Hearings to examine conflicts over ocean resources.
Meeting•Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Subcommittee on Coast Guard, Maritime, and Fisheries•Jun 12, 2025 · 10:00 AM
Summary
Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Subcommittee on Coast Guard, Maritime, and Fisheries held a meeting on Jun 12, 2025 at 10:00 AM in Russell Senate Office Building, Room 253.
Record
The meeting has its transcript on the record.
Transcript
The transcript runs to 4,781 lines and 284,200 characters, as the Government Publishing Office printed it.
1[Senate Hearing 119-152]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34 S. Hrg. 119-15256 FINDING NEMO'S FUTURE:7 CONFLICTS OVER OCEAN RESOURCES89=======================================================================1011 HEARING1213 before the1415 SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD, MARITIME,16 AND FISHERIES1718 of the1920 COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,21 SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION22 UNITED STATES SENATE2324 ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2526 FIRST SESSION2728 __________2930 JUNE 12, 20253132 __________3334 Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation3536 [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]3738 Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov3940 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE4161-519PDF WASHINGTON : 20254243 SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION4445 ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS4647 FIRST SESSION4849 TED CRUZ, Texas, Chairman50JOHN THUNE, South Dakota MARIA CANTWELL, Washington,51ROGER WICKER, Mississippi Ranking52DEB FISCHER, Nebraska AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota53JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii54DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts55MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee GARY PETERS, Michigan56TODD YOUNG, Indiana TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin57TED BUDD, North Carolina TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois58ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada59JOHN CURTIS, Utah BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico60BERNIE MORENO, Ohio JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado61TIM SHEEHY, Montana JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania62SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia ANDY KIM, New Jersey63CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware64 Brad Grantz, Republican Staff Director65 Nicole Christus, Republican Deputy Staff Director66 Liam McKenna, General Counsel67 Lila Harper Helms, Staff Director68 Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director69 Jonathan Hale, General Counsel70 ------7172 SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD, MARITIME, AND FISHERIES7374DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska, Chairman LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware,75ROGER WICKER, Mississippi Ranking76JOHN CURTIS, Utah BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii77BERNIE MORENO, Ohio GARY PETERS, Michigan78TIM SHEEHY, Montana TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin79 C O N T E N T S8081 ----------82 Page83Hearing held on June 12, 2025.................................... 184Statement of Senator Sullivan.................................... 185 Article dated October 9, 2023 from The New Yorker entitled,86 ``The Crimes Behind the Seafood You Eat'' by Ian Urbina.... 4587Statement of Senator Blunt Rochester............................. 388Statement of Senator Cruz........................................ 589Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 399091 Witnesses9293Hon. Sheldon Whitehouse, U.S. Senator from Rhode Island.......... 694Gregory B. Poling, Director and Senior Fellow, Southeast Asia95 Program and Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for96 Strategic and International Studies............................ 897 Prepared statement........................................... 1098Nathaniel Maandig Rickard, Co-Managing Partner, Picard Kentz &99 Rowe LLP....................................................... 14100 Prepared statement........................................... 15101Gabriel Prout, President, Alaska Bering Sea Crabbers............. 22102 Prepared statement........................................... 24103Whitley Saumweber, Director, Stephenson Ocean Security Project,104 CSIS........................................................... 27105 Prepared statement........................................... 29106107 Appendix108109Letter dated June 11, 2025 to Hon. Dan Sullivan and Hon. Lisa110 Blunt Rochester from Lisa Wallenda Picard, President and CEO,111 National Fisheries Institute................................... 61112Article dated November 20, 2023 entitled, ``From Bait to Plate--113 Tracking the Chinese Fishing Ships Linked to Rights and Labour114 Abuses at Sea'' by Ian Urbina.................................. 62115Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to:116 Gregory B. Poling............................................ 65117 Nathan Rickard............................................... 66118119 FINDING NEMO'S FUTURE:120 CONFLICTS OVER OCEAN RESOURCES121122 ----------123124 THURSDAY, JUNE 12, 2025125126 U.S. Senate,127 Subcommittee on Coast Guard, Maritime, and Fisheries,128 Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,129 Washington, DC.130 The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in131room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Dan Sullivan,132Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.133 Present: Senators Sullivan [presiding], Cruz, Moreno, Blunt134Rochester, Cantwell, and Whitehouse.135136 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN,137 U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA138139 Senator Sullivan. Good morning. The Subcommittee on Coast140Guard, Maritime and Fisheries will now come to order. The141Subcommittee is meeting today for our inaugural hearing of the142newly created subcommittee on the Coast Guard, Maritime and143Fisheries.144 I am honored to be chairing this subcommittee, and excited145to be serving with my Ranking Member, colleague, Senator Blunt146Rochester, as the Ranking Member of this important147subcommittee. I look forward to working with Senator Blunt148Rochester and her team, and all the members of this149subcommittee in the 119th Congress.150 Today's hearing will focus on international conflict,151criminal activity, and yes, even slave labor associated with152the ocean. We are particularly focused on the fight for153fisheries' resources, geopolitical flashpoints, where conflict154is likely to arise in the role of both state and non-state155actors involved in conflict with criminal activity in the156fishing sector. And of course, we want sustainable, lasting157fisheries.158 Additionally, we will discuss measures being taken to159address the growing challenges and criminal activity160surrounding these resources and conflicts, and what more can be161done. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, also known162as IUU fishing, poses a significant threat to global marine163ecosystems, economies, sustainable fisheries, and food164security.165 It is estimated that IUU fishing accounts for up to 20166percent of the global catch, which translates to global losses167between $10 billion and $50 billion annually for fishing fleets168that actually fish legally, like ours in America. The scale of169IUU fishing varies by region, with some areas experiencing more170severe impacts due to lax enforcement, corruption, and high171demand for seafood.172 Of course, the Chinese Communist Party in China plays a173significant role in this problem in the global fishing industry174and is the worst offender of IUU fishing by far--no surprise.175The Chinese government has provided billions of dollars in176subsidies to its distant water fishing fleets, gray fleets as177we sometimes call them, enabling their fishing sector to grow178exponentially.179 According to Global Fishing Watch, China operates180approximately 57,000 fishing vessels, 57,000, which accounts181for 44 percent of the world's total fishing activity. Operating182in tandem with the Chinese military to protect its fishing183fleet, the Chinese fishing boats benefit from the protection of184the Chinese coast guard and navy, ensuring their ability to185pilfer resources around the globe.186 And if you care about environment and healthy ecosystems,187this should be a top concern of yours, China ravaging our188oceans. The scale of China's fishing activities raises concerns189about the sustainability of global fish stocks around the world190and the geopolitical tensions that can arise from maritime191disputes.192 China is a concern, but Russia is as well. Close to Alaska,193Russia and other vessels conduct IUU fishing near our exclusive194economic zone, our EEZ. And although Russia banned imports of195U.S. seafood into Russia over 10 years ago, Russia has been196able to bring their seafood into the U.S., sometimes using197loopholes through China, as recently as the late 2023--in late1982023.199 IUU fishing is not an issue just for the United States.200U.S. fisheries are the most sustainable fisheries in the world.201But sustainably sourced, legally caught, high-quality seafood202can't compete with illegally sourced seafood that is being203plundered from our oceans.204 And I might add, due to some great reporting, and I am205going to reference it here in this hearing from Politico206Magazine, The New Yorker, China also uses slave labor on many207of its fishing vessels. Pretty hard to compete against slave208labor if you are an American fisherman. IUU fishing not only209distorts the true cost of seafood sold in markets, but it is210often linked overseas with transnational crime, forced and211slave labor, and even human and drug trafficking.212 So, the key to preventing IUU fishing is to lead213international efforts to address the issues at its sources214globally. And through the years, Congress and the Executive215Branch, Democrats and Republicans, have worked together with216global partners and have focused on IUU fishing. I am proud to217see my colleague and friend, Senator Whitehouse, here.218 He and I recently introduced our Fighting Foreign Illegal219Seafood Harvest, also known as the FISH Act, a bipartisan bill220that just recently in this committee passed unanimously. It221puts IUU fishing vessels on a blacklist, raises costs for IUU222vessel owners and importers, and supports increased Coast Guard223enforcement and work with our partners.224 It builds on previous bipartisan legislation that this225committee has championed, particularly Senator Wicker's226Maritime Safe Act. In April, President Trump signed an227Executive Order entitled, ``Restoring American Seafood228Competitiveness''.229 My office, and my team and I, were proud to work closely230with the Trump Administration on this important Executive231Order. This order aims at strengthening measures to combat IUU232fishing, including preventing IUU seafood from entering the233U.S. market and supporting international efforts to address the234issue at its source.235 We look forward to working with the Administration on these236efforts. But it is not all bad news. This is, after all, the237Subcommittee in charge of the Coast Guard, and I believe we are238going to be embarking on a golden age for our Coast Guard.239 In the budget reconciliation bill, right now there is $22240billion focused on the Coast Guard of the United States. That241will likely be the biggest investment in the Coast Guard in the242history of the United States of America. So there are a lot of243good things happening with regard to our Coast Guard.244 The U.S. has a vital role to play, a leading role to pay in245combating IUU fishing through regulatory measures,246international cooperation, consumer awareness, and passing the247FISH Act. By preventing IUUC seafood from entering our market,248the U.S. can help protect legitimate fishermen, some of whom we249will hear from today, and promote sustainable fishing practices250worldwide.251 With that, I want to thank all of our four witnesses for252being here today. And I am going to recognize my Ranking253Member, but I see the Chairman of the Commerce Committee has254arrived. And perhaps, Mr. Chairman, I don't know if you want to255say a few words.256 The Chairman. I will defer to the Ranking Member.257 Senator Sullivan. OK. Now over to my colleague, Senator258Blunt Rochester.259260 STATEMENT OF HON. LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER,261 U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE262263 Senator Blunt Rochester. Thank you, Chairman Sullivan. I am264looking forward to serving with you on this very important265committee--subcommittee. And I am also glad that you are266holding this very important hearing, and for the Chairman's267dedication to these issues, particularly through the268introduction of the FISH Act, along with Senator Whitehouse who269joins us today.270 This bill reflects the seriousness and the urgency of271illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. And I look272forward to working with you as we move this bill forward. I273also want to thank our witnesses for being here today and274sharing their expertise, and for the critical work that you do275each and every day to protect our oceans and our economy.276Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing is a serious and277growing global threat.278 Not only does it harm American fishermen and coastal279communities--which Delaware actually is a coastal community and280has many coastal communities--but it destabilizes marine281ecosystems, and even has national security implications. In my282home state, the mislabeling of Chesapeake blue crab undermines283the livelihoods of thousands of Delawareans.284 It is reported in a 2015 study, in an investigation they285found that fraudulent labeling of domestic crab occurred in286about 48 percent of mid-Atlantic crab cakes. The good news is287we have experts at NOAA's National Marine Fisheries Service288that collect data on this industry to enable enforcement of289science-backed regulations.290 Unfortunately, the Administration has fired about 18291percent of NOAA's fisheries staff and is looking to cut the292budget by 30 percent. To make matters worse, cuts to the rest293of the agency are undermining this work even further.294 NOAA fisheries relies on the NOAA fleet to conduct stock295assessment and surveys. A fleet that requires skilled296credentialed civilian mariners to operate. And due to the297ongoing hiring freeze, 30 percent of NOAA's research ships will298not leave the dock this summer. Fewer research ships in the299water will result in fewer assessments and surveys, opening the300door for illegally caught and fraudulently labeled products to301flood the market, which would undercut our own domestic seafood302industry and threaten consumer safety.303 Illegal fishing is also increasingly connected to criminal304activity like forced labor, human trafficking, and organized305smuggling operations. Forced labor is rampant in China's306seafood industry and processing plants, where many reports307detail how Uyghurs are forcibly moved and made to work in308unsafe conditions to satisfy market needs.309 These violations underscore the need for more transparency310with the seafood supply chain. Protecting American consumers311and business, that is the goal, but we can't achieve that goal312without the expertise, enforcement, and data from NOAA313fisheries. Now I would like to pivot to the role of the U.S.314Coast Guard and what it plays in our country.315 I too am really proud to be on this subcommittee as a316Ranking Member, and to work with our incredible Coast Guard.317Their presence deters bad actors and signals to the world that318the United States takes illegal fishing seriously.319 Unfortunately, the Administration has shifted limited Coast320Guard resources away from the coastal communities who need them321most. And I am especially concerned about the redirection of322the Coast Guard aircraft and ships away from core mission323priorities, like fisheries enforcement and search and rescue,324to be used for alien expulsion flights on behalf of ICE.325 This is not their mission, and we should be working326together to ensure the Coast Guard maintains access to the327resources they need to do their jobs. Illegal, unreported, and328unregulated fishing is an environmental issue, an economic329issue, a national security issue, and a moral issue, and it is330time for us to invest in the policies, agencies and personnel331NOAA and the Coast Guard need to protect American fishermen and332the consumers that rely on access to quality, ethically sourced333seafood.334 I look forward to today's discussion, and to continuing the335incredible bipartisan work of this subcommittee and this336committee, and our work to address this global challenge. Thank337you, and I yield back.338 Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Blunt Rochester. I am339honored that the Chairman of the Commerce Committee, Senator340Cruz, my good friend, is also here. So, Mr. Chairman, some341remarks from you would be very welcomed.342343 STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ,344 U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS345346 The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank347Chairman Sullivan for holding this hearing to discuss the348ongoing threat to America's economic and maritime security,349which is illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. This350problem is global, but its effects are being felt right here at351home, especially in my home state of Texas.352 For years, Mexican fishermen have brazenly crossed into353U.S. waters off the Texas coast to poach red snapper in the354Gulf of America. Some of these illegal boats have hauled in355thousands of pounds of red snapper at a time, stripping our356waters of one of the Gulf's most iconic and economically357valuable fish.358 They set long lines and nets, hauling out tons of snapper,359only to export many of those fish back to the United States.360These actions are illegal and flat out theft. This isn't just361about fish. Some of the very same vessels crossing into U.S.362waters to steal red snapper also support Mexican cartels363involved in smuggling drugs and smuggling people.364 These poachers are robbing from hardworking Texas fishermen365who play by the rules and rely on fishing to support their366families and their communities. The U.S. Coast Guard, the Drug367Enforcement Administration, and NOAA are all grappling with368this complex issue, trying to maintain the integrity of our369waters.370 Last year, the Coast Guard seized more than 18 tons of371illegally caught fish from Mexican lanchas, a dramatic increase372from just under 3.5 tons in 2017. And already this year, The373Coast Guard has arrested more than 50 Mexican fishermen and374seized thousands of pounds of illegally caught fish, further375underscoring the need for additional measures to protect our376resources.377 Earlier this year, this committee advanced the bipartisan378Illegal Red Snapper and Tuna Enforcement Act, which I379introduced, along with Senator Schatz of Hawaii, to give NOAA380and law enforcement the tools they need to identify fish stolen381from our waters. I also continue to support better tools and382increased resources for the Coast Guard, including maritime383surveillance platforms at South Padre Island, which I helped384authorize, to strengthen our ability to monitor and stop385illegal fishing and smuggling along our Southern maritime386border.387 Globally, we must also confront the threat posed by China's388use of its fishing fleet as part of a maritime militia. Many of389these Chinese vessels exploit crews through forced labor,390unsafe conditions, and wage theft. Crew members are held391against their will, denied basic human rights, and even392subjected to physical violence. This is not competition. It is393barbaric economic warfare.394 Let me be clear, our waters are not open to poachers. Texas395and U.S. fishermen deserve a free and fair market for their396seafood. And Americans deserve to know the seafood on their397dinner plate wasn't caught by criminal actors or Mexican398cartels violating U.S. law.399 I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses on how we400can strengthen our enforcement, close legal loopholes, and401restore order and accountability to our offshore waters.402Together, we must ensure that American fisheries and American403sovereignty are defended.404 Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And this is the405sign of a hearing that is already producing results. I was very406unaware of the challenges with Mexican IUU fishing, and that is407something that we will focus on in this subcommittee as well.408 Now, it is my goal to introduce our witnesses for today.409And I want to begin with recognizing Senator Whitehouse for his410opening remarks on the good bipartisan work that we have all411been doing on IUU fishing.412413 STATEMENT OF HON. SHELDON WHITEHOUSE,414 U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE ISLAND415416 Senator Whitehouse. Thanks, Chairman. It is good to be here417with you. It is good work with you on the FISH Act.418Congratulations on getting it successfully through the Commerce419Committee, and I hope we can find a good vehicle like the NDAA420to get it passed into law quickly. You very properly used the421word ``plunder'' about what is happening with the illegal422fishing fleet. You can kind of divide the illegal fishing423behavior in the high seas into two general categories.424 One is the pirate fishing fleet, which is just renegades425out there, very often using slave labor, very often not going426into national waters, very often operating with very bad427environmental conditions. And that fleet needs to be regulated,428needs to be reined in, needs to be brought to heel. It is doing429immense damage.430 The other is the Chinese fishing fleet, which is doing a431lot more than fishing out there. We believe that they have been432conducting, for instance, intelligence operations and things433like that. Having these fleets out there contributes to other434forms of smuggling, we believe, human smuggling, arms435smuggling, drug smuggling.436 When you open up this vector of illegal behavior, then437other lawbreakers will find it, and that is another reason for438shutting it down. I think all of us here, whether from Texas,439or Alaska, or Delaware, or Rhode Island have coasts, and it is440important to our fishing communities to stand up to the effect441that all of this pirate and Chinese predatory fishing has on442our fishing markets and on the well-being of our fishing443community.444 It is also good to help protect our oceans. We have pelagic445species that have been crashed 90 percent and more in their446population, and illegal fishing is a big contributor to that.447So, for healthy oceans and healthy markets, this is also an448important topic.449 And then Chairman Sullivan and I both spent a lot of time450with our friend Senator McCain, and we did a lot traveling, and451I was often the one who brought up the question of fishing as452we traveled around.453 And in the Pacific, every place we went together that had a454coast, when we brought up the question of illegal fishing, our455local interlocutors lit up.456 It was a big issue for them, particularly with respect to457the often violent behavior of the Chinese fishing fleet and the458Chinese navy vessels that support and defend that aggressive459fishing fleet. When we were in Munich together, you will460remember Senator Sullivan, we had a briefing from the AFRICOM461Commander.462 And without provocation by either of us said, oh, you know,463one thing that would really help us would be to be able to464support our allies under my command in Africa to make sure that465they can identify that there is illegal fishing going on in466their waters, identify whose illegal fishing is going on in467their water, and do what they can to try to defend against the468illegal fishing going on in their waters.469 That woke up the Navy, because it was an Army General who470was now starting to look at ocean stuff.471 Senator Sullivan. Actually, it was a Marine----472 Senator Whitehouse. It was a Marine. You are right. Sorry,473you are absolutely right. And so it was----474 The Chairman. The Chairman is liable to hold you in475contempt, Senator Whitehouse.476 [Laughter.]477 Senator Whitehouse. I know. I know. You don't mess with a478Marine ever. And very often, what was also brought up was479China.480 So in terms of creating soft power opportunities with our481allies, we have a great opportunity here to help them against482the Chinese fishing fleet, which is deeply annoying to483countries all around the world.484 So, thank you for giving me the chance to be here with you,485and I look forward to working with you to get the FISH Act486passed into law. And that is it.487 Senator Sullivan. Great. Well, I appreciate you being here.488I appreciate your hard work on these and other issues. Our Save489Our Seas Act bills have been helping clean up the oceans in490America and around the world, and we are working closely now491with President Trump and his team on those bills to implement492them. So a lot of good things happening.493 Senator Whitehouse. Forgive me if I have to get over to494Finance now. We have the Treasury Secretary----495 Senator Sullivan. No problem. Well, I want to thank you496again, Senator Whitehouse----497 Senator Whitehouse. And thank you also to the Chairman of498the Committee and the Ranking Member.499 Senator Sullivan. I want to welcome our witnesses now. We500have first Gregory Poling, who is the Director and Senior501Fellow for the Southeast Asia Program and Asia Maritime502Transparency Initiative at CSIS.503 So thank you, Mr. Poling. Nathan Rickard, who is a Partner504at Picard Kentz & Rowe. And especially I want a welcome Gabriel505Prout, who is a fellow Alaskan. President of the Alaska Bearing506Sea Crabbers Association. I believe a third generation Alaskan507out of Kodiak Island.508 So, Mr. Prout, we are very honored that you are here. I509think you definitely win the award for traveling the furthest510for this important hearing.511 And then finally, Dr. Saumweber who is the Director of the512Stevenson Ocean Security Project, CSIS, and Professor of Marine513Studies at the University of Rhode Island. So a constituent of514Senator Whitehouse.515 You will each have 5 minutes to deliver an oral statement,516and a longer written statement will be included in the record517if you so desire. So we will start with Mr. Poling.518519 STATEMENT OF GREGORY B. POLING, DIRECTOR AND SENIOR FELLOW,520 SOUTHEAST ASIA PROGRAM AND ASIA MARITIME TRANSPARENCY521 INITIATIVE, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES522523 Mr. Poling. Thank you very much, Chairman Sullivan and524Ranking Member Blunt Rochester. It is a real honor to testify525today. Before I begin, I should note that my institution, CSIS,526does not take policy positions, so my views are mine alone. I527saved Dr. Saumweber the difficulty of having to say the same528thing as a fellow CSISer. IUU fishing is not just an economic,529or food security, or an environmental issue.530 As we have already heard, this is a national security531threat. One that over the last decade, the U.S. and partners532and allies have woken up to. There is the direct cost that533organized criminal networks and illicit networks that engage in534IUU fishing also engage in other forms of illegality. What is535often called fisheries crime. Be that trafficking of drugs,536weapons, people, forced labor and modern-day slavery, money537laundering, tax evasion.538 They also indirectly contribute to piracy, as we have seen539in the Gulf of Guinea or Somalia over the last two decades. And540in some cases, even to insurgency and terrorism, as was the541case in the Sri Lankan civil war in the 90s and 2000s. So542vessels that engage in one type of illegal activity do not543generally only engage in that one type of illegal activity.544 There is also the indirect threat. IUU fishing undermines545governance and opens states up to coercion. That is546particularly true given the fact that China has the world's547largest distant water fleet and engages in the most IUU fishing548in the world.549 I would particularly highlight the effects in the Pacific550Islands. Other than Western Africa, the Pacific islands551probably suffer from the second largest amount of IUU phishing552in the word as a percentage of their total catch.553 They are also as if not more reliant on the revenues from554fishing, both their own and the sale of fishing rights to other555states like the U.S. who do follow the rules for things like556the South Pacific Tuna Treaty, as anywhere on Earth. And so,557when you have a Chinese fleet, the largest in the Pacific, also558engaged in the largest amount of IUU, it denies these states559the revenues they need.560 It undermines their governance. It takes away livelihoods561and fish protein from their communities. It opens them up to562all kinds of illegality. Also opens them up to potential elite563capture and influence operations as China engages in checkbook564diplomacy across the region. This is not a distant concern for565the United States.566 We are a Pacific power, a resident in the region, be it the567State of Hawaii or the territories of Guam, the Commonwealth of568Northern Mariana and American Samoa. We have millions of569Americans who live in the Pacific. Most of our exclusive570economic zone is in the Pacific.571 We also have our unique legal and moral obligations to572defend the three freely associated states of Palau, the freely573associated states of Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands. In574the Pacific, we have seen a now years long effort by Beijing to575increase its role as a blue water navy and global power by576seeking access, military, law enforcement, and dual-use access577across the Pacific Islands.578 That has been most successful in the case of the Solomon579Islands, where we saw China sign a landmark security agreement580that now allows both Chinese law enforcement, but also581potentially Chinese navy vessels to access the Solomons in ways582that are not clear. China has also sought similar access in583places like Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Vanuatu, and even Kiribati,584the closest Pacific Island state to Hawaii.585 Those have been less successful, but China will not stop586trying. And the more that China, or China's illegal fishing587fleet, whether intentional or not, deprives these small island588states of their number one or number two source of revenue in589most cases, undermining their governance, it opens these states590up more and more to Chinese economic coercion.591 It reduces their options, reduces their resilience, makes592elite capture of their businesspeople, their thought leaders,593and even their government officials far more likely, and594therefore increases the long-term challenge of the U.S. who, in595cooperation with our allies, Australia, New Zealand, France,596have been the undisputed resident power in the Pacific since597World War II of this newcomer that threatens our national598security.599 I would highlight three areas that we have significant600resources to confront this. A great deal has already been said601about the Coast Guard. The U.S. has been the top partner for602the Pacific Islands recently, along with Australia, in patrol603interdiction and domain awareness capabilities. We have604shipwright agreements for the Coast Guard with almost every605state in the region.606 We have the Navy doing the same through the Ocean and607Maritime Security Initiative. But these are vast waters, and608the number one need of the Pacific Islands is better maritime609domain awareness. That will not be accomplished using just610crude vessels on the water. It is too much space to cover, and611it is too expensive.612 They need more low-earth orbit, and they need more uncrewed613platforms, particularly through things like the Quad's Indo-614Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, which has615been very slow to roll out in the Pacific. Second, we have the616diplomatic and legal angle.617 China just a month and a half ago finally acceded to the618Port State Measures Agreement. I don't think anybody actually619believes that China is going to enforce the rules of the PSMA,620particularly for Chinese flagged vessels who are bringing621illegal catch back to China. But it gives the U.S. a great tool622to name and shame Beijing and try to hold its feet to the fire623internationally.624 And finally, we need to exercise the market power. The U.S.625is one of the largest seafood consumer markets in the world,626particularly for imports, and American consumers would much627rather eat sustainably and legally caught seafood, but they628need to be empowered to know the difference.629 And as a native Baltimorean, Ranking Member, I greatly630appreciate you pointing out that even in our region, it is631almost impossible to know where our seafood comes from. Thank632you.633 [The prepared statement of Mr. Poling follows:]634635 Prepared Statement of Gregory B. Poling, Senior Fellow and Director,636 Southeast Asia Program and Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative,637 Center for Strategic and International Studies638 Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Blunt Rochester, distinguished639Members of the Subcommittee, I am honored to share my views with you on640the topic of illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing as a641national security threat. CSIS does not take policy positions, so the642views represented in this testimony are my own and not those of my643employer. In my testimony, I would like to reflect on the direct and644indirect ways in which IUU fishing undermines national security, the645scale of IUU--particularly by Chinese-owned vessels--in the Pacific,646and the resources the U.S. has to confront this challenge.647 IUU fishing is most often treated as an economic and environmental648challenge but it is also an underappreciated nontraditional security649threat. IUU fishing affects national security in two ways. First, it650directly supports illicit networks engaged in the trafficking of651narcotics, weapons, wildlife, and people, along with other maritime652crimes. Second, IUU fishing deprives coastal and small island653developing state governments of desperately needed revenue while654undermining local livelihoods and food security. This combination655creates more fertile recruiting grounds for piracy, organized crime,656armed insurgency, and terrorism, and increases vulnerability to657economic coercion and elite capture by depriving officials of viable658economic alternatives. This is a particular concern in the Pacific,659where China seeks to use economic leverage to increase access and660affect local decisionmaking.661Support for Illicit Networks662 IUU fishing supports, both directly and indirectly, non-state663actors engaged in organized crime, piracy, and armed insurgency and664terrorism. It has become a part of the portfolio of illegal criminal665organizations, directly and indirectly supporting their other illicit666activities. Since 2009, the UN General Assembly has expressed ``concern667about possible connections between transnational organized crime and668illegal fishing.'' \1\ This linkage between IUU fishing and other669criminal activities has given rise over the last decade to the concept670of ``fisheries crime,'' or illegal fishing combined with ``crimes such671as tax evasion, human rights abuse, including human trafficking, drug,672wildlife, diamond and arms smuggling, fraud and pollution.'' \2\673---------------------------------------------------------------------------674 \1\ UN General Assembly, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly675on 4 December 2009, A/RES/64/72, 19 March 2010, para 61.676 \2\ Stop Illegal Fishing, ``FISH-i Africa,'' 13, cited in Cathy677Haenlein, Below the Surface: How Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated678Fishing Threatens Our Security (London: Royal United Services679Institute, 2017), 14.680---------------------------------------------------------------------------681 Nearly a decade ago, Cathy Haenlein of the Royal United Services682Institute explained the inevitability of illicit actors becoming more683involved in IUU fishing:684685 As demand increases and supplies dwindle, the corresponding686 rise in profits explains a further set of drivers . . . Indeed,687 the vastness of the high seas and law-enforcement capacity mean688 that the chances of being apprehended are low, while fish can689 be laundered easily into legitimate catches. Even where690 enforcement is effective, penalties are small . . . The result691 is a low-risk, high-reward environment perfectly tailored to692 the interests of criminal actors.