“Mass Gathering Events: Assessing Security Coordination and Preparedness”

1[House Hearing, 119 Congress]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34               MASS GATHERING EVENTS: ASSESSING SECURITY5                    COORDINATION AND PREPAREDNESS6=======================================================================78                                HEARING910                               BEFORE THE1112                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON13                  EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY1415                                OF THE1617                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY18                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES1920                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2122                             FIRST SESSION2324                               __________2526                              MAY 21, 20252728                               __________2930                           Serial No. 119-163132                               __________3334       Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security3536[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]3738       Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov/3940                               __________4142                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE4361-339 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 20254445-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------4647                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY4849                 Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman50Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice       Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,51    Chair                                Ranking Member52Clay Higgins, Louisiana              Eric Swalwell, California53Michael Guest, Mississippi           J. Luis Correa, California54Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida           Shri Thanedar, Michigan55August Pfluger, Texas                Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island56Andrew R. Garbarino, New York        Daniel S. Goldman, New York57Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois58Tony Gonzales, Texas                 Timothy M. Kennedy, New York59Morgan Luttrell, Texas               LaMonica McIver, New Jersey60Dale W. Strong, Alabama              Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking61Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma                  Member62Elijah Crane, Arizona                Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico63Andrew Ogles, Tennessee              Nellie Pou, New Jersey64Sheri Biggs, South Carolina          Troy A. Carter, Louisiana65Gabe Evans, Colorado                 Robert Garcia, California66Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania         Al Green, Texas67Brad Knott, North Carolina68                    Eric Heighberger, Staff Director69                  Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director70                       Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk71                                 ------7273          SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY7475                   Dale W. Strong, Alabama, Chairman76Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma              Timothy M. Kennedy, New York,77Gabe Evans, Colorado                     Ranking Member78Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania         Julie Johnson, Texas79Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex     Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico80    officio)                         Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi81                                         (ex officio)82               Diana Bergwin, Subcommittee Staff Director83          Lauren McClain, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director8485                           C O N T E N T S8687                              ----------88                                                                   Page8990                               Statements9192The Honorable Dale W. Strong, a Representative in Congress From93  the State of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency94  Management and Technology:95  Oral Statement.................................................     196  Prepared Statement.............................................     397The Honorable Timothy M. Kennedy, a Representative in Congress98  From the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on99  Emergency Management and Technology:100  Oral Statement.................................................     4101  Prepared Statement.............................................     6102The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress103  From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on104  Homeland Security:105  Prepared Statement.............................................     6106107                               Witnesses108109Mr. Donald Barnes, Sheriff-Coroner, Orange County Sheriff's110  Department, On Behalf of the Major County Sheriffs of America:111  Oral Statement.................................................     8112  Prepared Statement.............................................    10113Mr. John Junell, Chief Security Officer, Live Nation114  Entertainment:115  Oral Statement.................................................    12116  Prepared Statement.............................................    14117Mr. Jeremy Hammond, Assistant Commissioner, Southeastern118  Conference:119  Oral Statement.................................................    16120  Prepared Statement.............................................    17121122                             For the Record123124The Honorable Gabe Evans, a Representative in Congress From the125  State of Colorado:126  Statement of the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems127    International (AUVSI)........................................    23128129                                Appendix130131Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Jeremy Hammond........    33132Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for John Junell...........    35133Questions From Honorable Nellie Pou for John Junell..............    37134135MASS GATHERING EVENTS: ASSESSING SECURITY COORDINATION AND PREPAREDNESS136137                              ----------138139                        Wednesday, May 21, 2025140141             U.S. House of Representatives,142                    Committee on Homeland Security,143                      Subcommittee on Emergency Management144                                            and Technology,145                                                    Washington, DC.146    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m., in147room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Dale W. Strong148(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.149    Present: Representatives Strong, Evans of Colorado,150Mackenzie, Kennedy of New York, and Johnson of Texas.151    Also present: Representatives Correa, and Pou.152    Mr. Strong. The Committee on Homeland Security,153Subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology will come154to order. Without objection, the Chair may declare the155subcommittee in recess at any point.156    The purpose of this hearing is to assess security best157practices, highlight challenges, and understand how the Federal158Government, State government, local law enforcement, and the159private sector coordinate with one another for mass gathering160events.161    Without objection, the gentleman from California, Mr.162Correa, and the gentlewoman from New Jersey, Ms. Pou, are163permitted to sit on the dais and ask questions to the164witnesses.165    I now recognize myself for an opening statement.166    Good afternoon, and thank you for joining us today. I also167would like to take the time to thank the staff for their hard168work on this hearing.169    Today we will discuss the important and timely topic of170security preparedness and coordination for mass gathering171events. By their very nature, these events draw large crowds in172concentrated areas, making them attractive targets for173malicious actors.174    Ensuring their safety requires complex coordination among175Federal, State, and local authorities, including law176enforcement and emergency services. It also requires close177collaboration with partners in the sports and entertainment178industries.179    I witnessed the scale of these challenges first-hand when I180led a Congressional delegation to New Orleans to serve a181security preparation for the Super Bowl, following the New182Year's Eve attack on Bourbon Street.183    That incident and others like it serve as a stark reminder184that terrorist threats persist and underscore our185responsibility to safeguard such gatherings.186    These events will only continue to grow in prominence and187frequency. In the year ahead, the United States will host188several major international sporting events, including the 2025189FIFA World Cup, the 2026 FIFA World Cup, and the 2028 Summer190Olympics and Paralympics in Los Angeles.191    These events present enormous opportunities, delivering192economic benefits, while also showcasing our great Nation on193the international stage.194    But they also bring significant security challenges. Take195the 2026 World Cup, for example. Seventy-six matches will be196played in 11 U.S. cities, with an estimated 6.5 million fans197traveling to the United States, not to mention it will also be198played in the midst of the celebration of America's 250th199anniversary.200    To meet these unprecedented demands, DHS has convened an201all-hands-on-deck approach to ensure they are safe and secure.202    CISA is working to secure critical infrastructure. The203Office of Intelligence and Analysis is sharing threat204information, and CBP and CIS are carefully vetting and205processing international travelers.206    I am also proud of this committee's leadership in207addressing this topic. Three weeks ago, the committee passed208its budget reconciliation recommendation, including $625209million in additional preparedness funding for the 2026 World210Cup and $1 billion for the 2028 Olympics.211    I support these measures, and I hope funds can be212distributed as quickly and effectively as possible.213    Additionally, following President Trump's Executive Order,214convening a White House task force on the FIFA World Cup, this215committee established its own bipartisan Task Force on216Enhancing Security For Special Events in the United States.217    I applaud Vice Chairman McCaul, who will be chairing the218task force, and Chairman Green for their leadership on this219issue, and I'm honored to have been selected to join this task220force.221    I hope today's hearing will offer valuable insight and222inform future task force discussions.223    Many challenges must be addressed to improve security224preparedness for these major events. As we discussed last225month, unmanned aerial aircraft systems can act as a force226multiplier for DHS's mission.227    However, they can also be used for evil and unlawful228purposes. You may remember in 2017, a drone dropped leaflets229over 2 sporting stadiums, in violation of temporary flight230restrictions.231    It doesn't take very much to imagine, to see how the same232technology could've been used for a much deadlier purpose.233    As for--I previously mentioned, the New Orleans attack234demonstrated the danger that vehicles pose to mass gatherings235and the need to ensure effective countermeasures are in place.236    Additionally, the fan behavior at these events can be237erratic as seen during the 2024 Copa America match when238thousands of fans breached physical security barriers and239overwhelmed law enforcement.240    These examples reflect the importance of robust security241planning to ensure events are conducted peacefully, that all242spectators remain safe, and everyone has a good time.243    I'm thankful for the participation of our witnesses today.244I look forward to their perspective, as well as what Congress245and the Federal Government can do to support these events.246    Again, thank you all for being here, and I hope we can have247a productive and bipartisan discussion, as we seek to improve248security ahead of these mass gathering events.249    [The statement of Chairman Strong follows:]250                   Statement of Chairman Dale Strong251    Good afternoon and thank you for joining us.252    I would also like to thank the staff for their hard work on this253hearing.254    Today, this subcommittee will discuss the important and timely255topic of our security preparedness and coordination for mass gathering256events.257    By their very nature, these events draw large crowds in258concentrated areas, making them attractive targets for malicious259actors.260    Ensuring their safety requires complex coordination among Federal,261State, and local authorities--including law enforcement and emergency262services.263    It also requires close collaboration with partners in the sports264and entertainment industries.265    I witnessed the scale of these challenges first-hand, when I led a266Congressional delegation to New Orleans to survey security preparations267for the Super Bowl following the New Year's attack on Bourbon Street.268    That incident, and others like it, serve as stark reminders that269terrorist threats persist, and underscore our shared responsibility to270safeguard such gatherings.271    And these events will only continue to grow in prominence and272frequency.273    In the years ahead, the United States will host several major274international sporting events, including:275   The 2025 FIFA Club World Cup,276   The 2026 FIFA World Cup, and277   The 2028 Summer Olympics and Paralympics in Los Angeles.278    These events present enormous opportunities--delivering economic279benefits, while also showcasing our great Nation on the international280stage.281    But they also bring significant security challenges.282    Take the 2026 World Cup for example: 78 matches will be played in28311 U.S. cities, with an estimated 6.5 million fans traveling to the284United States.285    Not to mention, it will also be played in the midst of celebrations286for America's 250th anniversary.287    To meet these unprecedented demands, DHS has convened an ``all-288hands on deck'' approach to ensure they are safe and secure.289    CISA is working to secure critical infrastructure; the Office of290Intelligence and Analysis is sharing threat information; and CBP and291CIS are carefully vetting and processing international travelers.292    I am also proud of this committee's leadership in getting ahead of293this challenge.294    Three weeks ago, the committee passed its budget reconciliation295recommendations, including $625 million in additional preparedness296funding for the 2026 World Cup and $1 billion for the 2028 Olympics.297    I support these measures, and hope funds can be distributed as298quickly and effectively as possible.299    Additionally, following President Trump's Executive Order convening300a White House Task Force on the FIFA World Cup, this committee301established its own bipartisan Task Force on Enhancing Security for302Special Events in the United States.303    I applaud Vice Chairman McCaul, who will be chairing the task304force, and Chairman Green for their leadership on this issue.305    I'm honored to have been selected to join the task force.306    I hope today's hearing will offer valuable insights to inform307future task force discussions.308    There are many challenges that need to be addressed to improve our309security preparedness for these major events.310    As we discussed in our hearing last month, Unmanned Aircraft311Systems--or UAS--can act as a force multiplier for the DHS mission.312    However, they can also be used for evil or unlawful purposes.313    You may remember in 2017 a drone dropped leaflets over 2 sports314stadiums in violation of the Temporary Flight Restrictions.315    It doesn't take very much imagination to see how the same316technology could have been used for a much deadlier purpose.317    As I previously mentioned, the New Orleans' attack demonstrated the318danger that vehicles pose to mass gatherings--and the need to ensure319effective countermeasures are in place.320    Additionally, fan behavior at these events can be erratic, as seen321during the 2024 Copa America match when thousands of fans breached322physical security barriers and overwhelmed law enforcement.323    These examples reflect the importance of robust security planning324to ensure events are conducted peacefully, that all spectators remain325safe, and everyone has a good time.326    I'm thankful for the participation of our witnesses today.327    I look forward to their perspectives, as well as what Congress and328the Federal Government can do to support these events.329    Again, thank you all for being here, and I hope we can have a330productive and bipartisan discussion as we