Hearings to examine People's Republic of China influence and the status of Taiwan's diplomatic allies in the Western Hemisphere.

1[Senate Hearing 119-103]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34                                                        S. Hrg. 119-10356 SHARED THREATS: INDO	PACIFIC ALLIANCES AND BURDEN SHARING IN TODAY'S7                        GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT89=======================================================================1011                                HEARING1213                               BEFORE THE1415                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS16                          UNITED STATES SENATE1718                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS1920                             FIRST SESSION2122                               __________2324                             MARCH 26, 20252526                               __________2728       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations2930[GRAPHIC(s) NOT AVAILANLE IN TIFF FORMAT3132                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov3334        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE35 60-819PDF       WASHINGTON : 20253637                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS3839                JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman40PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska                JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire41DAVID MCCORMICK, Pennsylvania          CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware42STEVE DAINES, Montana                  CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut43BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee                TIM KAINE, Virginia44JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming                 JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon45MIKE LEE, Utah                         CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey46RAND PAUL, Kentucky                    BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii47TED CRUZ, Texas                        CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland48RICK SCOTT, Florida                    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois49JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah                   JACKY ROSEN, Nevada50JOHN CORNYN, Texas51       Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director52                Damian Murphy, Staff Director53                   John Dutton, Chief Clerk5455                              (ii)5657                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S5859                              ----------60                                                                   Page6162Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     16364Shaheen, Hon. Jeanne, U.S. Senator From New Hampshire............     36566Schriver, Hon. Randall, Chairman of the Board, Project 204967  Institute,68  Arlington, VA..................................................     469    Prepared Statement...........................................     67071Statement of Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro, Center Fellow, Freeman72  Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford73  University, Non-Resident Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for74  International Peace, Stanford, CA..............................     875    Prepared Statement...........................................    117677Dr. Victor Cha, Distinguished University Professor, Georgetown78  University President, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy79  Department, Center for Strategic and International Studies,80  Washington, DC.................................................    2581    Prepared Statement...........................................    278283                                 (iii)8485 SHARED THREATS: INDO-PACIFIC ALLIANCES AND BURDEN SHARING IN TODAY'S86                        GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT8788                              ----------8990                       WEDNESDAY, MARCH 26, 20259192                                       U.S. Senate,93                            Committee on Foreign Relations,94                                                    Washington, DC.95    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:11 a.m., in96room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James E.97Risch presiding.98    Present: Senators Risch [presiding], Ricketts, McCormick,99Scott of Florida, Cornyn, Shaheen, Coons, Kaine, Duckworth, and100Rosen.101102           OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,103                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO104105    The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Thank you106all for attending today.107    We apologize--we are starting a little late. We had an108important meeting before us and trying to get a handle on some109things that are going on.110    I am going to give the usual statement. We welcome all of111you here. This is a public hearing. We are doing the business112of the United States of America, and this is just as important113as a courtroom, and as a result of that there will be no114audience participation.115    Audience participation includes anything that attempts to116communicate with either witnesses or the committee. Whether you117are standing up, whether you are talking, whether you are118protesting, whether you are holding up signs, none of that is119permitted here.120    We have zero tolerance for it. If you do that you are going121to be arrested immediately, as the people yesterday did that122were arrested, and then after you are arrested and go through123the process you will be banned from the committee for a year.124    With that, we--again, we welcome your participation here as125a spectator, but that is the limit of what you can do here.126    With that, we have an important hearing this morning on127Indo-Pacific alliances and we have some good and important128witnesses for that.129    I am going to make an opening statement and then I will130recognize the ranking member to make an opening statement, and131then we will hear from our witnesses and then we will open it132up to a round of questions.133    With that, as an opening statement I would like to talk134about this issue. Over the past several years we have seen135China rapidly escalate its aggressive actions against Taiwan,136Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and other countries in the137Indo-Pacific.138    China has positioned itself as America's most significant139long-term challenge and that means, in the short-term, China's140military aggression in the Indo-Pacific should not go141unchecked.142    China's actions destabilize global security and disrupt143global trade, which could impact Americans' financial aspects.144    As demonstrated by China's spy balloon, which invaded our145sovereign airspace in 2023, China's ambitions are not confined146to Asia.147    China's military is rapidly modernizing its shipbuilding148capacity, which is formidable, and its development of dual-use149artificial intelligence is growing more advanced by the day.150    In this dangerous security environment, we and our allies151need to help ourselves by increasing defense spending and152building joint capabilities.153    China's aggression should be confronted, but America should154not be the world's only watchdog. To counter Chinese155aggression, we need our allies to work with us to ensure each156of us is strong and capable of pushing back.157    Today's hearing will focus on how we can build alliances158that are fit and up to this task.159    America is well-positioned because we have a Commander-in-160Chief who understands the need for a strong relationship with161our Indo-Pacific allies.162    President Trump's recent successful summit with the163Japanese Prime Minister and his administration's early focus on164the Philippines are proof of this.165    In his first term, President Trump deepened security166cooperation with Taiwan, kept the U.S.-Japan-South Korea167intelligence sharing initiative alive, and approved major arms168transfers to Southeast Asian partners.169    We need to build on this work. Key to this is encouraging170responsible and effective burden sharing from our partners.171This has been a decades-long bipartisan initiative that has172only become more pressing.173    South Korea has done great work here. Its defense spending174grew consistently during the Cold War and beyond, always175remaining well above 2 percent of its GDP.176    It now boasts a robust defense industry and is well-177positioned to work with the U.S. on boosting our shipbuilding178capacity.179    Japan's defense spending remains comparably low, but it has180taken important steps like acquiring counter-strike181capabilities, and in Taiwan, double-digit defense spending182increases must continue, given the threat it faces across the183Taiwan Strait.184    In addition to sharing the burden of defense, our allies185need to expand U.S. basing and overflight access around the186Indo-Pacific. The best way to show China that we stand together187is if we are physically present in the region.188    The Philippines has shown itself to be a great partner in189this regard since the signing of the Enhanced Defense190Cooperation Agreement. We need far more of this around the191region.192    I look forward to hearing the witnesses' thoughts on how to193approach both burden-sharing and access basing and overflight194in Asia, and more specifically what role the State Department195should play on these issues.196    The issue in military aggression--the rise in military197aggression from China is a threat to us all. If we do not use198our alliances in the Indo-Pacific to a high standard, we do199Americans and the people of the region a tremendous disservice.200    With that, thank you to the witnesses for being here today.201We have a good panel. We are looking forward to hearing from202them. With that, I recognize the ranking member.203204               STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN,205                U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE206207    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Chairman Risch. Welcome to our208witnesses. We so appreciate your being here this morning.209    From the South China Sea where China's Coast Guard harasses210Philippine forces to Beijing's military exercises over the211Taiwan Strait, there is bipartisan agreement that these212aggressive actions threaten national security.213    As we know, the impacts of China's rise are not isolated to214Asia. Debt trap diplomacy with infrastructure projects in215Africa, the flow of fentanyl precursor chemicals into Latin216America, economic coercion in Europe over Lithuania's support217for Taiwan, China's influence can be felt across the globe.218    That is certainly the case in Ukraine where China and North219Korea have been actively supporting Putin's war machine.220Beijing is watching how we respond to Ukraine as it weighs its221options in Taiwan.222    The presidents of both parties have recognized the223challenge that China poses. President Trump took important224steps by implementing export controls during his first term.225President Biden not only kept those controls in place, his226administration strengthened them.227    Our allies in Asia, as the chairman pointed out, also228recognize the threat that China poses. In 2022, Japan committed229to increasing its defense spending. Australia has made historic230investments in AUKUS, our trilateral defense partnership with231the U.K., and Taiwan is boosting its defense budget to over 3232percent of its GDP.233    I agree that American allies should pay their fair share of234defense spending, but we should also acknowledge that our Indo-235Pacific partners are stepping up and U.S. support for these236alliances is not charity--it is a strategic investment.237    America's alliances around the world are one of our238greatest security assets. South Korea hosts eight U.S. military239bases and 23,000 U.S. service members.240    Japan not only allows the U.S. to station 55,000 troops241across 15 major bases, it also helps pay for them, contributing242$2 billion a year.243    These partnerships are mutually beneficial and go beyond244our military. Whether in Europe or Latin America, our allies245help us to counter China's economic influence and246disinformation.247    The combined power of American and European markets248together expands our ability to set AI standards and our249alliances support American companies and workers.250    Last week I attended a defense industry round table on251AUKUS in New Hampshire. Strengthening our submarine industrial252base like the work being done at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard253does more than give us a strategic edge over China. It creates254high-quality American jobs and it supports our domestic255industry.256    So instead of threatening or undermining friendly nations257with tariffs, I think we should be strengthening our alliances.258NATO has contained the Soviet Union and Russia for decades. I259would be interested in hearing from our witnesses on what260mutual defense arrangements for the Indo-Pacific might look261like.262    We need to explore every advantage that we have. INDOPACOM,263our military command in the region, has also led the way in264implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Act. The commander265recently told me that INDOPACOM has been more effective than266any other U.S. regional command in ensuring women play key267roles in decision-making.268    That is a strategic strength and we should build on it if269we want to combat the growing link between security in Asia and270security in Europe.271    As we know, the world is more connected than ever. I hope272our witnesses this morning will speak not only to the273challenges we face, but also to the opportunities that we can274seize at this historic time.275    So I look forward to hearing your thoughts and I am276delighted that you are joining us. Thank you.277    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.278    We will now hear from our witnesses. We are going to start279with Randall Schriver, Chairman of the Board at the Project2802049 Institute.281    He previously served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for282Indo-Pacific Security Affairs in the first Trump283administration, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for284East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He is one of our foremost285experts on U.S. alliances in Asia.286    The floor is yours.287288  STATEMENT OF HON. RANDALL SCHRIVER, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD,289             PROJECT 2049 INSTITUTE, ARLINGTON, VA290291    Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member292Shaheen, and other distinguished members of the committee. I293appreciate the opportunity to be here this morning to testify294on this topic.295    So for the United States to realize our goal of a free and296open Indo-Pacific, we are and will continue to be very heavily297reliant on alliances and partnerships.298    We are a Pacific power, but we are not heavily resident in299the Western Pacific. Hawaii is three time zones away from the300continental U.S., but still west of the international--east of301the international date line, and even our great territories--302Guam, our state of Alaska--do not put us resident enough in the303Western Pacific to fully affect security the way we would like.304    This geographic conundrum advantages our adversaries and305competitors. For China, Russia, North Korea, they enjoy306geographic proximity to the areas we seek to safeguard.307    So this means in a contingency, whether that be Taiwan308Strait, West Philippine Sea, East China Sea, the United States309will always be the away team, will always be playing on the310road.311    Strong alliances and partnerships are the best way to312combat this tyranny of time and distance. In the military and313security domain, we rely on our allies and partnerships for at314least three types of contributions.315    First, we need them to develop their own capabilities for316their sufficient self-defense, but also to be contributors to317other regional contingencies if need be.318    Second, we rely on them for access basing and overflight,319as has been pointed out in the opening statements, as a distant320power ourselves.321    And third, we rely on our partners and allies to also play322a role in the shaping and the support for a free and open Indo-323Pacific and all that that entails, as well as day-to-day324activities that uphold deterrence.325    So these are the things that I think are the basis for326evaluating burden-sharing. I think too often burden-sharing is327scoped down to a single figure, which is how much is a country328spending per GDP--percentage of GDP on defense.329    I think that does not always tell the whole story. It is330revealing, but does not always tell the whole story. Just a few331examples, Philippines spends 1.5 percent of GDP on defense, but332yet they are making more and more sites available for U.S.333forces through, as the chairman mentioned, the EFTA agreements,334nine sites now.335    Japan, as was mentioned, has historically spent close to 1336percent of GDP, but in fact we were advocates for actively337suppressing that defense spending for many decades to now get338to a point where people would like to see them do more.339    They are doing more, but they are also the host to the340largest number of U.S. military forces forward deployed, and as341ranking member Shaheen pointed out, they are contributors342through host nation support.343    Taiwan is spending 2.5 percent of GDP, but they are also344spending a lot that is not accounted for in defense when it345comes to national resiliency on energy, on communications, on346civil defense.347    So perhaps they should be getting more credit. History is348very important, too. We have partners and allies that have349fought alongside us in every conflict since World War I, and,350of course, I am speaking most directly about Australia.351    So I believe it is a complicated formula and we should take352a comprehensive view on burden-sharing and give credit where353credit is due because these alliances are so important to us.354    This is further complicated by the changing nature of the355threat. Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles put our forward356deployed forces at risk so we are now more and more dependent357on our allies for basing and access.358    So spending figures do not capture the entire picture, in359my point of view. Our State Department will be extraordinarily360important in addressing this.361    Our State Department, they are the lead negotiators for362host nation support for access. They run our security363assistance, foreign military sales, foreign military financing,364international military education and training.365    They run programs that are adjacent to military and366security like the INL programs that support Coast Guards367through the prism of law enforcement, and I would argue even368the education and cultural programs--the Fulbright, the369International Visitors Program. That is investing in the370alliance managers of the future and I think that should be371supported.372    Let me close with four brief recommendations that address373issues under the purview of this committee.374    I think, number one, this committee should ask for regular375updates regarding our more advanced and mature alliances--Japan376and Australia--to make sure initiatives are on track with377respect to posture and C2 adjustments and both pillars of378AUKUS.379    Two, I think the committee should insist State Department380demonstrate FMS, FMF, and IMET are in fact in alignment with381our strategic goals and should be actively shaping that.382    Third, I think the committee should insist on a speedy383conclusion of U.S. assistance reviews and direct resumption of384aid that aligns with our strategic priorities, things like EDCA385and Coast Guard support and dioxin remediation in Vietnam.386    Finally, this committee should insist on a speedy387conclusion of State Department review of education and cultural388programs and direct resumption of programs that align with our389strategic priorities.390    Thank you. I look forward to your questions.391    [The prepared statement of Mr. Schriver follows:]392393               Prepared Statement of Randall G. Schriver394395    Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, and distinguished members396of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify on the important397issues related to our alliances in the Indo-Pacific region.398    To realize the Unites States' vision of securing a free and open399Indo-Pacific region, we are heavily reliant on alliances and400partnerships. The United States is a Pacific power, yet we are mostly401resident in the Eastern Pacific and lack significant presence in the402Western Pacific. Though Hawaii is three time zones west of the403continental United States, and Alaska's Aleutian Island chain stretches404beyond the international date line, we are still largely removed from405many of the key areas of the Western Pacific that significantly impact406America's vital interests.407    This geographic conundrum carries heavy implications for everything408from supply chains to trade, but from a national security perspective409our competitors and adversaries--that axis of China, Russia and North410Korea--all are advantaged by their physical proximity to the areas we411seek to safeguard. And in the event of a contingency, whether in the412Taiwan Strait, the Korean Peninsula, the East China Sea, or the West413Philippines Sea, the United States will be playing on the road as the414``away team.'' Strong alliances and partnerships are the best way to415combat ``the tyranny of time and distance.''416    In the military and security domain, we depend on alliances and417partnerships for at least three types of contributions. First, we need418our allies to build their own respective militaries for sufficient419self-defense, as well as for having capabilities they can bring to bear420on other regional contingencies. Second, we need allies and partners to421provide access, basing, and overflight (ABO) for forward deployed U.S.422military forces. And third we need allies and partners of like mind to423help create and uphold the free and open order in the Indo-pacific424characterized by protection of sovereignty, respect for international425laws and norms, peaceful dispute resolution, and the ability of426political leaders in all capitals to make decision free from coercion427and undue influence. How well or how poorly an ally contributes across428these three areas is the primary basis for evaluating their level of429``burden sharing.''430    Too often burden sharing is scoped down to a simple question of431``how much does the country spend on its defense as a percentage of432GDP?'' And in the cases where we have permanent bases and presence,433``how much is the country contributing in host nation support?'' While434those statics can be revealing, they often do not tell the entire435story. How should we evaluate a country like the Philippines which only436spends 1.5 percent of GDP on defense, but is offering expanded access437for U.S. forces in proximity to a major known contingency through nine438Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) locations? Taiwan is439spending 2.5 percent of GDP on defense (and is committed to increasing440that to 3 percent), but is also spending increasing amounts on441``national resilience'' to include resilient energy stockpiles,442hardened and redundant communications, and civilian sheltering and443civil defenses--all of which contribute to deterrence, but none of444which counts in the defense budget. What do we say of Singapore who is445not a treaty ally--but spends 3 percent of GDP on defense and has been446extremely generous on access opportunities for U.S. forces (including447paying to extend their major navy pier to accommodate aircraft448carriers--which we have but they do not). How do we account for449historical legacy? We spent decades actively encouraging Japan to450suppress defense spending, but now many claim they are falling short.451At the same time, we also have more forces stationed in Japan than any452other country in Asia and enjoy approximately a billion and a half U.S.453dollars a year in host nation support. Australia spends 2 percent of454GDP on defense, but is increasing access opportunities for U.S. forces455and has fought alongside the U.S. in every conflict since World War I.456    This evaluation is further complicated by the evolving nature of457the threat, and the changing character of warfare. Given the threat458from increasingly lethal and accurate Chinese ballistic and cruise459missiles, U.S. war planners have determined we need to fight in a460distributed, dispersed manner. This makes access and basing far more461important than it was two decades ago. The key to sustained combat462generation in a contested environment may very well come down to a463handful of dispersal points with sufficient maintenance and logistics464support, and forward positioning of critical munitions and fuel.465    Spending money on expensive legacy platforms might win favor with466those who solely judge an ally based on the total amount of defense467spending, but the keys to success in modern warfare may be acquiring468cheaper, attritable, autonomous systems, combined with an AI-enabled469comprehensive operating picture with optimized decision-making470assistance. An ally with a modernized C5ISR system that is also471interoperable with the U.S. military with real-time data sharing may472prove able to carry much more of the burden in both peacetime and in473conflict than a country with the largest quantity of legacy platforms.474    Beyond investing in one's own defense and beyond ABO, our allies475are increasingly important in shaping the regional security environment476and bolstering deterrence. Japan and Korea are more active in regional477security assistance, capacity building and training which is additive478to U.S. efforts. Australia and New Zealand's development assistance and479capacity building in Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia help make480countries in Oceana more resilient. And more allies and partners are481willing to join the U.S. in a variety of presence operations that482support freedom of navigation in the key maritime commons.483    It is therefore my judgement that we should take a far more484comprehensive view of burden sharing rather than looking only at485defense spending. In doing so, we will have a more accurate486understanding of a particular ally's actual contributions to regional487security and support of U.S. interests. A comprehensive account will488not relieve pressure on our allies to improve. Quite to the contrary,489it will help our diplomats become more focused on what the prioritized490``asks'' should be from our allies.491    The State Department will be absolutely crucial to our efforts492moving forward to modernize our alliances and to enhance comprehensive493burden sharing in at least four ways. First, the State Department is494the lead agency for international negotiations. Our diplomats will thus495be out front in negotiating host nation support agreements (e.g. Japan496in 2027) and future access agreements. Second, our State Department497runs security assistance programs. Critical programs such as Foreign498Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and499International Military Education and Training (IMET) are all run out of500State. Our ``T'' Bureau at State will have a lot of influence on how501efficiently the FMS and FMF process runs, as well as influence on what502allies procure and how partner countries modernize. Third, the State503Department runs programs that are military and security ``adjacent.''504For example, the INL bureau of the State Department through the prism505of law enforcement assistance has engaged in capacity building of506regional Coast Guards. Arguably, in the current environment of grey507zone incursions, assistance to the Philippine Coast Guard is as508important to deterrence as assistance to the military. USAID509(presumably now fully under State Department) also played a role in510supplying the ECDA sites with humanitarian supplies for use in the511event of natural disasters. In the case of partner country Vietnam,512USAID has helped with Dioxin remediation at former U.S. military sites513which has been a key enabler to building U.S.-Vietnam security ties.514And fourth, State Department has responsibility over assistance515programs that are non-military, but contribute greatly to alliance and516partner building. Fulbright programs and education and cultural517exchanges cultivate the next generation of talented and faithful518alliance managers.519    Let me close with four specific recommendations to Congress on520issues for which this committee has purview:521522  (1)  This committee should request regular updates regarding the more523        advanced and mature alliances with Japan and Australia524        respectively, on alliance modernization initiatives such as525        posture realignment, C2 adjustments, and both pillars of AUKUS526        to ensure the initiatives are sustained and on track.527528  (2)  This committee should insist State Department demonstrate FMS,529        FMF and IMET decisions are aligned with strategic priorities,530        and take into account lessons learned on the changing nature of531        warfare. Particular attention should be given to providing532        capabilities for advanced sensing, battlefield management and533        promoting a networked region of U.S. allies and partners.534535  (3)  This committee should insist on a speedy conclusion of U.S.536        assistance reviews and direct resumption of aid that aligns537        with strategic priorities. Emphasis should be placed on aid538        programs that support our military posture initiatives (e.g.539        EDCA), military adjacent capabilities (e.g. Coast Guards), and540        alliance and partnership enabling programs (e.g. Dioxin541        remediation).542543      And544545  (4)  This committee should insist on a speedy conclusion of State546        Department review of education and cultural exchange programs547        and direct a resumption of programs that align with strategic548        priorities. Our future alliance managers should be the first549        beneficiaries of the reconstituted Fulbright fellowships and550        International Visitor Leaders Program.551552    Thank you once again and I look forward to your questions.553554    The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Schriver. That is a555challenging list that you gave us, but we will talk about that556when we get to the questions.557    Next we have Dr. Mastro is a Center Fellow at the Freeman558Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford559University. She is also a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie560Endowment for International Peace.561    In addition, she continues to serve in the U.S. Air Force562Reserve where she works as a strategic planner at the Pentagon.563Her research focuses on the Chinese military, Asia Pacific564security issues, and coercive diplomacy.565    Dr. Mastro, the floor is yours.566567 STATEMENT OF DR. ORIANA SKYLAR MASTRO, CENTER FELLOW, FREEMAN568     SPOGLI INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, STANFORD569   UNIVERSITY, NON-RESIDENT SCHOLAR, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR570               INTERNATIONAL PEACE, STANFORD, CA571572    Dr. Mastro. Thank you.573    Chairman Risch, ranking member Shaheen, and esteemed574members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, thank you575for the opportunity to present my views today on how to best576approach alliance burden sharing in the Indo-Pacific.577    I will present what types of allied support I believe will578be the most strategically consequential for the U.S. ability to579deter Chinese aggression and how the United States