\3\693---------------------------------------------------------------------------694 \3\ Haenlein, Below the Surface, 8.695696 One of the most infamous examples comes from 2016, when Italian697authorities arrested a crime boss known as ``Fish King'' Franco Muto698and 56 others for organized crime. Muto controlled most of the fishing699vessels along Italy's Tyrrhenian coast but also engaged in drug700trafficking, extortion, and robbery. And in 2014, TRAFFIC International701alleged that coastal South Africa had ``transformed from a network of702small fishing communities, [t]o outposts of international organized703crime battling for the opportunity to harvest and export abalone,''704which in many cases local gangs traded to Chinese triads for drugs,705guns, and other contraband.\4\706---------------------------------------------------------------------------707 \4\ Kimon De Greef and Serge Raemaekers, South Africa's Illicit708Abalone Trade: An Updated Overview and Knowledge Gap Analysis709(Cambridge: TRAFFIC International, 2014), cited in Haenlein, Below the710Surface, 28.711---------------------------------------------------------------------------712 The connection between IUU fishing and human trafficking has been713widely documented and, while reliable statistics are impossible to come714by, the scale of the problem is clearly enormous. Modern slavery is715pervasive and hard to combat among IUU fishing fleets because many716vessels stay out at sea for months, illegally transferring catches717without ever entering a port to avoid scrutiny, hide the source of718their catches, and keep crews in often-brutal conditions without any719hope of escape.\5\ The Thai fishing industry became the poster child720for modern-day slavery in 2015 when the AP undertook a series of721investigations into the Thai fishing industry, which earned the paper722the Pulitzer Prize. The AP documented how Thai fishing vessels relied723upon migrants from neighboring Southeast Asian states tricked on board724with promises of productive employment and then kept in modern day725slavery.\6\ The outcry from the AP investigations led to the eventual726release of more than 2,000 slaves.\7\ The United States and European727Union threatened sanctions against imports of Thai seafood unless728authorities acted to crack down on human traffickers and better729regulate the fishing industry, which proved a successful intervention730as Bangkok has vastly improved oversight of its fishing industry and731cracked down on abuses over the last decade, though plenty of work732remains to be done. Unfortunately the problem remains pervasive among733global fleets, and especially China's distant water fishing vessels, as734evidenced by Customs and Border Protection's recent banning of the Zhen735Fa 7 from U.S. ports for forced labor abuses after a years-long736investigation by Ian Urbina's Outlaw Ocean.\8\737---------------------------------------------------------------------------738 \5\ Haenlein, Below the Surface, 26.739 \6\ Robin McDowell, Margie Mason, and Martha Mendoza, ``AP740Investigation: Slaves May Have Caught the Fish You Bought,'' AP, March74125, 2015, https://www.ap.org/explore/seafood-from-slaves/ap-742investigation-slaves-may-have-caught-the-fish-you-bought.html.743 \7\ Haenlein, Below the Surface, 26.744 \8\ Ian Urbina and Austin Brush, ``Federal Authorities Take Action745on China's Fishing Fleet,'' Outlaw Ocean, May 29, 2025.746---------------------------------------------------------------------------747 IUU fishing vessels also play a significant role in other forms of748trafficking, particularly of drugs. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime749(UNODC) and the U.S. Justice Department have documented numerous cases750of illicit fishing ships involved in trafficking cocaine from South751American to the United States, as well as heroine and cannabis.\9\ In752addition to organized crime, trafficking, and modern slavery, IUU753fishing has been used to support insurgent and terrorist groups. For754example, during the Sri Lankan civil war in the 1990s and 2000s, the755Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, which the U.S. government labeled a756terrorist organization, used IUU fishermen who were already adept at757avoiding the authorities to smuggle contraband through Indian and Sri758Lankan waters.\10\759---------------------------------------------------------------------------760 \9\ UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime, cited in Haenlein, Below761the Surface, 27.762 \10\ U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC), ``Global763Implications of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing,''764September 19, 2016, 14.765---------------------------------------------------------------------------766Undermining Governance; Facilitating Threats767 IUU fishing deprives governments in coastal and small island768developing states of funds needed for social services, infrastructure,769and other necessary spending.\11\ At the same time, it undercuts local770livelihoods leading to economic displacement and desperation. The771combination of these two effects directly undermines stability and772security, and indirectly contributes to the spread of threats from non-773state actors.774---------------------------------------------------------------------------775 \11\ Haenlein, Below the Surface, 36.776---------------------------------------------------------------------------777 Tens of millions of people work in the fishing industry worldwide,778mostly in developing Asia and Africa, and more than 1 billion people,779clustered disproportionately in coastal regions, rely on fish as their780primary source of animal protein. Communities that have traditionally781relied on the fishing industry often have few options to replace their782damaged livelihoods, leading to the kind of desperation on which783pirates, criminal gangs, terrorist groups, and other nefarious non-784state actors thrive.\12\785---------------------------------------------------------------------------786 \12\ NIC, ``Global Implications of IUU Fishing,'' 9, 12, 14-15.787---------------------------------------------------------------------------788 An academic study of 2,600 piracy incidents reported to the789International Maritime Bureau between 2004 and 2013 found that ``states790with reduced values of fisheries production are more likely to791experience piracy,'' suggesting that ``changes in labor opportunities792in the fishing section--driven primarily by overfishing--increases the793number of potential pirate recruits.'' \13\ For example, a surge in794illegal fishing by Chinese trawlers in the Gulf of Guinea since 2008795has made it difficult for local fishermen to make a living. Attacks on796fishing boats, tankers, and cargo ships in the gulf soared in the 2010s797and remain a persistent problem.\14\798---------------------------------------------------------------------------799 \13\ Ibid, 16.800 \14\ Ibid, 16-17.801---------------------------------------------------------------------------802 Some studies have also suggested a more direct, and ironic, link803between IUU fishing and piracy in the case of Somalia. According to a8042016 report from the U.S. National Intelligence Council,805806 IUU fishing also contributed to the increase in piracy off807 Somalia in the 2000s because many Somali fishers, who had808 learned to seize vessels in order to prevent illegal fishing in809 their historic fisheries transferred these initially defensive810 skills to piracy, according to scholars. As Somali fishers'811 incomes decreased as stocks diminished, they applied their812 newfound ship-seizing skills to piracy.\15\813---------------------------------------------------------------------------814 \15\ Ibid, 17.815816 The Pacific Islands region is likely second only to West Africa in817the proportion of seafood catch via IUU fishing, and this is driven818almost entirely by distant water fleets. China is the predominant819distant water fishing actor both globally and in the region, and is the820worst offender for IUU fishing according to the Global Illegal Fishing821Index. IUU fishing by Chinese vessels and to a lesser degree those of822other states primarily take the form of illegal transshipment of catch.823Transshipment vessels are large, refrigerated motherships which operate824under flags of convenience and through which smaller vessels offload825their catch to be shipped into port. Transshipment vessels are highly826associated with IUU fishing, and provide an opportunity to bypass827international and Federal fisheries management, import, and trade828regulations. Transshipment is in most cases prohibited by the829management guidelines of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries830Commission (WCPFC), which covers the exclusive economic zones (EEZs)831and high seas of the Pacific Islands, focused primarily on the832lucrative tuna fisheries. Nevertheless, utilization of transshipment833vessels via loopholes in the WCPFC rules has become the de facto method834of distant water fleets landing their fish catch in the Pacific, as835this allows the fish to be shipped into ports of convenience which have836less regulatory and enforcement capabilities to comply with domestic837and international law.838 All transshipment vessels operating in the WCPFC area must be839registered with the commission and report each time they take on catch840from another vessel. But research by Pew has shown that far more841transshipment occurs than is reported to the commission.\16\ This is842particularly true in the high seas pockets between EEZs. These843transshipment hotspots are vast and under the rules of the WCPFC844responsibility for monitoring and enforcement within them is divided up845among the neighboring small island states, which have little hope of846enforcing the law within them. IUU fishing destabilizes the region,847both in terms of sustainability and security. Many of these islands848rely on their fisheries as a primary source of protein, therefore IUU849fishing in these regions jeopardizes their fisheries management and850food security.851---------------------------------------------------------------------------852 \16\ Pew Charitable Trusts, ``Transshipment in the Western and853Central Pacific,'' September 12, 2019, https://www.pew.org/en/research-854and-analysis/issue-briefs/2019/09/report-finds-transshipments-in-855western-and-central-pacific-likely-underreported.856---------------------------------------------------------------------------857 The small-islands states of the Pacific are more reliant on well-858regulated fishing than anywhere else on earth. For most, with the859exceptions of Papua New Guinea and Fiji, local economies and government860revenue rely overwhelmingly on tourism (including ocean tourism) and861fishing or the sale of fishings rights to distant water fleets.862Communities rely on fish catch for a huge proportion of animal protein.863And Pacific Island governments view IUU fishing and fisheries crime as864the second most important national security challenge they face,865trailing but interconnected with climate change. This was codified in866the 2018 Boe Declaration, in which the leaders of all Pacific Island867states included human security, environmental and resource security,868and transnational crime as top priorities.869 The United States is a resident power in the Pacific Islands--the870state of Hawaii and the territories of Guam, American Samoa, and the871Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands are home to millions of872American citizens. Most of the U.S. EEZ and continental shelf are in873the Pacific, including areas bordering on the WCPFC waters being874pillaged by overfishing. The United States is a party to the South875Pacific Tuna Treaty which was just renewed last year with the Pacific876Island Forum Fisheries Agency, and the U.S. fleet follows the rules877therein. The United States also has a unique and legally binding878commitment to the defense of the three freely associated states of879Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia.880The other major resident powers of the Pacific Islands--Australia, New881Zealand, and France--are U.S. treaty allies, as is Japan, traditionally882a major external partner and donor.883 China, by contrast, is a newcomer in the Pacific Islands. It has884growing leverage thanks to its checkbook diplomacy and has used that885for political ends, including peeling away several of Taiwan's886remaining diplomatic allies in recent years (the Solomon Islands,887Kiribati, and Nauru), and to seek logistical access as it builds out a888blue water navy. The most worrying example of the latter is the889Solomons, where a 2023 security agreement gives Chinese law enforcement890and potentially military vessels access to the country's land and891waters. China has also tried, so far unsuccessfully, to secure access892to military or dual-use infrastructure in Papua New Guinea, Fiji,893Vanuatu, and reportedly Kiribati, which approaches closest to Hawaii894and in which foreign military access should be constrained by the 1979895U.S.-Kiribati Treaty of Tarawa. In each of these cases, China relies in896part on elite capture, using economic inducements to leverage local897government, business, and thought leaders to fulfill Beijing's wishes.898This is effective in the Pacific Islands because of the severe resource899constraints facing regional governments and societies; resource900constraints that are made worse by the significant IUU fishing,901primarily by Chinese-owned vessels, across the region.902U.S. Tools to Meet the Challenge903 The United States is not without considerable resources to confront904the challenge of IUU fishing, especially in the Pacific. Three types of905U.S. tools are of particular importance: military/law enforcement,906diplomatic, and commercial.907 The United States has the most advanced naval and coast guard908capabilities in the world and has leveraged them particularly well in909partnership with Pacific Island states. This is an enormous comparative910advantage for the United States in the strategic competition with911China. By supporting maritime domain awareness (MDA) and patrol912capabilities in the region, the United States presents itself as a913partner in what regional states have identified as one of their top914national security challenges, and it allows those states to identify915the bad actor, which tend to be Chinese vessels, thereby undermining916trust in Beijing.917 The U.S. has negotiated ship rider agreements with nearly every918state in the region, allowing the U.S. Coast Guard to assist with919fisheries patrols and interdiction by putting local law enforcement920officers aboard USCG vessels on patrol. The Navy has also leveraged its921assets through the Oceania Maritime Security Initiative, by which Navy922vessels transiting the Pacific also take on shipriders and engage in923fisheries patrol. And the United States has over the last decade924invested considerably in the capacity of local partners through efforts925like provision of the U.S. Navy/Department of Transportation's926SeaVision platform for maritime domain awareness (MDA) and the927deployment of U.S. MDA experts to Fiji and Papua New Guinea to assist928local officials. The deployment of USCG national security cutters to929Guam is further enhancing U.S. capabilities both within its own EEZ and930those of its partners. But there is more that can be done. In931particular, the effort to work with Australia, Japan, and India to932provide more space-based MDA capabilities through the Indo-Pacific933Partnership on Maritime Domain Awareness has so far produced little934results in the Pacific Islands.935 On the diplomatic front, the United States has been a champion of936global efforts to combat IUU fishing, including by being an early937adopter of the Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA) and launching the938annual Our Oceans Conference. PSMA has been particularly important as939the only global treaty specifically targeting IUU fishing, and today it940has more than 100 party states (the European Union having acceded on941behalf of all its members). The treaty reached a major milestone in942April when China finally became a party. But there is reason to be943skeptical that Beijing will fully implement the terms of the treaty.944PSMA is mainly seen as a way to prevent foreign vessels from offloading945illegally caught fish in port, but China's ports almost exclusively946offtake fish from Chinese-flagged vessels, including much of its947distant water fleet. PSMA does include provisions requiring flag states948to investigate and punish their own vessels suspected of engaging in949IUU.\17\ But China has not been proactive in enforcing its flag-state950obligations, as evidenced by that fact that it still operates the951largest IUU fleet in the world. The United States and partners should952leverage Beijing's entry into PSMA to ratchet up the diplomatic953pressure on China to get its own house in order.954---------------------------------------------------------------------------955 \17\ Elaine Young, ``China Joins Treaty to Fight Illegal Fishing, a956Major Milestone for Ocean Governance,'' Pew, April 17, 2025, https://957www.pew.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2025/04/17/china-joins-958treaty-to-fight-illegal-fishing-a-major-milestone-for-ocean-governance.959---------------------------------------------------------------------------960 Commercially, the United States has power courtesy of its vast961market. U.S. consumers account for a significant portion of global962consumption and that gives the United States leverage to set terms in963the global seafood market. U.S. consumers would much rather purchase964sustainably and legally caught seafood, but must be empowered to do so965through clear tracing and labelling. This was the impetus for the966Seafood Import Monitoring Program. And though that program has been967criticized as ineffective, it can be built upon to ensure that U.S.968consumers know what lands on their plates. Removing the profit motive969from IUU fishing is ultimately the only way to solve the problem and970secure U.S. economic and national security interests.971972 Senator Sullivan. Great. Excellent testimony. Mr. Poling, I973really appreciate it. Mr. Rickard, please.974975 STATEMENT OF NATHANIEL MAANDIG RICKARD, CO-MANAGING PARTNER,976 PICARD KENTZ & ROWE LLP977978 Mr. Rickard. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, thank you for979inviting me to participate in this hearing. I am Nathaniel980Rickard, Co-Managing Partner of the law firm Picard Kentz &981Rowe, and I have worked on international trade issues with the982U.S. commercial fishing industry for over 20 years.983 Four years ago, the U.S. International Trade Commission984investigated the economic impact of IUU seafood on U.S.985commercial fisheries, estimating that roughly 11 percent of the986value of all seafood imported into the United States was IUU987seafood. In light of their significance, the agency concluded988that the elimination of IUU imports ``would have a positive989effect on U.S. commercial fishers, with estimated increases in990U.S. prices, landings, and operating income for all species.''991 The ITC estimated that prohibiting IUU imports would992increase the fishing industry's operating income by nearly $61993million annually, benefiting a broad range of segments. The994shrimp industry, largely operating in the Gulf and South995Atlantic, would see a $13 million a year boost. The salmon996industry on the West Coast and in Alaska would see income grow997by $12 million a year.998 Blue crab watermen in the mid-Atlantic and Gulf would999receive another $6 million a year, while lobstermen in the1000Northeast would see $4 million annual increase. Our commercial1001fishermen need all the help they can get. On Sunday, to1002commemorate World Oceans Day, The USTR observed that over 901003percent of the seafood Americans consume comes from overseas.1004 The USTR also explained that ``tens of billions of dollars1005are estimated to be lost annually from IUU fishing, with U.S.1006industry bearing a significant portion of that loss.'' This has1007resulted in the deterioration of America's maritime industry,1008while those in other countries, particularly China, have1009massively expanded.1010 Applying the ITC's estimate to current circumstances, we1011would have imported roughly $2.7 billion worth of IUU seafood1012last year. That is over half the total value of all U.S.1013commercial seafood landings. This level of imports has1014devastated some of our commercial fishing sectors.1015 The Gulf and South Atlantic shrimp industry, for example,1016saw the value of its harvest cut in half between 2021 and 2023,1017losing over $250 million in value on close to the same catch1018volume. And it is not just coastal communities. American1019catfish growers experienced a 21 percent reduction in their1020sales value last year, losing nearly $100 million in revenue.1021 As with coastal fishermen, catfish farmers in Arkansas are1022being driven out of business by illegal seafood imports. And it1023is not just U.S. seafood producers. Americans should be eating1024more fish.1025 The per-pound value of U.S. commercial landings and U.S.1026seafood imports have both declined significantly over the past1027few years. But the volume of domestic landings and imports have1028also fallen. This means that in a time characterized by1029significant inflation, the cost of seafood is going the other1030way, and yet Americans are consuming less seafood.1031 It is reasonable to conclude that Americans' demand for1032seafood has been harmed by consumer concerns as to how fish in1033our market has gotten from hook or net to plate. Although1034Americans can comfortably assume that if they purchase U.S.1035wild caught or farmed raised seafood, it has been produced in1036an ethical and sustainable manner, what can any consumer really1037know about fish harvested by a foreign distant water fishing1038fleet?1039 Foreign seafood supply chains are opaque and non-1040transparent. In my private practice, we worked to stop trading1041networks through which Chinese farm raised shrimp was1042transshipped, given a false designation of origin, and then1043imported into the United States.1044 Over time, we documented how seafood products associated1045with increased risk, such as chum salmon or Alaska pollock,1046would be run through supply chains designed to limit disruption1047in the event that any Trojan horse exporter or paper importer1048fell under scrutiny. Still today, a quick review of shipment1049information confirms the continued operation of these networks,1050facilitating the large volume of IUU seafood believed to be in1051our market. There are things that can and should be done.1052 For example, the FISH Act of 2025 would meaningfully1053improve the market position of our domestic seafood producers,1054it would effectively counter important practices in foreign1055fisheries, and it would restore American consumer confidence in1056the seafood sold in our market.1057 The FISH Act does so by prohibiting the importation of any1058seafood caught, processed, or transported by foreign vessels on1059the IUU vessel list, and by requiring that CBP develop a1060strategy to identify imports of seafood harvested using forced1061labor. In furtherance to the latter objective, the FISH Act1062appropriately recognizes the central importance of data1063collection, data sharing, and data analysis to ensure that IUU1064seafood is kept out of the U.S. market.1065 President Trump's April Executive Order on seafood1066competitors reinforced the vital nature of the domestic seafood1067producers to the American economy, declaring that ``the United1068States should be the world's dominant seafood leader.'' And1069``the erosion of American seafood competitiveness at the hands1070of unfair foreign trade practices must end.''1071 I believe that the FISH Act advances those twin goals and1072appreciate the opportunity to speak in support of this1073legislation. Thanks. I look forward to any questions that you1074have.1075 [The prepared statement of Mr. Rickard follows:]10761077 Prepared Statement of Nathaniel Maandig Rickard, Co-Managing Partner,1078 Picard Kentz & Rowe LLP1079 Mister Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for1080inviting me to participate in this hearing. I am Nathaniel Rickard, co-1081managing partner of the law firm of Picard Kentz & Rowe LLP.1082 I have worked with the U.S. commercial fishing industry on1083international trade issues for over twenty years and I appreciate the1084opportunity to describe how illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU)1085fishing adversely impacts Americans.1086 Four years ago, the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC)1087issued a report of its investigation on the economic impact of imports1088of IUU seafood on U.S. commercial fisheries. Using 2019 import figures,1089the ITC estimated that 10.7 percent of the value of all seafood1090imported into the United States was from IUU seafood, totaling roughly1091$2.4 billion.\1\ Based on the significance of IUU seafood imports and1092how they competed for sales in the U.S. market, the ITC concluded that1093the elimination of these imports from our market ``would have a1094positive effect on U.S. commercial fishers, with estimated increases in1095U.S. prices, landings. . ., and operating income for all species. . .''1096\2\1097---------------------------------------------------------------------------1098 \1\ See U.S. International Trade Commission, Seafood Obtained via1099Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing: U.S. Imports and Economic1100Impact on U.S. Commercial Fisheries, Inv. No. 332-575, USITC Pub. 51681101(Feb. 2021) at 79.1102 \2\ Id. at 11.1103---------------------------------------------------------------------------1104 At base, the Federal agency found that removing IUU seafood imports1105would increase the total annual operating income of the U.S. commercial1106fishing and seafood processing industry as a whole by nearly $611107million. These benefits were not concentrated in any particular fishing1108industry or region of the United States.1109 The shrimp industry, largely operating in the Gulf and South1110Atlantic, would see a $13 million a year boost. The salmon industry on1111the west coast and in Alaska would see income grow by $12 million each1112year. The American tuna industry operating in the Pacific would gain1113another $8.5 million annually. Watermen in the blue crab industry in1114the mid-Atlantic and Gulf would receive another $5.6 million in yearly1115revenue. And lobstermen in the northeast would have another $4.11116million injected into their fishery each year.1117 The table below summarizes the ITC's estimate of the specific1118economic benefit to a wide range of U.S. commercial fishing and seafood1119processing industries that would result from the removal of IUU seafood1120imports from the U.S. market.11211122 Eliminating IUU Seafood Imports Would Increase the Commercial Fishing1123 and Seafood Processing Industry's Operating Income by $60 Million1124 Annually1125------------------------------------------------------------------------1126 Estimated Increase in Annual1127 U.S. Commercial Fishing Sector Operating Income\3\1128------------------------------------------------------------------------1129 Shrimp $13,149,4001130------------------------------------------------------------------------1131 Salmon (farmed & wild-caught) $11,831,7001132------------------------------------------------------------------------1133 Tuna $8,482,0001134------------------------------------------------------------------------1135 Blue crab (swimming crab) $5,630,0001136------------------------------------------------------------------------1137 Squid & Octopus $4,127,5001138------------------------------------------------------------------------1139 Lobster (warm-and cold-water) $4,115,4001140------------------------------------------------------------------------1141 Reef fish (Grouper & Red Snapper) $3,709,5001142------------------------------------------------------------------------1143 Cod & Pollock $2,755,2001144------------------------------------------------------------------------1145 Sardines, Herring, Anchovies, & $2,464,9001146 Mackerel1147------------------------------------------------------------------------1148 King crab & Snow crab $1,794,7001149------------------------------------------------------------------------1150 Mahi Mahi $1,746,7001151------------------------------------------------------------------------1152 Swordfish $838,7001153------------------------------------------------------------------------11541155 An additional $60 million a year in income would be significant for1156the thousands of small, family-owned businesses that comprise our1157domestic commercial fisheries. But it is also important in the context1158of the existential threat commercial fishermen are facing from import1159competition.1160---------------------------------------------------------------------------1161 \3\ See id. at 290-318.1162---------------------------------------------------------------------------1163 On Sunday, to commemorate World Oceans Day, the United States Trade1164Representative (USTR) noted that over 90 percent of the seafood1165consumed in this market is imported and that our trade deficit in1166seafood products has now reached $20 billion a year.\4\ The USTR1167observed that ``[t]ens of billions of dollars are estimated to be lost1168annually from [IUU] fishing, with U.S. industry bearing a significant1169portion of that loss.'' \5\ In result, the USTR described how America's1170maritime industry has been deteriorating while those in other1171countries, particularly China, have massively expanded.\6\1172---------------------------------------------------------------------------1173 \4\ See https://x.com/USTradeRep/status/1931033156347384221.1174 \5\ See https://x.com/USTradeRep/status/1931809450253291921.1175 \6\ See https://x.com/USTradeRep/status/1931033156347384221.1176---------------------------------------------------------------------------1177 The USTR's comments are fully supported by trade data.1178 In 2017, the American commercial fishing industry harvested 4.51179million metric tons of seafood with a landed value of $5.8 billion. In11802023, the volume of the industry's harvest fell 15 percent to 3.91181million metric tons, while the value of those landings fell by 121182percent to $5.1 billion. As shown in the table below, although the1183value of commercial landings is above what the industry experienced in11842020, over $1.4 billion has disappeared from the sector since 2021.11851186 Over the same time period, seafood imports have grown at close to1187the same pace as U.S. commercial seafood landings have declined. In11882017, the United States imported roughly 2.6 billion pounds of seafood1189worth $21.4 billion. By 2023, the volume of our seafood imports had1190grown by 9.4 percent in volume to 2.8 billion pounds and by 16.61191percent in value to $25.0 billion.11921193 The increased volume of seafood imports has had a devastating1194impact on some domestic commercial fisheries. The commercial shrimp1195industry in the Gulf and South Atlantic, for example, saw the value of1196its harvest cut in half between 2021 and 2023, dropping from $521.81197million to $268.7 million, while the volume of its landings declined by1198just 7.4 percent over the same time period.1199 The scope of illegally-traded IUU seafood imports is clearly1200significant. Using the ITC's estimate, we would have imported1201approximately $2.7 billion worth of IUU seafood last year. That is over1202half the total value of all U.S. commercial seafood landings.1203 Moreover, the economic harm caused by this massive amount of1204illegal seafood imports is not only felt in coastal communities. The1205United States also has significant aquaculture operations in ponds and1206tanks located far away from our oceans and these food producers have1207also been adversely impacted by illegal imports. For example, U.S.1208catfish growers had $358 million in sales last year, down 21 percent1209from their $454 million in sales in 2023.\7\ Since 2017, the total1210acreage in the United States used for growing catfish has fallen by121114.3 percent, from 60.8 thousand acres on January 1, 2017 to 52.11212thousand acres on January 1, 2025.\8\ As with their commercial fishing1213brethren on the coastline, catfish farmers in Arkansas believe that1214illegal seafood imports are driving them out of business and pushing1215domestically-raised catfish out of the marketplace.1216---------------------------------------------------------------------------1217 \7\ See U.S. Department of Agriculture, Catfish Production, ISSN:12181948-271X (Feb. 10, 2025).1219 \8\ Compare id. with U.S. Department of Agriculture, Catfish1220Production, ISSN: 1948-271X (Feb. 2, 2018).1221---------------------------------------------------------------------------1222 In this respect, American seafood producers throughout the country1223have enthusiastically welcomed the Restoring American Seafood1224Competitiveness Executive Order, which declares it to be the policy of1225the United States to ``combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated1226(IUU) fishing; and protect our seafood markets from the unfair trade1227practices of foreign nations.'' \9\ As the Executive Order recognizes,1228the presence of IUU seafood in the global market constitutes an unfair1229trade practice that has inappropriately curbed domestic seafood1230production.1231---------------------------------------------------------------------------1232 \9\ See Executive Order 14276 of April 17, 2025, Restoring American1233Seafood Competitiveness, 90 Fed. Reg. 16,993 (Presidential Documents1234Apr. 22, 2025).1235---------------------------------------------------------------------------1236 But the harm from IUU seafood is not limited to U.S. seafood1237producers. Americans should be eating more fish. The Scientific Report1238of the 2025 Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee appropriately1239emphasizes how much more seafood Americans should be consuming in order1240to promote a healthy lifestyle.