seek to improve security331ahead of these mass gathering events.332333    Mr. Strong. I now recognize the Ranking Member of the334subcommittee, Mr. Kennedy, for his opening statements.335    Mr. Kennedy. Thank you very much, Chairman, and good336afternoon everyone. It's great to see you all here today this337afternoon.338    I'd like to start on a somber note by remembering our339colleague and good friend, Congressman Gerry Connolly, who340passed away earlier this morning.341    Gerry was a passionate public servant, a tireless champion342for working families, and a defender of democracy. His loss343will certainly be felt deeply in Congress and in Virginia's34411th District.345    He was actually one of the first Members that I met when I346came here to Washington, DC. I believe he was the first Member347to stop by my office, before I was sworn in last year, to say348hello. He welcomed me as a fellow Irishman and offered me a349kindness that I'll never forget.350    We all knew him as a consummate gentleman and certainly a351leader and, again, a dear friend.352    So our thoughts are certainly with his wife Cathy, their353daughter Caitlin, and the entire Connolly family on this354difficult day.355    Now, turning to today's Emergency Management and Technology356Subcommittee hearing on mass gatherings, I want to thank all of357the witnesses for joining us here today.358    I also want to extend my gratitude to the staff for their359efforts in making today's hearing come together.360    My thoughts, and I believe all of our thoughts and361concerns, are with those in Kentucky, Missouri, Indiana,362Virginia, and everyone who was impacted by the tornadoes and363storms that hit just over this past weekend.364    Nearly 30 lives were lost in the devastation, and we know365far too often natural disasters are continually posing366significant threats to our Nation, and we have to ensure that367we are as prepared as possible to respond and meet the moment.368    Shortly after the storm, it became clear that the local369National Weather Service office in Kentucky is 1 of 4 offices370nationwide without enough staff.371    National Weather Service offices, in part, are the National372Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration offices as well, and373those are the offices that provide critical tornado forecasting374that is then transmitted into emergency alerts so that375communities can prepare.376    The future of emergency management in this country is377dependent on the kinds of investments we make in these missions378and the staff that keep them running.379    So I am certainly concerned that the President's budget380request cuts NOAA by at least 27 percent, and I fear that this381will only increase the level of devastation that we saw this382past weekend when it comes to future emergencies.383    Additionally, we are days away from the start of hurricane384season, and the chaos at the Federal Emergency Management385Agency continues to hinder our ability to support communities.386    So this won't just affect responses to natural disasters.387FEMA's preparedness and grants administration will have a388direct impact on the security of mass gatherings, like the 2026389FIFA World Cup and the 2028 Olympics.390    We know that mass gatherings don't happen in a vacuum, and391having strong emergency management infrastructure that can392respond is going to be essential to ensuring that the 2393premier, once-in-a-generation sporting events that we're394discussing today, among other mass gathering events, are as395seamless as possible.396    In preparing for these mass gathering events, State and397local first responders across the country are scaling up, and398in some cases, like the 2 major events--the Olympics and the399FIFA World Cup--these are historic visitations, record400investments for the communities and States, and potential high-401security risks.402    The Department of Homeland Security's Office of403Intelligence and Analysis conducts the annual Homeland Threat404Assessment, and its publication for 2025 warned that the405terrorism threat environment throughout our country remains406high.407    Given this, it's critical that the Federal Government make408good on its promise to provide States and local communities409with FEMA preparedness grant funding, so we're ready to respond410and mitigate any threats during these high-profile events.411    Again, I'm concerned that President Trump's budget proposes412a $646 million cut to FEMA's non-disaster grant programs.413    Cuts like these severely undermine our ability to detect414threats, support our local law enforcement partners, and415prepare for major events and mass gatherings.416    Now it's time to shore up the FEMA grant program, like the417Homeland Security Grant Program, which includes the State418Homeland Security Program, the Urban Area Security Initiative,419and Operation Stonegarden.420    I look forward to hearing about the importance of these421programs from our witnesses as well as ways that we can422continue to partner with each and every one of you, supporting423law enforcement, supporting the private sector and Federal424agencies in a collaborative, collective way so that we can425secure these mass gathering events and make them as safe as426possible for those in attendance and those in the vicinity.427    Again, thank you all for your service to our country, to428your respective communities, and I look forward to our429conversation.430    Thank you, Chairman.431    [The statement of Ranking Member Kennedy follows:]432              Statement of Ranking Member Timothy Kennedy433                              May 21, 2025434    First, I want to say that my thoughts are with those in Kentucky,435Missouri, Indiana, and Virginia, and everyone who was impacted by the436tornadoes and storms that hit over the weekend.437    Nearly 30 lives were lost in the devastation. Natural disasters438continue to pose a significant threat to our Nation, and we must ensure439that we are prepared as a Nation to respond. Shortly after the storm,440it became clear that the local National Weather Service (NWS) office in441Kentucky is 1 of 4 offices nationwide without enough staff.442    NWS offices, a part of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric443Administration (NOAA), provide critical tornado forecasting that is444then transmitted into emergency alerts so that communities can prepare.445The future of emergency management in this country is dependent on the446kinds of investments we make in these missions and the staff that keep447them running.448    I am deeply concerned that the President's budget request cuts NOAA449by at least 27 percent. I fear that this would only increase the level450of devastation we saw this weekend in future emergencies. Additionally,451we are days away from the start of hurricane season, and the chaos at452the Federal Emergency Management Agency continues to hinder our ability453to support communities. This won't just affect responses to natural454disasters. FEMA's preparedness and grants administration will have a455direct impact on the security of mass gatherings like the 2026 FIFA456World Cup and the 2028 Olympics.457    Mass gatherings do not happen in a vacuum, and having a strong458emergency management infrastructure that can respond, for example, to a459mass gathering dealing with extreme weather, will be essential to460ensuring that the two premier, once-in-a-generation sporting events461that we are discussing today are as seamless as possible. To prepare462for the 2026 FIFA World Cup and the 2028 Summer Olympics, State and463local first responders across the United States are scaling up for464historic visitation, record infrastructure investments, and the465potential for high security risks.466    The Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and467Analysis conducts an annual Homeland Threat Assessment, and its468publication for 2025 warned that the terrorism threat environment469throughout the country remains high. Given this, it's critical that the470Federal Government make good on its promise to provide States and local471communities with FEMA preparedness grant funding so that we are ready472to respond to and mitigate any threats during these high-profile473events.474    I am concerned that President Trump's budget proposes a $646475million cut to FEMA's non-disaster grant programs. Cuts like these476severely undermine our ability to detect threats, support our local law477enforcement partners, and prepare for major events like the World Cup478and the Olympics.479    Now is the time to shore up FEMA grant programs like the Homeland480Security Grant Program, which includes the State Homeland Security481Program, the Urban Area Security Initiative, and Operation Stonegarden.482    I look forward to hearing about the importance of these programs483from our witnesses, as well as the ways in which the Federal Government484can support local law enforcement, the private sector, and Federal485agencies in collectively securing mass events.486487    Mr. Strong. Thank you, Ranking Member Kennedy.488    Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening489statements may be submitted for the record.490    [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]491             Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson492                              May 21, 2025493    While today's hearing is focused on mass gatherings, the Federal494Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) role in supporting first495responders cannot be overstated. Unfortunately, the Trump496administration is creating a crisis at FEMA. Secretary Kristi Noem497appeared before this committee last week and doubled down on her498position that FEMA should be eliminated. She also admitted that she did499not have any written plan for addressing catastrophic disasters.500    Those statements alone should be cause for concern. But coming just501days before hurricane season begins and amid reports that FEMA has lost502thousands of employees, they are profoundly irresponsible and503dangerous. Unfortunately, the explicit attack on FEMA is not an504isolated incident. It's part of a larger pattern under this505administration--dismantling preparedness, sidelining career experts,506and treating public safety like a partisan game.507    Even as this administration undermines FEMA and emergency508preparedness, Trump's most loyal Republican allies are still lining up509to beg for Federal assistance when their States are hit by disaster.510While today's hearing focuses on upcoming large-scale events, local511communities across the country already face the challenge of preparing512with fewer resources.513    That's because the Trump administration froze key Federal514preparedness grants, including the Urban Area Security Initiative515(UASI), the State Homeland Security Program (SHSP), and the Securing516the Cities (STC) program. These grants fund everything from emergency517planning and training to equipment and exercises. Local officials rely518on this funding to prepare for mass gatherings. Yet, the Trump519administration delayed this money for months, only releasing portions520after Federal courts forced them to. Even now, several programs remain521in unlawful limbo, leaving cities and States stretched thin on funding522and unsure how to plan effectively for events like the World Cup.523    At the same time, the Trump administration has weakened our524emergency preparedness on multiple fronts: slashing the Federal525workforce, stripping DHS of essential staff responsible for threat526assessments and emergency coordination, and shutting down training527centers for first responders.528    The administration's proposed fiscal year 2026 budget goes even529further by eliminating key training programs for first responders530through the closure of the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium, a531group of 7 nationally-recognized organizations that provide specialized532training to emergency response personnel nationwide. Even more533dangerously, the Trump administration has scaled back Federal efforts534to address domestic violent extremism--the most lethal terrorist threat535facing the homeland.536    The administration's proposed fiscal year 2026 budget continues537this retreat by eliminating the Targeted Violence and Terrorism538Prevention (TVTP) program--an initiative focused on early intervention539and community-based prevention of radicalization and violence.540    Defunding this life-saving work sends a dangerous signal: that the541Federal Government under Donald Trump is willing to abandon its542responsibility to confront the threats we know are growing. Together,543these actions by the Trump administration represent not just a neglect544of duty, but a systematic dismantling of the tools and partnerships545that keep Americans safe. Our communities, our responders, and our most546vulnerable are the ones paying the price.547    I hope that today's hearing will be an honest conversation about548the Trump administration's actions and how Congress can better support549communities hosting mass gatherings.550551    Mr. Strong. I'm very pleased to have such an important552panel of witnesses before us today. I ask that the witnesses553please rise and raise their right hand.554    [Witnesses sworn.]555    Mr. Strong. Thank you. Please be seated.556    Let the record reflect that all witnesses have answered in557the affirmative.558    I would like now to formally introduce our witnesses.559Sheriff Donald Barnes is the sheriff-coroner of the Orange560County Sheriff's Department. He has served the Orange County561for over 35 years, having started in 1989.562    At the national level, he is the Major County Sheriffs of563America's vice president for homeland security and also chair564of their intelligence committee.565    Mr. John Junell is the chief security officer at Live566Nation Entertainment, where he leads their corporate security567program that helps keep employees, guests, and artists safe.568    Prior to his work at Live Nation, Mr. Junell served as a569special agent with the United States Secret Service, where he570served as the Agency's Presidential Protective Division.571    Mr. Jeremy Hammond is the assistant commissioner of the572Southeastern Conference where he plays a pivotal role in some573of the Nation's most high professional collegiate sporting574events, ensuring a seamless experience for fans, athletes, and575stakeholders alike.576    Before joining the Southeastern Conference, Mr. Hammond's577held senior roles with organizations such as Ingress Events,578WWE, and the Georgia Dome, developing deep expertise in event579management, public safety, planning, and venue operation.580    I thank the witnesses again for being here today. I now581recognize Sheriff Barnes for 5 minutes to summarize his opening582statement.583584  STATEMENT OF DONALD BARNES, SHERIFF-CORONER, ORANGE COUNTY585SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, ON BEHALF OF THE MAJOR COUNTY SHERIFFS OF586                            AMERICA587588    Mr. Barnes. Thank you, Chairman Strong and Ranking Member589Kennedy, for holding today's hearing.590    I'm here today representing the Major County Sheriffs of591America, the professional law enforcement association of the592largest sheriffs offices across the country. Our members serve593more than one-third of the United States population.594    As sheriff of Orange County, I lead an agency of more than5954,000 people who provide exceptional public safety services to596the 3.1 million residents in Orange County.597    As a major population center and popular tourist598destination on the Southern California region, mass gathering599events are a regular occurrence in our AOR. Nationwide,600managing the security for mass gathering events and addressing601associated public safety impacts largely fall on the shoulders602of sheriffs and our partners in city municipal police603departments.604    Today's focus is on the once-in-a-generation events--the605FIFA World Cup, the Olympics--and other events, as mentioned,606that will be coming to our country.607    It's been 3 decades since our Nation hosted these events so608close to each other. The FIFA World Cup of 1994 and the 1996609Olympics in Atlanta were significant moments for our country.610    Thirty years later, we will host these events in Southern611California, and in a dozen other regions, under a much more612complex, rapidly-evolving threat environment.613    We have greater technology available to assist us you know614with our security efforts, but risks associated with a cyber615attack are ever-present.616    Our border is more secure since the beginning of the year,617but many of the nefarious actors who entered our country over618the last 4 years remain, and their locations are unknown.619    An event that hosts visitors from all corners of the world620brings with it tensions from the multitude of conflicts621occurring around the globe.622    We must always remember that we have no national security623or homeland security without local law enforcement efforts.624    We can be successful in our goal of a safe World Cup and625Olympics if we use proven strategies and we are properly626resourced with the right