“Surveying the Threat of Agroterrorism, Part II: Assessing Federal Government Efforts”

1[House Hearing, 119 Congress]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34                   SURVEYING THE THREAT OF AGROTERRORISM,5                    PART II: ASSESSING FEDERAL GOVERNMENT6                    EFFORTS7=======================================================================89                                HEARING1011                               BEFORE THE1213                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON14                  EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY1516                                OF THE1718                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY19                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES2021                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2223                             SECOND SESSION2425                               __________2627                           FEBRUARY 11, 20262829                               __________3031                           Serial No. 119-393233                               __________3435       Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security3637[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]3839       Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov/4041                               __________4243                      U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE4463-778 PDF                   WASHINGTON : 202645=======================================================================4647                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY4849                Andrew R. Garbarino, New York, Chairman50Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice       Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,51    Chair                                Ranking Member52Michael Guest, Mississippi           Eric Swalwell, California53Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida           J. Luis Correa, California54August Pfluger, Texas                Shri Thanedar, Michigan55Tony Gonzales, Texas                 Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island56Morgan Luttrell, Texas               Daniel S. Goldman, New York57Dale W. Strong, Alabama              Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois58Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma              Timothy M. Kennedy, New York59Elijah Crane, Arizona                LaMonica McIver, New Jersey60Andrew Ogles, Tennessee              Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking61Sheri Biggs, South Carolina              Member62Gabe Evans, Colorado                 Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico63Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania         Nellie Pou, New Jersey64Brad Knott, North Carolina           James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia65Vince Fong, California               Troy A. Carter, Louisiana66Matt Van Epps, Tennessee             Al Green, Texas67Vacant68                     Keighle Joyce, Staff Director69                  Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director70                       Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk71                                 ------7273          SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY7475                   Dale W. Strong, Alabama, Chairman76Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma              Timothy M. Kennedy, New York,77Gabe Evans, Colorado                     Ranking Member78Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania         Julie Johnson, Texas79Andrew R. Garbarino, New York (ex    Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico80    officio)                         Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi81                                         (ex officio)82               Diana Bergwin, Subcommittee Staff Director83          Lauren McClain, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director8485                            C O N T E N T S8687                              ----------88                                                                   Page8990                               Statements9192The Honorable Dale W. Strong, a Representative in Congress From93  the State of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency94  Management and Technology:95  Oral Statement.................................................     196  Prepared Statement.............................................     297The Honorable Timothy M. Kennedy, a Representative in Congress98  From the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on99  Emergency Management and Technology:100  Oral Statement.................................................     3101  Prepared Statement.............................................     5102The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress103  From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on104  Homeland Security:105  Prepared Statement.............................................     6106107                               Witnesses108109Mrs. Suzette P. Kelly, Acting Executive Director, Agriculture110  Programs and Trade Liaison, U.S. Customs and Border Protection,111  U.S. Department of Homeland Security:112  Oral Statement.................................................     7113  Prepared Statement.............................................     9114Mr. Matt Allen, Director, Office of Homeland Security, U.S.115  Department of Agriculture:116  Oral Statement.................................................    12117  Prepared Statement.............................................    14118Mr. Jeff Cooper, Program Manager, Probabilistic Analysis for119  National Threats Hazards and Risks, Science and Technology120  Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:121  Oral Statement.................................................    16122  Prepared Statement.............................................    18123Dr. Ashley Grant, Senior Health Security and Biodefense Advisor,124  Office of Health Security, U.S. Department of Homeland125  Security:126  Oral Statement.................................................    20127  Prepared Statement.............................................    21128129                             For the Record130131The Honorable Timothy M. Kennedy, a Representative in Congress132  From the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on133  Emergency Management and Technology:134  Letter.........................................................     4135136                                Appendix137138Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Suzette Kelly.........    29139Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Matt Allen............    30140Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Jeff Cooper...........    30141Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Ashley Grant..........    31142143       SURVEYING THE THREAT OF AGROTERRORISM, PART II: ASSESSING144                       FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EFFORTS145146                              ----------147148                      Wednesday, February 11, 2026149150             U.S. House of Representatives,151                    Committee on Homeland Security,152                      Subcommittee on Emergency Management153                                            and Technology,154                                                    Washington, DC.155    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in156room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Dale W. Strong157[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.158    Present: Representatives Strong and Kennedy.159    Also present: Representative Van Epps.160    Chairman Strong. The Committee on Homeland Security161Subcommittee on Emergency Management Technology will come to162order. Without objection, the Chair may declare the163subcommittee in recess at any point. The purpose of this164hearing is to review Federal efforts in preparing for and165responding to threats facing our Nation's food and agriculture166sector. Without objection, the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr.167Van Epps, is permitted to sit on the dais and ask questions to168the witnesses. I now recognize myself for an opening statement.169Good afternoon and thank you for joining this Subcommittee on170Emergency Management and Technology. Today we have a Federal171panel of witnesses from the Department of Homeland Security and172the United States Department of Agriculture to discuss the173Federal Government's efforts to prepare for, mitigate, respond174to, and recover from acts of agroterrorism.175    The subcommittee previously met in September to examine176this threat, during which academic experts outlined the risk177that agroterrorism poses to our food and agriculture system and178its potential to destabilize the United States economy and179agriculture supply chain. Terrorists who target our food supply180have a variety of tools and methods at their disposal. They can181directly target our agriculture by deploying chemical and182biological agents. As our critical infrastructure becomes183increasingly connected, they could also carry out cyber attacks184on technology that the farms depend on. Our adversaries,185particularly the PRC, have also exploited research security186gaps to steal the intellectual properties tied to agriculture187technologies and genetically modified organisms. This theft188could cause significant economic harm and raise concerns that189these technologies could be manipulated or weaponized against190U.S. crop systems. The reality of this threat was a full--on191full display last year when the Department of Justice charged192three Chinese nationals with attempts to smuggle biological193agents into the United States, agents capable of causing severe194harm to crop and livestock. Any serious effort to prepare for195these threats must begin with preventing deadly pathogens and196harmful species from entering the country through our borders197and ports of entry.198    I'm grateful to Customs and Border Protection work in199detecting and intercepting these dangers, but prevention cannot200stop at the border. We must also deny adversaries opportunities201to position themselves inside the United States in ways that202could facilitate harm. The PRC has acquired farmland across the203United States, including land near critical infrastructure and204sensitive military installations. This proximity creates205vulnerabilities that could be exploited to surveil, disrupt, or206compromise our food and agriculture systems, undermining207prevention efforts long before threat is detected. Addressing208these risks requires strong oversight, transparency, and209coordination to ensure that our agriculture sectors do not210become a staging ground for hostile activities. Even with211strong prevention measures in place, we must be prepared for212the possibility that these efforts could fail. It is important213that the stakeholders and decision makers across all levels of214Government and the private sector receive adequate training to215detect, report, and respond to these threats.216    Equally important is robust information sharing across the217national laboratories, Government partners, and industries to218enable rapid and effective responses. We saw the value of this219partnership last week when law enforcement recovered and220identified biological material from a lab in Las Vegas and sent221it to the National Bio Forensic Analysis center for immediate222analysis. That rapid response capability is essential to223defending our homeland against biological threats, whether they224originate from the criminal actors, terrorists, or hostile225foreign adversaries. This is exactly the type of capability we226must sustain and strengthen, which is why I've led bipartisan227efforts to improve DHS biodefense readiness and advanced228legislation to counter China's efforts to undermine our229homeland security. I also applaud President Donald Trump and230his administration for issuing the National Farm Security231Action Plan to enhance our Nation's preparedness for these232dangers. This effort reflects the reality that the threat of233agroterrorism is not just a possibility. It is real, evolving,234and demands action across the Federal Government.235    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about236the steps they have taken to implement the proposals outlined237in this plan, the challenges that they face, and opportunities238to enhance collaboration amongst Federal agencies. I also239welcome any suggestions on how Congress can support these240efforts. I thank our witnesses for appearing before the241subcommittee today, and I hope their testimony will inspire a242bipartisan effort to strengthen and defend against the243significant threats.244    [The statement of Chairman Strong follows:]245                  Statement of Chairman Dale W. Strong246    Good afternoon and thank you for joining the Subcommittee on247Emergency Management and Technology.248    Today, we have a Federal panel of witnesses from DHS and USDA who249will discuss the current efforts and programs of the Federal Government250to prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover from acts of251agroterrorism.252    The subcommittee previously met in September to consider this253serious threat, where witnesses from academia spoke about the risks to254food and agriculture posed by agroterrorists and the startling ways in255which they could influence the stability of the United States' economy256and agricultural supply chain.257    Agroterrorists have a variety of tools and methods at their258disposal. They can target our agriculture directly by deploying259chemical and biological agents.260    With the greater interconnectedness of our critical infrastructure261systems, agroterrorists can also initiate cyber attacks against the262digital technologies our farms rely on.263    And notably, our Nation's adversaries, especially affiliates of the264People's Republic of China, have exploited gaps in research security to265commit acts of intellectual property theft of genetically-modified266organisms and agricultural technologies.267    This type of theft not only has the potential to cause economic268distress to the United States, but these advanced technologies have the269potential to be manipulated and weaponized against our crop systems.\1\270---------------------------------------------------------------------------271    \1\ China's Interests in U.S. Agriculture.272---------------------------------------------------------------------------273    The potential for the threat of agroterrorism was on full display274last year when the DOJ charged 3 Chinese nationals with attempts to275smuggle biological agents into the United States--biological agents276that have the potential to cause significant harm to crops and277livestock.278    Any effort to seriously and effectively prepare for agroterrorist279threats must include stopping deadly pathogens and invasive species as280they come across our borders and ports of entry, and I am grateful to281CBP in their work in detecting and intercepting the threats uncovered282last year.283    But we must also be ready if our efforts at prevention fail.284Ensuring that stakeholders and decision makers across all levels of285government and the private sector receive adequate training to detect,286report, and respond to these threats is paramount in securing our287Nation's food and agriculture.288    Furthermore, coordinating information-sharing efforts between our289various national laboratories, executive agencies, State and local law290enforcement, emergency managers, and stakeholders will be critical to291enabling rapid response to any emerging threats.292    I was pleased to see these collaborative efforts in action just293last week, when law enforcement collected samples of unidentified294biological materials at the scene of a bio lab in Las Vegas to send to295the National Bioforensic Analysis Center for immediate diagnostic296testing.