\10\ Nevertheless, one of the more1241stunning things about the U.S. seafood market right now is that the1242average per unit value of seafood is falling dramatically at the same1243time as apparent consumption is declining. The value of U.S. commercial1244landings fell by nearly 22 percent between 2021 and 2023, while the1245volume of those landings dropped by less than one percent. The value of1246U.S. seafood imports fell by 16 percent between 2022 and 2024, while1247the volume of these imports fell by 6 percent over the same timeframe.1248In other words, as shown in the table below, in a time characterized by1249significant inflation, the cost of seafood is declining and, yet,1250Americans are consuming less seafood.1251---------------------------------------------------------------------------1252 \10\ See generally U.S. Department of Agriculture and U.S.1253Department of Health and Human Services, Scientific Report of the 20251254Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee, Advisory Report to the Secretary1255of Health and Human Services and the Secretary of Agriculture (Dec.12562024).12571258 There are many possible explanations for this phenomenon. However,1259because imports comprise over 90 percent of the volume of seafood1260consumed annually in the United States,\11\ imports must play a central1261role in any explanation offered.1262---------------------------------------------------------------------------1263 \11\ See NOAA Fisheries, Improving International Fisheries1264Management: 2019 Report to Congress (Sept. 2019) at 41, 47, and 651265(observing that the U.S. market plays a substantial role in the1266international trade of seafood, as it represents the second largest1267seafood import market in the world, and seafood imports ``currently1268represent[] approximately 90 percent of U.S. seafood supplies. . .'');1269NOAA Fisheries, Report on the Implementation of the U.S. Seafood Import1270Monitoring Program (Apr. 2021) at 4-5 (``the United States imports more1271than 85 percent of its seafood. . .''); and Government Accountability1272Office, Food Safety: FDA Should Strengthen Inspection Efforts to1273Protect the U.S. Food Supply, GAO-25-107571 (Jan. 8, 2025) p. 21 n.31274(noting that the FDA estimates that 94 percent of the seafood Americans1275consume annually is imported).1276---------------------------------------------------------------------------1277 In the context of our existing seafood market, it is reasonable to1278conclude that American demand for seafood has been harmed by consumer1279concerns as to how the fish offered for sale has gotten from hook or1280net to plate. Americans can comfortably assume that if they purchase1281U.S. wild-caught or farm-raised seafood it has been produced with the1282oversight of our large, expansive, and complicated regulatory system.1283This means that environmental harms are mitigated and that workers have1284rights in line with all other American industries.1285 But what can any consumer really know about fish harvested by a1286foreign distant water fishing fleet? What confidence can any American1287have that the fishermen aboard those vessels are not toiling under1288inhuman conditions, that the boats are not decimating the environment,1289or that the workers in the foreign seafood processing plant are not1290being subjected to forced labor?1291 To the extent this may be on consumers' minds, I believe that there1292is valid reason to be concerned. In my private practice, I spent nearly1293a decade working to shut down trading networks through which Chinese1294farm-raised shrimp was transshipped through other countries, given a1295false designation of origin, and then imported into the United States.1296This usually involved foreign companies that would suddenly ship large1297quantities of shrimp to the United States to a consignee with a limited1298range of imported products. Some of these consignees would import just1299frozen shrimp and honey or just frozen shrimp and canned mushrooms or,1300at its most absurd, frozen shrimp and wooden bedroom furniture. Others1301would specialize in a limited set of seafood products, encompassing1302frozen shrimp, chum salmon, and pollock. Over time, we were able to1303document how importers would isolate seafood products associated with1304increased risk and run these through designed, specialized networks1305intended to limit disruptions to their business in the event that any1306one of its trojan horse exporters or paper importers come under1307scrutiny. Still today, a review of bill of lading information confirms1308that seafood continues to enter the United States through these opaque1309networks, facilitating the large volume of IUU seafood believed to be1310in our market.1311 For these reasons, the Fighting Foreign Illegal Seafood Harvests1312Act of 2025 represents a crucial opportunity to improve the market1313position of our domestic seafood producers, effectively counter1314abhorrent practices in foreign fisheries, and restore American consumer1315confidence in the seafood offered for sale in our market. Of particular1316importance is the FISH Act's prohibition of the importation of any1317seafood caught, processed, or transported by foreign vessels on the IUU1318vessel list and the requirement that U.S. Customs and Border Protection1319develop a strategy to identify imports of seafood harvested on foreign1320vessels using forced labor.1321 In furtherance of the latter objective, the FISH Act appropriately1322recognizes the central importance of data collection, data sharing, and1323data analysis in ensuring that IUU seafood, including seafood produced1324through forced labor, is kept out of the United States market.1325Traceability information is essential for distinguishing between1326legitimately harvested foreign seafood and illegal imports and thereby1327avoiding the imposition of additional burdens on imported seafood not1328harvested through IUU fishing. Similarly, the FISH Act's call for a1329study of the costs to the United States and global economy of IUU1330fishing, including the use of forced labor, will provide a necessary1331update to the ITC's Section 332 investigation and create a baseline by1332which interventions to counter IUU fishing may be evaluated.1333 President Trump's April Executive Order on seafood competitiveness1334reinforced the vital nature of domestic seafood producers to the1335American economy. As the Executive Order correctly observes, ``[t]he1336United States should be the world's dominant seafood leader'' and1337``[t]he erosion of American seafood competitiveness at the hands of1338unfair foreign trade practices must end.'' I believe that the FISH Act1339advances those twin goals and appreciate the opportunity to speak in1340support of this legislation.1341 Thank you for inviting me to share my experience here today and I1342look forward to answering questions.1343[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]13441345 Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you very much for that1346testimony. Mr. Prout.13471348 STATEMENT OF GABRIEL PROUT, PRESIDENT,1349 ALASKA BERING SEA CRABBERS13501351 Mr. Prout. Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Blunt1352Rochester, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank1353you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the1354devastating impact of IUU, illegal, unreported, and unregulated1355crab fishing, and unfair Russian and Chinese trade practices on1356American crab fishermen and coastal communities.1357 I would like to first start by acknowledging and thanking1358Senator Sullivan, as well as Senator Cantwell, for their1359longstanding support of independent crab harvesters like1360myself. Thank you. My name is Gabriel Prout, and I am the1361President of Alaska Bering Sea Crabbers. I represent the1362majority of quota and vessel owners harvesting king, snow and1363barrette crab in the Bering sea.1364 I am also a third generation commercial fisherman and a1365vessel owner from Kodiak, Alaska, a seafood powerhouse where1366hundreds of millions of pounds of product cross the docks each1367year. For nearly 20 years, I have worked in the Bering Sea in1368the Gulf of Alaska with two of my brothers, continuing a1369livelihood passed down from our father and grandfather.1370 In recent years, the collapse of the snow crab and red king1371crab stocks hit us hard. Boats sat tied up, crews were out of1372work, and families like mine faced deep uncertainty. This1373fishery isn't just our livelihood, it is our identity. Crab1374stocks now appear to be rebounding, but we still need action to1375protect small fishing families like mine, especially from the1376harms of IUU fishing.1377 For over 20 years, Russian IUU crab has undercut the1378economic foundation of our industry. In 2021, a U.S.1379International Trade Commission report found that in 2019, over138020 percent of U.S. imports of snow and king crab from the1381Russian Far East came from IUU sources.1382 Fortunately, U.S. imports of Russian crab have largely1383ceased thanks to the embargo that began under President Biden,1384continued under President Trump, and was strengthened by1385Senator Sullivan's work to close the China trans-shipment1386loophole. Still, Russia's IUU crab continues entering global1387markets through other channels, suppressing prices, and1388creating unfair competition for U.S. harvesters who follow the1389law.1390 Russia's actions extend far beyond IUU. The following are1391just a few key points. It has heavily subsidized its seafood1392industry to deliberately undercut U.S. competitors. Flooded1393international markets with underpriced seafood following its13942022 invasion of Ukraine to help fund its war.1395 And contributed to an estimated $1.8 billion in losses for1396the Alaska seafood industry during 2022 and 2023. There are1397also national security concerns. Russian crab is being funneled1398into the global market through North Korean smuggling networks1399where it is reprocessed and relabeled in China.1400 This collaboration between two sanctioned regimes1401undermines trade restrictions and raises serious concerns about1402enforcement and the global seafood supply chain integrity.1403Based on years of experience witnessing the impact of Russian1404IUU on Alaskan crabbers, I respectfully urge the following1405actions.1406 One, expand the seafood import monitoring program and1407ensure it focuses on species at highest risk for IUU fishing.1408Mandate country of origin labeling, also known as cool1409labeling, that also applies to cooked crab products.1410 Two, expand economic sanctions and trade restrictions,1411which would extend and strengthen sanctions on Russian origin1412seafood, and ensure enforcement on the ban of Russian seafood1413entering through third countries, especially China.1414 Expand intelligence sharing agreements with allies. This is1415under point three. Increase international cooperation and1416enforcement. Increase support for international bodies working1417to combat IUU fishing, and push for stronger enforcement of1418port state measure agreements, especially with countries still1419importing Russian crab around the world.1420 Four, provide economic relief to affected communities.1421Establish emergency relief similar to the Seafood Trade Relief1422Program and create low interest loans to help crabbers and1423fishing fleets modernize gear and remain competitive throughout1424the world. Prioritize support for small, independent, family1425owned fishing operations like those that I represent.1426 And five, strengthen U.S. enforcement against IUU fishing.1427Congress should pass Senate Bill 688, the FISH Act, and provide1428full funding and direction for the U.S. Coast Guard and NOAA to1429expand patrols, inspections, and enforcements targeting IUU1430threats. For over two decades, Russian IUU crab has undermined1431American fishermen who follow the rules, invest in1432sustainability, and support our coastal communities.1433 This isn't just about statistics. It is about lost1434livelihoods, struggling towns, and an industry fighting for1435survival. Congress has the opportunity to protect American1436harvesters and ensure global seafood is harvested legally and1437sustainably.1438 Thank you for your attention to this critical issue1439affecting thousands of American fishing families, and I look1440forward to your questions and working with the Committee on1441effective solutions. Thank you.1442 [The prepared statement of Mr. Prout follows:]14431444 Prepared Statement of Gabriel Prout, President,1445 Alaska Bering Sea Crabbers1446 Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Blunt Rochester, and1447distinguished members of the Subcommittee.1448 Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss1449the devastating impact of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU)1450crab fishing and unfair trade practices by Russia on American crab1451fishermen and coastal communities. I also want to thank both Senators1452Sullivan and Cantwell for their longtime support of independent crab1453harvesters. My name is Gabriel Prout, and I am the president of the1454Alaska Bering Sea Crabbers (ABSC), representing the majority of the1455quota and vessel owners who harvest king, snow, and bairdi crab in the1456Bering Sea.1457 I am also a third-generation commercial fisherman from Kodiak,1458Alaska--a seafood powerhouse that is known for the 100s of millions of1459pounds of product that come across its docks each year. For nearly two1460decades, I have worked in the Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska alongside1461two of my brothers, continuing the livelihood passed down from our1462father and grandfather.1463 In recent years, the collapse of the snow and red king crab stocks1464has hit our community hard. Boats sat tied to the dock, crews were out1465of work, and families like mine were left facing deep uncertainty. This1466fishery is not just our livelihood--it is our identity. Today, I am1467happy to report that crab stocks appear to be making a recovery, but1468more is still needed to be done to help protect small fishing families1469like mine and those that I represent in the Bering Sea crab fleet,1470especially when it comes to IUU.1471IUU Impact on U.S. Fishermen1472 The scale of economic losses from IUU fishing on American fishermen1473is staggering. U.S. fishermen are losing $1 billion in revenue per year1474due to illegal seafood imports. This represents approximately 201475percent of what American fishermen should be earning under fair market1476conditions.1477 For over two decades, Russian IUU crab fishing has undermined the1478economic foundation of America's legitimate crab fishing industry. The1479economic impact on Alaskan crab fishermen has been enormous. A 20211480report by the U.S. International Trade Commission estimated that in14812019, 20.8 percent of U.S. Imports of both snow and king crab in the1482Russian Far East were a product of IUU fishing. Thankfully, due to the1483trade embargo which began under President Biden and continued under1484President Trump, the U.S. imports of Russian crab has essentially1485ceased. This also was made possible by Senator Sullivan's work to close1486the loophole that allowed Russian seafood to enter the U.S. through1487China.1488 Despite Port State agreements aimed at curbing illegal fishing that1489Russia signed a decade ago with several trading partners, enforcement1490has been inconsistent and IUU fishing is still occurring according to1491recent media sources inside Russia. Russian fishing operations continue1492to impact global markets with illegally harvested crab, suppressing1493prices and creating unfair competition for law-abiding American1494fishermen who follow strict quotas, safety regulations, and sustainable1495fishing practices.1496Unfair Trade Practices, Forced Labor, and Market Manipulation1497 Russia has engaged in systematic unfair trade practices and human1498rights abuses that go far beyond traditional IUU fishing. Russia has1499significantly increased government subsidies for its seafood industry1500as part of a deliberate strategy to undercut American competitors.1501These subsidies allow Russian producers to sell seafood below fair1502market prices.1503 Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia1504began to flood the international market with underpriced seafood,1505including crab, to help fund its war effort. Fishermen have suffered1506amid cratering prices due to Russia flooding markets with artificially1507cheap seafood. This is a major contributing factor to unprecedented1508challenges faced by the Alaska seafood industry in recent years1509including an estimated $1.8 billion in losses in 2022-2023.1510 According to a 2023 Financial Transparency Coalition report, Russia1511also ranked among the top countries with fishing vessels accused of1512forced labor. Forced labor in Russian fishing also represents a1513significant component of broader human rights abuses and another way in1514which the Russian fishing industry engages in IUU fishing.1515National Security Concerns1516 There are numerous national security implications involving1517Russia's involvement in IUU fishing. Particularly concerning is the use1518of North Korean smuggling networks to launder Russian crab into global1519markets. North Korea has extensive experience in sanctions evasion,1520including seafood trafficking through China. These established1521smuggling routes and networks are now being exploited to move Russian1522crab through North Korea to China, where it can be reprocessed and1523relabeled as ``product of China'' before entering the global market.1524 The North Korean connection is particularly troubling because it1525involves collaboration between two sanctioned regimes to undermine1526trade restrictions. This represents a direct threat to U.S. national1527security interests beyond just economic competition.1528 Russian fisheries also present a significant national security1529threat through their dual-use capabilities that blur the lines between1530commercial fishing and state-sponsored espionage operations. Recent1531actions by a major Russian fishing company exemplifies this threat as1532its vessels exhibit suspicious movement patterns inconsistent with1533normal fishing activities, instead repeatedly loitering near critical1534infrastructure and military installations in the North and Baltic Seas.1535These activities are part of a broader Russian surveillance campaign1536that weaponizes civilian fishing vessels for espionage missions1537targeting both civilian and military infrastructure, potentially1538facilitating future sabotage operations. The vessels have been equipped1539with specialized technology for intelligence gathering, with at least1540one vessel banned from Dutch ports due to espionage concerns.1541Recommendations1542 Based on years of experience witnessing the impact of Russian IUU1543fishing on Alaskan crab fishermen, I respectfully urge the following1544actions:15451546 1. Strengthen Import Controls and Traceability15471548 The Administration and Congress should mandate comprehensive1549seafood traceability systems that track crab products that include:15501551 Enhancing the capabilities of the Seafood Import Monitoring1552 Program and ensuring that it only apply to the most at-risk1553 species of IUU fishing.15541555 Enhanced screening for products from known transshipment1556 routes, particularly those involving China.15571558 Mandatory country-of-origin labeling that applies to cooked1559 crab and cannot be circumvented by processing in third1560 countries.15611562 2. Expand Economic Sanctions and Trade Restrictions15631564 The Administration and Congress should expand economic and trade1565restrictions on Russian seafood and include:15661567 Continuing the prohibition on all Russian seafood imports,1568 including those processed through third countries.15691570 Imposing secondary sanctions on entities that facilitate1571 Russian seafood transshipment schemes.15721573 Imposing Section 301 tariffs on Russian seafood in the event1574 that the Russian seafood ban is lifted.15751576 3. Increase International Cooperation and Enforcement Congress1577 should authorize and fund:15781579 Enhanced satellite monitoring of fishing activities in the1580 Bering Sea and other shared waters.15811582 Intelligence sharing agreements with allied nations to track1583 vessel movements and identify smuggling networks.15841585 Support for international bodies combating IUU fishing.15861587 4. Provide Economic Relief for Affected Communities15881589 Congress should establish:15901591 Emergency economic assistance for fishing communities1592 impacted by unfair competition, similar to the Seafood Trade1593 Relief Program.15941595 Loan programs to help fishing operations modernize and1596 improve competitiveness.15971598 Market development initiatives to promote American-caught1599 seafood.16001601 5. Strengthen U.S. Fishery Legislation to Combat IUU Fishing16021603 Congress should:16041605 Pass S. 688, the Fish Act, a bill that would direct the1606 Administration to address IUU fishing in international1607 agreements, establish an IUU vessel list, and develop new1608 technologies to combat IUU fishing, among many other important1609 provisions.16101611 Direct and fund the U.S. Coast Guard to increase efforts to1612 combat IUU fishing.1613Conclusion1614 For more than two decades, Russian IUU crab fishing has undermined1615American fishermen who play by the rules, invest in sustainable1616practices, and support coastal communities across Alaska. The economic1617losses documented by industry analysts represent more than statistics--1618they represent lost livelihoods, struggling communities, and an1619industry fighting for survival against unfair competition.1620 As more countries around the globe move to ban Russian seafood and1621implement seafood traceability systems, they are looking to the U.S. as1622a global leader. Congress has the opportunity to lead by example,1623protecting American fishermen while promoting sustainable fishing1624practices worldwide.1625 The time for half-measures has passed. American fishermen deserve a1626level playing field, and American consumers deserve confidence that the1627seafood on their tables was harvested legally and sustainably. I urge1628this Committee to take decisive action to address IUU fishing. The1629Committee has an opportunity to support the hardworking men and women1630who make their living from America's marine resources.1631 Thank you for your attention to this critical issue affecting1632thousands of American fishing families. I look forward to answering1633your questions and collaborating with the Committee to develop1634effective solutions.16351636 Senator Sullivan. Thanks again, Mr. Prout. Great testimony.1637Great recommendations. And you know, for the audience here,1638these are some of the tough, great Alaska fishermen.1639 Some of you have seen the show Deadliest Catch. It is a1640dangerous business, and they bring in some of their best1641seafood, wild seafood in the world and shouldn't have to1642compete against this kind of IUU activity.1643 So Dr. Saumweber, you will wrap it up, and then we will go1644to questions.16451646 STATEMENT OF WHITLEY SAUMWEBER, DIRECTOR, STEPHENSON OCEAN1647 SECURITY PROJECT, CSIS16481649 [Technical problems.]1650 Senator Sullivan. You need to turn your mic on.1651 Mr. Saumweber. Thank you. Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member1652Blunt Rochester, and distinguished members of the Committee,1653thank you for inviting me to participate in today's hearing. It1654is an honor to be here, and I commend you for focusing on the1655urgent, important, and evolving challenge of IUU fishing.1656 My name is Whitley Saumweber, and I am a Professor of1657Marine Affairs at the University of Rhode Island and the1658Director of the Stephenson Ocean Security Project at the Center1659for Strategic and International Studies, where we examine the1660intersection of ocean health and global security.1661 I would be remiss if I did not highlight our Ocean Security1662and Human Rights Forum that we held just last week in1663partnership with the U.S. IUU and Labor Rights Coalition, and1664which addressed many of the topics we are discussing here1665today. I also note, as Greg Poling did, that my comments at1666this hearing are my own and should not be attributed to either1667CSIS or to the University of Rhode Island.1668 I have been working on U.S. ocean governance and security1669policy for more than two decades, and during this time I have1670seen illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing evolve from1671an important but secondary resource management issue, to one of1672the foremost and most complex ocean security challenges we face1673today.1674 It is important because of its centrality to questions of1675national wealth, sovereignty, and market stability in regions1676of the globe already beset by conflict, and to jobs and1677communities here at home in the U.S.. It is complex because of1678how the scale and nature of the challenge changes depending on1679the region and markets being considered.1680 Effective policy solutions are therefore also complex, but1681if successful, can support U.S. jobs, markets, and national1682security, while offering roadmaps for dealing with issues of1683global ocean governance and security that extend beyond just1684seafood.1685 For these reasons, IUU fishing is a prime example of a1686suite of emerging 21st century ocean security challenges that1687threaten norms of maritime governance and commerce, but which1688exist outside the bounds of more traditional security concerns.1689 Characteristics of these new ocean security threats include1690a link to competition for marine resources, using gray zone1691conflict, involvement in illicit and alternative trade1692economies, a multiplier effect with climate impacts on marine1693ecosystems, and impacts on human rights at sea.1694 IUU fishing has each of these characteristics, and I hope1695we get to discuss some of those in more detail later in the1696hearing. So how do we address this complex challenge?1697Successful strategies generally fall into one of four1698categories that should work in concert with each other, market1699access control, operational interdiction, presence, and1700resource and governance.1701 The U.S. is the largest single importer of seafood in the1702world, and together with the EU and Japan, we control 601703percent of the total global market in seafood. This means that1704comparable market access control policies across these three1705traditional partners have the potential to reshape global1706supply chains in deep and meaningful ways.1707 To be effective, such programs must include a strong supply1708chain transparency mechanism, a risk assessment program based1709on that information, a validation program, and crucially,1710strategic enforcement cascades that allow for scalable and1711targeted penalties. Here in the U.S., NOAA's Seafood Import1712Modeling Program meets some of these criteria, but not all.1713 NOAA conducted a year-long review of the program in 20241714and released an action plan last November that had significant1715support from both industry and civil society groups.1716Implementation of the action plan would greatly advance the1717ability of SIMP to meet the requirements I have described.1718 Market access control is the counter IUU tool with the1719greatest potential global reach, but operational interdiction1720of IUU activity remains important for deterrence. The U.S. can1721support operational interdiction through direct action by1722expanding shipwright agreements with partner nations, and we1723can provide direct support from maritime domain awareness in1724critical areas through both material assistance and capacity1725building.1726 One example of such an arrangement is the Indo-Pacific1727Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, already mentioned by1728Greg Poling, between the Quad, that is U. S., India, Japan, and1729Australia, and our Indo-Pacific partners. This agreement is a1730prime example of the kind of partnership and soft power1731security guarantee that the U.S. alone can offer to much of the1732world, and which on our best days, is one of the key reasons1733U.S. leadership has been indispensable for the past 80 years.1734 We provide help and support to those who need it and are1735prepared to support our partners in their own efforts to claim1736sovereign identity and rights. These are things we can offer1737which our competitors, notably China and Russia, cannot, and it1738is why such partnerships have provided a bulwark in the1739continuing effort to support the growth of democracy worldwide.1740 To make this approach work, however, the U.S. must be1741present in international fora and development work in order to1742provide that alternative. In these efforts, three agencies in1743particular are crucial, U.S. Coast Guard, NOAA, and USAID. Each1744of these play irreplaceable roles in the soft power competition1745that is the foundation of counter IUU fishing work.1746 The dismantling of USAID has already caused widespread harm1747to ongoing efforts, and the threats to NOAA are deeply1748concerning. Just as the U.S. Government needs a positive1749presence with partners abroad, it also needs capacity at home.1750We are now entering the final year of the first national1751strategy from the interagency working group for combatting IUU1752fishing, and there is tremendous opportunity to build on1753initial efforts.1754 With strong support for its member agencies, the working1755group could form the foundation of coordinated enforcement1756action. Conversely, significant budget cuts to any of the key1757agencies will cripple counter IUU programs. Cuts to NOAA in1758particular will fatally harm the ability to coordinate, conduct1759supporting science, and be present in critical negotiations and1760partnerships abroad.1761 Every U.S. Administration since George W. Bush has1762established or endorsed national strategies to combat IUU1763fishing. Similarly, every Congress over that time has supported1764bipartisan legislation attempting to grapple with the issue, of1765which Senator Sullivan, your FISH Act is a fine example.1766 I hope that this discussion today will help all of us to1767take advantage of that momentum and work toward these1768solutions. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.1769 [The prepared statement of Mr. Saumweber follows:]17701771Prepared Statement of Dr. Whitley Saumweber, Director, Stephenson Ocean1772 Security Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies1773 Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Blunt Rochester, and1774distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to1775participate in today's hearing. It's an honor to be here and I commend1776you for focusing on the urgent, important, and evolving challenge of1777IUU Fishing.1778 My name is Whitley Saumweber and I am both a Professor of Marine1779Affairs at the University of Rhode Island (URI) and the Director of the1780Stephenson Ocean Security Project at the Center for Strategic and1781International Studies (CSIS) where we examine the intersection of ocean1782health and global security and seek policy solutions that support1783sustainable development and reduce conflict. I would be remiss if I did1784not highlight our Ocean Security and Human Rights Forum\1\ that we held1785just last week in partnership with the U.S. IUU and Labor Rights1786Coalition,\2\ and which addressed many of the topics we are discussing1787here today. I also note that my comments at this hearing are my own and1788should not be attributed to either CSIS or URI.1789---------------------------------------------------------------------------1790 \1\ https://www.csis.org/events/ocean-security-and-human-rights-1791forum1792 \2\ US IUULR Coalition Joint Statement1793---------------------------------------------------------------------------17941. Introduction1795 I have been working on U.S. ocean governance and security policy1796for more than two decades including work here in the Senate, at NOAA,1797the White House, and now in the private sector and academia. During1798this time, I have seen Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU)1799fishing evolve from an important, but secondary, resource management1800issue to one of the foremost and most complex ocean security challenges1801we face today. It is important because of its centrality to questions1802of national wealth, sovereignty, and market stability in regions of the1803globe already beset by conflict and to jobs and communities here at1804home in the U.S. It is complex because of how the scale and nature of1805the challenge changes depending on the region and markets being1806considered. At one end of the spectrum, it involves nationalized1807distant water fleets, grey zone tactics, and soft power deployment as1808we see in the case of China and its large foreign fishing endeavors. At1809the other end of the spectrum, we may be discussing small, artisanal1810conflicts in the Caribbean that nonetheless have the potential to1811disenfranchise legal fishers and destabilize stocks. In both cases, the1812solution sets may have similar elements but also require some nuance to1813address specific regional needs. Finally, IUU fishing is a multifaceted1814challenge that is involved not just with the fish caught on a vessel1815somewhere at sea but is intertwined inextricably with global currents1816of peer competition, trade policy, market access control, supply chain1817transparency, and critically, human rights. Effective policy solutions1818are therefore equally complex and must address multiple mandates and1819capacities in ways that are politically challenging but, if successful,1820can support U.S. jobs, markets, and national security while offering1821roadmaps for dealing with issues of global ocean governance, trade, and1822security that extend beyond just seafood.18232. IUU Fishing as a 21st Century Security Threat1824 IUU Fishing is prime example of a type of emerging 21st century1825ocean security challenge that threatens norms of maritime governance1826and commerce. These challenges exist outside the bounds of traditional1827security concerns, involving such drivers as competition for living1828marine resources, gray zone conflict, alternative trade economies,1829climate impacts on marine ecosystems, and human rights at sea. None of1830these challenges are easily dealt with solely through traditional1831avenues of naval power and yet taken together pose as great a risk to1832global stability as other more kinetic threats. Rather these issues1833require a holistic approach to maritime statecraft that incorporates1834elements of domestic trade and market policies, foreign aid, and1835maritime domain awareness.18362.1 A highly competed resource1837 Approximately 3 billion people, more than a third of the global1838population, rely on fish for a critical portion of their daily protein1839intake.\3\ That number is expected to increase at a non-linear rate as1840both the world's population and the per capita consumption of fish1841continue to increase.\4\ This latter factor is a positive indicator of1842human health and well-being and is generally associated with the move1843out of extreme poverty with an increased access to highly nutritious1844foods. But ecosystems are already overtaxed. Global marine capture1845fisheries are essentially fully exploited with total catch remaining1846relatively flat since the 1990s at around 85 mmt. Total global fish1847consumption has continued to grow, with demand increasingly met by1848terrestrial or marine based aquaculture. But many aquaculture supply1849chains rely on wild capture sources of feed, putting pressure on1850keystone ecological stocks such as Antarctic krill, menhaden in the1851western Atlantic, and sardinella in west Africa.1852---------------------------------------------------------------------------1853 \3\ 2024 FAO State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture1854 \4\ Boyd et al., 2018: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12571-021-01246-91855---------------------------------------------------------------------------1856 Climate change is already impacting these stocks by reducing1857overall global productivity and causing broad geographic shifts in1858marine ecosystems. Fishery productivity under the worst climate1859scenarios is expected to decrease by as much as 50 percent in the1860tropics due to warming waters.\5\ This is also the region with the most1861direct dependence on marine resources for food and economic security1862and losses of such magnitude will be hugely destabilizing. Ecosystem1863shifts are generally poleward but, in some cases, like the western1864Pacific, stocks may shift east or west. No matter the direction, we are1865already seeing disruptions in both long standing economic and food1866security systems but also, importantly, the scientific and technocratic1867infrastructure that has been established to manage these systems1868sustainably.1869---------------------------------------------------------------------------1870 \5\ UN IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere1871---------------------------------------------------------------------------1872 All these challenges are further exacerbated by IUU Fishing. It has1873been estimated that 30 percent of global catch is not counted by the UN1874Food and Agriculture Organization with the potential undercount being1875as high as 60 percent.