mix of people and technology.627    Strategies that are most worthy of this committee's focus628and efforts include, No. 1, communication among law enforcement629partners.630    Sharing intelligence information across levels of631government is critical. This type of communication can best632occur through the network of fusion centers across our country.633    In Orange County, the Orange County Intelligence Assessment634Center responds to college protests, concern in conflicts with635the Middle East. Fusion centers play a central role in636communicating intelligence to personnel on the ground,637resulting in safe conclusions of these events.638    Continued and enhanced Federal funding is essential to639preparedness, providing support for strategic planning, and640maintaining operational and situational awareness.641    The UASI and SHSGP grants mentioned in Operation642Stonegarden provide funding that supports intelligence sharing643through fusion centers, builds critical incident response644capabilities, and creates Federal local partnerships that645strengthen national security.646    Second is the use of the Incident Command System. The647Orange County Sheriff's Department has long used ICS, known as648NIMS, SIMS, or whatever it might be at other levels, for649emergent events and planning for special events.650    It's a standardized protocol that creates command control,651communication coordination at all levels of government.652    It's been a proven, scaleable model that can be applied to653a variety of public safety incidents and events, and my654department has used it across our operational platform.655    Law enforcement across multiple jurisdictions needs to be656on the same page particularly with regard to events like the657Olympics and World Cup.658    Also, adaptation by Federal agencies would ensure better659integration when they work with State and local agencies during660these mass gathering events.661    Briefly, unmanned aerial systems will also be part of any662security strategy. Drones have proven to be a successful,663beneficial tool for public safety and emergency response, and664we anticipate that drone capabilities will be leveraged665extensively to help the World Cup and Olympic sites.666    Congressional support through legislation like H.R. 1058,667the DRONE Act, cosponsored by Representatives Correa and Nehls,668can help.669    At the same time, the unauthorized misuse of drones670represents a significant security concern for mass events and671the public's safety.672    Lawmakers must establish a legal framework that provides673broad-based but carefully regulated authority for locals to674deploy and operate counter-UAS systems. This framework must be675supported by funding, training, oversight, and transparency.676    Finally, I ask for your support in alleviating resource677impacts on local law enforcement. The number of simultaneous678events in multiple cities will put tremendous stress on679resources across the country.680    Federal grant funding to help offset these costs, which has681been provided during previous Olympics, will help us maintain682operations associated with these events while also fulfilling683our day-to-day law enforcement responsibilities to our684communities.685    I thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and I'm686looking forward to your questions.687    [The prepared statement of Mr. Barnes follows:]688                    Prepared Statement of Don Barnes689                              May 21, 2025690    Thank you Chairman Strong and Ranking Member Kennedy for holding691today's hearing.692    I am here today representing the Major County Sheriffs of America693(MCSA), a professional law enforcement association of the largest694Sheriff's offices across the country. Our members serve more than one-695third of the United States population. Our membership is comprised of696Sheriffs Offices serving counties with a population of 400,000 or more697and employing over 700 personnel.698    As Sheriff of Orange County, I lead an agency of more than 4,000699men and women who provide exceptional public safety services to 3.13700million residents. As a major population center and popular tourist701destination in the Southern California region, mass gathering events702are a regular occurrence in our area of responsibility.703    Nationwide, managing the security for mass gathering events and704addressing associated public safety impacts largely fall on the705shoulders of sheriffs and our partners in city police departments.706                        mass gathering dynamics707    There are several types of mass gathering events that present a708multitude of risks and security concerns. These mass gatherings can709occur daily at destinations like Disneyland in Orange County, CA or the710Disney World Resort in Orange County, Florida. There are annual mass711gathering events like the Coachella and Stagecoach Music Festivals in712Riverside County, California. This past year many of my colleagues were713responsible for ensuring the safety of those who attended the various714political events associated with the 2024 election. And there are715quasi-spontaneous events like protests. The unpredictable nature of716these events often makes them the most complex.717    Finally, there are the once-in-a-generation events we are primarily718focused on today--the FIFA World Cup and the Olympics. It has been 3719decades since our Nation hosted these events so close to each other.720The FIFA World Cup 1994 and 1996 Olympics in Atlanta were significant721moments for our country. Neither were without their challenges. World722Cup games were hosted in Los Angeles just 6 months after the723devastating North Ridge Earthquake. The Atlanta Games featured724memorable scenes like Muhammad Ali lighting the Olympic Torch and Keri725Strug securing Gold for Team USA, but the Games were also marked by a726deadly terrorist bombing at Centennial Park.727    Thirty years later we will host these events in Southern California728and in a dozen other regions under a much more complex threat729environment. We have greater technology available to assist with our730security efforts, but risks associated with cyber attack are ever731present. Our border is more secure since the beginning of this year,732but many of the nefarious actors who entered our country over the last7334 years remain. An event that hosts visitors from all corners of the734world brings with it tensions from the multitude of conflicts occurring735around the globe.736    Mitigating these risks falls to all those of us entrusted with737national security, homeland security and local public safety. We must738always remember that we have no national security or homeland security739without local public safety. We can be successful in our goal of a safe740World Cup and Olympics if we use proven strategies we know work and if741we are properly resourced with the right mix of people and technology.742                         successful strategies743    Today I will highlight strategies my colleagues and I believe are744most worthy of this committee's focus and efforts.745    Communication Among Law Enforcement Partners.--Sharing intelligence746information across levels of Government is critical. This type of747communication can best occur through the National Network of Fusion748Centers. Fusion centers are where local, State, Federal, and private-749sector partners collaborate to analyze and share threat-related750information. In Orange County, we use our fusion center regularly in751our work to help maintain safety at mass gathering events.752    A recent example occurred in the Spring of 2024 when multiple753Orange County law enforcement agencies were called to respond to754protests at the University of California, Irvine centered on the755conflict in the Middle East. Activity associated with the protests was756deemed unlawful and necessitated action by law enforcement. The fusion757center played a central role in communicating intelligence to personnel758on the ground, resulting in a safe conclusion to the event.759    This work highlights the need for those who work at the 80760recognized State and regional fusion centers around the Nation to761maintain access to local, regional, State, and Federal sources of762information at the Classified and unclassified levels. This includes763continued access to law enforcement records, criminal intelligence764databases, the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), the765Homeland Security Data Network (HSDN), the FBI's Criminal Justice766Information Services (CJIS), the FBI Network (FBINet), DHS's Treasury767Enforcement Communications System (TECS), and systems for collecting768and sharing tips, leads and threat-to-life data.769    This access enables fusion centers to add local and regional770context to national intelligence, as well as provide information and771value-added intelligence to support counterterrorism and other criminal772investigations that would otherwise be difficult or unlikely for lead773Federal, State, or local investigative agencies to obtain through774traditional channels.775    Use of Incident Command System (ICS).--The Orange County Sheriff's776Department has long used ICS to manage our response to emergencies and777plan for special events. ICS is a standardized approach to the command,778control, and coordination of a public safety response. ICS was779initially created by Southern California fire chiefs in 1968 to780organize their response to wildfires. It has proven to be a scalable781model that can be applied to a variety of public safety incidents and782events. My department has utilized ICS in response to barricaded783suspects, active shooters, and emergencies like the COVID-19 pandemic.784We have also used ICS in the planning of large-scale events, like the785August 2008 Saddleback Civil Forum which featured the Presidential786nominees of both parties.787    When used properly, ICS is particularly effective when multiple788agencies are involved in an event or response to an incident. The model789is rooted in the concept of defined roles, a common hierarchy, and a790commitment by all involved to the planning process. On July 13, 2024,791we saw the tragic results that can occur when roles are not clearly792defined. In reviews of the attempted assassination of then-former793President Trump, it was clear that several tasks and responsibilities794were not carried out due to lack of coordination. The ICS model is795designed to ensure coordination takes place and that all involved are796clear on their specific roles.797    Embedded Personnel.--Federal personnel should be embedded with798local staff during events where they have a role. For example, in799Orange County we have had several events featuring the President, Vice800President, Presidential candidates, and other Secret Service801protectees. Having an embedded Secret Service agent with our personnel802has enhanced communication and filled information gaps that could be803exploited by bad actors.804                      recommendations for congress805    Based on the success of these strategies I recommend this committee806work to support and implement the following:807    Ensure Use of ICS Construct.--Law enforcement across multiple808jurisdictions need to be on the same page. If we all are utilizing ICS,809people will know their roles, responsibilities and easily integrate810with one another. In my view it is important that Federal agencies811adopt the ICS model for their incidents and responses. ICS is a812universal model used by public safety agencies throughout the Nation.813Adaptation by Federal agencies would ensure better integration when814they work with State and local agencies during mass gathering events.815    Sustained Federal Investment in Homeland Security Funding.--816Continued and enhanced Federal funding is essential to preparedness,817providing support for strategic planning, and maintaining operational818readiness. The Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), State Homeland819Security Grant Program (SHSGP), and Operation Stonegarden provide820funding that supports intelligence sharing through fusion centers,821builds critical incident response capabilities, and creates Federal-822local partnerships that strengthen national security. These programs823have transformed our prevention, preparedness, and response824capabilities for both terrorist threats and natural disasters, creating825capacity that would not exist without Federal support. A major part of826our Nation's threat prevention and response capabilities are sustained827by FEMA grant funding--primarily through UASI and SHSGP. The828information access and analytical collaboration enabled by these grants829cannot be easily replicated. Therefore, it is a core Federal830responsibility to ensure these programs continue to support831capabilities that would otherwise be unavailable to the Federal832Government.833    Direct grant funding to local agencies--bypassing State-level834intermediaries--would eliminate bureaucratic hurdles, reduce835administrative overhead, and deliver resources more effectively to836front-line departments where they matter most.837    Counter-UAS Authority.--Drones have proven to be significantly838beneficial for public safety and emergency response, and we anticipate839that drone capabilities will be leveraged extensively to help protect840World Cup and Olympic sites. Congressional support through legislation841like H.R. 1058, the DRONE Act, co-sponsored by Representatives Correa842and Nehls can help.843    At the same time, the unauthorized misuse of drones presents a844significant security concern for mass events. Mass gathering events are845vulnerable to unauthorized Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), which puts846both public safety and national security at risk. This was seen the847past summer when concerts were paused due to drone activity.848    Current Federal law limits the use of counter-UAS technologies,849such as signal jamming, tracking, and drone interdiction, to just 4850Federal agencies. This legal gap is dangerous and must be addressed.851Lawmakers must establish a legal framework that provides broad-based,852but carefully regulated authority for locals to deploy and operate853counter-UAS systems. This framework must be supported by funding,854training, oversight, and transparency.855    Alleviate Resource Impacts on Local Law Enforcement.--The number of856simultaneous events in multiple cities across the Nation will put857stress on our resources. We must remember that law enforcement presence858will be needed not only at the games themselves but also at the859locations that will house the millions of visitors traveling into and860around our country.861    Much of what we do will fall on the shoulders of our existing862personnel. The overtime costs associated with filling shifts will put a863burden on our local agency budgets. Local agencies alone cannot864shoulder the burden for additional personnel, equipment, technology,865and supplies required to protect thousands of athletes and foreign866dignitaries, and secure Olympic housing and competition facilities867across hundreds of square miles. Federal grant funding to help offset868these costs--which has been provided during previous Olympic Games869hosted in the United States--will help us maintain operations870associated with these events while also fulfilling our day-to-day law871enforcement responsibilities in our communities.872    These recommendations are the 4 best things Congress and the873administration can do to ensure the 2026 FIFA World Cup and 2028874Olympic Games are remembered as the safest and most secure on record.875Sheriffs stand ready and willing to work with you and your colleagues.876I look forward to answering your questions.877878    Mr. Strong. Thank you, Sheriff Barnes.879    I now recognize Mr. Junell for 5 minutes to summarize his880opening statements. Mr. Junell.881882 STATEMENT OF JOHN JUNELL, CHIEF SECURITY OFFICER, LIVE NATION883                         ENTERTAINMENT884885    Mr. Junell. Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and886other Members of the subcommittee, I'm John Junell, chief887security officer at Live Nation Entertainment. Thank you for888the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss critical889safety issues facing the live entertainment industry.890    Twenty-twenty-four marked an historic milestone for live891music. Live Nation hosted more than 54,000 events, including892137 festivals, welcoming more than 151 million fans. And 2025893is already on track to surpass those benchmarks with more894stadium shows scheduled than ever before and record demand for895both concerts and festivals.896    As the scale and complexity of live events grow, we know897security measures need to enhance as well. I oversee the898development and implementation of security protocols and lead899the efforts to collaborate with local and Federal authorities900to help keep fans, artists, and workers safe.901    Our commitment to safety is unwavering. We've continuously902advanced our protocols and technologies, the dedication that903earned us the SAFETY Act Designation Award from DHS, but we904recognize there are limits to what we can do, especially when905it comes to the emerging threats posed by drones.906    As a private entity, we lack the authority to counter drone907activity, and law enforcement often lacks necessary908capabilities and authority to respond.909    This is why it's essential that more events are covered by910FAA-issued temporary flight restrictions, or TFRs, and counter-911UAS authority be expanded to local law enforcement.912    Drone use continues to grow rapidly. The FAA recently913reported that more than 1 million drones are now registered in914the United States, 160 percent increase since 2019. Given the915rise in usage in high-profile, drone-related incidents,916expanding TFR authority is needed.917    With the context in mind, I'd like to highlight several key918areas where we believe Congress can take further action.919    We commend Congress for passing section 935 of the FAA920Reauthorization Act last year which expands FAA authority to921issue drone-related TFRs for certain large-scale events.922    The provision allows TFR coverage for stadium concerts with923at least 30,000 attendees and festivals with at least 100,000.924    Live Nation was supportive of this provision but knows more925work must be done to mitigate the airborne threats at live926events.927    To maximize the impact of section 935, it's essential that928the FAA, State, and local law enforcement agencies, and other929stakeholders are fully aware of this new authority and equipped930to utilize it.931    Ultimately, success depends on the venue or local law932enforcement reaching out to Federal law enforcement agencies,933Federal law enforcement's willingness to request the TFR, and934the FAA's readiness to approve it.935    Without coordination and follow-through, this new provision936falls short of its intention to create more secure live events.937    Further recognition of this provision enhancement is938needed, including a clear, prominent, on-line process for939submitting a TFR request for all live events, including940concerts and festivals, and the addition of a dedicated941submission form to streamline the process for law enforcement942officials.943    Additionally, we ask Congress to consider lowering the944current thresholds to ensure that more events can benefit from945the protective coverage of TFRs.946    Last year alone, we had more than 1,000 shows in venues947with a capacity of 10,000. We ask Congress to lower the948attendance threshold to 10,000 for events taking place949outdoors.950    These proposed adjustments would significantly expand951safety coverage for high-density events that are currently952excluded despite facing comparable security risks.953    We also urge Congress to build on the progress made in last954year's FAA bill by strengthening air space protections to955include not only unmanned aircraft systems, but also small956manned aircrafts.957    We appreciate the bicameral and bipartisan attention this958issue has received and appreciate members for recognizing these959evolving threats.960    Finally, we urge Congress to grant mitigation authority to961qualified local law enforcement agencies. When a drone enters962restricted air space, rapid response is critical.963    But Federal authorities may not always be positioned to act964quickly. Allowing trained local agencies to respond to the965Federal guidance would significantly enhance real-time966capabilities and strengthen the effectiveness of TFRs.967    Similarly, we appreciate the bicameral and bipartisan968attention to this issue and commend Members for their efforts.969On behalf of Live Nation Entertainment, thank you all for your970leadership on these important issues, and I look forward to971answering your questions.972    [The prepared statement of Mr. Junell follows:]973                   Prepared Statement of John Junell974                              May 21, 2024975    Chair Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, other Members of the976Emergency Management and Technology Subcommittee, I'm John Junell,977chief security officer at Live Nation Entertainment. Thank you for the978opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the critical safety979and security considerations in the live entertainment industry.980    Twenty-twenty-four marked a historic milestone for live music--it981was the industry's biggest year to date. Artists toured the globe, and982fans showed up in record numbers. Live Nation hosted more than 54,000983events, including 137 festivals, welcoming more than 151 million fans.984Twenty twenty-five is already shaping up to surpass last year's985benchmarks--with more stadium shows scheduled than ever before, and the986demand for both festivals and concerts growing at an unprecedented987pace.988    As the scale and complexity of live events grow, we are advocating989for security measures to enhance as well. As the chief of security at990Live Nation, I am responsible for leading the company's security991program working in close contact with local and Federal authorities to992help keep fans, artists, and workers safe. Our commitment to safety is993unwavering--we've continuously advanced our protocols and technologies,994a dedication that was recognized through our receipt of the Department995of Homeland Security's SAFETY Act Designation Award. Yet, there are996limits to what we can achieve on our own, particularly when it comes to997the emerging and rapidly-escalating threat posed by unmanned aircraft998systems (UAS). It's important to emphasize that Live Nation, as a999private entity, does not have the legal authority to mitigate drone1000activity in air space, nor can we require our local law enforcement1001partners to acquire and use the necessary surveillance systems or1002counter-UAS technologies to prevent unauthorized activity. This1003limitation underscores why it is critical that more events fall within1004the scope of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)-issued temporary1005flight restrictions (TFRs).1006    With the continued rise in domestic drone usage--highlighted by the1007FAA's recent report that the number of registered drones has surpassed10081 million,\1\ a roughly 160 percent increase since 2019's 385,0001009reported,\2\--and in light of recent high-profile incidents that have1010made national headlines, it is clear that an expansion of TFR authority1011is urgently needed. Strengthening these protections is essential to1012ensuring public safety and preserving the integrity of large-scale1013events. With that context in mind, I'd like to highlight several key1014areas where we believe Congress can take further action.1015---------------------------------------------------------------------------1016    \1\ https://www.faa.gov/node/54496.1017    \2\ https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/data_research/aviation/1018aerospace_forecasts/FY2020-40_FAA_Aerospace_Forecast.pdf.1019---------------------------------------------------------------------------1020    Congress took an important step in the right direction with the1021passage of Section 935 in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. Live1022Nation was proud to be among the foremost industry advocates for1023Section 935, which expands the FAA's authority to issue TFRs for drones1024at large public gatherings, including stadium concerts with at least102530,000 attendees, and festivals with 100,000 people. Enactment of1026Section 935 marked progress in protecting our events from airborne1027threats. However, more work remains to ensure the provision is1028effectively implemented and to further enhance its scope to broaden1029protections for fans, performers, and event personnel at live events1030across the country.1031    To maximize the impact of Section 935, it's essential that the FAA,1032State/local law enforcement agencies, and other stakeholders across the1033country are fully aware of this new authority and equipped to utilize1034it. Clear communication, interagency coordination, and proactive1035outreach are critical to ensuring that TFR coverage for drones are1036authorized in a streamlined and timely fashion. We support a seamless1037TFR drone coverage application process by collaborating with our law1038enforcement and venue partners to reach out to Federal agencies and1039request a TFR on our behalf. Even as the producer of a show or1040festival, we rely on our partners to request and grant any TFR.1041Ultimately, success depends on the venue or local law enforcement1042reaching out to Federal law enforcement agencies, Federal law1043enforcement's willingness to request the TFR, and the FAA's readiness1044to approve it. Without consistent engagement and follow-through, this1045new provision falls short of its intention to create more secure live1046events. Further education and acknowledgement of this provision1047enhancement is needed--including mention of the change on the FAA's TFR1048application webpage and the addition of a dedicated submission form to1049streamline the process for law enforcement officials.1050    Additionally, we ask Congress to consider lowering the current1051attendance thresholds to ensure that more events can benefit from the1052protective coverage of drone-related TFRs. These current thresholds are1053too high to address the wide range of large-scale events that still1054face significant security risks but fall just below the current limits.1055Many of our events occur at outdoor venues, which regularly attract105610,000 to just under 30,000 attendees. Last year alone, we had more1057than 1,000 shows in venues with a capacity of 10,000. While these shows1058fall below the current threshold, they still present significant and1059similar security challenges due to their open-air design and dense1060crowds. Similarly, Live Nation produces festivals across the country1061that draw upwards of 85,000 festival goers, require more than 10,0001062credentialed workers, as well as artists and their teams--yet are not1063considered to meet the 100,000-person threshold. Given their scale,1064visibility, and logistical complexity, they too warrant TFR protection.1065Expanding eligibility to include these types of events is a necessary1066reality to keep pace with the technologically-advanced risks at large-1067scale events associated with aircraft activity.1068    As such, we respectfully ask Congress to lower the attendance1069threshold to 10,000 for events taking place outdoors. These proposed1070adjustments would represent a meaningful step forward--significantly1071expanding safety coverage for high-density events that are currently1072excluded, despite facing comparable security risks.1073    We also urge Congress to build on the progress made in last year's1074FAA bill by further strengthening air space protections to include not1075only unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), but also small, manned and1076unmanned aircrafts. We appreciate the bicameral and bipartisan1077attention this issue has received and commend Rep. Raul Ruiz and Sen.1078Marsha Blackburn for recognizing these evolving threats by sponsoring1079H.R. 2887, the Protecting Outdoor Concerts Act,\3\ which would expand1080Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR) coverage to include small, manned1081aircraft. By doing this, there would be a critical gap closed in1082current policy which would provide a more comprehensive security1083framework for TFR eligible events.1084---------------------------------------------------------------------------1085    \3\ Senate companion bill expected to be introduced soon.1086---------------------------------------------------------------------------1087    We urge Congress to consider granting carefully-defined mitigation1088authority to trained local law enforcement agencies. In the event of an1089unauthorized or suspicious drone entering restricted air space,1090response time is critical. While Federal agencies play a central role1091in countering unidentified aircraft efforts, they are not always1092positioned to respond immediately at the local level and/or do not have1093the bandwidth to do so. Empowering designated local and regional law1094enforcement agencies to take timely and proportionate action, under1095clear guidelines and in coordination with Federal partners, would1096strengthen real-time response capabilities and improve the overall1097effectiveness of TFRs. We appreciate the bicameral and bipartisan1098attention this issue has also received, and we commend Reps. Greg1099Stuebe, Dina Titus, Rudy Yakym, Lou Correa, Cory Mills, Jill Tokuda,1100Sens. Tom Cotton, and Jacky Rosen recognizing that empowering local law1101enforcement is a necessary step to mitigate UAS risks by cosponsoring1102H.R. 3207/S. 663, the Disabling Enemy Flight Entry and Neutralizing1103Suspect Equipment (DEFENSE) Act.1104    On behalf of Live Nation, we appreciate your continued leadership1105on these important issues and look forward to working with you to1106advance the safety and security of live events across the country. I1107look forward to answering your questions.11081109    Mr. Strong. Thank you, Mr. Junell.1110    I now recognize Mr. Hammond from the Southeastern1111Conference for 5 minutes to summarize his opening statement.11121113     STATEMENT OF JEREMY HAMMOND, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,1114                    SOUTHEASTERN CONFERENCE11151116    Mr. Hammond. Thank you, Chairman Strong and Ranking Member1117Kennedy, and the honorable Members of this subcommittee, for1118the opportunity to participate in today's hearing.1119    My name is Jeremy Hammond, and I have the honor of serving1120the 16 member institutions of the Southeastern Conference as1121assistant commissioner.1122    In my role, I lead our efforts to produce world-class1123championship events, including the SEC Football Championship,1124and I work with our member institutions to develop event1125management policies and procedures including public safety best1126practices.1127    I come to you today not only as somebody that is involved1128in the day-to-day management of public events, but as someone1129who's deeply invested in safeguarding the environments where1130friends and families come together to celebrate traditions,1131community, and competition--because that's really what we all1132seek together.1133    However, we cannot share those experiences without the1134assurance that we can enjoy them in safe, well-managed1135environments.1136    Just as the rapid advancement of technology and weaponry1137has evolved global conflicts, the same can be said for the1138threats that we must protect against at our favorite sporting1139event, concert, festival, or convention.1140    As cities across the United States prepare to host the1141World Cup and the Olympics over the coming years, there is no1142group of professionals better positioned or prepared, to plan1143for, manage, and mitigate challenges than those we call friends1144and colleagues here in this country.1145    The World Cup and the Olympics obviously are the 2 largest1146international events in existence. They present a provocative1147and highly-visible target for bad actors.1148    However, as my counterparts here today may agree, large1149public events with high threat profiles are produced 365 days a1150year in this country. Whether in metropolitan cities or small1151college towns, college athletics welcomes fans week after week1152from kickoff in late August to the last out in May.1153    Chairman Strong from Alabama can attest, in the SEC, we1154like to say, ``It just means more.'' During Saturdays in the1155fall our campuses grow to the populations of a midsize city.1156    In 2024, 5 SEC schools averaged 100,000 fans in their1157venues at home football games. Accounting for schools in other1158leagues, that number grows to 8 nationwide.1159    It's also routine that campuses host 50- to 75,0001160additional fans who take part in the fanfare around the stadium1161with tailgating and other activities.1162    Nowhere else in the world do you see that volume of fans in1163such consistency. If you follow college athletics, you know we1164love top 25 rankings, and the list of the largest sport venues1165by capacity, college football in America accounts for 8 of the1166top 10 globally.1167    Yet rarely to do of these events register on the SEAR1168rating system higher than a 4 or 5, meaning they have limited1169national importance to require Federal interagency support.1170    If I can just pause on that note for a second--the largest1171events that are hosted in this country on a consistent basis1172currently do not qualify for Federal interagency support.1173    I work with my colleagues at our member institutions to1174identify emerging challenges to their operations, and I'd like1175to share a few of those with you today. These topics fall in1176the category of ``what keeps you up at night.''1177    Vehicle mitigation. Campus environments are full of soft1178targets with tailgates and team walks surrounding the stadium.1179A bad actor with a vehicle has become a hallmark of modern1180crowd attacks.1181    Unfortunately, we saw that play out on January 1 in New1182Orleans as fans prepared to enjoy the Sugar Bowl.1183    As has been mentioned multiple times today already, the