“Pier Pressure: Regulation and Competition in Maritime Shipping”

1[House Hearing, 119 Congress]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34            PIER PRESSURE: REGULATION AND COMPETITION5                    IN MARITIME SHIPPING6=======================================================================78                                HEARING910                               BEFORE THE1112                  SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE,13                   REGULATORY REFORM, AND ANTITRUST1415                       COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY1617                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES1819                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2021                             SECOND SESSION2223                               __________2425                        TUESDAY, MARCH 17, 20262627                               __________2829                           Serial No. 119-593031                               __________3233         Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary3435[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]3637               Available via: http://judiciary.house.gov3839                               __________4041                 U.S. GOVERMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE4263-145                  WASHINGTON : 202643=======================================================================4445                       COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY4647                        JIM JORDAN, Ohio, Chair4849DARRELL ISSA, California             JAMIE RASKIN, Maryland, Ranking50ANDY BIGGS, Arizona                      Member51TOM McCLINTOCK, California           JERROLD NADLER, New York52THOMAS P. TIFFANY, Wisconsin         ZOE LOFGREN, California53THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky              STEVE COHEN, Tennessee54CHIP ROY, Texas                      HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,55SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin              Georgia56BEN CLINE, Virginia                  ERIC SWALWELL, California57LANCE GOODEN, Texas                  TED LIEU, California58JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey       PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington59TROY E. NEHLS, Texas                 J. LUIS CORREA, California60BARRY MOORE, Alabama                 MARY GAY SCANLON, Pennsylvania61KEVIN KILEY, California              JOE NEGUSE, Colorado62HARRIET M. HAGEMAN, Wyoming          LUCY McBATH, Georgia63LAUREL M. LEE, Florida               DEBORAH K. ROSS, North Carolina64WESLEY HUNT, Texas                   BECCA BALINT, Vermont65RUSSELL FRY, South Carolina          JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois66GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin            SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California67BRAD KNOTT, North Carolina           JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida68MARK HARRIS, North Carolina          DANIEL S. GOLDMAN, New York69ROBERT F. ONDER, Jr., Missouri       JASMINE CROCKETT, Texas70DEREK SCHMIDT, Kansas71BRANDON GILL, Texas72MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington73                                 ------7475               SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE,76                    REGULATORY REFORM, AND ANTITRUST7778                   SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin, Chair7980DARRELL ISSA, California             JERROLD NADLER, New York, Ranking81BEN CLINE, Virginia                      Member82LANCE GOODEN, Texas                  J. LUIS CORREA, California83HARRIET HAGEMAN, Wyoming             BECCA BALINT, Vermont84MARK HARRIS, North Carolina          JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois85DEREK SCHMIDT, Kansas                ZOE LOFGREN, California86MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington      HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,87                                         Georgia8889               CHRISTOPHER HIXON, Majority Staff Director90                ARTHUR EWENCZYK, Minority Staff Director9192                            C O N T E N T S9394                              ----------9596                        Tuesday, March 17, 20269798                           OPENING STATEMENTS99100                                                                   Page101The Honorable Scott Fitzgerald, Chair of the Subcommittee on the102  Administrative State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust from the103  State of Wisconsin.............................................     1104The Honorable Jerrold Nadler, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee105  on the Administrative State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust106  from the State of New York.....................................     3107The Honorable Jamie Raskin, Ranking Member of the Committee on108  the Judiciary from the State of Maryland.......................     5109110                               WITNESSES111112Erika M. Douglas, Associate Professor of Law, Temple University113  Oral Testimony.................................................     8114  Prepared Testimony.............................................    11115Tony Rice, Senior Director, Trade Policy, National Milk Producers116  Federation117  Oral Testimony.................................................    26118  Prepared Testimony.............................................    28119Richard Sicotte, Professor of Economics, University of Vermont120  Oral Testimony.................................................    38121  Prepared Testimony.............................................    40122Diana Moss, Vice President, Director, Competition Policy,123  Progressive Policy Institute124  Oral Testimony.................................................    42125  Prepared Testimony.............................................    44126127          LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC. SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING128129All materials submitted for the record by the Subcommittee on the130  Administrative State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust are131  listed below...................................................    65132133Materials submitted by the Honorable Becca Balint, a Member of134  the Subcommittee on the Administrative State, Regulatory135  Reform, and Antitrust from the State of Vermont, for the record136    An article entitled, ``NY Fed report says Americans pay for137        almost all of Trump's tariffs,'' Feb. 12, 2026, Reuters138    An article entitled, ``One-Third of Americans Cut Back to139        Cover Healthcare Expenses,'' Mar. 12, 2026, Gallup140    An article entitled, ``Oil Rises, Bringing Gains to 40% Since141        the Start of the War,'' Mar. 12, 2026, The New York Times142143                                APPENDIX144145Materials submitted by the Honorable Scott Fitzgerald, Chair of146  the Subcommittee on the Administrative State, Regulatory147  Reform, and Antitrust from the State of Wisconsin, and the148  Honorable Jerrold Nadler, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on149  the Administrative State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust from150  the State of New York, for the record151    A document entitled, ``Ocean Freight Shipper Bill of152        Rights,'' Mar. 2025, The National Industrial153        Transportation League154    A statement from The National Industrial Transportation155        League, Mar. 25, 2026156157                 QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES FOR THE RECORD158159Questions and response for Tony Rice, Senior Director, Trade160  Policy, National Milk Producers Federation, submitted by the161  Honorable Ben Cline, a Member of the Subcommittee on the162  Administrative State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust from the163  State of Virginia, for the record164165     PIER PRESSURE: REGULATION AND COMPETITION IN MARITIME SHIPPING166167                              ----------168169                        Tuesday, March 17, 2026170171                        House of Representatives172173               Subcommittee on the Administrative State,174175                    Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust176177                       Committee on the Judiciary178179                             Washington, DC180181    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in182Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Hon. Scott183Fitzgerald [Chair of the Subcommittee] presiding.184    Members present: Representatives Issa, Gooden, Harris,185Nadler, Raskin, Balint, Lofgren, and Johnson.186    Mr. Fitzgerald. [Presiding.] The Subcommittee will come to187order. Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a188recess at any time.189    We welcome everyone to today's hearing. Happy St. Patrick's190Day.191    This hearing on regulation and competition in the maritime192shipping industry is a Subcommittee hearing we have wanted to193tackle for some time.194    I will now recognize myself for an opening statement.195    Today, we are here to examine the statutory antitrust196exemption granted under the 1916 Shipping Act and its impact on197competition and consumers. Since the earliest day of maritime198shipping, ocean carriers have entered into cooperative199agreements to coordinate freight capacity and global shipping200routes. This was to ensure space abroad; a vessel didn't go201unused, and ships would not be arriving at the same ports at202the same time.203    Recognizing that these cooperative agreements, known as204``conferences,'' could act to restrict or eliminate competition205between rival shippers, Congress began studying the issue. What206Congress concluded was that, while there were certainly207anticompetitive aspects of these conferences, the benefits seem208to outweigh any potential harm.209    In the words of a 1914 Alexander report, quote,210211        To terminate the existing agreements would bring about two212        results. The steamship lines would either engage in rate wars,213        or to eliminate a costly struggle, they would consolidate214        through common ownership.215216    Congress' compromise came in the Shipping Act of 1916. As217part of that compromise, ocean carriers could enter into218collective agreements, so long as those agreements were filed219with and overseen by a Federal regulator, which today is known220as the Federal Maritime Commission, or the FMC.221    The industry today, however, looks very different from the222one Congress confronted in 1916. In 1998, the top 20 ocean223carriers controlled approximately 50 percent of the world's224container slot capacity. By 2018, that number had almost225doubled to nearly 90 percent. Today, three global shipping226alliances together control nearly all transatlantic and227transpacific trade.228    The intent behind the Shipping Act was also to advance the229interests of American shippers. As one scholar had put it,230``Both the original statute and the 1961 amendments are231designed to protect and foster a strong American flag merchant232marine.'' In other words, Congress wanted to protect American233interests against discrimination by foreign shippers.234    Yet, today, the largest ocean shipping companies are all235foreign-owned and controlled. In the list of the top 20236container shipping companies by market cap, there is not