can better580encourage such support.581    Burden sharing is often framed in financial terms, but if582we take a broader perspective, the contributions that our583allies can make goes much beyond defense spending.584    Instead, I would argue that we need to prioritize three585other forms of contributions from our allies.586    First, the United States needs to focus on getting more587expansive, flexible, and permanent access, basing, and588overflight in allied countries in the Indo-Pacific.589    Second, the United States needs greater influence in what590allies invest in to include greater support for U.S. military591construction and the development of certain military592capabilities that complement rather than duplicate our forces.593    As the previous witness already mentioned, our allies and594partners are doing a lot to support U.S. defense and deterrence595in the Indo-Pacific.596    If we do require greater access basing and overflight, in597my written testimony I lay out some specifics on what I think598that could look like for our allies and partners.599    As I have listed elsewhere, to deter China from using600force, especially over Taiwan, the United States needs to601implement a denial strategy--the ability to deny China from602achieving its goals through force.603    Some examples of things that we could do with our allies604and partners in terms of ABO that could achieve this goal are605things such as getting submarine tenders in Japan, more606permanent basing in the Philippines, and prioritizing anti-ship607capabilities in the southwest islands of Japan.608    I would also note that the United States should consider609renegotiating the relocation of our Marines from Okinawa to610Guam as that agreement was signed almost 20 years ago and does611not take into account the rise of China and the consequential612changing security environment.613    In addition to greater access, basing, and overflight, it614is important that the United States works with allies and615partners so that they spend on the right things, not just spend616more.617    The United States could encourage two types of spending in618particular--first, greater contributions to the cost of U.S.619military construction.620    It is important to note that a lot of our allies and621partners already contribute significantly to this, in622particular Japan, but South Korea could contribute more to623these costs.624    Philippine Government, however, is a bit more cash-625strapped, and given that the United States is trying to gain626access to basing there, this is one of the areas where the627United States should be able to make greater financial628contributions.629    Allied defense investment decisions could also be geared to630better support U.S. defense industry. The chairman already631mentioned the improvements and the contributions of South632Korean shipbuilding, and in recent years there have been great633developments in research, development, licensing production634between the United States and Japan and, of course, a prime635example being the expanded defense cooperation found in AUKUS.636    The United States could also encourage allies and partners637to invest in capability that complement instead of duplicate638U.S. capabilities.639    The third potential impactful area of burden sharing is640mission burden sharing. The allies and partners are investing641more in the capabilities to deter China and also take on a642greater responsibility during crises.643    For example, the United States might need South Korea to be644better positioned to take on responsibilities to counter North645Korean hostility during potential conflicts. In this vein,646South Korea should also agree to strategic flexibility for the647United States, meaning that the U.S. can use our forces on the648Peninsula for off-Peninsula contingencies, i.e., those that649involve China.650    Japan needs to be better prepared to deter conflict in the651East China Sea and Australia, through our cooperation, could652have a greater burden of exercising military dominance over key653Southeast Asian choke points.654    Recognizing the United States cannot do it all, we should655also welcome coordination and cooperation among our allies and656partners.657    Let me conclude by saying that the best way to encourage658any sort of burden sharing is not to publicly criticize allies659and demand it, but instead the United States needs to offer660more than security protections.661    Development assistance, political support, technological662cooperation, economic benefits, humanitarian aid and disaster663relief--these are some of the most impactful.664    The public nature of U.S. demands makes it hard for U.S.665allies, who are all democracies, to cooperate with the United666States and to consider some of the requests that we might make.667    Some for alliance burden sharing it is very important for668the United States to have access to all tools of national power669in order to convince countries to be better aligned with our670defense priorities.671    It goes without saying that that means the United States672needs the full use of all aspects of national power. The recent673dissolution of key agencies such as USAID or the U.S. Agency674for Global Media, which oversees Voice of America, these were675relatively important and inexpensive tools of U.S. power and676influence, and it makes the job of projecting U.S. power677overseas even much harder, and I hope, pending appropriate678reviews, that the funding and support for these tools resume in679the future.680    Thank you.681    [The prepared statement of Dr. Mastro follows:]682683             Prepared Statement of Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro684685    The Chairman. Thank you very much, Doctor.686    Now we will hear from Dr. Victor Cha. He is a distinguished687university professor at Georgetown University, the president of688the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy department at the Center for689Strategic and International Studies, and a senior fellow at the690George W. Bush Institute.691    He served on the NSC and as an advisor to the Secretary of692Defense on the Defense Policy Board across different693administrations. Dr. Cha is a leading expert on U.S. alliances694and particularly the U.S.-Korea alliance.695    Dr. Cha, we would like to hear from you.696697     STATEMENT OF DR. VICTOR CHA, DISTINGUISHED UNIVERSITY698  PROFESSOR, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT, GEOPOLITICS AND699      FOREIGN POLICY DEPARTMENT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND700             INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC701702    Dr. Cha. Thank you, Chairman Risch, ranking member Shaheen,703and members of the committee, for the opportunity to speak to704you today about U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific.705    I am going to make five points that summarize the full706statement and data that I have presented and would like to707submit for the record.708    The Chairman. It will be submitted.709    Dr. Cha. Thank you, sir.710    My first point is historical, and that is that our alliance711system in Asia, which was created over 70 years ago, has served712us very well.713    It won the Cold War, stopped communist dominoes from714falling, reduced poverty, created wealth and fostered715democracy. Nobody could have imagined this outcome 70 years716ago, and these alliances are a unique aspect of U.S. power.717    The second point is with regard to shared threats. As we718all know, we face these shared threats--China, the nuclear719buildup, missile buildup, assertive behavior in the Taiwan720Strait, South China Sea, East China Sea.721    This is now complicated by this axis of Russia, Iran, North722Korea and their conduits--Cuba, Iraq, Syria, Venezuela--all723actively working in concert to undermine U.S. interests.724    As we all know, for example, in the Ukraine war, almost 100725percent of the micro electronics behind Russian weaponry came726from China--glide bombs, attack drones from Iran--and 50727percent of the munitions today that Russia uses are sourced728from North Korea.729    So the U.S. has to prevail against these threats, but we730cannot do it alone. We need our alliances.731    In the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. has 24 persistent bases and732access to 20 other sites. By contrast, China has one overseas733base.734    These bases allow for rapid response and successful defense735and deterrence, but at the same time these alliances are in736need of reform and modernization.737    My third point is with regard to burden sharing, and the738main point here is that allies are much more capable of bearing739host nation costs than they were 50 years ago. Many of the740algorithms we use are legacies of the past.741    At the same time, any changes should avoid surprises to742give our allies in the region the domestic political space to743sell new agreements to their publics, as these sorts of744agreements need to be ratified by their legislatures, unlike745the case in the United States.746    Burden sharing algorithms that exponentially increase747allied payments will not be feasible unless they take into748account allied contributions outside of the alliance on behalf749of the alliance, such as the $18 billion that Japan has750provided in support to Ukraine, and the $3 billion plus that751South Korea has done as well.752    These burden sharing contributions need to be documented as753per legislation like the Allied Burden Sharing Report Act.754    My fourth point is in regard to access basing and755overflight. The United States increasingly operates in a756contested basing environment to include cost constraints,757adversary tactics, and the vagaries of domestic political758leadership in these host countries.759    Gaining access to allied bases and civilian facilities for760prepositioning of kinetic and nonkinetic capabilities is as761much political as it is a military exercise.762    It requires socializing publics and governments not just at763the national level, but also at the local level, to understand764the role they play in national security.765    In the case of Japan, this means securing access to JSDF766and civilian facilities in the dispersed positions in the767southwest island chain. It also means the U.S. commitment to768following through on the promise to create a joint force769headquarters to coordinate with the newly established JJOC in770Japan.771    In Korea, this means not just a military, but also a772political discussion with the next South Korean Government773about the role of the Korean military and the U.S. military in774a Taiwan contingency.775    South Korea has made good statements with regard to776Taiwan's defense in the previous two leaders' summits, but now777comes the hard part; bringing political consensus to think778about changes that include things like force presence on the779Peninsula, rear area support, and South Korean capabilities to780deter North Korea in the event of opportunistic aggression in a781Taiwan contingency.782    The other point I wanted to make about ABO strategy is to783complement our military access arrangements with a strategy to784stop Chinese economic coercion. This is because our access785could be compromised by Chinese commercial pressure on host786economies with regard to our arrangements.787    In this regard, U.S. Indo-Pacific allies need to take a788page from the EU's anti-coercion instrument and build a789collective economic deterrence framework that is not just an790economic strategy, but is also related to our military and ABO791strategy.792    My last point is that the update of our alliances should793include burden sharing in terms of allied participation in794global governance institutions when our traditional795institutions of global governance, like the U.N. Security796Council, are underperforming.797    In this regard, the State Department should formalize the798IP4--Indo-Pacific Four--grouping as regular participants in799global governance institutions like the NATO leaders' summit800and the G-7.801    These allies can help carry forward like minded agendas as802the United States consolidates its power at home.803    Thank you very much.804    [The prepared statement of Dr. Cha follows:]805806                Prepared Statement of Dr. Victor D. Cha807808    Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen and distinguished members of809the committee, it is an honor to appear before this committee on the810topic of U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. The views811represented in this testimony are my own and not those of any employer812or institution with which I am affiliated.813    The Indo-Pacific is of terrible importance to U.S. economic and814security interests, and our alliances help to preserve those interests815and achieve our goals there. But these alliances are in need of reform816and modernization given the challenges posed by the new geostrategic817environment.818    I will speak briefly about the historical importance of these819security institutions and ways to modernize them going forward. I820request that my full written statement be submitted for the record.821                     origins of the alliance system822    When the United States created a network of bilateral alliances in823Asia in the immediate postwar period, architects like John Foster824Dulles acknowledged that this system was different from the825multilateral structure built in Western Europe, but policymakers at the826time probably had no inkling of how successful this alliance system827would become and how well it would serve U.S. interests.828    Each of the bilateral alliances at that time with Japan, South829Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand830(ANZUS) afforded the United States an immense amount of power and831influence, unlike anywhere else in the world. The alliance system832created incredibly loyal allies like Japan, Australia, and South Korea,833the latter two of which have fought with the United States in every war834since World War I and the Korean War, respectively.835    Through this alliance system, the United States won the Cold War in836Asia: It created prosperity and economic development in the region837beyond anyone's imagination; it fostered growth and democracy. The838importance of democratic values in the alliance system cannot be839undervalued considering that at the outset of the alliance system's840creation in 1951, it looked very much like communism would win the day.841The CCP victory in China in 1949, the communist North Korea attack in8421950, and communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia lent credence to the843domino theory--that soon, all these distant, post-colonial states would844be falling behind the iron curtain. But that did not happen. The U.S.845alliance system in Asia prevailed.846                    today's geopolitical environment847    Today, the pacing threat from China crosses many dimensions,848including security, economic, information, and technology. But it is849complicated and enhanced by a growing group of illiberal actors850operating in concert with one another to undermine the U.S. position.851These actors are well known to you: Russia, Iran, and North Korea and852their conduit states, Cuba, Iraq, Syria, and Venezuela. Table 1, for853example, shows the range of support provided by these actors to854Russia's war in Ukraine. China supplied almost 100 percent of the855microelectronics for Russia's missiles, tanks, and aircraft. Iran856contributed significantly to Russia's supply of attack drones, close-857range ballistic missiles, and glide bombs among other weapons used in858the war. North Korea has provided 11,000-12,000 troops, hundreds of859ballistic missiles, and may account for as much as 50 percent of860Russia's ammunition today. Outside of these actors, the supply of like-861minded and capable partners dwindles in comparison with a growing862number of ``hedge'' states like Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia,863South Africa, and UAE who cannot be relied upon to side with the United864States depending on the issue.865866                  reforming the indo-pacific alliances867    