\2\297---------------------------------------------------------------------------298    \2\ Bio lab found in Las Vegas is similar to scene discovered in299California, raising questions from officials--CBS News.300---------------------------------------------------------------------------301    This center plays an important role in our national security and is302one of two components of the National Biodefense Analysis and303Countermeasures Center, the first national laboratory created by DHS. I304am proud to say that I am hard at work on legislation to authorize this305national laboratory to ensure that we can continue to stay on top of306biological threats for years to come.307    I applaud President Trump and his administration for issuing the308National Farm Security Action Plan to enhance our Nation's preparedness309for these dangers.310    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today regarding the311steps they have taken to implement the proposals outlined in this plan,312the challenges they encounter in securing our Nation from agroterrorist313threats, and the opportunities for enhanced interagency collaboration.314    I also welcome any suggestions on how Congress can be helpful in315these endeavors.316    I appreciate the work that our partners in the Executive branch do317every day, and I hope that the testimonies we hear will inspire a318bipartisan effort to enhance solutions to counter this significant319threat.320321    Chairman Strong. I now recognize the Ranking Member of this322subcommittee, Mr. Kennedy, for his opening statement.323    Mr. Kennedy. Good afternoon. Thank you very much, Chairman,324and thank you to our witnesses for being here today. I want to325begin by saying that I appreciate the Chairman for bringing326officials from the administration before this subcommittee. I327want to see more of these hearings with administration328witnesses in the future. I'd be remiss if I didn't acknowledge329the greatest threat to our Nation currently. With all due330respect to our witnesses, is not agroterrorism. We're seeing a331Department of Homeland Security that's killing our own332citizens, terrorizing communities, ignoring court orders,333rejecting due process, and advancing an extreme immigration334enforcement agenda that's stoking fear, creating chaos, and335degrading our democratic institutions. The Trump administration336is also dismantling FEMA before our eyes, refusing to337distribute critical counterterrorism grant funding, and moving338forward with plans to cut half of FEMA's work force. Mr.339Chairman, yesterday I sent a letter to your office to formally340request that this subcommittee turns its focus to FEMA issues,341including delays in preparedness and counterterrorism grants,342work force challenges, and areas for improvement in disaster343recovery. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to insert this344letter into the record.345    Chairman Strong. Without objection.346    [The information follows:]347                                 February 10, 2026.348The Honorable Dale Strong,349Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology,350        Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives,351        Washington, DC 20515.352    Dear Chairman Strong:353    I write to request that you, in your capacity as Chairman of the354Subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology, immediately355convene an oversight hearing on the Federal Emergency Management Agency356(FEMA).357    In March 2025, you began your term as Chairman of our subcommittee358with an oversight hearing on FEMA. In the year since the hearing,359serious and concerning changes have emerged regarding the Trump360administration's actions at FEMA. There are reports that Secretary of361Homeland Security Kristi Noem is withholding nearly $17 billion in362disaster relief funding.\1\ At the same time, FEMA's administration of363counterterrorism and preparedness grant programs has resulted in364unprecedented delays and interruptions in the release of grant funding365that States, localities, Tribes, and territories rely on to prepare for366disasters and emergencies.367---------------------------------------------------------------------------368    \1\ Scott Dance, Extra Scrutiny of FEMA Aid to States Has Created a369$17 Billion Bottleneck, NY TIMES (Jan. 27, 2026), https://370www.nytimes.com/2026/01/27/climate/fema-aid-kristi-noem.html.371---------------------------------------------------------------------------372    Secretary Noem also reportedly delayed funding for search and373rescue teams and call centers in the aftermath of flooding in Central374Texas in July 2025--an event that killed 135 people, including 35375children.\2\ \3\ More recently, Secretary Noem pushed forward her plans376to cut half of FEMA's workforce even as nearly half of U.S. States377struggled to recover from winter storms that killed over 100 people.\4\378These significant workforce reductions and staffing instability raise379questions about the Agency's capacity to meet its statutory380responsibilities during a period of increasing disaster frequency and381severity.382---------------------------------------------------------------------------383    \2\ Gabe Cohen, FEMA's response to Texas flood slowed by Noem's384cost controls, CNN (July 10, 2025), https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/09/385politics/fema-texas-flood-noem.386    \3\ Maxine Joselow, FEMA Didn't Answer Thousands of Calls From387Flood Survivors, Documents Show, NY TIMES (July 11, 2025), https://388www.nytimes.com/2025/07/11/climate/fema-missed-calls-texas-floods.html.389    \4\ Gabriela Aoun Angueira, FEMA will resume staff reductions that390were paused during winter storm, managers say, AP NEWS (Feb. 6, 2026),391https://apnews.com/article/fema-staff-cuts-kristi-noem-winter-storm-392fern-1b3a4ea77c6f299abda3f5046a6b24e5.393---------------------------------------------------------------------------394    An oversight hearing would provide the subcommittee with an395opportunity to hear directly from FEMA leadership about the impacts of396delayed or withheld preparedness and disaster relief funding, workforce397cuts, and how these challenges may affect emergency management398capabilities at all levels of government.399    I appreciate your consideration of this request and look forward to400working with you to ensure the subcommittee continues to exercise401strong oversight in support of FEMA's critical mission to keep402communities safe and resilient.403            Sincerely,404                                        Timothy M. Kennedy,405          Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emergency Management and406                                                        Technology.407408    Mr. Kennedy. Thank you. Last year, I introduced a bill,409H.R. 6507, the Department of Homeland Security Grants410Accountability Act, which would require increased transparency411and oversight of FEMA's Counterterrorism Grant programs. I hope412that's something we'll have an opportunity to discuss on the413subcommittee in the coming months. Turning to today's hearing,414I agree that our Nation must strengthen its biodefense,415including better preparing for potential attacks on our416agricultural systems. This includes ensuring that we have417enough agricultural specialists at our borders to detect418harmful pathogens, investing in research and development at419U.S. institutions through USDA, and strengthening our supply420chains to ensure they're resilient against potential bad421actors. But the way to do this is not by closing the Department422of Homeland Security Centers of Excellence or freezing funding423for USDA university partnerships, including those that directly424support agrosecurity. One of these closed Centers of Excellence425directly supported agrosecurity by researching and educating426Federal partners on how to detect and eliminate biological427threats that cross our borders.428    In my home State of New York, the administration halted429funding for Cornell University's Animal Health Diagnostic430Center, which tests livestock for diseases that could devastate431agricultural sectors and our economy. This significantly432impacts their ability to survey for high-consequence animal433diseases. All of that's to say, the Chairman and I are in full434agreement that we must strengthen our Nation's capabilities435against threats of agroterrorism, whether they be foreign or436domestic. I believe we do so by bolstering Federal investment437and resources rather than gutting them. This also means438ensuring our Customs facilitators have the resources needed to439survey biological threats. I have four bridges in my district440in western New York into Canada. I represent some of CBP's441agricultural specialists who report to work at U.S. ports of442entry and contribute every single day to our collective443biosecurity. So I understand the importance of ensuring our444Nation is hardened against any biological threats, and I445appreciate the Chairman's work in this space.446    I want to thank our witnesses for participating in today's447hearing, and I look forward to your testimony as we assess DHS448and USDA's preparedness in keeping our communities safe. I449yield back.450    [The statement of Ranking Member Kennedy follows:]451             Statement of Ranking Member Timothy M. Kennedy452                           February 11, 2026453    I want to begin by saying that I appreciate the Chairman for454bringing officials from the administration before our subcommittee. I455hope to see more hearings with administration witnesses in the future.456    I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the greatest threat to457our Nation currently, and with all due respect to our witnesses, it's458not agroterrorism.459    We are seeing a Department of Homeland Security that is killing our460own citizens, terrorizing communities, ignoring court orders, rejecting461due process, and advancing an extreme immigration enforcement agenda462that is stoking fear, creating chaos, and degrading our democratic463institutions. The Trump administration is also dismantling FEMA before464our eyes, refusing to distribute critical counterterrorism grant465funding and moving forward with plans to cut half of FEMA's workforce.466    Mr. Chairman, yesterday, I sent a letter to your office to formally467request that this subcommittee turn its focus to FEMA issues, including468delays in preparedness and counterterrorism grants, workforce469challenges, and areas for improvement in disaster recovery. Mr.470Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to insert this letter into the471record.472    Last year, I introduced a bill, H.R. 6507, the DHS Grants473Accountability Act, which would require increased transparency and474oversight of FEMA's counterterrorism grant programs, and I hope that's475something we will have an opportunity to discuss on this subcommittee476in the coming months.477    Turning to today's hearing, I agree that our Nation must strengthen478its biodefense, including better preparing for potential attacks on our479agricultural systems.480    This includes ensuring we have enough agricultural specialists at481our borders to detect harmful pathogens, investing in research and482development at U.S. institutions through USDA, and strengthening our483supply chains to ensure they're resilient against potential bad actors.484But the way to do this is not by closing DHS's Centers of Excellence or485freezing funding for USDA university partnerships, including those that486directly support agrosecurity.487    One of these closed Centers of Excellence directly supported488agrosecurity by researching and educating Federal partners on how to489detect and eliminate biological threats that cross our borders. And in490my home State of New York, the administration halted funding for491Cornell University's Animal Health Diagnostic Center, which tests492livestock for diseases that could devastate agriculture sectors and our493economy. This significantly impacts their ability to survey for high-494consequence animal diseases. All of that is to say, the Chairman and I495are in full agreement that we must strengthen our Nation's capabilities496against threats of agroterrorism, whether they be foreign or domestic,497and I believe we do so by bolstering Federal investments and resources498rather than gutting them. This also means ensuring our customs499facilitators have the resources needed to survey biological threats.500    I have four bridges that connect my district in Western New York to501Canada. I represent some of CBP's agricultural specialists who report502to work at U.S. ports of entry and contribute every single day to our503collective biosecurity. So, I understand the importance of ensuring our504Nation is hardened against any biological threats, and I appreciate the505Chairman's work in this space. I want to thank our witnesses for506participating in today's hearing, and I look forward to your testimony507as we assess DHS and USDA's preparedness in keeping our communities508safe.509510    Chairman Strong. Thank you, Ranking Member Kennedy. Other511Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening512statements may be submitted for the record.513    [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]514515             Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson516517    For my home State of Mississippi, agriculture is the518lifeblood of the economy. The vulnerability of our community to519biological threats is not theoretical, but rather an520existential threat to the livelihoods of thousands of families.521    As our farmers already struggle with rising input costs and522market volatility created by Donald Trump's tariffs, the added523risk of agroterrorism could lead to irreversible, catastrophic524economic damage. And while we recognize the threats posed by525agroterrorism, it is important for today's hearing to also face526the fact that the Trump administration continues to degrade our527national security infrastructure, which has also affected our528ability to detect and prevent biological threats.529    The proposed budget cuts and on-going staffing cuts to the530Department of Health and Human Services and the Centers for531Disease Control represent a dangerous retreat from our Nation's532biodefense infrastructure and significantly weaken our ability533to detect and respond to agroterrorism before they can534devastate our food supply. By gutting the very surveillance and535emergency programs designed to monitor zoonotic diseases and536agricultural pathogens, we are essentially leaving the gates537open to those who would use biological agents to destabilize538our economy and threaten public safety.539    This vulnerability is compounded by Donald Trump's decision540to withdraw from the World Health Organization (WHO) and541hastily close the United States Agency for International542Development (USAID). Both actions further exacerbate the risk543of biological diseases spreading by dismantling the544international early warning systems that provide us with545critical intelligence on emerging global threats.546    In the context of agroterrorism, our safety depends on547global cooperation and the ability to stop an outbreak at its548source. Without these partnerships, we are creating blind spots549that put our domestic livestock and crops at unneccesary risk550of intentional contamination. Lastly, I want to say that the551Trump administration is actively dismantling the very agency we552rely on when disasters, including biological events, happen:553FEMA.554    The administration is firing FEMA personnel and plans to555eliminate half of the agency's workforce. They are refusing to556distribute critical counterterrorism grants and have injected557an unprecedented level of chaos into the grants process. In558doing so, they are effectively abandoning our State, local,559Tribal, and territorial partners, leaving them defenseless560because the White House would rather settle political scores561than save lives. This systematic dismantling of our domestic562response capabilities is not an isolated failure; it is a563symptom of a broader, more dangerous agenda: Trump's564degradation of our national security.565    What's more, our Congressional colleagues are pushing566legislation that rips FEMA out of DHS with no consideration of567the detrimental effects on the Department, including fracturing568FEMA's counterterrorism responsibilities and crippling of the569agency's mandate for continuity of government. This committee570should be taking an active role in the conversation on FEMA's571future and the Trump administration's on-going harm to our572Nation's security. I hope it will do so immediately.573574    Chairman Strong. I'm very pleased to have such an important575panel of witnesses before us today. Ms. Suzette Kelly is the576deputy executive director of Agriculture Programs and Trade577Liaison for the CBP's Office of Field Operations at DHS. In578this role, Ms. Kelly provides leadership and expertise while579guiding collaboration and partnerships to safeguard our580agriculture and Nation's food supply. Mr. Matt Allen is the581director of the Office of Homeland Security for the United582States Department of Agriculture. He has served in this583capacity since 2020 and oversees Department-wide efforts in584radiation safety emergency programs, personnel and document585security, national security programs and policies,586communication security and operations sustainment. Mr. Jeff587Cooper serves as program manager for DHS Science and Technology588Directorates' PANTHR Program. PANTHR provides technical589information on CBRN hazards to help leaders make informed590decisions on preparedness and response to weapons of mass591destruction events. Dr. Ashley Grant is the senior health592security and biodefense advisor in DHS's Office of Health593Security, which leads DHS's effort in medical, work force594health and safety and public health. In this role, Dr. Grant595helps to mitigate the impact of biological threats. I thank you596all again for being here today.597    Pursuant to the committee's rule VII(C), I ask that the598witnesses please rise and raise your right hand. Do you599solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before this600Committee of Homeland Security of the U.S. House of601Representatives will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing602but the truth, so help you God?603    [Witnesses sworn.]604    Chairman Strong. Thank you. Please be seated. Let the605record reflect that the witnesses have answered in the606affirmative. I now recognize Mr. Kelly for 5 minutes to607summarize her opening statement.608609   STATEMENT OF SUZETTE P. KELLY, ACTING EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,610AGRICULTURE PROGRAMS AND TRADE LIAISON, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER611        PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY612613    Mrs. Kelly. Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and614Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to615discuss U.S. Customs and Border Protection's role in protecting616the United States from agroterrorism and biological threats. I617am honored to represent CBP's Office of Field Operations,618Agriculture Programs, and Trade Liaison. Every day, our front-619line personnel work tirelessly to safeguard American620agriculture, natural resources, and our communities by621preventing the introduction and spread of dangerous pests,622animal diseases, and biological agents. Agricultural and623biological materials, including animal products, genetic624materials, and infectious substances, are routine imports that625sustain our food supply and support scientific research and626medical advancements.627    However, these imports also pose significant risks. The628accidental or deliberate introduction of a pest, pathogen, or629disease could have significant adverse effects on domestic630agriculture and natural resources. For example, CBP recently631intercepted illicit shipments from the People's Republic of632China sent to U.S. researchers at academic institutions. These633shipments contained a dangerous fungal pathogen, harmful634genetic materials, and E. Coli concealed to evade CBP detection635and circumvent U.S. laws. To mitigate these types of threats,636CBP integrates agricultural inspection into its multi-layered637border security strategy that includes highly-trained638personnel, advanced targeting and detection capabilities, and639close collaboration with Federal partners and industry640stakeholders. Using their scientific and law enforcement641expertise, agriculture specialists work alongside CBP officers642and trade specialists to process and inspect millions of643shipments and traveler luggage at air, sea, and land ports of644entry. The work we do is vital. In fiscal year 2025 alone, CBP645agriculture specialists interdicted approximately 1.7 million646prohibited plant materials, animal byproducts, and meat items.647They also intercepted more than 100,000 actionable pests648identified as potentially dangerous to U.S. agriculture.649Recognizing the complexity of agroterrorism and biological650threats, CBP established the Biological Threat Exclusion651Program to strengthen our efforts and ensure a consistent652approach across the agency.653    Early detection of threats is essential. At the CBP654National Targeting Center, agriculture specialists use advanced655data systems to identify high-risk travelers and shipments656before they arrive at our borders. Our specialized detection657capabilities deployed to ports of entry further enhance our658efforts. For example, our agriculture canine teams screen659luggage and cargo for prohibited items quickly and effectively.660CBP is also expanding its use of mobile technology enabling661remote inspections real-time cargo release by enhancing662efficiency and enforcement. Collaboration is central to our663approach. CBP enforces laws on behalf of dozens of Federal664entities and works closely with partners such as Department of665Agriculture, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and666the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These partnerships enable667coordinated responses to emerging threats.668    In closing, CBP's agricultural inspection capabilities are669a critical component of our Nation's defense against670agroterrorism and biological threats. Working in coordination671with our partners, we will continue to identify and intercept672these threats, protect our national and economic security,673preserve our agricultural resources and safeguard our674communities.675    Thank you for your continued support of CBP's mission. I676look forward to your questions.677    [The prepared statement of Mrs. Kelly follows:]678                 Prepared Statement of Suzette P. Kelly679                           February 11, 2026680                              introduction681    Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and distinguished Members682of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today to683discuss U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP's) vital role in684protecting the United States from agroterrorism and other biological685threats as part of our border security mission.686    Under the leadership of the Secretary of Homeland Security and the687CBP Commissioner, CBP's Agriculture Programs and Trade Liaison office688within the Office of Field Operations continues to strengthen the689Nation's ability to detect and intercept agricultural and biological690threats. This office is at the forefront of a multi-layered process691that safeguards American agriculture, the economy, and communities from692the risks associated with the entry, establishment, or spread of pests,693pathogens, and harmful agents which can affect human, animal, and crop694health, and leads or performs activities to defend against threats of695bio- and agroterrorism.696    Biological materials, including diagnostic specimens, genetic697materials, human and veterinary products, infectious substances,698microorganisms, and disease vector hosts such as ticks and mosquitoes,699are frequently imported into the United States to support critical700research and medical activities. However, these imports can carry701significant risks. The introduction of an invasive pest or a biological702agent, such as a virus, bacteria, or fungus, could devastate U.S.703agriculture, threaten public health, and disrupt food supply chains.704For example, the introduction of pests and diseases such as New World705screwworm and African swine fever virus could severely impact the U.S.706livestock population and have a significant economic impact.707    Agricultural and biological threats are dynamic and increasingly708complex. A traveler may accidentally bring in a prohibited item709forgotten at the bottom of a suitcase, or an importer may ship an710unnoticed pest in a wooden shipping crate. However, some travelers and711importers may attempt to smuggle materials into the United States to712circumvent inspections, permits, and other import requirements. CBP's713role in safeguarding the Nation from agricultural and biological714threats becomes even more crucial as agroterrorism threats continue to715evolve and challenge traditional security measures. For example, CBP716recently intercepted individuals from the People's Republic of China717who attempted to smuggle biological samples of a dangerous fungal718pathogen into the University of Michigan.\1\ The violators in this case719attempted to ship potential harmful genetically-modified seeds and720genetic materials. These items, imported as de minimis shipments721through express consignment facilities, were artfully concealed in722documents and magazines in an apparent attempt to avoid CBP detection.723Through extensive coordination and collaboration with the Federal724Bureau of Investigation, these individuals were charged with smuggling725and other charges, resulting in the removal of one defendant from the726United States and a felony conviction with a sentence of time served727for the other defendant. In another example, on December 19, 2025,728Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Kash Patel posted on X that a729post-doctoral researcher and J-1 visa holder from China, Youhuang730Xiang, was charged with smuggling Escherichia coli (E. coli) into the731United States.\2\ The biological materials encountered in this case732were hidden in a shipment of clothing in an attempt to circumvent U.S.733laws and CBP detection.734---------------------------------------------------------------------------735    \1\ https://www.justice.gov/usao-edmi/pr/chinese-national-pleads-736guilty-and-sentenced-smuggling-dangerous-biological-pathogen.737    \2\ Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Kash Patel738[@FBIDirectorKash]. 2025, December 19. Youhuang Xiang, a post-doctoral739researcher and J-1 visa holder from China was charged with smuggling740Escherichia coli (E. coli) into the United States and making false741statements about it.742---------------------------------------------------------------------------743    Adversaries may also pursue agroterrorism--the deliberate attack744upon the U.S. agricultural sector--knowing that the introduction of a745deadly pathogen, virus, seed, or bacteria could devastate crops,746livestock, and natural resources, and have cascading, long-term effects747on our economy.748    Recognizing these risks, and as part of the enactment of the749Homeland Security Act establishing the Department of Homeland Security750(DHS) in 2003, Congress transferred agricultural quarantine and751inspection duties from the Department of Agriculture to DHS, thereby752integrating agricultural security into DHS's border security mission.753    Today, CBP uses risk-based traveler and trade targeting, data754intelligence, scientific and law enforcement expertise, Federal and755private-sector partnerships, and advanced detection capabilities to756protect the Nation against unintentional entries as well as those757seeking to deliberately bring dangerous biological or agricultural758materials into the United States.759    Furthermore, President Trump's Executive Order 14324, suspending760the de minimis exemption for low-value shipments, further strengthens761CBP's efforts to enforce trade laws and screen imports for potentially762dangerous biological materials.\3\ This regulatory change ensures that763all shipments, regardless of value, are subject to appropriate764inspection and enforcement, reducing vulnerabilities and enhancing765CBP's ability to intercept threats.766---------------------------------------------------------------------------767    \3\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/Presidential-actions/2025/07/768suspending-duty-free-de-minimis-treatment-for-all-countries/.769---------------------------------------------------------------------------770   intercepting agricultural and biological threats as part of cbp's771                        border security mission772    CBP Agriculture Specialists are the Nation's front-line defense773against threats to the U.S. agricultural sector. These highly-trained774professionals, with expertise in biological sciences and agricultural775inspections, diligently inspect international passenger baggage, cargo,776and conveyances to determine the admissibility of agricultural777commodities. Their work is essential in preventing the entry of778transboundary pests and diseases and maintaining the vitality and779security of the Nation's approximately $1.53 trillion agricultural780economy.\4\781---------------------------------------------------------------------------782    \4\ https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aqi.783---------------------------------------------------------------------------784    CBP's efforts to counter agricultural and biological threats are785fully integrated into its mission to secure U.S. borders, while786facilitating lawful travel and trade through air, sea, and land ports787of entry. Leading these efforts are CBP's Agriculture Specialists, who788work closely with CBP Officers to process more than 88,000 cargo789containers, millions of mail and express shipments, and more than 1.1790million travelers every day.\5\ CBP Agriculture Specialists use791scientific and law enforcement expertise, automated targeting systems,792X-ray technology, predictive analytics tools, and comprehensive793information sharing to ensure the safe facilitation of international794trade and travel while upholding the integrity of America's795agricultural sector and natural environment.796---------------------------------------------------------------------------797    \5\ https://www.cbp.gov/document/stats/cbp-snapshot.798---------------------------------------------------------------------------799    With the additional danger of agroterrorism, the role of CBP800Agriculture Specialists at our ports of entry is more crucial than801ever. Agriculture Specialists complete rigorous training in plant pest802identification, quarantine procedures, and law enforcement, with port-803specific instruction to address local challenges. They seize prohibited804or infested items, oversee remediation actions like treatment and805disinfection, and provide guidance on threat analysis and interdiction.806With more than 2,800 CBP Agriculture Specialists deployed nationwide807and at select Pre-Clearance locations, CBP maintains a robust front-808line defense against both accidental and deliberate introduction of809biological threats to the United States.810    Each year, CBP Agriculture Specialists intercept thousands of811``actionable pests,'' those identified through scientific risk812assessment as being dangerous to the health and safety of U.S.813agricultural resources. In fiscal year 2025, CBP Agriculture814Specialists interdicted approximately 1.7 million prohibited plant815materials, meat, and animal byproducts at ports of entry, while also816intercepting more than 100,000 pests from entering the United States.817    Recognizing the evolving nature of agroterrorism and biological818threats, CBP's Agriculture Programs and Trade Liaison office819established the Biological Threat Exclusion branch to enhance CBP's820capability to defend against biological threats to the United States.821The branch is comprised of Biological Threat Exclusion Coordinators,822who provide guidance to field personnel for the clearance, analysis,823and inspection of biological materials and ensure that policies,824procedures, and best practices are appropriately implemented throughout825the agency. The branch provides programmatic management of its 37826Biological Threat Operations Specialist positions, strategically827situated throughout the Agency's workforce. Biological Threat828Operations Specialists provide operational responses to biological829threats at ports of entry and serve as front-line technical advisors830for the targeting, risk analysis, inspection, adjudication, and831intelligence or informational reporting of biological materials.832                    advanced targeting capabilities833    CBP uses many of the same tools that support its anti-terrorism834activities to target potentially harmful agricultural items approaching835U.S. borders via shipments or individual travelers. Analysts at the836National Targeting Center use sophisticated data systems to proactively837analyze passenger and cargo information before departure from foreign838ports. These critical decision-support tools assist CBP Officers and839Agriculture Specialists in identifying shipments or travelers that840warrant comprehensive screening or inspection upon arrival. To further841enhance agriculture targeting, CBP has integrated Agriculture842Specialists within the infrastructure of its National Targeting Center,843allowing for a heightened focus on identifying high-risk entities that844may attempt to import shipments with pests, prohibited products,845contaminants, or smuggled goods. Agriculture Specialists at the846National Targeting Center also serve as a conduit for agriculture847information and intelligence collection at the national level. Working848alongside CBP Officers and other agency partners at the National849Targeting Center, Agriculture Specialists develop, coordinate, and850implement intelligence and information capabilities that support the851execution of CBP's primary mission to secure America's borders.852        specialized detection capabilities and mobile technology853    Complementing its targeting activities, CBP deploys specialized854canine teams, one of the agency's most effective assets within the855Agriculture Quarantine and Inspection Program. These highly-trained856dogs can screen luggage or cargo for hidden or forgotten fruits, meats,857and other prohibited items in seconds, saving human time and resources.858Today, approximately 