UAS1184or drone threat. The proliferation of drones in modern warfare1185has exacerbated that concern and for that threat at full1186stadiums across the country.1187    As it stands, our schools can spend upwards of $500,000 on1188drone-tracking technology, but they have no legal authority to1189intervene or mitigate a hostile drone.1190    We're encouraged by the efforts of both the Senate and the1191House to introduce legislation that would allow Federal1192agencies to deputize local officials with the authority to1193mitigate drone threats with the proper training and the access1194to the advanced technology.1195    Finally, access to intelligence, staffing, equipment, and1196funding resources that modernize public safety posture at our1197events.1198    In closing, to put it simply, the key to public safety is1199communication, transparency among agencies, and access to the1200appropriate resources.1201    As this committee evaluates the role of the Federal1202Government in supporting the host efforts for large public1203gatherings, please remember the schools, venues, promoters, and1204local officials hosting large gatherings on a nightly and1205weekly basis throughout the calendar year.1206    Please consider a review of the methodology of establishing1207a SEAR rating.1208    We're encouraged by the work of this committee and the1209collaboration and communication that will usher in some1210progress. Thank you.1211    [The prepared statement of Mr. Hammond follows:]1212                  Prepared Statement of Jeremy Hammond1213                              May 19, 20251214    Thank you, Chairman Strong, Ranking Member Kennedy, and the1215honorable Members of the Emergency Management and Technology1216Subcommittee for the opportunity to participate in today's hearing.1217    My name is Jeremy Hammond, and I have the honor of serving the 161218member institutions of the Southeastern Conference as assistant1219commissioner. I am the Conference liaison to the event management,1220operations, and facilities departments on our member campuses. I lead1221our efforts to produce the SEC Football Championship, NCAA1222Championships hosted by the Southeastern Conference, and support our1223team at various other events.1224    Prior to the SEC, I held several roles spanning venue management1225(Georgia Dome), tour management & promotion (WWE), and most recently as1226vice president of live events at an event management and public safety1227consulting firm (Ingress Events).1228    I appreciate the opportunity to share my perspective on the1229pressing public safety challenges facing mass gathering events, and1230particularly those unique to college athletics. I come to you today not1231only as someone involved in the day-to-day logistics of managing public1232events, but as someone deeply invested in safeguarding the environments1233where friends and families come together to celebrate traditions,1234community, and competition. However, we cannot share those experiences1235without the assurance that we can enjoy them in safe, well-managed1236environments.1237    Just as the rapid advancement of technology and weaponry has1238evolved global conflicts, the same can be said for the threats we must1239protect against at our favorite sporting event, concert, festival or1240convention.1241    My message today is not one of doom and gloom. As cities across the1242United States prepare to host the World Cup and the Olympics over the1243coming years, there is no group of professionals better prepared to1244plan for, manage, and mitigate challenges than those we call friends1245and colleagues here in this country.1246    The World Cup and the Olympics are the 2 largest international1247events in existence. They present a provocative and highly-visible1248target for bad actors. However, as my counterparts here today will1249agree, large public events with high threat profiles are produced 3651250days a year in this country. Whether in metropolitan cities or small1251college towns, college athletics welcomes fans week after week, from1252kickoff in late August to the last out in May.1253    Chairman Strong from Alabama can attest, in the SEC we like to say1254``It Just Means More''. During Saturdays in the fall, our campuses grow1255to the populations of a mid-size city. In 2024, 5 SEC schools averaged1256100,000 fans in their venues at home football games. Accounting for1257schools in other leagues, that number grows to 8. It is also routine1258that campuses host 50,000-75,000 additional fans who take part in the1259fanfare around the stadium with tailgating and other activities.1260Nowhere else in the world do you see that volume of fans in such1261consistency.1262    If you follow college athletics, you know we love top 25 rankings.1263In a list of the largest sports venues (by capacity), college football1264in America accounts for 8 of the top 10 globally. Yet, rarely do any of1265these events register on the SEAR rating system higher than a 4 or 5--1266meaning they have limited national importance to require Federal1267interagency support.1268    I work with my colleagues at our member institutions to identify1269emerging challenges to their operations and I'd like to share a few of1270those with you today.1271   Cost Management.--With a consistently-evolving threat1272        picture, the tactics and tools of the trade are rapidly1273        advancing. With that comes extreme growth in expenditure just1274        to maintain the status quo.1275   Staffing.--To activate a security deployment that is in line1276        with national standards, public safety officials on campuses1277        routinely draw from surrounding city labor pools to supplement1278        staffing needs. Spending on law enforcement personnel averages1279        several hundred thousand dollars per game for SEC schools.1280   UAS (Drone) Threat.--We are encouraged by the efforts of1281        both the Senate and the House to introduce legislation that1282        would allow Federal agencies to deputize local officials with1283        the authority to mitigate drone threats with proper training1284        and advanced technology. The proliferation of drones in modern1285        warfare has exacerbated concern for this threat at full1286        stadiums across the country.1287   Vehicle Mitigation.--As we experienced on January 1, 2025 in1288        New Orleans as fans prepared to enjoy the Sugar Bowl as part of1289        the College Football Playoff, a bad actor with a vehicle has1290        become a hallmark of modern crowd attacks. Campus environments1291        are full of soft targets at tailgates and team walks1292        surrounding the stadium.1293   Intelligence Sharing.--It is critically important that our1294        public safety officials on campus continue to receive and share1295        important intelligence information from and with State and1296        Federal agencies.1297    In closing, as this committee evaluates the role of the Federal1298Government in supporting the host efforts for large public gatherings,1299I'd respectfully request that we remember the schools, venues, and1300promoters hosting large gatherings on a nightly and weekly basis1301throughout the calendar year. We are encouraged by the work of this1302committee and the collaboration and communication that will usher in1303progress.13041305    Mr. Strong. Mr. Hammond, thank you for your opening1306statement. We're honored to have you here and each of our1307people here before us.1308    It doesn't matter if you're a cat, a tiger, a dog, a1309volunteer, whether you scream ``war eagle'' or ``roll tide''--1310every one of our conferences definitely have a task to provide1311safety for America.1312    Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their13135 minutes of questioning. An additional round of questioning1314may be called after all Members have been recognized. I now1315recognize myself for 5 minutes for questioning.1316    I'd like to begin by asking each of you, starting with1317Sheriff Barnes, what can Congress and the Federal Government do1318to better support security preparedness at mass gathering1319events going forward?1320    Mr. Barnes. Thank you, Congressman. First, the1321collaboration among Federal partners is key. The fusion1322centers, and the funding that drive them, I think, is necessary1323to maintain that, and I would even argue probably--argue for an1324increase.1325    Counter-UAS capabilities, I think, is going to be an1326imperative going forward, as mentioned before. Currently, we1327can probably speak for an hour about the risks that we have1328experienced by drones in our different areas of responsibility.1329    For example, in Orange County, we had an individual flying1330drones within hundreds of feet from departing aircraft at John1331Wayne Airport. Any one of those impacts would have undoubtedly1332placed that jet at risk and all its passengers.1333    Fortunately, that was adopted by the U.S. Attorney's1334Office. He was prosecuted, but we had no way to mitigate that1335drone or locate it.1336    We found him through social media as he's posting his1337footage on-line. If not for that, we probably would not know1338who that person was.1339    We've had narcotics trapping the drones into our jails. We1340had them intervene. We had the emergency response during1341wildland fires. Sadly, if you followed the recent news, the1342cartels, a foreign terrorist organization, are using drones and1343counter-drone technology against the United States.1344    The cartels have advanced forward of local law1345enforcement's capabilities, and we should anticipate that those1346technologies will make their way CONUS, inside the United1347States, and probably be a significant factor in any one of1348these events as bad actors use these technologies against us1349for legal law enforcement, overwatch efforts to any one of1350these venues.1351    Last I would say that funding is critical. UASI, SHSGP,1352Operation Stonegarden--which I do on behalf of the Federal1353Government's Western Border of the United States, which being1354impacted with maritime traffic again as a result of the1355lockdown of the border--all of those have a significant issue.1356    But interagency collaboration, I think, is most important.1357We all have to be at the table, and we have to be operating on1358the same common operating platform, whether it's NIMS, SIMS, or1359ICS, and make sure we have defined roles in a unified command,1360working with our private-sector partners, I would add, to make1361sure we put all of this in a good place, and we are ahead of1362the planning stage now--and that needs to start today.1363    We can't do these things, you know, a year from now. We're1364already behind the curve when it comes to counter-UAS1365technologies and other planning.1366    Mr. Strong. Thank you.1367    Mr. Junell.1368    Mr. Junell. Thank you, Chairman. I agree with the sheriff1369on intelligence sharing, fusion centers, collaboration. Any1370support to streamline the efforts would be greatly appreciated1371from the private sector as well as the Government sectors.1372    But streamlining particularly the response capabilities to1373UAS threats, if we could streamline the process, understand who1374is eligible, lower the thresholds to where we can cover more1375events, anything to do to streamline the process would be1376greatly appreciated amongst all the shareholders.1377    Mr. Strong. Thank you.1378    Mr. Hammond.1379    Mr. Hammond. Yes, I think 2 priorities from our1380perspective--No. 1, a reevaluation of the SEAR rating system,1381developing some additional consistency there in those1382directives, and then as my counterparts here have stated,1383streamlining that process to allow local authorities to1384mitigate the drone threat.1385    I think those are the 2 most pressing issues on the minds1386of our public safety officials on campus.1387    Mr. Strong. As we prepare to host these high-profile events1388in summer--every weekend each of you, you're involved in this--1389is it essential that the Federal Government double down on1390planning and collaboration with State local law enforcement?1391    Mr. Barnes. I would say triple down, Congressman. We are1392already behind the curve. These investments need to take place1393now, and keep in mind, while all these things are happening,1394FIFA World Cup, for example, you mentioned, at 11 locations, 71395events over a prolonged period of time.1396    The one other aspect we have is a drain on resources. We1397still have CONOPS. Continuity of operations still has to happen1398within all of our agencies to do the everyday job that we're1399expected to do. So, yes, it needs to happen now, and we need to1400get ahead of it today.1401    Mr. Strong. Thank you.1402    Mr. Junell, we have seen too many concerts and sporting1403events become the target of terrorist attacks. Can you describe1404Live Nation's role in working with law enforcement and host1405venues to ensure adequate security for event attendees and1406artists and athletes?1407    Mr. Junell. Yes, Chairman Strong. We work very closely with1408our law enforcement partners on a nationwide basis--everything1409from the planning, communication, coordination, joint1410understanding of risk, shared situational awareness, highly1411encourage co-location during the events, sharing intelligence,1412fusion centers, as the sheriff mentioned earlier, the Incident1413Command System--to make sure that we're all on the same page1414and able to plan for the foreseeable risk and be resilient to1415those risks that may not be foreseen.1416    Mr. Strong. Thank you. I now recognize Ranking Member1417Kennedy for 5 minutes for any questions he may have.1418    Mr. Kennedy. Yes, thank you, Chairman. Sheriff Barnes,1419thank you again for being here today.1420    In your testimony you make the case for sustained Federal1421investment in Homeland Security funding. As you've mentioned1422already, you know, that funding is critical, including $611423million through State Homeland Security Program, $156 million1424through the Urban Areas Security Initiative, and $2 million1425through Operation Stonegarden in fiscal year 2024, in order to1426prepare for FIFA World Cup and the Olympics around the corner.1427    Can you just discuss how the threat prevention and response1428capabilities enabled by these FEMA programs have helped your1429community proactively prepare for these mass events, and1430separately how that funding in such a robust manner helps these1431programs in California and New York prepare for these upcoming1432mass gatherings?1433    Mr. Barnes. Yes, thank you, Congressman. First, the funds1434that are being provided through those 3 initiatives1435specifically are essential in maintaining our posture of the 801436fusion centers nationally.1437    Our HIDTA programs are different funding, but that's been1438stagnant, has a significant risk. Operation Stonegarden, I1439already mentioned what would happen, but I'm going to turn the1440corner.1441    Without those funds, this is what will happen. We have to1442step back from our posture in our fusion centers which I think1443has been the most beneficial national security initiative that1444we maintained over the last 24 years--or 22 years, since 2003,1445when they were stood up.1446    Operation Stonegarden stops, we don't protect our borders1447and other initiatives that we have with those funds.1448    So without those funds--for example, I fund majority of my1449fusion center out of local taxpayer dollars. It subsidizes some1450of that program.1451    But the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center is1452100 percent funded through FEMA grant opportunities, SHSGP and1453UASI. That means that program stops.1454    They have a major initiative happening throughout the--1455through the FIFA World Cup. That means no intelligence, no1456vetting, no collaboration that would happen in that area and1457other areas like it. So we've taken a huge step back of keeping1458our Nation safe.1459    I will tell you, these have worked well because nothing bad1460has happened. We've intervened, interdicted, acted left of bang1461in numerous circumstances that has keeped our country safe.1462    This is not the time to step away from those programs.1463    Mr. Kennedy. Thank you very much.1464    Sheriff, again, a critical part of preparing for these mass1465events is ensuring that first responders have what they need in1466the event of an emergency. DHS programs train first responders1467so they can respond more efficiently and effectively.1468    Troublingly, the Trump administration has closed the1469National Fire Academy in Maryland, one of the Nation's premier1470training facilities for first responders.1471    His proposed budget would eliminate the National Domestic1472Preparedness Consortium, a group of 7 nationally-recognized1473organizations that provide training for FEMA and first1474responders.1475    So, Sheriff, this program is hosting several trainings in1476the greater Orange County area next month, dedicated to sport1477and special event evacuation and protective actions.1478    As you prepare for the 2028 Olympics, how might these1479expert trainings help the first responders