The United States must meet these challenges and win, not by going868it alone but with the support of our allies. There is no real869alternative. The alliance system has proven to be a winning formula in870the past, and it will do so again, but not without reform and871modernization.872    For some in the current administration, the imperative to update873and modernize these alliances stems from the judgment that they are874costly economically to the United States. If we use trade and defense-875spending as two metrics of allied burden-sharing, there are no Indo-876Pacific allies that are judged to be carrying their fair share.877878    Four principles should drive the mindset of alliance modernization:8791) Indo-Pacific allies are capable and can contribute much more to880networked capabilities than in the past; 2) Change is difficult, but881Indo-Pacific allies must manage the domestic-political resistance to882doing things differently; 3) Allies need to accept increased burden-883sharing as a given in the modernization effort; and 4) Allied884contributions to successful deterrence with the United States are a885critical pre-requisite to their realizing commercial opportunity with886China--that is, without security, there is no commercial opportunity,887there is only commercial coercion by China.888    In the Indo-Pacific region, the United States has 24 persistent889bases and access to 20 other military sites. By contrast, China has890only one overseas base in the world in Djibouti. These positions host89188,500 active-duty servicemembers, including about 60,000 in Japan and892about 28,500 in Korea.893    This presence affords the United States rapid response capabilities894to military contingencies; contributes to successful deterrence against895adversarial threats to the homeland and to allies/partners; and896provides the physical assurance of the U.S. security umbrella that is897critical not just to peace, but also to profitable commerce and898investment that drives the region's growth.899    Congress' role in maintaining this alliance network is critical in900its appropriation of funds for basing activities; its legislation of901policies and requirements related to basing; and its oversight of the902executive branch's policies related to basing and alliance relations.903                             burden-sharing904    Four principles should undergird the reform of burden-sharing905arrangements with allies. One, allied governments must recognize that906traditional monetary burden-sharing algorithms are legacies of a time907one-half century ago when U.S. capabilities dwarfed those of smaller908partners. Host-nation support arrangements where the U.S. annual909contribution is larger than that of the partner no longer makes sense910given the partner's wealth.911    Two, host-nation support agreements probably can and should take912account of allied contributions to defense and security outside of, but913on behalf of, the bilateral security partnership.914    Three, aside from the monetary aspects, burden-sharing should be915defined as the reorientation of costs and capabilities to the broader916regional deterrence and defense mission in the Indo-Pacific. While this917is already the case for some alliances, it is not the case for all and918needs to be so.919    Four, a critical element of reform is to avoid surprises. It is920imperative to create a suitable runway and plan that gives host nations921the political space to make potentially paradigm-shifting adjustments922to the alliance.923    Current SMA arrangements for Japan and South Korea adhere to a924legacy algorithm of incremental annual increases of around 2 percent925and 5-8 percent respectively. The newly concluded South Korea agreement926($1.05 billion in 2025 and $1.14 billion in 2026) expires in 2030; the927Japan agreement (about $1.5 billion in 2025) expires in 2026 with each928agreement covering about 40-50 percent (Korea) and 75 percent (Japan)929of the non-personnel costs of stationing USFK and USFJ (covering labor,930utilities, training, construction, purchase of local supplies).931    Negotiation of new agreements, following a ``cost-plus-50'' model932for example, will be difficult for host nations to swallow given the933need for legislative ratification (unlike in the United States). In934devising a more equitable formula for cost-sharing that acknowledges935the economic capacity of allied governments' substantial wealth, the936United States and allied governments could agree to include other non-937SMA contributions as part of the ledger of allied contributions in938future agreements. Table 2 gives examples of past non-SMA costs borne939by Japan and Korea.940941    Greater burden-sharing by allies could also acknowledge the out-of-942theater contributions by allies to security. But this would also943require that current burden-sharing agreements be revised to944reinstitute allied support for U.S. military assets outside of the host945nation (e.g., South Korea). For example, Table 3 enumerates Australia,946Japan and South Korea's contributions to Ukraine.947948    This more comprehensive definition of burden-sharing by allies949should be documented by the Administration through legislation like the950Allied Burden Sharing Report Act and the NATO Burden Sharing Report951Act.952                  access, basing and overflight (abo)953    The United States will increasingly operate in a contested basing954environment. Some of the challenges are internal in terms of our own955resource constraints. Some of them relate to the strategy of the956adversary (i.e., A2/AD). And some of the challenges are political and957internal to those particular host countries. Yet securing these958privileges are critical to giving the U.S. military resilience in terms959of staying power, resupply/repair, and storage, not to mention the960critical physical presence that undergirds credible deterrence.961    Here I cannot offer recommendations that you have not already962heard. In general, we need to push for U.S. use of allied bases in963contingencies where the ally is not directly threatened. Given growing964reach and capabilities of the adversary, the United States must do more965to harden forward presence infrastructure as well as increase air and966missile defense systems. There could be more burden-sharing of the967latter with allies, including additional THAAD systems in the region.968    In the case of Japan, major advances in defense spending and the969creation of the joint operational command (JJOC) are commendable, and970have been supported by the public. There is an expectation that the971United States would pre-consult with Japan on pre-positioning of972additional capabilities, and that Tokyo would gain support of local973communities. The Japanese Government could build on this momentum to974improve access arrangements for the alliance to make deterrence more975credible and defenses more capable in a Taiwan contingency. This976requires an initiative from the top to engage in a whole-of-government977dialogue internally and with the United States (in the 2+2 ministerial978talks) on revisions to SOFA which govern limited use access to JSDF and979civilian facilities other than permanent U.S. bases in Japan. The980purpose would be to streamline the national and local approval process981for U.S. access to dispersed positions in the Southwest (Nansei) island982chain (Miyako, Ishigaki, Yonaguni) in advance of an armed-attack983situation. Tokyo must also work with local governments to enhance their984understanding of the role they play in national defense (something985better understood in Tokyo). Such reforms should not be seen as a favor986or concession to the United States, but as necessary to enhance Japan's987national defense and security in the Nansei island chain closest to988Taiwan.989    In the case of South Korea, U.S. access to bases, the addition of990new non-kinetic capabilities, and the addition of kinetic capabilities991would be generally uncontroversial. The key is that they are framed as992directed toward the North Korean threat. The framing of capabilities as993directed to a Taiwan contingency, however, becomes more problematic994given the traditional South Korean reluctance to become entrapped in a995U.S.-China conflict. Domestic political factors matter here to a degree996in that conservative governments in Seoul tend to be a shade more open997to discussions about Taiwan contingencies. It is also noteworthy that998both progressive and conservative governments have broken new ground999with summit-level statements equating freedom of navigation and1000stability of the Taiwan straits with Korea's security. Still, the1001resistance is real. The United States could engage the next Korean1002Government in a broad reorientation of U.S. forces in Korea moving from1003a peninsular mission to a regional one. The range of options here could1004span removing troops from the peninsula to elsewhere, or increasing the1005presence in Korea with a portion each committed to peninsular defense1006and regional defense.1007    However, I would like to draw your attention to one important1008strategy to optimize U.S. ABO options. If the strategy for maintaining1009access rests on complementing and/or reforming large, main legacy1010operating base infrastructures, which are put at risk by the1011adversary's anti-access capabilities, with a network of smaller,1012dispersed, and concealed arrangements in the Indo-Pacific, then a major1013threat to this plan is not just China's ability to locate and1014militarily target such arrangements, but the political and commercial1015pressure that it can put on the hosts to withhold cooperation with the1016United States. Indeed, commercial pressure is probably the ideal tool1017for China to use given the nature of these small and dispersed ABO1018arrangements--that is, a host nation is more likely to succumb to1019intense Chinese economic pressure to withhold cooperation with the1020United States over a discrete access arrangement than over a large1021military base. China's use of economic coercion against U.S. allies is1022well-established. Since 2008, it has used economic coercion against 181023governments and over 500 companies (including U.S. primes). The purpose1024of the coercion is expressly political, not trade-related. The most1025well-known case related to access capabilities is probably the 2016-10262017 commercial assault on Korean companies for the emplacement of a1027THAAD battery in Seongju, South Korea, which did at least $7.5 billion1028dollars of damage.1029    An important component of an ABO strategy must be to complement the1030military access arrangements with a counter-coercion strategy designed1031to deter Chinese economic coercion. This strategy, otherwise known as1032``collective resilience'' would take the form of a multilateral1033economic deterrence mechanism that leverages the combined trade1034capabilities of like-minded partners to signal to China that they1035cannot economically coerce any one member of the group. Like-minded1036partners trade with China in 575 finished and intermediary goods valued1037at $59.61 billion upon which China is highly dependent, and for which1038China does not have alternative sources.\1\ A collective economic1039deterrence strategy has proven to work in Europe where the anti-1040coercion instrument (ACI) introduced in 2023 seems to have slowed1041China's coercive practices against other individual states as it had1042done to Lithuania. The United States should encourage Indo-Pacific1043allies to do the same expressly with the understanding that there is an1044important security rationale related to ABO.1045---------------------------------------------------------------------------1046    \1\ Victor Cha, ``Collective Resilience: Deterring China's1047Weaponization of Economic Interdependence,'' International Security 48,1048no. 1 (2023): 91-124. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00465.1049---------------------------------------------------------------------------1050                        opportunistic aggression1051    The war in Ukraine has made Indo-Pacific allies realize that war is1052a real possibility in Asia and that the unthinkable is possible. There1053is more proactive thinking in the region about dual contingencies and1054opportunistic aggression than I have ever experienced before. For1055example, we have had inquiries in the last 3 years from both Taiwan and1056South Korea about gaming out dual contingencies at the Track II level.1057An updated alliance structure should capitalize on this new thinking to1058proactively consider new ways of deterring opportunistic aggression.1059These could include, but not be limited to:10601061   Reorienting of the U.S. military presence on the Korean1062        peninsula to a regional deterrence and defense mission (either1063        by drawdown or supplementing);10641065   Training of USFK both on and off the peninsula;10661067   Collective defense declaration among the U.S., Japan, and1068        South Korea and a bilateral security declaration between Japan1069        and South Korea (2025 marks the 60th anniversary of normalized1070        relations);10711072   Increased South Korean defense spending and independent1073        military capabilities to deter North Korean opportunistic1074        aggression during a Taiwan contingency;10751076   Consideration of rear area support roles played by South1077        Korea in a Taiwan contingency10781079   Use of the UNC contributing nations' framework on the Korean1080        peninsula to enhance peacetime deterrence10811082    These are all politically sensitive issues in South Korea and would1083be topics to be taken up with the government once the political1084impeachment crisis in that country is resolved. Any reorientation of1085the U.S. presence on the peninsula, however, would require hard1086thinking about the retention of some ground troop presence to provide1087the traditional ``tripwire'' deterrent against North Korean1088adventurism; and would necessitate a planned, phased process that would1089minimize the negative political and economic externalities that would1090result from an abrupt change. Complete withdrawal of the troop presence1091would beg the question of cost (losing the South Korean subsidy), as1092well as alternative locations that would still be close enough to the1093fight to be effective. Increasing the troop presence (with a portion1094each trained for peninsular and regional defense) could mute potential1095South Korean self-help responses (e.g., proactive discussions of1096nuclearization), but would require a difficult Korean political choice1097to acknowledge its role in a Taiwan fight.1098                    new areas of allied cooperation1099    Updating of the alliances should include other new areas of1100cooperation outside of the military realm. A strong precedent has1101already been set by the previous two administrations for allied1102cooperation on economic security, export controls, and supply chains.1103Under the current administration, new opportunities have been unearthed1104in areas including shipbuilding and strategic energy cooperation with1105Japan and South Korea, in particular.1106    In Secretary Rubio's confirmation hearing before this body, he1107observed that eight decades after the end of the second World War,1108America is being called upon again to create a free world out of chaos,1109but he also noted the voters elected President Trump because they want1110a strong America with a ``prudent'' foreign policy. In this regard, the1111State Department should encourage our allies in the Indo-Pacific and1112Europe to play more active political roles in sustaining global1113governance as traditional institutions like the UN Security Council1114have underperformed and groupings like BRICS aim to disrupt the current1115rules-based order. I have two specific recommendations here. First, the1116United States should encourage more direct security dialogue and1117military planning among European and Asian allies that builds on the1118Trump and Biden administrations' previous efforts to build multilateral1119coalitions on functional issues like export controls, sanctions, and1120pandemic preparedness. The war in Ukraine, China's assertiveness, and1121North Korea's supply of Russia have brought the two theaters together1122in unprecedented ways and I have been personally impressed by the level1123of interest and sophistication in the European discussions on security1124of the Indo-Pacific.1125    Finally, the State Department would do well to promote and1126formalize the ``Indo-Pacific-4'' framework's (Japan, South Korea,1127Australia, New Zealand) participation in global governance1128institutions. Regular participation in the NATO leader's summits have1129led to greater cooperation across Europe and Asia in countering Chinese1130coercion. Moreover, the Group of Seven (G7) has become the de facto1131organization in which leading like-minded states coordinate policies,1132set sanctions, and define new rules and norms in the absence of1133functioning UN mandates. Indo-Pacific and European actors like1134Australia, South Korea and Spain are proven high performers in many of1135the pressing tasks identified in recent G7 leaders' summits like1136economic resilience and security, digital competitiveness, food1137security, climate change, labor security, and development, and1138therefore could contribute much to burden-sharing and global1139governance.