Committee on House Administration Subcommittee on Elections Hearing: “Examining Best Practices for Strengthening Election Security”

1[House Hearing, 119 Congress]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34                      EXAMINING BEST PRACTICES FOR5                    STRENGTHENING ELECTION SECURITY6=======================================================================78                                HEARING910                               BEFORE THE1112                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS1314                                 OF THE1516                   COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION1718                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES1920                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2122                             SECOND SESSION2324                               __________2526                              MAY 20, 20262728                               __________2930      Printed for the use of the Committee on House Administration3132[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]3334                            www.govinfo.gov35                           www.cha.house.gov3637                              __________3839                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE4063-819			 WASHINGTON : 202641=======================================================================4243                   COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION4445                    BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin, Chairman4647LAUREL LEE, Florida, Vice Chair      JOSEPH MORELLE, New York,48BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia                 Ranking Member49H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia         TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama50GREG MURPHY, North Carolina          NORMA TORRES, California51STEPHANIE BICE, Oklahoma             JULIE JOHNSON, Texas52MARY MILLER, Illinois53MIKE CAREY, Ohio5455                       Mike Platt, Staff Director56                  Jamie Fleet, Minority Staff Director5758                                 ------5960                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS6162                       LAUREL LEE, Florida, Chair6364BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia            TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama,65GREG MURPHY, North Carolina               Ranking Member66MARY MILLER, Illinois                JULIE JOHNSON, Texas6768                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S6970                              ----------71                                                                   Page7273                           Opening Statements7475Chair Laurel Lee, Representative from the State of Florida.......     176    Prepared statement of Chair Laurel Lee.......................     377Ranking Member Terri A. Sewell, Representative from the State of78  Alabama........................................................     379    Prepared statement of Ranking Member Terri A. Sewell.........     58081                               Witnesses8283Honorable Thomas Hicks, chairman, U.S. Election Assistance84  Commission.....................................................     685    Prepared statement of Honorable Thomas Hicks.................     986Honorable Christy McCormick, vice chair, U.S. Election Assistance87  Commission.....................................................    2288    Prepared statement of Christy McCormick......................    2489Honorable Benjamin Hovland, commissioner, U.S. Election90  Assistance Commission..........................................    3191    Prepared statement of Benjamin Hovland.......................    3392Honorable Donald Palmer, former commissioner, U.S. Election93  Assistance Commission, and Senior Legal Fellow, The Heritage94  Foundation.....................................................   10895    Prepared statement of Donald Palmer..........................   1109697                       Submissions for the Record9899Southern Poverty Law Center and The Leadership Conference letter.   118100101                      EXAMINING BEST PRACTICES FOR102                    STRENGTHENING ELECTION SECURITY103104                              ----------105106                              May 20, 2026107108                 Subcommittee on Elections,109                 Committee on House Administration,110                                  House of Representatives,111                                                   Washington, D.C.112    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:17 p.m., in113room 1310, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Laurel Lee114[Chair of the Subcommittee] presiding.115    Present: Representatives Lee, Murphy, Miller, and Sewell.116    Staff present: Michael Platt, Staff Director; Abby Salter,117Deputy General Counsel; Kristen Monterroso, Director of118Operations and Legislative Clerk; Josh Weber, Counsel; Libby119Sippel, Deputy Director of Member Services; Sage Dobbs,120Professional Staff; Jamie Fleet, Minority Staff Director;121Khalil Abboud, Minority Deputy Staff Director; Samuel122Iacobellis, Minority Senior Advisor; and Nikolas Youngsmith,123Minority Policy Director.124125OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LAUREL LEE, CHAIR OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE126        ON ELECTIONS, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM FLORIDA127128    Chair Lee. The Subcommittee on Elections of the Committee129on House Administration will come to order.130    The title of today's hearing is ``Examining Best Practices131for Strengthening Election Security.''132    I note that a quorum is present.133    Without objection, the Chair may declare a recess at any134time.135    Also, without objection, the hearing record will remain136open for 5 legislative days so Members may submit any materials137they wish to be included therein.138    Thank you, Ranking Member Sewell, Members of the Committee,139and our witnesses, for participating in today's hearing.140    Today, the Subcommittee on Elections will discuss the141different ways that States can strengthen election security.142The best practices that we will cover today include143enhancements to physical security and to cybersecurity.144    Addressing potential vulnerabilities improves voter145experience and voter confidence. Preparation and resilience146strengthens the integrity of our election systems, because it147prevents an issue before it arises.148    I look forward to discussing best practices for securing149elections and how Congress can be supporting those efforts.150    I would first like to highlight the different resources the151Federal Government makes available to elections administrators152for election security. The resources include Federal grants,153testing programs, and guidance from the Election Assistance154Commission.155    One great example is the EAC's Election Supporting156Technology Evaluation Program, or ESTEP. This program offers157voluntary security standards and evaluations for nonvoting158systems like poll books, election day reporting systems, or159other election supporting systems not covered by the Voluntary160Voting System Guidelines.161    The EAC's Voluntary Voting System Guidelines serve as a162baseline certification for new voting systems to evaluate163functionality, accessibility, and security.164    There is also great work that many States and localities165are doing on their own to enhance security and protect against166threats to their elections.167    For example, in 2024, the University of South Florida168hosted a cyber tabletop exercise with county supervisors of169elections, the FBI, and local law enforcement to strategize170responses to potential threats to election cybersecurity.171    To quickly disseminate information about cyber threats,172North Dakota uses a whole-of-government approach, which allows173agencies, cities, counties, and localities to have access to174the same statewide system.175    In North Carolina, the National Guard and State Emergency176Management Agency work collaboratively to monitor and respond177to cyber threats.178    To respond to physical threats, several States have179implemented common-sense integrity measures like tamper seals180for ballots, monitoring systems, and backup power sources at181polling locations.182    What is great about