After Assad: The Future of Syria

1[House Hearing, 119 Congress]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34                    AFTER ASSAD: THE FUTURE OF SYRIA56=======================================================================78                                HEARING910                                 OF THE1112                   SUBCOMMITTEE ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH13                               AFRICA1415                               BEFORE THE1617                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS18                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES1920                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2122                             FIRST SESSION2324                               __________2526                              June 5, 20252728                               __________2930                           Serial No. 119-223132                               __________3334        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs3536[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]3738 Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov, http://docs.house.gov39                       or http://www.govinfo.gov4041                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE4261-407PDF                    WASHINGTON : 20254344-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------4546                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS4748                    BRIAN J. MAST, Florida, Chairman49MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York,50CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey         Ranking Member51JOE WILSON,, South Carolina          BRAD SHERMAN, California52SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia53DARRELL ISSA, California             WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts54TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee              AMI BERA, California55MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee             JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas56ANDY BARR, Kentucky                  DINA TITUS, Nevada57RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 TED LIEU, California58YOUNG KIM, California                SARA JACOBS, California59MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida        SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK,60BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan                  Florida61AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN,       GREG STANTON, Arizona62    American Samoa                   JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida63WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio                JONATHAN L. JACKSON, Illinois64JAMES R. BAIRD, Indiana              SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California65THOMAS H. KEAN, JR, New Jersey       JIM COSTA, California66MICHAEL LAWLER, New York             GABE AMO, Rhode Island67CORY MILLS, Florida                  KWEISI MFUME, Maryland68RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia           PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington69KEITH SELF, Texas                    GEORGE LATIMER, New York70RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana               JOHNNY OLSZEWSKI Jr, Maryland71JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam                JULIE JOHNSON, Texas72ANNA PAULINA LUNA, Florida           SARAH McBRIDE, Delaware73JEFFERSON SHREVE, Indiana            BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois74SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina          MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania75MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington76RYAN MACKENZIE, Pennsylvania7778              James Langenderfer, Majority Staff Director79                 Sajit Gandhi, Minority Staff Director80                                 ------8182              SUBCOMMITTEE ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA8384                  MICHAEL LAWLER, New York, Chairman85JOE WILSON, South Carolina           SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK,86 DARRELL ISSA, California                Florida, Ranking Member87 TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee              BRAD SHERMAN, California88 RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia89 THOMAS KEAN, JR, New Jersey          WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts90 RYAN ZINKE, Montana                  KWEISI MFUME, Maryland91 MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington      GEORGE LATIMER, New York9293               Sarah Miller, Subcommittee Staff Director9495                        C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S9697                              ----------9899                            REPRESENTATIVES100101                                                                   Page102Opening Statement of Subcommittee Chairman Michael Lawler........     1103Opening Statement of Subcommittee Ranking Member Sheila104  Cherfilus-Mccormick............................................     3105106                               WITNESSES107108Statement of David Schenker, Taube Senior Fellow at Washington109  Institute for Near East Policy and Former Assistant Secretary110  of State for The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs................     4111  Prepared Statement.............................................     7112Statement of Anna Borshchevskaya, Senior Fellow at Washington113  Institute for Near East Policy.................................    16114  Prepared Statement.............................................    18115Statement of Jon B. Alterman, Brzezinski Chair in Global Security116  and Geostrategy at the Center for Strategic and International117  Studies........................................................    24118  Prepared Statement.............................................    26119120                                APPENDIX121122Hearing Notice...................................................    50123Hearing Minutes..................................................    51124Hearing Attendance...............................................    52125126                        Material for the Record127128Statement for the Record submitted by Hon. French Hill...........    53129130                    AFTER ASSAD: THE FUTURE OF SYRIA131132                              ----------133134                         Thursday, June 5, 2025135136                  House of Representatives,137       Subcommittee on Middle East and North Africa138                              Committee on Foreign Affairs,139                                                    Washington, DC.140141    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in142room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael Lawler143(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.144    Mr. Lawler. The Subcommittee on the Middle East and North145Africa will come to order. The purpose of this hearing is to146assess U.S. national security interests as relates to Syria and147discuss potential policy options to further them. I now148recognize myself to give an opening statement.149150          OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MICHAEL LAWLER151152    Syria is at a turning point. The fall of Bashar al-Assad153this past December following four decades of authoritarian rule154has created conditions for unprecedented change for Syria and155for the Middle East. This change comes with significant risk.156    The Syrian war dating back to 2011 has left most of the157country in ruins, destroyed by years of indiscriminate bombing158by Assad and his Russian and Iranian backers. The costs of159reconstructing this broken country will be in the tens of160billions, even by the most modest assessment, and investors161face significant hurdles as they work to navigate the complex162sanctions regime that has emerged after four decades of Assad163family rule.164    While there are rightfully many who seek to break down165barriers, advocating for sanctions relief to ensure166reconstruction can take place, and put Syria on a path of167success, we must not lose sight of core U.S. interests in this168rush to embrace Syria's new regime.169    There remain significant questions about Syria's new170interim authorities led by U.S.-designated foreign terrorist171organization Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, HTS, a former Al-Qaeda172affiliate, Ahmed al-Sharaa. Despite his hardened past, the173interim president continues to verbally signal a commitment to174reform, though his ability to deliver remains to be seen, which175is why we must be explicit with our goals for Syria.176    This includes the counter-ISIS mission, which has been a177central part of U.S. foreign policy since 2014. We must set178clear expectations for the interim authorities on what we179expect from them with respect to counterterrorism cooperation180to prevent a resurgence and assume responsibility for detention181centers holding thousands of ISIS members and affiliated182individuals in the northeast.183    And concerns about extremism are not, by any means, limited184to ISIS. Iran and its proxies have long used the country as a185sanctuary space to plan and carry out attacks, including186against Israel, while Russia sees Syria as a strategic187launchpad to undermine our interests not just in the Middle188East but much further afield, from Africa to Europe.189    There must be clear red lines when it comes to Iran and its190proxies', as well as Russia's, ability to operate in Syria.191Preventing Syria from being used as a sanctuary space is vital192not just for the U.S. but also for Syria. This will, no doubt,193be one of the metrics used as the international community194measures the success of Syria's transition and by extension for195the prospects for further economic relief.196    For Syria to succeed and reestablish itself on the197international world stage, it must take action to prevent198extremism from thriving once again, including by signaling a199commitment to inclusive governance by establishing a positive200working relationship with our Kurdish partners, the Syrian201Democratic Forces. They have been at the forefront of the202campaign to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS.203    On that basis, the Trump administration has rightfully204taken steps to waive U.S. sanctions on a limited and temporary205basis, giving al-Sharaa sufficient time to demonstrate he is206able to turn his words into actions. But this is not, I have to207stress, a full embrace of al-Sharaa or those he continues to208surround