\2\1140---------------------------------------------------------------------------1141    \2\ John J. Hamre, Victor Cha, Emily Benson, Max Bergmann, Erin L.1142Murphy, and Caitlin Welsh, ```Bending' the Architecture: Reimagining1143the G7,'' CSIS, June 12, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/bending-1144architecture-reimagining-g7.11451146    The Chairman. Thank you very much, Doctor.1147    We will now do a round of questions and if there is1148interest we will do a second round, and I am going to start1149first of all with you, Mr. Schriver.1150    You talked about--and I do not mean this to sound1151critical--but you were questioning the use of a percent of GDP1152as a commitment to what a country thinks it should do to defend1153itself.1154    I have always had the same thought myself. My problem is I1155cannot think of another thing that you can use to measure it.1156Do you have any other measuring devices that you have in mind1157that you think might be appropriate in that regard?1158    We see this across government. A lot of times they will1159take a broad brush and try to measure something with something1160that is not exactly related, but your thoughts on that, please.1161    Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What I meant to say1162is it is important, but many times insufficient, and in other1163instances there are factors that should be weighted more1164heavily like in the case of the Philippines--nine new active1165sites including those with geographic proximity to the Taiwan1166Strait is extremely valuable, even though they are only1167spending 1.5 percent of GDP from a relatively small economy.1168    So I am afraid it comes down to more of a qualitative1169assessment of weighing these different baskets--what are they1170doing on ABO, what are they doing on their own defense.1171    You get really sort of qualitative when you get to history.1172I think it counts that Australia has fought alongside us in1173every war since World War I.1174    I think that gives us confidence they will be alongside us1175in the future, and to me that is a part of having confidence in1176them sharing a burden in the worst of times, but that gets very1177hard to chart on a graph and measure.1178    The Chairman. Thank you, and I appreciate that,1179particularly with Australia. I never even think about what1180percent they spend on--it does not matter to me.1181    These people are friends and have been with us through1182thick and thin and that counts for way more than anything that1183you could talk about statistically.1184    I would like--I am going to give all three of you a short1185run at this.1186    Something I have been very impressed with in recent times1187has been the Philippines' desire to have us as an ally and vice1188versa, and we all know they are making real effort in that1189regard.1190    What are the Chinese doing about this? Their reaction,1191obviously, is going to be negative. How does that actually1192materialize in reality?1193    Why do we not start with you, Mr. Schriver, and we will go1194across.1195    Mr. Schriver. Well, they are certainly behaving1196aggressively toward the Philippines in the disputed1197territories. There is a lot of activity around Second Thomas1198Shoal that includes water cannons being fired from coast guard1199vessels, includes shouldering of Filipino vessels.1200    I think also what is going on is a lot of attempts at elite1201capture and economic coercion. As Dr. Cha mentioned, they are1202very focused on upcoming elections in the Philippines and what1203they might be able to do to tip the balance.1204    So they are playing a little bit of a long game, too, in1205addition to the points of coercion that are much more acute.1206    So, clearly, they do not like it, but from our perspective1207we cannot have an ECTA site and have the Chinese go around and1208buy up everything around it in terms of the electrical grid, in1209terms of the communication systems, in terms of the local1210infrastructure.1211    We have to be able to address it in a more comprehensive1212way.1213    The Chairman. Thank you.1214    Dr. Mastro.1215    Dr. Mastro. Thank you, Chairman. In terms of the things1216that the Chinese are doing, if you look at Chinese writings and1217speeches about the U.S. alliance system generally speaking, I1218think it is very telling that they spend a lot of energy in1219their discourse and their behavior and their capabilities1220trying to undermine the U.S. alliance system.1221    To me, the fact that they are leveraging some of these1222discussions right now in the United States--what the United1223States is doing vis-a-vis Ukraine, for example, and for1224example, the dissolution of some of our key agencies like1225USAID--they are using those to say that, one, the United States1226is not a reliable ally and, two, they are also increasing their1227military presence around a lot of key allies and partners like1228Japan, the Philippines, and their aggression towards Taiwan.1229    When I speak to the Chinese military directly and I ask1230them about their military activities in these areas, they tell1231me that they are specifically designed to demonstrate to allies1232and partners that the United States cannot help them, that in1233the case of their defense even though the United States1234military is a significant force, given the fact that we are not1235forward deployed sufficiently that those countries would be on1236their own.1237    So there is this implicit military coercion that is1238occurring. At the same time, they are offering a lot of1239positive inducements to some countries in the region.1240    If we alienate certain partners in the Indo-Pacific, in1241particular in Southeast Asia, if we ask them to pick sides, I1242am not sure we will like what side Singapore or even the1243Philippines might pick in the end.1244    For that reason the Chinese are leveraging both their1245economic coercion as well as positive inducements. The1246development assistance that the Chinese are giving to Southeast1247Asian countries in particular is significant, and for access,1248basing, and overflight the United States is trying to expand1249our relationships with countries in the Second Island Chain,1250for example Palau or the Federated States of Micronesia.1251    These are not countries that are under direct military1252threat from Beijing and so it is really--some of the programs1253we mentioned such as development assistance, economic1254assistance, military training, that convinced these countries1255to allow U.S. access, and on the same hand, the other side of1256the ledger they have the Chinese coming in with elite capture1257and economic incentives.1258    For that reason it is very important, I think, that we1259focus on the military side, but also the economic and political1260side as well.1261    The Chairman. Appreciate that.1262    Dr. Cha.1263    Dr. Cha. Just quickly, to add to what has been said, it is1264not just elite capture. It is dominating the information space1265and the media partnerships with lots of essentially resource-1266poor, media in the Philippines.1267    That needs to be combated in some way, and so things like1268RFA and VOA are actually quite important in that respect.1269    Then I will go back to the point on commercial pressure. As1270Randy said, there are nine access sites.1271    China knows how to put very targeted commercial pressure,1272perhaps on certain localities to try to complicate our ability1273to gain access to those sites.1274    So having some sort of collective strategy among Asia1275Pacific partners, again, sort of like the EU has done with the1276ACI, is something that is important for ABO strategy.1277    The Chairman. Thank you.1278    Senator Shaheen.1279    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.1280    Dr. Cha, you mentioned, and I think the other two panelists1281also suggested this, that the new cooperation between Russia1282and China and North Korea on the war in Ukraine is having an1283impact.1284    Can you talk about the impact that that is having to our--1285throughout the Indo-Pacific and the concerns that that raises1286with our other allies in the region?1287    Dr. Cha. I am happy to, Senator. I think it has had three1288effects.1289    The first is it has clearly had an effect on the1290battlefield, in the sense that 12,000 North Korean troops are1291in Kursk to try to regain some territory before peace1292negotiations start--again, 50 percent of Russian munitions1293today are reportedly sourced from North Korea. These are having1294real impacts on the battlefield. That is the first point.1295    The second is that it has really created a lot of concern1296among Indo-Pacific partners that anything is possible in Asia1297now.1298    War in the middle of Europe that looks like a war from days1299past cause them to think not only is war in the Taiwan Straits1300possible, and not only is war on the Korean Peninsula possible,1301but that these things could happen at the same time through1302opportunistic aggression.1303    For the first time we have started getting inquiries from1304both South Korean and Taiwan friends to think more trilaterally1305about those sorts of dual contingency scenarios.1306    Then the third effect, I think, is that it has really1307closed the gap between the way our European friends and our1308Indo-Pacific friends think about security. There are no longer1309two theaters--it really is one theater.1310    I have actually, I think, in the past year made more trips1311to Brussels than I have to the Indo-Pacific region because of1312all the interest in Asia, and the level of conversation--I1313think my colleagues would agree--in Europe on Indo-Pacific1314security now is at a much, much higher level than it was even a1315year ago.1316    So those would be the three things I would say.1317    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Do either of you want to add to1318that?1319    Yes, Dr. Mastro.1320    Dr. Mastro. Thank you, ma'am.1321    I would add for the China-Russia relationship in particular1322there are four main things that they are complicating for the1323United States.1324    First and foremost, their relationship is making it harder1325for the United States to deter the two countries independently,1326and then I think we can see with Ukraine--and I would predict1327it would be the same thing in the Indo-Pacific--it makes it1328harder for us to compel them to stop fighting and the reasons1329for that is, first, these two countries, while they might not1330fight together in the sort of interoperable alliance framework,1331they are serving and building the ability to serve as a1332strategic rear to one another.1333    Senator Shaheen. So let me interrupt for a minute, because1334in some quarters there is a suggestion that we can actually1335pull Russia away from China and separate the two of them.1336    Can you speak to that? Dr. Cha, you may want to speak to1337that as well as Mr. Schriver.1338    Dr. Mastro. I would say, generally speaking, I have done a1339historical review of the relationship since 1949 and the idea1340that you could present positive inducements or try to convince1341Russia, for example, that China is a greater threat than the1342United States or vice versa is not going to work.1343    The best strategy if we had any hope of pulling them apart1344is that for now while European countries are more concerned1345about the Indo-Pacific, it is not the case that they are1346reacting to China as if China is such a strong partner to1347Russia.1348    They still have very strong economic relations with China1349and they are reluctant to punish China for that relationship.1350If the Chinese thought it would come at an economic cost--their1351relationship with Russia--I think they would be much better1352geared to pull apart.1353    So NATO could play a greater role in that economic1354relationship with China to show them that they cannot just get1355all the military benefits from Russia without some diplomatic1356and economic costs.1357    Senator Shaheen. Mr. Schriver, do you have any?1358    Mr. Schriver. I would be highly suspicious of that1359endeavor, I think, particularly with Mr. Putin and Xi Jinping1360and the relationship that they have developed and the mutual1361reinforcing activities that have made them alliance like.1362    I would also point out some people refer to this as the1363reverse Kissinger. Of course, when Kissinger courted China,1364China and Russia had already--then the Soviet Union--had1365already had a very significant falling out. So it was not1366creating a fissure. It was taking advantage of a fissure.1367    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.1368    Dr. Cha, anything to add?1369    Dr. Cha. I was actually going to make a similar point to1370Randy's. I think in international relations, that sort of1371diplomacy only works if you occupy the pivot position--where1372the other two sides are coming to you. That is what was1373happening with Kissinger and diplomacy between the Soviet Union1374and China.1375    In this case, if we were to try a reverse Kissinger, it1376would be Russia that occupies the pivot position, and so for1377that reason, I think it would be suspect.1378    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.1379    The Chairman. Senator Ricketts.1380    Senator Ricketts. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank1381you to our witnesses here today to talk about this very1382important topic.1383    Since signing of the 1951 mutual defense treaty, the1384Philippines has been one of our key allies in the Pacific.1385However, in recent years, the alliance has grown both more1386important and even more key as far as our strategic alignment.1387    Despite being outmatched militarily and economically the1388Philippines have demonstrated an incredible resolve in1389resisting Beijing's unlawful aggression in the South China Sea,1390certainly, more recently.1391    It is also able to act as an important voice within the1392ASEAN against communist China's other pressure campaigns that1393you all have been talking about.1394    The most important is what the alliance provides us1395militarily and, Mr. Schriver, you were talking about the1396expansion of the EDCA bases and the nine strategic sites that1397they have given us access to to enhance our ability to deter1398communist China in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea and1399other key theaters.1400    It has also allowed us to deploy the Typhon missile system,1401which can hold land-based targets in China at risk as well as1402surface ships.1403    How important is it for us to continue to work with Manila1404to expand U.S. access to these sites and further invest in the1405infrastructure and housing for U.S. troops, Mr. Schriver?1406    Mr. Schriver. Thank you. I think it is extraordinarily1407important, and if you kind of racked and stacked in the region,1408I would put the Philippines right at the top of where we need1409to invest, given its geography and given a window of1410opportunity.1411    The last administration in Manila under President Duterte1412was not exactly user-friendly, if you will. Marcos has been a1413sea change and really more of a return to the norm, but a sea1414change nonetheless, and I think we should take advantage of1415that.1416    Frankly, the population, given Chinese aggression and1417coercion, is also very much in support of strengthening U.S.