“Public Funds, Private Agendas: NGOs Gone Wild”

1[House Hearing, 119 Congress]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34                       SAFEGUARDING PROCUREMENT:5                    EXAMINING FRAUD RISK MANAGEMENT6                      IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE78=======================================================================910                                HEARING1112                               BEFORE THE1314                 SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS1516                                 OF THE1718                         COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT19                         AND GOVERNMENT REFORM2021                      U.S.HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES2223                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2425                             FIRST SESSION2627                               __________2829                              JUNE 4, 20253031                               __________3233                           Serial No. 119-293435                               __________3637Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform3839[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]4041                       Available on: govinfo.gov,42                         oversight.house.gov or43                             docs.house.gov4445                                __________4647                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE4860-680 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 20254950-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------5152              COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM5354                    JAMES COMER, Kentucky, Chairman5556Jim Jordan, Ohio                     Vacant, Ranking Minority Member57Mike Turner, Ohio                    Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of58Paul Gosar, Arizona                      Columbia59Virginia Foxx, North Carolina        Stephen Lynch, Massachusetts60Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin            Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois61Michael Cloud, Texas                 Ro Khanna, California62Gary Palmer, Alabama                 Kweisi Mfume, Maryland63Clay Higgins, Louisiana              Shontel Brown, Ohio64Pete Sessions, Texas                 Melanie Stansbury, New Mexico65Andy Biggs, Arizona                  Robert Garcia, California66Nancy Mace, South Carolina           Maxwell Frost, Florida67Pat Fallon, Texas                    Summer Lee, Pennsylvania68Byron Donalds, Florida               Greg Casar, Texas69Scott Perry, Pennsylvania            Jasmine Crockett, Texas70William Timmons, South Carolina      Emily Randall, Washington71Tim Burchett, Tennessee              Suhas Subramanyam, Virginia72Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Yassamin Ansari, Arizona73Lauren Boebert, Colorado             Wesley Bell, Missouri74Anna Paulina Luna, Florida           Lateefah Simon, California75Nick Langworthy, New York            Dave Min, California76Eric Burlison, Missouri              Ayanna Pressley, Massachusetts77Eli Crane, Arizona                   Rashida Tlaib, Michigan78Brian Jack, Georgia79John McGuire, Virginia80Brandon Gill, Texas8182                                 ------8384                       Mark Marin, Staff Director85                   James Rust, Deputy Staff Director86                     Mitch Benzine, General Counsel87                      Bill Womack, Senior Advisor88             Jenn Kamara, Senior Professional Staff Member89                      Ashlii Dyer, Senior Counsel90      Mallory Cogar, Deputy Director of Operations and Chief Clerk9192                      Contact Number: 202-225-50749394                  Jamie Smith, Minority Staff Director95                      Contact Number: 202-225-505196                                 ------9798                 Subcommittee On Government Operations99100                     Pete Sessions, Texas, Chairman101Virginia Foxx, North Carolina        Kweisi Mfume, Maryland, Ranking102Gary Palmer, Alabama                     Minority Member103Tim Burchett, Tennessee              Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of104Brian Jack, Georgia                      Columbia105Brandon Gill, Texas                  Maxwell Frost, Florida106                                     Emily Randall, Washington107108                        C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S109110                              ----------111112                                                                   Page113114Hearing held on June 4, 2025.....................................     1115116                               Witnesses117118                              ----------119120Mr. Kelly P. Mayo, Deputy Inspector General for Investigations,121  DoD Office of the Inspector General122Oral Statement...................................................     6123124Mr. Seto Bagdoyan, Director, Forensic Audits and Investigative125  Services, U.S. Government Accountability Office126Oral Statement...................................................     7127128Written opening statements and bios are available on the U.S.129  House of Representatives Document Repository at:130  docs.house.gov.131132                           Index of Documents133134                              ----------135136  * Article, The Washington Post, ``Pentagon Buries Evidence of137  $125 Billion in Bureaucratic Waste''; submitted by Rep. Biggs.138139The document listed above is available at: docs.house.gov.140141                          Additional Documents142143                              ----------144145  * Questions for the Record: Mr. Bagdoyan; submitted by Rep.146  Sessions.147148  * Questions for the Record: Mr. Mayo; submitted by Rep.149  Sessions.150151These documents were submitted after the hearing, and may be152  available upon request.153154                       SAFEGUARDING PROCUREMENT:155                    EXAMINING FRAUD RISK MANAGEMENT156                    IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE157158                              ----------159160                    Wednesday, June 4, 2025161162                     U.S. House of Representatives163164              Committee on Oversight and Government Reform165166                 Subcommittee on Government Operations167168                                           Washington, D.C.169170    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in171room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Pete Sessions172[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.173    Present: Representatives Sessions, Comer, Foxx, Palmer,174Burchett, Gill, Mfume, Norton, Frost, and Randall.175    Also present: Representative Biggs.176    Mr. Sessions. The Committee on Government Operations and177the Federal Workforce [sic] will come to order. Good morning,178and welcome to not only the Members who are here today and the179staff, but also those people in the audience in support of the180discussion that we will have today.181    Without objection, I may declare a recess at any time.182    I recognize myself for the purpose of making an opening183statement.184    Today's hearing on the Department of Defense's fraud risk185management efforts and how they work to combat fraud. In 2024,186DoD officials told the GAO that they did not believe there was187much fraud within their department relative to their overall188spending. Reports show that DoD spends over $1 trillion189annually. So, as you can tell, even a small percentage would be190significant.191    From 2017 through 2024, DoD reported that about $10.8192billion could be confirmed as fraud--$10.8 billion, when193compared to a trillion is not what they would consider to be a194relative problem. We do. The people who are gathered today,195including Members of Congress on a bipartisan basis, do196consider that $10.8 billion of confirmed fraud is a problem.197    This figure mostly relies on dollars that were recovered.198According to GAO, confirmed fraud and the amount recovered may199only reflect a small fraction of the extent of fraud within200DoD.201    To accomplish its global mission, DoD relies on contractors202for goods and services. In Fiscal Year 2023, DoD reported that203about $431 billion, or 71 percent of total defense spending,204went to contractors for various products and services in205support of the warfighter--71 percent.206    For years, GAO has reported that DoD has struggled to207accurately account for the government property that contractors208possess.209    This long-standing issue affects the DoD's ability to210produce fully auditable financial services as we have discussed211in this Subcommittee and in the Committee under our young212Chairman, James Comer, for a number of years. It affects our213ability to ensure that taxpayer money is being spent214appropriately, and our servicemembers are getting actually what215they need because the taxpayer of this country is paying that216bill. It affects our ability to prevent bad actors from217exploiting vulnerabilities in the contracting system. In218essence, it keeps people honest because they know people are219looking.220    There have been some notable cases over the years that221highlighted how far fraudsters will go to line their pockets by222defrauding the Federal Government. In the early 2000s, Fat223Leonard orchestrated the worst corruption scheme in U.S. naval224history. He bribed Naval officers to steer business toward his225company, Glenn Defense Marine Asia. This company offered226services to the United States Navy, its ships, and it227overcharged the military by at least $35 million. This scheme228went on for over a decade. This case is still being229investigated so the full scope of damage is going to be put230together, and yet today we do not have the final figure. As far231back as 2006, Navy criminal investigators opened and closed 27232separate investigations into Glenn Defense Marine Asia.233    GAO recently reported that DoD's updated fraud risk234management strategy does not include data analytics. Data235analytics would make it easier and clearer for personnel to236verify information and determine eligibility for contractors to237receive Federal awards. It would also help connect the dots238between suspicious activities and those which were legitimate.239Had investigators and the DoD contracted personnel using data240analytics back in 2006, perhaps Fat Leaonard could have been241stopped years before.242    Examples like this are horrible, but fraud within the DoD243just does not threaten their financial positions, but it244undermines the opportunity for them to know what they have,245where it is located, and were the services properly provided.246    There are real operational impacts that can pose a threat247to our servicemembers. One such case involved Defense Criminal248Investigative Service, involved working against a fraudster who249purposefully falsified documents. These documents included a250fraudulent certificate to conceal the fraudster's company and251failure to maintain required manufacturing standards for a252machine gun part.253    This financial impact was only $124,000, but the non-254financial impact was even more troubling. A military engineer255testing one of these machine gun parts saw several256deficiencies. These deficiencies could have harmed our257warfighters, not just in protecting this Nation but also their258lives. Our sons and daughters are fighting for our country, and259they should not have to worry about whether or not a contracted260part for their weapon will function as it was correctly261manufactured.262    This Subcommittee is continuing to have conversations with263not only GAO, but also those within the Defense Department,264including the Inspector General community. We are there to make265sure that we work with them. We want to make sure agencies266understand their responsibility to make sure taxpayer money is267wisely spent.268    One of our first hearings this Congress was focused on269preventing fraud rather than chasing fraudsters who have270already run away with taxpayers' hard-earned dollars. Shining a271light on contracting fraud within DoD and highlighting some272commonsense strategies that can prevent this fraud is also what273this conversation is about today. Estimating the amount of274fraud within DoD is a hard task, but we are up to that, and I275hope that this conversation as well as those that we are giving276to the two witnesses that we have today, where they will277understand that we will join with them in making sure that the278U.S. Congress speaks with one voice to say that we do not just279expect this to be done; we want it done now. Time must be on280our side.281    At this time, I would like to yield to the distinguished282Ranking Member, Mr. Mfume, for any opening statement he would283like to make, and I am delighted that you are here, and good284morning. We made a determination, as I told our witnesses285yesterday, that Mr. Mfume and your side, the Democratic Party,286intends to forthrightly address this issue, come up with real287answers, and we are going to work together on this. The288gentleman is recognized.289    Mr. Mfume. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for290your remarks also. Working together is something that we, on291this side of the aisle, look forward to, particularly when we292are able to discern, as we have been, a great deal of problems293with the Department of Defense, in this case. But thank you. I294want to say good morning to you and to our witnesses and to295everyone else who is here in the meeting room, as well as my296colleagues who have taken time to be here today.297    All of this comes against a backdrop of seven straight298failed audits by the Department of Defense, which is really299hard to fathom. Some of you may be hearing this for the first300time, but seven straight audits deserves an exclamation point301behind it, because when we are dealing with the largest302appropriation within our Nation's budget, we deserve to be303served correctly.304    Oversight of the public purse really is not a partisan305talking point. It is, indeed, a constitutional promise that we306make to every taxpayer and to every servicemember who wears the307uniform. No Federal agency, as I indicated, spends more on308contracts than the Department of Defense. In Fiscal Year 2023,309it obligated roughly $456 billion, well over half of all310contract dollars, and the current continuing resolution boosts311defense discretionary spending to $892 billion. It is kind of312hard to get your arms around a number like that, but that is313the case, $892 billion.314    When a balance sheet is, obviously, that large, even a 1315percent error drains nearly $9 billion from our troops, our316readiness, and our modernization.317    Yet, the Government Accounting Office still places DoD's318business system on a fraud risk management, as the Chairman319said earlier, a High Risk List, confirming that at least $10320billion in fraudulent payments have gone out since 2017, and321then further warning us that the full extent is far higher than322that.323    GAO's message is really rather blunt. Until senior324leadership sustains a commitment to every defense dollar, all325defense dollars remain at risk. The leadership gap should326concern this Committee, contracting offices across the327services, and others, because although there are many that do328historic, or heroic, I should say, work, they need clear329direction from the top, and right now that is not where they330are essentially getting it.331    Congress must, therefore, hold DoD and all of its332contractors accountable when fraud erodes readiness, when it333squeezes small businesses, and when it undermines the public334trust.335    Disturbingly, the Trump Administration has moved us in the336wrong direction on this matter, because within days of taking337office it fired the DoD Inspector General, the Department's338chief watchdog, and has since proposed rolling back key339acquisition safeguards.340    You know, speed has its virtues. I do not deny that. But341dismantling guardrails and silencing oversight is not342efficiency. It is an engraved invitation to fraud.343    And so, as we look at DoD's progress today, I think that344our focus ought to be threefold. No. 1, drive leadership345commitment through every aspect of the agency. Fraud risk346management cannot be relegated to the back office. Secretary347Hegseth and service secretaries who serve with him must own it,348resource it, and insist on measurable results.349    No. 2, modernize the prevention tools. GAO has found that350DoD still lacks the real-time analytics needed to expose351phantom vendors and collusive bidding. So, data must be able to352talk to data before the money walks out of the door. I am not353suggesting that is how you fail seven straight audits, but it354is certainly not the way that you pass them.355    No. 3, enforce accountability, with consequences. When356fraud occurs, suspension, disbarment, and criminal action must357be swift, public, and proportional. Anything less rewards the358bad actors and punishes all the honest ones.359    Colleagues, today every fraudulent invoice paid is a weapon360system delayed, a housing unit deferred, or a veterans' clinic361understaffed. When we achieve and maintain the strongest362military on Earth, we have a clear obligation to make sure that363every defense dollar works as hard as it possibly can for the364men and women it is meant to serve.365    So, I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. I366look forward to working with Chairman Sessions and my other367colleagues on both sides of the aisle here, to try to find a368way, how do we translate all of their insights into some sort369of concrete reform, because reform is clearly, clearly needed.370With genuine leadership commitment and a vigilant congressional371oversight ongoing effort, I think we can safeguard, or372eventually we will be able to safeguard procurement, protect373the taxpayers' investment, and then, of course, strengthen our374national defense. Without it, we do a disservice to the375American taxpayer. Without it, we do a disservice to the men376and women who put on a uniform. And without it, we give up the377obligation that we have to make sure that waste, fraud, abuse,378breaking the law, finding ways to skirt the process, and then379ultimately making a profit off the system, that will be with us380forever if we do not act, and act swiftly.381    So, I want to yield back, and again thank the Chairman. I382want to thank the members present and all those who are here383out of a genuine concern to find a way to straighten out what384has been a very nasty, ugly problem affecting our Department of385Defense.386    I yield back.387    Mr. Sessions. Mr. Mfume, thank you very much, and not just388for your conversation but remembering and seeing, as you look389up today, we have many young students that are here, that are390here for a summer to learn not just about what might be391democracy and the role of Congress but also to understand that392Congress, too, has not just a role to play but an important393role to play. And it is my hope that they see that we have two394people, not just Republicans and Democrats, but two people who395are equally committed to the needs to make sure that their396future is brighter and better also, because they, while they397may be voters now, they soon will be taking our place, and want398to tell the story about their future. And it does reside around399the national security issues of the United States military. And400I want to thank you very, very much.401    I would ask unanimous consent that Congressman Andy Biggs402from Arizona be waived on today's hearing for the purpose of403asking questions. Without objection, so ordered.404    I also note that today we have our young Chairman, James405Comer, the Chairman of the whole Committee on Government406Reform. Mr. Chairman, we are delighted that you have taken time407to join us.408    Chairman Comer. Thank you, and I appreciate the ``young''409comment. I really appreciate that, Mr. Chairman.410    Mr. Sessions. Well, you earned it. How about that.411    I am pleased today to welcome our witnesses, Kelly P. Mayo412and Seto Bagdoyen. Mr. Mayo is Deputy Inspector General for413Investigations at the Department of Defense's Office of414Inspector General. Mr. Bagdoyan is the Director of Forensic415Audits and Investigative Services at the United States GAO,416Government Accounting [sic] Office. We look forward to having417you join us today, and when we met yesterday I assured you that418your comments, your insight, and the things which you would419bring to the table are not aimed at anything other than420resolution, information to where we are able to work with you.421And I also assured you that you would come before a422subcommittee that, while we have deep issues and problems, it423is shared by both of us, not only on a bipartisan basis but in424the best interest of the warfighter, who represents the425husbands and wives of men and women who want their children to426be taken care of properly as a fighting force to protect427America.428    So, pursuant to Committee Rule 9(g), the witnesses are429asked to please stand and to raise their right hand to be sworn430in.431    Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony that you432are about to give today is the truth, the whole truth, and433nothing but the truth, so help you God?434    [Chorus of ayes.]435    Mr. Sessions. Let the record reflect that the witnesses436have both answered in the affirmative. Both of you may take437your seat, and thank you very much.438    I now would like to recognize the witnesses for their439opening statement. Let me remind the witnesses that we have440read your written statement and it will appear in full in the441hearing record.442    As we spoke about yesterday, we are going to limit your443oral statement to 5 minutes, but we want you to make your444points, if you sneak over that. But certainly, in questions445from the Members that come here, we would like for you to give446full and complete thoughts that you have that enable us to447better understand the role that you play.448    As a reminder, please push the button on the microphone in449front of you so that the Members can hear you, and when you450begin to speak the light in front of you will turn green. You451will also see, after 4 minutes or so, the light will turn452yellow, and then the red light will come on. I encourage you to453please make sure that your conversation with us fits not only454within that timeframe but you are able to complete your work455properly, because we need to use your time to help us in456recognition of what we are trying to accomplish.457    I now recognize Mr. Mayo for his opening statement. The458gentleman is recognized.459460                       STATEMENT OF KELLY P. MAYO461462              DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INVESTIGATIONS463464                  DOD OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL465466    Mr. Mayo. Thank you, sir. Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member467Mfume, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the468opportunity to testify today regarding the important topic of469procurement fraud within the Department of Defense.470    As the Deputy Inspector General for Investigations, I lead471the Defense Criminal Investigative Service. We are the criminal472investigative arm of the DoD's Office of Inspector General,473which is mandated by Congress to oversee DoD programs and474operations.475    In support of the DoD IG's broader independent oversight476mission, DCIS conducts criminal and civil investigations to477ensure that resources meant for America's servicemembers are478not stolen, wasted, or compromised. My testimony today reflects479the experience of hundreds of DCIS special agents, analysts,480and other talented professionals who are dedicated to exposing481fraud and protecting the integrity of the U.S. defense spending482at home and abroad.483    My message for the Subcommittee today is clear and simple.484Investigating procurement fraud within the DoD is a top485priority for DCIS. Fraud harms military readiness, it puts486servicemembers at risk and erodes the trust of the American487taxpayers. That is why DCIS has been aggressively holding488fraudsters accountable since we were established more than 40489years ago.490    DCIS defines fraud as any intentional act or scheme to491obtain something of value from the DoD through false492statements, deception, or misrepresentation. It can be493perpetrated by individuals inside and outside of the government494and by the private sector companies providing products and495services to the DoD.496    DCIS targets fraud that threatens national security,497including product substitution, bid rigging, cybersecurity,498from domestic contractors. Our investigations routinely lead to499criminal convictions, Civil False Claims Act recoveries, and500contractor debarments, returning billions of dollars to the501government and preventing future losses.502    For example, in just the 6-month period from October 2024503through March 2025, DCIS investigations resulted in more than504$3 billion recovered for taxpayers.505    To date, DCIS has 1,864 open investigations, including 478506cases of procurement fraud. I cannot discuss any ongoing or507open investigations during today's hearing, to maintain the508integrity of the investigative process. However, I can509certainly talk about closed investigations.510    In conclusion, the procurement fraud is not a technical511irregularity for the DoD. It is a strategic vulnerability that512siphons taxpayers' funds and undermines public trust. Ongoing513engagement and support from the Congress are essential to514reinforcing the DCIS mission and upholding the trust placed in515us by the American people and those who we serve. We look516forward to working with a continued partnership with the517Subcommittee to uphold the standards of our warfighters that518our taxpayer expect. Thank you again for the opportunity to519testify today. I will welcome your questions.520    But if I may, I have 1 minute left, I would like to say521that I am incredibly honored to be here. I was a blue-collar522kid, homeless for a while, and this is a privilege of a523lifetime. Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen.524    Mr. Sessions. Mr. Mayo, thank you very much, and the525gentleman yields back his time.526    I now would like to recognize Mr. Bagdoyan. Mr. Bagdoyan,527you are recognized.528529                       STATEMENT OF SETO BAGDOYAN530531                                DIRECTOR532533               FORENSIC AUDITS AND INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES534535                 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE536537    Mr. Bagdoyan. Thank you. Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member538Mfume, and Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to discuss539today GAO's extensive work on procurement fraud risk management540at DoD.541    The President recently proposed a $1 trillion Fiscal Year5422026 budget for the Department, a substantial share of which is543for procurement, an operational area inherently at risk for544fraud. In general, fraud risk in Federal programs is a function545of weak controls as well as high spending levels, sprawling546scope and scale, and complex, often restrictive,547configurations. These causal factors are all present in DoD548activities, making effective fraud risk management very549challenging. In this regard, DoD faces significant financial550and non-financial fraud risks which, coupled with weak fraud551risk management, compromise the integrity of its programs,552resulting in operational readiness and national security553impacts.554    An example from our reporting underscores such impacts,555namely an ineligible foreign manufacturer, through opaque556ownership of U.S. shell companies, obtained contracts, accessed557and exported sensitive military data, and produced558nonconforming parts, which resulted in the grounding of 47559fighter jet aircraft.560    My remarks today aggregate the results of three GAO reports561since 2019 on DoD procurement fraud risk management, the562addition in February 2025 of fraud risk management to the563existing DoD financial management area on GAO's High Risk List,564and recent related GAO testimony before this Subcommittee.565    Against this backdrop, DoD asserted that fraud is not a566significant problem, challenged our adding fraud risk567management to the High Risk List, and disagreed with key568findings and more than half of our recommendations in our three569reports. These recommendations are fundamental to effective570fraud risk management. Thirteen of these recommendations,571including two designated as priority--which means ``must do''572recommendations--remain open, and though risks are immediate,573DoD has repeatedly delayed their implementation.574    Regrettably then, DoD's indifferent posture, including lack575of timely action, suggests that fraud risk management is not576yet a top leadership priority. With the foregoing as context, I577will make two principal points about the state of fraud risk578management at DoD.579    First, our analyses of about 2,700 adjudicated procurement580fraud causes, covering fiscal years 2015 to 2021, conclusively581showed that, assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, fraud582and risk is indeed a problem at DoD.583    Second, DoD's capacity to manage fraud risks falls well584short across multiple fundaments. For example, the DoD585antifraud strategy has not established clear roles,586responsibilities, and authorities across components for fraud587risk management, including the entity charged with leading this588effort. Accordingly, this entity cannot readily compel timely589and comprehensive action by components.590    Data analytics activities to identify and assess fraud591risks are essentially nonexistent across components, including592investigative units, missing a major opportunity to593significantly enhance fraud risk management decision-making and594action.595    I will close by underscoring that managing fraud risks596effectively is serious business, as their multiple impacts are597significant. Accordingly, for DoD to address such risks598successfully and safeguard its assets, it must promptly do599three vital things.600    First, acknowledge fraud risks are a problem, rather than601downplay their existence and significance. Second, determine602their extent, nature, and implications at the institutional as603well as the component levels. And third, act decisively and604timely as part of an integrated anti-fraud approach to fully605implement all our recommendations and build and sustain an606effective fraud risk management capacity.607    Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Mfume, this concludes my608remarks. I now welcome your questions. Thank you.609    Mr. Sessions. Mr. Bagdoyan, thank you very much. The610gentleman yields back his time.611    I am first going to go to our young Chairman of the full612Committee, the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Comer. Sir, you are613recognized.614    Chairman Comer. Thank you, Chairman Sessions, and I want to615thank you and Ranking Member Mfume for the work you do on this616Subcommittee. You all do it right, and I appreciate that.617    My first question for both witnesses, I assume you all will618both agree that fraud is a problem at DoD. Correct?619    Mr. Mayo. Yes, sir.620    Mr. Bagdoyan. Yes.621    Chairman Comer. So, do you, sir, Mr. Bagdoyan, do you have622an estimate of how much fraud there is at the Department of623Defense?624    Mr. Bagdoyan. I do not, Mr. Chairman. The numbers we have625are based on what Mr. Sessions mentioned in his opening626remarks, essentially confirmed fraud, which is----627    Chairman Comer. Massive, massive. And it has been mentioned628several times. The DoD, the Pentagon, continues to fail audits,629which is unacceptable, but they continue to do that.630    Mr. Bagdoyan. Yes. If I may add, that what is confirmed is631what has been detected, investigated, and adjudicated. So, I do632not know what has been missed.633    Chairman Comer. Right. Well, let me ask both of you. Does634the Department of Defense agree? I think I know where Secretary635Hegseth is, but do the rank and file employees, bureaucrats,636whatever you want to call them, at the Department of Defense,637do they agree that there is massive fraud in the Department of638Defense? Mr. Mayo?639    Mr. Mayo. I do not know that I can speak to that broadly,640sir. I think many of the people in the Pentagon do understand641this. I have not discussed this with them, but I think the642people in the DoD, many of them do the same.643    Mr. Bagdoyan. Yes, I would agree with Mr. Mayo. I cannot644speak to the rank and file in broad terms, but the people we645are working with to implement our recommendations seem to have646their hearts and minds in the right place. They do believe it647is a problem that needs to be addressed, but in terms of648personally verifying and vouching for that, I cannot do that.649    Chairman Comer. So, what advice do you all have for650Congress, for this specific Subcommittee, that is sincere. This651Subcommittee is quality. Everyone is sincere about wanting to652eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse and mismanagement in the653Federal Government. I think everyone knows the Department of654Defense is the poster child for waste, fraud, abuse, and655mismanagement in the Federal Government. We talk about it, but656nothing gets done. What advice would you all have, real quick,657for this Subcommittee and this Congress to actually get658something done to rein in the excessive spending, just the659exuberant waste at the Pentagon? Mr. Mayo?660    Mr. Mayo. Yes, sir. I think that we are doing it right now.661With your help, with your substantive help, I think we can make662some, not DCIS, but the government writ large.663    Chairman Comer. Sir?664    Mr. Bagdoyan. Yes, I would agree with that. Sustained,665regular oversight is very important.666    Chairman Comer. Let me ask you this. Is it Congress' fault?667We hear about Congress, you know, that the Pentagon will make a668suggestion on a certain type of aircraft, that maybe they do669not need as many or they do not need them at all, and a Member670of Congress that has a facility in their district will change671that and say, ``No, we are going to order three times as many672as we need.'' Is it Congress' fault? Who do you lay the blame673on? Is it Congress or the bureaucrats at the Department of674Defense? Mr. Mayo? We have to blame someone. Someone is at675fault for the way the Department of Defense continues to fail676audits, it continues to be, you know, efficient with taxpayer677dollars. Is that our fault? When I say ``our,'' I am talking678about Congress just from way, way back, you know, not Mr.679Burchett and myself, or Mr. Biggs. We are relatively new here.680    Mr. Sessions. You want to blame me.681    Chairman Comer. Well, no, no, no. You are one of the good682guys, Mr. Sessions. But who do you blame for this?683    Mr. Mayo. I would not know, sir. I think it is a pervasive684thing across the DoD. I think they are working hard to get685things done, and a lot of these things are slipping through the686cracks. It is certainly not your fault. I do not think so at687all.688    Chairman Comer. This is something--I have been here 8689years, and Mr. Biggs and I got here at the same time--it is not690getting any better. I mean, it gets worse. And, you know, I691think that the