himself with.209    We must use this opportunity to press him on key U.S.210priorities, notably as relates to counterterrorism, while also211retaining limitations on U.S. sanctions relief to ensure Iran212and Russia cannot benefit financially.213    Al-Sharaa has expressed a concerning willingness to embrace214Moscow, despite Putin's complicity in war crimes against the215Syrian people. For Russia, their presence in Syria is not just216about the Middle East; it is a vital staging ground essential217to everything they do in Africa and Eastern Mediterranean.218    We underestimate the strategic importance Syria holds for219the Russians at our own peril. Make no mistake: what happens in220Syria does not stay in Syria. The country has consistently221demonstrated its ability to impact and shape affairs far222outside its borders, from Europe's migrant crisis to ISIS to223the war in Ukraine.224    When Secretary Rubio testified before Congress last month,225he said, quote, ``There is no guarantee that by outreach and226working with the transitional authority in Syria, things are227going to work out. It may work out; it may not work out. But if228we don't reach out and try, it is a guarantee not to work229out.''230    And I echo the Secretary's sentiment and just came back,231along with the ranking member, from a trip to the Middle East,232including Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Jordan. And that was the233sentiment shared there as well. We want to give this an234opportunity to work but are fully cognizant of the consequences235of failure here.236    During this hearing, we will further examine Syrian237stability and the vital role Syria and the Syrian people play238in the Middle East.239    I now yield to the ranking member, Sheila Cherfilus-240McCormick, for her opening statement.241242 OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER SHEILA CHERFILUS-MCCORMICK243244    Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for245convening this important hearing on developments in Syria246following the fall of the brutal Assad regime.247    I welcome our expert panelists for this afternoon, all of248whom have robust knowledge of Syria, the broader Middle East,249and core U.S. interests at this time of immense transition and250opportunity.251    As Chairman Lawler noted, we recently returned from a252congressional delegation to Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Jordan.253In many meetings, developments in Syria were front and center.254Excitement was palpable among our regional partners over the255opportunities that changes in Syria and Lebanon present.256    Across the Middle East, U.S. allies and partners have257welcomed change in leadership in Damascus with the hopes to258support our robust construction work, investments in critical259infrastructure, and increased humanitarian assistance to the260millions of Syrians who require urgent aid as of today.261    I stand and support the Syrian people, who look to a new262future and a government that does not engage in systemic263campaigns of violence and repression against its own citizens.264I welcome the Trump administration's initial engagement with265the new Government of Syria, including the decision to lift266certain sanctions through the General License 25 and issuing a267180-day waiver on the Caesar Act sanctions.268    However, while the President is correct to say that this is269Syria's moment to shine, helping Syrians musts meet this moment270requires a clear plan. This is noble. However, I do not believe271that this can be achieved without providing incentives that272would allow the new Syrian Government to create and enable an273environment and a strong institution which is needed.274    Congress has not received any such details on the275administration's plan to implement sanction relief effectively,276nor a more coherent strategy that the administration on its277priorities for U.S.-Syrian relationships.278    I hope the vacuum the executive branch has created brings279members from both sides of the aisle together to work on280legislation that establishes clear priorities for further U.S.281engagement with Syria, including with respect to inclusion and282fully representative governance, protection of religious and283ethnic minority groups, continued counterterrorism cooperation,284and more.285    A conditions-based sanction relief policies with clear time286lines and matrices is critical for Syria's security, regional287security, and the United States' national security. I look288forward to working with my colleagues on legislation to address289this. Absent such congressional leadership, I fear the U.S.290Syria policy would be characterized by a haphazard, ill-291conceived, move-fast, break-things approach that has been a292characteristic of the Trump administration to date. The stakes293for Syrian people are too high and a peaceful Syria is too294critical to our own interests to be reckless and unfocused.295    Incentives for direct deliverables for Syria are critical.296U.S. policy on Syria must continue to prioritize effective and297multilateral counterterrorism operations, securing high-value298ISIS detainees, restoring critical life-saving humanitarian aid299that contributes to deradicalization, elimination of chemical300weapons and stores and unexploded ordnances, and capability-301building for the interim government's security forces.302    It also requires robust engagement with our regional303partners, including Jordan. At the exact moment when a change304in Syria requires a full set of foreign policy tools to advance305U.S. interests, the Trump administration has not only proposed306a gutting of the State Department, but numerous United States307stabilization and assistance programs active in Syria and308within neighboring countries have been cut.309    Today, because of the Trump administration's policies, our310regional partners in the Middle East are asking whether we keep311our word, whether our adversaries are betting that we won't. I312welcome the opportunity to speak with our panelists about the313policies and strategies we should be working on to ensure this314moment of cautious optimism for Syria's people is not wasted315and the United States' interests in the region are protected.316    I yield back.317    Mr. Lawler. Thank you to the ranking member.318    Other members of the committee are reminded that opening319statements may be submitted for the record.320    We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses321before us today on this important topic: Hon. David Schenker,322Taube Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East323Policy and previously Assistant Secretary of State for the324Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs under President Trump's first325administration; Dr. Anna Borshchevskaya, Senior Fellow at the326Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Dr. Jon B. Alterman,327Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy at the328Center for Strategic and International Studies.329    This committee recognizes the importance of the issues330before us and is grateful to have you here to speak with us331today. Your full statements will be made part of the record,332and I will ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks to 5333minutes in order to allow time for member questions.334    I now recognize Mr. Schenker for his opening statement.335336                  STATEMENT OF DAVID SCHENKER337338    Mr. Schenker. Thank you, Chairman Lawler, Representative--339Ranking Member Cherfilus-McCormick, honorable members. I340appreciate the opportunity to be here today.341    The future of Syria matters greatly to the United States.342Under Assad, Syria was a source of regional instability and a343persistent threat to Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan, among others.344Assad's fall represents an opportunity for Syria, Washington,345and its regional partners.346    There has been a lot of perseverating lately about Ahmed347al-Sharaa. To be certain, he is no panacea. At a minimum, he's348an Islamist and likely a bourgeoning authoritarian.349Notwithstanding lingering doubts, though, I believe al-Sharaa350is much better than Assad.351    He might not succeed in unifying and stabilizing Syria.352Five months after the fall of Assad, though, al-Sharaa is the353only game in town. The Trump administration should invest354diplomatic capital to help him succeed. Time will tell whether355suspending crippling U.S. sanctions was the right decision. A356gradual process may have had more success at shaping the new357government, or perhaps continued U.S. economic pressures would358have scuttled al-Sharaa's already unlikely attempt to stabilize359a fractious and scarred Syria.360    As with many U.S. policy decisions, the initiative to361suspend sanctions was not a choice between good and bad, but362rather a choice between bad and worse. Washington has no doubt363ceded some leverage, but I believe Trump made the less bad364decision; that is, to give al-Sharaa and the new Syria a365chance.366    Meanwhile, al-Sharaa is meeting some expectations on367important issues. He is cooperating with the U.S. on368counterterrorism and undoubtedly will continue to do so. It is369important that U.S. forces remain in Syria until conditions are370conducive to withdrawal.371    Foreign fighters constitute an even bigger challenge for372al-Sharaa. Terrorists, militia men, and foreign Jihadis played373a key role in toppling Assad. So these men are not going to be374expelled. Now, at al-Sharaa's request, the administration has375consented to the integration of some 3,500 of these fighters376into a unit of the military. While expedient, it is difficult377to imagine that this decision won't have problematic long-term378implications for discipline, accountability, and public379confidence.380    Integration of these Jihadis doesn't solve the problem. It381defers it. Post-Assad Syria will not be a democracy. Still,382Washington does have an abiding interest in the protection of383minorities, a modicum of human rights, and some kind of384political representation for Syria's ethnic and religious385communities. I am talking about the Kurds, Druze, Christians386alike. An inclusive Syria, I believe, will mitigate toward387stability.388    Going forward, Washington should set and convey389expectations to al-Sharaa on terrorism, foreign fighters, and390governance and be prepared to reimplement sanctions if Syria's391trajectory dictates.392    Al-Sharaa's relations with Israel are also another393challenge. Since the fall of Assad, Israel has been occupying394and bombing Syria, at times justifiably. At the same time, the395government is interdicting Iranian weapons shipments destined396for Hezbollah.397    Over time, direct discussions between