175 CBP agriculture canine teams operate in859airports, seaports, mail and express consignment facilities, and at860land border ports of entry, providing a critical detection capability861for prohibited agricultural products.862    CBP is also leveraging technology to transform and improve business863operations by expanding the Automated Targeting System Mobile Exam864Findings application. By equipping Agriculture Specialists at sea, air,865and land ports with portable tools, CBP can remotely complete866inspections and release cargo in real time. This mobile solution speeds867up cargo processing, enhances trade facilitation and enforcement, and868allows front-line personnel to perform inspections efficiently without869being tied to a fixed location.870       collaboration with government and private-sector partners871    CBP's front-line expertise, targeting programs, and detection872capabilities are further strengthened by extensive partnerships with873other Federal agencies and industry stakeholders. CBP enforces laws on874behalf of 47 Federal entities and works closely with partners such as875the Department of Agriculture, Food and Drug Administration, Centers876for Disease Control and Prevention, Fish and Wildlife Service, and the877Federal Bureau of Investigation. These partnerships enable coordinated878responses to emerging agricultural and biological threats and ensure879that regulations and policies are harmonized across agencies.880    The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, for example,881collaborates with CBP to develop agriculture rules, regulations,882policies, and training based on pest risk assessments. CBP, in turn,883implements internal policies to operationalize those regulations,884including how Agriculture Specialists identify shipments for exams and885what safeguards to institute in response to pest detection. CBP also886works directly with the Secretary's Office of Health Security to ensure887operational realities inform Government-wide discussions, led by Office888of Health Security, regarding the protection of food and agriculture.889Furthermore, recent CBP collaboration with the Federal Bureau of890Investigation and other Federal partners resulted in the successful891establishment of an interagency agreement specific to the importation892of biological materials. This agreement serves as a force multiplier,893significantly enhancing U.S. safety and security by delineating each894agency's roles and responsibilities, including the sharing of895information regarding noncompliant importation of biological materials.896    Demonstrating the importance of interagency cooperation in897addressing emerging threats, CBP--through its Agriculture Programs and898Trade Liaison office--has a critical role in the whole-of-Government899response to the threat of the New World screwworm.\6\ As an active900member of the One Health Coordination Unit-New World Screwworm901Interagency Working Group, CBP provides border security expertise and902shares intelligence to help prevent this harmful pest from entering the903country. Collectively, the Working Group enhances awareness of the New904World screwworm threat by conducting stakeholder outreach and905strengthening engagement between Federal partners and trade906stakeholders. To date, CBP has provided New World screwworm training to907more than 23,000 front-line personnel at ports of entry, ensuring908thorough awareness of this harmful pest and the Federal efforts to909mitigate the threat to U.S. agricultural resources. CBP is also910partnering with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on efforts to train911Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service canine teams to identify and912respond to New World screwworm, facilitate importations of sterile913insect fly pupae, and prepare outreach material to educate the914traveling public and trade community.915---------------------------------------------------------------------------916    \6\ https://www.screwworm.gov.917---------------------------------------------------------------------------918    CBP's mitigation strategy for agricultural and biological security919threats involves staying aware of current and emerging agricultural and920biological threats. It also includes regular training of CBP921Agriculture Specialists and Officers through programs conducted or922endorsed by Federal partners such as the Animal and Plant Health923Inspection Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This924continuous training approach ensures CBP's front-line personnel are925equipped with the most recent threat intelligence and detection methods926to prevent the introduction of prohibited, invasive, or potentially927dangerous pests, agricultural products, or biological materials.928    CBP's commitment to information sharing goes beyond internal929training, extending to key industries and academic communities to930strengthen awareness and compliance. Working with partner agencies, CBP931engages not only with trade and transportation communities, but also932with academic, research, and biopharmaceutical institutions to educate933these sectors on agricultural and biological threats, share required934import and export compliance measures, and promote best practices. For935example, CBP maintains robust pest exclusion programs centered on some936of the most devastating pests, including the Flighted Spongy Moth937Complex or Spongy Moth \7\ and Khapra Beetle,\8\ as well as risks938associated with pests in wood packaging material and other939contaminants.940---------------------------------------------------------------------------941    \7\ U.S. Department of Agriculture National Invasive Species942Information Center, https://www.invasivespeciesinfo.gov/terrestrial/943invertebrates/flighted-spongy-moth-complex.944    \8\ U.S. Department of Agriculture National Invasive Species945Information Center, https://www.invasivespeciesinfo.gov/terrestrial/946invertebrates/khapra-beetle.947---------------------------------------------------------------------------948    In summary, by building and maintaining strong relationships across949Federal agencies and industry stakeholders, CBP helps ensure that both950Government and private-sector partners are equipped to address the951complex and evolving nature of agricultural and biological threats.952                               conclusion953    CBP's multi-layered approach to protecting the United States from954agricultural and biological threats is actively implemented at ports of955entry every day. This daily vigilance helps protect our national and956economic security, preserve our natural and agricultural resources, and957safeguard our communities. By combining front-line expertise, advance958targeting and detection capabilities, and strong Federal and industry959partnerships, CBP effectively detects and intercepts dangerous960materials, preventing potentially harmful pests and biological threats961from entering the United States.962    Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and distinguished Members963of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I964look forward to your questions.965966    Chairman Strong. Thank you, Ms. Kelly. I recognize Mr.967Allen for 5 minutes to summarize his opening statement.968969STATEMENT OF MATT ALLEN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY,970                 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE971972    Mr. Allen. Good afternoon, Chairman Strong, Ranking Member973Kennedy, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank974you for the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon. I975have the privilege of leading the USDA Office of Homeland976Security. the Office coordinates across the Department to977mitigate risk, provide safeguards to USDA personnel and978information by leading Government-wide initiatives in979championing USDA's equities in homeland and national security.980I very much appreciate the opportunity to discuss these981important topics with you today. As you know, agriculture982contributes over 1.5 trillion to the U.S. Gross Domestic983Product each year. It underpins our society and is one of the984most important pillars that feeds, fuels, and clothes the985entire world. This past summer, the Department launched the986National Farm Security Action Plan, a first-of-its-kind987comprehensive strategy to acknowledge agriculture as a key988pillar of national security. The plan focuses on protecting989U.S. farmland from foreign adversaries, strengthening food990supply chains, ending fraud in nutrition programs, safeguarding991plant and animal health, and bolstering research security. The992National Farm Security Action Plan enables USDA to begin this993critical work to address the imperative for agriculture994security in America. The Action Plan serves as a launching995point for USDA to work in continued unison with Government and996other partners to fully integrate agriculture into broader997national security enterprise.998    Continuing the implementation of the plan. In January, USDA999launched a new on-line portal to streamline the reporting of1000transactions involving U.S. agriculture land by foreign persons1001under the Agriculture Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of10021978, or AFIDA, the new on-line portal's broader effort to1003strengthen the AFIDA enforcement and protect American farmland.1004We enjoy a strong working relationship with our partners across1005USDA and the U.S. Interagency with USDA's Animal Plant Health1006Inspection Service which is Department's lead under the1007National Response Framework, Emergency Support Function 11 for1008safeguarding animal and plant health, provide critical1009connections to threat intelligence resources which APHIS uses1010to mitigate operational and strategic risk. As the committee is1011likely aware, we're facing the threat of the northward creep of1012the New World screwworm toward our border. That poses a1013potential risk to livestock industry and pets. While we've not1014seen indications of intentional spread, there's well-recognized1015involvement of cartels designated as foreign terrorists1016organizations in transboundary cattle smuggling that is likely1017exacerbating the problem.1018    The on-going security situation south of the border also1019complicates effective control pest surveillance and places1020personnel responsible for addressing this pest at risk. I1021present this as an example to highlight the complexity of our1022global connected agriculture supply chains and emphasize the1023risk present in this critical infrastructure sector. OHS works1024hand-in-hand with both USDA agencies like APHIS and Federal1025partners to include CBP to ensure that we have the best and1026most up-to-date information for strategic decision making.1027    As just mentioned, we collaborate with the FBI and CBP on1028many--to identify threats of suspected acts of agroterrorism.1029Just a few months ago, Director Kash Patel of the FBI commented1030on the recent Michigan case involving foreign graduate students1031who illicitly brought fusarium. An agricultural pathogen in the1032United States is a persistent and enduring threat. U.S.1033agriculture and American farmers are faced with this and many1034other persistent enduring threats. Our Department leans on our1035partners to assist us investigating remedying these issues and1036that's why I'm delighted to have our colleagues from DHS here1037with us today. They have abundant authorities, resources, and1038personnel to assist us in detecting, defending the most1039tenacious threats to U.S. agriculture, the economy, and1040national security.1041    Those situations in Michigan underscore the importance of1042knowing that Federally-funded agriculture research and1043development is being done in conjunction with trusted partners.1044Just this morning, USDA announced the creation of an office1045dedicated to enhancing research security within USDA,1046continuing to implement National Security Presidential1047Memorandum 33 and educate USDA partners of why research1048security matters. It is easy to forget the food on our plates,1049the clothes on our backs, the warmth of our fires are all1050predicated on somewhere, somewhere transforming living or once1051living things into something that sustains us as individuals,1052families, communities, and a nation. The foundational place of1053agriculture in our overall well-being as American people and1054perhaps more importantly, the source for might in the Nation,1055cannot be understated. Safeguarding agriculture is something we1056take very seriously at the Department.1057    Chairman Strong and Ranking Member Kennedy, distinguished1058Members of subcommittee, thank you again for holding this1059hearing, the opportunity to testify on this important topic. I1060would also like to thank my colleagues that are joining me1061today, our partners in the interagency. As this is a whole-of-1062Government effort, none of us could do this independently, so1063our continued cooperation and collaboration is essential and I1064look forward to answering any questions you may have. Thank1065you.1066    [The prepared statement of Mr. Allen follows:]1067                    Prepared Statement of Matt Allen1068                           February 11, 20261069    Good afternoon, Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and1070distinguished Members of the subcommittee. My name is Matt Allen, and I1071have the privilege of leading the USDA Office of Homeland Security. Our1072six divisions coordinate across the Department to mitigate risk and1073provide safeguards to USDA personnel and information by leading1074Government-wide initiatives and championing USDA's equities in homeland1075and national security. To protect U.S. agriculture, OHS executes these1076critical Departmental functions across our emergency operations,1077continuity of operations, personnel security, classified1078communications, safety of ionizing radiation, and homeland and national1079security policy, planning, and preparedness activities for USDA. I very1080much appreciate the opportunity to discuss the important topic of farm1081security as national security with you today.1082    The U.S. Department of Agriculture was established in 1862. Our1083seal states ``Agriculture is the Foundation of Manufacturing and1084Commerce.'' This is as true today as it was then. Agriculture1085contributes over $1.5 trillion to the U.S. Gross Domestic Product each1086year. It underpins our society and is one of the most important pillars1087that feeds, fuels, and clothes the entire world.1088    This past summer, the Department launched the National Farm1089Security Action Plan: a first-of-its-kind comprehensive strategy to1090acknowledge agriculture as key pillar of national security. This plan1091focuses on protecting U.S. farmland from foreign adversaries,1092strengthening food supply chains, ending fraud in nutrition programs,1093safeguarding plant and animal health, promoting ``America First'' in1094all USDA programs, and bolstering research security. It includes key1095elements like tougher AFIDA enforcement for foreign land purchases and1096working with our Federal partners like U.S. Customs and Border1097Protection (CBP) to ensure that pests and pathogens don't enter the1098United States, threatening our herds and crops.1099    The National Farm Security Action Plan enables USDA to begin this1100critical work to address the imperative for agriculture security in1101America. This Action Plan serves as the launching point for USDA to1102work in continued unison with governmental and other partners to fully1103integrate agriculture into the broader national security enterprise in1104the coming months and years. Working together, we can and must protect1105and expand the resilience and durability of the U.S. food supply and1106all associated value chains.1107    Continuing the implementation of the Farm Security Action Plan, in1108January, USDA launched a new on-line portal to streamline reporting of1109transactions involving U.S. agricultural land by foreign persons, which1110can include businesses and governments, under the Agricultural Foreign1111Investment Disclosure Act of 1978 (AFIDA). The new on-line portal is1112part of a broader effort to strengthen AFIDA enforcement and protect1113American farmland. This on-line portal will enable USDA to better share1114data with our interagency partners, address a GAO audit finding, as1115well as reduce the burden on filers, streamlining the process for1116electronic submission and retention of AFIDA disclosure records.1117    In addition to the National Farm Security Action Plan, at the end1118of last year the Secretary issued a memorandum on research and1119development priorities. Continued pest and disease incursions continue1120to threaten U.S. farmers and ranchers. For example, continued New World1121screwworm infestations in Mexico, the continued westward expansion of1122the Spotted Lanternfly, persistence of Highly Pathogenic