good thing we have now with President Trump,692with the overall objective of the DOGE movement, is, we cannot693continue to spend $2 trillion a year more than we take in. We694have got to tighten our belts. Jamie Dimon talks about it, the695bond market is concerned, and we cannot continue this excessive696spending. And we want a strong military. We want to support our697troops. But we cannot continue to waste money.698    And I appreciate the witnesses here today. I appreciate the699hearing, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. Hopefully, we can700come together in a bipartisan way to solve this problem of701excessiveness at the Department of Defense.702    I yield back.703    Mr. Sessions. The gentleman yields back his time. While the704young Chairman is here, I would like to bend his ear for just a705second, on a bipartisan basis. We believe that what we are706doing today is also to point out that the Department of707Defense, when they respond back to the investigations that have708been done, the findings of fact and conclusions that the GAO709and IG have presented to the management of DoD, in writing,710they come back and say they are noncompliant, which means they711do not agree with the findings of professionals like the IG or712GAO.713    So, while you are worried about, and we are too, what we714spend, we are more concerned that they ignore----715    Chairman Comer. Exactly.716    Mr. Sessions [continuing]. That fraud is present in this.717And you will find that as a result of this hearing today, Mr.718Mfume and I will be requesting you and the Ranking Member of719the Committee join us in going to, across the river, to DoD, to720make sure that they understand that this is unacceptable and721that they have got to understand there is fraud.722    Chairman Comer. Absolutely. Well, thank you all for what723you are doing, and I appreciate this hearing and look forward724to the rest of it.725    Mr. Sessions. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Mr. Mfume?726    Mr. Mfume. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have got a727couple of questions about GAO and their risk management, if you728do not mind. Mr. Bagdoyan, in your view--and I do not have a729lot of time here, so if you can kind of quickly walk through730these with me--what leadership actions would have the greatest731immediate impact on lowering DoD's fraud risk profile?732    Mr. Bagdoyan. Yes. The key action here is to make it the733top priority for action, and make sure that that translates734down to the various levels, the various components that we have735audited over time. So, it has to come from the Secretary to736make sure that his staff are aware of that priority and start737building a culture of fraud risk management. Without that, all738the rest is not going to work.739    Mr. Mfume. Yes, and I think that is one of the clear things740we are going to be communicating to Secretary Hegseth. It has741got to start at the top, and it has got to be sustained.742Otherwise, we will be here 8 years from now, talking about 15743failed audits.744    How would you characterize the current state of DoD's data745integration for fraud detection? In other words, are we at the746starting line, the halfway point, or near the finish line?747    Mr. Bagdoyan. Being at the starting line would be a748charitable way to describe it. They are just not there. The749data are massive. They are difficult to work with. We spent750months cleaning up the data. One of my colleagues in the751audience did that as his full-time job for a long period of752time, before we could even analyze the data. So, that needs to753be looked at before they do any other work with the data.754    Mr. Mfume. Thank you for the characterizations. What755specific analytics and capabilities related to analytics should756DoD prioritize over the next 12 to 18 months to improve early757detection of fraudulent activity, early detection.758    Mr. Bagdoyan. Yes, early detection. Of course, make759building a data analytics capacity the priority. Then move on760to the data themselves, to clean them up, to make them usable,761make them reliable, and analyzable, if that is a word, to make762sure that the end result is actionable.763    Mr. Mfume. And could you highlight two or three, four764maybe, GAO recommendations that if implemented this year would765deliver the biggest return on investment for taxpayers?766    Mr. Bagdoyan. Well, to start with, we expect the anti-fraud767strategy from DoD toward the end of next month, I believe, that768they have promised, will include data analytics as a top769priority. So, that is a good starting point. And then the770second priority recommendation that I alluded to earlier771involves doing thorough fraud risk assessments and responding772to the results. Giving me a piece of paper to close a773recommendation is the beginning. But they have to go out and774operationalize what they have done. Otherwise, it is not going775to work.776    Mr. Mfume. And where do you see the greatest barriers? Is777it budget? Is it culture? Is it technology? When I say778``barriers,'' I mean barriers to closing those recommendations.779    Mr. Bagdoyan. Well, as I believe the Chairman mentioned780earlier, there was a resistance from leadership to our781reporting, to our recommendations, to the designation of the782high risk as part of financial management. So, that seems to783have softened over time because the people we are working with784at DoD are trying to implement the recommendations, and we785expect some of their products to come through later this month786and through next month.787    Mr. Mfume. And do you and Mr. Mayo communicate with one788another?789    Mr. Bagdoyan. We met this week. I expect that we will be in790touch.791    Mr. Mfume. Yes, I think it is important. I mean, I sense792his sincerity and yours, but unless there is some sort of793communication here, you know, we are still taking baby steps794instead of giant steps.795    I have one final question. Do you see any new, emerging796fraud schemes that perhaps are enabled by new technologies? In797other words, how do we stay one step ahead of the bad guys who798are finding ways, through technology, to evade capture?799    Mr. Bagdoyan. Unfortunately, the fraudsters are ahead of us800in multiple agencies, programs, and so on. The two most common801schemes that we flagged through our analyses are false claims802and overcharging. There is a whole slew of others, false bids803and so on. So, whatever analytics that DoD implements will have804to be very tactically focused on those fraud schemes, but I805cannot speak to one being more prevalent than the other.806    Mr. Mfume. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.807    Mr. Sessions. The gentleman yields back his time. I would808now like to go to the gentleman who was here well early and who809I know has other obligations, the distinguished gentleman from810Arizona, Mr. Biggs. You are now recognized, sir.811    Mr. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you and the812Ranking Member for this hearing today, and thank you, Mr. Mayo813and Mr. Bagdoyan, for being here.814    The DoD spends a ton of money. We have talked about that.815Yet, we are still seeing fraud, overbilling, fake shell816companies, bad parts, and the system looks the other way, way817too often. And so, I want to highlight something, Mr. Bagdoyan,818real quickly, that you mentioned. You talked about 47 aircraft819had to be grounded due to nonconforming parts provided from a820foreign company through essentially U.S. cutouts. And this gets821to one of the things you talked about is how you get there. You822have got to get them to acknowledge there is fraud. Then you823have to extract the nature and the implications of that fraud.824    Now, the implications of this fraud looks to me--and I want825to ask this question. Is there any evidence that these826nonconforming parts were a malevolent attempt to actually, by827some bad actor, to ground our planes or cause us problems, or828was this simply a scam and they did not care what happened,829they just wanted the money.830    Mr. Bagdoyan. Yes, that is a great question.831    Mr. Biggs. Is your mic on?832    Mr. Bagdoyan. Yes, apologies for that. Yes, we did come up833with some detailed information on that particular case. Let me834scurry through and see what I can attempt. But I do not believe835there was any malevolent intent. These parts, they are wing836parts, if you will. The total cost of the fraud is about837$180,000. But the grounding of the aircraft obviously was a838national security impact. But it was a very small part, made in839India, from a non-eligible manufacturer, through two shell840companies, which were basically a single person operating out841of their residence.842    Mr. Biggs. Yes, so this is the kind of implication that843fraud has on a national security, because you ground the planes844over a very small, simple contract and a scam that should have845been caught.846    We have been dealing with this type of thing for decades.847In fact, I appreciated Mr. Mfume showing his chart. But as far848as my research has shown me is, I have never seen that the849Pentagon ever has actually survived and passed a full850comprehensive audit. In fact, I have actually heard them say851they are too big to be audited that way.852    And so, I want to focus on something fairly straightforward853here. What makes a contract high risk? What red flags do you854see again and again, and most importantly, how do we stop it855before the money is already out the door? So, it is not about856politics. This is a bipartisan issue. We have had this problem857for decades, under both brands. So, we just want to make sure858the system works.859    So, my question for you--I will begin with Mr. Bagdoyan and860then go to Mr. Mayo--I am guessing you know that some contracts861are more prone to fraud than others, and what are the common862traits that tend to show up in a higher risk contract?863    Mr. Bagdoyan. I would say based on what I have seen, the864big-ticket items seem to be more prone, and also the865subcontractor universe is even more susceptible than the866primes, basically. You know, there is only a handful of prime867contractors. They integrate many, many others. So, the868subcontracting may be an area of particular interest.869    Mr. Biggs. Mr. Mayo, same question for you.870    Mr. Mayo. Yes, sir, and I would agree with my colleague.871Really, it is about subcontractors is a significant issue,872because we do not see down there. We do not see underneath the873contract, so we do not see what is going on with the874contractors.875    Mr. Biggs. So, once those types of high-risk contracts are876identified, what is the best way to put a watchdog on them and877make sure that you are not going to be prone or actually878defrauded?879    Mr. Mayo. Well, our audit component does a lot of audits in880that regard.881    Mr. Biggs. But that is post. I am talking about pre. So,882you have identified a certain kind of contract as really a883problem. How do you get in there and actually put down884guardrails? Mr. Mfune talked about guardrails.885    Mr. Mayo. Yes, sir. That would not be our role as the886investigative agency.887    Mr. Bagdoyan. I would say robust due diligence process,888past history, for example, should be looked at, and if there is889a risk----890    Mr. Biggs. Of the contractor.891    Mr. Bagdoyan. Of the contractor, right. Forget the contract892itself. It is the player that needs to the attention, first and893foremost.894    Mr. Biggs. Right. OK. And so, that leads to kind of a weird895dichotomy here. In Mr. Mayo's reporting, you have got a massive896contractor, a defense contractor, and I hate to even bring it897up because they are located in my home state. But Raytheon, in8982024, paid $950 million to resolve allegations involving899defective pricing, bribery, and export control violations. Is900that accurate, Mr. Mayo?901    