Israel and Syria,398which are reportedly underway, could help build some trust399between the parties, stabilize the border, and lead to more400normal relations between these longtime enemies.401    Another concern is that a weak Syria will invite foreign402meddling. At present, Iran is unwelcome, but the jury is out on403Russia. But Turkey and Israel both appear to be working to404establish military spheres of influence in Syria. Israel405bordering on Turkey, in my opinion, would be a recipe for406heightened tensions, and the Trump administration should be407pressing Israel and Turkey to establish, at a minimum, a408hotline to preempt unintentional escalation.409    In sum, Syria faces a lot of challenges. The new government410in Damascus will need U.S. political support and robust411diplomatic engagement to succeed. The U.S. can help with412coordinating reconstruction, keeping ISIS at bay, and413implementing banking sector reforms necessary to reopen Syria414for business while at the same time encouraging the government415to be more inclusive.416    It will be difficult for Washington to balance expectations417and be patient, but the potential benefits for the United418States and its partners of a stable, benign Syria that rejects419the so-called axis of resistance are enormous.420    Thank you. I have submitted testimony for the record, and I421will look forward to your questions.422    [The prepared statement of Mr. Schenker follows:]423   [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]424425    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Schenker.426    I now recognize Dr. Borshchevskaya for her opening427statement.428429                STATEMENT OF ANNA BORSHCHEVSKAYA430431    Chairman Lawler, Ranking Member Cherfilus-McCormick,432honorable members, thank you for the opportunity to testify433today. With your permission, I am submitting my written434testimony, and I am going to summarize it.435    We now have a once-in-a-generation opportunity to reshape436the balance of power in the Middle East. Bashar al-Assad's437dictatorship is over, but the window of opportunity it presents438is going to close fast.439    Russia seeks to replace our influence and remake the world440order with itself at the center. Syria is and has been441essential to that strategy. Nothing about the fall of Assad442changes Moscow's overall plans and objectives, but it does give443us a window of opportunity to foil Vladimir Putin's plans.444    As Chairman Lawler said in his opening remarks, what445happens in Syria tends to not stay in Syria. This is why we446need to ensure Russia does not reestablish a foothold there.447Knowing that, my testimony will now focus on several key issues448of vital importance to the U.S.449    First, the Eastern Mediterranean is crucial to Russia. That450is why the goal of control there is consistent in centuries old451for the Russian State. Make no mistake about it: this goal will452outlast Vladimir Putin. It is part of how Moscow views its453strategic positioning vis-a-vis the West.454    Second, Assad is gone, and Russia may change tactics but455not its strategic objectives. These tactics will focus on456staying in Syria, on leveraging economic influence, and457positioning Russia as a protector of minorities. Syria has been458fundamental to Russia's success in leveraging its influence for459the last decade across the Middle East. Russia retains this460influence as it seeks to use it to undermine the United States.461And if Moscow can navigate the new Syrian regime, the Kremlin462can continue to exert influence.463    Assuming the United States does not want to see its464position weakened in the region--and I would suggest that that465would be disastrous--the U.S. must ensure that Russia does not466reestablish control in Syria.467    To that end, the U.S. could utilize its influence through a468carrot-and-stick approach to block Russia's ability to leverage469power. The U.S. can achieve it through the following: first, by470tapping into the strength of Ukrainians; facilitate greater471ties with Syria and further empowering Ukrainians all across472the Middle East and North Africa. In Syria, the U.S. can473facilitate economic and diplomatic ties between the two474countries, for example, by supporting Ukraine's wheat475deliveries to Syria. And all across the MENA region, the U.S.476can facilitate a push for Ukrainian technology, arms trade, and477information.478    Over the last 3 years, the Ukrainian military has479integrated Western and post-Soviet military systems and made480impressive innovations in the arms industry. And we saw an481example of that most recently with Ukraine's drone attack on482Russia this past weekend. We saw how creative, how powerful,483that attack was. The U.S. now has significant opportunity to484partner with Ukraine to help transform and modernize Middle485East states that have been traditional Russian client states.486    Second, continual engagement with the Syrian Government--487this engagement should include demonstration that if this488government meets certain guideposts, it will be able to unlock489aspects of a normalized relationship, which it desires.490    And last, limiting Russia's resources through additional491sanctions and tackling Russia's so-called ghost fleet of492illicit oil tankers--as the United States and Europe ease or493suspend sanctions against Syria, they must balance the need to494help Syria recover with the need to block Russia's ability to495profit from this recovery and use its economic tools to gain496control. This could also include additional sanctions against497Russia and entities that work with Russia and working with498Turkey to crack down on the ghost fleet's legal violations and499ecological threats.500    I began my testimony by telling you that this is a once-in-501a-generation opportunity. Let me reiterate here that this502window is closing quickly. While we deliberate, Russia is503strengthening its partnerships with Iran, China, and North504Korea. Ensuring Russia does not reestablish a position in Syria505is bigger than Syria, but it is also bigger than even Russia506alone. Thank you.507    [The prepared statement of Dr. Borshchevskaya follows:]508   [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]509510    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Dr. Borshchevskaya.511    I know recognize Dr. Alterman for his opening statement.512513                  STATEMENT OF JON B. ALTERMAN514515    Dr. Alterman. Thank you, Chairman Lawler, Ranking Member516Cherfilus-McCormick, distinguished members of the committee.517    Let me start by expressing my condolences over the passing518of Mr. Connolly. He and I met almost forty years ago when he519was working for Senator Pell, and I was a very young aide for520Senator Moynihan. Then, as now, I was in awe of his energy, his521creativity, and his dedication to public service. His loss is a522loss to this committee and to the country.523    As Chairman Lawler said, Syria stands at a profound524inflection point. Syrians celebrate having overthrown a brutal525dictatorship, but they don't know whether they will live under526another dictatorship, a theocracy, a democracy, or a failed527State.528    The questions before Congress are clear. How much should we529care about Syria's future? How much can we shape it? And how530should we proceed? On the first point, make no mistake: Syria531is important to U.S. national security. It borders key U.S.532allies Israel, Turkey, and Jordan. The country hosts an active533Jihadi movement, and elements in the country have a long534history of cooperation with Iran.535    Syria's new leaders are overwhelmed by their domestic536needs. They are navigating the wreckage of 50 years of537dictatorship and 15 years of civil war. The economy has538operated on bribery, government shakedowns, and Captagon drug539sales for years. Infrastructure is crumbling, and there is a540critical shortage of capable administrators.541    The government also faces severe security dilemmas. Two of542the most important are how to handle tens of thousands of543Syrians who supported Assad's repression and how to manage544Jihadi movements that include thousands of foreign fighters who545have been important allies of Syria's new leaders.546    Our impact in this context is going to be limited. We will547have the most influence shaping Syria's external environment.548Multiple countries have keen interests in Syria's future, and549that creates some dangerous dynamics. Turkey sees itself as the550dominant external actor, and it has worked closely with Hayat551Tahrir al-Sham, Syria's current rulers. Turkey views Syrian552reconstruction as both a security imperative and also a553business opportunity.554    Israel's interests sharply conflict with Turkey's. The555Israeli leadership views Syria's new leaders as Jihadist or556Jihadi-adjacent. After decades with Hezbollah threatening557Israel from Lebanon, Israel is creating a buffer zone along558Syria's border while working to weaken Islamist forces in the559Syrian Government.560    Iran seeks to maintain a foothold in a country where it561invested tens of billions of dollars and maintained a strategic562pathway to Hezbollah. And as Anna suggested, Russia similarly563attempts to preserve its military bases and what's left of564decades of influence and investment in Syria. Europe wants a565peaceful Syria to stem the refugee flow, and the Gulf States566want to keep Iran marginalized.567    In this, Syria faces a critical danger beyond Jihadi568capture. It could become a battleground for regional proxy569wars, much like Lebanon was in the 1970's and 1980's. The570growing hostility between Israel and Turkey, exacerbated by the571Gaza war, poses particular risks. Countries may adopt unsavory572allies to undermine each other in Syria, and the effects could573spread regionally.574    The Trump administration correctly relaxed sanctions, and575it has given Syria's new government an opportunity to576demonstrate its intentions and capacity. Still, that policy577needs some adjustment.578    First, while appointing a Syria envoy was constructive,579choosing somebody who is simultaneously Ambassador to Turkey580creates a conflict of interest that will make balancing between581the regional players much harder. Ambassador Barrack's two jobs582will be in conflict much of the time.583    Second, we can't exert influence over allies and partners584while they pour aid into Syria and we completely abstain.585Humanitarian engagement here serves U.S. self-interests and586isn't mere charity. Groups we oppose throughout the Middle East587build grassroots support through social services, and we can't588afford to be absent on the aid front.589    We don't have to fully understand Ahmed al-Sharaa's590motivations or trust his background, which