Avian1123Influenza, and the decimation of our domestic citrus industry due to1124citrus greening are just a few instances of how invasive pests and1125diseases threaten American agriculture and our natural resources.1126Research and development focused on new and effective methods for1127preventing, detecting, controlling, and eradicating these threats is a1128top priority for USDA and the security of U.S. agriculture. This1129memorandum helps address the priorities for research, as well as1130knowing who we are collaborating with, ensuring tax dollars are funding1131priorities for American producers.1132    USDA's Office of Homeland Security enjoys a strong working1133relationship with our partners in USDA and across the U.S. interagency.1134With USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), which1135is the Department's lead under the National Response Framework1136Emergency Support Function (ESF) No. 11 for Safeguarding Animal and1137Plant Health, we provide critical connections to threat intelligence1138resources which APHIS uses to mitigate operational and strategic risk.1139    As the committee is likely aware, the continuing northward creep of1140New World screwworm toward our borders poses a potential risk to our1141livestock industry, pets, and wildlife. While we've not seen1142indications of intentional screwworm spread, the well-recognized1143involvement of cartels--recently designated as foreign terrorist1144organizations--in transboundary cattle smuggling is likely exacerbating1145the natural spread of this pest. The on-going security situation south1146of our border also complicates effective control, pest surveillance,1147and places our personnel responsible for addressing this pest at risk.1148I present this example to highlight the complexity of our globally-1149connected agricultural supply chains, and to emphasize the risk present1150in this critical infrastructure sector. The USDA Office of Homeland1151Security works hand-in-hand with both USDA Agencies, like APHIS, and1152Federal partners, including CBP, to ensure we have the best, most up-1153to-date information to aid in strategic decision making.1154    USDA also works cooperatively and collaborates with FBI and CBP to1155identify threats or suspected acts of agroterrorism and carry out1156effective and coordinated investigations and response, including multi-1157layered interagency enforcement. USDA supports FBI investigations by1158sharing information, assisting in investigatory activities, and1159pursuing concurrent administrative action. USDA participates in FBI1160agroterrorism training, as well as localized law enforcement meetings1161and discussions to ensure close working relationships and readiness1162across agencies.1163    Just a few months ago, FBI's Director Kash Patel commented on the1164recent Michigan case involving the foreign graduate students who1165illicitly brought Fusarium--an agricultural pathogen--into the United1166States as a ``persistent and enduring threat.'' U.S. agriculture and1167American farmers are faced with this--and many other--persistent and1168enduring threats. The Department of Agriculture leans on our partners1169to assist in investigating and remedying these issues. That's why I'm1170delighted to have our colleagues from the Department of Homeland1171Security here with us today as they have additional authorities,1172resources, and personnel to assist us in detecting--and defending--1173against the most tenacious threats to U.S. agriculture, our economy,1174and national security.1175    Situations like those that happened last year in Michigan1176underscore the importance of knowing that Federally-funded agricultural1177research and development at universities is being done in conjunction1178with trusted partners. Today, USDA announced the creation of an office1179dedicated to enhancing research security within the USDA Office of the1180Chief Scientist. This new office will be tasked with helping USDA1181continue to implement NSPM-33 and educate USDA partners about why1182research security matters when it comes to agriculture.1183    The U.S. Government has traditionally viewed ``agroterrorism''1184through the lens of potentially dangerous pests or diseases1185intentionally operationalized by state or non-state actors to damage1186American agriculture and inflict harm on the U.S. populace. However, it1187is important that we do not over-index on just ``biothreats.'' As the1188``foundation of manufacturing and commerce'', the threats against1189agriculture are so much more than the threat of contagion in one crop1190or several species. Agriculture is the absolute core of rural American1191livelihoods and well-being. If our producers cannot grow and sell their1192food, fuel, or fiber products at markets either domestically or abroad,1193rural America cannot thrive. Disruption to those delicate systems of1194systems such as interruptions to viable and reliable germplasm;1195position, navigation, and timing; labor for harvesting and processing;1196cold-chain storage; transportation logistics and enduring port access;1197or reliable and real-time market information--each or all can spell1198cascading disaster to our Nation's heartland. As we think about1199`agroterrorism' as a Nation, I respectfully ask the committee to1200encourage a wider, more holistic potential appreciation for the problem1201set we collectively face as we look at agriculture as fundamental to1202our national security.1203    It is often easy to forget that the food on our plates, the clothes1204on our backs, and the warmth of our fires are all predicated upon1205someone somewhere transforming a living or once living thing into1206something that sustains us as individuals, families, communities, and a1207Nation. The foundational place of agriculture in our overall well-being1208as American people and--perhaps more or most importantly--source of1209might for the Nation cannot be understated. Safeguarding agriculture is1210something we take very seriously at the Department of Agriculture. If1211we do our work in silos individually, we collectively will fail1212together. We must stay vigilant against any risks and threats to1213agriculture on a continuous basis.1214    Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and distinguished Members1215of the subcommittee--thank you again for holding this hearing and the1216opportunity to testify on this important topic. I would also like to1217thank my colleagues that are joining today and our partners in the1218interagency, as this is a whole-of-Government effort. None of us could1219do this independently so our continued cooperation and collaboration is1220essential. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.12211222    Chairman Strong. Thank you, Mr. Allen. I now recognize Mr.1223Cooper for his 5 minutes to summarize his opening statement.12241225   STATEMENT OF JEFF COOPER, PROGRAM MANAGER, PROBABILISTIC1226 ANALYSIS FOR NATIONAL THREATS HAZARDS AND RISKS, SCIENCE AND1227  TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY12281229    Mr. Cooper. Good afternoon, Chairman Strong, Ranking Member1230Kennedy, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank1231you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the1232Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology1233Directorate. The risks to the food and agricultural sector and1234supply chain are varied and serious. The Nation's food and1235agricultural systems are designated critical infrastructure.1236The disruption, whether naturally-occurring, accidental, or1237intentional, can result in cascading impacts to public health,1238economic stability, and confidence in the Government. As global1239supply chains become more interconnected, they become1240increasingly vulnerable to biological threats and understanding1241and managing these potential risks is more important than ever.1242DHS has the Federal authority to assess and manage threats to1243critical infrastructure, serving as a coordinator for the1244whole-of-Government effort that includes all levels of1245government and industry owners and operators within DHS, the1246Science and Technology Directorate that supports this mission1247by providing technical threat analysis, risk analysis and1248decision support to inform preparedness and response efforts1249across the Homeland Security enterprise.1250    Under National Security Memorandum 16, DHS was tasked with1251conducting risk assessments related to threat against the food1252and agriculture, working in coordination with the Secretary of1253Agriculture and the Secretary of Health and Human services and1254others. DHS's role is to ensure that leaders at the Federal,1255State, and local levels have clear science-based understanding1256of the threats they face, the potential consequences of those1257threats and the trade-offs associated with different1258preparedness and response options. S&T contributes to DHS's1259risk assessment mission by delivering technically-defensible1260analysis and user tools to help decision makers prioritize1261actions and resources. One way that S&T executes this mission1262is through the Probabilistic Analysis of National Threats,1263Hazards and Risks Program or PANTHR. PANTHR provides analytical1264capabilities that integrate threat information, hazard data and1265consequence modeling to support risk-informed decision making1266across chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive,1267and cyber threat areas. These capabilities are designed to1268inform policy and operations, not to execute or set them.1269Rather, they help answer fundamental questions decision makers1270face, including which threats pose the greatest risk, where1271vulnerabilities exist and where investments can most1272effectively reduce that risk.1273    Risks to the food and agricultural system are complex. They1274vary by agent, commodity geography and response capacity, and1275the consequences of disruption can extend well beyond the1276agricultural sector. Through PANTHR, S&T develops and applies1277risk and computational analytics that support strategic1278operational and tactical planning. These efforts help decision1279makers to compare risks across various scenarios and assess how1280different interventions may reduce the likelihood or1281consequences of those events. Risk assessments depend on1282reliable data. For many agricultural threat agents, including1283emerging and reemerging diseases, experimental data is limited1284or incomplete. To address this gap, S&T also conducts the1285Agricultural Threat Characterization Research Project that1286examines properties and impacts of biological threats relevant1287to agricultural such as high-pathogenic avian influenza and1288African swine fever. This research produces science-based1289knowledge products that inform hazard awareness, analytical1290modeling, and preparedness planning.1291    In addition to analysis and threat characterization, S&T1292conducts applied research and development to inform future1293capabilities and enhance agricultural biosecurity. This1294includes work to improve screening and sensing technologies at1295ports of entry as well as methodologies and decision support1296tools for depopulation disposal and decontamination. These1297efforts are designed to inform capability development and1298transition to our operational partners such as USDA and CBP.1299S&T works closely with DHS components and interagency partners1300including the Department of Agriculture to ensure analytical1301capabilities address real-world needs. Through tailored1302analysis, reach-back support and scenario development, S&T1303provides decision support to planning exercises and1304preparedness activities. S&T supports the USDA's National Farm1305Security Action Plan by providing the technical risk assessment1306framework needed to inform sound policy and operational1307decisions. In this way, S&T's contributions align with DHS's1308responsibilities under the National Security Memorandum 16 and1309complement USDA's leadership on agricultural policy compliance1310and enforcement. The Science and Technology Directorate is1311committed to helping the Nation understand and manage these1312risks to the food and agricultural sector through rigorous1313science-based analysis and decision support. These complex1314risks require disciplined coordination across Federal, State,1315and local partners. With continued support from Congress, S&T1316will continue to provide the analytical foundation that informs1317preparedness and protects the American people, our food supply,1318and our economy.1319    Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and distinguished1320Members of the subcommittee, it is a privilege to testify1321before you today. Thank you for your support of the Science and1322Technology Directorate. I look forward to your questions.1323    [The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper follows:]1324                   Prepared Statement of Jeff Cooper1325                           February 11, 20261326    Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and Members of the1327subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today1328on behalf of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Science1329and Technology Directorate (S&T).1330    The risks to the food and agriculture sector and supply chain are1331varied and serious. The Nation's food and agriculture systems are1332designated critical infrastructure, and their disruption, whether1333intentional, accidental, or naturally-occurring, can result in1334cascading impacts to public health, economic stability, and confidence1335in government. As global supply chains grow more interconnected and1336biological threats become easier to exploit, understanding and managing1337these risks is more important than ever.1338    DHS has the Federal authority to assess and manage threats to1339critical infrastructure, serving as coordinator of a whole-of-1340Government effort that includes all levels of government and industry1341owners and operators. Within DHS, the Science and Technology1342Directorate supports that mission by providing technical threat1343analysis, risk assessment, and decision support to inform preparedness1344and response efforts across the Homeland Security Enterprise.1345  dhs's role in addressing risks to the nation's food and agriculture1346                                 sector1347    Under National Security Memorandum-16, DHS was tasked with1348conducting risk assessments related to threats against the food and1349agriculture sector. Working in coordination with the Secretary of1350Agriculture and the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and others,1351DHS's role is to ensure that leaders at the Federal, State, and local1352levels have a clear, science-based understanding of the threats they1353face, the potential consequences of those threats, and the trade-offs1354associated with different preparedness and response options.1355          s&t's contribution to risk-informed decision making1356    S&T contributes to DHS's risk assessment mission by delivering1357technically defensible analysis and tools that help decision makers1358prioritize actions and resources.1359    One way S&T executes this mission is through the Probabilistic1360Analysis of National Threats, Hazards, and Risks (PANTHR) program.1361PANTHR provides analytical capabilities that integrate threat1362information, hazard data, and consequence modeling to support risk-1363informed decision making across chemical, biological, radiological,1364nuclear, and explosive threat areas.1365    These capabilities are designed to inform policy and operations,1366not to set or execute them. Rather, they help answer fundamental1367questions decision makers face: which threats pose the greatest risk,1368where vulnerabilities exist, and where investments can most effectively1369reduce risk.1370       risk and computational analytics for food and agriculture1371    The risks to food and agriculture systems are complex. Threats vary1372by agent, commodity, geography, and response capacity, and the1373consequences of disruption can extend well beyond the agricultural1374sector.1375    Through PANTHR, S&T develops and applies risk and computational1376analytics that support strategic, operational, and tactical planning.1377These efforts help decision makers compare risks across scenarios and1378assess how different interventions may reduce the likelihood or1379consequences of an event.1380    Tools such as the Tools for Integrated Evaluation of Risk (TIGER)1381support this work by enabling modeling and analysis tailored to the1382food and agriculture sector. Recent improvements have focused on1383increasing efficiency and timeliness through modernized data management1384and cloud-based capabilities, allowing analysts to provide more1385responsive support to DHS components and interagency partners.1386                  agricultural threat characterization1387    Risk assessment depends on reliable data. For many agricultural1388threat