\6\ This discrepancy has huge implications for1876the sustainability of stocks but also for the ability to model and1877forecast impacts while disrupting legal markets.1878---------------------------------------------------------------------------1879 \6\ Pauly et al., 2016: https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms102441880---------------------------------------------------------------------------18812.2 An avenue for gray zone conflict1882 The concept of maritime gray zone conflict is a commonly accepted1883way of considering modern inter-state disputes in highly contested1884arenas, especially when those disputes involve nuclear armed states1885that wish to avoid actual war. Gray zone activity connotes plausible1886deniability, so that leaders on both sides can choose to interpret a1887provocative interaction in ways that are non-escalatory. There is a1888broad spectrum of actions that can fall under this rubric. Looking just1889at the South China Sea we have regular physical interventions by the1890Chinese Coast Guard which have resulted in harm to national assets and1891personnel of other nations.\7\ Framed as maritime enforcement activity,1892these activities can be coded as non-strategic. At the other end of the1893conflict spectrum in the region, China is using its fishing fleets, and1894even subsidizing their construction, as a maritime militia to present1895both a physical presence and barrier.\8\ Private actors--even with1896substantial support from their home states--can easily be disavowed by1897governments.1898---------------------------------------------------------------------------1899 \7\ https://apnews.com/article/china-philippines-us-sea-clash-1900d08f4532c2a66047c6fa2833b190176d77731902 \8\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/pulling-back-curtain-chinas-1903maritime-militia1904---------------------------------------------------------------------------1905 Both these examples, however, represent modes of direct conflict,1906even if they are `gray' in nature. When considering 21st century ocean1907security threats, the category of `gray' conflict should also be1908reflective of other kinds of competition. Any means of resource control1909is ultimately an expression of sovereignty or lack thereof by others.1910Thus, distant water fishing fleets can serve both legitimate economic1911interests as well as strategic state needs by their presence in foreign1912waters and the pressure they may exert on local resources. Shore based1913infrastructure can also be considered part of this equation especially1914when it is under the control of non-local actors and allows for the1915isolation of local resources from local economies. For example,1916development of a private port and fish processing facilities that1917operate outside of local laws and without local employment.\9\ This1918type of control further erodes local resource sovereignty and can lead1919to closed supply chains that do not provide equitable benefits to host1920nations. In addition, these types of ventures may often be vehicles of1921corruption through opaque and uneven access agreements. These examples1922of conflict are `gray' in that they use economic and legal mechanisms1923in a coercive, corrupt, or coopting way to seize control over resource1924supply chains for strategic ends.1925---------------------------------------------------------------------------1926 \9\ https://ocean.csis.org/commentary/distant-water-fishing-along-1927china-s-maritime-silk-road/1928---------------------------------------------------------------------------19292.3 External trade economies1930 Just as the rise of asymmetric gray zone conflict presents a1931growing challenge to the norms of ocean governance, so too does the1932emergence of asymmetric economic competition. By this I mean trade1933flows and economies that operate outside, and often in explicit and1934direct abeyance, of existing market rules and expectations. The1935clearest example of this phenomenon is the rise of the shadow fleet of1936oil and gas tankers and associated vessels being used to carry fossil1937fuels from sanctioned states such as Russia, Iran, and Venezuela to1938willing market nations such as China and India.\10\ \11\ At some point1939a market becomes large enough to go from being illegal to a competitor1940and we must ask ourselves what that point is and, as with asymmetric1941kinetic threats, how we approach it as it is normalized. All sanctioned1942commodities--not just oil--have the potential to enter this alternate1943economy depending on demand. Seafood can be sanctioned at both the1944state and corporate level and trade in IUU should be considered a trade1945in illicit commodities as much as sanctioned oil or arms or technology1946with as great a potential over the long term to destabilize key regions1947of the globe. Once again, we come back to the question of sovereignty1948and resource control. In this case the tools at hand are market access1949control and supply chain transparency.1950---------------------------------------------------------------------------1951 \10\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-shadow-war-against-west1952 \11\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-exorcise-russias-ghost-fleet1953---------------------------------------------------------------------------19542.4 Human Rights1955 In a fully competed ocean with emerging, unregulated trade flows1956the pressure to increase economic margins is intense. As has been the1957case throughout history, one of the most straightforward ways to do so1958is to reduce the costs of the labor force. In this case there is a1959large and exploitable population of migrant labor available, primarily1960in southeast Asia, at the same moment that new opaque supply chains are1961opening. We know that IUU Fishing goes hand in hand with forced labor1962at sea.\12\ Distant water fishing fleets are especially primed for1963abuse with long voyages and isolation the norm. It is an easy1964conjecture to imagine that other supply chains in these alternative1965economies are also taking advantage of similar opportunities to exploit1966their labor force. With seafood we also know that we cannot isolate the1967maritime elements of the supply chain in dealing with this moral1968travesty. Illegal products at sea are often processed and packaged1969illegally on shore. The Outlaw Ocean Project has recently highlighted1970the abuse of North Korean and Uyghur populations in Chinese seafood1971processing facilities and of poor women in Indian shrimp plants.\13\1972Once again, we must consider how market access and transparency can be1973used to combat this problem.\14\1974---------------------------------------------------------------------------1975 \12\ Selig et al., 2022: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-1976022-28916-21977 \13\ https://www.theoutlawocean.com/1978 \14\ https://www.csis.org/analysis/streamlining-government-1979coordination-rights-conscious-supply-chains1980---------------------------------------------------------------------------19813. IUU Fishing Solution Sets1982 Because of the complexity of the IUU challenge successful counter1983strategies must necessarily include elements that reach across1984individual agency mandates and, ideally, operate with intentional1985prioritization, coordination, and leveraging of capabilities within the1986U.S. government and between partners abroad. Broadly these activities1987fall into the following categories: (1) Market Access Control; (2)1988Operational Interdiction; (3) Partnerships and Presence; and (4)1989Resources and Governance.19903.1 Market Access Control1991 The EU remains the largest common market for seafood in the world,1992accounting for approximately 35 percent of global imports but the U.S.1993is second and remains the largest single state market accounting for1994approximately 16 percent of global imports by value. If we also include1995Japan, the fourth largest market by import value, we reach nearly 601996percent of the total global market in seafood.\15\ This means that1997comparable market access control policies across these three1998traditional partners have the potential to reshape global supply chains1999in deep and meaningful ways. To be effective such programs must2000include: (1) strong supply chain transparency mechanisms; (2) a program2001of risk assessment based on those mechanisms; (3) a program of2002validation based on the risk assessment; and (4) a program of strategic2003enforcement cascades based on the validation that allow for scalable2004and targeted enforcement. These actions can and should range from2005denial of entry for individual shipments to criminal enforcement and2006economic sanctions on beneficial owners and supporting states.2007---------------------------------------------------------------------------2008 \15\ UNFAO GLOBEFISH2009---------------------------------------------------------------------------2010 Each of these individual programs can take different forms but the2011critical elements must each exist and work together to be effective.2012The EU maintains a requirement for state sponsored catch certificates2013and holds out the possibility of state level trade sanctions for2014failure to comply with anti-IUU fishing regulations through a red-2015yellow-green carding system. The U.S. requires individual importers of2016record to submit supply chain information to the National Oceanic and2017Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) Seafood Import Monitoring Program2018(SIMP) with the potential for post-hoc administrative penalties should2019an audit find a violation. NOAA also maintains broad, though seldom2020used authority, to apply state level sanctions on vessels or nations2021listed in a biennial report to Congress on IUU activities as mandated2022by the High Seas Driftnet Moratorium Protection Act.\16\ Conceptually,2023SIMP remains an important part of U.S. market access control but broad2024dissatisfaction with NOAA's implementation of the program led to a2025yearlong review and subsequent action plan released in November 20242026that had significant support from both industry and civil society2027groups.\17\ Implementation of the action plan would greatly advance the2028ability of SIMP to meet the requirements of an effective market access2029control program as described above. Particularly important elements of2030the action plan included the commitments to require data submission2031prior to entry, implementation of an automated analysis of data for2032risk factors to better leverage resources and reduce costs, and to2033expand the definition of IUU fishing to align with the UNFAO2034definition\18\ and to expressly include human rights and labor abuses.2035---------------------------------------------------------------------------2036 \16\ https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/international/international-2037affairs/report-iuu-fishing-bycatch-and-shark-catch2038 \17\ https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/s3/2024-11/SIMP-Action-2039Plan_final.pdf2040 \18\ UNFAO IUU IPOA2041---------------------------------------------------------------------------2042 In addition to efforts to improve our own market access control2043program here in the U.S. and to bring it into alignment with other2044major market states, we should continue to support the development of2045other related measures abroad. These include implementation of the Port2046State Measures Agreement, the first counter-IUU multilateral2047instrument, and development of nascent access control programs in2048strong partner nations like Japan and the Republic of Korea which share2049the U.S.' concern about China's use of seafood trade for security2050purposes. Each of which also represent significant global markets. Both2051countries have just begun to implement their programs at the pilot2052stage.20533.2 Operational Interdiction2054 While market access control remains the counter-IUU tool with the2055greatest potential global reach, operational interdiction of IUU2056activity remains critical for deterrence and the demonstration of2057sovereign control over marine resources as well as a commitment to the2058norms and standards of ocean governance under the UN Convention on the2059Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The stability and credibility of UNCLOS is a2060key foundation for ocean security, sustainability, and sovereignty.2061UNCLOS created the basic jurisdictional framework for ocean governance,2062drew a clear political geography for the ocean, and assigned specific2063rights and duties assigned to different categories of states. Its2064provisions represent the common set of rules that have supported2065relatively stable maritime sovereignty and commerce for the past 502066years. But this foundation is under threat by the unilateral actions of2067China, Russia, and others as noted above.2068 A recent report by the ocean conservation organization Oceana,2069using data from Global Fishing Watch, found that China's fishing fleets2070account for 30 percent of global activity on the high seas and can be2071found fishing in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of more than 902072nations worldwide.\19\ Understanding where such larger fleets are2073operating, whether they are doing so legally, and having the ability to2074appropriately interdict illegal operations once found remain2075significant challenges for many nations. Without these capabilities2076individual countries may be effectively seeding sovereign control of a2077national resource to a foreign nation and placing itself at national2078risk based on the value of that resource. Bilateral access agreements2079developed under such conditions are likely to be made under pressure2080and without transparency and may be avenues for corruption as a means2081of achieving unrelated geopolitical goals. It is these very concerns2082that led the U.S. Coast Guard\20\ to declare IUU Fishing a greater2083maritime threat than piracy, the U.S. combatant commands SOUTHCOM \21\2084and AFRICOM \22\ to identify IUU fishing as a significant source of2085maritime security threat in the southeastern Pacific and Gulf of Guinea2086respectively, and fostered the release of a 2022 National Security2087Memorandum\23\ directing greater coordination on the issue all within2088the last five years.2089---------------------------------------------------------------------------2090 \19\ China's Global Fishing Footprint2091 \20\ USCG IUU Fishing Strategic Outlook2092 \21\ https://www.southcom.mil/Media/Special-Coverage/SOUTHCOM-2093Support-to-Operation-Southern-Cross/2094 \22\ https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/34377/africom-and-law-2095enforcement-cooperation-enhances-maritime-security-in-west-africa2096 \23\ Memorandum on Combatting Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated2097Fishing and Associated Labor Abuses2098---------------------------------------------------------------------------2099 The U.S. can support operational interdiction through direct action2100by pursuing ship-rider agreements with partner nations to enable U.S.2101vessels, most often from the USCG, to act to enforce the sovereignty of2102that partner's EEZ. We can also provide direct support for maritime2103domain awareness (MDA) in critical areas and work with partners to2104provide the technical capacity and training to use and distribute such2105information. One example of such an arrangement is the Indo-Pacific2106Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPPMDA) between the Quad2107(U.S., India, Japan, and Australia) and our Indo-Pacific partners.\24\2108---------------------------------------------------------------------------2109 \24\ Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness2110---------------------------------------------------------------------------21113.3 Partnerships and Presence2112 The Indo Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness2113described above is a prime example of the kind of partnership and soft2114power security guarantee that the U.S. alone can offer to much of the2115world and which, on our best days, is one of the key reasons U.S.2116leadership has been indispensable for the past 80 years. We provide2117help and support to those who need it and are prepared to support our2118partners in their own efforts to claim sovereign identity and rights.2119 These are things we can offer which our competitors, notably China2120and Russia, cannot and it is why such partnerships have provided a2121bulwark in the continuing effort to support the growth of democracy2122worldwide. No alliance is stronger than one freely given. One element2123above all others is crucial for this approach to work, however, and2124that is presence. The U.S. must be present in international fora and2125development work in order to provide that alternative. We must be2126active participants in Regional Fishery Management Organizations as2127well as foreign aid programs. We must be prepared to support capacity2128building through technical assistance and through the direct provision2129of aid, material, and assets. In this work three agencies in particular2130are crucial: the U.S. Coast Guard, NOAA, and USAID. Each of these play2131irreplaceable roles in the soft power competition that is the2132foundation of counter-IUU fishing work.21333.4 Resources and Governance2134 Just as the U.S. government needs a positive presence with partners2135abroad to effectively counter IUU fishing it also needs the capacity at2136home to work together, coordinate and support individual lines of2137effort, and to develop new, more efficient ways of identifying and2138acting on risk. The 2020 Maritime SAFE Act established the Interagency2139Maritime SAFE Working Group and charged it with developing a government2140wide roadmap for addressing IUU fishing. The working group, under the2141rotating chairmanship of the Department of State, NOAA, and USCG,2142succeeded in developing a five-year strategy for 2022-2026 that laid2143out approaches for priority regions and flag states in the work2144period.\25\ Implementation of this first plan was uneven but contained2145much to build on and represents the only statutory mandate for such2146work. As we enter the final year of this first strategy there is the2147opportunity to build on initial efforts. With strong leadership and2148support from the Administration and Congress this working group could2149form the foundation of coordinated enforcement action between NOAA,2150USCG, Department of State, DHS Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and2151Treasury. It could support more efficient transfer of information and2152targeted support for partners abroad. Conversely, significant budget2153cuts to any of these key agencies will cripple the ability to work2154together, share information and strategies, and create significant2155roadblocks to any meaningful counter IUU strategy by the U.S.2156government.2157---------------------------------------------------------------------------2158 \25\ National 5 Year Strategy for Combatting IUU Fishing: 2022-20262159---------------------------------------------------------------------------2160 4. Conclusion2161 Every U.S. Administration since George W. Bush has established or2162endorsed national strategies to combat IUU fishing. Similarly, in every2163Congress over that time, there has been bi-partisan legislation2164attempting to grapple with the issue. I applaud the bi-partisan work2165here in the Senate demonstrating this commitment most notably through2166Chairman Sullivan's FISH Act that has recently marked up in this2167Committee. I also note that important bi-partisan legislation has2168previously been introduced in the House, specifically Representative2169Huffman's Illegal Fishing and Forced Labor Prevention Act which I2170understand may be reintroduced in this Congress. I hope that this2171discussion today will help all of us to take advantage of that momentum2172and work towards these solutions.21732174 Senator Sullivan. Great. Excellent opening statements by2175all four, actually five of our witnesses. Senator Whitehouse is2176at another hearing. So, thank you on that. Let me begin with2177the basic question of this idea of whole of Government2178approach.2179 One of the things that I have been trying to do in my2180capacity, but I think we can do a better job of it. And Dr.2181Saumweber, your point about Japan, EU, and the United States,218260 percent of all imports in the world. That is huge power.2183 So after we finally got the U.S. Government to ban the2184importation of Russian seafood, took a long time, and then ban2185the, as Mr. Prout talked about, the kind of laundering of2186Russian seafood through China. They tried to cheat. Communist2187dictatorships are all working together to cheat, as they2188typically do.2189 I have been trying to get other countries, our allies, EU,2190Canada, Japan in particular, to do something similar. The2191Canadians, to their credit, have done a lot of banning of2192Russian seafood imports, but I would like to get all of your2193opinions very quickly on just what you think some of the key2194things we could do with like-minded partners and allies to2195enhance international cooperation, which I think is really the2196key. It has kind of come out in all your testimony.2197 And importantly, also get the word out--the naming and2198shaming that Mr. Poling talked about. You know, China likes to,2199you know, pretend that it is a country that sticks up for2200developing countries in Africa, the Pacific Islands. And as2201your testimony showed, Mr. Poling, it is very much to the2202contrary.2203 Their activities are completely undermining the2204sovereignty, independence, economic capacity of these countries2205that China claims that it tries to favor. We need to get the2206word out on that much better.2207 So can I get any and all of your views on the need for2208deeper international cooperation and what specific2209recommendations you would make for us or the Trump2210Administration to do that? And I will just take any and of you2211guys to weigh in on that question. Go ahead, Dr. Saumweber.2212 Mr. Saumweber. Sure. I will start. Thank you for that2213question. Yes, I absolutely--as I pointed out in my testimony2214and you noted, you know, we have these strong traditional2215partners in the EU and Japan, and we are together this huge2216block of the seafood market. That market power is----2217 Senator Sullivan. Is huge.2218 Mr. Saumweber. It is tremendous. And it is really true that2219market access control offers the most far-reaching tool for2220controlling this problem--for getting at this problem. If we2221can work with those partners to set common standards, we can2222set the tenor for the market. We can set the direction that it2223goes. So it is really going to require us to work closely with2224the European Union----2225 Senator Sullivan. And in your experience, do the Europeans2226and the Japanese want to do this? I was a little disappointed.2227I tried to get the--when the Biden Administration was putting2228in a strong fish statement in the G8 summit agreement with the2229G8 leaders, my office actually drafted that statement. Sent it2230to the Biden team.2231 To their credit, they used it. The Japanese, who are good2232friends, good allies, they thwarted it. So if you are from2233Japan and you are watching this, you know, again, I am a strong2234supporter of the alliance. I think the Japanese are great on so2235many issues.2236 On this issue, they were weak, and they needed to step up2237and be stronger. I hope the people from the Japanese embassy2238are watching this here.2239 Mr. Saumweber. I think Japan cares a great deal about IUU2240fishing. I think----2241 Senator Sullivan. Do they? OK----2242 Mr. Saumweber. Yes, they do. From their perspective, they2243have a very serious problem with the Chinese in particular2244coming into their waters, and North Korea as well. And so, I2245think they are very concerned about it from a sovereignty2246standpoint, from illegal presence of----2247 Senator Sullivan. Because it hurts their fishermen, too.2248 Mr. Saumweber. Yes, absolutely. And they have a very, very2249strong concern with it. The sort of particulars of it are a2250little bit different than here in the United States, but they2251do have a market access control program, as does the EU.2252 The EU is in some ways further along than we are, and they2253take a slightly different approach in how they implement it,2254but they do you have a program, as do we. And if we can align2255standards, that would hugely powerful.2256 Senator Sullivan. Yes----2257 Mr. Saumweber. The Japanese are just kind of at the start2258of getting it going, so we need to support them and to help2259them----2260 Senator Sullivan. So you think that would be a really2261important kind of outcome of this hearing to work on that?2262 Mr. Saumweber. Absolutely.2263 Senator Sullivan. Good. Any other thoughts on that, Mr.2264Poling?2265 Mr. Poling. I would make two points. First, I think we2266could do a far better job collaborating with our most2267technologically advanced partners when it comes to supporting2268maritime domain awareness.2269 Senator Sullivan. Yes.2270 Mr. Poling. We are vanishingly close to a point in time2271when it will be all but impossible for a vessel that has a2272metal superstructure that is say five meters or longer to run2273dark anywhere in the world.2274 We know what the technology looks like to accomplish that.2275Combinations of low-earth orbit satellites collecting synthetic2276aperture radar, radio frequency protection, et cetera.2277 But most of that capability is in the private sector, and2278it is not all American. On synthetic aperture radar, we have2279got maybe two of the top four companies trying to develop low-2280Earth orbit constellations. The others are in Japan and Europe.2281When it comes to radiofrequency----2282 Senator Sullivan. But still our allies.2283 Mr. Poling. Our allies. But for a number of reasons, mostly2284around security sector assistance, our platforms that we2285provide to allies and partners only incorporate American2286technology.2287 To give one example, in the case of the Philippines, who is2288up against the most coercion from China's maritime militia,2289they have all but abandoned using preferred U.S. platforms in2290favor of Canada's platform. Now the dark vessel detection, or2291DVD system, because that can incorporate not just Canadian, but2292also American and European technology.2293 Whereas the American platforms only incorporate American2294companies. We need to understand that, of course, there is2295creative competition here among tech companies, but this is a2296global problem.2297 And we should not turn partners away from whether it is2298Japanese, European, Israeli, Korean alternatives that can do a2299good job. That we should be able to light up the entire ocean2300in the next 5 to 10 years, but we won't do it with just2301American tech.2302 The second point I would make is, on the legal front, yes,2303we are parties and champions of port state measures, of the2304Fish Stocks Act. We are still not a party to UNCLOS. And that2305gives China a free point in every debate in every international2306platform.2307 Senator Sullivan. OK, good. Senator Blunt Rochester.2308 Senator Blunt Rochester. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to2309put a fine point on a comment that was said at the very end of2310your testimony, Dr. Saumweber, where you said this used to be a2311secondary issue.2312 I was just writing down different words from jobs, and the2313economy, and our small businesses, and mid-sized businesses2314that are impacted, our environment, as Senator Whitehouse2315mentioned, criminal activities, trade. I wrote down technology.2316I wrote down health.2317 Because we haven't really talked about the health impact of2318this, but when we are dealing with illegal products, we don't2319know what is in some of these things. So, even our health2320status. national security.2321 And we talked about Russia and China, and just the impact2322that they have not only on our national security, but also on2323their influence in other places around the world. And you know,2324and markets, our market power, piracy, international trade,2325technology. To me, this is a front and center issue.2326 And so, I want to start off with my first comment to say, I2327am excited to join the FISH Act. That is number one.2328 Senator Sullivan. There you go. Progress.2329 Senator Blunt Rochester. There you go.2330 [Laughter.]2331 Senator Blunt Rochester. And second, Dr. Saumweber, I2332wanted to ask your opinion. We know that NOAA National Marine2333Fisheries Service plays a vital role in combating IUU fishing.2334 From your experience, can you talk about what the impact2335of--the operational impact of a 30 percent budget cut to NOAA's2336enforcement activities, and can you describe how these cuts2337would affect NOAA's ability to conduct investigations into2338seafood fraud and mislabeling, which was another thing that we2339mentioned, issues that directly impact not only consumers but2340domestic fisheries?2341 Mr. Saumweber. Yes, thank you for that question. A 302342percent cut in NOAA's budget would be devastating to these2343efforts on a number of fronts. First of all, among the first2344things to go with any budget cut, even a much smaller cut than234530 percent, is the kind of interagency coordination that is2346hard, difficult, requires time, but is sometimes seen as being2347outside of kind of the core day to day mission of good Federal2348workers.2349 And so they don't dedicate time to those kinds of things2350that are complicated but necessary to attack this kind of2351really difficult challenge. And so, right out the window, you2352would sort of lose that coordination capacity that is so2353fundamental to this effort.2354 Next, you are going to lose the ability to have supporting2355science, to have the necessary kind of research done to2356understand how these stocks are changing, to understand what2357critical limits may or may not be being passed, and to be2358thinking about how this is really impacting our fishermen here2359at home.2360 And then finally, and I think as important in any of those2361situations is the ability, as I mentioned, to be present, to be2362part of these international negotiations, to be at the regional2363fishery management organizations where we are negotiating with2364China, where we are negotiating with our competitors.2365 We need to be educated and speak in a way that is informed2366about the state of affairs in the world and about the nature of2367fish stocks and the health of the ocean. And with those cuts,2368it will fundamentally damage the ability to do that.2369 Senator Blunt Rochester. Thank you. Doctor--or Mr. Prout,2370in addition to the travel, I would also say you have the best2371lapel pin of everyone as well with that beautiful crab. Mr.2372Prout, thank you for being here today. I appreciate you2373highlighting IUU fishing as a national security threat, and I2374share that view.2375 I would like to focus on a particularly urgent issue raised2376in your testimony, and that is the use of North Korean2377smuggling networks to launder Russian crab into the global2378seafood supply chain. From your vantage point in the commercial2379seafood sector, how visible or traceable is this laundering2380activity, and what makes it hard to detect?2381 Mr. Prout. Thank you, Senator Blunt Rochester. It is2382incredibly hard to detect because eventually it just lands as2383the name of another country. So there is no commitment to2384actually saying where it originally comes from, as cool would2385help with.2386 So once it goes through there and goes through those2387channels to get modified and then placed as a different country2388of origin, you essentially lose the original traceability.2389 And then of course, that is easier imported to these other2390countries around the world and possibly even back into the U.S.2391domestic market so that U.S. consumers are unaware of where the2392true source of their seafood and what they are supporting is2393actually coming from.2394 So it is incredibly difficult to really truly trace that.2395We know what is happening, but after it takes effect, it is2396hard to continue to follow it.2397 Senator Blunt Rochester. And what are the risks to U.S.2398fishermen, processors, consumers, if seafood from sanctioned2399regimes continue to enter the market undetected?2400 Mr. Prout. Undetected--it is--one of the key components of2401it is the downward pressure it puts on prices for true2402fishermen who are held to a higher standard of safety, of2403responsibility, and sustainability for their fisheries.2404 So really, it is the downward pressure that that is putting2405on local fishermen. It is, you know, when those products enter2406the market, it puts a tremendous amount of that downward2407pressure on prices for U.S. fishermen.2408 Senator Blunt Rochester. Mr. Chairman, I had more questions2409than I will submit for the record, but could I ask one last2410question?2411 Senator Sullivan. Sure, sure. I am going to do another2412round.2413 Senator Blunt Rochester. Oh, OK.2414 Senator Sullivan. Or two, or three.2415 Senator Blunt Rochester. OK.2416 [Laughter.]2417 Senator Sullivan. This is very important. I think Senator2418Cantwell might be on her way, but we will keep asking2419questions.2420 Senator Blunt Rochester. Perfect. Mr. Prout, you also2421described Russian fishing vessels exhibiting behavior that2422suggests they may be engaged in intelligence gathering near2423critical infrastructure.2424 I think this is one of the biggest issues that we talk a2425lot about on this committee as well is critical infrastructure2426around the world and just any kind of surveillance, you know,2427vulnerabilities. How concerned are you that commercial fishing2428vessels could be used as cover for surveillance or sabotage,2429particularly in the U.S. waters or near allied infrastructure?2430 Mr. Prout. Thank you, Senator Blunt Rochester, for the2431question. It is definitely of concern because we know what is2432happening with the monitoring that we have in place. These2433Russian vessels or Chinese vessels that are labeled as foreign2434fishing vessels are not exhibiting behavior or maneuvering that2435is typically associated with fishing behavior.2436 They are stationing at certain areas around the country2437typically, as you mentioned, to gather reconnaissance and2438possibly even sabotage for future operations. So it is2439definitely a major concern that they kind of use these fishing2440labels or fishing operations as a covert method for their2441sabotage and intel gathering capabilities and goals.2442 Senator Blunt Rochester. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will2443yield back.2444 Senator Sullivan. All right. It is great to have the2445Ranking Member here. Are you ready, Senator Cantwell or--I will2446now turn it over to Senator Cantwell for some questions.24472448 STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,2449 U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON24502451 Senator Cantwell. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank2452you to my colleague for also the great work on the2453Subcommittee. And thank you, Senator Sullivan, just for the2454important discussion about illegally unreported, unregulated2455fisheries, and how much that causes harm in both Washington,2456and Alaska, and across the Nation. I am sure that has pretty2457much been the subject of this conversation.2458 Senator Sullivan. The world.2459 Senator Cantwell. OK, good.2460 Senator Sullivan. Alaska, Delaware, Texas--the world.2461 Senator Cantwell. So illegal fishing counts for up to one-2462third the world's total fishery. So about 11 percent, $222463billion in seafood imports were caught illegally. So this2464really does--China and Russia are two of the worst actors in2465this space, and Russia in particular poses a direct threat to2466the livelihood of U.S. fishermen, including in my home state.2467 One study found that one-third of fish imported from China2468was actually Russian fish, and we need to keep up the pressure2469to stop this illegal Russian seafood from disrupting the2470markets here in the United States. So, in the 2022 defense2471bill, working with my colleague from Alaska, we included the2472largest ocean legislative package in decades, including2473provisions to expand NOAA's seafood traceability programs.2474 And we worked together with the NOAA Corps to expand their2475fleet of vessels and aircraft so that we can more and better2476affect stock assessments, and better science, and support for2477fishing families to stop the illegal fishing. So, the2478Administration though is calling for us to be seafood dominant.2479 That is great. They say they care about stopping illegal2480fishing, and yet they are gutting the core of NOAA programs and2481staffing, and that could have disastrous effects to our2482fisheries management, science, and enforcement. So far the2483Administration's action have led to 576 employees at the2484National Marine Fisheries Service being lost.2485 That is an 18 percent reduction in staff from January, and2486a 36 percent vacancy rate of normal staffing levels. NOAA told2487fishery managers not to expect basic survey data that they need2488to manage fisheries.2489 This is unacceptable. To make it worse, 30 percent of2490NOAA's research ships will be tied up at the docks this summer2491because the Administration is refusing to hire the credentialed2492mariners to sail, and that is very problematic.2493 But we all know that at least two pollock stock assessment2494surveys and salmon surveys on the West Coast are canceled. So,2495my question to you, Mr. Saumweber is--science is the2496foundation. How are these current NOAA budget cuts impacting on2497not being able to do stock assessments hurting us in our2498ability to combat illegal fishing?2499 Mr. Saumweber. Thank you, Senator. So, budget cuts to NOAA2500are devastating to our ability to combat IUU fishing. You can't2501really combat the problem without understanding what is there.2502The challenge, as you noted, is to have a strong foundation,2503strong understanding of what is sustainable, of what it is2504possible to catch.2505 And without that understanding, we have a very limited2506ability to work to set appropriate boundaries, to work with our2507partners to combat IUU fishing. NOAA science is the foundation2508for all of these negotiations that we are doing in the2509international space, with our partners, and it is the2510foundation for the work that we do here at home to prevent2511illegal products from coming into the Nation.2512 Senator Cantwell. Thank you for that. Mr. Prout, as a2513crabber, are you concerned about the NOAA fisheries workforce2514programs, and the cuts and impacts?2515 Mr. Prout. Yes. Thank you, Ranking Member Senator Cantwell.2516Yes, absolutely. The NOAA surveys are an essential part of how2517we run our fisheries. They are essentially the backbone of our2518fisheries across the U.S.2519 So without them, we don't have the data set for safe and2520sustainable harvest levels to be set. These surveys guide our2521quotas, protect the resource, and they give regulators the2522essential data and confidence to know whether or not they2523should open, or in some cases close a fishery.2524 So if those surveys are underfunded or not funded at all or2525delayed and they are operating--it causes a tremendous amount2526of uncertainty for the processors involved, for the fishermen2527involved, for the communities that rely on those species.2528 Continued investments and funding of those of those surveys2529is not just good science in my opinion, it is also required for2530economic stability, so you still have these fisheries in a2531sustainable manner for the future.2532 Senator Cantwell. Well, again, I apologize to my colleagues2533and others if I am repeating something that has been said, but2534we worked in a bipartisan base to secure Coast Guard funding2535and infrastructure investment.2536 We made massive upgrades to the Coast Guard infrastructure2537in Kodiak--your hometown, I guess. And we authorized new heavy2538weather boats needed for search and rescue for the fishermen2539off our coast.2540 And I am concerned that the Coast Guard has temporary2541reassigned ships and aircraft away from those core missions2542without a concrete plan. So for example, a C-130 based in2543Kodiak is now being used to fly ``alien expulsion missions'' on2544behalf of ICE.2545 We need them to do the search and rescue, and to deter2546illegal fishing in the Bering Sea. So, you highlighted in your2547written statement that we should fund Coast Guard to increase2548to combat illegal fishing. How important is this presence in2549Kodiak for crabbers?2550 Mr. Prout. Thank you, Ranking Member Cantwell. It is2551tremendously important.2552 When you start losing necessary infrastructure and pieces2553of equipment that are dedicated for those search and rescue2554efforts, those--the IUU efforts to deter IUU, and they start2555being allocated to different areas and then--when they2556originally attended, it makes it extremely difficult for2557fishermen to make safe and sound decisions when you know there2558is going to be less assets available for one of the most2559primary functions, which is search and rescue and protection of2560the fleet.2561 So it is very critical that we maintain those pieces of2562infrastructure for the local fishing communities throughout2563Alaska and the U.S.2564 Senator Cantwell. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I2565could just, Mr. Saumweber, for the record. I asked--you talked2566about surveys, but I think you probably believe the fishing2567patrols are also important. The fishing patrols are also2568important----2569 Mr. Saumweber. Yes, of course.2570 Senator Cantwell.--to the management council.2571 Mr. Saumweber. Absolutely, yes.2572 Senator Cantwell. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.2573 Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Cantwell. And look on2574stock assessments, I am adamant that we need to do it. To be2575honest, the Biden Administration was a fail on it. We had to2576not focus nearly enough on stock assessments. You may recall, I2577had the Deputy Secretary of Commerce here for his confirmation2578hearing just a couple of weeks ago with the Trump2579Administration, and I kind of read them the riot act on stock2580assessments, so it is a bipartisan abuse----2581 Senator Cantwell. I don't remember that.2582 [Laughter.]2583 Senator Sullivan. Oh, I think you remember that. More2584importantly, he remembers it, right.2585 Senator Cantwell. I am joking. I am joking.2586 Senator Sullivan. But so, I agree. And as I mentioned2587earlier, if we get to the budget reconciliation bill, would2588love your guys' vote on it. Maybe that is not going to happen.2589 But one thing that will happen is a massive historic2590investment in the Coast Guard, which is going to be, probably2591as I mentioned in my opening statement, the biggest investment2592in the Coast Guard in U.S. history. $22 billion--it has never2593been seen, anything like that.2594 And it is all going to go into cutters, and icebreakers,2595and helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft, and shoreside2596infrastructure in Kodiak and Juneau and Seattle. So, there is2597going to be a lot.2598 Senator Cantwell. I so appreciate your leadership on this2599issue, and your forthright education of people who didn't quite2600understand how critical stock assessments were to our fisheries2601and to being able to manage and police.2602 But I do hope that in these resource allocations, that we2603will make these points about the resources being shifted and2604how we--I mean this is why I believe in a NOAA Organic Act,2605because I am tired of people coming in every two years----2606 Senator Sullivan. I agree.2607 Senator Cantwell.--and giving us a different statement. So,2608thank you, Mr. Chairman.2609 Senator Sullivan. So let me ask for the Committee, we have2610had a mention of one bill, and Mr. Prout mentioned it. It was2611actually a bill that I got into a committee markup of a bigger2612bill here. Was dealing with the cool labeling that you2613mentioned, Mr. Prout.2614 And then I also had in last year's NDAA a provision saying2615no Chinese fish in any of our military commissaries, PXs, you2616know, chow halls. I mean, you think the Chinese Communist2617Party, PLA, is serving Alaskan crab in their Chinese military2618mess halls? They are not, OK.2619 So that bill was unfortunately stripped out of the NDAA2620last year by the then Speaker of the House. I have no idea why2621he was kind of pro-China, but can I just get the Committee's2622view very quickly, because I want to turn to some other issues,2623on those two bills. Mr. Prout, I am assuming the COOL Act,2624cooked crab labeling legislation that I got in that was2625actually the CHIPS and Science bill a couple of years ago, you2626and others are still very supportive of it. You mentioned it in2627your opening testimony.2628 And then I had a provision in the NDAA last year that2629passed as very bipartisan in the markup of the Armed Services2630committee, no Chinese fish in any U.S. military, PX,2631commissary, chow hall.2632 I mean, come on, why on earth would we or the U.S. military2633buy IUU fish from China when it can buy great Alaskan crab. So2634can I get just your views on that? This will be important as I2635press to get this legislation passed again this year. Mr.2636Poling, you have a view on either of those?2637 Mr. Poling. Well, on the second----2638 Senator Sullivan. No Chinese communist fish in commissaries2639and on U.S. military bases?2640 Mr. Poling. I won't speak to whether the fish are2641communist, but I do----2642 [Laughter.]2643 Mr. Poling. I do think it sends an important signal of the2644U.S.'s commitment to only import sustainably caught and legally2645caught fish.2646 Senator Sullivan. Good. Mr. Rickard.2647 Mr. Rickard. I think the country of origin labor laws have2648been massively important for domestic fisheries. And being2649able--for consumers to be able to make choices at retail with2650more information is always better.2651 Senator Sullivan. Great. Mr. Prout.2652 Mr. Prout. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Yes, country of2653origin labeling is extremely important, especially when it2654comes to not only frozen live crab products but frozen cooked2655crab products.2656 Senator Sullivan. By the way, can you--because I tried to2657explain this to all my colleagues here. It took a while. You2658can do it probably in much better time. Why is the cooked issue2659important as well?2660 Mr. Prout. It is one of the methods used to circumvent2661that. There is just different labeling enforcement for cooked2662products versus raw products that come into the state.2663 And ensuring that we have a country of origin labeling that2664also applies to the cooked product of the crab would help2665immensely in getting that applied the right way and letting2666people know what is actually going on for that country of2667origin.2668 And then as far as the Chinese fish and the food served, we2669just want to--we want--you know, Alaskan freedom fish is what2670we want.2671 Senator Sullivan. We want freedom fish to our service2672members, not commie fish to our service members.2673 Mr. Prout. Absolutely.2674 Senator Sullivan. Mr. Saumweber, you agree with those2675bills? Because I am going to re-attack them and hopefully get2676these over the goal line.2677 Mr. Saumweber. Thank you. I absolutely believe that country2678of origin labeling is a great idea. And also absolutely believe2679that the U.S. Government should be using its purchasing power2680in whatever way it can to support sustainability and2681traceability in our supply chains.2682 Senator Sullivan. I mean, the idea that we are buying--that2683our military is buying Chinese fish to serving to Soldiers, and2684Marines, and Sailors is just dumb, right. And I have no idea2685why the Speaker of the House last year stripped my bill out of2686the NDAA, but we will re-attack that.2687 Mr. Prout, let me go back to you on the Russian fishing2688industry and unfair competition with regard to U.S. fishermen,2689particularly in the crab area. You know, there was--I have2690stated it publicly. I don't have it in front of me. But there2691was a senior Russian official who publicly declared, we know we2692are at war with American fishermen, right. Just said it, right.2693 And their government is giving them resources, subsidies2694for their fleet. How did the banning of the importation of2695Russian seafood into U.S. markets help our crabbers, but helped2696the U.S. industry, all of our fishing communities, whether in2697Texas or Delaware, in Alaska? Help--and did that help your2698ability then to sell to the biggest market in the world, which2699is our market?2700 And what more should we be doing both with regard to the2701unfair competition with China and Russian fleets? We have2702talked about their IUU practices, their slave labor practices.2703Another thing that happens is their governments heavily2704subsidize their fleet. We don't do that--hardly at all here.2705 So what are the other things we can be doing, and how has2706the ban on Russian seafood into the U.S. market, including the2707Chinese communist loophole that we also shut down, helped your2708industry and other fishermen throughout the country?2709 Mr. Prout. Yes. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. So the effect2710of IUU and the importation of it into our markets has been2711nothing short of devastating. When Russia had originally--when2712they flood the market with illegal underpriced crab, or any2713other seafood commodity for that matter, it puts downward2714pressure on our prices and destabilizes the processors. So2715processors within Alaska especially rely on numerous revenue2716sources of different seafood commodities from multiple----2717 Senator Sullivan. And that is particularly the case in2718Kodiak, right?2719 Mr. Prout. Correct. Yes, absolutely. Hundreds of millions2720of pounds of different--of products coming across the dock, and2721they use that method to stay afloat, kind of diversifying their2722portfolio a little bit.2723 But if they take a major loss on crab or salmon, it really2724destabilizes their efforts and it threatens their whole2725operation. And additionally, fishermen then are potentially2726looking at a loss of a place to deliver because the processor2727is unable to compete with the importation of IUU products just2728due to the price difference that is associated with it.2729 Senator Sullivan. It is hard to compete against slave2730labor.2731 Mr. Prout. It is. I mean, I will just go ahead and say I do2732work for my father, though, so they have a little bit2733associated with that.2734 [Laughter.]2735 Mr. Prout. But also, the new--the program----2736 Senator Sullivan. We might have to strike that lie.2737 [Laughter.]2738 Senator Sullivan. If your dad is watching, we apologize.2739 Mr. Prout. But as far as the impact of your efforts, it has2740had a tremendous impact of banning the importation of Russian2741crab. One of the most notable products in Alaska, of course, is2742the Alaskan Red King Crab.2743 And this past season, myself and family, and all the rest2744of the fishermen who participated in that experienced, record2745prices at the dock for their catch. And I can confidently say2746that I believe that wouldn't have taken effect had there still2747been a large importation of Russian product coming into the2748domestic market.2749 So, your efforts to stem the flow of the IUU has been very2750obvious to my family and many of the fishermen within Alaska.2751 Senator Sullivan. And in terms of Government policies that2752we can undertake to combat IUU fishing, the heavily subsidized2753fleet--the one thing I want to talk about briefly, and actually2754I will save it for the next round because I want to be2755respectful to my colleague here. Well, I will just mention it.2756 And I am going to really, really compliment some of these2757reporters. This is Ian Urbina who wrote this incredible New2758Yorker piece, ``The Crimes Behind the Seafood You Eat,'' and it2759was all about Chinese IUUs. It is really detailed investigative2760reporting. I would like to submit that for the record for this2761hearing. Without objection.2762 [The information referred to follows:]27632764 The New Yorker27652766 THE CRIMES BEHIND THE SEAFOOD YOU EAT27672768China has invested heavily in an armada of far-flung fishing vessels,2769in part to extend its global influence. This maritime expansion has2770come at grave human cost.27712772 By Ian Urbina27732774 October 9, 202327752776 DANIEL ARITONANG GRADUATED from high school in May, 2018, hoping to2777find a job.2778 Short and lithe, he lived in the coastal village of Batu Lungun,2779Indonesia, where his father owned an auto shop. Aritonang spent his2780free time rebuilding engines in the shop, occasionally sneaking away to2781drag-race his blue Yamaha motorcycle on the village's back roads. He2782had worked hard in school but was a bit of a class clown, always2783pranking the girls. ``He was full of laughter and smiles,'' his high-2784school math teacher, Leni Apriyunita, said. His mother brought homemade2785bread to his teachers' houses, trying to help him get good grades and2786secure work; his father's shop was failing, and the family needed2787money. But, when Aritonang finished high school, youth unemployment was2788above sixteen per cent. He considered joining the police academy, and2789applied for positions at nearby plastics and textile factories, but2790never got an offer, disappointing his parents. He wrote on Instagram,2791``I know I failed, but I keep trying to make them happy.'' His2792childhood friend Hengki Anhar was also scrambling to find work. ``They2793asked for my skills,'' he said recently, of potential employers. ``But,2794to be honest, I don't have any.''2795 At the time, many villagers who had taken jobs as deckhands on2796foreign fishing ships were returning with enough money to buy2797motorcycles and houses. Anhar suggested that he and Aritonang go to2798sea, too, and Aritonang agreed, saying, ``As long as we're together.''2799He intended to use the money to fix up his parents' house or maybe to2800start a business. Firmandes Nugraha, another friend, worried that2801Aritonang was not cut out for hard labor. ``We took a running test, and2802he was too easily exhausted,'' he said. But Aritonang wouldn't be2803dissuaded. A year later, in July, he and Anhar travelled to the port2804City of Tegal, and applied for work through a manning agency called PT2805Bahtera Agung Samudra. (The agency seems not to have a license to2806operate, according to government records, and did not respond to2807requests for comment.) They handed over their passports, copies of2808their birth certificates, and bank documents. At eighteen, Aritonang2809was still young enough that the agency required him to provide a letter2810of parental consent. He posted a picture of himself and other recruits,2811writing, ``Just a bunch of common folk who hope for a successful and2812bright future.''2813 For the next two months, Aritonang and Anhar waited in Tegal for a2814ship assignment. Aritonang asked Nugraha to borrow money for them,2815saying that the pair were struggling to buy food.2816 Nugraha urged him to come home: ``You don't even know how to2817swim.'' Aritonang refused.2818 ``There's no other choice,'' he wrote, in a text. Finally, on2819September 2, 2019, Aritonang and Anhar were flown to Busan, South2820Korea, to board what they thought would be a Korean ship. But when they2821got to the port they were told to climb aboard a Chinese vessel--a2822rusty, white-and-red-keeled squid ship called the Zhen Fa 7.2823 Satellite data from Global Fishing Watch show about a thousand2824ships from China's distant-water fishing fleet on September 2, 2019.2825 That day, the ship set out across the Pacific.2826 Aritonang had just joined what may be the largest maritime2827operation the world has ever known.2828 In the past few decades, partly in an effort to project its2829influence abroad, China has dramatically expanded its distant-water2830fishing fleet. Chinese firms now own or operate terminals in ninety-2831five foreign ports. China estimates that it has twenty-seven hundred2832distant-water fishing ships, though this figure does not include2833vessels in contested waters; public records and satellite imaging2834suggest that the fleet may be closer to sixty-five hundred ships. (The2835U.S. and the E.U., by contrast, have fewer than three hundred distant-2836water fishing vessels each.) Some ships that appear to be fishing2837vessels press territorial claims in contested waters, including in the2838South China Sea and around Taiwan. ``This may look like a fishing2839fleet, but, in certain places, it's also serving military purposes,''2840Ian Ralby, who runs I.R. Consilium, a maritime-security firm, told me.2841China's preeminence at sea has come at a cost. The country is largely2842unresponsive to international laws, and its fleet is the worst2843perpetrator of illegal fishing in the world, helping drive species to2844the brink of extinction. Its ships are also rife with labor2845trafficking, debt bondage, violence, criminal neglect, and death. ``The2846human-rights abuses on these ships are happening on an industrial and2847global scale,'' Steve Trent, the C.E.O. of the Environmental Justice2848Foundation, said.2849 It took a little more than three months for the Zhen Fa 7 to cross2850the ocean and anchor near the Galapagos Islands. A squid ship is a2851bustling, bright, messy place. The scene on deck looks like a2852mechanic's garage where an oil change has gone terribly wrong. Scores2853of fishing lines extend into the water, each bearing specialized hooks2854operated by automated reels. When they pull a squid on board, it2855squirts warm, viscous ink, which coats the walls and floors. Deep-sea2856squid have high levels of ammonia, which they use for buoyancy, and a2857smell hangs in the air. The hardest labor generally happens at night,2858from 5 p.m. until 7 a.m. Hundreds of bowling-ball-size light bulbs hang2859on racks on both sides of the vessel, enticing the squid up from the2860depths. The blinding glow of the bulbs, visible more than a hundred2861miles away, makes the surrounding blackness feel otherworldly. ``Our2862minds got tested,'' Anhar said.2863 The captain's quarters were on the uppermost deck; the Chinese2864officers slept on the level below him, and the Chinese deckhands under2865that. The Indonesian workers occupied the bowels of the ship. Aritonang2866and Anhar lived in cramped cabins with bunk beds. Clotheslines of2867drying socks and towels lined the walls, and beer bottles littered the2868floor. The Indonesians were paid about three thousand dollars a year,2869plus a twenty-dollar bonus for every ton of squid caught. Once a week,2870a list of each man's catch was posted in the mess hall to encourage the2871crew to work harder.2872 Sometimes the officers patted the Indonesian deckhands on their2873heads, as though they were children. When angry, they insulted or2874struck them. The foreman slapped and punched workers for mistakes.2875``It's like we don't have any dignity,'' Anhar said.2876 The ship was rarely near enough to land to get cell reception, and,2877in any case, most deckhands didn't have phones that would work abroad.2878Chinese crew members were occasionally allowed to use a satellite phone2879on the ship's bridge. But when Aritonang and other Indonesians asked to2880call home the captain refused. After a couple of weeks on board, a2881deckhand named Rahman Finando got up the nerve to ask whether he could2882go home. The captain said no. A few days later, another deckhand,2883Mangihut Mejawati, found a group of Chinese officers and deckhands2884beating Finando, to punish him for asking to leave. ``They beat his2885whole body and stepped on him,'' Mejawati said. The other deckhands2886yelled for them to stop, and several jumped into the fray. Eventually,2887the violence ended, but the deckhands remained trapped on the ship.2888Mejawati told me, ``It's like we're in a cage.''2889 ALMOST A HUNDRED YEARS before Columbus, China dominated the seas.2890In the fifteenth century, China's emperor dispatched a fleet of2891``treasure ships'' that included warships, transports for cavalry2892horses, and merchant vessels carrying silk and porcelain to voyage2893around the Indian Ocean. They were some of the largest wooden ships2894ever built, with innovations like balanced rudders and bulwarked2895compartments that predated European technology by centuries. The2896armada's size was not surpassed until the navies of the First World2897War. But during the Ming dynasty political instability led China to2898turn inward. By the mid-sixteenth century, sailing on a multi-masted2899ship had become a crime. In docking its fleet, China lost its global2900preeminence. As Louise Levathes, the author of ``When China Ruled the2901Seas,'' told me, ``The period of China's greatest outward expansion was2902followed by the period of its greatest isolation.''2903 For most of the twentieth century, distant-water fishing--much of2904which takes place on the high seas--was dominated by the Soviet Union,2905Japan, and Spain. But the collapse of the U.S.S.R., coupled with2906expanding environmental and labor regulations, caused these fleets to2907shrink. Since the sixties, though, there have been advances in2908refrigeration, satellite technology, engine efficiency, and radar.2909Vessels can now stay at sea for more than two years without returning2910to land. As a result, global seafood consumption has risen fivefold.2911 Squid fishing, or jigging, in particular, has grown with American2912appetites. Until the early seventies, Americans consumed squid in tiny2913amounts, mostly at niche restaurants on the coasts.2914 But as overfishing depleted fish stocks the Federal government2915encouraged fishermen to shift their focus to squid, whose stocks were2916still robust. In 1974, a business-school student named Paul Kalikstein2917published a master's thesis asserting that Americans would prefer squid2918if it were breaded and fried. Promoters suggested calling it2919``calamari,'' the Italian word, which made it sound more like a gourmet2920dish. (``Squid'' is thought to be a sailors' variant of ``squirt,'' a2921reference to squid ink.) By the nineties, chain restaurants across the2922Midwest were serving squid. Today, Americans eat a hundred thousand2923tons a year.2924 China launched its first distant-water fishing fleet in 1985, when2925a state-owned company called the China National Fisheries Corporation2926dispatched thirteen trawlers to the coast of Guinea-Bissau. China had2927been fishing its own coastal waters aggressively. Since the sixties,2928its seafood biomass has dropped by ninety per cent. Zhang Yanxi, the2929general manager of the company, argued that joining ``the ranks of the2930world's offshore fisheries powers'' would make the country money,2931create jobs, feed its population, and safeguard its maritime rights.2932The government held a grand farewell ceremony for the launch of the2933first ships, with more than a thousand attendees, including Communist2934Party elites. A promotional video described the crew as ``two hundred2935and twenty-three brave pioneers cutting through the waves.''2936 Since then, China has invested heavily in its fleet. The country2937now catches more than five billion pounds of seafood a year through2938distant-water fishing, the biggest portion of it squid. China's seafood2939industry, which is estimated to be worth more than thirty-five billion2940dollars, accounts for a fifth of the international trade, and has2941helped create fifteen million jobs. The Chinese state owns much of the2942industry--including some twenty per cent of its squid ships--and2943oversees the rest through the Overseas Fisheries Association. Today,2944the Nation consumes more than a third of the world's fish.2945 China's fleet has also expanded the government's international2946influence. The country has built scores of ports as part of its Belt2947and Road Initiative, a global infrastructure program that has, at2948times, made it the largest financier of development in South America,2949sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia. These ports allow it to shirk taxes2950and avoid meddling inspectors. The investments also buy its government2951influence. In 2007, China loaned Sri Lanka more than three hundred2952million dollars to pay for the construction of a port. (A Chinese2953state-owned company built it.) In 2017, Sri Lanka, on the verge of2954defaulting on the loan, was forced to strike a deal granting China2955control over the port and its environs for ninety-nine years.2956 Military analysts believe that China uses its fleet for2957surveillance. In 2017, the country passed a law requiring private2958citizens and businesses to support Chinese intelligence efforts. Ports2959employ a digital logistics platform called logink, which tracks the2960movement of ships and goods in the surrounding area--including,2961possibly, American military cargo. Michael Wessel, a member of the2962U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, told me, ``This is2963really dangerous information for the U.S. to be handing over.'' (The2964Chinese Communist Party has dismissed these concerns, saying, ``It is2965no secret that the U.S. has become increasingly paranoid about anything2966related to China.'')2967 China also pushes its fleet into contested waters. ``China likely2968believes that, in time, the presence of its distant-water fleet will2969convert into some degree of sovereign control over those waters,''2970Ralby, the maritime-security specialist, told me. Some of its ships are2971disguised as fishing vessels but actually form what experts call a2972``maritime militia.'' According to research collected by the Center for2973Strategic and International Studies, the Chinese government pays the2974owners of some of these ships forty-five hundred dollars a day to2975remain in contested areas for most of the year.2976 Satellite data show that, last year, several dozen ships illegally2977fished in Taiwanese waters and that there were two hundred ships in2978disputed portions of the South China Sea. The ships help execute what a2979recent Congressional Research Service study called '' `gray zone'2980operations that use coercion short of war.'' They escort Chinese oil-2981and-gas survey vessels, deliver supplies, and obstruct foreign ships.2982 Sometimes these vessels are called into action. In December, 2018,2983the Filipino government began to repair a runway and build a beaching2984ramp on Thitu Island, a piece of land claimed by both the Philippines2985and China. More than ninety Chinese ships amassed along its coast,2986delaying the construction. In 2019, a Chinese vessel rammed and sank a2987Filipino boat anchored at Reed Bank, a disputed region in the South2988China Sea that is rich in oil reserves. Zhou Bo, a retired Chinese2989senior colonel, recently warned that these sorts of clashes could spark2990a war between the U.S. and China. (The Chinese government declined to2991comment on these matters. But Mao Ning, a spokesperson for its Ministry2992of Foreign Affairs, has previously defended her country's right to2993uphold ``China's territorial sovereignty and maritime order.'') Greg2994Poling, a senior fellow at C.S.I.S., noted that taking ownership of2995contested waters is part of the same project as assuming control of2996Taiwan. ``The goal with these fishing ships is to reclaim `lost2997territory' and restore China's former glory,'' he said.2998 CHINA'S DISTANT-WATER FLEET is opaque. The country divulges little2999information about its vessels, and some stay at sea for more than a3000year at a time, making them difficult to inspect. I spent the past four3001years, backed by a team of investigators working for a journalism3002nonprofit I run called the Outlaw Ocean Project, visiting the fleet's3003ships in their largest fishing grounds: near the Galapagos Islands;3004near the Falkland Islands; off the coast of the Gambia; and in the Sea3005of Japan, near the Korean Peninsula. When permitted, I boarded vessels3006to talk to the crew or pulled alongside them to interview officers by3007radio. In many instances, the Chinese ships got spooked, pulled up3008their gear, and fled. When this happened, I trailed them in a skiff to3009get close enough to throw aboard plastic bottles weighed down with3010rice, containing a pen, cigarettes, hard candy, and interview3011questions. On several occasions, deckhands wrote replies, providing3012phone numbers for family back home, and then threw the bottles back3013into the water. The reporting included interviews with their family3014members, and with two dozen additional crew members.3015 China bolsters its fleet with more than seven billion dollars a3016year in subsidies, as well as with logistical, security, and3017intelligence support. For instance, it sends vessels updates on the3018size and location of the world's major squid colonies, allowing the3019ships to coordinate their fishing. In 2022, I watched about two hundred3020and sixty ships jigging a patch of sea west of the Galapagos. The3021armada suddenly raised anchor and, in near simultaneity, moved a3022hundred miles to the southeast. Ted Schmitt, the director of Skylight,3023a maritime-monitoring program, told me that this is unusual: ``Fishing3024vessels from most other countries wouldn't work together on this3025scale.'' In July of that year, I pulled alongside the Zhe Pu Yuan 98, a3026squid ship that doubles as a floating hospital to treat deckhands3027without bringing them to shore. ``When workers are sick, they will come3028to our ship,'' the captain told me, by radio. The boat typically3029carried a doctor and maintained an operating room, a machine for3030running blood tests, and videoconferencing capabilities for consulting3031with doctors back in China. Its predecessor had treated more than three3032hundred people in the previous five years.3033 In February, 2022, I went with the conservation group Sea Shepherd3034and a documentary filmmaker named Ed Ou, who also translated on the3035trip, to the high seas near the Falkland Islands, and boarded a Chinese3036squid jigger there. The captain gave permission for me and a couple of3037my team members to roam freely as long as I didn't name his vessel. He3038remained on the bridge but had an officer shadow me wherever I went.3039The mood on the ship felt like that of a watery purgatory. The crew was3040made up of thirty-one men; their teeth were yellowed from chain-3041smoking, their skin sallow, their hands torn and spongy from sharp gear3042and perpetual wetness. The scene recalled an observation of the3043Scythian philosopher Anacharsis, who divided people into three3044categories: the living, the dead, and those at sea.3045 When squid latched on to a line, an automated reel flipped them3046onto a metal rack. Deckhands then tossed them into plastic baskets for3047sorting. The baskets often overflowed, and the floor filled shin-deep3048with squid. The squid became translucent in their final moments,3049sometimes hissing or coughing. (Their stink and stain are virtually3050impossible to wash from clothes. Sometimes crew members tie their dirty3051garments into a rope, up to twenty feet long, and drag it for hours in3052the water behind the ship.) Below deck, crew members weighed, sorted,3053and packed the squid for freezing. They prepared bait by carving squid3054up, separating the tongues from inside the beaks. In the galley, the3055cook noted that his ship had no fresh fruits or vegetables and asked3056whether we might be able to donate some from our ship.3057 We spoke to two Chinese deckhands who were wearing bright-orange3058life vests. Neither wanted his name used, for fear of retaliation. One3059man was twenty-eight, the other eighteen. It was their first time at3060sea, and they had signed two-year contracts. They earned about ten3061thousand dollars a year, but, for every day taken off work because of3062sickness or injury, they were docked two days' pay. The older deckhand3063recounted watching a fishing weight injure another crew member's arm.3064 At one point, the officer following us was called away. The older3065deckhand then said that many of the crew were being held there against3066their will. ``It's like being isolated from the world and far from3067modern life,'' he said. ``Many of us had our documents taken. They3068won't give them back.3069 Can we ask you to help us?'' He added, ``It's impossible to be3070happy, because we work many hours every day. We don't want to be here,3071but we are forced to stay.'' He estimated that eighty per cent of the3072other men would leave if they were allowed.3073 Looking nervous, the younger deckhand waved us into a dark hallway.3074He began typing on his cell phone. ``I can't disclose too much right3075now given I still need to work on the vessel, if I give too much3076information it might potentially create issues on board,'' he wrote. He3077gave