a237single U.S. company.238    The United States depends on foreign flag vessels for 97239percent of its maritime trade. COSCO Shipping, one of the240largest container shipping companies by market share, is owned241and controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. That presents242its own national security risks, which the House Committee on243Homeland Security and the China Select Committee have been244investigating.245    This concentration and coordination can exacerbate supply246chain disruptions that would otherwise be more resilient when247competition is robust. For example, during the COVID pandemic,248freight rates for a container increased from $1,300 to as much249as $11,000.250    When geopolitical crises have struck, such as the Russia-251Ukraine conflict, or more recently, the ongoing air strikes252against the Iranian regime, ocean carriers have leveraged their253monopoly power to charge detention and demurrage fees,254surcharges, and other fees that should, instead, be charged by255marine terminal operators.256    What would otherwise be unreasonable business practices in257a competitive environment; it appears to be routine under these258anticompetitive alliances. The result of the Shipping Act, as259we have seen, may have, unfortunately, been precisely what260Congress was hoping to avoid--concentration of foreign shipping261companies, to the detriment of American businesses and262consumers.263    When Congress granted the antitrust exemption, it tasked264the Federal Maritime Commission with subjecting these ocean265carrier agreements to antitrust scrutiny. However, as one of266our witnesses will explain today, the FMC has never once267brought a case against the powerful ocean shipping carriers268that dominate shipping markets. Despite having the statutory269authority to seek a judiciary remedy or monetary penalties, the270FMC has never taken an enforcement action to challenge an271agreement. Some will call this ``underenforcement.'' It could272be called a dereliction.273    Over the years, the FMC has maintained the position that274competition was vigorous among ocean carriers and their three275major shipping alliances. Even after the COVID pandemic, in276which the United States faced some of its greatest supply chain277challenges, the FMC reported to Congress that, ``Competition278among ocean common carriers, among the three major alliances,279and among the members in each of these alliances is vigorous.''280    That argument is in tension with the position taken by281Congress and the DOJ in recent years. When Congress passed the282Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 2022, it did so to alleviate283concerns among businesses that ocean-carrying alliances were,284quote, ``able to wield excessive power to prevent285competition.'' Yet, despite Congress giving the FMC more286authority to police the carriers in the terms of their287agreements, it appears the agency is still sitting on its288hands.289    The DOJ, meanwhile, has long maintained the position that290antitrust exemption for ocean shipping is no longer justified,291and has repeatedly submitted comments to the FMC expressing292antitrust concerns over ocean carrier alliances.293    In 2016, for example, the DOJ submitted comments urging the294FMC to oppose the proposed Ocean Alliance Agreement. In their295comments, the DOJ stated that the agreement ``contemplates296extensive cooperation among members and would grant the parties297the ability to broadly coordinate service between routes,298including the unfettered exchange of competitively sensitive299information.''300    Additionally, the DOJ stated, ``The increase in301concentration in the transpacific shipping market is presumed302likely to enhance market power under the antitrust laws.''303Despite this warning, the FMC authorized the Ocean Alliance in3042016, and has continued to extend the agreement, most recently,305until March 2032.306    An economy based on vigorous competition protected by the307antitrust laws does the best job of promoting consumer welfare308and a vibrant, growing economy. Statutory antitrust exemptions309are antithetical to those principles.310    As the bipartisan Antitrust Modernization Commission311stated,``Statutory exemptions from the antitrust laws312undermine, rather than upgrade, the competitiveness and313efficiency of the U.S. economy.''314    When Congress grants immunity from antitrust scrutiny, we315must do so selectively and with consumers in mind. When316compelling evidence suggests consumers no longer benefit from317an antitrust exemption, it is appropriate for Congress to318reexamine whether it is still in the public interest to allow319otherwise anticompetitive behavior to continue unchecked.320    That is why we are here today, to better understand the321history of the Shipping Act and whether, after nearly 100322years, it is still in the consumers' best interests.323    We will also hear today whether other government324regulations, such as environmental regulations in international325shipping, or restrictions in domestic maritime shipping, like326the Jones Act, are negatively impacting shipping prices and327harming consumers.328    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and hearing329what they have to say today. Thank you.330    I now recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Nadler, for an331opening statement.332    Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Chair, in this333senseless war, there is no defined goals and no end in sight.334With gas prices skyrocketing and with an affordability crisis335that is draining Americans' pocketbooks, and is only getting336worse, a hearing to examine maritime shipping rules does not337exactly meet the moment.338    The affordability crisis touches nearly every aspect of our339lives. Staple grocery costs have risen more than three percent340over the last year--causing many Americans to struggle just to341put food on the table. The rent and mortgage payments are342stretching families' budgets, with many young people priced out343of the housing market altogether. Utilities are up an average344of 12 percent from last year, and health insurance premiums345have gone through the roof, especially after Republicans let346critical subsidies expire. On top of all this, gas prices have347risen sharply since Trump attacked Iran, and are climbing348higher by the day.349    It is no wonder that consumer confidence is the lowest it350has been since 2014. Americans are feeling the freeze, but351Republicans have done nothing to ease their pain and many of352their policies are only making it worse.353    The increased costs faced by consumers have been fueled in354large part by the global trade war launched by President Trump355last year, which has taken aim at friends and enemies alike.356Instead of taking a targeted and thoughtful approach to trade357that would protect American industries, workers, and consumers,358Trump has taken a scattershot approach--imposing steep tariffs359across the board that are driving up prices for American360consumers and businesses, while doing very little to bring361investment to our shores.362    By one estimate, American consumers have paid more than363$230 billion in tariff costs since the Trump Administration364began. That's more than $1,700 per family. Even though the365Supreme Court has struck down some of the tariffs, significant366others remain, and the refunds mandated by the courts will go367to businesses, not consumers.368    At the same time, President Trump has taken this country to369war with Iran--without making the case to the American public370or seeking congressional authorization. Iran has now retaliated371by shutting down the Strait of Hormuz, through which one-fifth372of the world's oil supply travels--a response that comes as a373surprise to no one, except Donald Trump. As a result, the price374of oil is already over $100 a barrel and gas prices are375skyrocketing.376    Rigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws could be a377powerful tool in the effort to address the affordability378crisis, but instead, this administration has corrupted the379antitrust process--rewarding their political allies, punishing380their perceived enemies, and firing the career professionals381and other officials who have refused to cater to industry382lobbyists or to carry out a toothless enforcement scheme.383    The ask of the senior leadership in the DOJ's Antitrust384Division appears to have cleared the path for one of the most385egregious examples of lax enforcement--the government's386sweetheart deal with Live Nation-Ticketmaster. The monopolistic387power of this company has been known ever since Live Nation and388Ticketmaster first proposed merging in 2009. At the time, I389urged my colleagues--I joined my colleagues in warning about390the impact it would have on consumers. Although the merger was391approved, I am sad to say that our concerns turned out to be392well-founded.393    The millions of Americans have felt the effects of Live394Nation-Ticketmaster's anticompetitive practices. When they395bought a ticket to a concert, performed in a local production,396or worked at an auditorium, they saw how the company drove up397ticket prices, limited tour dates, or prevented other companies398from entering the market.399    Given this awful record, I sought reexamination of the400merger by the antitrust enforcers in 2021. Thankfully, in 2024,401the Biden Administration and 40 State Attorneys General sued402Live Nation-Ticketmaster for monopolizing markets across the403live entertainment industry.404    At the time, I said, quote,405406        Since its merger in 2010, Live Nation-Ticketmaster has engaged407        in boldly anticompetitive practices at the expense of408        consumers, entertainers, venues, and vendors. Instead of409        cooperating with the terms of its consent decree with the410        Department of Justice, the company has only grown more brazen411        in its tactics to corner the primary and secondary ticket412        markets.413414    Despite having a slam-dunk case, days into trial, the Trump415Administration suddenly settled the case for practically416nothing--leaving venues, performers, and consumers out in the417cold. The case was settled so abruptly that the judge even418admonished the government and Live Nation-Ticketmaster for419their quote, ``absolute disrespect for the court, the jury, and420the entire process.''421    This case is not only the most recent, but also one of the422most damning examples of how corrupt the Republican-controlled423DOJ is. As one former antitrust official noted, ``You really424couldn't send a clearer message that antitrust is dead at the425Federal level than settling this particular case.''426    Thankfully, most of the State Attorneys General involved in427the case dejected the settlement and vowed to continue the428litigation. The Trump Administration, on the other hand,429appears content to allow consumers to pay more for less.430    Such a sorry state of affairs cries out for congressional431oversight, but the Republican majority has been silent, while432the Trump Administration guts the antitrust enforcement433agencies that should be protecting consumers, not companies.434    Mr. Chair, market consolidation, unpredictable tariffs, and435the war in Iran are all driving prices up, but this hearing is436designed to address none of these pressing issues. By all437means, we should examine the maritime shipping industry at some438point, but the affordability crisis is urgent right now, and it439is growing worse. That is where our attention