includes troubling591associations with some of the region's most vicious terrorists.592Given our justified uncertainty, we should support him593modestly, test him continuously, and ensure that our allies594remain aligned with our policy.595    I see great potential in Syria, as I think many of us do,596and we also see Syria's risks. We need a policy that makes the597former more likely and heads off the second. A modest598conditional U.S. strategy anchored in coordination with allies599and partners offers the best opportunity to advance U.S.600interests.601    [The prepared statement of Dr. Alterman follows:]602    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]603604    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Dr. Alterman.605    I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.606    Ms. Borshchevskaya, what are Russia's main objectives in607Syria, and how has Assad's fall shaped its ability to achieve608them?609    Dr. Borshchevskaya. At present, Russia is working very hard610to ensure it retains a presence in Syria. At this stage, they611are being relatively quiet, but they are watching. They are612engaging in discussions with the current Syrian Government. And613as I mentioned in my written remarks, Russia is trying to614position itself as a protector of minorities.615    The most striking example of that is one that I mentioned616in my testimony where, according to Russian Foreign Ministry617Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, Russia had given several thousand618people refuge at Hmeimim during an outbreak of violence on the619coast.620    So I think, at this stage, Russia is taking a very cautious621wait-and-see approach and slowly building ties and retaining622influence. But make no mistake: this is toward a larger goal.623    Mr. Lawler. And how could the Kremlin use Syria's624transition as an opportunity for financial gain? From that625perspective, what guardrails need to be in place to prevent626that from happening as we consider how best to lift Syria's627complex and multifaceted sanctions regime?628    Dr. Borshchevskaya. So I think Russia's-one big advantage629Russia has is its trade relationships with the Gulf States. And630as we are now seeing Gulf States looking to engage economically631with Syria, given the fact that Russia has these strong632relationships with these countries--so many Russian oligarchs633have fled to the Gulf after Russia's invasion of Ukraine--634Russia could find ways to cement ties through second and third635parties, and that would be hard to trace. And that is something636that we need to continuously monitor and look to block.637    Mr. Lawler. Mr. Schenker, how might the power vacuum in a638post-Assad Syria be exploited by regional actors like Turkey?639    Mr. Schenker. Thank you, Chairman. I think, as Jon Alterman640said a few minutes ago, you do have Turkey that not only has641relations with HTS but also with the Syrian National Army,642other active militia in the country, and shares, frankly, their643ideological, in a way, fellow travelers. They are Islamists, as644well, the Government of Turkey. And I think there is645opportunities for them to make inroads, influence, with the new646government. They are a more trusted partner than many.647    At the same time, on the ground, there's a real648possibility--we see, right now, Qatar trying to get in. We see649Saudi Arabia, as well, that frankly, in my view, is a better650influence. But all these groups will be competing, and if they651compete to see who can spend more to rebuild Syria, maybe that652is a good thing. But if they compete for political influence,653this could lend to corruption or further radicalization.654    Mr. Lawler. I think, to that end, Israel has sought to curb655the growing Turkish influence in Syria. In recent months,656Israel has become increasingly forward-leaning in terms of its657willingness to take action within Syria's borders to contain658the threat, though there have been efforts to have discussions659between Israel and Turkey.660    What can the U.S. do to make sure that both sides'661interests are protected in this transition?662    Mr. Schenker. Thank you. Certainly, I think that the United663States should be working with Israel and Syria if they need our664help, to get together and chat quietly to deconflict, to gain a665better understanding of where each party is at, what their own666concerns are.667    You are not going to have a successful Syria, frankly, if668you can't have Syrian Government forces operating south of669Damascus. So what can be done to reassure Israel? And what can670be done going forward to--on areas that are overlapping, where671both al-Sharaa and Israel agree? ISIS has to be fought.672Palestinian groups may have to be restrained. And these are673things that both Israel and Syria can work on jointly.674    Mr. Lawler. Last, al-Sharaa has pledged to establish675inclusive governance in Syria and certainly prevent the country676from becoming a staging ground. I think, obviously, he has said677a lot of the right things. That was a takeaway, certainly, from678my conversations in Saudi Arabia and Israel and Jordan. But679obviously, the proof will be in the pudding.680    So what is your assessment of his willingness to deliver on681these promises thus far, and does he have an effective command682and control of the various militia troops on the ground?683    Mr. Schenker. Those are two good questions but two separate684questions. I think in terms of inclusive governance, the answer685is this is very much a work in progress. They had committee686meetings to talk about the constitution or the temporary687constitution. These were widely panned, I think, by minority688groups as being performative, that there wasn't a real689inclusion--other types of things that have appeared that the690nature of the Syrian State is defined as being a Muslim State691in the constitution. This, to many in Syria, is viewed as692exclusionary.693    And the appointment of, certainly--let's--we can go beyond694just minorities, so the inclusion of women in government is695also, I think, striking how low it is.696    As for command and control or control over these militias,697the answer is no. I think he controls a very small part of698Syria to date and is even working to incorporate in an699effective manner the SDF, the Kurdish U.S.-backed700counterterrorism partner. This, too, I think, is a challenge,701if for no other reason that al-Sharaa himself has appointed702Jihadi to be in charge of Hasakah, who has perpetrated703atrocities against Kurds before.704    Mr. Lawler. Thank you.705    I now recognize Ranking Member Cherfilus-McCormick for 5706minutes.707    Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you so much, and thank you708for your testimony. Being actively participating in the709recovery and reform of Syria is top line for us to make sure710that Syria has a real chance of succeeding. And I think our711goal really is to be one of the strongest partners to Syria but712also to be the most influential. And right now, we are713competing with Russia, and we are aware that Russia now has two714bases that it does have control over.715    But I wanted to first start with the first half. How can we716be successful in being the strongest partner to ensure we have717stability? Do you believe that--I know we lifted the sanctions,718but what are some of the reforms or strings that you would like719to see attached when it comes to incentivizing them to make720sure that they are actually moving in a forward movement that721we can trust and believe in? Oh, that question is for Dr.722Alterman. Well, actually, first--I was actually going to ask it723to all you guys, but I will start with you.724    Dr. Alterman. Thank you. I think, first, we are all friends725from many years ago, and I think we also fundamentally agree on726many of the issues in Syria, as many of you do.727    Look. I think the way we become a force multiplier is728partly we are active on the ground, but I think even more729important is we have an ability to rally our partners and730allies in a way that no other country does. As you have heard731from several of us, there is a real challenge of Israel and732Turkey mixing it up, but there are other parties, too.733    And to me, there is partly an issue of what our aid should734be, but I don't think we should spend a lot of time trying to735create the perfect incentive, the perfect conditions, the736perfect consequences of bad action. I think it is much more737important that we make sure all of our friends and allies are738rowing in the same direction. It is not at all clear to me that739they will. It is not at all clear to me that they want to.740    And to me, this is really--it is partly an aid issue, but I741think more fundamentally, it is a diplomacy issue, and it is742the administration speaking with one voice about some very743complicated issues where I think the administration may not744agree internally on all of the issues. But I think we have to745speak with one voice, act with one hand, and persuade our746allies and partners to join with us rather than undermine each747other, which I think will really undermine the chances for748recovery in Syria.749    Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Well, you mentioned that we need750to use all of our diplomatic tools. And right now, our tool kit751has been diminished due to the cuts we have seen with USAID. So752I wanted to narrow in. Are there any that you think are753imperative for us to actually have some guardrails so we can754say these need to be in place so we can help move them along in755a positive direction?756    Some of the responses we got when we were overseas also--757there is an ambivalence about this new administration and758government. So how can we put guardrails, if anybody has any759suggestions? What needs to be incorporated to help that along?760And I will open that up to you.761    Mr. Schenker. Ranking Member, I think at a minimum we762should be working on--you know, now that we have had these--763suspension of sanction, you still won't see--what they need is764really a huge flow of foreign direct investment, of--to build,765actually, a financial life, right? There is no economic life in766Syria to speak of.767    And with the suspension and with the prospect of--after 180768days of reimposition of sanction, if performance is inadequate769for some reason or another, this does not inspire confidence of770investors. So this requires that we help the Government of771Syria to help themselves through banking reforms, through772cleaning up their counterterrorism and financing, et cetera, so773that we can start to--people can start to rely on banks, and774they can actually do business. That is at a minimum.775    But there are no guardrails, right? We are relying on one776person here. This is key personnel. And he--it is remarkable,777really, you know, the irony that we are relying on a U.S.