these physical-security upgrades is183that HAVA grants can be used for this exact purpose. I am very184interested in hearing more about how these grants are185administered and what the results of past grants have been in186States across America.187    Another important measure that increases voter experience188and voter confidence is access for election observers. The189Committee on House Administration deploys congressional staff190to serve as election observers for U.S. House races and ensure191elections are run in a secure manner. State parties and192individual candidates also deploy observers, because their193presence at polling places builds trust with voters and allows194for the rapid flow of information to necessary parties.195    While no two States administer their elections the exact196same way, one thing should be universal: Election officials197must take a comprehensive approach to administering secure198elections. They should consider every factor to minimize199security risks.200    By implementing strong risk management approaches, they not201only strengthen election systems, they also build trust and202transparency. When voters feel confident in elections, turnout203increases. That is a good thing for our democracy.204    The best practices we will discuss today can help every205State improve their election security efforts. I want to thank206our witnesses for being here today, and I look forward to our207conversation.208    With that, I yield to Ranking Member Sewell for an opening209statement.210    [The prepared statement of Chair Lee follows:]211212 PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIR OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS213                           LAUREL LEE214215    Today, the Subcommittee on Elections will discuss the216different ways that States can strengthen election security.217The best practices that we will cover today include218enhancements to physical security and to cybersecurity.219    Addressing potential vulnerabilities improves voter220experience and voter confidence. Preparation and resilience221strengthens the integrity of our election systems, because it222prevents an issue before it arises.223    I look forward to discussing best practices for securing224elections and how Congress can be supporting those efforts.225    I would first like to highlight the different resources the226Federal Government makes available to elections administrators227for election security. The resources include Federal grants,228testing programs, and guidance from the Election Assistance229Commission.230    One great example is the EAC's Election Supporting231Technology Evaluation Program, or ESTEP. This program offers232voluntary security standards and evaluations for nonvoting233systems like poll books, election day reporting systems, or234other election supporting systems not covered by the Voluntary235Voting System Guidelines.236    The EAC's Voluntary Voting System Guidelines serve as a237baseline certification for new voting systems to evaluate238functionality, accessibility, and security.239    There is also great work that many States and localities240are doing on their own to enhance security and protect against241threats to their elections.242    For example, in 2024, the University of South Florida243hosted a cyber tabletop exercise with county supervisors of244elections, the FBI, and local law enforcement to strategize245responses to potential threats to election cybersecurity.246    To quickly disseminate information about cyber threats,247North Dakota uses a whole-of-government approach, which allows248agencies, cities, counties, and localities to have access to249the same statewide system.250    In North Carolina, the National Guard and State Emergency251Management Agency work collaboratively to monitor and respond252to cyber threats.253    To respond to physical threats, several States have254implemented common-sense integrity measures like tamper seals255for ballots, monitoring systems, and backup power sources at256polling locations.257    What is great about these physical security upgrades is258that HAVA grants can be used for this exact purpose. I am very259interested in hearing more about how these grants are260administered and what the results of past grants have been in261States across America.262    Another important measure that increases voter experience263and voter confidence is access for election observers. The264Committee on House Administration deploys congressional staff265to serve as election observers for U.S. House races and ensure266elections are run in a secure manner. State parties and267individual candidates also deploy observers, because their268presence at polling places builds trust with voters and allows269for the rapid flow of information to necessary parties.270    While no two States administer their elections the exact271same way, one thing should be universal: Election officials272must take a comprehensive approach to administering secure273elections. They should consider every factor to minimize274security risks.275    By implementing strong risk management approaches, they not276only strengthen election systems, they also build trust and277transparency. When voters feel confident in elections, turnout278increases. That is a good thing for our democracy.279    The best practices we will discuss today can help every280State improve their election security efforts. I want to thank281our witnesses for being here today, and I look forward to our282conversation.283284 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TERRI A. SEWELL, RANKING MEMBER OF285   THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM286                            ALABAMA287288    Ms. Sewell. Good afternoon, everyone. I want to thank289Chairwoman Lee and those witnesses who are gathered here today290for your testimony.291    As Ranking Member of the Elections Subcommittee, I take292very seriously the responsibility that Congress holds to our293constituents and to the Constitution to ensure that our294elections are fair and secure.295    Our elections are the foundation of public trust in self-296government. Every American, regardless of race, religion,297party, or ideology, deserves confidence that their votes will298be counted accurately and that their election will be299administered fairly.300    Yet the threats facing our elections are growing at an301alarming pace. Voters at home see their right to vote targeted,302whether by hostile State legislatures or really aggressive303courts, while all election officials face targeted threats from304radical groups at home and abroad.305    Moreover, our President and his allies have widely spread306debunked conspiracy theories and false claims that are designed307to undermine our collective belief in democracy.308    Now the conservative Supreme Court recent decision in309Louisiana v. Callais has ignited a five-alarm fire to the310voters of this country. As this hearing occurs, Republican311State legislatures like mine in Alabama and across the South312are franticly redrawing Jim Crow-era maps that will erase Black313political representation at all levels of government.314    As this administration continues to perpetuate that the lie315that the 2020 Presidential election was stolen, voter316suppression and discrimination is at a fever pitch.317    Just this week, President Trump created a taxpayer-financed318slush fund for January 6th insurrectionists who violently tried319to overturn the results of the 2020 election. I think this is320hypocrisy at its highest degree.321    We are here today doing important work to guarantee that322election workers have the financial resources they need to do323their jobs effectively, all while this President is paying out324to people who committed heinous crimes money out of taxpayers'325dollars.326    During a moment of incredible political turmoil, election327officials across the country are being asked to administer328elections while Republican State legislatures change the rules329of the game in their scramble to consolidate power. Our330election officials must navigate these changes while also331suffering from inconsistent and often inadequate funding332streams.333    In my home State of Alabama, local election administrators334and county officials are responsible for running elections335across 67 counties, often with constrained budgets and outdated336equipment that must still meet modern security standards.337    Federal support through the Help America Vote Act