should lie today.440    I yield back.441    Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentleman yields back. We are waiting442for Chair Jordan. I will now recognize the Ranking Member of443the Full Committee, Mr. Raskin, for his opening statement.444    Mr. Raskin. Mr. Chair, thank you very much. Thanks to the445witnesses for joining us today.446    A majority of Americans feel like they're getting priced447out of Donald Trump's new gilded age in America. A third of448Americans, around 82 million people, are skipping meals or449basic healthcare to pay for utilities. Prices for food staples450like eggs, sugar, and meat jumped up in 2025 and are climbing451every day.452    Whether you rent or own, housing is becoming more453unaffordable for the working middle class, while Donald Trump454bulldozes the White House and throws ``Great Gatsby parties''455at Mar-a-Lago for his billionaire Cabinet and the fellow stars456of the Epstein files.457    Forget owning a house, when three-quarters of Americans say458that buying a new car is out of reach. If you have got a car,459driving it is becoming ludicrously expensive, as gas prices460have shot up 25 percent just in the last few weeks--with461Trump's ``war of choice'' in the Middle East. Gas prices are462soaring every day, as the theocrats of Iran retaliate by463shutting down the shipment of oil through the Strait of Hormuz,464and Donald Trump spends $2 billion a day on this war that we465never declared and didn't even debate--putting it on America's466imaginary credit card and driving up our deficit and our467national debt.468    President Trump's impulsively stupid policies and the469invertebrate response of Republicans in Congress have made life470even more expensive and difficult for our people. Republicans471refuse to address the healthcare crisis, and instead, chose to472cut Medicaid and the tax credits that help make healthcare473affordable and accessible to millions of people.474    Meantime, monopolies and corporate giants rule in Trump's475economy. The MAGA-controlled agencies have waved through giant476mergers in the real estate market, which means that you pay477more for a home and have fewer options for buying one. They478also settled slam-dunk rent price-fixing cases, where major479landlords across America conspire to set the rent that you pay480for your home, ensuring that they will get richer while you481spend more on rental housing.482    Just last week, the DOJ OKed an obviously corrupt483settlement of the Live Nation-Ticketmaster suit, which may484appease MAGA's big business campaign funders, but will do485nothing to lower the exorbitant prices that people pay to see486live entertainment. The government originally accused Live487Nation-Ticketmaster, a multibillion-dollar live-event business,488of stifling competition, coercing artists and venues into using489its services, and driving up ticket prices for millions of490fans, while pocketing bloated profits. Under the Trump491Administration, this years-long case has been quietly settled492with no changes for the millions of American consumers,493artists, venues, and competitors that this business injured and494overcharged.495    President Trump promised that foreign countries, not496Americans, would pay for his giant and illegal tariffs, and he497promised that those tariffs would create jobs. Both promises498turned out to be empty. President Trump's tariffs, which he499applied unilaterally, haphazardly, and unevenly, of course,500unconstitutionally--failed to create new jobs, and instead,501effectively, taxed every American more than $2,500. A study by502the Fed shows that 90 percent of these costs were paid by503American companies and American consumers, not by China or any504other foreign country.505    The resulting brutal affordability squeeze has landed most506heavily on people who also lost critical social services, like507SNAP food stamp benefits, children's health insurance, Medicaid508and Medicare, and funding for rural hospitals--when House509Republicans passed their One Big Ugly Class Warfare Bill.510    Our government actually has the agency tools needed to511address the Trump affordability crisis, but Trump has either512totally dismantled them or corrupted them. He has broken the513agencies that protect us against fraud, scams, and financial514conspiracies.515    He has fired any antitrust official who has disagreed with516his policy of giving political allies a green light to swallow517up their competitors. Last month, he abruptly dismissed518Assistant Attorney General Gail Slater, who was often the only519dissenting voice, as lobbyists in backrooms and White House520insiders pushed mergers that are terrible for consumers and521driving us toward an economy run by oligarchs.522    The Majority has conducted zero oversight of these523antitrust corruption debacles--leaving it to the Democrats to524invite as a witness Gail Slater's Deputy, Roger Alford, who was525fired for raising concerns about rank pay-to-play corruption526and self-dealing in the GOP-controlled antitrust agencies.527Alford implored us in this room to conduct oversight of the528Antitrust Division before it is too late for America. A two-529term Trump official, thus, begged us to do our jobs to protect530the American people, but it has fallen on deaf ears among our531colleagues.532    President Trump's policies and Republican inaction mean533that today Americans cannot afford daily life, but Trump and534the billionaire class are getting richer every day. Just four535tech billionaires--Elon Musk, Mark Zuckerberg, Jeff Bezos, and536Jensen Huang--all whom donated to Trump's inauguration, they537made $288 billion in less than one year. By contrast, the538American people paid $2,500, on average, last year for higher539prices, thanks just to the tariffs alone.540    The President has said that the affordability crisis is,541quote, ``a hoax, a con job, a scam,'' but his illegal tariffs542were the hoax. His claim to support release of the Epstein543files is the con job, and his illegal unilateral war in Iran,544which is costing us more than a billion dollars a day, and 13545American lives already, and more than a thousand Iranian lives,546including children, is the scam.547    The real fraud is President Trump's personal net worth548going up $1.4 billion in his first year of his second term, and549his son-in-law Jarad Kushner raking in $2 billion from the550Saudis and more than $1.5 billion from Qatar, while exercising551a lot more decision over the decision to go to war than any of552the Members in this room did combined.553    What are we here today to discuss? An esoteric antitrust554exemption about shipping. Now, in normal times, I might555appreciate an examination of this or any other antitrust556exemption, but these aren't normal times and this Majority557isn't even prepared to reform the exemption in any event--558something I would certainly be open to discussing.559    The millions of Americans literally cannot afford now to560get medicine or pay for housing or for groceries in Trump's561economy. We must do everything we can to try to help the people562now with the tools that are actually at our disposal. Instead,563our Republican colleagues have called us here to discuss a564niche antitrust exemption unlikely to change anytime soon.565    The ship of State is taking on water rapidly every day and566starting to sink, but our colleagues want to have a debate567about diversionary things. Count me out.568    Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.569    Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentleman yields back.570    I would just make the comment that, as a namesake of Scott571Fitzgerald, I thought it was a cheap shot that you brought up572the ``Great Gatsby-style parties.''573    [Laughter.]574    Mr. Raskin. I meant it only as the highest form of575flattery. Right?576    Mr. Fitzgerald. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.577Without objection, all other opening statements will be578included in the record. We will now introduce today's579witnesses.580    Professor Erika M. Douglas. Ms. Douglas is an Associate581Professor of Law at Temple University's Beasley School of Law.582Her scholarship focuses on antitrust, data privacy, and583intellectual property law. Professor Douglas previously worked584in private practice, where she focused on antitrust and585technology-related matters.586    Mr. Tony Rice. Mr. Rice is senior director of trade policy587at the National Milk Producers Federation, an association of588dairy producers and cooperatives. Mr. Rice focuses on matters589relating to U.S. dairy exports.590    Professor Richard Sicotte. Mr. Sicotte is an Assistant591Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of592Vermont. Professor Sicotte, his work focuses on economic593history, industrial organization, political economy, and594international economics.595    Ms. Diana Moss. Ms. Moss is a Vice President and the596Director of Competition Policy at the Progressive Policy597Institute. Her work focuses on antitrust enforcement and sector598regulation.599    We welcome our witnesses and thank them for appearing600today. We will begin by swearing you in. Would you please rise601and raise your right hand?602    Do you swear or affirm under penalty of perjury that the603testimony you are about to give is true and correct, to be the604best of your knowledge, information, and belief, so help you605God?606    Let the record reflect that the witnesses have answered in607the affirmative. You can take your seat, please.608    Please know that your written testimony will be entered609into the record in its entirety. Accordingly, we ask that you610summarize your testimony in five minutes.611    Professor Douglas, you may begin.612613                 STATEMENT OF ERIKA M. DOUGLAS614615    Ms. Douglas. Thank you, Chair Fitzgerald, Ranking Member616Nadler, and the distinguished Members of the Subcommittee.617    My name is Erika Douglas. I'm an Associate Professor of Law618at Temple University in Philadelphia. I've been dedicated to619antitrust law for over 15 years--first, in private practice,620then at major law firms, and now, as a professor and leader at621organizations like the ABA.622    My research examines how antitrust interacts with623regulation. Ordinarily, antitrust law applies across the624economy to prevent anticompetitive agreements among rivals.625That is not the case in international ocean shipping. Antitrust626law is blocked by Section 4307 of the Consolidated Shipping627Act. This section shields certain agreements among rivals that628are filed with the Federal Maritime Commission. This ocean629shipping exemption is one of the oldest in antitrust law. It's630not clear that it was ever justified, and it certainly is not631today.632    Congress created this exemption based on the mistaken view633that ocean shipping had special economics; that free634competition would cause the industry to fall apart from635overcapacity and rate wars. We've known for decades that this636is not true.637    From the 1990s onward, ocean shipping has been increasingly638deregulated. It has not led to industry collapse. Antitrust639courts have long rejected the concept of ruinous competition.640This German act rightly assumes that competition benefits the641consumers that we're concerned about here today. Antitrust642should coexist with ocean shipping regulation, just as it does643with regulation in other industries, like airlines,644telecommunications, and securities.645    The second reason for this exemption was to even the646playing field for American carriers in international