Mr. Mayo. That is, sir.902    Mr. Biggs. That is a billion dollars that one company can903afford to pay back after some very egregious and serious904allegations. And I see I am out of time. I do have, Mr.905Chairman, a submission for the record.906    Mr. Sessions. Without objection.907    Mr. Biggs. Thank you very much. And with that, thank you908for letting me be here today.909    Mr. Sessions. Does the gentleman seek additional time?910    Mr. Biggs. Mr. Chairman, I could probably go all day on911this. I have got a whole truckload of questions, but I think I912will submit them in writing to Mr. Bagdoyan and Mr. Mayo. And913then, I will share with the Committee the responses.914    Mr. Sessions. We respect that and appreciate your line of915questioning. The gentleman yields back his time. The916distinguished gentlewoman from the District of Columbia, Ms.917Norton, is recognized.918    Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For over three919decades, GAO has maintained a High Risk List to identify920critical government programs and services most vulnerable to921waste, fraud, and abuse, or most in need of transformation. GAO922added financial management at the Department of Defense to that923list in 1995, and it has remained on it ever since.924    I have grave concerns that the chaos we are seeing at the925Pentagon under the Trump Administration is threatening the926progress we have made toward a clean audit. Secretary Hegseth927has proven, time and again, that he cannot be trusted to lead928the Department or with any national security. The Trump929Administration has also purged independent expert and930nonpartisan leaders at DoD, including the Inspector General.931President Trump and the Department of Government Efficiency are932also decimating the Federal workforce which serves and protects933Americans, and DoD is not exempt from this purge. Secretary934Hegseth has announced plans to reduce DoD civilian personnel by935five to eight percent, which will result in tens of thousands936of jobs being cut from the Department.937    Mr. Mayo, would you agree that having adequate staffing is938important for carrying out your office's important work?939    Mr. Mayo. Yes, ma'am, I would agree with that.940    Ms. Norton. Mr. Mayo, have you had any staffers accept the941deferred resignation plan that the Administration offered?942    Mr. Mayo. Yes, ma'am. We did have some people that left.943    Ms. Norton. Mr. Bagdoyan, has DoD speed and responsiveness944improved in recent months?945    Mr. Bagdoyan. Speed and responsiveness to recommendations,946for example? I am not sure if I understand your question fully.947Apologies. Like DoD responding to GAO requests? Yes, we have948seen some improvement in that regard. Things are still delayed,949but they were delayed over the 5 or 6 years of our auditing, so950it has been a pervasive problem.951    Ms. Norton. DoD's high risk challenges, especially related952to financial management, are pervasive, complex, and953intertwined. The Department needs skilled and committed public954servants to effectively address those challenges. In hearing955this Committee held last fall on this topic, GAO testified956about the importance of the, quote, ``tone at the top,'' close957quote, in reducing fraud.958    Mr. Bagdoyan, what does GAO mean by ``tone at the top'' and959what is important to financial management at DoD?960    Mr. Bagdoyan. Yes. ``Tone at the top'' comes from the top961leader, in this case it would be the Secretary of Defense, to962make fraud risk management, financial auditability one of his963top priorities, and make sure that his subordinates realize964that that is a top priority. And then working from that top965level to start instilling a culture of fraud risk management966and auditability, among other priorities, of course.967    But, as I mentioned to Mr. Mfume previously, unless it968comes from the very top it is not going to happen.969    Ms. Norton. I hope this Department will hear our concerns970and take steps necessary to safeguard taxpayer money and our971national security.972    And I yield back.973    Mr. Sessions. The gentlewoman yields back her time. The974gentleman from Tennessee, my friend, Mr. Burchett, you are975recognized, sir.976    Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Mayo, I share your977enthusiasm. When I look back on my life I did not have anything978like yours. I had two wonderful parents, and they are both in979heaven, and they were the best influence in my life and a lot980of my buddies' lives. But I still, every day I am up here, I981think it is just an incredible gift. More people played pro982baseball than have been in Congress. So, thank you for what you983said, brother.984    And I think fraud is just a part of the military heritage,985almost. My daddy was in the Pacific in the Second World War,986and they know they are going to be in the tropics and it is987going to be raining and it is going to be hot, and they had988this old, crappy raingear that did not keep you dry. And it was989just a nightmare, and they never fixed it. They had guns that990did not work correctly, looked like they were made by a991committee in Washington, not by somebody in combat.992    You know, and currently we are building aircraft carriers,993and everybody will tell you, it is not going to be my daddy's994war. The Japanese are not going to bomb Pearl Harbor. Six to 8995months later, America's might is not going to roll out across996the Pacific and destroy a very evil enemy. And if you go997onsites like Unusual Whales, you will see the abuse that goes998on by Members of Congress, and it is never going to change.999    One of the things that would change is if we eliminate1000individual stock trades, but that is not going to happen. We1001will come up with a good bipartisan bill. We are working on it,1002me and Pramila Jayapal and AOC and Chip Roy and some others,1003very bipartisan. But I have no doubt that it will pass--I mean,1004there is no inclination it will pass because we do not have the1005guts, because this town is as crooked as a dog's leg and it is1006part of our heritage. And that disgusts me.1007    But saying all that--I guess you are my therapist today,1008Mr. Mayo--Department of Defense leadership says that you do not1009believe there is a significant fraud at DoD. Based on your1010work, do you agree with that?1011    Mr. Mayo. I disagree. Yes, sir. I disagree with that.1012    Mr. Burchett. You disagree with that. On what basis do you?1013    Mr. Mayo. Our work shows that there is a lot of, and in my1014statement, there was significant procurement fraud across the1015panoply of the DoD, overseas. So, we have a problem.1016    Mr. Burchett. Yes. I think part of the problem is we have1017got a lot of war pimps at the Pentagon, and they are not the1018ones going to go be dying. It is going to be people like my1019little girl and some of the kids in this audience that are1020going to die in some of these worthless wars we are in.1021    How much do you think the Department of Defense loses every1022year to fraud?1023    Mr. Mayo. I could not say, sir. I could probably ask people1024smarter than me in my staff, but I can get back to you on that.1025    Mr. Burchett. See, that is part of the problem. They send1026you two guys in here, and I suspect you all are pretty honest1027guys. And you cannot answer the dadgum questions, and to me1028that just shows an inherent arrogance that we have at the1029Pentagon. And they have not passed eight audits. They have not1030even attempted to finish the dadgum audits. And yet, they come1031up here and we give them more money. Again, our greed. Old men1032make decisions and young men are going to die.1033    What fraud practice in the Department of Defense are1034especially vulnerable to? If either one of you all want to take1035a shot at that, it would be all right.1036    Mr. Mayo. Procurement fraud is especially the one that we1037see the most of, and we target the most, because that is the1038big dollar projects. So, that would be my answer to that.1039    Mr. Burchett. It just seems like we are letting these1040people steal from us, and I just do not think that will ever1041stop. I can remember in a meeting one time they started1042pointing out--on an aircraft carrier, which we know are1043antiquated. We are not going to need them in the future. All1044the people tell us, that are in the know, tell us we are not1045going to need them. You are going to have half a trillion1046dollars' worth of apparatus sitting on the deck and some1047uneducated country is going to send a $100,000 missile and sink1048it all. And you can put a million dollars' worth of drones up1049in the air and knock down a half a trillion dollar jet. And yet1050we are continuing down that path.1051    And part of the problem is, as they did in the meeting,1052they started pointing out in people's district what apparatus1053was made in their district. And even though we are going to1054mothball this stuff, we are going to put it on a shelf, people1055are going to go without in this country, yet the war pimps1056still tend to profit, and we allow it. I just do not think it1057is ever going to change.1058    I think people up here are sincere. I would say our1059Chairman and Ranking Member Mfume are some of the most honest,1060honorable people I have ever served with. But I think this is1061the type of committee, they just pat us on the head and tell1062us, ``Oh, you are doing a great job,'' and then the corruption1063continues. And it is both dadgum parties, and we ought to be1064ashamed of ourselves.1065    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1066    Mr. Sessions. The gentleman yields back his time. I would1067like to see if I could try and begin to answer one of the1068questions that is in testimony. From 2017 to 2024, DoD reported1069$10.8 billion in confirmed fraud. The reason why they do not1070know that exact number is because DoD fails to even put the1071hooks in place to discover more, and we do not have enough1072people on the front line stopping it. But $10.8 billion is very1073significant. I appreciate the gentleman's, not only line of1074questioning, but holding accountable the significant amount of1075that.1076    Mr. Burchett. Mr. Chairman, we just do not have the guts to1077do anything about it. We are going to sit up here and make1078platitudes--not you all, but other Members of Congress will--1079and then they will walk out and wink and nod to the K Street1080lobbyists who profit from this.1081    So, thank you, Mr. Chairman.1082    Mr. Sessions. I thank the gentleman very much. The1083distinguished gentleman from Florida, Mr. Frost, you are1084recognized.1085    Mr. Frost. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and I agree1086with the comments we just heard from my colleague,1087Representative Burchett. And hopefully, as years go on and more1088people come to the institution, we actually get the guts to1089deal with this waste, fraud, and abuse in the DoD and with our1090military contractors that, yes, are stealing from us.1091    And I think it is despicable that so much of our taxpayer1092money goes to these companies. And yet I will tell you one1093place I was last week. I was on the picket line with the UAW in1094my district in front of Lockheed Martin, because they are not1095paying the assembly line workers and the people creating all1096this stuff enough money to be able to pay their damn rent in1097Orlando.1098    Mr. Mayo, but before we can even talk about having the1099courage at some time and place we are unsure of, we have got to1100talk about what is going on right now. Mr. Mayo, this past week1101the Pentagon announced that DOGE had been authorized to review1102most unclassified Pentagon contracts to root out inefficiency.1103Is DOGE answering to you or the DoD IG in this effort?1104    Mr. Mayo. We have not talked to DOGE at all.1105    Mr. Frost. You have not spoken with DOGE, at all.1106    Mr. Mayo. No. They have not----1107    Mr. Frost. When was your office consulted about DOGE input1108into the contract review process?1109    Mr. Mayo. I cannot answer that, sir. I do not know.1110    Mr. Frost. You do not know. Because, to me, you know, if1111your job is to find waste, fraud, and abuse, and then you have1112DOGE, which is supposedly supposed to be looking for waste,1113fraud, and abuse, would you agree that the only efficient way1114to go about that would be to work together?1115    Mr. Mayo. Yes, sir, perhaps.1116    Mr. Frost. In the contract review process run by the DoD1117IG, how would you typically prevent political interference?1118    Mr. Mayo. Please restate that.1119    Mr. Frost. In the contract review process that the IG's1120office runs in DoD, how do you typically go about preventing1121political interference?1122    Mr. Mayo. I have no answer for that because that is not1123part of what we do. But I can certainly get back to you on that1124and get some answers.1125    Mr. Frost. So, do you have any idea of how your office is1126ensuring that DOGE has the strongest controls possible to1127prevent this kind of abuse that we are talking about?1128    Mr. Mayo. Well, I do not know, because DOGE has not come to1129the OIG at this point. We have not seen anybody from DOGE.1130    Mr. Frost. Yes. I mean, under DOGE it feels like efficiency1131and anti-fraud have been actively defunded, deregulated,1132dismantled, and disregarded. And this is part of the problem,1133is we can sit up here and talk about working in a bipartisan1134way all we want, and I think that is really important. In fact,1135the Chair of the Committee, Comer, said during his comments,1136quote, ``DoD is the poster child for waste, fraud, and abuse,''1137but voted yes on a budget that would give the Department of1138Defense more money than they have ever had, over a trillion1139dollars.1140    And then, on the other hand, they talk about waste, fraud,1141and abuse in food assistance, in Medicaid, and slash that to1142the tunes of hundreds of billions of dollars. That means they1143are taking more of an aggressive approach on working families1144and people who depend on some of these services for their1145health care and to feed their children than they will with the1146military contractors. That is why, and Burchett is being really1147nice about it, but that is part of the reason why we are not1148going to handle this. We can sit up here and talk to you all1149day. The fact of the matter is right in front of us. The1150Majority is moving through a budget that would give the1151Department of Defense the most money they have ever had while1152they are, quote/unquote, ``the poster child for waste, fraud,1153and abuse.''1154    Americans need to know which Pentagon dollars are going to1155servicemembers and national defense and which are lining the1156pockets of unethical contractors, over 50 percent of the DoD1157budget.1158    According to the recent GAO testimony before this1159Committee, the DoD thinks there is very little fraud in their1160procurement. Mr. Bagdoyan, do you agree with the DoD's1161assessment?1162    Mr. Bagdoyan. I do not.1163    Mr. Frost. And Mr. Mayo, do you agree with the DoD's1164assessment, that there is little fraud?1165    Mr. Mayo. I do not.1166    Mr. Frost. From where you sit, have the DOGE staff firings1167and reduction of resources from the IG's office to other1168offices, has this helped you investigate fraud cases?1169    Mr. Mayo. No.1170    Mr. Frost. Does it hurt?1171    Mr. Mayo. I think we are doing the same thing we have1172always done.1173    Mr. Frost. So----1174    Mr. Mayo. Which, we continue to just run cases, run1175investigations like we have done. And we just do what we are1176supposed to do. And I do not think it has impacted us as an1177investigative agency.1178    Mr. Frost. All right. Thank you. I have been watching the1179limited progress toward getting DoD to be able to pass a1180financial audit. The Marine Corps recently explained that the1181personnel cuts will likely erase the progress they have made,1182when last year they become the first of our service branches to1183be able to pass a financial audit.1184    I do not know what the path we are on is right now. I think1185it is hurting these efforts. But my hope is that we will be1186able to take this seriously moving ahead and not just put in1187our sights food assistance and Medicaid, when it comes to1188cutting budgets, because of perceived waste, fraud, and abuse.1189But look at the biggest ledger item that we have, and the1190poster child of waste, fraud, and abuse, as said by our1191Chairman of the full Committee, the Department of Defense.1192    Thank you. I yield back.1193    Mr. Sessions. The gentleman yields back his time. Thank you1194very much. The distinguished young Chairman, who sits on this1195Committee and who has distinguished service to the U.S.1196Congress, Ms. Foxx, is recognized. Dr. Fox is recognized.1197    Ms. Foxx. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your distinguished1198service.1199    My question is for both of our witnesses. I will start with1200Mr. Bagdoyan. You can answer first.1201    We can all agree we must hold bad actors accountable for1202poor performance and fraud. Federal agencies, including DoD,1203may suspend or disbar contractors for sustained poor1204performance or serious lack of business honesty or integrity.1205Suspended or debarred entities are prohibited from entering1206into new contracts with Federal agencies, with suspensions1207lasting no more than 12 months, and debarments usually lasting12083 years.1209    According to an industry study, there has been a1210significant decline in suspensions and debarments in recent1211years. Do you believe that instances of contractor poor1212performance and dishonesty are actually declining or are they1213being reported less often?1214    Mr. Bagdoyan. That is a good question. I am glad you asked1215it, Dr. Foxx. I will have to get back to you on this. This is1216beyond my area of expertise, but we do have people at GAO who1217may be able to provide an answer for you.1218    Ms. Foxx. I do want an answer.1219    Mr. Bagdoyan. Absolutely.1220    Ms. Foxx. Mr. Mayo, do you have anything to add to that?1221    Mr. Mayo. It has not impacted us, but I think you are1222probably correct.1223    Ms. Foxx. OK. Mr. Bagdoyan, a GAO report from early 20241224notes that data analytics can help inform fraud risk management1225and are a significant tool for helping agencies transition from1226a costly pay-and-chase model to an approach that is more1227focused on fraud prevention. While the DoD's fraud risk1228management strategy refers generally to data analytics it is1229not established as a specific fraud risk management control1230activity.1231    In your opinion, is this a missed opportunity for the1232Department to root out fraud, and what benefits and cost1233savings could be achieved if DoD made greater use of data1234analytics?1235    Mr. Bagdoyan. Sure. Thank you again for your question. It1236is a very good question. It is a timely one. As I mentioned1237earlier, in response to another Member's question, we do expect1238an updated anti-fraud strategy later next month, and it is our1239understanding that DoD will make data analytics an explicit1240requirement in that strategy. Of course, that remains to be1241seen. We will give it a very good scrub to make sure that1242whatever DoD is proposing to do is responsive to our1243recommendation.1244    But the key point is, if they implement the recommendation1245on paper, they send me something over to look and review, that1246is the start. Then they have to go operationalize that and1247achieve results. So, having a requirement for data analytics is1248not the end of the story.1249    Ms. Foxx. I understand that. What do you think is the1250biggest obstacle for DoD identifying cases of fraud or abuse1251before they occur? Is that lack of having analytics?1252    Mr. Bagdoyan. That is a significant part of it. Also, it is1253the commitment to look. If you do not acknowledge you have1254fraud then you are not really going to bother to have controls1255in place to figure it out.1256    Ms. Foxx. Are you aware of other Federal agencies doing a1257good job fighting procurement fraud, and if you do, what1258lessons can we learn from those examples?1259    Mr. Bagdoyan. Sure. Unfortunately, I have been doing fraud1260risk management work for about 11 years now at GAO, and many1261agencies--big, intermediate, and small--struggle with this. But1262one of the ones that we have pointed out as being a success1263story is the Export-Import Bank of the United States. They1264started a ``tone at the top,'' made it a priority, and then1265took all the steps necessary to implement fraud risk management1266capacity. We are in the process of starting a mandated review1267of where they are, and we should be reporting on that sometime1268next year. So, we will go back and make sure that what they did1269put in place remains effective.1270    Ms. Foxx. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I think what Mr.1271Bagdoyan, especially, has pointed out is that there has to be1272the willingness to look for fraud, first of all, and there is a1273need, I think, for us, as an oversight committee, to stay on1274top of this issue, and to push for that.1275    You know, it is really, really sad that so many people who1276work for the Federal Government do not understand that it is1277the hardworking taxpayers who provide the funds for these1278programs, and that all of us deserve them to have that attitude1279where they want to save every penny. I have that attitude. The1280people in my office have that attitude. And some way or1281another, we have to infuse the entire Federal Government with1282that attitude.1283    Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman.1284    Mr. Sessions. The gentlewoman yields back. To clarify a1285little bit of what you have spoken about, which I think is on1286point, and that was yesterday when I met with both these1287gentlemen, separately, I asked the question that was asked by1288Mr. Randall, and that essentially was, ``Do you believe that1289there is a problem?'' And both of these gentlemen virtually1290leapt out of their chair in violent agreement that there is a1291problem. And we came to a quick resolution. I knew where they1292stood.1293    Thank you very much. We next would move to the gentlewoman1294from Washington. Ms. Randall, you are recognized.1295    Ms. Randall. Thank you so much, Chairman. And, you know, I1296am so grateful for our witnesses for being here, and I just1297want to start with additional grounding and gratitude for my1298constituents, nearly 27,000 of whom are Federal employees,1299working for the DoD, who each individually do want to deliver1300the best results possible, know they are using taxpayer1301dollars, and are fighting to deliver for the mission, often1302with parts that they are responsible for piecemealing together,1303using old equipment, scrapping naval vessels in order to use1304every piece possible to deliver results for the mission.1305    So, I do believe that we have work to do to ensure that the1306Department of Defense is accountable and is able to pass an1307audit, because that is important. That is our oversight1308responsibility. But we have to make sure that the folks on the1309ground, doing the work, delivering these results for mission1310readiness, have all of the resources that they need in order to1311meet the mission.1312    Naval Base Kitsap and Puget Sound Naval Shipyard are two of1313the installations in my district, and I recently met with the1314superintendents at these military installations. They have1315voiced some important reasonable steps that we should implement1316in order to root out fraud and improve procurement and1317contracting and operations. But there are steps that should be1318done, not with a chainsaw but