and law enforcement1480community in Orange County?1481    Mr. Barnes. Thank you again. I will tell you that I would1482not speak how they went prospectively. Retrospectively, they1483have been beneficial in our response platforms and protocols.1484    The American public never sees what we do behind the1485scenes, and if we do it well, they never do see what we do1486behind the scenes, because we invested in these infrastructures1487and planning and logistics and resources and training, and all1488that happens in the shadows.1489    But you can't step up or stand up a team to be responsive1490on the fly. It has to happen in real time, multi-agency1491collaboration, which we do routinely with our partners in1492firefighting and other venues and platforms.1493    So it is an investment to be ready to respond, hopefully1494that we don't need to, but this is also a huge investment on1495resources and personnel that have to be on the ready, standing1496in reserve in response to these venues. It's been that way for1497decades.1498    Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Sheriff. As you likely know, we1499have a Department of Homeland Security Secretary who has stated1500that this administration's intent is to eliminate FEMA.1501    Are you concerned about the impact that that might have on1502Orange County that you represent and the State of California,1503as well as, you know, our responsiveness across the Nation?1504    Mr. Barnes. Yes. Once again, that is a great question.1505Obviously I'm going to hypothesize, but if we start to draw1506back on these investments, whether it be in Orange County,1507California, nationally, we're turning a corner, and we're1508actually, I would say, inviting something bad to happen without1509our ability to be responsive or to interdict prior to that act1510happening.1511    So I would say this is not the time that we should be1512backing away from these investments. We need to maintain our1513posture of readiness across the Nation.1514    Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Chairman.1515    I yield back.1516    Mr. Strong. The Ranking Member yields back.1517    I now recognize the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Evans.1518    Mr. Evans. Thank you, Chairman and Ranking Member. Thank1519you, of course, to all of our witnesses for coming.1520    Mr. Chairman, I'd like to enter into the record this1521statement from the Association of Uncrewed Vehicle Systems1522International that includes some security recommendations for1523mass gathering events that empower local law enforcement.1524    Mr. Strong. Without objection.1525    [The information follows:]1526Statement of the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International1527                                (AUVSI)1528                              May 21, 20251529    This limitation leaves stadiums, universities, concert venues, and1530police departments with a dangerous gap between awareness and action.1531Detection technologies may alert security personnel to a drone entering1532restricted air space, but without the legal authority to act, they are1533unable to interdict it, potentially until harm is already done.1534                recommendations for congressional action1535    AUVSI urges Congress to take the following steps to strengthen1536stadium security and empower local partners with the tools they need:1537    1. Expand Counter-VAS (cUAS) Authority.--Congress should authorize1538        a narrowly-tailored expansion of cUAS authority to qualified1539        State and local law enforcement agencies and critical1540        infrastructure entities, including stadiums and event1541        organizers, under appropriate oversight and training1542        requirements.1543    2. Support Pilot Programs.--DHS and FAA should launch and fund1544        pilot programs that enable stadium operators, police1545        departments, and universities to test and evaluate cUAS1546        technologies in real-world environments with rigorous1547        Federally-administered training and oversight.1548    3. Invest in Detection Infrastructure.--Congress should appropriate1549        dedicated funding to help local jurisdictions acquire UAS1550        detection systems and integrate them with emergency response1551        networks.1552    4. Implement ARC Recommendations.--The FAA's UAS Detection and1553        Mitigation Systems Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC), co-1554        chaired by AUVSI's president and CEO Michael Robbins, issued1555        recommendations in 2024 for minimum performance standards and1556        approval pathways for UAS detection technologies at airports1557        and critical infrastructure. These frameworks should be1558        expanded and adapted for stadiums and event venues.1559    5. Clarify FAA and DBS Roles.--Federal agencies should work in1560        tandem to streamline approval processes for deploying cUAS1561        tools around protected air space, including TFR zones, and1562        develop real-time data-sharing platforms between Federal,1563        State, and venue-level security stakeholders.1564    6. Working Together to Protect the Public.--Stadium operators, law1565        enforcement agencies, and event organizers are on the front1566        lines of ensuring public safety in an increasingly complex air1567        space environment. While Federal regulations like FAA TFRs play1568        a vital role, they must be coupled with on-the-ground1569        capability to detect and mitigate drone threats effectively.1570    AUVSI appreciates the committee's leadership in exploring how the1571Federal Government can better partner with public and private entities1572to secure mass gatherings. We stand ready to work with Congress, DHS,1573FAA, and other stakeholders to modernize our national approach to1574stadium security and UAS threat response.1575    Thank you for your attention to this urgent issue. We look forward1576to continuing to support the development of safe, secure, and1577innovative UAS policy that empowers and protects our communities.15781579    Mr. Evans. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank you to the1580witnesses. My first question will be to Mr. Barnes.1581    I spent a combined total of a little over 2 decades in1582between both military and law enforcement. On the Army side I1583was a Black Hawk helicopter pilot, so operating in the same air1584space as a lot of the new and emerging UAS threats that we're1585facing, both overseas and then also fighting fires and all of1586the things that we use in the domestic operation space here in1587the United States.1588    Then as a police officer, I got to lead our mobile field1589force, and so I've been that, user-level, boots-on-the-ground1590individual that's operating and having to make real-time1591decisions whenever we have either mass gathering events that1592were anticipated or if you have contingencies that emerge in1593mass gathering events.1594    So my first question to you--I think we've talked a little1595bit about fusion centers and lot of the preplanning and1596intelligence that comes out of facilities like that--can you1597talk a little bit more about the tactical level?1598    You've done your preplanning. The event is now in full1599swing. What are those critical shortcomings at the tactical1600level, specifically focusing on either equipment shortfalls,1601training shortfalls, communications shortfalls during an event1602that would potentially impact your ability to operate1603efficiently with other Federal, State, and local partners?1604    Mr. Barnes. Thank you, and first of all, thank you for your1605service. Your question is a good one. You look at preparedness,1606and from a tactical perspective--you mentioned mobile field1607force--mobile field force should be a national standard for1608crowd control and maintaining order within our communities.1609    We've heavily invested in mobile field force in the county1610of Orange and trained all the municipal agencies on mobile1611field force tactics and response protocols, and it's worked1612very well for us.1613    From tactics, it first starts with intelligence, getting1614good information. We know there's mis-, dis-, and1615malinformation campaigns we should expect over the next several1616years, so getting good information in and being able to be1617responsive to that.1618    There's a huge drain of resources when you have a tactical1619element in reserve for a prolonged period of time, I think that1620we agree.1621    This other resource is like bomb detection, canines, and1622others that work in tandem with them that have a limited1623utility that you have to replicate at a much larger platform.1624    So tactics, rapid response models, I think, are very key,1625ability to have them ready to go out, but we just don't have1626the depth. So I think investing in that now ahead of time and1627making sure as a national standard we have these protocols in1628place.1629    I stressed for a long time through FEMA to have resource1630tasking for law enforcement. It's not as deep as it should be,1631look at all the critical issues we have to face on a broad risk1632environment that we have to be prepared for.1633    Mr. Evans. Thank you. Continuing down that train, I've done1634a lot of the Federal training in places like Anniston, Alabama,1635to make sure that we have that interoperability at the Federal,1636State, and local level.1637    What do you see as far as communication shortfalls with1638folks in your sheriff's office potentially having to work and1639collaborate in real time with folks from other agencies,1640particularly with regard to the communication equipment?1641    Mr. Barnes. Well, thank you for that question again,1642Congressman. I'll start with, Orange County's had an1643interoperable radio system for decades. 3.1 million people, all1644the law enforcement agents can communicate at the same time1645we're a dedicated channel.1646    That technology should be at least strive to advance it1647nationally, or minimally have our Federal partners in the same1648room on the same communications conduit so we're sharing1649information in real time for the benefit of everybody.1650    That has not always been the case. We saw that happen in1651Parkland High School, in Uvalde, recently in Butler. We have1652learned a lot about what we need to do. We just have to make1653sure we solve that problem before we go to forward and make1654sure we're on the same communication platform.1655    Mr. Evans. Thank you. I got 1 minute and 5 seconds left, so1656final question again will be to you, Sheriff, but drawing on1657some of the comments from others about UASs and TFRs.1658    So flying on wildfires, of course, you have a TFR that's1659going to be dropped over the wildfire area so that crews like1660myself can go out and do our jobs. You still have drones that1661come through. You got to shut down the fire TFR, ground all of1662the aircraft until we can chase the drone out.1663    On that, again, tactical, user level, what do you think are1664the most critical shortcomings to be able to actually1665kinetically intervene in real time in the event that you have1666malicious drone activity occurring?1667    Mr. Barnes. I'll start with the FAA Reauthorization Act or1668legislation that would give local law enforcement or public1669safety the authority to have that. If you look forward into1670FIFA, there's not a depth for counter-UAS that can manage this1671at a national scale.1672    I would say task force operators and locals that have dual1673designation and training technology and access to the platforms1674are most critical. You look at what happened with the Palisades1675fire.1676    They took one of the most beneficial firefighting apparatus1677out of the sky, because of an impact with a drone, for 3 days.1678It could've contributed to a lot of structures being saved.1679    So we have to invest now. We can't wait a year or 2 years1680or when FIFA's on our doorstep. That has to happen now, in my1681belief, and I think we have the ability to spread that out1682responsibly through good policy and protocols and have that1683shared.1684    We have to do it now because the cartel's already ahead of1685us, and we're going to be dealing with this domestically if we1686don't prepare for it, not to mention if there's a mass drone1687attack--a mass weaponized drone attack, we cannot be responsive1688to that.1689    Sorry I went long, but the threat arises much broader, and1690it's advancing beyond your capabilities if we don't get in this1691game today.1692    Mr. Evans. Thank you. Yield back.1693    Mr. Strong. Thank you. The gentleman from Colorado yields.1694The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Mackenzie, is recognized1695for 5 minutes of questioning.1696    Mr. Mackenzie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate1697everybody being here today to discuss such a serious topic,1698about how we can protect our communities and individuals who1699are attending mass gatherings from terrorist attacks and other1700threats.1701    My first question, I'd like to go to Mr. Junell from Live1702Nation Entertainment. We are fortunate to have a venue that is1703being operated in coordination with Live Nation in our local1704community now. It's a midsize venue, I would characterize it.1705    So can you please talk to what, in particular, you are1706doing for events like that, maybe not the high-profile events,1707for the World Cup or anything like that, but communities like1708mine are hosting music events and gatherings on a regular1709basis. Tell me about what you're doing at midsize events like1710that.1711    Mr. Junell. Yes. It's--sir, regardless of the size of the1712event, the concern is the same. We want to make sure that we1713are as prepared as can be, we are trained, facilitating all the1714intelligence sharing and everything else through our Federal,1715State, and local law enforcement partners and working highly in1716a collaborative process to make sure that we have the1717standards, we have a clear picture of the issues that we're1718dealing with, understanding what our roles and responsibilities1719are, and then what our partners will be bringing to the table1720as well, so that we have that robust resilience around the1721event regardless of the size.1722    Mr. Mackenzie. Thank you.1723    For all of our testifiers then, obviously the attention of1724our country is going to shift next year to the America 250, the1725World Cup, other big events like that, that are taking place1726all across our country.1727    So for anybody on the panel, do you feel that we are1728prepared at this point, or is there more work that needs to be1729done, and if so, is it resources, training? What can we assist1730with from a Federal level and as Members of Congress?1731    Mr. Barnes. I think we're working toward being prepared.1732Those plannings are being put--committees are in place, and the1733collaboration has started, especially on FIFA and also the1734Olympics.1735    Club Cup is coming next year. That brings a different1736clientele to the country that's different than the FIFA World1737Cup, and they have a tendency to operate outside social norms1738that we might consider in America, taking to the streets,1739levels of intoxication, celebrations, fan fest that might be1740problematic.1741    So, yes, we are in the planning stages, but it takes1742resources. I look at that not as a cost. It's an investment1743into the planning. The preparedness, the logistics, the1744training, the tactics, the equipment, all of those things need1745to start happening now or else we'll be behind the curve when1746the time comes to be responsive and keeping our public safe.1747    Mr. Mackenzie. Do you feel at this point in time that we1748are on track to be ready for those events?1749    Mr. Barnes. I think we are in the planning stage, which,1750for the Olympics, I think we're on track. I think there's1751already been some preplanning on Olympics with the Los Angeles1752city and county that has had advance teams look at what's1753happened in Paris and others.1754    The threat environment has changed, and it's ever-evolving,1755so we have to be dynamic. I know that we look at mitigating the1756threats as they change over time. They will change between now1757and 2028, and we have to stay ahead of the curve and make sure1758that we are well-planned and well-prepared to take whatever1759threat comes next, especially in the area of cyber.1760    We should anticipate the cyber threat advancing well beyond1761our capabilities. I'm not picking on the administration, but1762stepping away from cyber at this time and putting it on the1763shoulders of locals, we're going to have different response1764capabilities across the country who can interdict, intervene,1765and be responsive to cyber attacks, DDoS attacks, whatever it1766might be that's going to change, not to mention traditional1767attacks like bomb threats and swatting incidents, and then1768intentional attacks and the normal crime that comes with these1769events.1770    All of these things make this a very complex solution that1771needs to be implemented over a prolonged period of time. It's1772not