shipping647competition. This rationale also no longer makes sense. There648are no major American carriers left. The European Union has649repealed its own shipping exemption. Today, the U.S. exemption650serves only to shield foreign carriers from our antitrust651laws--at the expense of American shippers and consumers.652    It's important to understand that, in place of the usual653antitrust laws, ocean shipping has a partial substitute that is654not being used. The FMC holds the exclusive statutory power to655challenge ocean carrier agreements that result in an656unreasonable reduction in service or increase in cost.657    My research shows that the FMC has never brought such a658case, despite holding this power for over 40 years. This record659suggests that the FMC tolerates greater competitive risk than660would antitrust law, although the agency's analysis often lacks661transparency.662    This legal landscape is concerning to me as an antitrust663scholar because the ocean shipping industry bears at least664three classic hallmarks of antitrust risk.665    First, it's highly concentrated. The industry is dominated666by three major alliances which account for up to 95 percent of667ocean shipping. As recently as 2011, this figure was only 30668percent. Concentration increases the risk of antitrust669violations by making collusions easier.670    Second, ocean shipping has an unusual web of agreements671among competitors. The FMC has over 360 agreements on file. The672big three alliance agreements allow rivals to decide jointly on673the volume of cargo they ship and when vessels are deployed.674The First Circuit recently confirmed that a similar agreement675between airlines violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.676    Finally, there's recent collusion in this industry. Where677antitrust jurisdiction remains, the DOJ has been vigilant in678bringing criminal charges. Carriers have colluded in the679shipment of vehicles and farm equipment, and price-fixed in680food and medicine shipped to Puerto Rico. These cartels harm681any American consumer who buys goods that travel by ship. These682factors create a perfect storm for anticompetitive conduct. If683there's consensus around one issue in antitrust trust, it's684that these sorts of exemptions are rarely justified.685    I would encourage you to consider the repeal of the arcane686ocean shipping exemption to free antitrust law to protect687American shippers, ports, and consumers from these risks.688    Thank you.689    [The prepared statement of Ms. Douglas follows:]690    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]691692    Mr. Fitzgerald. Thank you, Professor Douglas. Mr. Rice, you693may begin.694695                     STATEMENT OF TONY RICE696697    Mr. Rice. Chair Fitzgerald, Ranking Member Nadler, and the698Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to699testify before you today on the maritime supply chain700challenges faced by the U.S. dairy industry. Having spent 18 or701so years milking cows on my Pennsylvania dairy farm that my702family runs today, this is a true honor.703    My name is Tony Rice, and I serve as the Senior Director of704Trade Policy for the U.S. Dairy Export Council and the National705Milk Producers Federation, where I lead supply chain policy706development for both organizations.707    America's dairy farmers and the communities they support708depend on reliable access to global markets--with roughly 17709percent of production reaching international customers last710year in the form of cheese, whey proteins, or other dairy711ingredients.712    As most dairy products are perishable, maintaining product713integrity throughout the global supply chain is critical.714Shipping disruptions risk compromising product quality and715eroding the confidence that overseas customers play in U.S.716dairy products.717    While North America is our most important market, a growing718volume of our exports is reaching overseas customers via719oceangoing vessels. With the U.S.-flagged oceangoing fleet720representing only 2.3 percent of global shipping capacity, U.S.721dairy exporters are almost wholly dependent on foreign entities722to transport their products.723    Today, less than a dozen shipping companies dominate the724industry, and most operate within just three large carrier725alliances. While these alliances can create operational726efficiencies for carriers, this also means that exporters have727fewer options when selecting shipping services and less728leverage when negotiating service terms.729    To counter this trend, we support efforts to strategically730invest in the domestic maritime sector, including enhancing731capacity for American shipbuilding to strengthen the resilience732of our supply chains by offering exporters more options.733    Simultaneously, Congress should consider permitting reform734to expedite new shipyard capacity and investments in mariner735workforce education and training.736    Conversely, U.S. dairy exporters are very concerned that737foreign ocean carriers are likely to pass through costs738associated with proposed port fees on foreign-flagged, owned,739or operated ships. In a normal supply environment, additional740fees would incentivize dairy exporters to select U.S.-flagged741carriers instead. Unfortunately, U.S. dairy exporters have742little choice than to contract with a foreign carrier and743likely assume responsibility for any penalty fees--putting them744at a competitive disadvantage to other global suppliers. We745urge the U.S. Government to carefully evaluate the effects of746these penalties on U.S. agricultural exporters.747    The pandemic exposed structural imbalances in international748shipping networks, that shippers face extremely limited749container availability, high-port congestion, and unpredictable750vessel schedules. In 2021 alone, our industry lost over $1.5751billion due to missed sales opportunities, reduced product752values, and sharply higher costs associated with unreliable753shipping services.754    Frankly, the worst of these issues have abated, but some755underlying problems remain. The persistent issue of unreliable756ocean carrier schedules and limited accountability is an757ongoing source of frustration. While the delays are due to a758number of factors, including weather and port congestion, a759shrinking number of carrier options exacerbates the situation--760with exporters rarely receiving sufficient information about761why a booking was rolled or delayed.762    Ocean carriers also maintain control of containers and set763limits on the availability and use of chassis which adds costs764and constrains trucking, drayage, and scheduling options for765export shippers.766    We commend the FMC for launching an investigation in767January into whether the ocean carriers have been unreasonably768restricting truckers and shippers from their choice of chassis769providers. Continued FMC oversight is critical to provide a770fairer market for U.S. exporters.771    Dairy farmers milk their cows 365 days a year. For a772producer in Wisconsin, these supply chain challenges are not773abstract policy concerns. When export shipments are delayed,774canceled, or become expensive to move, the disruptions ripple775back through the supply chain and, ultimately, affect farm776income.777    To ensure competitiveness now, we urge the FMC to maintain778strong oversight over foreign ocean carriers and alliances, and779to enforce the law with respect to reasonable service, and780ensure adequate transparency, particularly regarding schedule781changes and equipment availability. To enable more options, we782support efforts to restore an American maritime industry.783    As Congress deliberates these important issues, we784encourage focus on how the ocean carrier market is meeting the785needs of U.S. exporters. Since foreign-owned ocean carriers786receive antitrust exemptions, it is only reasonable that they787treat U.S. exporters fairly.788    I appreciate the opportunity to provide comments on these789important issues, and I look forward to your questions. Thank790you.791    [The prepared statement of Mr. Rice follows:]792    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]793794    Mr. Fitzgerald. Thank you, Mr. Rice. Professor Sicotte, you795may begin.796797                  STATEMENT OF RICHARD SICOTTE798799    Mr. Sicotte. Thank you. Chair Fitzgerald, Ranking Member800Nadler, and the Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for801inviting me to testify today on regulation and competition in802ocean shipping.803    I'm a Professor of Economics at the University of Vermont,804areas of specialization in industrial organization and economic805history. Drawing on my experience researching the shipping806industry and its regulation, my goal is to bring an economic807perspective to the matters before the Committee today.808    The Shipping Act of 1916 authorized the predecessor of the809Federal Maritime Commission to approve cartel conference810agreements in ocean shipping, and those agreements so approved811would be immune from the antitrust laws--conference agreements,812fixed rates, coordinated capacity, and sometimes the firms813pooled revenues. Subsequent amendments to the Shipping Act,814effectively, prohibited rate-fixing, but still permit firms to815cooperate intensively in matters of capacity and operations.816    Shipping agreements must be submitted to the Federal817Maritime Commission, which, quoting to its 2024 report,818``analyzes these agreements for potential anticompetitive819effects.'' The FMC reported that, at the end of Fiscal Year8202024, there were 360 agreements, 50 of which were subject to821staff monitoring.822    From the perspective of U.S. foreign commerce, one could823argue that the most important kinds of agreements are the space824charter agreements, vessel-sharing agreements, and shipping825alliances. First, the space charter agreements, are when one826firm rents space on another firm's ships. Vessel-sharing827agreements are between two or more firms that use space on one828another's vessels and they coordinate capacity. Alliances are829described by the FMC as ``large VSAs'' which are nearly global830in scope.831    These agreements provides the backdrop for the adoption of832very large capacity container ships, frequently more than83310,000 20-foot equivalent units on a ship, sometimes twice that834amount. The trend in the industry is toward ever-larger ships.835    According to the FMC, Fiscal Year 2024, nearly 90 percent836of U.S. transatlantic and transpacific water-borne commerce was837carried by members of these three shipping alliances. There has838been some realignment among these firms over the past 18839months, so that MSC, a former alliance member, is no longer in840alliance, and another firm joined in a new alliance that was841approved.842    These are challenging economic questions--there are843challenging economic questions surrounding these agreements and844their effects.845    First, if agreements jointly fix capacity, then they can846exercise market power, even though they do not explicitly847collude on rates.848    Second, such close cooperation and information-sharing can849facilitate collusion, tacit or otherwise. A commonly shared850view among the industry, in particular, is that alliances and851vessel-sharing agreements enable firms to achieve economies of852scale and enjoy cost savings that might be passed on, at least853in part, to consumers.854    Measuring the efficiency gains that might exist and855quantifying the potential market power or exercise of market856power are really within