me a phone number for his family and asked me to contact them.3078``Can you get us to the embassy in Argentina?'' he asked. Just then, my3079minder rounded the corner, and the deckhand walked away. Minutes later,3080my team members and I were ushered off the ship.3081 When I returned to shore, I contacted his family. ``My heart really3082aches,'' his older sister, a math teacher in Fujian, said, after3083hearing of her brother's situation. Her family had disagreed with his3084decision to go to sea, but he was persistent. She hadn't known that he3085was being held captive, and felt helpless to free him. ``He's really3086too young,'' she said. ``And now there is nothing we can do, because3087he's so far away.''3088 IN JUNE, 2020, the Zhen Fa 7 travelled to a pocket of ocean between3089the Galapagos and mainland Ecuador. The ship was owned by Rongcheng3090Wangdao Deep-Sea Aquatic Products, a midsize company based in Shandong.3091On board, Aritonang had slowly got used to his new life. The captain3092found out that he had mechanical experience and moved him to the engine3093room, where the work was slightly less taxing. For meals, the cook3094prepared pots of rice mixed with bits of fish. The Indonesians were3095each issued two boxes of instant noodles a week. If they wanted any3096other food--or coffee, alcohol, or cigarettes--the cost could be3097deducted from their salaries. Crew photos show deckhands posing with3098their catch and gathering for beers to celebrate.3099 One of Aritonang's friends on board was named Heri Kusmanto. ``When3100we boarded the ship in the first weeks, Heri was a lively person,''3101Mejawati said. ``He chatted, sang, and joked with all of us.''3102Kusmanto's job was to carry hundred-pound baskets of squid down to the3103refrigerated hold.3104 He sometimes made mistakes, and that earned him beatings. ``He did3105not dare fight back,'' a deckhand named Fikran told me. ``He would just3106stay quiet and stand still.'' The ship's cook often struck Kusmanto, so3107he avoided him by eating plain white rice in the kitchen when the cook3108wasn't around. Kusmanto soon got sick. He lost his appetite and stopped3109speaking, communicating mostly through gestures. ``He was like a3110toddler,'' Mejawati said. Then Kusmanto's legs and feet swelled and3111started to ache.3112 Kusmanto seemed to be suffering from beriberi, a disease caused by3113a deficiency of Vitamin B1, or thiamine. Its name derives3114from a Sinhalese word, beri, meaning ``weak'' or ``I cannot.'' It is3115often caused by a diet consisting mainly of white rice, instant3116noodles, or wheat flour. Symptoms include tingling, burning, numbness,3117difficulty breathing, lethargy, chest pain, dizziness, confusion, and3118severe swelling. Like scurvy, beriberi was common among nineteenth-3119century sailors. It also has a history in prisons, asylums, and migrant3120camps. If untreated, it can be fatal.3121 Beriberi is becoming prevalent on Chinese vessels in part because3122ships stay so long at sea, a trend facilitated by transshipment, which3123allows vessels to offload their catch to refrigerated carriers without3124returning to shore. Chinese ships typically stock rice and instant3125noodles for extended trips, because they are cheap and slow to spoil.3126But the body requires more B1 when carbohydrates are3127consumed in large amounts and during periods of intense exertion. Ship3128cooks also mix rice or noodles with raw or fermented fish, and3129supplement meals with coffee and tea, all of which are high in3130thiaminase, which destroys B1, exacerbating the issue.3131 Beriberi is often an indication of conditions of captivity, because3132it is avoidable and easily reversed.3133 Some countries (though not China) mandate that rice and flour be3134supplemented with B1. The illness can also be treated with3135vitamins, and when B1 is administered intravenously patients3136typically recover within twenty-four hours. But few Chinese ships seem3137to carry B1 supplements.3138 In many cases, captains refuse to bring sick crew members to shore,3139likely because the process would entail losing time and incurring labor3140costs. Swells can make it dangerous for large ships to get close to3141each other in order to transfer crew members. One video I reviewed3142shows a man being put inside a fishing net and sent hundreds of feet3143along a zip line, several stories above the open ocean, to get on3144another ship. My team and I found two dozen cases of workers on Chinese3145vessels between 2013 and 2021 who suffered from symptoms associated3146with beriberi; at least fifteen died.3147 Victor Weedn, a forensic pathologist in Washington, D.C., told me3148that allowing workers to die from beriberi would, in the U.S.,3149constitute criminal neglect. ``Slow-motion murder is still murder,'' he3150said.3151 The contract typically used by Kusmanto's manning agency stipulated3152heavy financial penalties for workers and their families if they quit3153prematurely. It also allowed the company to take workers' identity3154papers, including their passports, during the recruitment process, and3155to keep the documents if they failed to pay a fine for leaving early--3156provisions that violate laws in the U.S. and Indonesia. Still, as3157Kusmanto's condition worsened, his Indonesian crewmates asked whether3158he could go home. The captain refused. (Rongcheng Wangdao denied3159wrongdoing. The captains of Chinese ships in this piece could not be3160identified for comment. A spokesman for the manning agency blamed3161Kusmanto for his illness, writing, ``When on the ship, he didn't want3162to take a shower, he didn't want to eat, and he only ate instant3163noodles.'')3164 The ship may have been fishing illegally at the time, possibly3165complicating Kusmanto's situation.3166 During this period, according to an unpublished intelligence report3167compiled by the U.S. government, the Zhen Fa 7 turned off its location3168transponder several times, in violation of Chinese law. This generally3169occurred when the ship was close to Ecuadorian and Peruvian waters;3170captains often go dark to fish in other countries' waters, like those3171of Ecuador, where Chinese ships are typically forbidden.3172 On June 21st, the ship disappeared for eight days, between Peruvian3173and Ecuadorian waters.3174 On July 28th, it disappeared for fifteen days, near the Galapagos.3175 On August 14th, it disappeared again, near Ecuadorian waters.3176 ``Short of catching them in the act, this is as close as you can3177get to firm evidence,'' Michael J. Fitzpatrick, the U.S. Ambassador to3178Ecuador, told me. (Rongcheng Wangdao's vessels have been known to fish3179in unauthorized areas; one of the Zhen Fa 7's sister ships was fined3180for unlawfully entering Peruvian waters in 2017, and another was found3181illicitly fishing off the coast of North Korea. The company declined to3182comment on this matter.) Transferring Kusmanto to another vessel would3183have required disclosing the Zhen Fa 7's location, which might have3184been incriminating.3185 By early August, Kusmanto had become disoriented. Other deckhands3186demanded that he be given medical attention. Eventually, the captain3187relented, and transferred him to another ship, which carried him to3188port in Lima. He was taken to a hospital, where he recovered;3189afterward, he was flown home. (Kusmanto could not be reached for3190comment.) Meanwhile, the rest of the crew, which had by then been at3191sea for a year, felt a growing sense of isolation. ``They had initially3192told us that we would be sailing for eight months, and then they would3193land the ship,'' Anhar said. ``The fact was we never landed anywhere.''3194 CHINA DOES MORE illegal fishing than any other country, according3195to the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.3196Operating on the high seas is expensive, and there is virtually no law-3197enforcement presence--which encourages fishing in forbidden regions and3198using prohibited techniques to gain a competitive advantage. Aggressive3199fishing comes at an environmental cost. A third of the world's stocks3200are overfished. Squid stocks, once robust, have declined dramatically.3201More than thirty countries, including China, have banned shark finning,3202but the practice persists. Chinese ships often catch hammerhead,3203oceanic whitetip, and blue sharks so that their fins can be used in3204shark-fin soup. In 2017, Ecuadorian authorities discovered at least six3205thousand illegally caught sharks on board a single reefer. Other marine3206species are being decimated, too. Vessels fishing for totoaba, a large3207fish whose swim bladder is highly prized in Chinese medicine, use nets3208that inadvertently entangle and drown vaquita porpoises, which live3209only in Mexico's Sea of Cortez. Researchers estimate that, as a result,3210there are now only some ten vaquitas left in existence. China has the3211world's largest fleet of bottom trawlers, which drag nets across the3212seafloor, levelling coral reefs. Marine sediment stores large amounts3213of carbon, and, according to a recent study in Nature, bottom trawlers3214release almost a billion and a half tons of carbon dioxide each year--3215as much as that released by the entire aviation industry. China's3216illicit fishing practices also rob poorer countries of their own3217resources. Off the coast of West Africa, where China maintains a fleet3218of hundreds of ships, illegal fishing has been estimated to cost the3219region more than nine billion dollars a year.3220 The world's largest concentration of illegal fishing ships may be a3221fleet of Chinese squidders in North Korean waters. In 2017, in response3222to North Korea's nuclear-and ballistic-missile tests, the United3223Nations Security Council, with apparent backing from China, imposed3224sanctions intended to deprive Kim Jong Un's government of foreign3225currency, in part by blocking it from selling fishing rights, a major3226source of income. But, according to the U.N., Pyongyang has continued3227to earn foreign currency--a hundred and twenty million dollars in 20183228alone--by granting illicit rights, predominantly to Chinese fishermen.3229An advertisement on the Chinese Website Zhihu offers permits issued by3230the North Korean military for ``no risk high yield'' fishing with no3231catch limits: ``Looking forward to a win-win cooperation.'' China seems3232unable or unwilling to enforce sanctions on its ally.3233 Chinese boats have contributed to a decline in the region's squid3234stock; catches are down by roughly seventy per cent since 2003. Local3235fishermen have been unable to compete. ``We will be ruined,'' Haesoo3236Kim, the leader of an association of South Korean fishermen on Ulleung3237Island, which I visited in May, 2019, said. North Korean fishing3238captains have been forced to head farther from shore, where their ships3239get caught in storms or succumb to engine failure, and crew members3240face starvation, freezing temperatures, and drowning. Roughly a hundred3241small North Korean fishing boats wash up on Japanese shores annually,3242some of them carrying the corpses of fishermen. Chinese boats in these3243waters are also known for ramming patrol vessels. In 2016, Chinese3244fishermen rammed and sank a South Korean cutter in the Yellow Sea. In3245another incident, the South Korean Coast Guard opened fire on more than3246two dozen Chinese ships that rushed at its vessels.3247 In 2019, I went with a South Korean squid ship to the sea border3248between North Korea and South Korea. It didn't take us long to find a3249convoy of Chinese squidders headed into North Korean waters. We fell in3250alongside them and launched a drone to capture their identification3251numbers.3252 One of the Chinese captains blared his horn and flashed his3253lights--warning signs in maritime protocol. Since we were in South3254Korean waters and at a legal distance, our captain stayed his course.3255The Chinese captain then abruptly cut toward us, on a collision3256trajectory. Our captain veered away when the Chinese vessel was only3257thirty feet off.3258 The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs told me that ``China has3259consistently and conscientiously enforced the resolutions of the3260Security Council relating to North Korea,'' and added that the country3261has ``consistently punished'' illegal fishing. But the Ministry neither3262admitted nor denied that China sends boats into North Korean waters. In32632020, the nonprofit Global Fishing Watch used satellite data to reveal3264that hundreds of Chinese squid ships were routinely fishing in North3265Korean waters. By 2022, China had cut down this illegal armada by3266seventy-five per cent from its peak. Still, in unregulated waters, the3267hours worked by the fleet have increased, and the size of its catch has3268only grown.3269 SHORTLY AFTER New Year's Day, 2021, the Zhen Fa 7 rounded the tip3270of South America and stopped briefly in Chilean waters, close enough to3271shore to get cell-phone reception. Aritonang went to the bridge and,3272through pantomime and broken English, asked one of the officers whether3273he could borrow his phone. The officer indicated that it would cost3274him, rubbing his forefinger and thumb together. Aritonang ran below3275deck, sold some of his cigarettes and snacks to other deckhands,3276borrowed whatever money he could, and came back with the equivalent of3277about thirteen dollars, which bought him five minutes. He dialed his3278parents' house, and his mother answered, excited to hear his voice. He3279told her that he would be home by May and asked to speak to his father.3280``He's resting,'' she told him. In fact, he had died of a heart attack3281several days earlier, but Aritonang's mother didn't want to upset her3282son while he was at sea. She later told their pastor that she was3283looking forward to Aritonang's return. ``He wants to build a house for3284us,'' she said.3285 Soon afterward, the ship dropped anchor in the Blue Hole, an area3286near the Falkland Islands, where ongoing territorial disputes between3287the U.K. and Argentina provide a gap in maritime enforcement that ships3288can exploit. Aritonang grew homesick, staying in his room and eating3289mostly instant noodles. ``He seemed to become sad and tired,'' Fikran3290said. That January, Aritonang fell ill with beriberi. The whites of his3291eyes turned yellow, and his legs became swollen. ``Daniel was in pretty3292bad shape,'' Anhar told me. The captain refused to get him medical3293attention. ``There was still a lot of squid,'' Anhar said. ``We were in3294the middle of an operation.'' In February, the crew unloaded their3295catch onto a reefer that carried it to Mauritius. But, for reasons that3296remain unclear, the captain refused to send Aritonang to shore as well.3297 Eventually, Aritonang could no longer walk. The Indonesian crew3298went to the bridge again and confronted the captain, threatening to3299strike if he didn't get Aritonang medical help. ``We were all against3300the captain,'' Anhar said. Finally, the captain acquiesced, and, on3301March 2nd, transferred Aritonang to a fuel tanker, the Marlin, which3302agreed to carry him to Montevideo, Uruguay. The Marlin's crew brought3303him to a service area off the coast, where a skiff picked him up and3304took him to the port. A maritime agency representing Rongcheng Wangdao3305in Uruguay called a local hospital, and ambulance workers took him3306there.3307 Jesica Reyes, who is thirty-six, is one of the few interpreters of3308Indonesian in Montevideo. She taught herself the language while working3309at an Internet cafe that was popular among Indonesian crews; they3310called her Mbak, meaning ``Miss'' or ``big sister.'' From 2013 to 2021,3311fishing ships, most of them Chinese, disembarked a dead body in3312Montevideo roughly every month and a half.3313 Over a recent dinner, Reyes told me about hundreds of deckhands in3314need whom she had assisted.3315 She described one deckhand who died from a tooth infection because3316his captain wouldn't bring him to shore. She told me of another ailing3317deckhand whose agency neglected to take him to a hospital, keeping him3318in a hotel room while his condition deteriorated; he eventually died.3319 On March, 7, 2021, Reyes was asked by the maritime agency to go to3320the emergency room to help doctors communicate with Aritonang; she was3321told that he had a stomach ache. When he arrived at the hospital,3322however, his whole body was swollen, and she could see bruises around3323his eyes and neck. He whispered to her that he had been tied by the3324neck. (Other deckhands later told me that they hadn't seen this happen,3325and were unsure when he sustained the injuries.) Reyes called the3326maritime agency and said, ``If this is a stomach ache. . .You're not3327looking at this young man.3328 He is all messed up!'' She took photographs of his condition,3329before doctors asked her to stop, because she was alarmed.3330 In the emergency room, physicians administered intravenous fluids.3331Aritonang, crying and shaking, asked Reyes, ``Where are my friends?''3332He whispered, ``I'm scared.'' Aritonang was pronounced dead the3333following morning. ``I was angry,'' Reyes told me. The deckhands I3334reached were furious. Mejawati said, ``We really hope that, if it's3335possible, the captain and all the supervisors can be captured, charged,3336or jailed.'' Anhar, Aritonang's best friend, found out about his death3337only after disembarking from the Zhen Fa 7 in Singapore, that May. ``We3338were devastated,'' he said, of the crew members. When we reached him,3339he was still carrying a suitcase full of Aritonang's clothes that he'd3340promised to take home for him.3341 FISHING IS ONE of the world's deadliest jobs--a recent study3342estimates that more than a hundred thousand workers die every year--and3343Chinese ships are among the most brutal.3344 Recruiters often target desperate men in inland China and in poor3345countries. ``If you are in debt, your family has shunned you, you don't3346want to be looked down on, turn off your phone and stay far away from3347land,'' an online advertisement in China reads. Some recruits are lured3348with promises of lucrative contracts, according to court documents and3349investigations by Chinese news outlets, only to discover that they3350incur a series of fees--sometimes amounting to more than a month's3351wages--to cover expenses such as travel, job training, crew3352certifications, and protective workwear. Often, workers pay these fees3353by taking out loans from the manning agencies, creating a form of debt3354bondage. Companies confiscate passports and extract fines for leaving3355jobs, further trapping workers. And even those who are willing to risk3356penalties are sometimes in essence held captive on ships.3357 For a 2022 report, the Environmental Justice Foundation interviewed3358more than a hundred Indonesian crew members and found that roughly3359ninety-seven per cent had their documents confiscated or experienced3360debt bondage. Occasionally, workers in these conditions manage to alert3361authorities. In 2014, twenty-eight African workers disembarked from a3362Chinese squidder called the Jia De 1, which was anchored in Montevideo,3363and several complained of beatings on board and showed shackle marks on3364their ankles. Fifteen crew members were hospitalized. (The company that3365owned the ship did not respond to requests for comment.) In 2020,3366several Indonesian deckhands reportedly complained about severe3367beatings at sea and the presence of a man's body in one of the ship's3368freezers. An autopsy revealed that the man had sustained bruises,3369scarring, and a spinal injury. Indonesian authorities sentenced several3370manning-agency executives to more than a year in prison for labor3371trafficking. (The company did not respond to requests for comment.)3372 In China, these labor abuses are an open secret. A diary kept by3373one Chinese deckhand offers an unusually detailed glimpse into this3374world. In May, 2013, the deckhand paid a two-hundred-dollar recruitment3375fee to a manning agency, which dispatched him to a ship called the Jin3376Han Yu 4879.3377 The crew were told that their first ten days or so on board would3378be a trial period, after which they could leave, but the ship stayed at3379sea for a hundred and two days. ``You are slaves to work anytime and3380anywhere,'' the deckhand wrote in his diary. Officers were served meat3381at mealtimes, he said, but deckhands got only bones. ``The bell rings,3382you must be up, whether it is day, night, early morning, no matter how3383strong the wind, how heavy the rain, there are no Sundays and3384holidays.'' (The company that owns the ship did not respond to requests3385for comment.)3386 The broader public in China was forced to reckon with the3387conditions on ships when the crew of a squid jigger called the Lu Rong3388Yu 2682 mutinied, in 2011. The captain, Li Chengquan, was a ``big,3389tall, and bad-tempered man'' who, according to a deckhand, gave a black3390eye to a worker who angered him. Rumors began circulating that the3391seven-thousand-dollar annual salary that they had been promised was not3392guaranteed. Instead, they would earn about four cents per pound of3393squid caught--which would amount to far less. Nine crew members took3394the captain hostage. In the next five weeks, the ship's crew devolved3395into warring factions. Men disappeared at night, a crew member was tied3396up and tossed overboard, and someone sabotaged a valve on the ship,3397which started letting water in. The crew eventually managed to restore3398the ship's communications system and transmit a distress signal,3399drawing two Chinese fishing vessels to their aid. Only eleven of the3400original thirty-three men made it back to shore. The lead mutineer and3401the ship's captain were sentenced to death by the Chinese government.3402(The company that owns the ship did not respond to requests for3403comment.)3404 Labor trafficking has also been documented on American, South3405Korean, and Thai boats. But China's fleet is arguably the worst3406offender, and it has done little to curb violations. Between 2018 and34072022, my team found, China gave more than seventeen million dollars in3408subsidies to companies where at least fifty ships seem to have engaged3409in fishing crimes or had deaths or injuries on board--some of which3410were likely the result of unsafe labor conditions. (The government3411declined to comment on this matter, but Wang Wenbin, a spokesperson for3412the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recently said that the fleet operates3413``in accordance with laws and regulations,'' and accused the U.S. of3414politicizing ``issues that are about fisheries in the name of3415environmental protection and human rights.'')3416 In the past few years, China has made a number of reforms, but they3417seem aimed more at quelling dissent than at holding companies3418accountable. In 2017, after a Filipino worker died in a knife fight3419with some of his Chinese crewmates, the Chinese government created a3420Communist Party branch in Chimbote, Peru--the first for fishing3421workers--intended to bolster their ``spiritual sustenance.'' Local3422police in some Chinese cities have begun using satellite video links to3423connect to the bridges of some Chinese vessels. In 2020, when Chinese3424crew members on a ship near Peru went on strike, the company contacted3425the local police, who explained to the workers that they could come3426ashore in Peru and fly back to China, but they would have to pay for3427the plane tickets.3428 ``Wouldn't it feel like losing out if you resigned now?'' a police3429officer asked. The men returned to work.3430 AS I REPORTED on these ships, stories of violence and captivity3431surfaced even when I wasn't looking for them. This year, I received a3432video from 2020 in which two Filipino crew members said that they were3433ill but were being prevented from leaving their ship. ``Please rescue3434us,'' one pleaded. ``We are already sick here. The captain won't send3435us to the hospital.'' Three deckhands died that summer; at least one of3436their bodies was thrown overboard. (The manning agency that placed3437these workers on the ship, PT Puncak Jaya Samudra, did not respond to3438requests for comment. Nor did the company that owns the ship.) On a3439trip to Jakarta, Indonesia, in 2020, I met a half-dozen young men who3440told me that, in 2019, a young deckhand named Fadhil died on their ship3441because the officers had refused to bring him to shore. ``He was3442begging to return home, but he was not allowed,'' Ramadhan Sugandhi, a3443deckhand, said. (The ship-owning company did not respond to requests3444for comment, nor did his manning agency, PT Shafar Abadi Indonesia.)3445This past June, a bottle washed ashore near Maldonado, Uruguay,3446containing what appeared to be a message from a distressed Chinese3447deckhand. ``Hello, I am a crew member of the ship Lu Qing Yuan Yu 765,3448and I was locked up by the company,'' it read. ``When you see this3449paper, please help me call the police! S.O.S. S.O.S.'' (The owner of3450the ship, Qingdao Songhai Fishery, said that the claims were fabricated3451by crew members.)3452 Reyes, the Indonesian translator, put me in touch with Rafly3453Maulana Sadad, an Indonesian who, while working on the Lu Rong Yuan Yu3454978 two years ago, fell down a flight of stairs and broke his back. He3455immediately went back to work pulling nets, then fainted, and woke up3456in bed. The captain refused to take him to shore, and he spent the next3457five months on the ship, his condition worsening. Sadad's friends3458helped him eat and bathe, but he was disoriented and often lay in a3459pool of his own urine. ``I was having difficulty speaking,'' Sadad told3460me last year. ``I felt like I'd had a stroke or something. I couldn't3461really understand anything.'' In August, 2021, the captain dropped3462Sadad off in Montevideo, and he spent nine days in the hospital, before3463being flown home. (Requests for comment from Rongcheng Rongyuan, which3464owns the ship Sadad worked on, and PT Abadi Mandiri International, his3465manning agency, went unanswered.) Sadad spoke to me from Indonesia,3466where he could walk only with crutches. ``It was a very bitter life3467experience,'' he said.3468 Like the boats that supply them, Chinese processing plants rely on3469forced labor. For the past thirty years, the North Korean government3470has required citizens to work in factories in Russia and China, and to3471put ninety per cent of their earnings--amounting to hundreds of3472millions of dollars--into accounts controlled by the state. Laborers3473are often subjected to heavy monitoring and strictly limited in their3474movements. U.N. sanctions ban such uses of North Korean workers, but,3475according to Chinese government estimates, last year as many as eighty3476thousand North Korean workers were living in one city in northeastern3477China alone. According to a report by the Committee for Human Rights in3478North Korea, at least four hundred and fifty of them were working in3479seafood plants. The Chinese government has largely scrubbed references3480to these workers from the Internet. But, using the search term ``North3481Korean beauties,'' my team and I found several videos on Douyin, the3482Chinese version of TikTok, that appear to show female seafood-plant3483workers, most posted by gawking male employees. One Chinese commenter3484observed that the women ``have a strong sense of national identity and3485are self-disciplined!'' Another argued, however, that the workers have3486no choice but to obey orders, or ``their family members will suffer.''3487 In the past decade, China has also overseen a crackdown on Uyghurs3488and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, a region in northwestern3489China, setting up mass detention centers and forcing detainees to work3490in cotton fields, on tomato farms, and in polysilicon factories. More3491recently, in an effort to disrupt Uyghur communities and find cheap3492labor for major industries, the government has relocated millions of3493Uyghurs to work for companies across the country. Workers are often3494supervised by security guards, in dorms surrounded by barbed wire. By3495searching company newsletters, annual reports, and state-media stories,3496my team and I found that, in the past five years, thousands of Uyghurs3497and other Muslim minorities have been sent to work in seafood-3498processing plants. Some are subjected to ``patriotic education''; in a34992021 article, local Party officials said that members of minority3500groups working at one seafood plant were a ``typical big family'' and3501were learning to deepen their ``education of ethnic unity.'' Laura3502Murphy, a professor at Sheffield Hallam University, in the U.K., told3503me, ``This is all part of the project to erase Uyghur culture,3504identities, religion, and, most certainly, their politics. The goal is3505the complete transformation of the entire community.'' (Chinese3506officials did not respond to multiple requests for comment on Uyghur3507and North Korean forced labor in the Nation's seafood-processing3508industry.)3509 The U.S. has strict laws forbidding the importation of goods3510produced with North Korean or Uyghur labor. The use of such workers in3511other industries--for example, in solar-panel manufacturing--has been3512documented in recent years, and the U.S. has confiscated a billion3513dollars' worth of imported products as a result. We found, however,3514that companies employing Uyghurs and North Koreans have recently3515exported at least forty-seven thousand tons of seafood, including some3516seventeen per cent of all squid sent to the U.S. Shipments went to3517dozens of American importers, including ones that supply military bases3518and public-school cafeterias. ``These revelations pose a very serious3519problem for the entire seafood industry,'' Martina Vandenberg, the3520founder and president of the Human Trafficking Legal Center, told me.3521 China does not welcome reporting on this industry. In 2022, I spent3522two weeks on board the Modoc, a former U.S. Navy boat that the3523nonprofit Earthrace Conservation uses as a patrol vessel, visiting3524Chinese squid ships off the coast of South America. As we were sailing3525back to a Galapagos port, an Ecuadorian Navy ship approached us, and an3526officer said that our permit to reenter Ecuadorian waters had been3527revoked. ``If you do not turn around now, we will board and arrest3528you,'' he said.3529 He told us to sail to another country. We didn't have enough food3530and water for the journey. After two days of negotiations, we were3531briefly allowed into the port, where armed Ecuadorian officers boarded;3532they claimed that the ship's permits had been filed improperly and that3533our ship had deviated slightly in its approved course while exiting3534national waters. Such violations typically result in nothing more than3535a written citation. But, according to Ambassador Fitzpatrick, the3536explanation was a bit more complicated. He said that the Chinese3537government had contacted several Ecuadorian lawmakers to raise concerns3538about the presence of what they depicted as a quasi-military vessel3539engaging in covert operations. When I spoke with Juan Carlos Holguin,3540the Ecuadorian Foreign Minister at the time, he denied that China was3541involved. But Fitzpatrick told me that Quito treads carefully when it3542comes to China, in part because Ecuador is deeply in debt to the3543country. ``China did not like the Modoc,'' he said. ``But mostly it did3544not want more media coverage on its squid fleet.''3545 THE DAY OF ARITONANG'S DEATH, Reyes filed a report with the3546Uruguayan Coast Guard, and showed officers her photographs. ``They3547seemed pretty uninterested,'' she said. The following day, a local3548coroner conducted an autopsy. ``A situation of physical abuse3549emerged,'' the report reads. I sent it to Weedn, the forensic3550pathologist, who told me that the body showed signs of violence and3551that untreated beriberi seems to have been the cause of death. Nicolas3552Potrie, who runs the Indonesian consulate in Montevideo, remembered3553getting a call from Mirta Morales, the prosecutor who investigated3554Aritonang's case. ``We need to continue trying to figure out what3555happened. These marks--everybody saw them,'' Potrie recalled her3556saying. (A representative for Rongcheng Wangdao said that the company3557had found no evidence of misconduct on the ship: ``There was nothing3558regarding your alleged appalling incidents about abuse, violation,3559insults to one's character, physical violence or withheld salaries.''3560The company said that it had handed the matter over to the China3561Overseas Fisheries Association. Questions submitted to the association3562went unanswered.)3563 Potrie pressed for further inquiry, but none seemed forthcoming.3564Morales declined to share any information about the case with me. In3565March of 2022, I visited Aldo Braida, the president of the Chamber of3566Foreign Fishing Agents, which represents companies working with foreign3567vessels in Uruguay, at his office in Montevideo. He dismissed the3568accounts of mistreatment on Chinese ships that dock in the port as3569``fake news,'' claiming, ``There are a lot of lies around this.'' He3570told me that, if crew members whose bodies were disembarked in3571Montevideo had suffered physical abuse, Uruguayan authorities would3572discover it, and that, when you put men in close quarters, fights were3573likely to break out. ``We live in a violent society,'' he said.3574 Uruguay has little incentive to scrutinize China further, because3575the country brings lucrative business to the region. In 2018, for3576example, a Chinese company that had bought a nearly seventy-acre plot3577of land west of Montevideo presented a plan to build a more than two-3578hundred-million-dollar ``megaport.'' Local media reported that the port3579would be a free-trade zone and include half-mile-long docks, a3580shipyard, a fuelling station, and seafood storage and processing3581facilities. The Uruguayan government had been pursuing such Chinese3582investment for years. The President at the time, Tabare Vazquez,3583attempted to sidestep the constitution, which requires a two-thirds3584vote by both chambers of the General Assembly, and authorize3585construction of the port by executive order.3586 ``There's so much money on the table that politicians start bending3587the law to grab at it,'' Milko Schvartzman, a marine researcher based3588in Argentina, told me. But, following resistance from the public and3589from opposition parties, the plan was called off.3590 The seafood industry is difficult to police. A large portion of3591fish consumed in the U.S. is caught or processed by Chinese companies.3592Several laws exist to prevent the U.S. from importing products tainted3593by forced labor, including that which is involved in the production of3594conflict diamonds and sweatshop goods. But China is not forthcoming3595with details about its ships and processing plants. At one point, on a3596Chinese ship, a deckhand showed me stacks of frozen catch in white3597bags. He explained that they leave the ship names off the bags so that3598they can be easily transferred between vessels. This practice allows3599seafood companies to hide their ties to ships with criminal histories.3600On the bridge of another ship, a Chinese captain opened his logbook,3601which is supposed to document his catch. The first two pages had3602notations; the rest were blank. ``No one keeps those,'' he said.3603Company officials could reverse engineer the information later. Kenneth3604Kennedy, a former manager of the anti-forced-labor program at3605Immigration and Customs Enforcement, said that the U.S. government3606should block seafood imports from China until American companies can3607demonstrate that their supply chains are free of abuse. ``The U.S. is3608awash with criminally tainted seafood,'' he said.3609 These companies included retail chains such as Costco, Kroger, H3610Mart, and Safeway.3611 They also included food-service distributors like Sysco and3612Performance Food Group, each servicing hundreds of thousands of3613restaurants and cafeterias at colleges, hotels, hospitals, and3614government buildings. (These companies did not respond to requests for3615comment.)3616 It's likely that some of the squid Aritonang died catching ended up3617on an American plate.3618 To