has338helped Alabama and other States improve voting systems,339strengthen cybersecurity, and modernize election340administration. Since Congress passed that Act, billions of341dollars have been distributed nationwide to support election342administration improvements.343    Even that funding has not been enough. Additional sustained344Federal funding would provide Alabama and other States with345much-needed assistance to better support county elections.346    Congress has the responsibility to act before347vulnerabilities become crises. The cost of prevention is far348lower than the cost of repairing public trust.349    Our democracy is one of the most important institutions we350have, not just as Members of Congress but as American citizens.351Future generations will judge whether we meet this moment in352American history with resolve. As primary elections are353currently underway and we are getting closer to the midterm354elections, Americans must know that our elections will be fair355and secure.356    Let us stand up for democracy. Let us stand up for the357truth. Voters and the power of the ballot depend upon it. Let358us provide every State with the tools, resources, and sustained359Federal support necessary to protect the sacred right to vote.360    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, as well361as the work that this Committee, this important Subcommittee,362will continue to provide.363    I want to thank Chairwoman Lee, and I yield back the364balance of my time.365    [The prepared statement of Ranking Member Sewell follows:]366367  PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON368                   ELECTIONS TERRI A. SEWELL369370    Good afternoon, everyone. I want to thank Chairwoman Lee371and those witnesses who are gathered here today for your372testimony.373    As Ranking Member of the Elections Subcommittee, I take374very seriously the responsibility that Congress holds to our375constituents and to the Constitution to ensure that our376elections are fair and secure.377    Our elections are the foundation of public trust in self-378government. Every American, regardless of race, religion,379party, or ideology, deserves confidence that their votes will380be counted accurately and that their election will be381administered fairly.382    Yet the threats facing our elections are growing at an383alarming pace. Voters at home see their right to vote targeted,384whether by hostile State legislatures or really aggressive385courts, while all election officials face targeted threats from386radical groups at home and abroad.387    Moreover, our President and his allies have widely spread388debunked conspiracy theories and false claims that are designed389to undermine our collective belief in democracy.390    Now the conservative Supreme Court recent decision in391Louisiana v. Callais has ignited a five alarm fire to the392voters of this country. As this hearing occurs, Republican393State legislatures like mine in Alabama and across the South394are franticly redrawing Jim Crow era maps that will erase Black395political representation at all levels of government.396    As this administration continues to perpetuate that the lie397that the 2020 Presidential election was stolen, voter398suppression and discrimination is at a fever pitch.399    Just this week, President Trump created a taxpayer financed400slush fund for January 6th insurrectionists who violently tried401to overturn the results of the 2020 election. I think this is402hypocrisy at its highest degree.403    We are here today doing important work to guarantee that404election workers have the financial resources they need to do405their jobs effectively, all while this President is paying out406to people who committed heinous crimes money out of taxpayers'407dollars.408    During a moment of incredible political turmoil, election409officials across the country are being asked to administer410elections while Republican State legislatures change the rules411of the game in their scramble to consolidate power. Our412election officials must navigate these changes while also413suffering from inconsistent and often inadequate funding414streams.415    In my home State of Alabama, local election administrators416and county officials are responsible for running elections417across 67 counties, often with constrained budgets and outdated418equipment that must still meet modern security standards.419    Federal support through the Help America Vote Act has420helped Alabama and other States improve voting systems,421strengthen cybersecurity, and modernize election422administration. Since Congress passed that Act, billions of423dollars have been distributed nationwide to support election424administration improvements.425    Even that funding has not been enough. Additional sustained426Federal funding would provide Alabama and other States with427much needed assistance to better support county elections.428    Congress has the responsibility to act before429vulnerabilities become crises. The cost of prevention is far430lower than the cost of repairing public trust.431    Our democracy is one of the most important institutions we432have, not just as Members of Congress but as American citizens.433Future generations will judge whether we meet this moment in434American history with resolve. As primary elections are435currently underway and we are getting closer to the midterm436elections, Americans must know that our elections will be fair437and secure.438    Let us stand up for democracy. Let us stand up for the439truth. Voters and the power of the ballot depend upon it. Let440us provide every State with the tools, resources, and sustained441Federal support necessary to protect the sacred right to vote.442    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, as well443as the work that this Committee, this important Subcommittee,444will continue to provide.445446    Chair Lee. Without objection, all other Members' opening447statements will be made part of the hearing record if they are448submitted to the Committee clerk by 5 p.m. today.449    Today, we have one witness panel. I will now introduce our450witnesses.451    First, we have Election Assistance Commission Chairman452Thomas Hicks. Next, we have EAC Vice Chair Christy McCormick.453We also have a third EAC Commissioner, Benjamin Hovland.454Finally, we have former EAC Commissioner Don Palmer.455    Each witness will have 5 minutes to provide an opening456statement.457    I now recognize Chairman Hicks for the purpose of giving an458opening statement.459460   STATEMENTS OF THE HONORABLE THOMAS HICKS, CHAIRMAN, U.S.461     ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION; THE HONORABLE CHRISTY462MCCORMICK, VICE CHAIR, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION; THE463    HONORABLE BENJAMIN HOVLAND, COMMISSIONER, U.S. ELECTION464ASSISTANCE COMMISSION; AND THE HONORABLE DONALD PALMER, FORMER465 COMMISSIONER, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, AND SENIOR466             LEGAL FELLOW, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION467468                 STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS HICKS469470    Mr. Hicks. Thank you, Chairwoman. I ask that my full471statement be accepted into the record.472    Chair Lee. So ordered.473    Mr. Hicks. Chairwoman Lee, Ranking Member Sewell, and474Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to475appear before you to discuss the election security work of the476United States Election Assistance Commission.477    As an independent, bipartisan agency, the EAC offers478trusted sources grounded in Federal law and responsive to the479practical realities of State and local election officials.480    We appreciate the Subcommittee's important oversight and481your close engagement with the EAC.482    Election officials have been the first line of defense483against escalating security threats and cannot be expected to484defend their election systems alone. These are our neighbors,485PTA members, and part of our congregations, armed not with guns486or bullets but with the law and the Constitution.487    Many officials describe their work as increasingly488technical and security-focused, even though they do not have489dedicated cybersecurity personnel and their budgets have490remained stagnant. In recent years, the demand for assistance491has grown significantly.492    Since the establishment of the agency under the Help493America Vote Act, the EAC has engaged with officials from494jurisdictions of all sizes