the expertise of industrial857organization economists. In the context of other industries,858these same issues are analyzed by economists at the Department859of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, whether in the860context of mergers, cartels, or vertical restraints.861    There is very little in the public record that sheds light862on the kinds of analysis being conducted by FMC staff on these863agreements. I don't really understand what kind of economic864analysis they're engaged in. We know that they're monitoring;865we don't know what that entails.866    I think that the other witnesses have already spoken to867some of the--for example, Professor Douglas spoke about the868FMC's lack of enforcement of antitrust. They have yet to block869or enjoin any carrier agreement. They acknowledge competitive870concerns, but it's unclear what's actually being done about871them.872    Reasonable reform, in my view, would be that the review of873interfirm agreements in ocean shipping be carried out by874professionals at the DOJ or FTC, and that they are able to875access essential data that only the FMC has access to, so that876they can carry out that kind of analysis.877    I look forward to your questions.878    [The prepared statement of Mr. Sicotte follows:]879    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]880881    Mr. Fitzgerald. Mr. Sicotte, thank you so much. Dr. Moss,882you may begin.883884                    STATEMENT OF DIANA MOSS885886    Ms. Moss. Thank you. Chair Fitzgerald, Ranking Member887Nadler, and the Members of the Subcommittee, it's an honor to888be here today.889    PPI advocates for pragmatic competition policies that890champion the economic prospects and outlook for working891Americans. Any conversation about the importance of the U.S.892antitrust laws or exemptions to those laws would be incomplete893without considering the broader role or competition in894antitrust enforcement as a major tool for protecting consumers.895    Consumers are the backbone of the U.S. economy. Almost 70896percent of spending in the economy in the first quarter of 2024897was attributable to personal consumption expenditures. Sensible898competition policy and strong antitrust enforcement are major899tools for protecting those consumers from the exercise of900market power that drives up prices, lowers quality, stifling901innovation, and limits choice and market access.902    The U.S. antitrust laws protect consumers by ensuring that903they are not harmed by anticompetitive mergers, and business904practices that squeeze out smaller rivals, and fixing prices or905dividing up markets. The importance of those laws is widely906acknowledged by both Democrats and Republicans.907    The bipartisan Antitrust Modernization Commission908established by Congress in 2002 explained that, ``The rule of909laws stand as a bulwark to protect free market competition''910and ``prohibit anticompetitive restraints that harm consumer911welfare.''912    In legislating antitrust exemptions, Congress has weighed913the harm to competition and consumers against the benefits of914achieving broader economic, social, or regulatory goals. The915evidence on the benefits of immunities and exemptions is916increasingly negative, because most of the markets that are917immunized from liability under the antitrust laws are now918highly concentrated. For example, the top four container919shippers control 60 percent of the global market, but the three920big alliances or conferences control up to 90 percent of the921global market.922    In airlines, domestic mergers have, similarly, increased923the global control of immunized international alliances. At924these levels of concentration, anticompetitive consolidation925and conduct would be considered presumptively illegal under the926antitrust laws.927    The benefits of exemptions accrue to a few powerful928companies, but their costs affect a wide swath of consumers.929Sixty percent of the world's commodities pass through global930shipping lanes, and transportation costs, more generally,931highly impact the final prices of consumer commodities shipped932into the United States.933    Suffice it to say that Congress has the power to revisit934antitrust exemptions, especially for the Shipping Act--to roll935them back; to narrow them, or to make sure that they sunset936rapidly.937    Let me finish with two other developments that, much like938antitrust exemptions, raise concerns that antitrust enforcement939can't or isn't doing enough for consumers.940    First, a recent PPI report finds that, in food, healthcare,941housing, transportation, and insurance, merger enforcement has942historically been at levels that are far below the all-sector943average. This needs to change.944    Second, more recently, premature settlements in antitrust945cases have become the norm. Fully litigated trials and strong946remedies, like injunctions and breakups for restoring947competition, would have served consumers far better in lowering948prices, but settlements we are seeing could even harm consumers949more, including in the Hewlett Packard-Juniper Networks merger;950the Live Nation-Ticket-master monopolization case, and the951RealPage anticompetitive price-fixing case.952    Finally, the ability of U.S. companies to compete globally953is at risk. Aside from directly raising prices to consumers to954the tune of billions and billions of dollars over the last955year, IEEPA tariffs on imported commodities raise the costs of956U.S. companies, making their goods less competitive relative to957foreign alternatives. Retaliatory tariffs have decimated958certain sectors, like soybeans, by eliminating markets for959exports that U.S. farmers rely on for long-term income security960and stability.961    The foregoing policies undermine competition and consumers.962Congress has the power to revoke outdated and harmful antitrust963exemptions and ensure that the DOJ and FTC uphold due process964and the rule of law; that competition remains healthy; that the965laws rein-in market power, and we keep the cost of living down966for millions of American workers and consumers.967    I appreciate the opportunity to submit testimony for this968hearing, and I look forward to answering your questions.969    [The prepared statement of Ms. Moss follows:]970    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]971972    Mr. Fitzgerald. Thank you, Dr. Moss. We will now proceed973under the--minute rule with questions.974    I want to recognize the gentleman from Texas for five975minutes.976    Mr. Gooden. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Professor Douglas, it has977been pointed out that the FMC hasn't done a great job of978regulating anticompetitive practices. Would it benefit if we979consolidated more of those functions--enforcement functions980rather--into the DOJ or the FTC?981    Ms. Douglas. If you repealed the exemption, the DOJ and FTC982would have those enforcement functions that the FMC is not983using.984    Mr. Gooden. Do you have a position on that?985    Ms. Douglas. Yes. That the repealed exemption is something986that a lot of people would support, and I definitely support.987    If I can dig in a bit more to what you're asking, I'm not988necessarily saying that the FMC's power has to change, but the989additive power from the DOJ and FTC by repealing the exemption990would be beneficial here, because we're not seeing a lot of991enforcement.992    Mr. Gooden. Are there current policies or regulatory993loopholes that the big three alliances are using or exploiting994that you're aware of?995    Ms. Douglas. It's not a loophole, in that it's permitted996under the Shipping Act right now. Under 4307, antitrust law997does not apply to these big three shipping companies. In that998sense, it's a matter of the law permitting it right now because999of the exemption.1000    Mr. Gooden. Thank you. Mr. Rice, going back to the issue of1001collusion, how do these issues affect every day American1002households?1003    Mr. Rice. Sure. Thank you, Congressman, for the question.1004    As we've seen for our dairy producers and exporters, the1005highly consolidated nature of the shipping industry creates1006headaches for us, due to inefficiencies that arise. It's not1007wholly the fault of carriers, as we see port congestion and1008weather delays, but the shrinking number, as Mr. Sicotte has1009pointed out, the shrinking number of available options just1010limits the availability of carriers for our exporters and our1011producers to move their product overseas.1012    Mr. Gooden. Mr. Sicotte, what changes to the current1013regulatory framework would you propose, short of a full removal1014of the antitrust exemption?1015    Mr. Sicotte. Short of a full removal, I would recommend1016that the FMC be required to share its confidential service1017contract data with the DOJ or FTC, and if the DOJ reviews an1018agreement, which they should have the right to do, that those1019objections have to be responded to publicly in a way that we1020can understand what the FMC is doing. That would be a minimum.1021    Mr. Gooden. It also doesn't seem like they are lots of1022American ship companies banging down our doors asking for this.1023    Mr. Sicotte. Well, there are, in terms of ocean shipping1024carriers, zero, right? They were absorbed into foreign shipping1025companies over the past 30 years, 40 years--30 or 40 years.1026There used to be two very large ones, but that's true.1027    Mr. Gooden. I will close with you, Dr. Moss. My1028constituents aren't banging down my door about this issue. I1029suspect my colleagues on the Left would say the same thing. Do1030you have anything you would add? It seems like everyone's1031getting toward the same page here.1032    Ms. Moss. I do think consumers care significantly about1033their cost of living.1034    Mr. Gooden. Sure, absolutely.1035    Ms. Moss. We know this to be a serious problem.1036    Consumers are smart enough to understand that their1037commodities, especially the big-spend items in their budget, on1038food and commodities, anything that goes into building or1039construction, are really affected by immunities and exemptions.1040They drive up the cost, and they drive up the final prices to1041consumers.1042    I've talked to a lot of consumers all the time and they are1043aware of these policies. When I say, ``Did you know that the1044antitrust laws don't apply in this particular sector?'' they1045get very angry.1046    Mr. Gooden. It sounds crazy, right? Yes.1047    Thank you. I appreciate you all. I yield back to the Chair1048my time.1049    Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentleman yields back. We now1050recognized Mr. Nadler from New York for five minutes.1051    Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chair.1052    Professor Douglas, we have read countless stories about1053reported corruption in the DOJ. This Subcommittee heard1054testimony from the former second-in-command of the Antitrust1055Division, Roger Alford, after he was fired for pushing back1056against this corruption, about how mergers and settlements in1057the Trump Administration increasingly involve backroom deals,1058creating a pay-to-play system. What effect does this kind of1059corruption of the rule of law have on the market, and what does1060that mean for consumers?1061    Ms. Douglas. Thank you for this important question.1062    I am gravely concerned by reports of political influence1063peddling in antitrust agencies. I work on the rule of law, and1064I don't think it should ever be displaced by political1065favoritism in antitrust law, or otherwise. I want to