agents, including emerging and re-emerging diseases, critical1389empirical data are limited or incomplete.1390    To address this gap, S&T conducts Agricultural Threat1391Characterization research that examines the properties and impacts of1392biological threats relevant to agriculture, such as Highly Pathogenic1393Avian Influenza and African Swine Fever. This research produces1394science-based knowledge products that inform hazard awareness,1395analytical modeling, and preparedness planning.1396    These products are shared with DHS components and interagency1397partners, including USDA and FDA, to support coordinated preparedness1398and response efforts, while respecting the distinct authorities and1399responsibilities of each department.1400        supporting detection, screening, and response readiness1401    In addition to analysis and characterization, S&T supports applied1402research and development to inform future capabilities that enhance1403agricultural biosecurity.1404    This includes work to improve:1405   Screening and sensing technologies to help identify1406        prohibited agricultural products at ports of entry1407   Methodologies and decision support tools for depopulation,1408        disposal, and decontamination that facilitate rapid response1409        and prevent disease spread while minimizing waste,1410        environmental impact, and negative public perception.1411    These efforts are designed to inform capability development and1412transition to operational partners.1413             decision support and interagency collaboration1414    S&T works closely with DHS components and interagency partners,1415including the Department of Agriculture, who leads the food and1416agriculture sector, to ensure analytical capabilities address real-1417world needs. Through tailored analysis, reach-back support, and1418scenario development, S&T provides decision support for planning,1419exercises, and preparedness activities.1420    This includes development of targeted analytical products,1421scenarios, and injects that help leaders test assumptions, identify1422gaps, and strengthen coordination before an incident occurs. These1423efforts support whole-of-Government preparedness and complement USDA-1424led policy and programmatic initiatives.1425      relationship to the usda national farm security action plan1426    S&T supports the USDA National Farm Security Action Plan by1427providing the technical risk assessment foundation needed to inform1428sound policy and operational decisions. In this way, S&T's1429contributions are aligned with DHS's responsibilities under National1430Security Memorandum-16 (NSM-16) and complement USDA's leadership on1431agricultural policy, compliance, and enforcement.1432    The risks to the food and agriculture sector are complex and1433evolving and require disciplined coordination across Federal, State,1434and local partners. With continued support from Congress, S&T will1435continue to play a critical role in helping the Nation understand and1436manage agroterrorism risks by providing rigorous, science-based1437analysis and decision support that protect the American people, our1438food supply, and our economy.1439                               conclusion1440    Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and Members of the1441subcommittee, it is a privilege to testify before you today.1442    I thank you for your support of S&T and look forward to your1443questions.14441445    Chairman Strong. Thank you, Mr. Cooper. I now recognize Dr.1446Grant for 5 minutes to summarize her opening statement. Dr.1447Grant.14481449     STATEMENT OF ASHLEY GRANT, SENIOR HEALTH SECURITY AND1450BIODEFENSE ADVISOR, OFFICE OF HEALTH SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT1451                      OF HOMELAND SECURITY14521453    Ms. Grant. Thank you. Thank you so much, Chairman Strong.1454Ranking Member Kennedy and distinguished Members of the1455subcommittee. I'm honored to be here to speak today about the1456Department of Homeland Security's effort to defend against1457agroterrorism and other biological threats. I have spent my1458entire career focused on trying to make sure our Nation is1459better prepared for biological incidents. As a senior health1460security and biodefense advisor at the Department of Homeland1461Security's Office of Health Security, I am honored to share our1462approach to protecting America's food and agriculture sector.1463Advances in biotechnology as well as artificial intelligence1464have made it easier for nefarious actors to develop and deploy1465biological agents that could devastate our crops, livestock,1466and food production. These threats jeopardize not only economic1467stability, but also our national security. At DHS, we recognize1468that farm security is national security. Along with USDA, the1469Office of Health Security leads and coordinates efforts across1470the Department to protect our Nation's food and agriculture1471sector from high-consequence threats. Our mission is rooted in1472statutory responsibility and key directives, including the1473Securing our Agriculture and Food Act. We oversee activities1474related to the Department's food defense, agriculture security,1475and lead policy initiatives for preparedness, detection, and1476response. Today, I will cover 4 core areas of our work.1477    First, coordination and policy leadership. The Office of1478Health Security works closely with DHS components such as1479Customs and Border Protection, as well as the Science and1480Technology Directorate. We also coordinate with our interagency1481partners such as USDA as well as the Health and Human Services.1482Together, we ensure that DHS and the U.S. Government efforts1483are unified, efficient, and responsive to evolving threats.1484Second, risk assessment and intelligence integration. The1485Office of Health Security partners with DHS Science and1486Technology Directorate to assess risks to our food and1487agriculture sector. We integrate technical threat analysis and1488risk modeling with policy and operational planning, a key1489element of our support to health analysts embedded in State and1490local fusion centers nationwide. These analysts gather and1491disseminate health security information, ensuring actionable1492intelligence reaches decision makers and front-line responders.1493    Third, preparedness exercises and training. The Office of1494Health Security designs and executes complex exercises to test1495and strengthen our ability to prevent, detect, and respond to1496biological threats. For example, last month we held a complex1497exercise--tabletop exercise down in El Paso, Texas. This1498exercise focused on a potential New World screwworm incursion1499in the United States through three different mechanisms. No. 11500through illicit cattle trading; No. 2, through our livestock;1501and a potential human case. This is a severe pest that can1502affect our economy as well as our livestock. The exercise1503brought over 250 participants from Federal, State, local,1504county, Tribal, different agencies and highlighted the1505importance of an integrated response and identified gaps in1506planning and capability.1507    Our fourth core function is innovation and continuous1508improvement. The Office of Health Security invests in data1509analytics and technology solutions to enhance early warning1510detection and response. Early detection and rapid response is1511critical to making sure we are prepared for threats to our food1512and agriculture. Through initiatives like the Integrated1513Consortium of Laboratory Networks, we are advancing our1514collaborative ability to prepare for and mitigate from emerging1515threats. In conclusion, threats against our food and1516agriculture sector are significant and evolving. DHS, the1517Office of Health Security, and our partners are committed to1518safeguarding the Nation's food and agriculture system through1519collaboration, innovation, and readiness.1520    Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to1521your questions.1522    [The prepared statement of Ms. Grant follows:]1523                   Prepared Statement of Ashley Grant1524                           February 11, 20261525    Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and distinguished Members1526of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the1527U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to defend the1528United States from agroterrorism and related biological threats. As the1529senior health security and biodefense advisor at the DHS Office of1530Health Security (OHS), I am honored to share the Department's approach1531to protecting our Nation's food and agriculture sector and systems.1532With extensive experience in biosafety and biosecurity, including1533leading technical audits and serving as a subject-matter expert on1534chemical and biological programs across multiple Federal agencies--I1535have first-hand knowledge of the potential threats to our Nation's food1536and agriculture systems and the resources available to protect them.1537    Advances in biotechnology and artificial intelligence (AI) have1538made it easier for state and non-state actors to develop and deploy1539biological agents that could devastate crops, livestock, and food1540production, threatening economic stability and national security.1541Strengthening biosurveillance, biosecurity, and response capabilities1542is essential to protect America's agricultural sector from these1543evolving threats. As emphasized in the USDA National Farm Security1544Action Plan, farm security is national security. At DHS, OHS supports1545this principle by leading and coordinating DHS's efforts to protect the1546Nation's food and agriculture sector from agroterrorism and other high-1547consequence threats. OHS ensures that the security and resilience of1548American agriculture remain at the forefront of our homeland security1549mission.1550                      ohs authorities and mission1551    OHS serves as the Department's principal medical, workforce health1552and safety, and public health authority. Under the Securing Our1553Agriculture and Food Act, OHS has responsibility to coordinate DHS1554efforts to defend the Nation's food, agriculture, and veterinary1555systems against terrorism and other high-consequence threats, whether1556intentional or naturally-occurring. This responsibility includes1557oversight of the Department's activities related to veterinary public1558health, food defense, and agricultural security and leading the1559Department's policy initiatives relating to preparedness, detection,1560response, and recovery activities for agroterrorism and intentional1561biological threats. OHS also has responsibilities to defend against1562agriculture and food threats through the National Security Memorandum-156316 (NSM-16), the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness1564and Response Act of 2002, the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act,1565the Food Safety Modernization Act, the Pandemic and All-Hazards1566Preparedness Act, and the Homeland Security Act of 2002.1567  ohs's role and activities in managing risks to food and agriculture15681. Coordination and Policy Leadership1569    OHS leads the Department's policy initiatives and provides1570coordination for DHS's food, agriculture, and veterinary defense1571activities. In order to do so, we work closely with DHS components,1572such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the Science and1573Technology Directorate (S&T), as well as with the U.S. Department of1574Agriculture, Food and Drug Administration, and other Federal, State,1575local, Tribal, territorial, and private-sector partners. OHS ensures1576that DHS's efforts are postured, unified, efficient, and responsive to1577evolving agroterrorism threats.15782. Risk Assessment and Intelligence Integration1579    OHS leads and coordinates the Department's overall risk assessment1580activities in partnership with S&T. While S&T provides technical threat1581analysis, risk modeling, and scientific data to characterize and1582quantify risks to the food and agriculture sector, OHS integrates S&T's1583analytical products through a policy, preparedness, and operational1584planning perspective for biological, chemical, and radiological hazards1585affecting food and agriculture. For example, a key element of our1586strategy is maturing and augmenting a network of fusion center health1587analysts at the local level that are embedded in state-run fusion1588centers across the country. These analysts play a critical role in1589gathering, analyzing, and disseminating health security intelligence,1590ensuring that actionable information reaches State and local decision1591makers, industry stakeholders, and front-line responders. Through1592regular engagement and technical assistance, OHS supports the fusion1593center health analyst community in identifying emerging threats and to1594better prepare our communities for rapid responses.15953. Preparedness, Exercises, and Training1596    OHS effectuates statutory responsibilities, Executive Orders, and1597the USDA National Farm Security Action Plan to ensure coordination and1598connection to protect the national food systems and agriculture1599industry. As an integral part of this multi-layered approach, OHS1600designs and executes complex exercises based on scenarios that test and1601strengthen the Nation's ability to prevent, detect, and respond to1602potentially catastrophic threats to U.S. food and agriculture sector,1603including agroterrorism incidents. Recently, on January 14, 2026, OHS1604led a comprehensive tabletop exercise in El Paso, Texas, focused on1605strategic preparedness and response to potential New World screwworm1606(NWS) infestations. NWS is a parasitic insect that presents a severe1607threat to livestock, wildlife, and a more limited threat to human1608health, with the potential to disrupt agricultural livestock1609production, and make impacts to trade, and public health.1610    OHS worked across the Federal interagency and with State, local,1611and Tribal partners to convene over 250 participants including1612operational decision makers from Federal, State, local, and Tribal1613agencies, representing law enforcement, public health, agriculture,1614environmental response sectors, and other critical partners. The1615scenario explored three unique NWS introduction pathways, challenging1616participants to coordinate incident response, communication, and1617contingency planning for cascading impacts.1618    Key outcomes included strengthened coordination and identification1619of planning and capacity gaps, including the need for targeted1620education and outreach to a broader set of stakeholders. The exercise1621also highlighted trade implications, laboratory bottlenecks, and the1622importance of an approach that integrates clinical, public health,1623food, agriculture, and veterinary sectors. This event is just one1624example of exercises that OHS has developed and hosted that have1625improved understanding of agency roles, preparedness, and opportunities1626for new partnerships, preparing participants for stronger coordination1627to prevent and respond to agricultural and biological threats.16284. Innovation and Continuous Improvement1629    OHS invests in data analytics, and technology solutions to enhance1630early warning, detection, and response capabilities. Through1631initiatives such as the Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks,1632OHS is advancing the Nation's ability to collaboratively prepare for,1633respond to, and mitigate emerging agroterrorism threats.1634                               conclusion1635    The risks to food and agriculture are significant and evolving.1636Food security is national security. DHS, the Office of Health Security,1637and our partners are committed to safeguarding the Nation's food and1638agriculture systems, by fostering collaboration, driving innovation,1639and ensuring the readiness of our homeland to meet the challenges1640ahead.1641    Thank you for your support and the opportunity to testify. I look1642forward to your questions.16431644    Chairman Strong. Thank you, Dr. Grant. Members will be1645recognized by order of seniority for their 5 minutes of1646questioning. An additional round of questioning may be called1647after all Members have been recognized. I now recognize myself1648for 5 minutes of questioning.1649    The actions of agroterrorism could become even more1650dangerous if they had access to farmland near U.S. military1651bases. Redstone Arsenal is in my district and I understand1652first-hand the threat this could pose to our service members1653and our homeland security. This is why I'm concerned by a 20241654GAO report which found gaps in Federal reporting requirements1655that could allow it to happen. Fortunately, the Trump1656administration's National Farm Security Action Plan has called1657for stronger USDA reporting and disclosure requirements for1658foreign farmland purchases near military bases and other1659sensitive sites. Mr. Allen, how is the USDA seeking to1660implement the National Farm Security Action Plan's proposal to1661tighten these reporting requirements? What steps has the1662Department taken so far?1663    Mr. Allen. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question and1664your support of this. Right now, the Department is in the1665process of moving the Agriculture Foreign Investment Disclosure1666Act Program from the Farm Production Conservation Mission area1667to my office to have a more national security focus. Also, as I1668mentioned, in January we opened an on-line portal that will1669have as a database getting us away from the 1978 paper-based1670process to modernize the AFIDA's system. We have also issued at1671the end of last calendar year an advance notice of proposed1672rulemaking to update the form, the process of the entire1673program to gather more pertinent information than we have in1674the past to share with our partners, especially at Homeland1675Security, Department of War, and the Treasury to integrate with1676the CFIUS process.1677    Chairman Strong. Thank you. Switching gears, Ms. Kelly's1678CBP plays an important role at our Nation's borders and ports1679of entry to detect and intercept harmful pathogens and1680biological materials from entering our Nation. How have blind1681foreign actors exploited vulnerabilities at ports of entry to1682introduce threats to our Nation's agriculture? How can CBP1683harden its screening of these materials?1684    Mrs. Kelly. Thank you for the question, Chairman. What1685we've seen, not even specific to one particular pathway, but1686across many of the pathways where we are continuing to harden1687our processes, is are these numerous artful attempts to evade1688our detection capabilities. We're seeing varying levels of1689concealment practices such as utilizing public media comic1690books to obfuscate the presence of biological materials. We're1691also observing that there are attempts to transport these1692materials on their person or hidden into personal items such as1693bedroom slippers. To ensure that we continue to advance our1694inspection capabilities, we are launching efforts to modernize1695our infrastructure. We're making strategic investments in our1696non-intrusive inspection technology, and we are also working1697with the industry to ensure that there are sustained awareness1698of biological threats and the numerous attempts by which1699individuals and malicious actors may attempt to introduce these1700items.1701    Chairman Strong. Thank you. Turning to Mr. Cooper, the1702National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, also1703known as NBAC is a DHS Science and Technology-operated national1704laboratory. Through its two centers, NBAC provides expertise to1705help DHS understand biological threats and the capabilities of1706our adversaries. As I mentioned earlier, recent news reports1707indicated that the unidentified biological samples from an1708incident in Las Vegas were sent to the center for texting--or1709for testing. Mr. Cooper, what is the scale and scope of NBAC's1710cooperation with law enforcement and how does this partnership1711support DHS's mission?1712    Mr. Cooper. Chairman, thank you for that question. So as1713you mentioned, S&T does own and operate the National Biodefense1714Analysis and Countermeasure center, NBAC. The forensic center1715however, is operated by the FBI. So I would defer to my FBI1716colleagues on what--how they are participating in the1717investigation and supporting the State and locals for that.1718S&T's role is to ensure the facility has the necessary1719capabilities in order for the FBI to pursue its investigations.1720    Chairman Strong. Thank you. My time has expired. I now1721recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman from New York, Mr.1722Kennedy, for 5 minutes of questioning.1723    Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Chairman. Our Nation's ability to1724recover from some of the most significant emergencies is1725largely thanks to one agency, FEMA. For example, during COVID-172619, FEMA led the Nation's pandemic response efforts,1727distributing personal protective equipment, ventilators, and1728testing supplies across the country. If a large-scale1729agroterrorism attack occurred, FEMA's resources and authorities1730would be indispensable for minimizing human casualties and1731economic impacts. However, Trump and Secretary Noem have both1732stated they want to completely get rid of FEMA. As of just days1733ago, there are credible reports that Secretary Noem is planning1734to cut FEMA's remaining work force in half. So Dr. Grant is a1735senior advisor for DHS office responsible for mitigating the1736impact of biological threats. Do you believe that gutting1737FEMA's work force improves our Nation's ability to respond to1738large-scale agroterrorism attack or not?1739    Ms. Grant. Thank you for your question, Ranking Member1740Kennedy. I believe there's an important mission of FEMA,1741including the different missions that you describe. I think our1742office works across not only industry, but also across the1743Department to make sure that we're prepared as we can be for1744agricultural terrorism threats. I would have to get with our1745FEMA representatives to talk about specific grants that you1746brought up in terms of cutting. So we can take that as a get-1747back to answer your question about the specific grants you're1748referring to.1749    Mr. Kennedy. If FEMA employees were cut in half, basically1750gutting the agency, do you believe that that would have a1751negative impact on your ability to do your work?1752    Ms. Grant. Again, I'm not really--so in terms of the impact1753that FEMA can have, we work with them on annexes as well as1754other documents, but not directly in terms of responding to1755different incidents like this.1756    Mr. Kennedy. Would a drastic work force reduction at FEMA1757compromise the Office of Health Security's ability to protect1758American people from the impacts of a biological attack?1759    Ms. Grant. I believe that we should take that back and get1760with our colleagues at DHS to look at the complete impact that1761could have across our department.1762    Mr. Kennedy. Thank you. Ms. Kelly, I represent, as I1763mentioned earlier, northern border community in western New1764York. The over 200 agricultural specialists who work at our1765ports of entry are essential in ensuring inbound goods crossing1766our Northern Border are free of dangerous pathogens. As you1767have testified today, what are some of the unique challenges1768that these agricultural specialists face at the Northern1769Border?1770    Mrs. Kelly. Thank you. The evolving threat landscape is, I1771would offer not specific to a region or a particular port, and1772that is because of the movement of trade. The complexities of1773this landscape are taken into consideration. The--certainly the1774trade and travel industry and that specific characterization of1775movement, but also the way in which an agricultural threat may1776impact the specific sector. As we look at a more granular1777level, such as the ports, then staffing levels, detection1778capabilities, infrastructure, all of these varying factors may1779characterize the complexity of that specific landscape.1780    Mr. Kennedy. Thank you. I understand the CBP Port of1781Buffalo has a biological threat operations specialist. Will1782Buffalo receive a biological threat exclusion coordinator1783anytime soon?1784    Mrs. Kelly. Thank you for that question as well. We're very1785excited about the Biological Threat Exclusion Program and1786really appreciate the support of the program from Congress as1787well. With regards to our staffing models, they're informed by1788our resource allocation and work force staffing models which1789predict and take into consideration the type of operational1790needs.1791    Whether a particular port may have a threat exclusion1792coordinator or threat operations specialist is strictly1793determined or the decision, I should say, is informed by our1794staffing models.1795    Mr. Kennedy. Understood. Ms. Kelly, are there gaps in1796current Federal law that could improve biosurveillance at our1797northern ports of entry?1798    Mrs. Kelly. There are certainly opportunities for the1799regulations to be updated to ensure that we can continue to1800deliver our mission and execute in an efficient and effective1801manner. Regulations that encourage accountability with regards1802to information sharing and collection can certainly ensure that1803we continue to make robust decisions at the ports of entry.1804    Mr. Kennedy. I'm out of time. Chairman, if I could just1805add, Ms. Kelly, if there are opportunities for you to inform1806myself and the Chairman of legislation that could in fact1807improve this bio-surveillance, we are open to that. Thank you.1808    Chairman Strong. Ranking Member's time has expired. I now1809recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Van Epps, for 51810minutes of questioning.1811    Mr. Van Epps. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this1812very important hearing. Thank you to the witnesses for being1813here today. Thank you to the Trump administration and your work1814to keep our country safe. The food and agriculture sector is1815one of America's 16 designated critical infrastructure sectors.1816Because nearly 95 percent of U.S. farms are family-owned1817operations, our farmers are especially vulnerable. An attack1818can rapidly cascade from farms to processors, distributors, and1819ultimately to grocery shelves nationwide. Agroterrorism isn't1820just an abstract threat. It is the deliberate introduction of1821plant or animal pathogens to cause economic damage, food1822shortages, panic, and strategic disruption.1823    We know this threat is real because agriculture is1824biologically vulnerable. Many high-consequence livestock1825diseases such as foot-and-mouth disease do not occur in the1826United States today. That means our herds lack natural immunity1827and an outbreak could rapidly--could spread rapidly before1828detection.1829    USDA has estimated that a major foot-and-mouth disease1830outbreak could cost the United States tens of billions of1831dollars in economic losses, devastate exports, and require the1832mass culling of animals to contain spread. A pathogen does not1833need to be weaponized in a sophisticated lab to cause1834catastrophic damage. It only needs to be introduced into a1835dense livestock or processing environment.1836    The modern threat environment compounds this risk.1837Terrorist networks, transnational criminal organizations, or1838state-linked actors could attempt to smuggle pathogens through1839ports of entry, mail systems, research collaborations, or1840contaminated feed and biological materials. Agriculture is1841uniquely exposed because farms are geographically dispersed,1842biosecurity practices vary, and the supply chain depends on1843continuous movement of animals, feed, and products. A1844coordinated biological attack on livestock or crops could1845simultaneously trigger food shortages, economic shock, and1846strain on military logistics, particularly in districts like1847mine that host Fort Campbell.1848    This is why the Trump administration's National Farm1849Security Action Plan is so important. It recognizes that1850preparedness is paramount. It requires robust bio-surveillance,1851real-time data sharing between USDA, DHS, FBI, and State1852officials.1853    Strong screening at ports of entry, laboratory capacity for1854rapid pathogen identification, and joint exercises that1855simulate deliberate biological introduction. If an adversary1856wants to undermine the United States without firing a shot,1857targeting our food supply is a strategic pathway. We cannot1858afford to treat that risk as secondary.1859    Ms. Kelly, what screening protocols are in place at ports1860of entry to detect intentionally concealed livestock or crop1861pathogens? How do those protocols differ from routine1862inspections designed to catch accidental pest or food1863violations?1864    Mrs. Kelly. Thank you for the question. Our capabilities1865start really at the National Targeting Center, where we are1866harmonizing our law enforcement data holdings with information1867that is collected and/or provided by our partners at the United1868States Department of Agriculture Animal Plant Health Inspection1869Service. Excuse me.1870    This information is then shared with our front-line1871personnel to ensure that we can continue to strike the balance1872between facilitating trade and enforcing import regulations in1873a manner in which we can deliver meaningful consequences as1874well. With regards to malicious attempts, we have varying1875levels of operational policies and interagency agreements with1876several of our internal and external partners. These policies1877are underpinned by the National Incident Management System as1878well as the National Response Framework.1879    Mr. Van Epps. Thank you. Dr. Grant, when DHS or FBI1880identifies credible intelligence suggesting an adversary may1881target U.S. agriculture, how quickly does that information1882translate into heightened inspection posture at ports of entry?1883    Ms. Grant. Thank you so much for that question. We work1884with our CBP colleagues through the National Targeting Center1885to disseminate that information to them. In addition, we would1886work with our State and locals through our health fusion1887centers to disseminate that information to the localities. So1888throughout those both mechanisms, we would get that information1889to the people that need it.1890    Mr. Van Epps. Great. Thank you. This is both for Mr. Allen1891and Ms. Kelly. How are Federal agencies ensuring that State1892agriculture departments and producers receive timely threat1893intelligence without creating unnecessary alarm?1894    Mr. Allen. Thank you for the question, sir. Our Animal1895Plant Health Inspection Service through our National1896Veterinarian Office works directly with State departments of1897agriculture to pass information on a regular and timely basis,1898including just last week we had the National State Directors of1899Agriculture here in the District of Columbia, and had days of1900face-to-face meetings with them.1901    Mr. Van Epps. Great. Thanks. Mr. Chairman, I'm out of time,1902so I yield back.1903    Chairman Strong. I want to thank the witnesses for their1904valuable testimony and the Members for their questions. The1905Members of the subcommittee may have some additional questions1906for the witnesses. We would ask the witnesses to respond to1907these in writing. Pursuant to committee rule VII(E), the1908hearing record will be held open for 10 days.1909    Without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned.1910    [Whereupon, at 2:49 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]19111912                            A P P E N D I X19131914                              ----------19151916        Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Suzette Kelly1917    Question 1a. At a previous hearing of this subcommittee devoted to1918this topic, witnesses noted that there is no consolidated resource1919addressing vulnerabilities and more importantly, mitigation tactics,1920pertaining to food security practices and threats to agriculture.1921    What current information-sharing practices do your agencies employ1922with other relevant agencies and especially with private-sector1923stakeholders, including academia and industry, and do you believe that1924a single vetted resource of information could help to improve best1925practices on the ground?1926    Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) employs a multi-1927faceted approach to information sharing with other relevant agencies1928and private-sector stakeholders, including academia and industry. CBP1929has provided proactive briefings to other relevant agencies, including1930Fusion Center Health Analysts, to enhance awareness of biological1931threats and share information on the deceptive tactics used to import1932biological materials. Furthermore, CBP proactively engages with1933academia and industry to mitigate agricultural and biological threats1934by offering essential import and export compliance guidance, promoting1935best practices to enhance regulatory awareness, and disseminating1936comprehensive education on current and emerging risks. CBP's National1937Targeting Center (NTC) maintains global partnerships to identify and1938dismantle illicit networks before they reach U.S. borders. The NTC1939fulfills a critical role in improving situational awareness among1940international and industry stakeholders through on-site liaison1941officers. CBP also maintains a cadre of liaisons embedded with select1942State agricultural offices in California, Texas, and Florida that1943foster awareness of threats to the agricultural sector, ensuring the1944interests of the various organizations are met. CBP provides1945operational