to support ongoing election security495work spanning four core areas: physical security,496cybersecurity, personal security, and contingency management.497    Election officials work daily to meet the demands of an498increasingly complex security environment. As the public499profile of elections have grown, election infrastructure has500become an active target for a broad range of bad actors.501    Physical-security and cybersecurity measures focus on the502protection of infrastructure and are the backbone of election503security. These measures include chain of custody, bipartisan504teams, and protections against phishing and other cybersecurity505attacks.506    Election officials across the country have also faced a507growing number of threats to their personal safety, including508swatting incidents, suspicious packages, and bomb hoax threats509targeting election officials and polling places--even510yesterday, with the incident that happened in Pennsylvania.511    A 2024 national survey of election officials found a third512have experienced harassment in connection to their work, while513half knew of someone who had left the profession due to safety514concerns.515    The EAC has helped to facilitate a sharing of best516practices between State, local, and Federal Government partners517to improve the overall security of U.S. elections. These518efforts promote safe, secure, accurate, and accessible519elections for every voter.520    While we offer online and in-person training on topics such521as chain of custody, physical security of election facilities,522and contingency planning, for many jurisdictions, especially523smaller and rural offices, these trainings are the only source524of nationally recognized, nonpartisan election security525guidance.526    So far, more than 7,000 officials who serve more than 100527million voters have participated in EAC training. This direct,528no-cost support represents about $1.6 million in savings for529local offices.530    One of our most popular resources is the Election Scenario531Test Deck, which provides real-world scenarios to election532officials that they can use to participate in training and533evaluate their incident response. To date, more than 5,500534decks have been distributed nationwide.535    The common thread through all the work is the human536element. Election officials are the best tool for ensuring537elections are secure.538    While HAVA was enacted with security in mind, the threat539landscape and the presence of malicious actors has grown.540Today, State and local officials are incorporating541cybersecurity protections and physical-security measures into542nearly every aspect of election administration, even under543significant staffing and funding constraints.544    For the United States to continue to be a world leader in545election best practices, the Federal Government must support546and invest in our election infrastructure.547    I have full faith and confidence in election officials to548carry out their duties. The EAC will remain a dedicated Federal549partner through 2026 and beyond.550    Thank you for convening this important hearing and for your551ongoing support. I look forward to continuing our work for the552American people, and I am here to answer questions you may553have.554    Thank you.555    [The prepared statement of Mr. Hicks follows:]556557            PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS HICKS558[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]559560    Chair Lee. I now recognize Vice Chair McCormick for the561purpose of giving an opening statement.562563              STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTY MCCORMICK564565    Ms. McCormick. Chairwoman Lee, Ranking Member Sewell, and566Members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to567appear before you today.568    I welcome the chance to highlight the ongoing work of the569Election Assistance Commission, the EAC, to bolster election570security. This hearing demonstrates your commitment to election571integrity across America, and we thank you for your efforts.572    The EAC partners with States to support secure, effective573administration of Federal elections. Strong election security574depends on proven practices like pre-election testing,575auditing, and paper ballots, along with constant vigilance576against evolving threats.577    Through practical tools, best practices, and direct578support, the EAC helps election administrators protect the579systems and processes that sustain public confidence in our580democracy during the 2026 midterms and beyond.581    HAVA funds help States in this endeavor by allowing them to582invest in security resources that strengthen election583infrastructure. Grant reports show that States use funds to584support sustainable security practices such as network585monitoring, endpoint protection, multi-factor authentication,586automatic system backups, physical security, and cybersecurity587efforts.588    Over the past year, the EAC's Election Technology Office589modernized the Nation's voting system infrastructure by590certifying two voting systems to the latest Voluntary Voting591System Guidelines, VVSG 2.0, and we have five additional592systems under test.593    Some of the enhanced security requirements of VVSG 2.0594include use of paper ballots, increased support for auditing,595improved cybersecurity requirements like air gap systems,596enhanced access controls, and secure system updates; upgraded597physical standards limiting unauthorized access and what can be598connected to the systems; and preventing undetectable changes599in the software that could alter results.600    VVSG 2.0 also emphasizes transparency, reflecting what601election officials are already doing to secure systems, and602managing risk through measures like tamper-evident seals, two-603person integrity, chain-of-custody procedures, and continuity604planning.605    The Testing and Certification Division has also drafted606VVSG 2.1. This initiative reflects the agency's commitment to607continual improvement of election systems and the modernization608of guidance centered around election integrity.609    Realizing the value that the VVSG certification process has610provided to States, the EAC launched the Election Supporting611Technology Evaluation Program, or ESTEP, in 2023. This started612a focused EAC effort to research best practices around613election-supporting technologies that are used year-round, such614as electronic poll books, electronic ballot delivery, voter615registration, and election-night reporting systems.616    In May 2024, the EAC launched the Nation's first Federal617Voluntary Electronic Poll Book Certification Program. The618program has already certified three systems, with two more619systems under test. The value of this process is proven by the620fact that, just weeks after certifying the first electronic621poll book system, North Carolina adopted the agency's622certification requirements for its own certification program.623    As jurisdictions continue to modernize their equipment, the624EAC is analyzing emerging election technologies and translating625those findings into practical guidance, such as list626maintenance, grants, and physical security.627    In all of this, we strive to be transparent while ensuring628the safety of all involved in the electoral process, from629administrators to poll workers, to observers.630    With security top of mind for election officials, the EAC631will continue to move forward in our work to protect the632election infrastructure that supports America's representative633democracy. We are a small agency but one exclusively devoted to634fulfilling the promise of the Help America Vote Act and meeting635the evolving needs of election administration across the636country.637    Thank you for your support of the EAC and your tireless638commitment to State and local election officials and to639election integrity. We look forward to collaborating with you640on these and other important matters, and I would be pleased to641respond to any questions that you have.642    Thank you.643    [The prepared statement of Ms. McCormick follows:]644645          PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTY MCCORMICK646[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]647648    Chair Lee. I now recognize Commissioner Hovland for the649purpose of giving an opening statement.650651               STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN HOVLAND652653    Mr. Hovland. Thank