commend1066the Subcommittee from hearing from Roger Alford and important1067voices on this issue.1068    That's all that I can say on it for right now. Thank you.1069    Mr. Nadler. Thank you.1070    Dr. Moss, can you answer the same question? What is the1071impact on the market and consumers of this kind of pay-to-play1072corruption? Is there anything that Professor Douglas missed?1073    Ms. Moss. Professor Douglas summed it up quite nicely. We1074are in a troubling new era where antitrust enforcement has been1075politicized and weaponized. There appear to be two channels.1076One is to go directly to the White House with your deal to1077grease the skids for antitrust review. The other channel is for1078what appears to be political interference to swoop in and to1079commandeer cases to create premature settlements that reward1080companies, powerful companies, and harm consumers and workers1081in the markets that are affected.1082    Antitrust is a key tool, as I've stated, for protecting1083competition, consumers, workers, paychecks, and pocketbooks, if1084you will. If it does not function, if we lose due process, and1085if we sacrifice the rule of law, we are harming millions and1086millions of American workers and consumers, and we are going to1087decimate our economy in the process.1088    Mr. Nadler. Can you give us some examples?1089    Ms. Moss. Absolutely. Of course, the worst, which has1090already been referenced, is the Live Nation-Ticketmaster deal.1091A very surprised and angry judge, a very surprised and angry1092set of 40 States plus D.C., who were locked out of a1093settlement. The settlement does nothing--nothing--to reduce the1094market power of Live Nation-Ticketmaster in ticketing, in1095concert promotion, in exclusive contracts with venues.1096    The bad conduct will continue. We have a long history of1097bad conduct and violation of past decrees by the company. This1098will do nothing to lower the monopoly ticket fees to millions1099of fans. It will steer everybody back to the Live Nation-1100Ticketmaster platform for 20 more years of monopolistic1101conduct.1102    The same thing with Hewlett Packard. Under Gail Slater, she1103was prepared to--DOJ--go to court to enjoin that merger, which1104would have created a duopoly and local area networks. Another1105premature settlement, ineffective remedy, that will do nothing1106to keep costs down for American businesses.1107    I could go on. I could go on, but those are two very1108leading examples.1109    Mr. Nadler. Thank you.1110    Dr. Moss, this hearing has been called to examine1111competition in the maritime shipping industry. Can you compare1112the impact of reforms in this area to the impact of addressing1113the cost of Trump's tariffs, the doubling of healthcare1114premiums, or the recent surge in gas prices?1115    Ms. Moss. I would say the issue of immunities and1116exemptions is very important. Any abstention or exception or1117immunity from enforcing the antitrust laws and holding1118companies liable under the antitrust laws does an enormous1119disservice to competition, to our market economy, to our1120consumers and workers.1121    In the broader scheme of things, we are probably talking1122about a drop in the bucket relative to the over $400 billion of1123additional costs that Americans have absorbed as a result of1124tariffs within an incredibly compressed, short period of time.1125    We are really looking at a very macropicture in terms of1126adverse impact of policies on consumers and a very, very micro,1127surgical policy through repealing or rolling back the shipping1128exemption. The two really do not compare. We need a more1129holistic approach to how to protect our consumers and our1130workers.1131    Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Dr. Moss. I yield back.1132    Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentleman yields back. We now recognize1133the gentleman from North Carolina for five minutes.1134    Mr. Harris. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to all of you1135on the panel for your presence and your expertise today.1136    Mr. Rice, as someone who represents a district where1137agriculture is a prominent industry in North Carolina, I'm1138always worried about ways in which this anticompetitive1139behavior in the ocean shipping industry can harm producers, as1140I know you have expressed as well. Can you take just a few1141moments and explain the impact that the alliance system is1142having on agricultural exporters?1143    Mr. Rice. Well, certainly, thank you, Congressman.1144    To give you a bit of an example, the worst of these supply1145chain issues happened during the pandemic. As I mentioned1146before, our exporters are wholly dependent on foreign ocean1147carriers. While the Shipping Act prevents them from1148unreasonably refusing to deal with us, it doesn't prevent them1149from rolling a booking, moving it onto the next ship, not1150giving transparency into why a shipping was rolled.1151    For example, one of our exporters had a container destined1152for Asia. It was rolled so many times that the original ship1153that it had been scheduled to sail on had went to Asia and came1154back, and that's the one that picked up the container.1155    There's one piece of this that, yes, some of these1156alliances, they do create some operational efficiencies, but at1157the same time, Congress saw fit, when passing the Shipping Act,1158that if these carriers are to receive antitrust exemptions,1159they have to provide reasonable access for U.S. exporters and1160ensure efficiency.1161    It's hard to reconcile when we saw 70 percent of some of1162these carriers carrying--70 percent of the ship would be empty1163containers, while our exports would be left on the dock during1164the height of the pandemic. Now, those, thankfully, have abated1165since then, but we do see these issues with transparency, and a1166lack thereof, into why decisions are made; why sailings are1167canceled or blanked. It creates a ton of logistical issues for1168our industry who is exporting perishable products that need to1169get to an end consumer in a timely fashion.1170    Mr. Harris. Thank you very much.1171    Mr. Rice, while we are there, in April 2025, the Trump1172Administration released a Maritime Action Plan with a goal of1173really restoring America's maritime dominance. The plan seeks1174to really revitalize U.S. shipbuilding and rebuild the maritime1175workforce. Can you give us your thoughts on how this plan would1176help to address the problems that the American, particularly1177American dairy exporters and other agricultural exporters, are1178currently facing with the ocean shipping?1179    Mr. Rice. Certainly. Investment in the U.S. shipbuilding1180industry, as I mentioned, is sorely overdue. For example,1181Chinese shipbuilders build 230 times the number of ships per1182year as the United States. It's very troublesome that we just1183don't have an industry here in the United States to produce1184these container ships that we need.1185    Yes, supporting investment in the shipbuilding capacity,1186streamlining the permitting, and reforms at shipyards and1187ports--there's a long backlog of maintenance and expansion1188issues at the ports themselves that need to be addressed.1189    The one thing I mentioned in my remarks as well, in1190developing a plan to fund these programs, we just think it1191warrants careful consideration of any penalty fees that are put1192on foreign ships to make sure that the people who are actually1193paying it aren't American exporters.1194    Mr. Harris. Well, thank you.1195    Ms. Douglas, as you note in your testimony, the Federal1196Maritime Commission, or FMC, rarely brings cases against the1197ocean shipping carriers that dominate shipping markets, despite1198having the legal authority to do so. Can you kind of help us1199dive into that, of how lack of transparency over the FMC's1200competitive analysis of ocean shipping agreements could be1201contributing to the FMC's lack of challenges to ocean carrier1202agreements?1203    I'll follow that up and give you the rest of my time. What1204would be the possible effects of having the DOJ work with the1205FMC to scrutinize ocean shipping agreements?1206    Ms. Douglas. Right. The lack of challenges seems to suggest1207that there's either not analysis happening or analysis that's1208happening that tolerates greater anticompetitive harm than1209antitrust law.1210    What Professor Sicotte and I are both saying is it's not1211clear how the FMC is coming to these conclusions. Because from1212the outside perspective, it's a concentrated industry that,1213we've heard from industry here, is dominated by a few1214companies, and has had a number of cartels that have been1215prosecuted where the exemption doesn't apply.1216    We would need to know how these agreements are being1217implemented in fact. That's something that antitrust law can1218get at. If DOJ could do an investigation, the rule of reason1219looks carefully at these sorts of claims that maybe there's1220some efficiencies here; maybe there isn't. There are a lot of1221different provisions in these agreements, but as written, we1222can't really tell what's going on.1223    Mr. Harris. All right. Thank you very much. Mr. Chair, I1224yield back.1225    Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize1226the Ranking Member of the Full Committee, Mr. Raskin, for five1227minutes.1228    Mr. Raskin. Thank you, Chair Fitzgerald.1229    Dr. Moss, President Trump promised to lower prices on day1230one. What has actually happened since day one, and how are1231American families faring?1232    Ms. Moss. Thank you for the question.1233    Nothing has happened. In fact, things have gone the other1234way. The promise to lower prices on day one was really lip1235service to a broader political strategy.1236    Consumers have been under assault for years by growing1237concentration in really critical consumer-facing sectors.1238Consumers spend 75 percent of their budgets on food,1239transportation, housing, healthcare, and insurance. Those are1240highly concentrated industries that needed direct attention and1241support for very, very strong enforcement, which we have not1242gotten under this current administration.1243    Consumers are really buckling under the burden of high1244prices from excessive market power, from supply chain1245instability, from inflation. That should be a No. 1 goal.1246Consumers support the economy. They are the backbone of the1247economy. Without them, we will not have a robust, functioning1248economy.1249    Mr. Raskin. People instinctively understand the way that1250corruption and insider political influence end up harming1251consumers and driving up prices. I wonder, is it also the case1252that, when we allow combinations to form and conglomerates to1253take over the economy, that this increases corruption and it1254increases political inequality and injuries to democracy.1255    Ms. Moss. Yes. The purpose of the antitrust laws, of1256course, is to promote competition in the economy; to prevent1257the concentration of market power. The antitrust laws really1258address directly the economic effects of high concentration and1259a lack of competition.1260    What you're getting at is a really important connection1261between economic power and political power. There is a direct1262link there. The importance of antitrust enforcement in1263controlling economic power, excessive economic power, does link1264directly into controlling excessive political power. Of course,1265political power can lead down a number of different