with a tactical approach, that we1319are not currently seeing with the DOGE efforts, to slash a1320budget and infuse additional dollars into the Department of1321Defense without real thought to how we deliver on these1322mission-critical efforts.1323    Mr. Bagdoyan, can you discuss instances of counterfeit or1324substandard equipment that may have compromised the safety of1325our service members?1326    Mr. Bagdoyan. Sure. Thank you for your question. I will1327refer back to the example that I cited in my opening remarks.1328This occurred about 15 years ago. It took a couple of years to1329investigate, given the complexity of the scheme. But1330essentially it involved two shell companies, co-owned by a1331company in India. The shell companies obtained exported plans1332and schematics of military equipment, in this case jet1333fighters. And the wing part for the F-15 fighter aircraft--that1334is the type of plane involved here--was defective because it1335was not conforming to what the contract required. So, whether1336it was poor workmanship or some other factor contributing to1337that, but it did result in the grounding of 47 aircraft over a1338period of time. And it involved not a lot of cost, $180,000 if1339I recall correctly. But I would be happy to look into some more1340details and send them over to you if you would like.1341    Ms. Randall. Sure. Thank you. I would appreciate reviewing1342that. I also want to bring up another example. In August 2024,1343Austal USA, a shipbuilder for the Navy, pleaded guilty to a1344scheme involving faulty butterfly valves used in ships. And1345Austal charged the Navy for military-grade valves but failed to1346actually test the valves to make sure that they reached the1347proper safety and operational standards. These faulty valves1348could potentially lead to leaks in a ship's hull, and Austal's1349actions put the individuals of our military at grave risk. And1350these we are talking about are two examples, and I am sure they1351are not the only two.1352    Mr. Mayo, what proactive measures does your office take? I1353know you have referenced how your office is not responsible for1354creating, sort of, fraud detection policies or procedures. That1355is not your work. Your job is to investigate claims. But have1356you made any proactive recommendations to DoD for ways that1357they might address fraudulent criminal activities by1358contractors or vendors?1359    Mr. Mayo. I have not talked to DoD, but I really appreciate1360you asking that question because I have a good answer.1361    In 2017--I came on board in 2016--in 2017, I saw the need1362for data analytics, and in the succeeding years we now have an1363organic data analysis that we utilize. It is not predictive of1364crime, but it has tools that we can help with our1365investigations. And that is organic to DCIS. So, I wanted to1366highlight that for the people here.1367    So, we do have that capability, and we have some very, very1368smart people that do these things. And the OIG has their1369capacity also, and they work with us seamlessly to deal with1370these types of criminal investigations.1371    Ms. Randall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time.1372    Mr. Sessions. The gentlewoman yields back her time. Thank1373you so much for the line of questioning. It is most1374constructive for people who also are in the room who have the1375same expectation that you do, corresponding with Mr. Mfume and1376myself.1377    We next go to the distinguished gentleman from Denton,1378Texas. The gentleman, Mr. Gill, is recognized.1379    Mr. Gill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for1380holding this hearing. And I would also like to say thank you to1381the witnesses for taking the time and coming here.1382    Mr. Bagdoyan, I want to start with you. A recent report by1383the GAO found that for fiscal years 2017 through 2024, DoD1384reported about $10.8 billion in confirmed fraud. The report1385went on to say, quote, ``The full extent of fraud affecting DoD1386is not known but is potentially significant.''1387    Do you have a monetary estimate of the fraud that takes1388place annually within the DoD, perhaps beyond that number?1389    Mr. Bagdoyan. I do not, and actually, the figure you quoted1390is for all fraud around DoD, not just procurement. The1391recovered amount, that is about $7 billion over a number of1392years, is for procurement. So, those are two different sets of1393numbers. Plus, for the confirmed fraud, we did notice, and I1394believe the IG may have flagged this, as well, that DoD1395reported the same figure, $2.4 billion, for two consecutive1396fiscal years. So, that raises some questions about the1397reliability of what has been reported. I believe in the past1398the OIG has questioned the process of arriving at those types1399of numbers.1400    So, I would urge some caution in using those numbers, but1401they do represent what is basically known through adjudication.1402So, they have to be detected first, investigated, then1403adjudicated. So, we have no idea what is being missed.1404    Mr. Gill. If you were to guess, would you guess that total1405fraud at the DoD is higher than that number?1406    Mr. Bagdoyan. I would suspect it is, yes.1407    Mr. Gill. And how many open recommendations issued by the1408GAO are there that would improve financial management within1409the DoD?1410    Mr. Bagdoyan. For financial management, I will have to get1411back to you. On fraud risk management, based on the three1412reports that I have responsible over the last 6 years or so, we1413still have 13 open recommendations. We are expecting responses1414from DoD, as I mentioned before, throughout June and into next1415month. We just sent over the list of priority recommendations1416to the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Hegseth, for his personal1417attention. So, that letter will be made public early next week.1418    Mr. Gill. But either way it is a substantial number.1419    Mr. Bagdoyan. It is a substantial number. The risks are1420immediate, so delaying implementation exacerbates that risk.1421    Mr. Gill. Why do you think they have delayed1422implementation, and how long should it take for the DoD to1423implement some of the recommendations that have been given to1424them?1425    Mr. Bagdoyan. Yes. To be fair it does take time to do this1426and to do it right. But we have encountered pretty significant1427delays, I think, over time that may reflect lack of attention,1428lack of urgency, lack of priority. That is speculative on my1429part, but it is consistent with what we have encountered with1430other agencies.1431    Mr. Gill. Got it. Thank you. And Mr. Mayo, a couple of1432questions for you. The DoD Inspector General has identified 171433scope-limiting weaknesses that are significant roadblocks to1434the DoD's clean audit opinion goal. What steps do you think the1435DoD can take, or needs to take, to obtain a clean audit by14362028?1437    Mr. Mayo. Sir, that is a great question and really outside1438my expertise. I can go back to the audit component and get some1439data for you and get back to you on that.1440    Mr. Gill. Got it. OK. Thank you. And with that, Mr.1441Chairman, I will yield back the remainder of my time.1442    Mr. Sessions. The gentleman yields back his time.1443    I would like to, if I can, answer one of the questions that1444the distinguished gentleman asked, because we have two1445witnesses who are trying to professionally represent not only1446themselves but their departments, GAO and the IGs.1447    The bottom line is, is that there is plenty of1448documentation that shows that DoD, at least over a period of1449several years, said, ``It is not a problem. The things you1450bring to us, it is not a problem. We are not going to even take1451this conversation further.'' So, that is the conversation that1452both of these gentlemen are operating under. And the hope is1453now, with a new Administration, a new Secretary, that there1454will be an emphasis not only on attempting to do something but1455be willing to opening up their eyes to the recommendations that1456have come from professional groups like GAO and Inspectors1457General.1458    So, it is not a matter of them wanting to do or not do.1459They deny its existence. And this is the part, why both of1460these gentlemen literally came out of their chairs yesterday,1461in my office, when we posed this issue.1462    So, I want you to know that your line of questioning is1463most instructive. They also were trying to be very polite back1464to you. So, that is in defense of these young men.1465    Thank you very much. The gentleman yields back his time. We1466now move to the distinguished gentleman, the young Chairman1467from Alabama, Mr. Palmer. You are recognized, sir.1468    Mr. Palmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to direct1469my questions a little bit differently, and I wanted to1470participate in this hearing because I have been looking at some1471of these issues for quite a while. And I realize this is1472focused predominantly on fraud risk management.1473    But one of the things that I think creates an opportunity1474for fraud mismanagement is how we handle big projects at the1475Department of Defense, whether it is a construction project or1476a new weapon system. And I just want to ask each of you to1477comment on this if you think you are able to do that.1478    I think a lot of times when Congress approves a major1479weapon system or a major construction project, and this is1480particularly problematic on construction projects overseas,1481there is a tendency on the part of the Department of Defense to1482start those projects before the design is complete, and it1483results in a huge amount of change orders. I am working on some1484ideas on how to mitigate that from the congressional side in1485terms of ensuring that the money will be there so that they do1486not feel the pressure to start these construction projects or1487other projects or weapon systems before the design is ready.1488    But would you comment on how that, when your design is not1489complete, you are issuing lots of change orders, how that opens1490us up to mismanagement and potential fraud?1491    Mr. Mayo. Me, sir?1492    Mr. Palmer. Yes.1493    Mr. Mayo. I would not be able to discuss that, but in a1494different sphere I would submit that what you are talking1495about, large procurements of weapon systems, they are really1496hybrids for fraud, because of, like you said, the complex1497nature, and when they come online, when the parts come online.1498So, we do have a lot of worry about large weapon systems, and1499we have a lot of fraud work in the past and now in those kinds1500of things, when they are in that phase. So, that would be my1501feedback for you.1502    Mr. Palmer. Mr. Bagdoyan?1503    Mr. Bagdoyan. Yes, I would fully agree with Mr. Mayo's1504comments. I mean, this is an element of hyper-complexity,1505basically. You have a big system. It has the prime contractor,1506I assume, leading the effort, and then the whole army of1507subcontractors, which is a key element of risk here. I am not a1508procurement expert by any means, but I do believe that element1509of complexity, uncertainty, long lead times, all kinds of1510different things add to heightened risk. Definitely.1511    Mr. Palmer. And when you add to that just a myriad of1512change orders----1513    Mr. Bagdoyan. That is right.1514    Mr. Palmer [continuing]. Which I think is problematic. And1515then when you start talking about construction projects, and1516particularly in remote locations, I think it makes it very1517difficult for inventory management. And again, if the design is1518not complete and you are making all these changes, isn't that1519an area where we need to really bear down?1520    And Mr. Chairman, I have been giving quite a bit of thought1521to this, and I have actually been thinking about this for 6 or15228 years, about how we appropriate for major defense programs,1523and maybe thinking about saying that if the project design or1524the weapon system design is not ready that we carry the funding1525over into the next fiscal year, so that we give the Department1526of Defense time to get the design right. And I think that will1527reduce a lot of the fraud and mismanagement and save us a lot1528of money in those areas.1529    And Mr. Mayo and Mr. Bagdoyan, you can comment on that, and1530you may have already commented sufficiently. But that is one of1531the areas where I really want to focus, Mr. Chairman, in terms1532of trying to reduce the amount of waste that we have in our1533defense procurement programs.1534    And with that, I will be happy to yield back.1535    Mr. Bagdoyan. If I may answer Mr. Palmer's question, Mr.1536Chairman, each element of complexity in a program, as I alluded1537to in my opening remarks, that is one of the key drivers of1538fraud risk in Federal programs is their complex configuration,1539what someone can do, cannot do, and so on. So, it is almost1540like risk is built in. And if you add multiple layers in a big,1541complex program of DoD, then that really exacerbates risk. So,1542trying to control for that as part of the up-front due1543diligence, for example, would be an important step.1544    Mr. Palmer. I thank the witnesses. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1545    Mr. Sessions. The gentleman yields back his time. Thank you1546very much. I now would yield myself time.1547    Gentlemen, thank you very much. This time that we are1548spending with you is just one of many areas where this1549Subcommittee, including Mr. Mfume and myself, are concerned1550about not just waste, fraud, and abuse, but also misdirected1551payments. And we have looked at and determined that it is a1552governmentwide problem. And while there is discussion1553necessarily up here that could be a disagreement between the1554parties, something called DOGE, which is government efficiency,1555is a necessary item whereby we bring in fresh eyes to look at,1556actually, the data and information that most of the time,1557Congress, and perhaps even you, do not see. And that is an1558observation about the amount of money that flies out the door.1559    One of the most instructive things that I have learned is1560that there is approximately, at this time, documented, some1561$400 billion that went out from big government--we are talking1562about all the agencies, some $400 billion--that went out the1563door from the day after the election to the day that President1564Trump was inaugurated. And it was a determination made by1565someone to move forward on decisions to spend money, knowing1566that there needed to be a review, knowing that waste, fraud,1567and abuse not only existed across government but that it1568increasingly was an issue that they were challenged with.1569    So, regardless of that, I think it is important that you1570have confidence that Mr. Mfume and I, not looking back to blame1571someone but rather moving forward, we want to hear from FEMA,1572we want to hear from DoD, we want hear from the newest of the1573secretaries and those management organizations, what are their1574plans? How do they intend to structure now, based upon1575information that I think DOGE has provided, that have become1576public, that are not hidden, that are not whispered about, but1577that become generally available.1578    And so, I want you to know that both organizations--1579Inspectors General, Mr. Mayo; Mr. Bagdoyan, the GAO--that you1580represent organizations that we will continue, on a bipartisan1581basis, both of us, to look at, and instead of looking back we1582will have the vision to how are we going to fix it.1583    You both have specialized in DoD. You have heard person1584after person this morning to describe to you our desire to1585engage the Department of Defense at the highest level--not1586levels, level--and to extract from that person, once they are1587able to understand, not just from DOGE but also your1588accounting, of the significant impairment of a delivery of1589dollars and material and equipment that would be available to1590the warfighter. And I just want you to know that the1591conversation today, as you go back home tonight or as you have1592the conversation among your colleagues, is it is a bipartisan1593issue. It is seen very many times the same way. And it should1594reinvigorate your organizations to know that the day-to-day job1595that they do, when they are told by some organization it did1596not matter, we are noncompliant, we do not care, that they1597still do their job, that they still write the reports, that1598they still point up those things that are factual basis, that1599they continue to be on point for understanding that while they1600may not be in DoD, we support the men and women that defend1601this Nation. That they are people who are professional and well1602balanced, and that Members of Congress that are here will be1603supportive of them and not give up that hunt.1604    So, to both of you and your staffs that appeared in my1605office yesterday and the hundreds of people that work for you,1606please reinforce to them that they are part of the answer, not1607the denial of a problem.1608    I want to thank both of you for being here. I am now going1609to move to the distinguished gentleman from Maryland for any1610closing comments that he would like to make, and then I will do1611the same. The gentleman is recognized.1612    Mr. Mfume. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and my thanks,1613obviously, to both of our witnesses for being here and for1614being as forthcoming as you could be.1615    I think one of the things, for me at least, is common1616sense, which is not always common, as we know in life. And it1617just would appear to me that with these ongoing failures to1618meet an audit, with huge fraud being publicized, as it was just1619recently in the Raytheon case, where they agreed to pay $9501620million, not because of an error but because they got caught.1621And when you consider also the fact that this conversation1622predates many of us on this panel. It just goes back years and1623years and years. And when you consider the fact that all1624branches of the service, save the Marine Corps, continue to1625find ways not to be compliant with basic law. And when you hear1626GAO report, as it has done today and has done previously, about1627all these things that are going on, common sense tells me that1628it is important for the Secretary of Defense to speak with a1629clear tongue and a clear idea of what has to be done down the1630ranks. That is where the order has to come from.1631    We know that with respect to the Marine Corps, it was1632testified here in previous meetings that the Commandant said,1633``Look, we are going to do it this way. It is the right way.1634And anybody that does not do it that way is out of here.'' I1635think we need the same kind of determination and the same kind1636of commitment from, as the Chairman said, the top level, which1637is Secretary Hegseth.1638    And I would hope that he would come before this Committee1639and be prepared to talk about what we have been talking about1640now for years, that he has inherited this, and what he plans to1641do about it.1642    I am glad to hear about the Export-Import Bank. I did not1643know that they had kind of established a pattern that could, in1644fact, be something that could be looked at by other parts of1645DoD and other agencies. But we have got to find a way to ask1646ourselves why does the Department of Defense, for years,1647continue to be on the High Risk List? People come in and they1648go. Secretaries die. They move on. And this is an1649embarrassment. It is an embarrassment, and it is thumbing the1650nose of the government right at taxpayers. Our taxpayers really1651want to expect that if we are going to be, as we say,1652efficient, that we are doing something in a real way to be1653efficient.1654    I mean, DOGE, with all due respect, was this Committee.1655This is what we have been dealing with for years and years and1656years, until all of a sudden there was a new entity, DOGE, that1657claims to be doing exactly that. We have got the playbook. We1658have got the information. We have got the data. We have got the1659research. We have got the examples. So, this is sort of like1660reinventing the wheel for no necessary purpose, and at the same1661time not being able to deal with the real question of, in this1662current spending resolution before the Congress, we are1663prepared to be voting on a package that includes $892 billion1664for the Pentagon. Which is why I have opposed that spending1665package altogether, because you cannot do that and at the same1666time cut money, in my opinion, from Medicare, and say you have1667to cut it, when you really do not have to. What you need to do1668is tighten your belt and find moneys elsewhere, like within1669this budget that we continue to see, talked about over and over1670and over again. As I said before, the budget is so large, just1671a 1 percent error is the equivalent of $9 billion. We should1672not take that lightly.1673    And, you know, I am going to say it again, Mr. Chairman. I1674swear I am tired of saying this over and over again. And like1675you are, and I really appreciate your efforts here. We want to1676see progress, and if we do not see progress, I think we have1677got to go before the full Congress and to argue and to1678forcefully debate and to make the case that no action is not1679sufficient.1680    So, we heard the stories today, and we know that in many1681respects people are wondering how are you going to cut this,1682you are going to cut SNAP assistance for children and women.1683You are going to reduce Medicaid, Medicare. You are going to1684threaten, even though it has not been said yet, to make Social1685Security unstable. Just the thought of it being unstable causes1686problems. And then look at what is happening in the bond1687markets and what is going on with investors in other countries1688around the globe, as they look at our credit worthiness and1689whether or not we, in fact, mean what we say.1690    So, I am going to get off of my little soapbox. I just can1691tell you that this is bad. There is no justification for this,1692whatsoever.1693    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.1694    Mr. Sessions. The gentleman yields back his time, and I1695want to publicly, once again, thank the distinguished gentleman1696for not only working us and with me, but for your insistence1697that we can make progress. And I think that it is important1698that the GAO community and the IG community, as well as these1699organizations in government--yes, I am talking about Article1700II--that they understand that there are several people on the1701Hill who will not kick the can down the road, that we will1702decide that a mark has been laid in the road. Because it is1703important that the American people have confidence in what we1704are doing, because we expect results.1705    So, I want to thank the distinguished gentleman. I want to1706thank both of you. I did this in my comments, but I want to1707thank both of you for taking time. I find you both not only1708genuine men of honesty but of representation of professional1709product. And both of you took my questions yesterday, and have1710taken them today, that we believe must be resolved. And so, for1711your staff and for the people that you represent, we are very1712proud of the work that you are doing.1713    And I see no further questions from the Subcommittee. We1714will now conclude this hearing. And I want to thank each of you1715very much.1716    This concludes the hearing of the Subcommittee on1717Government Reform and Oversight for Federal Government1718Operations and the Workforce [sic].1719    [Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]17201721                                 [all]