-1418Philippine ties and I think it is the time to make the1419investments that are needed.1420    Senator Ricketts. Great. We were just talking about China's1421really aggressive position toward the Philippines, these gray1422zone attacks in the South China Sea. You mentioned some of the1423areas there. It is really, really valuable that Manila shows1424this defiance, is it not, Mr. Schriver?1425    Mr. Schriver. It is. They are, of course, first and1426foremost responsible for their own defense and I think they1427have done a very admirable job on these resupply missions to1428Second Thomas Shoal, really resisting that Chinese pressure and1429coercion.1430    Senator Ricketts. So what else can we or Japan or Australia1431do to be able to support the Philippines as it resists this1432gray zone activity here in the South China Sea?1433    Mr. Schriver. I think Chinese coercion is not limited to1434South China Sea so I think pushback in the East China Sea,1435pushback in areas closer to Vietnam.1436    It is a comprehensive approach that is led by the U.S. but1437joined with allies and partners will, I think, demonstrate to1438the Chinese that they have got a broader problem, that the1439country that signed UNCLOS and ratified it, but does not honor1440it and acts outside it is going to face broad pushback.1441    Then on point in the Philippines, I do think we need to1442resume our cooperation with the Philippine Coast Guard which is1443now on pause because it is a state INL program and it is a law1444enforcement program.1445    The Coast Guard is really on the front lines, not1446necessarily the Navy in every case, so I think there is a1447number of things we can do and, again, it is extraordinarily1448important.1449    Senator Ricketts. What about the cooperation between Japan1450and the Philippines? They have recently, you know, gotten some1451agreements together. What do you think about that?1452    Mr. Schriver. Very encouraging. If you looked at a map:1453Japan, Philippines, what is in the middle--it is Taiwan--and I1454think a lot of the security cooperation is oriented toward that1455major known contingency.1456    Japan is also stepping up with security assistance so we1457are no longer the sole provider or only provider of military1458equipment and other training and other types of services. Japan1459is a very professional military and they are lending that1460expertise to the Philippines in very helpful ways.1461    Senator Ricketts. I think we provided about $500 million1462last year in FMS to the Philippines and, obviously, it is1463encouraging to see Japan do that as well.1464    You were also talking about the percent of GDP that the1465Philippines is spending and evaluating the bases and so forth.1466    Is it fair for us to ask the Philippines to get to 21467percent of GDP spending on their own defense? They are trying1468to modernize here.1469    Mr. Schriver. I am for being aspirational and I think given1470the threat they are facing it is reasonable to ask. I think1471those discussions--that is why we need skilled diplomats. That1472is why we need capable alliance managers with years of1473experience.1474    I agree there are some approaches, as Dr. Mastro pointed1475out, that can have negative effects and so I think we need to1476do it with a degree of deftness, but it is important.1477    Senator Ricketts. Do the Philippines have that kind of1478capability? Can they economically support 2 percent of GDP, do1479you think?1480    Mr. Schriver. The short answer, I would say, is yes, but it1481is a very robust democracy. They have a lot of other priorities1482when it comes to development of the economy.1483    So this would be grinding it out through the legislature,1484but I think they could get there, given the threat and the very1485real requirements they have for defense.1486    Senator Ricketts. Great. Thank you, Mr. Schriver.1487    The Chairman. Senator Coons.1488    Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our1489witnesses.1490    Dr. Cha, you have spoken extensively about the alignment of1491some of our core adversaries and, as you just referenced in1492your opening statement, support from China, Iran, North Korea1493is absolutely critical to Russia's war effort against Ukraine.1494    Many, I think, are now underestimating what these three1495countries are getting in return for that partnership. Could you1496just speak briefly to what North Korea is or could be gaining1497from their munitions support, their now active troop support,1498and the negative impacts this might be having in the Indo-1499Pacific region and how our allies are viewing it, and how they1500might step up?1501    Dr. Cha. Sure, Senator.1502    I think your question really points to the fact that what1503is happening in the war in Ukraine has serious impact on what1504is happening in Indo-Pacific security as well.1505    Initially, I think that when the Biden administration1506publicized the first arms transfer to the Wagner Group, we1507became very worried that this was the start of a relationship1508between these two that would only grow as Russia's need for1509munitions and troops also grew.1510    Initially, we thought that what was being provided was,1511largely, a lot of food, fuel and energy--things that were1512really stocked out in North Korea after a 3\1/2\-year lockdown1513from COVID.1514    For North Korea, this opportunity with Russia emerged just1515as they were coming out of a 3\1/2\-year COVID lockdown. This1516was like a Christmas present for them.1517    The concern now is that it has moved beyond food, fuel,1518energy and medicines to higher end military technology, and I1519think if we track the U.S. Government's statements about this,1520they have moved from statements about the theoretical or1521hypothetical to statements of fact.1522    We have seen this, I think, also in North Korea's own1523actions and demonstrations. Successful military satellite1524launches after successive failures--they became more successful1525after Kim Jong-un's first visit to----1526    Senator Coons. So it is your view that North Korea is1527almost certainly receiving sophisticated missile satellite1528military assistance from Russia in exchange for their support?1529    Dr. Cha. Yes, and the one I would particularly point to is1530potential nuclear-propelled submarine technology, because the1531North Koreans put the leader in front of a new submarine and1532said this is a nuclear powered submarine.1533    So this is the one that I think has gotten the most1534attention recently, but, yes, all those things that you1535mentioned.1536    Senator Coons. I have limited time. You also spoke about1537the critical role that Radio Free Asia provides. It has a $601538million budget, but reaches 60 million people a week.1539    Given upcoming elections in the Philippines, given our1540concern about soft power and influence in the region, Pacific1541Island nations, how wise or foolish is it that the1542Administration just canceled Radio Free Asia?1543    Dr. Cha. So, again, I think our access basing and1544overflight strategy is directly related to competition in the1545information space where China is creating these media1546partnerships all over the Global South and creating a narrative1547of the United States that is clearly counter to our interests.1548    We need to be able to push back on that with real, accurate1549information, and that comes from places like VOA and RFA.1550    Senator Coons. Dr. Mastro, you spoke to the fact that the1551PRC is taking advantage of our abrupt withdrawal from hundreds1552of different development partnerships throughout the Indo-1553Pacific.1554    Just speak, if you would, briefly to what kind of challenge1555you think it is creating for us and our strategic interests for1556us to have abruptly canceled and shut down economic development1557partnerships, public health partnerships, things like providing1558reliable energy to our new basing opportunities in the1559Philippines, providing partnerships in terms of intel and1560communication, security in the Philippines.1561    What is the strategic impact to our abrupt withdrawal as1562partners for dozens and dozens of programs across these key1563countries?1564    Dr. Mastro. So, sir, I think the first thing to mention is1565if we are having a hard time assessing what is impactful for1566the competition with China or not, it is always useful to look1567at what the Chinese are spending on and what they are saying.1568    So they spend eight times more than we do on public1569diplomacy, and as Dr. Cha already mentioned, with all of their1570information centers, with Xinhua and others, they are obviously1571extremely focused in this area.1572    What is important for the Indo-Pacific is that a lot of1573these countries are not--it is very different than NATO allies1574and partners in that many of these countries have a lot of1575incentives not to support the United States militarily.1576    What we have on offer--if they are not threatened with1577direct invasion from China, which even allies like Australia1578are not, what we have on offer are other things besides just1579that security cooperation.1580    When we build infrastructure, for example, in the1581Philippines there is this understanding that with that foreign1582development and assistance that type of infrastructure can be1583used by the Philippines when U.S. forces are not there.1584    Without those types of commitments there are a lot of1585countries that they put themselves at risk, that the threat1586from China becomes greater the more they cooperate with us, and1587so the only way to outbalance that is with the economic1588incentives--offering humanitarian aid, disaster relief, foreign1589development assistance, and that is why the Chinese are so1590focused on those tools of power.1591    Senator Coons. Thank you. I think we are making an enormous1592mistake in unilaterally and abruptly shutting down long-1593standing humanitarian, economic development, infrastructure,1594and relief programs throughout the Indo-Pacific.1595    Thank you.1596    The Chairman. Senator McCormick.1597    Senator McCormick. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, thank you,1598and thank you to our panelists.1599    A free and open Indo-Pacific is critical to our nation's1600security. I think we all agree on that. To paraphrase General1601MacArthur, the Pacific acts as a protective shield for all of1602the Americas with the Western Pacific as its linchpin.1603    I am excited to have this great group to talk about the1604alliances that are so central to that shield because they are1605on the front lines of defending against China--the Chinese1606Communist Party's aggression and escalating efforts and1607expansionist ambitions in the First Island Chain.1608    We must stand with those allies and ensure those1609partnerships deliver on matched value to both sides including1610burden sharing.1611    So Dr. Cha, good to see you again, and I would like to1612start with you. Japan has been one of the allies where we have1613seen the most progress in increasing defense investment and1614interoperability with U.S. forces.1615    We recently had Ambassador Designate Glass testify before1616this committee. What priorities should be top of mind for him1617and for this administration to make that deterrence from the1618U.S.-Japan alliance most credible?1619    Dr. Cha. Thank you, Senator.1620    I would say that there are three things. The first is, as I1621mentioned in my testimony, the Japanese stood up the JJOC--the1622Japan Joint Operational Command. It was a big step in the1623alliance to try to create a much more militarily capable,1624interoperable, integrated relationship with the United States.1625    It is incumbent on our side to really fulfill our1626commitment to create a joint force headquarters. I think that1627is one. Even though that is not necessarily a diplomatic1628matter, it is an important message to send.1629    The second is that I would like to see is a continuation of1630the bilateral and trilateral relationship among the U.S.,1631Japan, and South Korea. This was something that both the first1632Trump administration as well as the Biden administration worked1633on.1634    Major steps were made since August of 2023. I know we have1635a little bit of a political situation in South Korea, waiting1636for a new government to come into place, but in terms of1637defense and deterrence, and making more credible the U.S.1638position in Asia and giving confidence to allies in the Indo-1639Pacific as well as in Europe about U.S. sustained commitment, I1640think that is extremely important as well.1641    Then, the third are the things that my colleagues have1642mentioned in terms of Japan's role in places like the1643Philippines and in other parts of Asia, as well as Taiwan,1644where they can play a very important role in helping to1645complement what the United States is doing in terms of access,1646basing and overflight.1647    Senator McCormick. Very good. Thank you.1648    Mr. Schriver, Secretary Rubio recently reiterated U.S.1649policy with regard to Taiwan--any forced, compelled, coercive1650change in the status of Taiwan.1651    Where would you see the United States falling short in its1652role in deterring a war in the Taiwan Strait?1653    Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Senator.1654    I think I would point to a few things, and it is not1655necessarily falling short, but there has been an evolutionary1656process where we have been more direct in our language and1657rhetoric. We have been moving into areas that were previously1658too sensitive like training of Taiwanese military forces.1659    I think we need to continue the posture initiatives. We1660really need to develop the Philippines, particularly northern1661Luzon, which has that geographic proximity to the Taiwan1662Strait.1663    We need to strengthen our training of Taiwan military1664forces. That was a taboo for decades and now we are getting1665them to a point where they are more professional, more1666proficient, as they are placing a greater emphasis on training.1667    I think, as Dr. Mastro implied in her opening statement, it1668is not only what they spend. They have got to 2.5. They pledged1669to get to 3 percent and they say that is a floor, not a1670ceiling, but it is what they spend it in and what they invest1671on, and I think given the changing nature of warfare they need1672to look at modernized command and control that will help1673optimize battlefield decisions.1674    They need to look at a lot more unmanned autonomous in1675every domain including underwater. I think we need to help lead1676them in this investment strategy as really key to upholding1677deterrence.1678    Senator McCormick. Very good. Thank you. I will yield the1679rest of my time.1680    The Chairman. Thank you.1681    Senator Duckworth.1682    Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all1683for being here today.1684    My office has been hearing about how vital initiatives1685aimed at advancing American interests in the Indo-Pacific have1686been stalled over the last several weeks, and this is following1687up on my colleagues' interest in the Indo-Pacific as well.1688    This includes not only critical programs, but also1689essential funding that supports intelligence efforts on1690pressing regional issues.1691    I am deeply concerned that the current administration is1692pursuing a path that directly contradicts strengthening Indo-1693Pacific alliances, a move that could have far-reaching1694implications for our security.1695    Like my colleagues have mentioned, I am deeply concerned1696about the PRC's activities in the