pathways.1266That's what we're seeing right now.1267    Mr. Raskin. You can get into a vicious cycle where economic1268concentration increases political concentration of power, and1269then, that further deepens the ability to manipulate the1270economy for particular groups?1271    Ms. Moss. That is correct. I would just add a really1272important point. These precedents are now being set for the1273first time in the United States, this type of weaponization and1274politicization of the antitrust process.1275    This administration will not be here forever. There will be1276other administrations. The setting of those precedents as they1277exist now can--it really spells a very, very dismal and1278concerning future for our antitrust establishment and law1279enforcement in the U.S.1280    Mr. Raskin. The shipping antitrust exemption which we are1281discussing today has actually been studied and debated1282extensively, and even reformed repeatedly, as recently as 2022.1283Can you name some of the other anticompetitive policies and1284problems today orchestrated by the Trump Administration that1285are doing a lot more damage to American consumers than the1286shipping exemption?1287    Ms. Moss. Sure. One thing that the Trump Administration1288did, as part of its order to realign regulation, to eliminate1289anticompetitive relation--anticompetitive regulations, was to1290really gut the ability of the U.S. Department of Agriculture to1291collect data, to do analysis that would have really supported1292competition initiatives in our food supply chains.1293    We see independent cattle ranchers, for example, being1294pushed out, priced out of the market by large, industrialized1295players and the packer cartel.1296    The inability of USDA to collect data has completely1297undercut the agency's important authority to police competition1298and--1299    Mr. Raskin. Was the purpose of elimination of the data1300collection function?1301    Ms. Moss. I believe the--eliminating the data collection1302was designed, potentially, to undercut the ability of the1303agency to function properly and support competition in our food1304and--1305    Mr. Raskin. Is that happening in other agencies and1306departments, too?1307    Ms. Moss. It absolutely is. In housing--I referenced the1308Real-1309Page settlement--we really needed a court decision on what1310constitutes algorithmic price-fixing on a digital platform. We1311didn't get that because that case was settled.1312    Mr. Raskin. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chair.1313    Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentleman yields back. I recognize1314myself for five minutes.1315    Ms. Douglas, you list several examples in your testimony of1316how the ocean carrier agreements could raise significant1317anticompetitive risks. Can you talk about that a little bit1318more?1319    Ms. Douglas. Yes. We understand what these agreements look1320like as written. My written testimony talks about what they1321might look like as implemented.1322    If carriers can't agree on scheduling, that means they1323could also allocate different markets to each other. That's a1324classic antitrust law violation.1325    It's also possible that there could be an exercise of1326monopsony or buyer power against ports in the United States,1327because these agreements allow these companies to collectively1328negotiate, where previously they would have been individual1329buyers.1330    Particularly, on the idea of scheduling, enabling market1331allocation, we have a close parallel in the airline industry,1332right? Another transportation industry where we have seen that1333a scheduling agreement in U.S. v. American Airlines, which is a13342024 case, a scheduling agreement caused a decrease in1335capacity. It caused the competitors who made that agreement to1336decide to fly less planes.1337    What I'm saying is you would have to look at how these1338agreements are being implemented in shipping to figure out if1339that is also occurring here, if there's a capacity reduction1340here, or if there's market division happening here.1341    The other big risk that I highlight in my written testimony1342is that these companies are allowed to share extensively1343competitively sensitive information. Normally, rivals don't1344share with each other their future plans for the market. These1345agreements allow alliances to engage in that sort of sharing.1346It's not itself a violation, but it's a classic factor that in1347antitrust law we look at to say that, if companies can talk1348with each other about their competitive plans, that's likely to1349reduce their rivalry in the market and lead to higher prices.1350    Thank you.1351    Mr. Fitzgerald. Let me just followup then. How should DOJ1352view these agreements? What should they be looking for? What1353would prompt them to take action on some of these agreements?1354    Ms. Douglas. Right. If the DOJ were to look at these1355agreements under the rule of reason, they would be looking at1356whether they unreasonably limit competition relative to a free1357and fair open market without the agreements.1358    They would want to look at how these companies are1359scheduling their services relative to how they might be1360scheduled if the market was competitive, if it didn't have1361those agreements in place. They might look, for example--and1362this is purely something that's taken from the airline case--1363are these companies sending as many ships as close in time as1364they would if they didn't have this agreement? Are they sending1365fewer ships or ships with less capacity? Is there this capacity1366reduction or market allocation, which are, again, classic1367violations of antitrust law under the Sherman Act? The DOJ1368would have to look at how these agreements are being1369implemented in practice to make that fact-specific evaluation.1370    Mr. Fitzgerald. Very good. Thank you.1371    Mr. Rice, so given that the top three alliances control1372over 80 percent of the market, as you spoke about earlier, do1373you think that provides ocean carriers with market power over1374importing and exporting companies? Is this simply another fact1375or a piece of data that doesn't necessarily have that effect?1376Where do you think that falls?1377    Mr. Rice. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chair.1378    Yes, certainly the consolidation within the ocean carrier1379industry does create challenges in the power that they amass.1380For example, there might be a dairy exporter from Wisconsin1381sending only three or four containers a month, and they have1382little to no leverage in those negotiations with one of three1383alliances. That component is concerning.1384    The other component is, to some of the other witnesses who1385have testified about this, is the ability for these alliances1386to coordinate on overcapacity now that there's new ships coming1387online. Limiting capacity creates problems for exporters as1388well in the number of options that we have to get the1389containers to their end destination.1390    It's a number of factors, but the amassing, and it1391continues to accumulate. This is not a static thing. These1392alliances continue to consolidate and create additional market1393power that our exporters have struggled to gain any leverage in1394negotiations with.1395    Mr. Fitzgerald. Very good. My time has expired. We will go1396to the gentlewoman from Vermont for five minutes.1397    Ms. Balint. Thank you, Mr. Chair.1398    Mr. Fitzgerald. Yup.1399    Ms. Balint. Competition brings down prices, right? When we1400don't have real competition, then executives and investors get1401to reap more profits, and everyone else gets sticker shock.1402That is partly why this area of the law is so interesting to1403me.1404    Because lack of competition in all industries impacts1405people in their bottom line. Dr. Moss, you spoke to that really1406directly. This includes maritime shipping.1407    Although this may be a small aspect of what is increasing1408cost, it is important for us to look at this. It is why1409antitrust law matters.1410    I know that antitrust law can seem dry; it can seem1411complicated, and I get that. To your point, Dr. Moss, American1412consumers understand that, when there are only a few big1413players, regardless of the industry, they pay the price for1414that. It is at the heart of what I think we are trying to do on1415this Committee, is translate that for everybody.1416    Dr. Sicotte, I appreciate that we have a Catamount in the1417room today from the University of Vermont. Nice to see you.1418    I would like to go to you first. Am I right that about 80-141990 percent of ocean shipping is actually controlled by just1420three major shipping alliances?1421    Would you mind putting on your mic?1422    Mr. Sicotte. I apologize.1423    Ms. Balint. No, that's all right.1424    Mr. Sicotte. I'm not used to this.1425    Yes, that was the Fiscal Year 2024 figure in the FMC1426report. There's one very large company that has subsequently1427removed itself from the alliance, but the most--by any stretch,1428you would call this quite a concentrated industry.1429    Ms. Balint. We talk about alliances. We will talk about1430conferences. Again, I'm trying to translate it for people back1431home. From where I sit, this looks a lot like cartels.1432    Tell me why these ocean shippers form these cartels. Why1433does this advantage them?1434    Mr. Sicotte. Well, the advantage--there could be two1435possible advantages from an economic perspective, right?1436    One is that it enables them to use very large container1437ships that they wouldn't be able to fill on their own. That is1438one--that's their logic for an efficiency defense.1439    Ms. Balint. OK.1440    Mr. Sicotte. OK? The other logic would be the market power,1441the exercise of market power. To actually evaluate the merits1442of those arguments is really--it needs to be done. That's what1443is missing in that.1444    Ms. Balint. I agree with you, and I think we can't just1445take their word for it around efficiency. We have to actually1446kick the tires and see if this holds water.1447    I want to get to what you were talking about, market power.1448Tell me what they can do collectively as a cartel that they1449can't do separately.1450    Mr. Sicotte. Well, if it's a full cartel--now, they--1451cartels--1452    Ms. Balint. I'm using that word. I understand you may not1453be comfortable with that word.1454    Mr. Sicotte. Yes, because, technically, they're not1455permitted to fix rates jointly, right? That would be one1456stretch. If you can fix capacity jointly, you can, potentially,1457have the same impact. OK?1458    Ms. Balint. Do you think it is fair to say that these1459massive ships with mountains of containers that carry,1460basically, everything that Americans see on their shelves, they1461are owned by these three alliances/cartels. They are actually1462impacting Americans directly every time that they go to the1463store and take something off the shelf. Is that fair to say?1464    Mr. Sicotte. Yes, absolutely. Not only that, it's all the1465American farmers. Much of what's traded are inputs as well and1466intermediate goods. It hurts companies. It raises the costs of1467doing business.1468    Ms. Balint. Yes. Actually, that is a great segue into1469talking with you, Mr. Rice.1470    I'm a Vermonter. I understand the importance of the dairy1471industry. I'm wondering, how does this directly--again, I'm1472using the word ``collusion'' because that is what I think it1473is. It is a cartel involved in collusion. How does this