you. Thank you, Chairwoman Lee, Ranking654Member Sewell, and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for655the opportunity to appear before you to discuss this important656topic and the work of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission.657    When Congress created the EAC with the Help America Vote658Act of 2002, it charged the agency with a clearinghouse659function to look at best practices across the Nation. The EAC660has embraced this part of our mission in recent years,661particularly as election administration has evolved.662    My colleagues and I work with State and local election663officials from all 50 States, 5 territories, and the District664of Columbia. From that experience, I can confidently say that665no one cares more about the security and integrity of our666elections than the Americans who run them.667    The challenges faced by election officials today would have668seemed nearly unimaginable to the officials serving when HAVA669passed. The reality is that administering elections is harder670and more expensive than it has ever been before.671    Our State and local election officials do an amazing job672with limited resources. In the years since HAVA, Congress has673provided significant funding, which helps support essential674aspects of elections, such as secure and accessible voter675registration, accurate ballot tabulation, auditable results,676and safe and secure election facilities.677    Federal funding, however, has covered less than 5 percent678of the estimated total cost of running elections during that679time.680    Similarly, the EAC tries to help fill some of those gaps681but is often limited by our level of funding. Last fiscal year,682the EAC saw a 15-percent reduction in agency funding, at a time683when demand has only increased.684    We have been doing our best to respond by sharing best685practices, creating resources that help election officials, and686offering technical assistance where possible. In fact, this687past month, we held meetings with our advisory boards, made up688of election officials from across the country and other key689stakeholders. We heard resounding enthusiasm for the EAC's work690and the direction we are heading.691    The agency is nearing a point where funding cuts will692impact what we can accomplish and the support we can provide693election officials, especially related to election security.694    My colleagues spoke about our election technology and field695services team. They are doing amazing work, but they are a team696of only 10 people. With over 8,000 election jurisdictions in697the United States, there are limits to our capacity, but not to698our desire or our commitment.699    We continue to work creatively and thoughtfully to respond700to election officials' needs. We are piloting a number of701efforts, including those to enhance election security and702technology in a way that informs future programs and allows for703rapid scaling if appropriate funding is provided.704    This is also part of why we designed the EAC's Learning705Lab, to release new content on a rolling basis and provide706asynchronous trainings accessible to election officials707anywhere in the country at no cost.708    Additionally, one of the agency's most significant709accomplishments was the development and adoption of the 2.0710version of the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines. As Vice711Chair McCormick noted, there are now two systems certified to712this standard and five more in the testing process.713    A report that we shared with Congress this week notes that714much of the voting equipment in use is nearing the end of their715recommended lifespans and conservatively estimates a cost of716$2.7 billion for jurisdictions across the country to make this717transition.718    I mention this because we must consistently invest in our719election administration infrastructure. Too often, we are720bailed out by the innovation and hard work of the public721servants that run our elections. Many seasoned election722officials have left the profession, taking with them valuable723institutional knowledge. To fully meet the challenges of this724moment and ensure our elections remain secure, there needs to725be greater support for elections at the local, State, and726Federal levels.727    We know this investment matters. Since 2018, States report728using HAVA security grants to replace paperless voting systems,729harden statewide voter registration databases, increase730cybersecurity training, and enhance physical security. Many of731these improvements to election security were made possible732because of the Federal funding and congressional support.733    At the EAC, we are committed to continuing to do everything734we can to ensure elections are safe, secure, accurate, and735accessible.736    Thank you for the opportunity to testify about our work and737the challenges facing election officials. I am happy to answer738any questions you may have.739    [The prepared statement of Mr. Hovland follows:]740741          PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN HOVLAND742[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]743744    Chair Lee. I now recognize former Commissioner Mr. Palmer745for the purpose of giving an opening statement.746747                STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD PALMER748749    Mr. Palmer. Thank you. Thank you, Chairwoman Lee and750Ranking Member Sewell.751    As you know, I have recently moved to The Heritage752Foundation as a senior legal fellow for election integrity, and753the views expressed today are my own and should not be754reflected on The Heritage Foundation.755    I really do appreciate the opportunity to talk about756cybersecurity and the election security of the voting systems757and the election systems that we use--election officials use.758We want them to be able to concentrate on administering the759election, not worried about the back-end security of those760systems. That is why I really appreciate the work that my761colleagues to my right have done over the last decade.762    As I sit back and I think about, you know, since I have763moved on, what are some of the recommendations that I would764provide to the Committee, I have a few.765    I would, No. 1, support the existing SECURE IT concept that766would add a formal vulnerability testing program. There is767great work that is done on the testing of voting systems, but768there needs to be--we need to add to that concept.769    The SECURE IT Act was made a part of the National Defense770Authorization Act. It required penetration testing, and it was771the first step to simulate real-world attacks on election772systems and voting systems where you tabulate votes.773    Unfortunately, there was no appropriation attached, and,774obviously, that is going to slow the work. In my mind, things775need to be going quicker, not slower. The work is way too slow776to stay ahead of our adversaries in this area.777    The window to secure elections and increase voter778confidence is urgent on your mind. That window could be779closing. That is why this is the most rapid approach, using a780vulnerability testing program to do that.781    I think there should be a fully funded vulnerability782testing program, that it should be the highest priority, and783that every voting machine needs to go through that process.784    The second recommendation is that--we heard a lot of great785information on the ESTEP program, both from the Chair and from786the EAC Commissioners. That is a very positive program that787really should be expanded--the Congress should look at788expanding that.789    There are huge success stories with the certification of790electronic poll books. That has been a concern of the Congress791for a number of years. Now there is actually a functioning792program, with systems being reviewed, and that should be793expanded.794    The third recommendation I would make is that we prioritize795voter registration system security and modernization.796    As the Committee is aware, the voter registration system is797really one of the core functions of the Help America Vote Act.798It holds all of the voter registration data of the citizens799that will vote, and we want to make sure that is secure and it800is accurate.801    There has been bipartisan concern over the years over the802security of those voter registration systems, both from the803Congress and from outside groups. Even more so, there have been804documented instances of