region. Before this1697administration the United States led with a clear strategy--1698invest, align, compete--in response to the PRC's growing1699geopolitical influence in the Indo-Pacific, and we demonstrated1700that strength by consistently following through on our1701commitments, proving to our allies that the U.S. is a reliable1702partner, a leader in defending democracy and a defender of1703international norms.1704    This strategy was central to our global leadership in1705maintaining peace and stability in the region, and,1706unfortunately, we are walking backwards as the Trump Asia1707policy of today seems to be neglecting our well-established1708alliances, institutions, the rule of law, and rules.1709    I am a co-founder of the bipartisan Quad Caucus and I made1710it a priority to send a clear and powerful message to our1711allies, partners, and even competitors that the United States1712is committed to the Indo-Pacific region in the long term, and I1713wholeheartedly believe that defense, diplomacy, and cooperation1714are crucial.1715    Mr. Schriver, as someone who has held a key in shaping U.S.1716defense policy in the Indo-Pacific what specific steps should1717the United States takes to demonstrate its long-term commitment1718to the Indo-Pacific and its allies within the context of the1719Quad?1720    Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Senator Duckworth, and thank you1721for your leadership on the Quad. It is very important.1722    I am the only one up here who is not a professor, but if I1723were to give this administration a grade it would not be1724failing.1725    It would be incomplete, because I think they have done some1726very positive things--the Prime Minister Kishida visit, Prime1727Minister Modi's meeting with President Trump--and I would point1728to Secretary Rubio's decision on the very first day in office1729to hold a Quad meeting as part of that positive agenda1730notwithstanding some of the other issues that you mentioned,1731and I share some of your concerns I am sure.1732    I think what we understand took place in that Quad meeting1733at the foreign minister level is there was a very kind of1734nascent discussion about moving into the security issues and1735that is significant that Foreign Minister Jaishankar would go1736along with that and actually introduce some of that, as I1737understand it, which indicates India is sufficiently concerned1738that they are willing to take this format and move it into1739military and security issues.1740    I would like to see that nurtured and matured and even,1741perhaps, go operational. We have got a lot of PLA activity in1742the Indian Ocean now. Anti-submarine warfare cooperation could1743happen quietly, but it could involve the four countries doing1744real-world things that would be very significant.1745    Senator Duckworth. Do you not think that that is also a1746place where we can strengthen our relationship with Quad, but1747also not alienate important regional partners like ASEAN?1748    I do think that there is a need to strengthen economic1749relations with the Quad, but in a way that complements our1750relationship with ASEAN and their leadership role both--so I am1751asking both economic cooperation, but also cooperation,1752especially when it comes to strategies where the Chinese are1753really infiltrating into the region. Go ahead.1754    Mr. Schriver. Thank you. I do agree with that. I think you1755are the expert on ASEAN, but it is a region of very mixed1756stages of development, different types of government, and so I1757think disaggregating and looking at where the Quad can be1758helpful as a donor, as an economic partner, I think that kind1759of sophisticated approach would really help counter what China1760is doing.1761    China is gaining ground in Southeast Asia--there is no1762doubt about it, and we are seeing a lot of--particularly since1763the tariffs, we are seeing a lot of Chinese investment going1764into Southeast Asia, some of which is helpful to them, but some1765of which is also over capacity, crowding out some of their1766indigenous manufacturing and aspects of their economy.1767    So I would like to see the Quad do more in this area.1768    Senator Duckworth. Yes, because I think Quad investment1769into ASEAN maybe as part of the supply chain manufacturing1770issues for the United States is an opportunity and, frankly, we1771have come off a very strong year in ASEAN of Indonesian1772leadership.1773    The Malaysians are doing a great job there now. Philippines1774are next. I think there are some real opportunities there for1775some partnerships and I would like to see the United States1776continue to pursue those economic relationships, in addition to1777their strategic partnerships, but making those linkages between1778Quad and ASEAN.1779    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1780    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.1781    Senator Cornyn.1782    Senator Cornyn. Thank you all for being here.1783    Mr. Schriver, I like your characterization of the tyranny1784of time and distance when it comes to the Taiwan contingency.1785We like to talk about very euphemistic terms, which could be a1786bloody and very destructive military conflict.1787    First, let me ask you about supply chains. The reason why1788Senator Warner and I and all--and many of our colleagues joined1789together and passed the CHIPS and Science Act starting back in17902020, but then finally, I guess, in 2022 was because we were1791worried about the supply chains of advanced semiconductors and1792the fact that the United States only made about 12 percent of1793those, and the fact that in this world we live in we are1794extraordinarily dependent on that sort of technology for1795everything from our iPhones to the avionics and the Joint1796Strike Fighter.1797    Are there other supply chains that we need to be concerned1798about in the event of another pandemic, natural disaster, or1799military conflict in the Indo-Pacific? I would invite anybody1800to offer any advice now and if you want to get back to us with1801a more comprehensive list I would welcome that.1802    Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Senator.1803    I think when you look at something like CHIPS you got to1804understand the component parts, which gets down to critical1805minerals and the mining and the processing, and so it is a very1806complex supply chain, and where I think we can do better now to1807better position us for resiliency in the event of a conflict is1808to really look at alternate sources of critical minerals and1809that processing and that whole sort of chain of production.1810Right now we are heavily relying on China.1811    Senator Cornyn. Yes. China processes 90 percent.1812    Mr. Schriver. Yes.1813    Senator Cornyn. Ninety percent, as I recall.1814    Any other thoughts on supply chains from the other1815panelists?1816    Dr. Mastro. I just want to add that there is no entity that1817is in a better position to protect U.S. interests than the1818United States itself, and when we pull out of the Indo-Pacific1819we are basically outsourcing that to another country like1820China.1821    China itself has a ``Made in China 2025'' standards--2035.1822They have identified 15 areas where not only do they want to be1823self-sufficient so that we have less power to shape their1824decisions, but they have been very explicit that they want the1825world to be reliant on them precisely so they have this type of1826leverage that you are talking about.1827    In any scenario involving Taiwan, the Chinese are hoping1828this is going to be a quick war--3-4 weeks, and even in those1829types of scenarios the disruption economically is going to be1830significant, but the United States needs to be in the position1831that we could intervene in that time frame so that what we1832threaten is much more of a global disruption to the Chinese1833themselves.1834    Senator Cornyn. Because time is so short, let me start with1835Dr. Cha on this question.1836    You talk about how long the Taiwan contingency conflict1837will last. My impression from traveling in the region is that1838we have a lot of wonderful allies that have capabilities and1839they vary a lot depending on the nation, but we have seen in1840Ukraine there is a difference between capability and will, and1841one of the things that I am very concerned about is we are1842overestimating our--what our allies might be willing to do.1843    I think, Dr. Mastro, you mentioned they are reluctant to1844take sides. That seemed to be the typical response we got as we1845were talking to folks in the Indo-Pacific, but in terms of--and1846I know this is a hard question and maybe one we do not want to1847confront, but I do not think we have any choice but to1848confront--if there was a shooting war in the South China Sea1849where, according to President Xi's instructions to the PLA,1850they needed to be ready by 2027 to essentially take Taiwan who1851can we depend on? What countries?1852    If you could list those in terms of our--of who would be1853the most likely and who would be the most effective, that would1854be very useful.1855    Dr. Mastro. Well, sir, if I can just say we can depend on1856Japan to allow us access to their two U.S. bases, at the very1857least. Japanese logistical support will be critical, but that1858will only come into play in a more protracted conflict if the1859United States does intervene in time.1860    The northern Philippines and southwest Japan are the only1861areas in combat radius of Taiwan, and so the immediate support1862of use of U.S. bases and in the Philippines in particular, we1863are not investing right now in the types of air and naval1864capabilities that we need to be able to respond in a timely1865manner in the Taiwan Strait.1866    If we did, that it would basically be the almost immediate1867permission to use those bases in the northern Philippines and1868southwest Japan for direct kinetic action against the ships1869making their way across the strait that would be by far the1870most critical.1871    Then in a more protracted conflict, other basing options1872like in Australia and in the Second Island Chain become more1873important, but immediate approval from Japan to use those1874bases, like, within hours is the most important thing.1875    Senator Cornyn. Dr. Cha.1876    Dr. Cha. Yes, I would not disagree with that at all. The1877only thing I would add is the point about the duration of the1878conflict and the scope of it.1879    If the duration of the conflict and the scope extends1880beyond the First Island Chain, Second Island Chain, or even the1881Indian Ocean, then that necessarily will bring other players1882in. If it gets to that level, I think we would be able to count1883on some of those players, even potentially the Europeans, to1884help as well.1885    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.1886    Senator Rosen, you are next.1887    Senator Rosen. Thank you, chair Risch, ranking member1888Shaheen. Thank you for being here today, for holding this1889hearing.1890    I want to talk about countering the PRC influence. Of1891course, in the South Pacific is what we are talking about today1892because our economic security--our security relationships with1893Pacific Island nations play a significant role in our ability1894to counter expanding PRC influence.1895    It is particularly true for members of the Compacts of Free1896Association, or COFA, an agreement that serves as a bedrock of1897U.S. engagement with Palau, the Marshall Islands, and1898Micronesia.1899    COFA is a mutually beneficial arrangement affording our1900military access to areas of immense strategic importance in1901exchange for U.S. assistance.1902    Under COFA, USAID is tasked with leading disaster response1903efforts to all three island countries, but with USAID gutted,1904no other agency has the authority, the technical expertise, the1905capacity, or the resources to respond to a natural disaster in1906the Pacific.1907    Disregarding our obligations under COFA potentially puts us1908in violation of our own agreement and will only cede ground to1909the PRC, which has been actively using, as we know,1910humanitarian assistance to expand its sphere of influence in1911the Pacific.1912    So, Dr. Cha, can you speak to the importance of the COFA1913agreement and USAID's presence in the region to U.S. national1914security and can you expand on some of the consequences if the1915PRC were to displace us in the region?1916    Dr. Cha. Thank you, Senator.1917    I do not disagree with the way you have characterized the1918importance of the Pacific Island nations and also the vacuum1919that could be filled by China or is already being filled by1920China when U.S. assistance is not there--U.S. commercial1921support, all these things.1922    I think the Biden administration deserves credit for1923responding to this, but at the same time, unfortunately, it was1924too little too late because the Chinese had already made1925security agreements of that nature.1926    Again, I will go back to one of the points that I talked1927about in my testimony, which is that in addition to the1928importance of things like RFA and VOA to compete in the1929information space so that there is a fair narrative of the1930United States and our interest in the region, the commercial1931support is also important.1932    Again, China has used economic coercion against 181933governments and over 500 companies since 2008, heightened1934during Xi Jinping's terms, of course.1935    These Pacific Island nations are just easy prey for Chinese1936influence in that way, so we need to be able to combat that as1937well.1938    Senator Rosen. I want to expand a little bit upon that1939because it is also one of the only three Pacific Island nations1940to recognize Palau--excuse me, recognize Taiwan's independence.1941    So it is something I discussed with Palau's President when1942he and I met back in 2021, and so as a result Palau is1943increasingly becoming a victim of PRC harassment.1944    To increase Palau's resilience, the USAID was supporting1945the development of an undersea cable system, which is vital for1946global communications, facilitating financial transactions, for1947national security. This program is now halted as a part of the1948overall foreign assistance freeze.1949    I am going to stick with you, Dr. Cha. Can you talk about1950the importance of infrastructure development, undersea cable1951systems in the Pacific Islands, and what signal do you think we1952are sending if we are stopping this support to Palau and to1953others?1954    Dr. Cha. As we often say in government, you cannot fight1955something with nothing, and so if we are moving away from--we1956can, of course, look to allies and partners like Australia and1957others to help, but if the United States is not supporting1958that, then it is just going to be a vacuum that is going to be1959filled by China or other actors that seek to undermine our1960interests there.1961    Senator Rosen. Thank you. I want to talk a little bit, Dr.1962Mastro, quickly about economic coercion by the PRC. We know1963that they are really spending a lot of money by supporting1964Philippines on energy security, infrastructure spending,1965prepositioning near key military installations, economic1966development programs.1967    I am going fast because my time is running out.1968Humanitarian assistance to demonstrate the value of what they1969are doing. Much of the work we have been doing is stopped. They1970are stepping in.1971    So, Dr. Mastro, can you expand on some of the more1972prominent coercive tactics the PRC employs in the Indo-Pacific1973region?1974    Dr. Mastro. To the discussion, ma'am, that we were just1975having it is--they have a three-prong strategy and one key part1976is exploitation or exploiting gaps where the United States is1977not present.1978    They have more consulates and embassies in the region than1979we do. They have more elite visits than we do and, obviously,1980we have talked about the foreign aid and development1981assistance. So part of it, of course, are these positive1982inducements.1983    When it comes to the coercion, the Chinese, when they