-778designated erstwhile terrorist to secure all these disparate779factions of Syria in this broken society. So I think it is also780important to be thinking about executive protection.781    Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Well, my last question, if I can782have a moment--I really wanted to get to the two bases which783are under Russian control. Do you believe that Russia will be784successful at maintaining control and influence over those785bases?786    Dr. Borshchevskaya. Well, I think that remains to be seen,787but I think Russia has a real chance in maintaining a nominal788degree of control. And that is very important because that is789Russia's ability to project power into multiple directions,790into NATO's southern flank, into the Middle East, and into791Africa.792    And beyond that, if I may, to your earlier question about793what can we do, I agree with David. The reality is there are no794guardrails. But I think we could aim to demonstrate that we are795committed to Syria and that we are going to be consistent.796    Russia came into Syria 10 years ago at a time when there797was a vacuum. And any vacuum that there is, Russia is going to798fill. So I think if we can demonstrate a consistency in799interest--because one of the biggest problems that many of our800partners have with us is that we are inconsistent. We say one801thing, and then we change policies. Sometimes we don't know802what the policy is.803    And if we can demonstrate that we are committed, that this804is important for us, and that we are willing to do what it805takes, be it, as David described, through helping Syria806navigate banking reform but also empowering other actors who807are our partners in Syria--essentially, filling in the need808that otherwise Russia would fill--I think that would be an809important step forward.810    Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you.811    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Ranking Member.812    I now recognize the gentleman from South Carolina,813Representative Wilson, for 5 minutes.814    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Chairman Lawler. And I815want to say amen to your opening comments--additionally, how816important this hearing is. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.817    All the members are here, which is outstanding. And Ryan818Zinke has just joined us all the way from Montana. And then I'm819really grateful that we have Congressman Cory Mills here, who820actually was in Damascus last month to support the people of821Syria.822    So we are just so grateful for what we see as a historic823decision by President Donald Trump to lift all sanctions on824Syria. I believe it was a masterstroke that has the potential825to lead to a complete realignment of the Middle East with826stability, peace, and prosperity for all the people.827    It is particularly important to me because last November, I828had the distinction and honor of being identified by the829dictator Bashar al-Assad as an enemy of the State. I take that830as a great honor. Three weeks later, he fled to Moscow, where831he should be, with war criminal Putin. What a great team they832are.833    But again, it is so exciting to me, the people of Syria834standing up for freedom and democracy. In one move, President835Trump has boxed out China from the whole of the Arab world. He836has additionally provided for helping expel Russian bases which837are logistics for the Russians, for war criminal Putin,838maintaining dictatorships in Africa. He has also prevented the839Iranian regime from resurgence and taken a major step to put840pressure on ISIS.841    As Secretary of State Marco Rubio testified to the842committee a few weeks ago, it is important to immediately lift843the sanctions. And that has truly been done. I also appreciate844that the Syrian Government has limited the activities of the845Russian bases. And at the same time, though, we need to do more846to completely expel the Russians.847    The new Syrian authorities should remember war criminal848Putin's massive crimes of mass murder in Aleppo. This also led,849with the mass murder, to historically unprecedented dislocation850of over half the people of Syria from their homes, their851mosques, their schools, their businesses, their churches--852nearly 12 million people. In modern times, it is inconceivable853that so many millions could lose everything they have, and half854a million people were murdered.855    Turkey and Jordan have been so appreciated for securing856millions in refugee camps. And with that in mind, Dr.857Borshchevskaya, you have done great with your identification of858how to remove the Russian bases. And I would like to know what859our other colleagues, Dr. Schenker and Dr. Alterman--how can we860help them remove these bases?861    Mr. Schenker. Well, I'll give a first crack at that. I862think the Government of Syria is disinclined toward Russia and863Iran for the reasons that you mentioned. Russia and Iran helped864the Assad regime kill half a million Syrians in what resembles865a genocide and to force 12 million Syrians into exile in866something that resembles ethnic cleansing. And so they are867disinclined.868    And we have seen already that the Government of Syria, the869Sharaa government, has canceled contracts with STG Engineering,870a Russian engineering firm that was developing Tartus' port,871the civilian port in Tartus, and signed an $800 million with872Dubai Port World from the Emirates. This is a positive step,873but this is going to require, I think, ongoing diplomatic874engagement.875    Iran also--there is no direct flights right now. The ties876are not great. I think they are wary, and they keep on877intercepting and interdicting Hezbollah weapons that Iran is878sending into Syria to traverse into Lebanon. So they are doing879the work, but I think they need be pushed over the finish line.880And they are going to need something eventually to fill that881vacuum, to replace Russia.882    Dr. Alterman. Thank you, Congressman.883    If I may, I think to add to what David said, and to884underline it in some ways, this persistent attraction of Russia885is if the Government of Syria feels it may need a veto on the886Security Council. And the Russians are so unscrupulous that887even after contributing to the death of hundreds of thousands888of Syrians, I think they are willing to execute their veto for889a partner that does something for them.890    And I think the Sharaa government, at this point, may not891want to abandon that option. The more secure they feel that892things are moving in the right direction, the less they feel893they need somebody to veto things for them, I think the less894attractive the Russians are because on many levels--commercial,895military, and so on--the Russians aren't a very attractive896partner.897    Mr. Wilson. Well, I hope they say that America, Saudi898Arabia, Tokyo, Jordan, Qatar, UAE are much better partners than899war criminal Putin.900    I yield back.901    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative Wilson.902    I now recognize the gentleman from California,903Representative Sherman, for 5 minutes.904    Mr. Sherman. President Trump is a tough negotiator when he905is dealing with Americans or Canadians. He has eliminated the906vast majority of our sanctions, and we still don't have a907pledge that he will be--that the Russian bases will be908eliminated.909    So you have one country that did not support Assad in any910way, that does not have military bases in Syria--the side that911was bombing the current government's forces retains those912bases. Now, we have acquiesced in 3,500 foreign Jihadis913fighters being, quote, ``integrated'' into the military. This914is a force that could be, to the extent they have any915ideological control, pulling Sharaa in the wrong direction.916    It is argued that abandoning those forces would also be a917problem. These 3,500--what portion of the total foreign918fighters are the 3,500 that are now being integrated? Is it919substantially all, or----920    Mr. Schenker. Yes, the reports suggest that it is the vast921majority of them. Of course, there were earlier reports that922al-Sharaa had given key posts to--and senior-level posts within923the Ministry of Defense, and the military, about a dozen----924    Mr. Sherman. Are those reports accurate?925    Mr. Schenker. Yes. The earlier reports about the dozen,926yes.927    Mr. Sherman. So it is one thing to us to acquiesce and them928joining the military because you gotta do something with them,929perhaps. But the idea of giving them key posts seems extreme.930And I guess the question is, have we surrendered our sanctions931regime in return for sufficient controls on the foreign932fighters, for sufficient controls on Russia and its bases?933    I was here when Obama was incredibly concerned about the934use of chemical weapons by Assad. We took the Chemical Warfare935Treaty seriously. Has this new regime disposed of any936stockpiles of chemical weapons and the ability to create those937weapons?938    Mr. Schenker. Should I go again?939    Mr. Sherman. Yes. Go ahead.940    Mr. Schenker. Thanks. As for the foreign fighters, I don't941know what the administration has requested. Initially, they had942requested that these people be expelled. Obviously----943    Mr. Sherman. But they have acquiesced officially, more or944less, in the integration.945    Mr. Schenker. Correct.946    Mr. Sherman. And as a de facto matter, they've acquiesced947in these foreign fighters getting important government948positions. But if you could talk a little bit about the949chemical weapons and the capacity to manufacture----950    Mr. Schenker. Yes. These were in the initial Trump951administration requests of the Government of Syria, and in952fact, this is one of the good news stories. The Syrians have953provided access to the chemical weapons watchdog, and then just954today, the IAEA was in Syria. They went out to Deir ez-Zor to955look at Kibar and the remains of that and four other nuclear956facilities.957    Mr. Sherman. So at least we are looking, and I assume that958we have at least a commitment to dispose of these weapons of959mass destruction.960    Dr. Alterman. Congressman, one of the things that is most961remarkable about Ahmed al-Sharaa is he has managed to convince962all kinds of pretty difficult people that he is fundamentally963on their side. Whether it was Zarqawi, whether it is Ayman964Zawahiri or Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi his secret.965    Mr. Sherman. And Donald Trump.966    Dr. Alterman. Well, but his secret ability seems to be that967he