Whereupon, at 3:56 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]22612262                                  [all]