have1984leverage, they use it every single time and so we can expect1985that if we step away so we are no longer in a position to1986ensure freedom of navigation.1987    So countries like the Philippines will have to trust that1988the Chinese will allow them to trade with the rest of the1989world, and while some might say, ``oh, the Chinese would never1990cut off that access,'' I think it has been pretty clear that1991when they are upset about something, and we are not even1992talking about foreign policy--military strategy.1993    If you say or believe anything different about what happens1994domestically in China then you are a target. Our allies and1995partners, I think, have learned and are learning more and more.1996If your strategy is to not upset Beijing--if that is your1997defense strategy, it is not going to work.1998    Senator Rosen. Right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1999    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.2000    Senator Scott.2001    Senator Scott of Florida. Thank you, Chairman Risch and2002Ranking Member Shaheen.2003    Thank you for your testimony today. So first off, do you2004think that as China builds up their economy, there is a greater2005chance that they are going to use their military to invade2006Taiwan?2007    Dr. Mastro. Well, sir, I would focus on their military2008capabilities. We are not deterring China right now from taking2009Taiwan by force.2010    What is deterring them is they have not finalized their2011military modernization. In particular, they have not honed2012command and control logistics.2013    Senator Scott of Florida. So if they have a crappy economy,2014if their economy falls apart, will they have less military2015assets?2016    Dr. Mastro. So far, sir, the size of their economy they do2017not have to choose between guns and butter and so it would2018really have to be such a decrease that you have widespread2019social instability.2020    In that case, I think they turn inward, but otherwise, I2021think they have the resources to continue the modernization.2022    Senator Scott of Florida. What percentage of their economy2023is tied to the American consumer?2024    Dr. Mastro. I would have to get back to you on the2025specifics, but they are an export driven economy and their2026connection to the global economy is number one. If they2027believed trade with U.S. allies and partners would stop if they2028attacked Taiwan, they would never do it.2029    Senator Scott of Florida. So do you think it would be2030logical for any democracy, including in the United States, for2031the people in these countries to stop buying Chinese products?2032    Dr. Mastro. Well, sir----2033    Senator Scott of Florida. Not whether it would be easy.2034Should we?2035    Dr. Mastro. So the way I think about it is if in times of2036peace before we have this type of conflict, if we get rid of2037all of our leverage against the PRC, we do not have that2038economic deterrent in place.2039    The Chinese are trying to diversify and to be less reliant2040on us for a reason.2041    So I think those measures should be considered and should2042be in place in times of crisis, but potentially not something2043implemented in peacetime.2044    Senator Scott of Florida. They are using their economy2045right now to build up their military. Would we not be better2046off to stop buying anything from them today so they will have2047less resources to modernize their military?2048    After the fact, it is too late. Once they have the military2049that they have--like, I personally do not understand why2050anybody buys an American--a Chinese product.2051    I have never understood it. When I came up here 6 years2052ago, 85 percent of the drones bought by the Federal Government2053were Chinese made. That seems like stupidity.2054    It only took 6 years to get that passed through the NDA. I2055do not know why we want to continue to build the Chinese2056economy. So do you guys intentionally go buy Chinese products?2057    Dr. Mastro. Sir, just I would add that the technology, I2058think, something that you highlighted is vitally important. If2059there is any U.S. product, technology, know-how that2060contributes to the lethality of the Chinese military, those2061absolutely need to be prevented from being exported.2062    Senator Scott of Florida. So you do not think it matters2063what their economy is doing? They did not seem to have a very2064good economy back when their big military--when their economy2065was one-tenth the size and they clearly could not threaten2066Taiwan when their economy was one-tenth the size. So I do not2067get why we help them build up their economy.2068    Does anybody else----2069    Mr. Schriver. I think it is an extremely valid point. I2070think for often--for many years we thought that our economic2071engagement would help shape and change China politically.2072    It did not. I think there are constituencies in the United2073States that do profit from the trade relationship with China2074and they continue to be advocates for it, but I think we should2075look at things like revoking PNTR.2076    I think we should look at strengthening export controls and2077outbound investment. It makes no sense to me that we would2078restrict the Chinese from investing in an entity in the United2079States that is engaged in developing some technology with2080military applications, but yet outbound investment can go2081invest in a Chinese entity that does the exact same research.2082Makes no sense at all.2083    Senator Scott of Florida. Dr. Cha, what do you think?2084    Dr. Cha. The only thing I will add to that is that the2085other effect of the world's economic interaction with China is2086that it has caused many countries and allies of ours to self-2087censor.2088    They stay away from saying things or taking actions that2089are in favor of the United States because they are worried they2090are going to get whacked by China with some sort of trade2091sanction, or all of a sudden they are going to stop sending2092tourists, or they are going to stop importing bananas from the2093Philippines. There is a whole list of things that China does,2094basically weaponizing trade and interdependence.2095    Senator Scott of Florida. I know my time is up. I just do2096not get why we buy one product. Our military is dependent on2097Chinese drugs.2098    How are you going to change on a dime once they decide to2099invade Taiwan? Why we would ever rely on Chinese technology for2100anything like drones it seems pretty foolish.2101    Thank you.2102    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Scott.2103    Senator Shaheen.2104    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I have a few more questions2105before we close the panel out.2106    First, I would like to go back, Mr. Schriver, I think, to2107Senator Ricketts' question about the foreign military sales in2108the Philippines and I would just like to point out for the2109record that $164 million of the $500 million in FMF for the2110Philippines is frozen under the cuts and the freezing of2111programs with the State Department. So that is troubling when2112we think about what we are hoping from the Philippines.2113    I wanted to--staying on the Philippines, the ICC has2114arrested former President Duterte on a warrant for extra2115judicial killings.2116    Do you all have any views on how that is going to affect2117the upcoming presidential election in the Philippines and what2118that might mean for the U.S. relationship with the Philippines?2119Anybody have any thoughts about that?2120    Mr. Schriver. It is an excellent question and it is2121probably too soon to tell. There is a segment of the population2122that does not like to see a former president carted off in2123handcuffs, notwithstanding the actual things he authorized as2124President and, of course, this is a family affair. His daughter2125is the Vice President and presumably leader of the Duterte2126faction in the next set of elections.2127    Senator Shaheen. So maybe I should ask it this way. How do2128we think--if she wins the next presidential election, how do we2129think that will affect the relationship with the U.S.?2130    Mr. Schriver. We have got about as good a partner as we2131could ever want in Marcos. So, inevitably, it probably goes2132down. She is in many ways her father's daughter and thinks2133similarly about some of these issues like the alliance.2134    She has also shown streaks of independence and, of course,2135she has a complicated relationship with her father in other2136ways.2137    I think it is difficult to say, but I think we have a2138window of opportunity now given Marcos, which is why as you2139point out the things that are frozen--I think we should be2140moving with all due urgency while this window is open.2141    Senator Shaheen. Do you all agree with that assessment?2142    Dr. Mastro. Yes, ma'am, and if you would indulge me. Given2143your question, I think it highlights the importance of having a2144really nuanced understanding of the domestic politics in the2145Philippines.2146    We have already mentioned the seizure of some--the2147dissolution of some programs under this current administration,2148but also besides the Fulbright's research funding under Minerva2149grants, for example, have all been ceased, and as a professor2150at a university, you know, having people study these types of2151issues--we do not have Ph.D. students anymore that we are2152encouraging to learn languages, to do these sorts of things,2153because the funding has stopped.2154    Senator Shaheen. I agree. I think it is totally2155shortsighted and does not recognize how important soft power is2156to deterring conflict and aggression.2157    Dr. Cha, did you want to add anything?2158    Dr. Cha. I agree with that. It is not just a military2159alliance. It is a relationship.2160    Senator Shaheen. Right.2161    Dr. Cha. It is a political and social relationship that2162crosses generations. In all of these countries, all of these2163Indo-Pacific allies, as I mentioned in my testimony, it is2164about political engagement, not just military engagement.2165    In the case of the Vice President, it is a very important2166role for the State Department and others in terms of2167diplomacy's early engagement and socializing not just the2168elite, but also the public about why these nine ECTA sites are2169important.2170    Senator Shaheen. I want to go back to the information space2171because you have mentioned--several of you have mentioned RFA2172and VOA, and we had a hearing here on China--I think it was our2173first hearing--and one of the people testifying pointed out2174that China spends over a billion dollars, that we know of, a2175year in the information space trying to influence information2176in countries in the Indo-Pacific and much of it is2177disinformation and misinformation.2178    So can you talk about what that means for us when we are2179not playing in this space at all?2180    Dr. Cha. Sure, Senator.2181    So recently, I was asked--this was before the cuts--to2182speak to a group of Fulbright scholars who were going out to2183countries in Southeast Asia and Central Asia, places where2184there is a lot of Chinese media partnerships, and I told them2185that they should expect to go into an information environment2186in which everybody believes that the war in Ukraine was started2187by NATO.2188    They could not--they were Americans--believe that people2189would think that, but this is what happens when you try to2190fight something with nothing.2191    I think Oriana said it great when she said they spend eight2192times more on public diplomacy than we do. That about tells you2193who is dominating the information space and that, again,2194directly relates to the military.2195    That is not sort of two or three steps removed from the2196military. That directly relates to political consensus on2197access, basing and overflight.2198    Senator Shaheen. Yes, I do not--anybody else want to add?2199    Go ahead.2200    Dr. Mastro. Ma'am, if I can just add, Xi Jinping himself2201has been very clear that his top priority is to be the leader2202of the developing world.2203    Before this administration came in, when I was providing2204recommendations and advice, I would say the United States has2205not really had a strategy towards the developing world in a2206long time and that should be our number one priority is2207enhancing and increasing spending in some of these areas.2208    We look at some of this propaganda coming out of the CCP2209and we think it is so heavy handed--who can possibly believe2210this, but after you spend time in a lot of these places and2211spend time in Beijing--I have been there for some of their top2212meetings of defense ministers with developing countries and the2213rhetoric about the imperial United States, the colonial United2214States.2215    I often have to remind everyone that the United States has2216never been a colonial power. It really resonates with a lot of2217these countries and these are places in some cases no U.S.2218president has ever visited. Xi Jinping has gone to 70 percent2219of the poorest countries in places like Africa, Central Asia,2220where our leaders just do not go.2221    It used to be the case that the Foreign Service could fit2222on one aircraft carrier. I wonder what it is going to look like2223in future years, but expanding our reach through those types of2224programs and departments is not only effective, as the other2225witnesses have highlighted, but it is actually relatively2226cheaper than trying to do it through military means.2227    Senator Shaheen. I am out of time and we have to go vote,2228but I just have a final question because I visited the Indo-2229Pacific last year and one of the countries we visited was2230Vietnam, and I was amazed at how positive all the leaders we2231met within Vietnam were about their strategic partnership with2232the United States, how they wanted to expand on that, the plans2233they had to grow the economy and their willingness to stand up2234to China in ways that many of the other countries in the region2235were not.2236    Does anybody want to speak to what opportunity we have with2237Vietnam?2238    Mr. Schriver.2239    Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Senator. We poll as a country--not2240political leaders or parties, but as a country--94 percent2241favorable in Vietnam, which is just stunning given how recent2242our conflict was.2243    Senator Shaheen. Very stunning, yes.2244    Mr. Schriver. Now, the Chinese poll in single digits and2245those two figures might be related, but that, to me, suggests2246there are definitely opportunities.2247    When I was at the Pentagon we did try to open things up. We2248had three aircraft carrier visits to Vietnam in about 3\1/2\2249years.2250    There are ways we are expanding the relationship. We are2251helping them with the maritime domain awareness issues related2252to the Chinese incursions, but here is what I will come back2253one more time to things that we have suspended.2254    The dioxin remediation is absolutely critical. The war of--2255legacy of war issues are absolutely critical enablers to the2256broader military and defense cooperation that we want.2257    I have been to those sites, been to Bien Hoa. I have seen2258the local population how much they appreciate it because they2259have been concerned at the effects of Agent Orange. If we step2260away from that, these opportunities will close.2261    Senator Shaheen. I could not agree more and thank you all2262very much for your testimony today.2263    The Chairman. Thank you. Been a very interesting panel and2264we really appreciate all of your views on these matters,2265critically important to people of the United States.2266    We are--I am going to keep the record open for questions2267until tomorrow at the close of business and I would ask if you2268get a question if you would respond promptly.2269    I know you are volunteering to this, but, nonetheless, if2270you would help us in that regard, we really appreciate that.2271Again, thank you for your testimony.2272    The hearing is adjourned.2273    [Whereupon, at 11:38 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]