perspective as an active participant and member of the New1946World screwworm One Health Coordination Unit. In an effort to1947proactively ensure the safety of high-interest events, such as 20261948FIFA World Cup, CBP is proactively engaging with appropriate1949representatives to provide import guidance for blood and urine samples,1950thereby strengthening compliance measures in preparation for the 20261951FIFA World Cup. A singular vetted resource or streamlined information-1952sharing mechanism intended to enable robust sharing of information and1953sustain awareness of biological threats can enhance situational1954awareness, improve decision making, standardize best practices, enable1955efficient response times and support training and education. CBP1956currently leverages the Homeland Security Information Network to1957securely disseminate immediate operational information amongst a vast1958network of Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, international,1959and private-sector partners, thereby enhancing border security,1960supporting collaborative efforts against illicit activities, and1961fostering interagency cooperation.1962    Question 1b. In your opinion, if such a resource were to exist,1963what would be the best way to go about creating it, and how could1964relevant departments and agencies cooperate with each other to assemble1965this document or database?1966    Answer. Existence of such a resource or mechanism relies upon1967defining the scope and content for development of this resource or1968mechanism, technology platform, governance and maintenance, and1969interagency cooperation. Holding the agencies accountable for1970information sharing through appropriate legislation, resources, and1971funding may enable delivery of this resource.1972    Question 2. Ms. Kelly, CBP plays an important role at our Nation's1973borders and ports of entry to detect and intercept harmful pathogens1974and biological materials from entering our Nation.1975    How does CBP work with its partners in national laboratories,1976including the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center1977and Plum Island Animal Disease Center which are operated by DHS S&T, as1978well as other regional animal and plant diagnostic laboratories, to1979conduct testing of biological threats which CBPAS detect and interdict?1980    Answer. The role of CBP Agriculture Specialists (CBPAS) is to1981prevent the entry of plant and animal pests, pathogens, and diseases.1982Interceptions of pests and noncompliant biological materials are1983transferred to the custody of the responsible regulating agency, such1984as the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health1985Inspection Service, or an investigating agency, such as the Federal1986Bureau of Investigation. CBP does not directly facilitate the transfer1987of interceptions to diagnostic laboratories or conduct testing of1988biological threats which CBPAS detect and interdict. CBP defers to DHS1989Science & Technology for specific details related to National1990Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center and Plum Island Animal1991Disease Center.1992         Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Matt Allen1993    Question 1. At a previous hearing of this subcommittee devoted to1994this topic, witnesses noted that there is no consolidated resource1995addressing vulnerabilities and more importantly, mitigation tactics,1996pertaining to food security practices and threats to agriculture.1997    What current information-sharing practices do your agencies employ1998with other relevant agencies and especially with private-sector1999stakeholders, including academia and industry, and do you believe that2000a single vetted resource of information could help to improve best2001practices on the ground?2002    Answer. USDA, as the ``People's Department,'' has maintained a2003proud tradition of working closely with academia and producers to2004promote the latest scientific understandings and agricultural practices2005that keep U.S. agriculture the most productive in the world and2006protects it from intentional and unintentional threats.2007    USDA carries out its information-sharing activities primarily2008through its role as Co-Sector Risk Management Agency for the Food and2009Agriculture Critical Infrastructure sector, and co-chair for the Food2010and Agriculture Sector Government Council (GCC) a responsibility shared2011with the Food and Drug Administration. The GCC includes academia,2012State, local, Tribal and territorial members as well as Federal2013partners. The GCC acts as the counterpart and partner to the private2014industry-led Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating Council (SCC) in2015the planning and coordination of activities to ensure the resilience of2016the Nation's food and agriculture system.2017    USDA has not found the lack of a single vetted resource of2018information addressing vulnerabilities and mitigation tactics2019preventing the implementation of mitigations across the sector.2020    Question 2. In your opinion, if such a resource were to exist, what2021would be the best way to go about creating it, and how could relevant2022departments and agencies cooperate with each other to assemble this2023document or database?2024    Answer. USDA does not currently recommend an additional database,2025as we currently coordinate across the Federal departments and agencies2026to address the most pressing threats to the Food and Agriculture2027Sector. An effective, whole-of-Government effort to secure all 162028critical infrastructure sectors and interdependences happens with CISA2029as the National coordinator, providing strategic guidance and assessing2030cross-sector risk and vulnerabilities.2031         Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Jeff Cooper2032    Question 1a. At a previous hearing of this subcommittee devoted to2033this topic, witnesses noted that there is no consolidated resource2034addressing vulnerabilities and more importantly, mitigation tactics,2035pertaining to food security practices and threats to agriculture.2036    What current information-sharing practices do your agencies employ2037with other relevant agencies and especially with private-sector2038stakeholders, including academia and industry, and do you believe that2039a single vetted resource of information could help to improve best2040practices on the ground?2041    Answer. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and2042Technology Directorate (S&T) shares data, information on modeling and2043characterization capabilities, and knowledge products on threats and2044risks to the food and agriculture sector with relevant DHS components2045(e.g., Office of Health Security, the Federal Emergency Management2046Agency) and interagency government stakeholders (e.g., the U.S.2047Department of Agriculture, the Food and Drug Administration, the2048Environmental Protection Agency) to support planning and preparation2049efforts. S&T shares the modeling and characterization information2050through annual information sessions, monthly newsletters, and ad-hoc2051presentations of new data and modeling results with stakeholders and2052subject-matter experts. The data, information, and modeling are2053generated by S&T activities as well as integrated from sources across2054the departments, agencies, academia, and industry. Additionally, the2055Probabilistic Analysis for National Threats Hazards and Risk team2056operates an on-line Hazard Knowledge Management System, that enables2057the sharing of data, model results, and software tools--providing2058partners with access to the most recent technical information that S&T2059has related to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials2060threats to both human health and the food and agriculture sector. There2061are currently For Official Use Only and Classified versions which are2062available to authorized users within the U.S. Government. S&T2063contributes updates on on-going research and relevant risk models in2064biannual joint meetings, as appropriate, of the Food and Agriculture2065Sector coordinating councils. The meetings facilitate information2066exchanges between the Government Coordinating Council and the Sector2067Coordinating Council, which includes industry and academic2068representatives.2069    Single vetted resource of information: There is certainly some2070benefit to establishing a single, centralized resource that would2071enhance information sharing among multiple partners, but it also may2072present unintended consequences like delays in disseminating2073information. By centralizing data, modeling results, and technical2074updates into one platform, stakeholders across government, academia,2075and industry could access timely and relevant information more2076efficiently, improving coordination, reducing redundancies, and2077supporting collective preparedness and response efforts. This idea2078merits additional study and coordination with the interagency and the2079Office of Management and Budget. To ensure proper information security,2080the system would need to provide tiered access, allowing users to view2081only information appropriate to their clearance level and demonstrated2082need to know. Any centralized resource would be implemented consistent2083with applicable Federal research security, and foreign investment risk-2084management frameworks, in coordination with the appropriate interagency2085partners. This approach would safeguard Classified and Sensitive data2086while facilitating effective information sharing among authorized2087stakeholders.2088    Question 1b. In your opinion, if such a resource were to exist,2089what would be the best way to go about creating it, and how could2090relevant departments and agencies cooperate with each other to assemble2091this document or database?2092    Answer. Should such a resource exist, we recommend creating a2093working group to develop a plan for implementing consolidated2094information sharing across appropriate agencies. This group could2095inventory and leverage existing solutions, enabling efficient access to2096data, modeling results, and technical resources for all stakeholders.2097By coordinating efforts through this working group, we could enhance2098collaboration and ensure timely dissemination of critical information.2099        Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Ashley Grant2100    Question 1a. At a previous hearing of this subcommittee devoted to2101this topic, witnesses noted that there is no consolidated resource2102addressing vulnerabilities and more importantly, mitigation tactics,2103pertaining to food security practices and threats to agriculture.2104    What current information-sharing practices do your agencies employ2105with other relevant agencies and especially with private-sector2106stakeholders, including academia and industry, and do you believe that2107a single vetted resource of information could help to improve best2108practices on the ground?2109    Answer. The Office of Health Security (OHS) shares information with2110Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, private-sector, and2111academic organizations by participating in established food,2112agriculture, and public health forums, supporting the integration of2113State and local health intelligence analysts into their State and local2114fusion centers, and sponsoring training and exercises focused on2115threats to the food, agriculture, and public health sectors.2116    For example, OHS participates in the U.S. Centers for Disease2117Control and Prevention's ``U.S. One Health Coordination Unit,'' which2118launched in 2024 as a Federal-level coordination mechanism focused on2119zoonotic diseases. OHS also regularly participates in Government2120Coordinating Councils and corresponding Sector Coordinating Councils,2121including those related to the food and agriculture sector, managed2122through the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and2123Infrastructure Security Agency.2124    OHS also supports the integration of State and local health2125analysts into their fusion centers. This includes hosting a long-2126standing monthly meeting for these officials to share best practices,2127resources, and actionable information related to health security2128threats. OHS also sponsors individual security clearances for2129appropriate State and local officials to access relevant, Classified2130health and medical intelligence information through these fusion center2131networks.2132    OHS has developed and sponsored discussion-based exercises focused2133on agroterrorism and other threats to food and agriculture supply chain2134for State and local, Tribal, territorial, and private-sector partners.2135These tabletop exercises include participants from industry and2136academia to ensure all relevant parties are engaged in the2137conversation. For example, OHS, in coordination with the U.S.2138Departments of Agriculture, Interior, and Health and Human Services'2139Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, recently hosted a tabletop2140exercise in El Paso, Texas, focused on a coordinated whole-of-2141Government response to New World screwworm. OHS has also delivered2142training to private-sector partners on the lawful importation of2143biological substances to thwart the illegal transfer of dangerous2144pathogens or genetically-modified organisms into the United States.2145    There is benefit to establishing a single resource of information.2146However, it is important to be mindful of any unintended impacts such2147as delays in production and/or distribution of that information. This2148concept should be analyzed further including through engagement with2149Federal interagency partners.2150    Question 1b. In your opinion, if such a resource were to exist,2151what would be the best way to go about creating it, and how could2152relevant departments and agencies cooperate with each other to assemble2153this document or database?2154    Answer. This concept should be researched further across the2155interagency. In addition to ensuring that it does not inadvertently2156delay distribution of information, it should not duplicate or integrate2157any existing structures. Currently, Federal and non-Federal partners2158communicate and cooperate routinely on defending the Nation from2159threats to the U.S. food and agriculture sector.2160    Question 2a. Dr. Grant, OHS recently led a joint food security2161exercise pertaining to New World screwworm with USDA, Department of the2162Interior, and CDC.2163    What findings has OHS gleaned from this exercise, and what steps2164will it take to harden our Nation's defenses against this disease after2165having completed the joint exercise?2166    Answer. While the formal after-action report of key findings is2167still in development, exercise participants did identify several2168preliminary findings from the New World Screwworm Tabletop Exercise2169held in El Paso, TX, in January 2026.2170   Both multi-agency and cross-sectoral coordination is2171        critical to prepare for and defend against agricultural2172        threats.2173   Established plans, protocols, and structured notification2174        processes support collaboration among Federal, State, Tribal,2175        and local agencies.2176   Expanding education and outreach beyond traditional2177        veterinary and health care partners and consistent public2178        messaging would improve the coordinated response to New World2179        screwworm.2180    Question 2b. At this time, are you aware if this exercise will2181inspire future interagency and interdepartmental exercises to combat2182other threats to food and agriculture beyond New World screwworm, and2183what lessons has OHS learned from conducting this exercise in2184formulating potential future exercises, including with regards to2185enhancing State, local, and private-sector outreach?2186    Answer. OHS heard from several attendees of the tabletop exercise2187that they are planning or intend to conduct a food and agriculture2188threat-related exercise in their own jurisdiction. Some participants2189mentioned this was their first agricultural threat exercise despite2190their relevant roles in responding to such an event, and the exercise2191highlighted the importance of practicing a coordinated response to such2192events.2193    The Federal Government has an important role in inspiring and2194appropriately supporting such exercises. As an additional resource, OHS2195is finalizing a cross-sector catastrophic exercise scenario catalog2196that should help State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners more2197efficiently plan and execute their own food, agriculture, and health2198care-related exercises to enhance preparedness. These exercise2199scenarios provide an opportunity to practice response roles, define2200shared responsibilities, and explore unique interdependencies that that2201may not be present in other exercise scenarios.22022203                                 [all]