can convince people that, fundamentally, he is with them. I968think he does it within his government. He does it outside of969his government.970    Mr. Sherman. I want to sneak in one more question. Do we971foresee a Syria in which the Kurds, the Druze, and others will972have effective control of their area, cooperate with the973government but still have autonomy and their own military974presence? Or do we see the government in Damascus trying to, in975effect, conquer and disarm the Druze and the Kurds?976    Dr. Alterman. Well, I think the Kurds are an especially977difficult case and this regard. But as I said, this is why I978think it is so important that we not have Syria turn into a set979of regional proxy wars, because if that happens, that will980endanger all of the minority communities and the stability and981the territorial integrity of the country.982    Mr. Sherman. So, certainly, we should have gotten clearer983guarantees for the Christian community before we eliminate the984sanctions. Of course, we can restore those sanctions at any985time. But it appears as if we have given them almost everything986they want and gotten an--you know, aside from the chemical987weapons, which of course is their obligation anyway, we have988gotten very few concessions.989    I yield back.990    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative Sherman.991    I now recognize Representative Kean for 5 minutes.992    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.993    And thank you to our distinguished witnesses for being here994today. As we evaluate the State of Syria following the fall of995the dictator Bashar al-Assad, we must ensure that the U.S.996continues to support our allies in the region. This includes997promoting peace and cooperation between Syria and Israel.998    Dr. Borshchevskaya, recent reports cite direct meetings999between Israel and Syria in efforts to ease tensions between1000the two nations. What actions should the U.S. Government be1001taking to encourage Syria to continue to pursue peace with our1002important allies in Israel?1003    Dr. Borshchevskaya. I think the United States can continue1004to stay engaged diplomatically and signal to Israel that a1005stable Syria is--a stable, whole Syria, a Syria that is not1006weak and divided--is also in Israel's interest. I think also,1007to a certain extent, engagement with Azerbaijan--that has1008facilitated meetings between Israel and Turkey on the conflict1009between Turkey and Israel that David had mentioned in his1010opening remarks.1011    So I think staying engaged diplomatically would be very1012important, and it would be, again, demonstrating consistency in1013our commitment to Syria.1014    Mr. Kean. Well, are--Dr. Alterman, you mentioned in your1015testimony--and this is--I would like to say this for the other1016two panelists as well--what--how to test the current regime in1017Syria that--what other steps are necessary--and I may have this1018for the entire panel--to test that they're actually going1019through on the commitments?1020    Dr. Alterman. Thank you, Congressman. I think we need lots1021of tests. I think we have to test them continually on how they1022treat various minority communities, how they treat Jihadis. And1023the Jihadi issue is difficult because, as we know in Iraq,1024firing all the members of the Ba'ath Party helped create an1025insurgency in Iraq. You don't want to have that. You have a1026problem with the Jihadis; their countries don't want them back.1027    So is there some way where you can separate people who can1028be reformed from people who can't be? I think this is something1029we should be working with allies and partners to continually1030evaluate. I don't think there is any test that is going to make1031me feel comfortable and feel we can start ignoring things in1032Syria. I think what we have to do is we have to work with1033Syrians and work with others to come up with a wide array of1034things, a constant set of report cards, and talk about where1035this is going. Where do we have to nudge it? And where are1036things encouraging and we want to encourage them further?1037    Mr. Kean. Israel's safety and security is paramount. So how1038do we ensure that--you know, Dr.--excuse me, Mr. Schenker, what1039steps has the U.S. taken to support counterterrorism efforts in1040the Middle East?1041    Mr. Schenker. Well, there is an ongoing liaison,1042Congressman, between Israel--sorry, between Syria and the1043United States. There is exchange of information. And Syria has1044acted on--against impending terrorist attacks.1045    We know earlier that al-Sharaa, back when he was Jolani,1046cooperated with the Turks in Idlib Province. So this type of1047ongoing intelligence--and this makes not only Syria safer from1048ISIS but also makes Israel safer.1049    At the same time, we now see what appears to be the1050beginnings of communications between the al-Sharaa1051administration and the Government of Israel. And they, too, can1052do some liaisons, some counterterrorism cooperation. And Israel1053can test Syria on this.1054    This is going to take some time to build trust, but this is1055a border--Israel already occupies swaths of Syrian territory1056right now. There have been--and just was, I think, this past1057week--a few mortars fired toward Israel from what we believe1058are Palestinian groups. Israel says they are going to hold the1059al-Sharaa government responsible.1060    We will see going forward if they respond to information or1061if they expel Palestinian terrorist groups from Damascus. This1062is an open question. They have arrested some. But this is also1063an ongoing work in progress.1064    Mr. Kean. Thank you.1065    I yield back.1066    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative Kean.1067    I now recognize Representative Mfume for 5 minutes.1068    Mr. Mfume. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.1069    My thanks to the witnesses also. I don't want to be1070redundant, but there was something that caught my ear a moment1071ago.1072    Mr. Schenker, you described--and I hope I am adequately1073repeating this--the regime in Syria as being a disparate1074erstwhile group of U.S.-designated terrorists. You don't have1075to comment. I am just saying it caught my ear. Am I incorrect?1076    Mr. Schenker. Al-Sharaa. I described al-Sharaa----1077    Mr. Mfume. Al-Sharaa.1078    Mr. Schenker [continuing]. and the country being a1079disparate group of ethnic groups and religious groups. But al-1080Sharaa in particular is a----1081    Mr. Mfume. Yes.1082    Mr. Mfume. You know. Yes.1083    Mr. Mfume. So it is a sad situation. I mean, it is a scary1084situation, particularly from those of us who look abroad. I1085think this 180-day pause is a position and point of concern for1086a lot of people. I just want to be on the record and say I just1087don't trust Syria. I have not trusted them since they committed1088all sorts of heinous crimes against innocent people.1089    This Damascus government I am not convinced is any better1090than the government that they took down. I could be wrong and1091would love to be wrong. And I am not paranoid, but I think a1092little paranoia is good sometimes. In other words, I don't1093believe that Humpty Dumpty fell. I think he was pushed.1094    And in this instance, I just don't believe that the Syrian1095Government in Damascus is everything they say they are until1096they take some concrete steps so that the outside world and1097community will understand that they are correct. And I agree1098with the assumption that somebody made earlier that Russia1099would easily trade a veto to be able to get another partner.1100And the partner might want a veto so bad that they find1101themselves shaking hands.1102    It is all very, very kind of scary. But let me ask you, do1103you believe that the administration, our Secretary of State,1104and others have done enough to ensure that this current regime1105in Syria has not and will not re-create the same conditions1106that previously existed, especially in regards to the support1107of terrorist groups and the tamping down of human rights? I1108would just like to get your opinions on the record.1109    Let's start with A, Mr. Alterman. If we are looking for an1110order here, let's go alphabet.1111    Dr. Alterman. Okay. I think this is a process and not an1112event, sir. I think this is going to be ongoing. It is going to1113take years. I share all of your discomfort. I spoke to a friend1114who has been a journalist in the Middle East for decades. He1115spoke to Ahmed al-Sharaa, and he said, I spoke to him and got a1116sense that we are going to see not Bashar al-Assad again but1117Hafez al-Assad ascend again.1118    Hafez al-Assad--not his son, but certainly not a friend of1119the United States, certainly not a force for stability in the1120Middle East. Could we be going there? We could be going there.1121I don't think there is any policy where we just do the policy1122and we are done. I think this is going to be a process of1123years.1124    He will try to settle in what he--what his government--1125whether he will be in power and what his government will look1126like in 2 years', 5 years' time. I don't know. He doesn't know.1127It is quite possible that he will misjudge how to deal with1128radicals in his own midst. It is quite possible that he will1129fall prey to some sort of Israeli-Turkish differences.1130    I don't know how this is going to go, but I think we have1131to constantly be watchful for all the reasons you say----1132    Mr. Mfume. Paranoid.1133    Dr. Alterman. Paranoid people have enemies, right?1134    Mr. Mfume. Yes, they do.1135    Dr. Alterman. And there are a lot of enemies in Syria, and1136there is a lot of bad stuff that has happened in Syria and will1137happen in Syria.1138    Mr. Mfume. Okay. Let me just get a couple more responses1139in. Thank you very much for that. I appreciate it.1140    Dr. Borshchevskaya. Sure. You know, I also share your1141concerns. And let me start by answering your question with the1142following. I was born in the Soviet Union. I remember when it1143fell apart. I was a child at the time, but I remember it very1144well. There was a sense of euphoria that Russia was going to1145transform into a liberal-style democracy. We saw what happened,1146and Russia went back to its authoritarian past.1147    So I share your concerns. I think the fact of the matter1148is--you know, to answer your question, it is very hard to know1149what there is to be done. Has the administration done enough?1150There is only so much we can do to look forward. We have to1151take it one step at a time.1152    We don't have a lot of leverage. And the fact that1153sanctions can be snapped back quickly, that there is this 180-1154degree window, that is an important leverage that we have. But1155the fact of the matter is there is not a whole lot beyond that.1156    I think--as I said in my opening remarks, I think that the1157most important thing we can do is to stay engaged and give1158consistent benchmarks and to demonstrate that we are going to1159hold this government responsible to those benchmarks.1160    Mr. Mfume. Thank you very much.1161    My time is expired. I think the key here is gradualism.1162That is how we proceed, not with giant steps, but little bitty1163steps that we measure daily, weekly, and monthly in this1164process.1165    Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.1166    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative.1167    I now recognize Representative Baumgartner for 5 minutes.1168    Mr. Baumgartner. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you1169for this very important committee hearing.1170    Syria has a special place in my heart, not just for the1171immense geopolitical importance of this troubled part of the1172world, but roughly 30 years ago, my first trip to the Middle1173East was as a Kurd scholar to Syria and Jordan. And I spent a1174really meaningful summer in Damascus and Aleppo and saw, at the1175time, what I had hoped was going to be a world new possibility1176and opening right before the peace--what would eventually be a1177peace agreement with Jordan and Israel and so much potential in1178Syria, and certainly potential that has not been realized. In1179fact, it has gone much the other way these last 30 years.1180    I very vividly remember, when I was at the U.S. Embassy in1181Iraq during the surge, the challenge of foreign fighters coming1182across the border from Syria. And then, as Iranian influence1183grew throughout the region as the U.S. stepped back, we saw1184some of the consequences there.1185    I also appreciate that all three of you testified to the1186importance of deliberate, thoughtful, strategic action by the1187U.S., I think much in contrast to what we saw, particularly1188under the Obama administration, when we saw an offhand comment1189by John Kerry open the door for Russia to enter the region. We1190saw a red line by President Barack Obama then not enforced by1191the U.S. Government, and then a statement by President Obama1192that Russia entering Syria was going to be a quagmire for them,1193that it was all a mistake.1194    I would just ask, perhaps, you, Anna--and I will just call1195you Dr. Anna. When you are a Baumgartner, you honor sympathy1196for challenges on last names. But could you contrast or give1197some thoughts on U.S. Government policy in the last 15 years,1198kind of just haphazard--what I would call haphazard, but I1199would like to hear your comments--versus what we would like to1200see in a thoughtful strategy.1201    In the briefing document today, I saw a list of conditions1202from the State Department that they had put on the Government1203of Syria to sort of come into the union with the West and the1204U.S. And as I was looking, I thought it is a good list of1205conditions, but I also thought wouldn't it be helpful if we had1206a list of conditions--not the same conditions, but conditions1207for Syria's neighbors of behavior that we would like to see1208there?1209    Perhaps, specifically, what would we like to see from1210Turkey and Israel in addition to--I think it is a given that1211they would have a hotline to avoid a proxy war, but what would1212be one or two things we would like to see from each of Syria's1213neighbors with respect to Syria? But both--so some commentary1214on the haphazard nature, perhaps, and then what we would like1215to see from their neighbors.1216    Dr. Borshchevskaya. Sure. Well, first, you know, the Obama1217administration saw Russia essentially as part of a solution1218rather than the problem as the ongoing Syria tragedy developed.1219And so, to me, what I highlighted over the course of my work is1220that Russia cannot be part of the solution. Putin had taken1221advantage of that perception.1222    These events that you refer to, such as the statement that1223Syria was going to be a quagmire for Russia, Secretary Kerry1224opening the door for Russia and so forth--there was this1225confusion about what Russia was, what it could do, and1226therefore--and then the belief that Russia could help disarm1227Assad. Remember, this was Assad's biggest backer, who frankly1228created Assad's chemical weapons in the first place. He could1229not possibly disarm him.1230    So what I would like to see is more consistency and clarity1231that we need to compete with Russia. Russia cannot be part of a1232solution, especially not after helping Assad destroy this1233country, because our credibility is on the line at this point.1234    In terms of what we would like to see beyond the hotline,1235well, I would like to see more diplomatic engagement, more1236commitment to empowering other actors, like I mentioned,1237potentially such as Azerbaijan, who has already stepped into1238this role, but also looking--to take your question a little bit1239further beyond our partners--looking to create linkages between1240European and Middle East theaters.1241    That is why I highlighted the importance of empowering1242Ukrainians, tackling Russia's ghost fleet, looking at the1243bigger strategic picture, because that is how Russia is looking1244at it.1245    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative Baumgartner.1246    I now recognize the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Schneider,1247for 5 minutes.1248    Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Lawler.1249    I want to thank the witnesses. I have so many questions.1250How do we help make sure that al-Sharaa succeeds? How do we1251protect minorities? How do we orient Syria toward our allies1252and away from enemies like Iran, but at the same time, how do1253we make sure allies like Turkey don't move the S-300's to Syria1254to get out of CAATSA? Things that we need to worry about.1255    But, Dr. Borshchevskaya, you talked about Russia and the1256Soviet Union, and I started thinking as I'm sitting here about1257history. The Soviet Union lasted 69 years. To understand where1258Russia goes after the Soviet Union, you have to understand1259where it was before and, you know, look back to the 800's.1260    Syria history goes back even farther, and you have more1261ethnic groups than you can count. When the civil war started126212, 13 years ago, I remember using--I guess it was 2011, 141263years ago--using a metaphor of a corkscrew and that there were1264so many different groups in there. And as countries around and1265even the U.S. got involved, we essentially tied ourselves to1266that corkscrew. And every time the corkscrew turned, it pulled1267us further and further in.1268    We didn't know what the outcome would be. Ultimately,1269finally, Assad left. Al-Sharaa rises to power. Those threats1270seem to have been cut in many ways, but we still are very1271much--as you all have said, we have interests in Syria, and not1272just our interests. We have interests and concerns with1273countries who are trying to stay in Syria: Russia, Iran, and1274others.1275    So my question is, given this narrow window of opportunity1276that you have talked about that we are looking at, the desire1277of Russia to make sure it maintains its access to the Eastern1278Mediterranean that is so critical for its view, China trying to1279make sure it has its play, Iran, et cetera, what do we need to1280do as the United States, most importantly--and I am just going1281to go down one, two, three from left to right. What does1282Congress need to do to make sure that we are protecting our1283interests, protecting our long-term hopes and aspirations for a1284new region? I say this as the chair of the Abraham Accords1285Caucus. Syria is talking about being part of the Abraham1286Accords. And I will leave it at that.1287    So Dr. Alterman?1288    Dr. Alterman. Thank you very much, Congressman. First, I1289think you are thinking about this in exactly the right way. If1290you think about who wants instability in Syria, it is the1291people we are most concerned about. It is the Iranians and the1292Russians who seek to exploit instability because they see Syria1293settling down as helping us and undermining them. I think that1294is partly why we need to work so closely with our partners and1295allies.1296    I was talking to a friend over the weekend and mentioned I1297was testifying. He said, ``So no State Department witnesses?''1298I mean, I think one of the things Congress can do is you can1299engage with the administration----1300    Mr. Schneider. We would like to.1301    Dr. Alterman [continuing]. and make sure--no, and make sure1302that they have worked out both where they are--and to say I am1303very concerned about Ambassador Barrack trying to play both the1304Turkey role and the Syria envoy role because it then becomes1305very hard to reassure the Israelis----1306    Mr. Schneider. And I want to give others a chance to1307respond, but I will say if you do everything half-assed, you do1308nothing well. And so I agree with you.1309    Dr. Borshchevskaya?1310    Dr. Borshchevskaya. Sure, and I agree with Jon on what he1311just said. I mean, to add to that, I think Congress can make it1312clear that Syria is a priority, that it will highlight these1313issues on a regular basis; it will engage in conversations and1314monitor and look for potential points of leverage.1315    Mr. Schneider. Thank you.1316    Mr. Schenker?1317    Mr. Schenker. Yes. Thank you, Congressman. I actually agree1318with what Jon said about Tom Barrack. I have a section in my1319written testimony about this. I don't think he can do two jobs1320of one person simultaneously well, in addition to the conflicts1321of interest.1322    What I do say one of the things he can do--and I don't know1323if you have already done this, but you know how you have the1324Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act.1325People who undermine the stability or countries who undermine1326the stability of Syria can also be sanctioned or otherwise1327treated differently. I mean, just an idea.1328    Mr. Schneider. I like that idea.1329    With my last few seconds, I will just make an observation.1330I mentioned the Soviet Union was 69 years. Assad family took1331power in 1971, 25 years after Syria was established as a State.1332We can think of those in long periods.1333    But just doing some research as I was sitting here, the1334Ottomans ruled Syria for 400 years. Before that, the Arabs1335ruled Syria for almost 900 years, the Byzantines for 300 years.1336The Romans were there. And that is just the modern history of1337Syria. It goes back ten of thousands of years.1338    I think if we are going to