impact1474American dairy farmers?1475    Mr. Rice. Well, thank you, Congresswoman. Vermont has some1476great cheeses and other dairy products.1477    Ms. Balint. Thank you for noticing.1478    Mr. Rice. For cheeses, for example, perishability is a real1479concern. When these carriers aren't beholden to the interests1480of U.S. agriculture or dairy exporters, those products may not1481reach customers in time, and then, you have shelf-life issue at1482the East Coast.1483    Ms. Balint. Exactly. Absolutely. I see that I'm almost--1484well, I am out of time.1485    If I could just say, if you will indulge me just for a1486moment, Mr. Chair--I know that this is an issue that we can1487come together on as Democrats and Republicans. It is one of the1488reasons why I love being on this Subcommittee, where we can1489actually do some bipartisan work. I hope that this is something1490that we will dive into--not just on the shipping industry, but1491all the industries in which Americans are getting screwed1492because we are not actually holding their feet to the fire and1493actually enforcing antitrust law.1494    Thank you. I yield back.1495    Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentlewoman yields back. Now, I will1496recognize the gentleman from California for five minutes.1497    Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chair.1498    Ms. Douglas, as a researcher, how do prices paid by our1499similar importers or exporters compare here to other countries1500around the world?1501    Ms. Douglas. That's an excellent question that I would look1502to my economics colleagues to answer when it comes to specifics1503on price.1504    Mr. Issa. OK. Who has got the proof that somebody else gets1505a better price than us? Is this a monopoly that screws the1506whole world or is it just a monopoly that is screwing the1507United States?1508    Yes, sir?1509    Mr. Sicotte. Well, that's such a great economics question.1510That's precisely the information that we don't know the answer1511to the question. Because that's actually a surprisingly1512difficult thing to come up with; is to actually measure the1513degree of market power that's being exercised.1514    There's a good reason to be suspicious, based on the1515contours of the agreements, right, for sure. If they can't1516actually--I've never seen someone using the data and actually1517answering your question. I don't know the answer.1518    Mr. Issa. OK. Well, let's explore this direction. Because1519we are asserting here today that there is a monopoly at work;1520that it is Chinese-based, and that it is using its market1521power.1522    Is it fair to say the Chinese don't just own ships, they1523own the ports here and around the world, including, but not1524limited to both sides of the Panama Canal?1525    Mr. Sicotte. It's my understanding that the port ownership1526is that they--that COSCO was forced to divest partially.1527Certainly, in terms of their agreements and their operations,1528they're a very large player.1529    Mr. Issa. If they were transparent in some ways, they are1530opaque in some of the transfer cost?1531    Mr. Sicotte. A lot of the data would be available to the1532Federal Maritime Commission to investigate that, yes.1533    Mr. Issa. OK. Let's go the other way. Ms. Douglas, I'm1534going back to you. I'm not going to quit until you give me an1535answer to something--not that you are not trying to.1536    Is it fair to say that, if the group of companies1537together--nine companies--with the kind of market power they1538have--and some of them specifying more in one country versus1539another--if you were looking at a merger and acquisition, you1540would turn this one down?1541    Ms. Douglas. That's absolutely fair to say because the1542market shares, as we've mentioned, would be at least above 60-154395 percent. For mergers, we typically look at a 30-percent-or-1544above share. So, yes.1545    Mr. Issa. From a pure U.S. standpoint, we can agree that we1546created a monopoly in 1916 and thereafter. We allowed it to1547continue. Now, we have allowed this trust/monopoly--and1548``trust'' is probably even a better word--to, in fact, be1549opaque and to operate in a way that we really just don't know1550whether they are gouging us or not? We don't know whether they1551are getting a fair price? Even more importantly, if they1552decided not to service us, we would have very little recourse1553because we don't own enough ships to take care of ourselves.1554All those are vulnerabilities based on the current trust, if1555you will. Is that fair to say?1556    Ms. Douglas. That's fair to say. I just want to make sure1557we're being clear that what we're talking about is agreements1558among competitors. Regardless of whether there is monopoly1559power, agreements can still be unlawful. That's what we're1560seeing in this space, and that's why it should have antitrust1561oversight.1562    Mr. Issa. Well, as someone in San Diego who watched former1563CEO Smisek collude with the other airline companies to screw1564San Diego out of its direct flight from DCA, it is not just1565price. Sometimes it is service. We found ourselves with less1566choice. We were not without power.1567    If we, essentially, set aside or partially set aside this1568law in bipartisan legislation, then the dismantling or the1569regulating or the holding accountable could begin. Is that fair1570to say?1571    Ms. Douglas. Then the scrutiny from antitrust law would be1572applied and would likely find that there's problems in this1573industry, if this were repealed. We've seen around the edges1574where DOJ retains its jurisdiction, where the exception doesn't1575apply, there have been a number of cartel cases that have been1576successfully provided.1577    Mr. Issa. OK. Last question in closing, is there a solution1578less than setting aside the 1916 law that would effectively1579require transparency before making the decision, but trigger an1580invalidation of this law if they failed to meet that1581requirement? Is that a possible solution to get the answers to1582your questions before we decide how much to break up these1583agreements? I'm just wondering if, from a legislative1584standpoint, if we have a middle ground here that we could come1585together on. Quickly.1586    Mr. Sicotte. I think so. If you amend the law to require,1587or FMC to take into account DOJ's input more explicitly, that1588could be a middle ground.1589    Mr. Issa. I thank you, Mr. Chair, and I appreciate the1590extra time and I yield back.1591    Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentleman yields back. I would1592recognize the gentleman from Georgia for five minutes.1593    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chair.1594    There is a well-known theory around here that nothing comes1595before this Committee that has not been approved in advance by1596Donald Trump, or directed by him to occur. Today, we are1597talking about competition between ocean carriers on the high1598seas, while here at home Americans are catching hell trying to1599pay their bills.1600    He is wanting us to be talking about what is happening on1601the high seas, but there are a lot of people at home watching1602C-SPAN. I'm always surprised at how many people do.1603    There are people at home wondering, what is this MAGA1604Republican Congress doing to address the fact that competition1605between predatory Wall Street private equity and venture1606capital firms are swallowing up the single-family home market?1607They are crowding out homebuyers, controlling the market,1608concentration in the market, driving up the cost of real estate1609beyond what people can pay--while at the same time getting a1610stranglehold on the apartment market and raising rents up at1611will, using algorithms and other predatory processes to soak1612the American people of their money.1613    Yes, the rent in America is too damn high. Yes, the price1614of groceries in America is too damn high. The cost of gas in1615America--and across the world now--is too damn high.1616    The cost of medical care is too damn high. We have got1617venture capital and private equity firms swallowing up medical1618practices and hospitals, getting a lock on the medical care1619market, while at the same time insurance companies are doing1620the same thing.1621    Costs continue to go up for Americans due to market1622concentration into the hands of the super-wealthy billionaires1623who were seated behind Trump at his inauguration--the same ones1624who will be frolicking in the new White House ballroom that is1625being built to replace the West Wing of the White House.1626    They are getting richer and richer, and Americans trying to1627make an honest day's pay are paying more and more.1628    Can any of you witnesses think of one single thing that1629MAGA Republicans have done in Congress to make life more1630affordable for the American people? Can any of you cite one1631thing that they have done? I'm with you; I can't, either.1632    Let me ask someone, are tariffs taxes? Dr. Moss, what do1633you say?1634    Ms. Moss. The answer is the answer that we all know, and1635even your average American consumer knows, that the tariffs are1636taxes. They are paid by consumers. They raise the prices for1637essential commodities, where Americans, workers and consumers1638spend most of their money. That is just Economics 101. That is1639the economic reality. It is also the political reality.1640    Those consumers vote. They are going to turn out in droves1641because cost of living is such a top-of-mind issue for them. If1642anything galvanizes consumers in the upcoming election cycles,1643it will be that issue.1644    Mr. Johnson. Well, I tell you, it is $175 billion in taxes1645due to tariffs that have been levied on the American people1646over the last year by this Trump Administration--with the1647complicity of Members of Congress here in control, MAGA1648Republicans. Americans will, indeed, be looking at it in1649November.1650    The high cost of housing, food, medical care, and energy is1651what the American people are concerned about. This Committee1652appears to be focused on competition between ocean carriers on1653the high seas. I think that is a shame.1654    With that, I yield back.1655    Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentleman yields back.1656    Ms. Balint. Mr. Chair, I have a couple of UCs to enter into1657the record.1658    Mr. Fitzgerald. The gentlewoman is recognized.1659    Ms. Balint. First, from Reuters, February 12, 2026, ``NY1660Fed report says Americans pay for almost all of Trump's1661tariffs.''1662    Second, Gallup, March 2026, ``One-Third of Americans Cut1663Back to Cover Healthcare Expenses.''1664    Third, finally, from The New York Times, ``Oil Rises,1665Bringing Gains to 40% Since the Start of the War.''1666    Mr. Fitzgerald. Without objection.1667    Ms. Balint. Thank you.1668    Mr. Fitzgerald. That concludes today's hearing. Thank you1669to our witnesses for appearing before the Committee today.1670    Without objection, all Members will have five legislative1671days to submit additional written questions for the witnesses1672or additional materials for the record.1673    Without objection, the hearing is adjourned.1674    [Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]16751676    All materials submitted for the record by Members of the1677Subcommittee on the Administrative State, Regulatory Reform,1678and Antitrust can be found at: https://docs.house.gov/1679Committee/1680Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=119042.16811682                              [all]