vulnerabilities being identified and805those vulnerabilities being exploited.806    Now, we know that breaches of a voter registration system807that is outward-facing to the internet does not necessarily808mean results are going to be changed, but the impact on the809public could be very negative.810    We need to do everything we can--I say ``we''--the country811needs to do everything we can to secure those voter812registration systems. I can tell you right now, we are not813doing everything we can. We should be doing everything we can,814but we are not doing everything we can.815    My next recommendation is that we encourage coordination816between the Federal partners and the EAC. That just makes a lot817of sense, that there be a sharing of responsibilities on818coordination. That would save taxpayer money.819    CISA has reduced its footprint in elections, but election820officials want more election focus on the products. I think the821EAC realizes that and has tried to step up to the plate and822provide scenario training, in coordination with other Federal823partners.824    I think that targeted funding to the EAC which would allow825additional coordination would be helpful and to provide826additional cybersecurity offerings that are election-related.827    My last recommendation is: Obviously, local governments and828local law enforcement are the most critical aspect of physical829security of local election officials. The FBI has really830stepped up with the trainings and--and significant trainings,831particularly on bomb threats, for example.832    How can Congress help? I would just give you one example.833Targeted assistance to increase the accessibility of polling834places, that was a congressional initiative, and I think the835same can be done for the physical security of polling places836and election offices.837    Thank you.838    [The prepared statement of Mr. Palmer follows:]839840           PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD PALMER841[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]842843    Chair Lee. Thank you.844    I will now begin our questions today, followed by the845Ranking Member. I now recognize myself for the purpose of846witness questions.847    Chairman Hicks, I will begin with you.848    From 2020 to 2023, the largest share of Election Security849Grants were disbursed for cybersecurity. Can you share with us850some of the uses of those grant funds and your assessment of851whether that investment in cybersecurity was valuable?852    Mr. Hicks. Thank you, Chairwoman.853    I do believe that that investment was valuable. The one854criticism I would have is that it was not enough.855    The fact is that most of these jurisdictions use this money856to protect IT systems against foreign attacks. I do not want to857remind the Committee how we are in conflict now with a very858dangerous adversary, and that adversary attacked our systems859back in 2016, 2020, and 2024. That is nothing that is secretive860to anyone. There are also other foreign actors that are out861there who want to do the U.S. harm.862    We provided the jurisdictions with money to strengthen and863harden their systems, but that was not enough. They have864updated their voting systems in certain jurisdictions, and they865have improved the accuracy of their voting rolls, and other866activities as well. I do believe that, in order to ensure that867we combat this foreign threat over and over again, more868resources will be needed.869    Thank you.870    Chair Lee. In 2024, the EAC authorized the use of HAVA871grants for physical security. Can you share with us some of the872expenses that would be covered under that new guidance?873    Mr. Hicks. We also authorized things in 2022 for the874personal safety of election officials overall, similar to what875Congress did to ensure that their Members remain secure and876safe.877    In 2024, we basically offered more trainings for election878officials, but we also ensured that they can use this to879upgrade systems that they have, basically harden those systems,880whether or not that is two-step authentication or other aspects881as well.882    Chair Lee. Vice Chair McCormick, you discussed VVSG 2.0883during your testimony. Would you share with us some of the key884distinctions between 2.0 and 1.0?885    Ms. McCormick. Yes. Thank you for the question, Chairwoman.886    VVSG 2.0 includes major improvements to cybersecurity887guidelines, including requiring air-gapping from any kind of888public network. We have prohibited wireless technology in the889machines. We have also provided that there must be multi-factor890authentication for all the systems.891    Another thing we have done is that we have required892physical-security and data-protection requirements. Those are893strengthened significantly to make sure that there is no894intrusion on the systems that cannot be detected.895    As well, that goes to our software independence, which is896now required. Software independence helps us identify whether897there has been any compromise to the systems.898    We also now are requiring penetration testing before the899systems even come in for test.900    We have done a number of upgrades to the VVSG 2.0. As I901said, we have two systems that have gone through this process902and have been certified by the EAC now. Those are now hitting903the market for the first time. We have five systems under test.904    We are also looking to upgrade from 2.0 to 2.1 and looking905at things such as barcodes and wireless technology and other906ways we might be able to continue to strengthen the security907aspects of our guidelines.908    Chair Lee. Mr. Palmer, you just mentioned during your909testimony--you gave several really interesting recommendations,910but one related to helping State and local officials with911cybersecurity.912    You touched on the evolving role of CISA, where CISA has a913reduced footprint in the elections arena. Is there another914agency--is it the EAC? Do you think there is another entity915that could step up to help? Or would your recommendation be916that CISA reengage in a different way?917    Mr. Palmer. Thank you, Madam Chair.918    I think that CISA is reducing its footprint, and the EAC,919because it is the agency that focuses on elections, primarily,920or solely in its core mission, that we have a responsibility to921provide services across the board to election officials. Many922of those services have been picked up by the EAC. Sometimes it923is the Federal agency coordination or it is trainings that have924been going on across the country.925    In discussions with CISA that I have had, those services926are still available. Sometimes I think the EAC could serve as a927translator and work with CISA, in coordination with CISA, to928provide those services, because election officials like it;929they like to have election-centric services.930    The EAC has former election officials that serve on it.931Many of its Commissioners have been involved in elections. A932very professional group of former election officials that can,933you know, sort of translate for the rest of the Federal934Government what they want from the Federal Government. So----935    Chair Lee. Thank you, Mr. Palmer.936    Mr. Palmer. Thank you.937    Chair Lee. We are out of time.938    I now recognize the Ranking Member for 5 minutes.939    Ms. Sewell. Thank you, Madam Chair.940    Again, I want to thank all of our witnesses for your941testimony.942    You know, I truly believe, and we hear over and over again943in this Subcommittee, that we are not funding the Election944Assistance Commission and election-security and--integrity945infrastructure enough.946    I wanted to ask you, Chair Hicks: I know that administering947the Federal Election Security Grants is one of the biggest948responsibilities that you all have. Am I correct that the949Congress has gone from providing a high of $425 million in950recent years to a low of $15 million in 2025 in those grants?951    Mr. Hicks. Yes, you are correct, Ranking Member.952    Ms. Sewell. How has that decrease--and that is a big953decrease--how has it manifested itself in our States? What are954you seeing in terms of what is not going funded that should be955going funded because of this reduction?956    Mr. Hicks. States are basically trying to make sure that957the Federal Government pays its fair share, in terms of having958the biggest footprint on the ballot and so forth for elections959overall.960    I believe that election--the officials that I have