doing any one thing. It's doing 100 things simultaneously1773that's going to put us in a position of preparedness. That has1774started, but I think we have a long way to go.1775    Mr. Mackenzie. Well, again, I'd like to thank all of you.1776All law enforcement across the country put themselves in harm's1777way every single day. We appreciate that work that you do, and1778the preparedness that we are looking for as a country, I think,1779we are in many ways on track.1780    I know there are some things that we want to continue to1781work on. As you mentioned, threats evolve and the nature of1782those threats change with time, and so we got to continue to1783stay on top of those as we prepare for an incredible year next1784year, again, celebrating America's 250 and also welcoming1785people from around the world for the World Cup.1786    So thank you again, and with that, I yield back.1787    Mr. Strong. The gentleman from Pennsylvania yields back. I1788now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Correa, for 51789minutes of questions.1790    Mr. Correa. Chairman Strong, thank you very much, and for1791our Ranking Member, Mr. Kennedy, thank you for this hearing. I1792want to welcome our witnesses today, Sheriff Barnes from our1793good Orange County, Mr. Junell, Mr. Hammond.1794    Sheriff Barnes, let me turn to you first. Orange County1795vibe--Disneyland, Knott's Berry Farm, the Olympics, the World1796Cup, the Angels--you got a lot to defend, sir. So far, I think1797you've been--the other guys have scored zero on you, so good1798job.1799    How serious is the threat of international terrorism to1800you?1801    Mr. Barnes. Congressman Correa, thank you very much, and I1802appreciate your partnership over the years.1803    Not just international terrorism, foreign terrorist1804organizations, CT, domestic terrorism, home-grown violent1805extremists, extremist groups are ever present.1806    Again, going back to the fusion center, I have a fusion1807center committed to Orange County, the Orange County1808Intelligence Assessment Center, one of the 80 nationally1809routinely recognized for our product and intervention1810strategies.1811    All those things are happening in real time, and not to say1812that bad things have been mitigated, but the last 4 years,1813unfortunately, through the border, have undoubtedly let bad1814actors into our country.1815    Without getting into any Classified information, we know1816that we are looking for people CONUS, who may be accelerating1817their plans because of actions in immigration trying to locate1818them.1819    It is a completely different threat horizon that we've ever1820faced, and so, yes, there are a lot of----1821    Mr. Correa. Sheriff Barnes, if I may interrupt you, you1822talk about this fusion center, and I've had the opportunity to1823go tour it. That's a center where you take information from all1824sources--international, domestic, State, local, and you put1825that together, and it gives you a picture of the threat1826environment. Is that correct?1827    Mr. Barnes. Yes, and I would say, when fusion centers were1828set up post-9/11, they were focused on foreign terrorism1829abroad. They are all crimes, all hazards now. Our fusion1830centers focus on domestic terrorism, bad actors, extreme1831groups, narcotics trafficking, sex trafficking, human1832trafficking. It's looking at everything and so----1833    Mr. Correa. Now you've got, on top of that, unmanned aerial1834small aircraft?1835    You said propaganda, misinformation, artificial1836intelligence, those are on top of the other things you're1837doing? That's what the fusion centers have to challenge?1838    Mr. Barnes. Yes, Congressman, it is an all-inclusive, risk-1839mitigation center and for the benefit of not just the region,1840the State, but the Nation. We're putting product out for1841everybody and sharing that information among fusion centers,1842with our partners to make sure everybody's well-informed of1843what the threats are and how they're evolving.1844    Mr. Correa. So if we want to play linebacker for you, make1845sure that nobody scores, what is it that you would see from1846us--more funding, legislative action to give you more1847authority, for example, maybe to control, take down aerial1848drones?1849    Mr. Barnes. Exactly that, Congressman. Maintaining the1850funding for the fusion centers through the SHSGP, UASI,1851Stonegarden, and other avenues for funding.1852    The HIDTAs, which is a different funding source, I think,1853is not sufficient. Dealing with the worst time in our Nation's1854history--narcotics trafficking, which does have a direct threat1855to these venues through users consuming products that are1856clandestine-produced and probably fentanyl, and also the1857technology.1858    The technology needs to keep up with the times, and we, I1859think, are--we're playing defense, and I don't like playing1860defense. I want to be in the offense. So giving us the1861technology that we can intervene appropriately. If any of these1862things do happen through counter-UAS or other venues, we need1863to be prepared for that.1864    Mr. Correa. You mentioned earlier that you would want us to1865triple down on Federal funding for your fusion centers. Is that1866correct?1867    Mr. Barnes. I think we need to not step away, but I think1868there's opportunities to invest larger. If I lose those1869funding, my fusion center is going to take a significant hit on1870some of the all crimes, all hazards.1871    This is not just for Orange County. This is across the1872Nation there's benefit.1873    Mr. Correa. So you're speaking for the Nation as a whole1874when you talk about funding fusion centers, coordination with1875the Federal Government, all it takes, resources that you need,1876and other sheriffs across the country need, to keep Americans1877safe?1878    Mr. Barnes. Not just sheriffs. If you look at the fusion1879center network as it operates, there isn't any major city chief1880that operates outside of a major county based on definition.1881    All the venues that are being proposed are happening in1882major counties or major cities that are represented and1883supported by the fusion center network. Especially for the FIFA1884World Cup and Club Cup, the connectivity and sharing of real-1885time information among that venue, which we did through the1886elections recently, has to happen in real time as these threats1887present themselves because they're likely to be replicated in1888other areas as bad actors share their tactics to try to bring1889this country down and do harm.1890    Mr. Correa. Sheriff, I want to thank you for your time, for1891your efforts in being here, informing us here in Congress,1892about the needs that you have on Main Street. It makes us1893better policy makers. Thank you very much. Hope to talk to you1894soon again. Thank you very much.1895    Mr. Barnes. Thank you, Congressman Correa.1896    Mr. Strong. The gentleman from California yields back.1897    I now recognize the gentlelady from New Jersey, Ms. Pou,1898for 5 minutes of questioning.1899    Ms. Pou. Thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman. It's1900wonderful to be back on this committee. Thank you. Thank you to1901our Ranking Member Kennedy for also holding this meeting.1902    I'd like to begin by certainly indicating that, you know,1903mass gatherings are unique opportunities to connect with others1904and feel like we are a part of something bigger than ourselves.1905    Especially after the pandemic, there has been a renewed1906appreciation for the value of a sold-out ball game or concert.1907    The FIFA World Cup will bring together hundreds of1908thousands of fans. It is a time for friendship and celebration,1909and I am so proud that the final match will be played in my1910district in New Jersey.1911    I was recently named the co-chair of a new bipartisan task1912force focused on enhancing security for special events like the1913World Cup, and I look forward to the Chairman calling our first1914official meeting and beginning our work.1915    With that being said, I'd like to begin my questioning and1916indicate that, you know, as my district, as I've just1917mentioned, ratchets up for security preparation for the World1918Cup, our first responders and municipalities need resources1919today to plan for next year.1920    I am deeply concerned by the Trump administration's illegal1921withholding, or otherwise delaying, critical FEMA and anti-1922terror grants.1923    These delays seriously undermine the ability of State and1924local government to protect our communities and ensure that1925large sporting events like the World Cup are safe and secure.1926    Last week I pressed Secretary Noem on when our communities1927will receive guidance on the Homeland Security Grant Program.1928Unfortunately, she did not give me an answer.1929    So, Sheriff Barnes, how do delays in critical grant1930funding, like the State Homeland Security Grant Program or the1931Urban Areas Security Initiative, impact your Department's1932ability to keep communities safe, especially as they prepare1933for high-profile events like the World Cup that I've just1934mentioned?1935    Mr. Barnes. Yes. Thank you for the question. First, as an1936adage in anything we do, you fail to plan, you plan to fail, so1937planning is everything and preparedness goes into many facets1938of equipment, tactics, training, tools, tabletop exercises,1939red-teaming these events so we make sure that we're thinking1940like our adversaries. It's all very critical and that planning1941needs to start today.1942    Regarding the FIFA World Cup, there's one aspect, and I1943love the partnerships we have with our private-sector1944representatives here, but a lot of the response protocols are1945beyond the venue itself. There's practice sites, hotels, other1946things and areas that grow beyond that that are contemporaneous1947to the actual event that spill over into local neighborhoods,1948communities. Maybe even though it's beyond your Congressional1949district that need to be protected in the plan that goes into1950that as well, and those take resources.1951    Funding is essential. If we don't have the offset, this is1952a planned event. It doesn't qualify for most mutual aid plans,1953which means no reimbursement unless it's financed or funded up1954front. For the ability to recover cost and planning, that needs1955to take place in my opinion today to put those funds and make1956those funds available for the planning stages.1957    Ms. Pou. Thank you. I can't agree with you more. Thank you1958so very much for your answer. You know, I also would want to1959speak about the home-grown violent extremists and domestic1960terrorists that preys on events like the World Cup that brings1961together different communities. That is why our New Jersey1962office of Homeland Security identified attacks from these1963groups as the highest threat to New Jersey.1964    Earlier this year, I traveled to New Orleans with the1965Chairman and with some of our other colleagues here to learn1966about the devastating attack on Bourbon Street carried out by a1967homeland extremist. During this trip, we heard from local law1968enforcement about the threats our Nation faces from home-grown1969terrorism at highly-attended events.1970    Sheriff Barnes, if you would, please, what are the unique1971threats posed by the home-grown extremists and domestic1972terrorists to mass gatherings events and how are you working to1973combat these threats?1974    Mr. Barnes. Yes. Thank you. I think you mentioned several1975of those already. Vehicle rammings. They are mostly spontaneous1976actors that are not even on the grid or even known to either1977Federal authorities or locals, so spontaneous bad actors are an1978evolving trend that we're seeing. Some of these people weren't1979even, had a case open or had any threats.1980    Open-source information is important. That's why the fusion1981centers play such a critical role. They're oftentimes trip-wire1982events that we see immediately prior to postings or some things1983that happen on open-source information, like social media.1984Going back after 9/11 reinvigorated the ``see something, say1985something'' campaign that worked so well several decades ago,1986so people who do have information of individuals can be brought1987to the attention of law enforcement.1988    I preface all of this with first and foremost the1989protection of first amendment rights. When people do decide to1990take to the streets and protest responsibly or have actions,1991we're always focused on Constitutional rights of our citizenry1992first, but have to be prepared when it crosses over into1993illegal activities to keep our Nation safe.1994    Ms. Pou. Thank you.1995    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.1996    Mr. Strong. The gentlewoman yields back. I now recognize1997the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Johnson, for 5 minutes of1998questioning.1999    Ms. Johnson. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. As a Member2000of Congress serving the city of Dallas, you can see I'm very2001interested in the FIFA World Cup and this will bring in2002millions of dollars of revenue for small businesses in2003surrounding communities and millions of new visitors to the2004north Texas area and from around the world. We are thrilled to2005be hosting 9 matches, which is the largest amount of matches in2006the country.2007    We're also the broadcast hub for the FIFA World Cup and so2008it's going to become not only a unique--it's a sustained2009security need that we have, because we're going to have media2010professionals throughout the world in the city for a prolonged2011period of time, not just for the unique time lines of the2012matches themselves.2013    I was thrilled to have the opportunity to travel with you,2014Mr. Chairman, to New Orleans, and some of my colleagues on this2015committee in advance to the Super Bowl, and we saw an immense2016amount of planning that goes into these events to keep2017attendees safe.2018    Meanwhile, Secretary Noem and President Trump are expected2019to propose significant cuts to the FEMA preparedness grants,2020funding that is critical for major event security. The proposed2021budget also eliminates the national domestic preparedness2022consortium, which has trained thousands of emergency response2023teams. In just my district alone, they have trained almost202412,000 participants. These programs not only train our local2025first responders at no cost to them or our cities, but also2026partner with the city for domestic preparedness, FEMA, and2027other Governmental agencies. When we do not have adequate2028funding to keep these programs afloat. We will not have the2029work force to keep the public safe. By cutting funding to these2030programs, this administration is setting our cities up for2031failure and putting the lives of attendees and our security2032personnel at risk.2033    The World Cup is anticipated to bring in more than 62034million visitors from around the world in a time where2035cybersecurity work force is significantly understaffed and2036cyber attacks are on the rise. Illegal freezes on grant funding2037and TSA agents are being terminated and we need to take a2038serious look at how prepared we actually are in just 1 year2039before the event takes place. I look forward to working2040alongside my colleagues to ensure every step of the way.2041    You know, Mr. Chairman, I'm just really concerned that this2042Congress right now--while having this hearing is fabulous, we2043need to focus on the security of our country. We want to have a2044successful Olympics. We want to have a successful World Cup. We2045have the chance to see up close and personal just how much goes2046into the planning of the Super Bowl. It was an enlightening2047experience to see just the effort, the expense, and the2048coordination that's required among so many agencies.2049    While we're shining that, we're talking about it, which is2050fabulous, but on the other hand in this very building in the2051Rules debate in our Capitol, we're having a budget that guts2052all the funding for it. So how can we do that? How can we gut2053all the funding and then still say we are prioritizing the2054security?2055    So, you know, gentlemen, my question for you is, you know,2056what potential threats do you see and do you have enough2057resources? Are you--do you think that we have allocated enough2058resources for this country and the visitors to come here to be2059safe when they come for World Cup?2060    Mr. Junell. Congresswoman, whether it's the World Cup, the2061Super Bowl, a large festival, or a smaller festival, we all2062show the same concerns. What's concerning at this moment is the2063threat persists from UAS, and at this time the thresholds are2064too high. The authority to act upon the threats are very2065limited, and it's--we just need a streamline process to help2066facilitate the protection that is warranted.2067    Ms. Johnson. You know, I want to ask you a question about2068that. So at a different hearing or actually maybe when we were2069in New Orleans, one of the things that was brought up to us was2070the lack of local law enforcement's ability