document the gaps in the system, we followed the supply chain to3619show where squid tainted by worker abuse might end up.3620 First, we tracked the Zhen Fa 7 by satellite, from 2018 to 2022.3621 During that time, it transferred its catch to seven refrigerated3622reefers.3623 We then tracked the journey of one reefer, the Lu Rong Yuan Yu Yun3624177, to China's Shidao port.3625 It is especially difficult to document where the catch goes once it3626gets to port. Arduous in-person tracking is sometimes the only way to3627follow its movements.3628 We hired private investigators in China to track a shipment of3629squid from the Lu Rong Yuan Yu Yun 177. They hid in their car at the3630port, filming at a distance as workers unloaded the squid and then3631packed it into trucks.3632 They followed the trucks out of the port.3633 The trucks eventually arrived at a seafood facility owned by a3634company called Rongcheng Xinhui Aquatic Products.3635 We also reviewed the ownership details of the other reefers that3636transshipped with the Zhen Fa 7 and found that its squid likely ended3637up at five additional processing plants in China.3638 Two of these plants, owned by Chishan Group, have employed at least3639a hundred and seventy workers transferred from Xinjiang, according to3640local news reports and corporate newsletters on the company's Website.3641(A representative from Rongcheng Haibo, one of the plants, said that3642the company ``has never employed any Xinjiang workers.'' A3643representative from Shandong Haidu, the other plant, said, ``There is3644no use of illegal workers from Xinjiang or other countries, and we3645recently passed human-rights audits.'' Chishan Group did not respond to3646requests for comment.)3647 The plants connected to the Zhen Fa 7 then sent large quantities of3648their seafood to at least sixty-two American importers.3649 On April 22nd, Aritonang's body was flown from Montevideo to3650Jakarta, then driven, in a wooden casket with a Jesus figurine on top,3651to his family home in Batu Lungun. Villagers lined the road to pay3652their respects; Aritonang's mother wailed and fainted upon seeing the3653casket.3654 A funeral was soon held, and Aritonang was buried a few feet from3655his father, in a cemetery plot not far from his church. His grave3656marker consisted of two slats of wood joined to make a cross.3657 That night, an official from Aritonang's manning agency visited the3658family at their home to discuss what locals call a ``peace agreement.''3659Anhar said that the family ended up accepting a settlement of some two3660hundred million rupiah, or roughly thirteen thousand dollars. Family3661members were reluctant to talk about the events on the ship.3662Aritonang's brother Beben said that he didn't want his family to get in3663trouble and that talking about the case might cause problems for his3664mother.3665 ``We, Daniel's family, have made peace with the ship people and3666have let him go,'' he said.3667 Last year, thirteen months after Aritonang's death, I spoke again3668to his family by video chat. His mother, Regina Sihombing, sat on a3669leopard-print rug in her living room with her son Leonardo.3670 The room had no furniture and no place to sit other than the floor.3671The house had undergone repairs with money from the settlement,3672according to the village chief; in the end, it seems, Aritonang had3673managed to fix up his parents' home after all. When the conversation3674turned to him, his mother began to weep. ``You can see how I am now,''3675she said. Leonardo told her, ``Don't be sad. It was his time.''36763677This piece was produced with contributions from Joe Galvin, Maya3678Martin, Susan Ryan, Austin Brush, and Daniel Murphy.36793680 Senator Sullivan. That--there was another really, really3681good piece in Politico Magazine. Ian Urbina has just done a3682great job in terms of highlighting this. But my point is, to3683Senator Blunt Rochester's point earlier, this is such a3684unifying issue for America. It should be.3685 These guys are using forced labor. They are using3686unsustainable environmental practices. They are crushing our3687seafood coastal communities. They are undermining our allies.3688They are ruining the fish stocks of the world. And they are3689often using human trafficking.3690 And then, I mean, you mentioned it, Mr. Prout, the North3691Koreans are laundering their seafood. They are using their3692money for terrorism. I mean, it sounds like the plot of a bad3693James Bond movie, right. I mean, this should be unifying. We3694should be making the whole world know about this. I mean, and3695it really doesn't get out there. I don't think there is any3696American that thinks this is a good idea, that we are importing3697Chinese slave labor fish that is putting hardworking American3698fishermen and their families out of business.3699 So, maybe I will just mention for the whole panel, what3700more can we be doing to let the world know. This New Yorker3701piece--came out in October 9, 2023, which is incredible.3702 I think the whole country should read this. You would be3703shocked at what you guys in Alaska, what our fishermen have to3704compete against. You can't compete against slave labor, and3705unsustainable fisheries, and cheating, which is what the3706Chinese communists do all over the world.3707 So, what more can we be doing, either to name and shame, as3708you said Mr. Poling, or any other things that our Government3709can be doing in, you know, coordination with others to get the3710word out? Mr. Prout, you want to take that one first?3711 Mr. Prout. Yes. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. At the end of3712the day I think it is just--it comes down to, it is hard to3713hard to compete when you play by the rules and your competitor3714doesn't, especially at a global scale. So I think we need to3715help modernizing. It is plain and simple, modernizing the3716fleets of America.3717 The majority of our crab fleet in Alaska is outdated and3718inefficient. Maintenance costs are extremely high to try and3719stay up on safety, and any issues that come up from just having3720old vessels. I think the average age of the Bering Sea crab3721fleet is over 50 years old at this point.3722 So, anything that can be done to help mitigate those issues3723is extremely important. At the same time, looking at new crab3724builds, you know, an average crab build right now is between3725$10 million and $15 million. That is an extremely difficult3726hurdle to overcome when you are looking at trying to modernize3727a vessel or modernize your fleet.3728 So I think Congress could definitely step up and help with3729modernization loans, vessel recapitalization programs, as well3730as grants and disaster relief to help fishermen who are still3731in difficult situations just from the fallout of IUU fishing3732and the effect it has had on our domestic markets as of3733recently.3734 Senator Sullivan. Good. Great answer. Mr. Rickard.3735 Mr. Rickard. I just want to emphasize the importance of3736this market to global seafood supply chains around the world.3737And how incredible the tool is available by leveraging market3738access to change behavior overseas and to draw attention to3739these problems.3740 And so, you know, I found Mr. Prout's testimony about the3741actions taken on IUU Russian seafood to be fascinating because3742you can see the impact overall of the market and how much that3743has changed things.3744 As you know, the Weaker Force Labor Prevention Act under3745its current enforcement has made seafood a priority sector3746because the Chinese seafood processing industry can take in3747anything. The actual denial of access to this market is how I3748think you draw attention to it. And unfortunately, the Federal3749Government has not done very much of that.3750 In a very isolated incidence where we have said in order to3751ship to the U.S., you have to meet these certain requirements.3752I think they have all been effective, but they have been so3753limited in their application that we are not using that tool3754effectively.3755 Senator Sullivan. I mean, we have banned Russian seafood,3756right. Should we ban the importation of Chinese seafood?3757 Mr. Rickard. Just for me, I think that that is an3758appropriate response overall to what is a huge challenge3759internationally, yes.3760 Senator Sullivan. Other answers to that? And then, do you3761have any more questions----3762 Mr. Saumweber. I will just say quickly here, I think that3763there are two levels to operate on. On the first, as you well3764know, Senator, a big part of leadership is showing up. And this3765year we have had the 10th International Ocean Conference hosted3766by the government of South Korea. This week is the third U.N.3767Ocean Conference.3768 This fall, December, will be the G20 meeting in South3769Africa. All three of these are major international conferences3770focused on oceans, and at which IUU is the major agenda item.3771And the U.S. has not sent a delegation to either of the ones3772currently or previously happening, and I don't believe we will3773be sending one to the G20.3774 That is a big problem. The rest of the world sees that.3775China is stepping in and knows that. And our allies and3776partners are wondering where we are in those forums and what3777our priorities are. And then, second----3778 Senator Sullivan. That is a great point, by the way. We can3779make sure we are reaching out to the State Department after3780this hearing saying, hey, come on guys, show up. The3781President's Executive Order focuses on this stuff, so let's get3782going.3783 Mr. Saumweber. Thank you. I would also just like to3784emphasize the points that Mr. Prout and Mr. Rickard made there3785as well, that the market access control is such a crucial part3786of this.3787 And, you know, we have a market access control program here3788in the United States that has been, I would say, partially3789implemented. And the problem with partial implementation is you3790leave large gaps and loopholes for illegal product to enter the3791country.3792 You have created essentially half of a regulatory program,3793and people are smart, bad guys are smart, and they see where3794the holes are, they see what the dark places are, and they fit3795their illegal product in those dark places.3796 So, if we want to have an effective market access control3797program, we need to really think about investing in NOAA, and3798investing in our seafood import monitoring program, and3799expanding it in ways that make sense, so we don't have these3800gaps and loopholes.3801 Senator Sullivan. By the way, on international agreements,380210 years ago, when I first got to the Senate, I worked with a3803number of members of this committee to pass legislation for the3804U.S. to join the Port State Measures Agreement that deals with3805a lot of these issues. China has finally ratified this3806agreement just recently, but I always like to remind people3807what we call--with the Chinese promise fatigue.3808 Which means almost every promise, almost every agreement,3809almost everything they have ever told us as a country we are3810going to do, they never do, right. We have promise fatigue with3811the Chinese.3812 They just don't ever abide by their agreements. Do you3813think the Chinese are going to shut down their IUU fishing to3814comply with the Port State Measures Agreement, which they just3815ratified?3816 Mr. Saumweber. Short answer, no.3817 Senator Sullivan. Hell no----3818 Mr. Saumweber. I think that the Chinese do what makes sense3819in the immediate term. And so in other words, you know, they3820will comply to the extent that it makes sense for them. And I3821think that they have seen great success in using their distant3822water fishing fleet, both as an economic tool for their own3823purposes, but also as a tool of soft power, and I that they3824will continue to do so.3825 Senator Sullivan. Yes. Any other thoughts on kind of final3826thoughts on what we should be doing to kind of address these,3827including the big one I really want to--and Mr. Poling, you3828mentioned it in your testimony.3829 Like this idea of naming and shaming. This is a great3830article, right. These Politico Magazines articles on all this3831are really, really good, and yet, they just don't seem to be3832breaking through to the general public.3833 Mr. Poling. I would also commend Ian Urbina, his Outlaw3834Ocean outfit, for their fantastic reporting, which among other3835things led to CBP's recent sanctioning of the Zhen Fa 7, the3836Chinese vessel, for human trafficking.3837 Senator Sullivan. Right.3838 Mr. Poling. You know, one good example here, I think, is to3839look to how the Europeans have more effectively leveraged their3840market power than we have when it comes to sanctions on3841specific countries for fishing violations. Not always perfect,3842but their yellow card, red card system that they use to3843threaten, and then in some cases ban the import of seafood, has3844had success. Not in the case of China or Russia.3845 But after the AP won the Pulitzer in 2012 for their3846investigations into slavery in the Thai seafood industry, the3847Europeans gave them a yellow card, the threat that all Thai3848seafood imports to the European Union would be banned if they3849didn't get their act together.3850 And the Thais made remarkably quick progress in better3851monitoring and enforcement. Same is true of the Vietnamese, who3852have been under a yellow card for years. So, I think the U.S.3853has been slow to recognize that we have the largest import3854market in the world and an enormous amount of market power, if3855we can adequately leverage it to get other countries to tow the3856line.3857 Senator Sullivan. Yes. No, that is a really important3858point. Although I will say the Marine Stewardship Council, we3859have some real issues with them. They seem to be kind of in the3860pocket of the Russians. They haven't checked on the Russian3861fleet. They stamp them sustainably all the time, even though3862they don't inspect them. There is some real issue with those3863guys.3864 So, I agree that we need to do the sustainability3865certification, but the MSC is failing, and they are, in my3866view, kind of giving Russia a blank check to do whatever the3867heck they want, and they don't even go check on the3868sustainability of that fleet, primarily because the Russians3869pay them money, in my view.3870 So I have got a real problem with those guys, and I think3871they are actually part of the problem. Mr. Rickard, do you have3872a final point on policies that we should be focused on?3873 Mr. Rickard. No, not beyond the things that have been3874discussed.3875 Senator Blunt Rochester. Mr. Chairman, I want to follow up3876on your point about it breaking through. And I think as a3877follow up, it would be good to have some real conversation3878about these things because it affects all of us. And so, the3879breakthrough is important.3880 I think the global participation shows--demonstrates how3881serious we are about it. But I really am interested as well in3882the market access control and what you described as partial3883implementation. I personally, I am new to this subcommittee and3884would love to understand a little bit more about partial3885implementation versus full implementation, and what that really3886looks like.3887 And then last, my other concern was a comment that I think3888Mr. Rickard made about Americans consuming less. That is3889concerning. And so, figuring out how we balance and give real3890confidence to people about the industry. And as a seafood3891lover, this is really important I think to so many of us.3892 And so, again some of those are follow-ups that I would3893like to delve a little bit deeper on as well. But thank you so3894much, Mr. Chairman, for the important committee--subcommittee3895opportunity. And also thank you to all of the witnesses.3896 Senator Sullivan. Great. Well, listen, this has been a3897great hearing. I really, really appreciate the panelists. Mr.3898Prout, thank you again for the award of coming the furthest,3899for participating----3900 Senator Blunt Rochester. And nice lapel pin.3901 Senator Sullivan. And nice lapel pin. We are going to3902follow up on this a lot. As you see, there is a real bipartisan3903consensus to do more. I think we need to do a lot more.3904 And we will be relying on experts like all of you in the3905coming weeks and months as we push forward on a really, really3906important issue that, as Senator Blunt Rochester just talked3907about, it encompasses national security, environmental issues,3908human trafficking, slave labor, the economy of our coastal3909communities, the viability of our fishermen. I mean, this kind3910of encompasses a lot of things.3911 And the good news here in the Congress is that it is very3912bipartisan, in part because it encompasses so many of these3913important issues. So, what we will respectfully ask of the3914witnesses is the Committee record will be open for about3915another two weeks. There are additional questions that we3916submit to you.3917 We ask that you try to get them back to the Committee3918promptly. And other than that, at this juncture, this hearing3919is adjourned. And I want to thank again all the witnesses for3920their outstanding service today.3921 [Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]39223923 A P P E N D I X39243925 National Fisheries Institute3926 June 11, 20253927Hon. Dan Sullivan,3928Chairman,3929Subcommittee on Coast Guard, Maritime, and Fisheries,3930Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,3931United States Senate,3932Washington, DC.39333934Hon. Lisa Blunt Rochester,3935Ranking Member,3936Subcommittee on Coast Guard, Maritime, and Fisheries,3937Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,3938United States Senate,3939Washington, DC.39403941Dear Chairman Sullivan and Ranking Member Blunt Rochester:39423943 On behalf of the approximately 300 member companies of the National3944Fisheries Institute (NFI), I write to share our views on several topics3945impacting the seafood industry in connection with your Subcommittee's3946June 11, 2025 ``Finding Nemo's Future: Conflicts Over Ocean Resources''3947oversight hearing.3948 For almost 80 years NFI has been the leading voice for the fish and3949seafood industry and America's largest seafood trade association. Our3950members span the entire seafood value chain--from East Coast lobster,3951clam and scallop harvesters, Alaska vessel owners, Pacific processors,3952Midwest importers, and Southern shellfish producers, to aquaculture3953providers, distributors, cold storage providers, retailers, and seafood3954restaurants. Collectively, these companies supply American families3955with tens of millions of delicious, healthy, sustainable seafood meals3956every year, and directly support almost 1.6 million American jobs and3957more than $183 billion in economic value to the U.S. economy.3958 NFI has long championed strong, practical Federal oversight of the3959commercial seafood sector. From food safety and economic transparency3960to cracking down on Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing,3961NFI and its member companies have consistently led efforts to uphold3962responsible practices across the supply chain. Our commitment to3963sustainable fisheries is grounded in the goal of ensuring American3964consumers have continued access to nutritious, high-quality seafood--3965today and for generations to come.3966 To put it bluntly, Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU)3967fishing is a scourge on the seafood community. It harms effective3968fishery management measures, undercuts harvesters that fish legally and3969responsibly, and can be associated with unfair treatment of3970crewmembers.3971 NFI and its members fully support efforts to combat IUU fishing.3972That includes backing Federal initiatives that position the United3973States as a global leader in enforcing sustainable fisheries management3974and deploying tools like the Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA),3975which directly targets illicit activity at the point of entry.3976 The April 17, 2025, Executive Order from President Trump rightly3977directs the Secretary of Commerce to reevaluate recent expansions to3978the Seafood Import Monitoring Program (SIMP) and to improve its3979targeting of high-risk imports from nations with poor records on3980international fisheries compliance.3981 However, NFI believes we must go further and eliminate the SIMP3982program. SIMP has not delivered meaningful results. NOAA Fisheries' own3983April 2021 report acknowledged that SIMP ``does not prevent or stop IUU3984fish and fish products from entering U.S. commerce.'' The program's3985one-size-fits-all, paper-heavy approach places an excessive burden on3986compliant businesses, while doing little to deter IUU fishing at its3987source. A global problem like IUU cannot be solved with a narrow,3988after-the-fact, port-based documentation program.3989 Rather than rely on a flawed system like SIMP, the United States3990should invest in more effective strategies: building international3991partnerships, enhancing bilateral and multilateral cooperation,3992improving enforcement coordination with allies, and supporting Regional3993Fishery Management Organizations (RFMOs) in their work to monitor and3994regulate harvests.3995 Several promising pieces of legislation have been introduced,3996including S.283, the Illegal Red Snapper and Tuna Enforcement Act, and3997the Fighting Illegal Seafood Harvests (FISH) Act--S.688 and H.R. 3756.3998These bills would strengthen existing tools to combat IUU fishing by3999enabling NOAA Fisheries to work more closely with the U.S. Coast Guard4000and other enforcement partners to stop illegal activity before it4001enters U.S. commerce--not after. NFI is proud to support these bills as4002written, particularly if they replace the SIMP program with a more4003results-driven, strategic approach.4004 Access to healthy, legal seafood is vital for American consumers,4005and effectively addressing IUU fishing is essential to maintaining that4006access. SIMP has not met its intended goals and continues to place4007burdens on the wrong parties. Instead, the Federal government should4008focus on collaborative, enforcement-first strategies that address the4009root of the problem.4010 Thank you for the opportunity to share our views on this important4011issue. We appreciate the Committee's attention to the challenges posed4012by IUU fishing and stand ready to support efforts that strengthen4013enforcement and ensure continued access to legal, responsibly sourced4014seafood for American consumers.4015 Sincerely,4016 Lisa Wallenda Picard,4017 President and CEO.4018 ______40194020From Bait to Plate--Tracking the Chinese Fishing Ships Linked to Rights4021 and Labour Abuses at Sea40224023 Ian Urbina--November 20, 202340244025China: The Superpower of Seafood4026In recent decades, working aggressively to expand its might, China has4027transformed itself into the world's seafood superpower. This pre-4028eminence has come at a grave human and environmental cost. Part Four:4029Preventing abuses by tracing seafood from bait to plate proves4030difficult.40314032 No sooner had U.S. President Joe Biden issued an executive order in4033March 2022 prohibiting the import of Russian seafood, an effort aimed4034at depriving billions of dollars that might go towards Putin's war in4035Ukraine, than members of Congress said the ban was unenforceable. U.S.4036importers often do not know where their fish is actually caught, and4037trade data indicate that nearly a third of wild-caught seafood imported4038and labelled as being from China is actually pulled from Russian4039waters.4040 The embarrassing setback highlighted the opaque nature of the4041world's seafood supply chains and has since spurred calls from American4042legislators, ocean conservationists, consumer advocates and human4043rights organisations to require U.S. importers to track their seafood4044from bait to plate to ensure it is not tied to labour and environmental4045crimes or violations of sanctions on ``pariah'' states like North Korea4046and Iran.4047 Since the Russian seafood import ban took effect in June 2022, at4048least 31 Chinese squid ships have fished in Russian waters, including4049several owned by companies shipping seafood to the U.S. and the4050European Union, according to satellite data and export records.4051 China catches, processes and exports the vast majority of the4052planet's seafood. It has a distant-water fleet that is more than double4053the size of its next competitor. More than 70 percent of the seafood4054landed by this fleet, measured by weight, is squid.4055 Ranked as the world's worst purveyor of illegal and unregulated4056fishing and highly prone to using forced labour, this fleet has been4057tied to myriad crimes, including cases of raiding Argentinian waters,4058routinely turning off their transponders in violation of Chinese law,4059illegally fishing in North Korean waters in violation of UN sanctions,4060and engaging in violence, wage theft, severe neglect and human4061trafficking of foreign and Chinese crew.4062 A Chinese captain opened his fishing logbook, which is supposed to4063show where, when and what was caught. The first two pages had writing4064on them, but the rest were blank.4065 With ships so far from shore, constantly in transit, typically4066operating on the high seas, where national governments have limited4067jurisdiction, seafood supply chains are distinctly tough to track.4068 In the many handoffs of catch between fishing boats, carrier ships,4069processing plants and exporters there are gaping holes in traceability,4070according to Sally Yozell, the director of the environmental security4071programme at the Stimson Center, a research organisation in Washington,4072D.C. ``Most seafood is caught by Chinese ships or processed in China,''4073she said, ``which makes the chain of custody even more opaque.''4074 Some U.S. seafood companies that import from China say they know4075their seafood is untainted by crimes because they are provided with4076``catch certificates'' by Chinese processors that indicate the4077provenance of the catch, detailed down to the level of which ship4078caught it, and where. These documents are far from foolproof, because4079they are self-reported, often unverifiable, and filled out at the4080processing plant, not on the ships themselves where the crimes occur,4081said Sara Lewis from FishWise, a nonprofit organisation that does4082seafood sustainability consulting. The catch certificates also say4083nothing about labour conditions.4084Tracking Chinese ships4085 To document the nature of these traceability gaps as catch moves4086from bait to plate, a team of reporters followed and, in some4087instances, boarded for inspection, Chinese fishing ships at sea in4088several locations, including in the waters close to North Korea,4089Gambia, the Falkland Islands and the Galapagos Islands.4090 The team followed the ships by satellite back to ports, and then to4091pin down who was cleaning, processing and freezing the catch for4092eventual export, it tracked Chinese fishing ships as they moved their4093catch to refrigeration ships and carried it to ports in China, where4094the trucks were filmed and followed to the processing plants. The4095reporters used export records to track the seafood to grocery stores,4096restaurants and food service companies in the EU and US.4097 This investigation revealed examples of gaps in tracking at each4098handoff. Roughly 350 miles west of the Galapagos Islands, on a Chinese4099squid fishing ship, a deckhand opened the freezers several floors below4100deck to reveal stacks of frozen catch in white bags. He explained that4101they leave the fishing ship names off bags because that allows them to4102transfer cargo more easily to other fishing ships owned by the same4103company. This gives fishing companies greater versatility but also4104makes it impossible for downstream buyers to know what ship actually4105caught their fish.4106 On the bridge of another ship, a Chinese captain opened his fishing4107logbook, which is supposed to show where, when and what was caught. The4108first two pages had writing on them, but the rest were blank. ``No one4109keeps those,'' a captain said about the logs, noting that company4110officials on land reverse engineer the information later. In processing4111plants, the squid on the conveyor belts was often separated not based4112on the ship that caught it but instead based on weight, quality, size4113and type based on the market willing to pay a premium for each4114attribute.4115 Seafood is the planet's last major source of wild protein and it is4116also the largest internationally traded food commodity. Experts cite a4117variety of reasons that they worry about China's domination over this4118market. Political analysts like Whitley Saumweber and Ty Loft at the4119Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., say4120China's near monopoly over distant-water fishing ``imperils the food4121security of millions of people,'' especially in developing countries4122that rely most on fish for their source of protein.4123 American legislators say China's dependence on illegal practices4124puts domestic fishermen at a competitive disadvantage. ``We cannot4125continue to allow countries such as China and Russia to undercut our4126honest fishers by abusing our oceans and fellow human beings,'' said a4127June 2022 letter to Biden signed by Republican Jared Huffman from4128California, and Republican Garret Graves from Louisiana. ``Addressing4129illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing (IUU) is an important step4130in ensuring that, not only are our citizens eating safe and healthy4131food, but that their economic interests are protected.''4132 There are laws meant to block products associated with trafficked,4133prison, Uighur, North Korean or child forced labour. These laws are4134particularly ineffective with seafood.4135 Fishing is the world's deadliest profession and abusive conditions4136on these ships are well documented. Human rights advocates such as the4137Environmental Justice Foundation and Human Rights Watch have warned4138that the seafood buyers have no way of knowing whether they are tacitly4139complicit in these crimes. Consumer advocates cite the health risks4140resulting from the 15 percent to 30 percent of the seafood that winds4141up on American plates that is not what is listed on the label.4142 Because of the lack of tracking, much of the seafood that Americans4143eat is also of uncertain origin.4144 That creates potential health risks, but it also means--as human4145rights advocates such as the Environmental Justice Foundation and Human4146Rights Watch have pointed out--that it's hard to know when fish have4147been caught by vessels that rely on illegal fishing techniques and4148labour practices.4149 Ocean conservationists like Oceana and Greenpeace point to the duty4150of seafood companies to stop illegal fishing, especially as the seas4151are running out of fish with more than a third of the world's stocks4152overfished, a number that has tripled since 1974, according to the UN4153agency that oversees fisheries.4154 A variety of supply-chain laws exist to prevent the U.S. import of4155prohibited goods. Aside from the sanctions on states such as North4156Korea, Iran, Venezuela and Russia, there are also laws meant to block4157products associated with trafficked, prison, Uighur, North Korean or4158child forced labour.4159 These laws are particularly ineffective with seafood, however,4160because there is limited information about what happens on fishing4161ships.4162 Kenneth Kennedy, a former forced-labour programme manager under the4163U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, said U.S. legislators and4164Federal agencies often lack the political will to apply most of the4165anti-slavery or other product-tracking laws because such investigations4166move painfully slowly and complicate international trade deals.4167 Federal efforts to monitor seafood have generally ignored the4168Chinese fleet, even though these ships have the greatest ties to labour4169and environmental crimes. More than 17 percent of seafood imports from4170China were caught illegally, according to U.S. trade data. According to4171a 2021 study by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized4172Crime, a nonprofit that studies the impacts of organised crime, China4173ranks first and Russia second, among 152 nations engaged in illegal4174fishing. In 2020, the U.S. Department of Labor said Chinese squidders4175are especially apt to use migrant and captive labour.4176 In 2016, the U.S. government created the Seafood Import Monitoring4177Program, which requires that importers keep detailed records of their4178catch from point of harvest until entry into the US. Squid, however,4179was not included among the programme's 13 monitored seafood species,4180which were chosen primarily because of worries about illegal fishing4181and fraudulent labelling, not human rights and labour abuses. In 2021,4182NOAA, the agency that oversees the monitoring programme, announced4183plans to expand the number of included species based on new criteria,4184including whether the fleet catching the fish is associated with human4185trafficking.4186 American customs officials today track only two or three types of4187squid, according to David Pearl, a foreign affairs specialist at NOAA--4188a problem, given that there are in fact 30 to 40 commercial species.4189Even when import records are kept, companies are allowed to conceal4190their import and export data from the public by simply asking Federal4191regulators for an exemption, which many companies do.4192 In press releases, on their websites and in Security and Exchange4193Commission filings, some seafood retailers claim to enforce standards4194that ensure that their supply chains are clean of illegality or abuse.4195But John Hocevar, the oceans campaign manager at Greenpeace USA, said4196that so-called corporate responsibility programmes tend to be4197ineffective, because they are largely self-policing, lack third-party4198oversight or verification, focus on environmental not human rights4199concerns, and typically reach only as far as the processing plants, not4200the ships where crimes are most likely to occur.4201 According to Yozell, from the Stimson Center, even knowing what4202country caught the fish is tough. U.S. Federal law requires retailers4203to inform customers of the origin of most types of food but exempts4204seafood that is processed in another country and re-exported. If fish4205is caught on Russian boats but processed in China, it gets labelled as4206being a product of China.4207 Even companies that claim environmental and labour stewardship have4208been found to be tied to Chinese ships with crimes and risk indicators.4209Ruggiero Seafood, which says on its website that it does not sell4210illegally caught seafood, has been tied to a squid ship that was found4211violating UN sanctions by fishing in North Korean waters in 2019.4212Kroger, one of the largest supermarket chains in the US, which says on4213its website that it ``never knowingly'' buys illegally caught seafood,4214has been linked to a Chinese ship that fished illegally in Indonesia in42152020. Lidl, the largest supermarket in Europe, cites its commitment to4216responsible sourcing under the slogan ``A Better Tomorrow.'' But4217Eridanous, Lidl's own brand of squid, is processed at a plant linked to4218at least three fishing companies whose vessels have a history of4219fishing offences, including lengthy transmission gaps in key squid4220fisheries in the North and South Pacific, illegal fishing in Peru's4221exclusive zone, and shark finning.4222 Ruggiero and Kroger did not reply to requests for comment. Lidl4223said it is opposed to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and4224that it raised the findings of this investigation with its supplier,4225Zhoushan Xifeng, which provided a statement saying it is not involved4226in fishing offences.4227 Many larger seafood companies have joined an industry programme4228called the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), which offers assurance on4229traceability and sustainability. Jackie Marks, an MSC spokesperson,4230said the programme is primarily to prevent environmental crimes and4231tracking where fish came from, not what labour concerns might exist on4232ships.4233 The programme