talked961to have said that they are going to have to cut back on a few962things in order to ensure that things remain safe and secure963for the elections moving forward.964    Ms. Sewell. Ms. McCormick, I know that we appropriated965about $45 million in 2026. I am hearing from lots of966secretaries of state that that simply is not enough and967directly from election administrators that that is simply not968enough.969    What do you see is going undone because of the decrease in970the amount of funding?971    Ms. McCormick. $45 million has to be distributed between972the 50 States and the territories, and so we hardly even----973    Ms. Sewell. That turns out to be about, what, $200,000 per974State?975    Ms. McCormick. I am sorry.976    Ms. Sewell. That $45 million turns out to be about $250,000977per State. I mean, the total is $45 million, right?978    Ms. McCormick. Right. It is a minimum amount of money.979    Ms. Sewell. Yep.980    Ms. McCormick. States cannot use that money to do things981like purchase new voting systems--which a lot of them are in982the position of needing to do at this point--to strengthening983the systems that they already have, to provide training for984their personnel.985    They need to do physical security as well--physical986barriers, cameras, card readers, secure transportation for987voting systems and ballots--cybersecurity risk assessments,988incident response, threat testing, threat monitoring on social989media, and, again, securing their voter registration system.990    Ms. Sewell. All of that costs money, right?991    Ms. McCormick. Yes, it does. The Federal----992    Ms. Sewell. Right now we are not funding that.993    Ms. McCormick [continuing]. Government is just a drop in994the bucket.995    Ms. Sewell. Yes.996    You know, Mr. Palmer, I know you are a former Commissioner,997but I think hindsight is 20/20 vision, right? What would you998recommend to this Committee and to Congress in terms of999funding, adequately funding, the Commission? What do you see as1000the biggest threat?1001    Mr. Palmer. Well, if we are talking about the Commission, I1002think that many of the programs that we have talked about, like1003the ESTEP program and the vulnerability testing program, there1004is already a framework to do that. The Congress has set that1005up. I mean, I know the EAC----1006    Ms. Sewell. Are we funding it?1007    Mr. Palmer. No, it is not being funded, and it is coming1008out of the nickels and dimes that the EAC is finding in the1009sofa, trying to keep that alive.1010    I just think that that is a critical piece of national1011security--vulnerability testing. It just makes a lot of sense.1012It is an investment for the rest of the election community, a1013very small investment, that would have huge dividends.1014    Ms. Sewell. Absolutely.1015    Commissioner Hovland, what would you say is the most1016essential function that the Commission runs? How do you see the1017reduced funding affecting that mission?1018    Mr. Hovland. Thank you for the question, Ranking Member.1019    I think that, you know, again, we have our four core1020mission areas, but as we look to expand the clearinghouse1021function as well as our election technology initiatives, there1022is really a need. Again, we have provided information to1023Congress, to Appropriations, on how many of these programs are,1024sort of, ready and turnkey because we have done pilots, because1025we have done the work to see how best to spend this money and1026how it can have an immediate impact.1027    Again, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, when you look1028at the 8,000 jurisdictions across the country, really, the1029scale that we are talking about is significant. Right now----1030    Ms. Sewell. Do you think that $250,000 is enough per State1031to be able to adequately fund elections?1032    Mr. Hovland. On the grant side, again, I do not think that1033is sufficient. I know from election officials that every dollar1034matters, but, again, when you are talking about capital1035purchases, whether that is replacing voting equipment or1036upgrading the security of statewide voter registration1037databases, you know, one of the things that we often hear about1038from Congress is the unspent funds----1039    Ms. Sewell. Yep.1040    Mr. Hovland [continuing]. and, often, when the amounts are1041lower, they are waiting--the States are waiting to make those1042capital purchases, like replacing their statewide voter1043registration database, or making those significant investments.1044    Ms. Sewell. Madam Chair, thanks for indulging me for going1045a little over.1046    I would like to request unanimous consent to submit for the1047record a letter from 84 voting, civil-rights, faith, labor,1048environmental, and disability-rights organizations, led by the1049Southern Poverty Law Center and The Leadership Conference, that1050call on Congress to allocate considerably more funding for1051election administration in Fiscal Year 2027.1052    Chair Lee. Without objection, so ordered.1053    Ms. Sewell. Thanks.1054    [The Southern Poverty Law Center and The Leadership1055Conference letter follows:]1056[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]10571058    Chair Lee. I now recognize the gentleman from North1059Carolina, Dr. Murphy, for 5 minutes.1060    Dr. Murphy. Thank you, Madam Chair.1061    They gave me a cheat sheet for your names, because I am too1062old and I cannot read everybody's name down there.1063    Thank you very much for convening this Subcommittee1064hearing.1065    Obviously, this is a bipartisan issue. We want people to1066have access to what is a tremendous right that we are given1067here in the United States to vote, and we want to make sure1068that they are safe and secure.1069    I was just reading--I was not aware of what happened in1070Pennsylvania. Thankfully nobody was injured.1071    I would like to go just a little bit, quick, off-script to1072ask Mr. Palmer about what is the deal going on with Maryland.1073My understanding is, they sent out 500 wrong mail-in ballots.1074Oops?1075    Mr. Palmer. Well, I mean, I saw some of the conversation1076about that, sir, and I would say that, you know, it is a1077mistake that just cannot happen. That type of mistake cannot1078happen.1079    Dr. Murphy. Five hundred thousand.1080    Mr. Palmer. It is a lot, sir. It is a very--it is a huge1081mistake. I know the people that--you know, and then, obviously,1082you can point at the vendor and say, well, the vendor made the1083mistake, but the buck stops with the election officials. I----1084    Dr. Murphy. That is exactly right.1085    Mr. Palmer. I--you know, I have sympathy for them. I have1086been in a position where one mistake can have an impact on an1087election. It is that type of thing that hurts confidence.1088    I have hope that continued training and professional1089training will, you know, sort of----1090    Dr. Murphy. This is where, again, this Committee and1091Congress, you know, one way or the other, is supposed to1092provide oversight. Their response is, ``Well, we will send1093another 500,000 out.'' What could go wrong there?1094    It just shows that there are problems with our election1095system, and it is OK for us to question it, and it is OK for us1096to do due diligence on these type of things.1097    That just amazed me. I have known some patients of mine who1098have come in and said they got mail-in ballots and they got1099them for people that lived in their residence 3 and 4 years or11005 years before. There are obviously problems that go on with1101this.1102    I want to talk a little bit about cybersecurity. We live in1103a digital world where now there is AI, there is quantum physics1104that are pushing out insane amount of data and really1105jeopardizing our systems. We live in a dangerous time. There1106are enemies that want to destabilize, divide us at home. We1107have seen this in so many different instances.1108    Commissioner Hovland, I just want to ask about the EAC. How1109does it work to stay informed to the constantly evolving cyber1110threats? What does it do to not only figure these out but also1111to communicate to, you know, State and local levels to make1112sure that people know what is going on?1113    Mr. Hovland. Thank you for the question.1114    You know, it is a real challenge. Often, one of the biggest1115challenges, when you talk about the scope and scale of 8,000-1116plus jurisdictions across the country, is communicating to that1117last mile.1118    