understand Syria, we need to1339understand the history of the different ethnic groups in the1340area. But it is also imperative that we understand the1341topography of the area, the importance of the Euphrates River1342running from the north--southeast--or south--yes, southeast, as1343well as the mountains running vertical from south to north,1344because to fail to understand that, we will fail and make1345mistakes with unintended consequences.1346    I yield back.1347    Mr. Lawler. I now recognize Representative Zinke for 51348minutes.1349    Mr. Zinke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1350    I want to turn my attention to the PKK, which is a Marxist1351terrorist organization. I do think it was a mistake of this1352government to arm them because the enemy of our enemy is not1353necessarily our friend. And because of the Kurds, I think we1354made a mistake to think that all Kurds are the same, just like1355all Irish the same except the IRA.1356    Now, having said that, the Kurds, or the Syrian Government1357as it is, has said that they are disarmed. I would like your1358opinion on what that disarmament really means, and are they?1359    And, doctor, if you would go first--Dr. Anna.1360    Dr. Borshchevskaya. Well, I mean, first, let me just say I1361think the announcement that the PKK was disarmed is1362historically important. When I think about the key PKK, I think1363about the fact that it was the Soviet Union that helped empower1364this organization in the first place. So I think, if it is in1365fact disbanded, it is a step in the right direction. I----1366    Mr. Zinke. Do you think they are really disbanded?1367    Dr. Borshchevskaya. So I don't have accurate information1368that they really have disbanded, and I think that it behooves1369us to continue monitoring this issue. But I don't have that1370information.1371    Mr. Zinke. Dr. Alterman, your opinion?1372    Dr. Alterman. I don't think they have decided what this all1373means yet. I am not sure the Turkish Government is confident1374what it all means yet. It is an opening, and it requires1375watchful waiting.1376    I agree with you on many of the threats, but I also think1377we shouldn't close the door on the possibility that this1378conflict is entering a very different phase than it has been in1379for many years.1380    Mr. Zinke. And sir?1381    Mr. Schenker. I agree with Jon, Congressman. I think that1382this is a start. I think it is far from clear that the PKK has1383put down its weapons and all the people that were at one time1384adherents of the PKK--that they are finished.1385    Mr. Zinke. So the ISIS individuals that are imprisoned--1386there are a number of them. The former PKK is guarding them.1387What should be our policy, other than sending them to El1388Salvador?1389    Mr. Schenker. Well, the policy has been, Congressman, the1390repatriation, ultimately, of these people to go back to the1391countries that they were from and that they would be1392responsible for them in those countries.1393    As you know, no country wants to take back former members1394of ISIS. It has been a very slow process. Iraq has taken back1395some. Other countries--Oman has taken back some people, I1396believe. Our policy should be for the Government of Syria1397ultimately to be responsible for these camps.1398    Mr. Zinke. Doctor, do you agree?1399    Dr. Alterman. I once again agree with my old friend, David1400Schenker.1401    Mr. Zinke. So how big of a threat are they if they were1402released into the population?1403    Mr. Schenker. I think you would see, Congressman, the1404immediate resurgence of ISIS in the area, absolutely.1405    Mr. Zinke. I agree.1406    And doctor?1407    Dr. Alterman. There is no question in my mind that some1408people can be reformed. There is also no question in my mind1409some people cannot be reformed, and you would see increased1410ISIS--there already is, of course, ISIS activity, and you would1411see more of it.1412    Mr. Zinke. In the interest of time and letting my1413colleagues also give questions, I yield back.1414    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative Zinke.1415    I now recognize Representative Mills, the chairman of the1416Oversight Subcommittee, for 5 minutes.1417    Mr. Mills. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.1418    Mr. Schenker, I wanted to go back to one of the things you1419talked about. You said that they want to show inclusivity, but1420nothing has been done yet. But my understanding is that you1421have the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, Hind Kabawat,1422who is Christian. You have Amjad Badr, who is the Minister of1423Agriculture, who is Druze. So would you like to kind of reState1424what you meant by that statement, just to be clear?1425    Mr. Schenker. Yes. Thank you, Congressman. I was talking1426about if you look at overall composition of the government1427between, for example, men and women, and also if you look at1428what these communities said after the constitutional meetings1429and the consultations about whether their inputs were1430appreciated, taken into consideration, incorporated into the1431draft documents, I think that there was a lot of complaints1432from the communities.1433    Mr. Mills. Speaking on the documents, I mean, in 2025,1434under al-Sharaa, he signed an agreement with the Druze1435representatives from Sweida Province, which integrated the1436Druze into the entire State institutions. So this is obviously1437a very pivotal step, something that not even Assad or any of1438the others were willing to do.1439    And in talking about inclusivity, as you know, even some of1440our own allies are just now starting to incorporate women into1441ministries, Ambassadorial positions, et cetera, based on1442cultural understandings and nuances.1443    You also mentioned the IAEA, which is a very important1444part. But OPCW, who is actually the Organization for the1445Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, has been in there on multiple1446occasions inspecting every single one of the actual sites, and1447to include 22 sites just in the last week and a half and how1448they would actually look at safely--this is the key thing;1449people think that you can just go ahead and pick up these1450chemicals and just toss them out in the trash, and we are going1451to be good--but safely be able to dispose of this so they can't1452be utilized in the future.1453    We also talked about--and I agree with this. This is going1454to be one of those relationships that we have to not only be1455cautious of based on backgrounds and past experiences, but it1456is going to be a ``trust but verify'' relationship. And we know1457that very well in any conflict, post-conflict, areas.1458    But if we took the broad-brush approach that someone's past1459therefore defines their future, we wouldn't have alliances with1460Japan and Germany to this day. And so I think that we need to1461keep this in mind because what I have seen so far is the1462current administration there has not only partnered with Iraq1463CTS and the U.S. to help counter ISIS operations, they have not1464only continued to stop the illicit weapons transfers of Hashd1465al-Sha'bi and the Iranian regime-backed militia groups through1466Syria into Lebanon to be utilized to attack, but just today, 151467antitank guided missiles and 30 crates of heavy caliber1468ammunitions that was concealed by smugglers in a truck headed1469to Hezbollah was blocked and prevented from being able to be1470utilized against Israel.1471    So I say this to explain that not actually looking at a way1472to try and work with the Syrian people to get an inclusive,1473democratically elected, free Syrian Government only opens the1474door for our adversaries like Russia, who, when I spoke with1475President al-Sharaa, said that he already had a proposal on the1476table by Russia that they were demanding that be signed. And he1477refused because he said, ``I would rather partner with the West1478and start developing our Nation.''1479    When he talked about Iran, he said that we have not only1480pushed Iran out, but we will never allow Syria to be a proxy1481State of Iran. They can have a diplomatic opening of their1482consulate or their embassy, but we will even limit the number1483of visas for Iranians to come here because we know their1484influence, operations, and their capabilities. This is a man1485who fought in combat on both the good side and the bad side. So1486he understands how these operations work.1487    So what would be a greater risk: not looking to work with1488Syria and make them an ally and help the regional stability and1489protect the great State of Israel, or to allow them to fall1490into the hands of the predatory manners of Russia and Iran and1491China?1492    Mr. Schenker. Congressman, I agree with you wholeheartedly.1493As I said earlier, the chemical weapons--the WMD, the IAEA, the1494counterterrorism cooperation--these are high points. I think1495there is some criticism on the inclusivity part, but I am all1496for working with this government. This is the only game in1497town, and it is our opportunity to lose. So we should be on the1498ground floor.1499    Mr. Mills. And I think that not even allowing China into1500the palace, which is something that he has done, shows even a1501further desire to work with the West. I think that helping to1502establish good neighbors, as Robert Frost--the ``Good fences1503make good neighbors'' relationship with Israel--will protect1504our allies there.1505    I think that people understand that if you study the1506geopolitics of the Middle East, making sure Syria is stable1507will ensure that we can have a stable Middle East, which is1508President Trump's America-first agenda and promise.1509    Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. With that, I yield back.1510    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Representative Mills. I echo your1511sentiments.1512    I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony1513and the members for their questions. The members of the1514subcommittee may have some additional questions for the1515witnesses, and we will ask you to respond to these in writing.1516Pursuant to committee rules, all members may have 5 days to1517submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the1518record, subject to the length limitations.1519    Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.1520    [Whereupon, at 3:32 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]15211522                                APPENDIX15231524                              ----------15251526               Material Submitted for the Hearing Record1527[GRAPHICS] NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]15281529                                 [all]