does not assess labour conditions or do inspections4234on fishing ships to check for crimes like wage theft, beatings, debt4235bondage, or human trafficking. Instead, MSC focuses primarily on4236determining whether processing plants are hygienic, labelling is4237accurate, and all ships and plants in supply chains are identifiable.4238To be certified under MSC, fishing and seafood companies have to submit4239paperwork indicating they have not been prosecuted for forced labour or4240related crimes in the past two years, and fishing companies must report4241what steps they take to prevent such crimes.4242 The U.S. government has taken action in isolated cases. In December42432022, for example, the Treasury Department issued sanctions under the4244Global Magnitsky Act against the directors of two large Chinese fishing4245companies, Dalian Ocean Fishing and Pingtan Marine Enterprise, based on4246allegations of forced labour and illegal fishing by some of their more4247than 150 ships.4248 The U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency has the duty to stop4249imports tied to forced labour entering the country, and in the past4250five years the agency has boosted its efforts. It has issued such4251orders on long-line tuna fishing vessels flagged in Taiwan, but it has4252never taken action against Chinese squid ships, despite the evidence4253that they are among the worst actors.4254 This story was produced by The Outlaw Ocean Project, a nonprofit4255journalism organisation in Washington, D.C. Reporting and writing was4256contributed by Ian Urbina, Joe Galvin, Maya Martin, Susan Ryan, Daniel4257Murphy and Austin Brush. This reporting was partially supported by the4258Pulitzer Center.4259 ______42604261 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to4262 Gregory B. Poling4263 Question 1. How does IUU fishing by state-backed fleets--4264particularly from the People's Republic of China--undermine U.S.4265interests and the sovereignty of other nations?4266 Answer. IUU fishing including that by PRC-flagged vessels supports,4267both directly and indirectly, non-state actors engaged in organized4268crime, piracy, and armed insurgency and terrorism. It has become a part4269of the portfolio of illegal criminal organizations, directly and4270indirectly supporting their other illicit activities. IUU fishing4271deprives governments in coastal and small island developing states of4272funds needed for social services, infrastructure, and other necessary4273spending. At the same time, it undercuts local livelihoods leading to4274economic displacement and desperation. The combination of these two4275effects directly undermines stability and security, and indirectly4276contributes to the spread of threats from non-state actors.4277 These threats are especially worrying in the Pacific Islands, which4278are overly reliant on revenues from foreign fishing and in which the4279United States is a resident power due to its Pacific territories,4280freely associated states, and long-standing security partnerships. The4281PRC is the most prevalent IUU fisher in the region. It has growing4282leverage thanks to its checkbook diplomacy and has used that for4283political ends, including peeling away several of Taiwan's remaining4284diplomatic allies in recent years, and to seek logistical access as it4285builds out a blue water navy. In each of these cases, China relies in4286part on elite capture, using economic inducements to leverage local4287government, business, and thought leaders to fulfill Beijing's wishes.4288This is effective in the Pacific Islands because of the severe resource4289constraints facing regional governments and societies; resource4290constraints that are made worse by the significant IUU fishing,4291primarily by Chinese-owned vessels, across the region.42924293 Question 2. As China expands its distant-water fleet and Russia4294militarizes key Arctic Sea routes, what concrete lessons from U.S.4295efforts to counter IUU fishing and maritime coercion can be applied to4296the Central Arctic?4297 Answer. The United States has been an effective leader in counter-4298IUU fishing efforts globally, and especially in the Indo-Pacific,4299through three avenues. All three are applicable in the Arctic. These4300are (1) significant resourcing for maritime domain awareness and4301maritime security capacity building for partner states, including4302through leadership in low-earth orbit remote sensing platforms; (2)4303close partnership with other capable and like-minded states, including4304Australia, France, New Zealand, and Japan in the Pacific; and (3)4305diplomatic and legal leadership, especially by championing the adoption4306of the Port State Measures Agreement globally.4307 ______43084309 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Cruz to4310 Nathan Rickard4311 Question 1. The Illegal Red Snapper and Tuna Enforcement Act (S.4312283) aims to develop a field test kit to determine the geographic4313origin of these fish. How would this technology enhance the National4314Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's ability to enforce fishing4315regulations and prevent illegally caught seafood from entering the U.S.4316market?4317 Answer. The bipartisan Illegal Red Snapper and Tuna Enforcement Act4318(S. 283) instructs Federal agencies to develop a standard methodology,4319based on chemical analysis, for identification of the country-of-origin4320of seafood as a tool to support the enforcement of the prohibition on4321imports of seafood harvested through illegal, unreported, and4322unregulated (IUU) fishing. This methodology is to be applied to pilot4323species for identification, with red snapper as an example of a4324stationary stock and tuna as an example of a highly migratory stock.4325Under the express terms of the legislation, any methodology developed4326should: (1) be consistent with the needs of Federal and state law4327enforcement agencies; (2) minimize processing time; (3) involve the use4328of a field kit that can be easily carried by one individual; and (4) be4329able to test for prepared red snapper and tuna products. The Act4330further requires the Undersecretary of Commerce for Standards and4331Technology/Director of the National Institute of Standards and4332Technology to issue a report no later than two years after enactment4333regarding the development of the methodology and its application.4334 Through the development of a standard methodology, the Federal4335government would be able to distinguish between fish landed in U.S.4336waters and those landed in foreign waters. With a field test available,4337law enforcement officials can ascertain the origin of red snapper and4338tuna products and confiscate illegal seafood, as necessary, prior to4339sale to American consumers.4340 The American shrimp industry has significant experience in the4341development of test methodologies used to improve enforcement of U.S.4342laws and regulations covering foreign seafood. In 2008, the Southern4343Shrimp Alliance, in coordination with the Catfish Farmers of America4344and Slade Gorton, worked with AOAC International to develop methods,4345subject to laboratory evaluation, for the detection of a variety of4346veterinary drugs and pesticides found in foreign shrimp, Siluriformes4347fish (catfish/basa/tra/swai), and tilapia. Through this process, AOAC4348International also began to work with test producers to develop fast4349and affordable methods of testing for the presence of a wide-range of4350veterinary drugs, including fluoroquinolones, nitrofurans,4351chloramphenicol, quinolones, methyltestosterone, malachite green, and4352gentian violet.\1\ The quality, sensitivity, and accuracy of these4353tests have increased over time, permitting the European Union to4354require that Indian and Vietnamese shrimp exporters test all shipments4355of shrimp for veterinary drug contamination prior to exportation to4356Europe.\2\ Although the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has4357declined to obtain similar commitments from these countries, the4358European Commission reports that this pre-export testing has4359effectively prevented contaminated shrimp from being shipped to the4360European Union.\3\4361---------------------------------------------------------------------------4362 \1\ See Southern Shrimp Alliance, Developing Standards and Testing4363(Oct. 18, 2010), available at: https://shrimpalliance.com/developing-4364standards-and-testing/.4365 \2\ See European Commission, Directorate-General for Health and4366Food Safety, DG(SANTE) 2024-8085, Final Report of an Audit of Vietnam4367Carried Out from 24 September to 17 October 2024 in Order to Evaluate4368Controls on Residues of Pharmacologically Active Substances, Pesticides4369and Contaminants in Animals and Animal Products, at 5 (``Supplementary4370to the aquaculture NRCPs, national legislation requires that each4371consignment of aquaculture products intended for export to the EU is4372subject to official pre-export testing for chloramphenicol, nitrofuran4373metabolites, enrofloxacin, ciprofloxacin and trifluralin. In addition,4374consignments of finfish are to be analysed for malachite green and4375leuco-malachite green, and consignments of crustaceans--for doxycycline4376and oxytetracycline.'' Footnote omitted); and European Commission,4377Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety, DG(SANTE) 2022-7490,4378Final Report of an Audit Carried Out in India from 07 September 2022 to437929 September 2022 in Order to Evaluate the Control of Residues and4380Contaminants in Live Animals and Animal Products Including Controls on4381Veterinary Medicinal Products, at 6 (``Commission Decision 2010/381/EU,4382as last amended, requires that 50 percent of the aquaculture4383consignments of Indian origin arriving at EU borders are tested for4384residues of chloramphenicol, tetracycline, oxytetracycline,4385chlortetracycline and metabolites of nitrofurans 3-amino-2-4386oxazolidinone (AOZ), semicarbazide (SEM), 1-aminohydrantoin (AHD) and43873-amino-5-morpholinomethyl-2-oxazolidone (AMOZ). The same decision4388requires that all consignments are accompanied by a laboratory result4389from the place of origin (hereafter, the pre-export testing--PET) for4390the same substances.'' Footnote omitted).4391 \3\ See European Commission, Directorate-General for Health and4392Food Safety, DG(SANTE) 2022-7490, Final Report of an Audit Carried Out4393in India from 07 September 2022 to 29 September 2022 in Order to4394Evaluate the Control of Residues and Contaminants in Live Animals and4395Animal Products Including Controls on Veterinary Medicinal Products, at43966 (``The data for 2020 to 2022 indicate. . .that without the 1004397percent PET obligation, the number of RASFFs in the EU would have been4398much higher.'').4399---------------------------------------------------------------------------4400 Separate and apart from developing methodologies for the detection4401of veterinary drug residues in seafood products, the Southern Shrimp4402Alliance also supported efforts by U.S.4403 Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to develop a testing4404methodology for determining the country-of-origin of farm-raised shrimp4405imported into the United States. CBP's work resulted in the publication4406of an academic paper, Determination of the Country of Origin of Farm-4407Raised Shrimp (Family Penaeide) Using Trace Metal Profiling and4408Multivariate Statistics, in the Journal of Agricultural and Food4409Chemistry (Aug. 28, 2009) that facilitated determinations as to the4410country in which imports of products originating from the shrimp4411species Penaeus vannamei were raised in aquaculture ponds.\4\ The4412development of this testing methodology supported CBP's determination4413that Chinese-origin shrimp was being unlawfully transshipped through4414Malaysia and given a false country-of-origin identification to evade an4415FDA Import Alert and antidumping duties imposed on Chinese-origin4416shrimp.\5\4417---------------------------------------------------------------------------4418 \4\ See Smith, Ralph G. and Watts, Carson A., Determination of the4419Country of Origin of Farm-Raised Shrimp (Family Penaeide) Using Trace4420Metal Profiling and Multivariate Statistics, Journal of Agricultural4421and Food Chemistry, Vol. 57, Issue 18, pp. 8244-8249 (Aug. 2009),4422https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/jf901658f.4423 \5\ See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Seafood Fraud: FDA4424Program Changes and Better Collaboration among Key Federal Agencies4425Could Improve Detection and Prevention, GAO-09-258 (Feb. 2009) at 154426(``On the basis of industry information and CBP and ICE investigations,4427CBP determined that Chinese shrimp was being transshipped to the United4428States through Malaysia. Due to this illegal transshipment, importers4429of Chinese shrimp were able to circumvent not only the 2005 antidumping4430duty but also FDA's recent import alert.'').4431---------------------------------------------------------------------------4432 Consistent with the recognition of the importance of developing4433hand-held rapid tests for any issue raised by seafood trade, the4434discussions with AOAC also expanded to encompass low-cost, rapid4435methods for confirming the species of shrimp made available for sale as4436being either foreign or domestic.\6\ Eventually, the domestic shrimp4437industry would work directly with researchers in an effort to create4438this capability. Beginning in 2020, the Southern Shrimp Alliance began4439collaborating with a team of food safety microbiologists at Florida4440State University to augment existing testing methodologies for seafood,4441including rapid tests for the confirmation of species of both red4442snapper and shrimp.\7\ Most recently, this has led to a project4443authorized by Florida Sea Grant, PCR Lateral Flow Assays for Rapid4444Onsite Seafood Authentication, intended to result in the4445standardization and application of assays for the identification of six4446commercially important species landed in the Gulf: (1) black grouper;4447(2) red drum; (3) red grouper; (4) red snapper; (5) yellowtail snapper;4448and (6) royal red shrimp.\8\4449---------------------------------------------------------------------------4450 \6\ See Southern Shrimp Alliance, Developing Standards and Testing4451(Oct. 18, 2010), available at: https://shrimpalliance.com/developing-4452standards-and-testing/.4453 \7\ See Christine Blank, Florida Researchers Develop Rapid4454Authenticity Test to Combat Shrimp Mislabeling, Species Substitution,4455SeafoodSource (Aug. 4, 2023), available at: https://4456www.seafoodsource.com/news/premium/processing-equipment/florida-4457researchers-develop-rapid-authenticity-test-to-combat-shrimp-4458mislabeling-species-substitution.4459 \8\ See Florida Sea Grant, PCR Lateral Flow Assays for Rapid Onsite4460Seafood Authentication, available at: https://www.flseagrant.org/4461projects/pcr-lateral-flow-assays-for-rapid-onsite-seafood-4462authentication/.4463---------------------------------------------------------------------------4464 NOAA Fisheries has historically declined to exercise its full4465statutory authority or to allocate meaningful agency resources to4466regulating imported seafood, preferring to concentrate law enforcement4467assets on governing the U.S. domestic seafood industry which now4468accounts for just six percent of the seafood consumed in the U.S.4469market.\9\ Nevertheless, the domestic shrimp industry has utilized4470rapid tests to address the false marketing of imported, farm-raised4471shrimp as domestic wild-caught shrimp in restaurants throughout our4472southern coastline.\10\ The availability of low-cost, hand-held rapid4473tests to confirm the species of shrimp offered for sale at food service4474establishments has provided the U.S. shrimp industry with the capacity4475to independently detect and document fraud. This campaign, in turn, has4476resulted in increased interest by both Federal and state law4477enforcement, including NOAA Fisheries Office of Law Enforcement, to4478review unlawful activities.4479---------------------------------------------------------------------------4480 \9\ See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Activities for the4481Safety of Imported Seafood (Feb. 2023) at 4 (``Seafood has become one4482of the most highly traded food commodities in the world with total4483imports in 2018 accounting for approximately 94 percent of the volume4484of seafood sold in the United States.'' Citation omitted).4485 \10\ See Southern Shrimp Alliance, Seafood Labeling Laws, https://4486shrimpalliance.com/issues/industry-enhancement-efforts/seafood-4487labeling-laws/.4488---------------------------------------------------------------------------4489 Based on the experience of the U.S. shrimp industry, the4490development of effective, accurate, and inexpensive rapid tests4491substantially augments the ability to detect and interdict unlawful4492imports and misleading marketing of seafood products. As such, once4493enacted, the Illegal Red Snapper and Tuna Enforcement Act would provide4494the American commercial red snapper and tuna fisheries with an4495invaluable tool to identify foreign seafood products that are sourced4496through IUU fishing. Even if NOAA Fisheries were to persist in its4497heavy regulation of domestic commercial fisheries and lax oversight of4498imported seafood, the development of field tests that permit a4499determination as to whether red snapper or tuna were landed in U.S. or4500foreign waters can be used by domestic commercial fishing industries to4501draw needed attention to unlawful efforts to introduce IUU seafood into4502this market.4503 This is particularly important for red snapper. NOAA Fisheries4504first identified Mexico for IUU fishing related to the activities of4505lanchas in U.S. waters targeting red snapper in 2019. Thereafter,4506pursuant to the High Seas Driftnet Moratorium Protection Act, NOAA4507Fisheries negatively certified Mexico for IUU fishing in both 2021 and45082023 ``for its continued failure to combat unauthorized fishing4509activities by small hulled vessels (called lanchas) in U.S. waters, for4510which it was first identified in 2019.'' \11\ Virtually all of the U.S.4511Coast Guard's interdictions of foreign vessels fishing in U.S. waters4512in Fiscal Years 2023 and 2024 came from the single area in which4513lanchas operate: ``98 percent (114 of 116) of the interdictions4514occurred in Coast Guard District 8, the Gulf of America.'' \12\4515Although Mexico was negatively certified for a second time in 2023, the4516number of Coast Guard detections and interdictions increased in Fiscal4517Year 2024 compared to Fiscal Year 2023.\13\ The incursions into U.S.4518waters from lanchas continue today, with the U.S. Coast Guard routinely4519reporting interdictions\14\ and the U.S. Department of Justice recently4520reporting that it had changed policy and that the Federal government is4521now arresting and criminally prosecuting Mexican fishermen involved in4522lanchas operations.\15\ In the first criminal prosecution publicly4523announced, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of4524Texas explained that the captain of the lancha ``had been arrested on452528 prior occasions for illegal fishing'' and that the entire crew4526``knew the catch would be seized if they were caught in U.S. waters but4527chose to take the risk due to the limited supply of red snapper in4528Mexican waters.'' \16\4529---------------------------------------------------------------------------4530 \11\ NOAA Fisheries, Port Denials Under the Moratorium Protection4531Act, https://www4532.fisheries.noaa.gov/international-affairs/port-denials-under-4533moratorium-protection-act.4534 \12\ Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland4535Security, Coast Guard Missed Opportunities to Interdict Foreign Fishing4536Vessels Suspected of Illegally Fishing in U.S. Waters, OIG-2525 (June45376, 2025) at 3, footnote omitted, https://www.oig.dhs.gov/reports/2025/4538coast-guard-missed-opportunities-interdict-foreign-fishing-vessels-4539suspected-illegally-fishing-us-waters/oig-25-25-jun25.4540 \13\ See id. at 3 (``Specifically, the Coast Guard interdicted 554541of 265 detections in FY 2023, and 61 of 281 detections in FY 2024.'').4542 \14\ See e.g., U.S. Coast Guard Press Release, Coast Guard, partner4543agencies detain 13 Mexican Fishermen, Seizes 1,500 pounds of illegally4544caught fish off Texas coast (June 13, 2025), https://www.news.uscg.mil/4545Press-Releases/Article/4216692/coast-guard-partner-agencies-detain-13-4546mexican-fishermen-seizes-1500-pounds-of/; and U.S. Coast Guard Press4547Release, Coast Guard detains 4 Mexican fishermen, seizes 200 pounds of4548illegally caught fish off Texas coast (May 23, 2025), https://4549www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/4196727/coast-guard-detains-4-4550mexican-fishermen-seizes-200-pounds-of-illegally-caught-f/.4551 \15\ See United States Attorney's Office, Southern District of4552Texas Press Release, Mexican commercial fishermen plead guilty to4553illegal red snapper harvesting (June 9, 2025), https://www.justice.gov/4554usao-sdtx/pr/mexican-commercial-fishermen-plead-guilty-illegal-red-4555snapper-harvesting.4556 \16\ Id.4557---------------------------------------------------------------------------4558 Nevertheless, NOAA Fisheries has, to date, failed to recommend that4559the President utilize authority under 16 U.S.C. Sec. 1826a(b)(3) to bar4560imports as a response to Mexico's IUU fishing of red snapper in Texas4561waters. Under this statutory provision, in response to negative4562certification determinations from NOAA Fisheries, the President ``shall4563direct the Secretary of the Treasury to prohibit the importation into4564the United States of fish and fish products and sport fishing equipment4565(as that term is defined in section 4162 of title 26) from that4566nation.'' NOAA Fisheries, however, has never recommended that any4567action be taken to restrict snapper imports from Mexico.4568Unsurprisingly, both the volume and value of our imports of Mexican4569snapper have grown significantly. Specifically, in the four years4570between 2012 and 2015, the United States imported an average of 8.14571million pounds of snapper from Mexico valued at $22.8 million.\17\ In4572the most recent four-year period spanning from 2021 through 2024, the4573average annual volume of Mexican-origin snapper imports increased by4574nearly 38 percent to 11.1 million pounds, while the average annual4575value of these imports more than doubled to $49.3 million.\18\ Thus,4576despite ``the limited supply of red snapper in Mexican waters,'' our4577imports of Mexican snapper do not reflect any depletion in that stock.4578At the same time, incidents of IUU fishing by of red snapper by Mexican4579vessels in U.S. waters have increased.4580---------------------------------------------------------------------------4581 \17\ Source: U.S. International Trade Commission, Dataweb (HTSUS4582Codes: 0302.89.5058 and 0303.89.0067).4583 \18\ Id.4584---------------------------------------------------------------------------4585 The IUU fishing of red snapper harms American fishermen by4586depleting managed snapper stocks in U.S. waters, killing marine mammals4587and sea turtles that are protected under U.S. fishery management plans,4588and through sales lost to Mexican snapper in the U.S. market.4589Accordingly, although the development of a field test kit to determine4590origin of red snapper would provide a number of benefits in the market4591for both law enforcement and American commercial fishermen, the access4592that snapper harvested from Mexican lanchas in U.S. waters has to our4593market must be shut off. Congress has authorized such action to be4594taken and the facts overwhelming support doing so.45954596 Question 2. What specific tactics are foreign competitors using--4597like transshipment, fraudulent paperwork, or mislabeling--to flood the4598U.S. market with illegally harvested shrimp, and what enforcement tools4599or policy changes do you believe are most urgently needed to protect4600Texas shrimpers from this unfair and illegal competition?4601 Answer. According to NOAA Fisheries, the value of commercial shrimp4602landings in the state of Texas fell from $185 million in 2021 to $904603million in 2023.\19\ Although final landings data has not yet been4604reported by NOAA Fisheries for 2024, preliminary reporting indicates4605that commercial values for domestic shrimp remained at depressed levels4606last year. The decline in value was not principally due to a limited4607harvest, as the volume of shrimp landed in Texas in 2021 was 65 million4608pounds, while landings in 2023 were 56 million pounds.\20\ Rather,4609imports of cheap, unfairly-traded shrimp overwhelmed the U.S. market4610and forced prices down such that Texas shrimpers were forced to work4611twice as hard--during a period of significant inflation--to earn income4612in line with historic experience. Many Texas shrimpers, faced with4613these stunning price declines, tied up and stopped working.4614---------------------------------------------------------------------------4615 \19\ Source: NOAA Fisheries, Fisheries One Stop Shop (FOSS)4616Database.4617 \20\ Id.4618---------------------------------------------------------------------------4619 As the Texas state legislature recently detailed in H.C.R. 76,4620signed by Governor Greg Abbott on June 20th,\21\ the shrimp industry in4621Texas supports more than 14,000 jobs, generating approximately $8504622million in economic value for the state. As H.C.R. 76 explains, ``[t]he4623sustainability of the domestic shrimp industry is crucial to the4624survival of many small, family-owned businesses and to the stability of4625Gulf Coast communities, but this important economic engine is currently4626imperiled by unfair competition and other rising challenges. . .'' \22\4627---------------------------------------------------------------------------4628 \21\ See https://capitol.texas.gov/BillLookup/4629Text.aspx?LegSess=89R&Bill=HCR76.4630 \22\ See id.4631---------------------------------------------------------------------------4632 The domestic shrimp industry has expended substantial resources4633engaging in self-help to counter this unfair competition. In 2003, the4634shrimp industry organized to use the antidumping laws to address the4635harmful impact of shrimp sold at below fair value in the market, with4636antidumping duty orders on Chinese, Indian, Thai, and Vietnamese shrimp4637imposed in February 2005\23\ that remain in place today. Even more4638recently, led by the Port Arthur, Texas-based American Shrimp4639Processors Association, the domestic shrimp industry successfully4640petitioned for relief from countervailable subsidies granted to foreign4641shrimp industries in Ecuador, India, and Vietnam and from shrimp sold4642at below fair value from Indonesia.\24\4643---------------------------------------------------------------------------4644 \23\ See Notice of Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less4645than Fair Value and Antidumping Duty Order: Certain Frozen Warmwater4646Shrimp from the People's Republic of China, 70 Fed. Reg. 5,149 (Dep't4647Commerce Feb. 1, 2005); Notice of Amended Final Determination of Sales4648at Less than Fair Value and Antidumping Duty Order: Certain Frozen4649Warmwater Shrimp from India, 70 Fed. Reg. 5,147 (Dep't Commerce Feb. 1,46502005); Notice of Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair4651Value and Antidumping Duty Order: Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from4652Thailand, 70 Fed. Reg. 5,145 (Dep't Commerce Feb. 1, 2005); and Notice4653of Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value and4654Antidumping Duty Order: Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the4655Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 70 Fed. Reg. 5,152 (Dep't Commerce Feb.46561, 2005).4657 \24\ See Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Indonesia: Antidumping Duty4658Order; Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Ecuador, India, and the Socialist4659Republic of Vietnam: Countervailing Duty Orders, 89 Fed. Reg. 104,9824660(Dep't Commerce Dec. 26, 2024).4661---------------------------------------------------------------------------4662 In the past, U.S. shrimp importers and foreign shrimp exporters4663responded to the imposition of antidumping duties through4664transshipment, fraudulent paperwork, and mislabeling. Now, however, the4665U.S. shrimp market is overwhelmingly dominated by foreign aquaculture4666industries that routinely use harmful and banned antibiotics in their4667shrimp aquaculture. Last year, roughly 48 percent of the total volume4668of shrimp and shrimp products imported into the United States came from4669just two countries: India and Vietnam.\25\ These two countries are, by4670far, the single largest sources of contaminated shrimp imports in major4671shrimp importing markets, including the European Union, Japan, and the4672United States.\26\4673---------------------------------------------------------------------------4674 \25\ According to the U.S. International Trade Commission's Dataweb4675service, the United States imported 1.7 billion pounds of shrimp in46762024, of which 649 million pounds came from India and 153 million4677pounds came from Vietnam.4678 \26\ See Southern Shrimp Alliance, Which Countries Continue to Use4679Antibiotics in Shrimp Aquaculture? The EU, Japan, and the United States4680All Find the Same Thing: India and Vietnam (Jan. 30, 2025), https://4681shrimpalliance.com/which-countries-continue-to-use-antibiotics-in-4682shrimp-aquaculture-the-eu-japan-and-the-united-states-all-find-the-4683same-thing-india-and-vietnam/.4684---------------------------------------------------------------------------4685 Moreover, the U.S. shrimp market is now dominated by foreign supply4686chains that have been corrupted by forced labor practices. Most4687disturbingly, even with repeated exposes and confirmation of the4688widespread use of forced labor in the Indian shrimp supply chain,\27\4689India has accounted for between 52 percent and 61 percent of the total4690volume of peeled shrimp imported into the United States in every year4691since 2018.\28\ In September of last year, the U.S. Department of Labor4692added shrimp from India to the list of goods produced by forced4693labor.\29\ Nevertheless, for the last seven years, more than one out of4694every two pounds of foreign, peeled shrimp sold in our market came from4695a supply chain featuring contract peeling sheds where vulnerable4696populations are subject to heinous exploitation.4697---------------------------------------------------------------------------4698 \27\ See Corporate Accountability Lab, Hidden Harvest: Human Rights4699and Environmental Abuses in India's Shrimp Industry (Mar. 2024),4700https://corpaccountabilitylab.org/hidden-harvest; The Outlaw Ocean4701Project, India Shrimp: A Growing Goliath, The True Price of a Cheap4702Appetizer, https://www.theoutlawocean.com/investigations/india-shrimp-4703a-growing-goliath/; and CNN, The U.S. Is India's Biggest Importer of4704Shrimp. Teenage Girls and Women Working in the Booming Industry4705Describe Grueling Conditions, https://www.cnn.com/interactive/asequals/4706indian-seafood-industry-women-exploitation-as-equals-intl-cmd/.4707 \28\ Source: U.S. International Trade Commission, Dataweb.4708 \29\ See Notice of Publication to the Department of Labor's List of4709Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor, and Updates to the List4710of Products Requiring Federal Contractor Certification as to Forced or4711Indentured Child Labor, 89 Fed. Reg. 72,897 (Dep't Labor Sept. 6,47122024); and Bureau of International Labor Affairs, U.S. Department of4713Labor, List of Goods Produced by Child or Forced Labor, https://4714www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-goods.4715---------------------------------------------------------------------------4716 Importation of shrimp contaminated by harmful antibiotics, an4717adulterated food product, is prohibited by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic4718Act.\30\ Similarly, importation of shrimp produced through forced labor4719is prohibited pursuant to 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1307. Accordingly, the4720importation of foreign shrimp containing veterinary drug residues and/4721or produced through forced labor constitutes an illegal act.4722Nevertheless, minimal enforcement of our laws has obviated any need for4723foreign exporters or U.S. importers to engage in the type of fraud used4724to obfuscate the origin of the shrimp. Instead, contaminated shrimp and4725shrimp produced through forced labor is simply routinely imported into4726the United States, with small fractions of contaminated shrimp4727occasionally identified through the FDA's limited sampling of imported4728food. No imports of Indian shrimp have ever been prohibited from entry4729into this country because they were produced by forced labor.4730---------------------------------------------------------------------------4731 \30\ See 21 U.S.C. Sec. 331(a).4732---------------------------------------------------------------------------4733 While information regarding the FDA's sampling and testing of4734foreign shrimp products, specifically, is not publicly available, the4735agency has endeavored to make more information regarding its activities4736available to the public through data dashboards.\31\ These data4737dashboards provide user-friendly access to information regarding4738specific import entry lines of food products, as well as any on-site4739inspections of foreign food facilities. On a broader level, the data4740dashboards also allow users to analyze the number of entry lines,4741refusals, examined entry lines, and sampled entry lines by country and4742broad product type.4743---------------------------------------------------------------------------4744 \31\ See https://datadashboard.fda.gov/oii/cd/index.htm.4745---------------------------------------------------------------------------4746 Here, the information made available by the FDA of human foods4747sourced from India is instructive. In 2012, the United States imported4748176,832 entry lines of human food from India, of which the FDA sampled47491,908 entry lines (1.1 percent) and refused 1,700 entry lines (1.04750percent).\32\ By 2019, we imported 329,601 entry lines of human food4751from India--an increase of 86.4 percent in just seven years--of which4752the FDA sampled a mere 1,206 entry lines (0.4 percent)--a 36.8 percent4753decline--and refused just 925 entry lines (0.3 percent)--a 45.6 percent4754decline.\33\ As these numbers imply, the amount of adulterated imported4755food products detected by the FDA is closely correlated to the number4756of samples taken by the agency. As such, it is not a surprise that in47572024 the U.S. imported an unprecedented record of 437,145 entry lines4758of human food from India--an increase of 32.6 percent in five years--of4759which the FDA sampled 1,836 entry lines (0.4 percent) and refused 1,9914760entry lines (0.5 percent).\34\4761---------------------------------------------------------------------------4762 \32\ See https://datadashboard.fda.gov/oii/cd/impsummary.htm.4763 \33\ Id.4764 \34\ Id.4765---------------------------------------------------------------------------4766 Because these numbers demonstrate that the chances of having any4767shipment sampled are incredibly low, the reasonable conclusion to be4768drawn by any Indian foreign shrimp producer is that there is little to4769be gained in ceasing use of veterinary drugs that act as growth4770promoters and prophylactics against crop loss when supplying U.S.4771customers. Similarly, because there is little risk that a shipment of4772contaminated foreign shrimp will be identified at the U.S. port, no4773incentives exist for U.S. importers to demand that foreign ponds stop4774the practice of using banned antibiotics or fungicides.4775 The U.S. shrimp industry, and Texan shrimpers in particular, cannot4776compel the FDA or U.S. Customs and Border Protection to enforce Federal4777laws that should prohibit the importation of these cheap, unfairly-4778traded goods that have cratered dockside prices. However, the failure4779of these Federal agencies to administer their statutory obligations has4780devastated American shrimping coastal communities from Texas to North4781Carolina.