One of the ways that we have been doing that--we1119communicate a number of things, but really so much on1120cybersecurity is about the basics. You know, even when we look1121at threats from artificial intelligence and AI, so much of the1122prevention comes down to being good at the basics.1123    That is why we address that with both resources that we1124provide, various, you know, training guides, et cetera, but1125also pieces of our Learning Lab. Some of the trainings in that1126platform walk through best practices, and it can help----1127    Dr. Murphy. Do you guys communicate, State and local, as1128literally as--currently, how often do you guys do that? What is1129your relationship with those folks?1130    Mr. Hovland. We have regular contact with election1131officials all across the country and----1132    Dr. Murphy. What does ``regular contact'' mean?1133    Mr. Hovland. Every day.1134    Dr. Murphy. OK.1135    Mr. Hovland. You know, again, it depends. We have a monthly1136newsletter dedicated to election officials. We have a platform1137to communicate with election officials. Our board meetings that1138I mentioned earlier have State and local officials from every1139State and territory in the country.1140    Through those processes, we get very widespread feedback--1141small jurisdictions, large jurisdictions, State officials,1142local officials--and that really helps inform our work and1143makes it better.1144    Dr. Murphy. OK. Great.1145    Mr. Hicks, just one question, because I never understand--I1146do not know what the answer to this is, when people say ``pay1147their fair share.'' I have never had an idea when, you know,1148taxation--this, that, and the other stuff.1149    How much, in your opinion, should the Federal Government be1150paying versus what should the State be paying as far as1151elections? What is the fair-share number?1152    Mr. Hicks. That is a hard question to answer, Congressman--1153--1154    Dr. Murphy. Well, you are the one that brought it up.1155    Mr. Hicks. Yup, yup, I agree, I agree. I would say that1156elections, overall, cost close to $6 billion per election1157cycle. I think adding--2 years ago for the Congress to1158appropriate $15 million is not enough.1159    If I had my druthers, I would say the Federal Government1160should pay 100 percent of Federal elections. That is not for me1161to decide. That is for Congress to decide.1162    Dr. Murphy. OK.1163    Mr. Hicks. So ``fair share,'' I think, is a significant1164amount.1165    Dr. Murphy. OK. All right.1166    Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.1167    Chair Lee. I now recognize the gentlelady from Illinois,1168Mrs. Miller, for 5 minutes.1169    Mrs. Miller. Thank you, Chairwoman Lee, for hosting this1170important hearing and to the witnesses for taking time to be1171here.1172    American citizens deserve secure elections and to know that1173their votes are guaranteed. They are tired of fraud, and their1174faith in our elections is dwindling.1175    We all know the Democrats want to cheat by not passing the1176SAVE America Act, but I will continue to fight every day to get1177that piece of legislation to the President's desk.1178    In this Committee, we passed H.R. 8721, the Preventing1179Foreign Interference in American Elections Act, that makes1180important changes to our election laws by prohibiting foreign1181nationals from funding ballot-harvesting and ballot-collection1182efforts.1183    This common-sense bill put forth by my colleague will help1184the American people gain confidence in their elections while1185curbing foreign influence that seeks to undermine our1186institutions.1187    I look forward to the continuing good work that this1188Committee is doing.1189    My first question is for Mr. Hicks.1190    What steps has the EAC taken in an effort to mitigate1191illegal voting by non-citizens?1192    Mr. Hicks. Congresswoman, States run the elections. It is1193illegal for non-citizens to vote. What we do is, we do not play1194an active role into who can vote and who cannot vote. The1195eligibility of voters relies on the States.1196    Mrs. Miller. Right. It is illegal for them to vote.1197    Mr. Hicks. Correct.1198    Mrs. Miller. It is illegal for illegals to vote. My1199question is, what steps has the EAC taken to make sure that1200illegals are not voting in our elections, non-citizens are not1201voting in our elections?1202    Mr. Hicks. The EAC does not run elections. We cannot do1203anything to ensure that. That is a State issue.1204    Mrs. Miller. You should be taking steps, though, to1205mitigate illegal voting by non-citizens.1206    Also, if you want the Federal Government to pick up the tab1207for elections, then maybe the Federal Government could say, you1208have to have a photo ID and you have to be a U.S. citizen.1209    Mr. Palmer, how does poll-worker training contribute to1210election integrity and voter confidence? What does poll-worker1211training look like?1212    Mr. Palmer. Poll-worker training is--I mean, that is the1213front lines of helping voters cast the ballot. That poll-worker1214training is imperative.1215    What it really means is, officials at the county office, as1216well as other poll workers who are long-term--served a long1217time, they provide guidance on the different missions that take1218place inside a polling place, if it is confirming the identity1219of someone, if it is giving them the right ballot, making sure1220that there is calm and no chaos in a polling place. That is the1221importance of a poll worker.1222    Mrs. Miller. I am just curious, how do you train a poll1223worker to keep non-citizens from voting when they do not have1224to show an ID?1225    Mr. Palmer. Well, poll workers, they are going to follow1226the rules of the jurisdiction. It is up to us, as the1227policymakers, it is up to the Congress to set the rules--the1228State legislatures--set the rules of the eligibility of who is1229going to be casting a ballot.1230    We expect the poll workers to follow the instruction of the1231legislature. In some ways, I do not want to put that onus on1232them. They will follow the rules and procedures that are1233provided to them.1234    Mrs. Miller. Which is why it is so important that we pass1235the SAVE America Act.1236    Ms. McCormick, as jurisdictions modernize their elections,1237what steps can they take to proactively ensure the security of1238their systems?1239    Ms. McCormick. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman1240Miller.1241    There are a number of things that election officials can1242do.1243    The first thing that they can do is rigorous testing of the1244election equipment both before, during, and after an election.1245    They can also engage in stringent auditing practices. All1246States now require the elections to be audited, and we now have124798 percent of the country using paper ballots. The best way to1248do that is to do an eye exam--hand examination of the ballots1249to make sure that they match the results.1250    I agree with you that we have a crisis in election1251confidence right now, and we need to be able to assure our1252voters that our election outcomes are accurate, they are fair,1253and they are secure. Part of that is to the allow observers1254into the polling places to be as transparent as possible.1255    Those are some things that election officials can do to1256strengthen the security and the transparency of our elections.1257    Mrs. Miller. I have to say, across the country, Democrats1258and Republicans want--they election integrity. They want people1259to show voter ID and proof of citizenship. We have to pass our1260legislation here to require States and local governments to1261prove that you are a U.S. citizen before you are voting.1262    With that, I will yield back.1263    Chair Lee. I would like to thank our witnesses for1264appearing before us today and sharing your experience, your1265expertise, and your insight.1266    Members of the Committee may have some additional questions1267for you, and we ask you to please respond to those questions in1268writing.1269    Without objection, each Member will have 5 legislative days1270to insert additional material into the record or to revise and1271extend their remarks.1272    If there is no further business, I thank the Members for1273their participation.1274    Without objection, the Committee stands adjourned.1275    [Whereupon, at 3:10 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]12761277                         [all]