to actually deal2071with the drones. You had to go through just this crazy red tape2072in order to take down a potential threat. Is that still in2073place? Has that been corrected, or--and are you aware of2074efforts on the table to correct that?2075    Mr. Junell. So the FAA Reauthorization Act was a step in2076the right direction, but it is implemented inconsistently2077across all the different events, and having the ability to work2078with venues, to work with our law enforcement partners, to be2079able to successfully apply for a TFR is challenging. Then2080whether or not the Federal resources are available from the2081agencies and then whether or not FAA approves, it's a2082complicated process that really needs some attention to2083streamline and make more consistent across all the events.2084    Ms. Johnson. Do you feel--and at Live Nation, you see lots2085of stuff. I can only imagine. You see all the things, so2086besides, you know, drones and besides this lack of coordination2087between the agencies to give the men on the ground the ability2088to deal with an immediate threat, besides that issue, what2089other security threat issues are you concerned with in2090particular to these large-scale events that are coming up?2091    Mr. Junell. Of course. It's home-grown violent extremists.2092It's terrorism. It's just crime in general. Managing large2093crowds. It's all the things that my colleagues have spoken2094about today and making sure that we have coordinated2095collaborated plans in partnership with all of our stakeholders2096to include Federal, State, and local partnerships, and we're2097all singing from the same sheet of music with planning,2098operations, and response.2099    Ms. Johnson. Yes. Then at the same time, we're laying off2100record numbers of FBI agents and we're going to make our2101country less safe. Gentlemen, I think my time is expired and2102thank you very much.2103    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.2104    Mr. Strong. The gentlewoman from Texas yields back. I thank2105Sheriff Barnes, Mr. Junell, and Mr. Hammond for their valuable2106testimony and the Members for their questions. The Members of2107the subcommittee may have some additional questions for the2108witnesses and we would ask the witnesses to respond to these in2109writing.2110    Pursuant to committee rule VII(E), the hearing record will2111be held open for 10 days. Without objection, the subcommittee2112stands adjourned.2113    [Whereupon, at 3:14 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]21142115                            A P P E N D I X21162117                              ----------21182119       Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for Jeremy Hammond2120   impact of sear ratings on personnel, law enforcement, and federal2121                                support2122    Question 1a. Mr. Hammond, you note in your written testimony that2123while major international events like the World Cup and the Olympics2124tend to dominate discussions around mass gathering events, large public2125events with high-threat profiles are produced every day in this2126country. You further specify that ``in a list of the largest sports2127venues (by capacity), college football in America accounts for 8 of the2128top 10 globally.'' On game day, college towns that are often small2129communities expand by the tens of thousands, and your campuses,2130infrastructure, and personnel need to be able to support this2131population. Yet, you explain, rarely do any of these events register on2132the SEAR rating system higher than a 4 or 5.2133    How have these SEAR ratings affected stadiums' abilities to acquire2134the necessary personnel, law enforcement, and Federal funding for2135games?2136    Answer. The SEAR (Special Event Assessment Rating) system, in its2137current form, is helpful and necessary for major events but is2138insufficient for capturing the real risks associated with major2139collegiate sporting events. It no longer reflects the realities of2140today's threat environment, or the scale of events routinely hosted on2141college campuses. Despite hosting events that routinely exceed 100,0002142attendees, most SEC football games are assigned a SEAR rating of 4 or21435--levels that do not trigger meaningful Federal assistance.2144    This has serious implications:2145   Federal Support is Limited.--Current SEAR ratings prohibit2146        the deployment of critical assets, such as counter-UAS2147        technologies, for regular-season games--even though drone2148        threats have escalated globally.2149   Personnel Shortages.--Due to nationwide law enforcement2150        attrition and limited mutual aid resources, several2151        universities have had to reduce key positions such as K9 units2152        and SWAT personnel--roles that require extensive training and2153        cannot be filled on short notice.2154   Funding Inaccessibility.--Institutions note that Federal2155        agencies are willing to collaborate, but the inability to2156        qualify for Federal financial support through SEAR leaves2157        campuses to shoulder the full burden of security for massive2158        events.2159    Without SEAR reform, the largest regular gatherings in the United2160States--and the college towns that host them--will continue to operate2161without the level of protection their risk profile warrants.2162      security posture impact from game-day campus-wide activities2163    Question 1b. With the additional activities occurring around the2164stadium and across campus, how does this change the security posture2165for a college game day?2166    Answer. College game days are no longer confined to stadiums. Game-2167day operations now extend well beyond the stadium and encompass large2168fan zones, tailgating, concerts, and other events.2169   Resource Strain.--Simultaneous events stretch law2170        enforcement, EMS, and support personnel. These overlapping2171        demands dilute the ability to secure the stadium itself.2172   Complex Incident Management.--Most institutions use unified2173        command approaches to manage these multifaceted environments,2174        but prolonged hours and resource limitations remain a concern.2175   Infrastructure and Response Delays.--At several2176        institutions, geographic separation between venues means2177        delayed response times during crises.2178   Growing Threat Surface.--More events mean more centralized2179        crowds and softer targets--with limited resources to scale up2180        security appropriately.2181    This wide-spread activity means:2182   Security resources are diluted, often pulled away from the2183        stadium--the primary target--to cover adjacent areas.2184   Law enforcement and security staff face extended shifts,2185        reducing peak readiness and resilience.2186   Increased vulnerability to threats, as larger crowds2187        concentrate in open, unsecured areas across campus.2188    Unified command structures and integrated risk assessments help2189manage this complexity, but limited access to Federal resources2190restricts how robust our security postures can be under growing demand.2191       is the sear system flawed? recommendations for improvement2192    Question 1c. Do you believe that the SEAR system as currently2193devised is flawed, and how can a better methodology for determining2194risk for special events be envisioned?2195    Answer. Yes, the consensus among institutions is that the SEAR2196system is in need of modernization. Several key concerns include:2197   Outdated Threat Assumptions.--The system was designed around2198        high-profile, one-time events like the Olympics or Super Bowl.2199        However, regular college games now exceed those events in2200        attendance and frequency.2201   Lack of Local Context.--Events in smaller towns place2202        outsized burdens on local public safety agencies, unlike larger2203        cities with greater infrastructure.2204   Insufficient Consideration of National Impact.--These events2205        often involve VIPs, including children of national leaders, and2206        are nationally televised--making them potential high-value2207        targets.2208   Media and Institutional Risk.--A single high-profile2209        incident on a college campus could produce devastating2210        reputational and financial consequences--potentially deterring2211        enrollment and participation for years.2212    Suggested Improvements:2213   Develop and implement a standardized risk matrix considering2214        stadium capacity, open vs. enclosed environments, concurrent2215        events, alcohol sales, available law enforcement resources, and2216        national/local threat levels.2217   Conduct preseason and per-event threat assessments jointly2218        with DHS to determine support levels.2219   Empower DHS and SMEs to re-evaluate gaps in State/local2220        capability and support legislative efforts to authorize broader2221        threat mitigation tools. Pursue legislative authority to enable2222        State and local law enforcement to deploy modern threat2223        mitigation tools.2224           ensuring support for events with lower sear scores2225    Question 1d. How can we ensure that large-scale events that are2226determined to have lower-risk scores still receive the adequate help2227that they need to deter threats?2228    Answer. Many large-scale events remain excluded from needed Federal2229resources simply because of their lower SEAR ratings. To address this:2230   Prioritize Crowd Size.--Attendance should be a triggering2231        factor for support and access to counter-drone systems and2232        other Federal resources. Adopt policies similar to SETFR2233        (Sporting Event Temporary Flight Restrictions) which use venue2234        capacity (30,000+) to trigger protections, while closing the2235        loophole that excludes non-athletic events in the same venue.2236   Assess Local Capability.--Events should be judged not only2237        by symbolic threat, but by the community's capacity to respond.2238   Specialized Resource Pools.--Create mechanisms for campuses2239        to request limited but critical Federal resources--e.g.,2240        counter-drone teams, EOD K9s, or mobile security support--even2241        at SEAR 4 or 5 levels.2242   Establish a Threat-Based Best Practices Model.--Develop2243        guidelines for use of screening, drone mitigation, air space2244        control, and unified command based on evolving threats and2245        lessons learned by creating a Best Practices library.2246             dhs safety act and anti-terrorism technologies2247Is the Liability Protection Sufficient to Incentivize Use?2248    Question 2a. The DHS SAFETY Act provides incentives for the2249development and deployment of anti-terrorism technologies by creating2250systems of risk and litigation management. Currently, more than 1,0002251anti-terrorism technologies have now been approved for coverage under2252the SAFETY Act.2253    Is the level of liability offered for the use of approved anti-2254terrorism technologies sufficient to incentivize greater use of these2255technologies?2256    Answer. The SAFETY Act provides helpful protections, but its2257incentive value is limited by 2 factors:2258   High Costs.--Many SAFETY Act-approved technologies are2259        prohibitively expensive for university settings without Federal2260        grants.2261   Practicality Over Coverage.--Institutions adopt technologies2262        based on operational need, not liability coverage alone.2263Is the Rate of Technology Approval Keeping Pace with Threats?2264    Question 2b. How effective is the current rate at which the Science2265and Technology (S&T) Directorate approves anti-terrorism technologies?2266Is the rate of approval keeping up with the threat landscape?2267    Answer. The approval process is generally effective, but needs2268improvement in priority areas, particularly:2269   Drone detection and tracking, which remains underrepresented2270        among approved technologies despite being one of the fastest-2271        growing threats.2272   Institutions recommend including end-users (i.e., campus law2273        enforcement and emergency managers) in the evaluation and2274        approval process to ensure solutions are operationally2275        relevant.2276Are There Critical Technologies Still Lacking Approval?2277    Question 2c. Are there any critical anti-terrorism technologies or2278groups of technologies which have yet to receive official approval2279under the SAFETY Act?2280    Answer. The most critical unmet need across campuses is counter-2281drone technology and the authorization for State and local law2282enforcement to detect and mitigate drone threats. With the rise in2283drone use for surveillance and potentially hostile purposes, U.S.2284stadiums are high-profile, high-density soft targets that remain2285unprotected and is an immediate concern.2286                               conclusion2287    We strongly support efforts to modernize the SEAR system, expand2288the scope of SAFETY Act technologies, and enable law enforcement to2289meet today's rapidly-evolving threat landscape. The current SEAR2290framework does not reflect this operational reality and leaves critical2291vulnerabilities unaddressed. We support a modernized risk-based2292approach that considers crowd size, community capacity, and current2293threats.2294    We thank you for your commitment to public safety and we stand2295ready to work alongside Congress, DHS, and educational leadership to2296enhance safety and preparedness for all mass gathering events.2297         Questions From Chairman Dale W. Strong for John Junell2298    Question 1. Mr. Junell, last August, 3 Taylor Swift concerts were2299canceled in Vienna after uncovering a terrorist plot against her shows.2300Three teenagers were arrested after bomb-making materials were2301discovered in their home, and an interview quickly revealed the attack2302was inspired by ISIS. Over 150,000 tickets were sold between the 32303concerts.2304    The Eras Tour famously attracted tens of thousands of young fans.2305These plots were clearly targeted to a specific audience and would have2306inflicted unthinkable damage. The cancellation of these shows and2307capture of the would-be perpetrators is a victory for international law2308enforcement, and a testament to the necessity of information sharing.2309    Were there any lessons learned from the incident with the Eras Tour2310shows in Vienna that would prevent these threats from manifesting?2311    Answer. Thank you for the questions, Chairman Strong.2312    Live Nation Entertainment (LNE) did not promote or operate Taylor2313Swift's Eras Tour, including the Vienna shows in question, and we were2314not involved in the decision to cancel them. Even though these events2315were not LNE's, incidents like this reinforce the deployment of best2316practice security measures we already prioritize in every country we2317operate--including persistent risk assessment, close coordination with2318law enforcement and all other public safety stakeholders, robust2319intelligence sharing, and collaborative, layered security planning to2320mitigate or manage identified or evolving risks posed to mass2321gatherings. We're constantly learning from global threats, even if it's2322not our event, and adjusting our protocols accordingly to help ensure2323the safety of fans, artists, and staff.2324    Question 2a. The DHS SAFETY Act provides incentives for the2325development and deployment of anti-terrorism technologies by creating2326systems of risk and litigation management. Currently, more than 1,0002327anti-terrorism technologies have now been approved for coverage under2328the SAFETY Act.2329    Is the level of liability offered for the use of approved anti-2330terrorism technologies sufficient to incentivize greater use of these2331technologies?2332    Answer. Yes. From LNE's perspective, the liability protection2333provided under the SAFETY Act plays a substantial role in driving the2334adoption of innovative anti-terrorism technologies and practices across2335the live events industry. The potential liability stemming from an act2336of terrorism can be enterprise-crippling. For some organizations, the2337risk of such liability is a deterrent to pursuing emerging2338technologies, implementing bold operational procedures, or exploring2339new services.2340    The SAFETY Act reduces that barrier by providing strong2341protections, which gives organizations the confidence that not only are2342the approved technologies and services effective but that the2343organizations are protected for implementing them. One of the most2344powerful aspects of the SAFETY Act is the flow-down liability2345protection it affords to users of approved technologies and services.2346This flow-down effect makes the protections not only possible but2347practical--enabling venue operators like ours to confidently adopt2348SAFETY Act-approved tools and processes and incorporate them into2349baseline security standards across all venues.2350    Question 2b. How effective is the current rate at which the Science2351and Technology (S&T) Directorate approves anti-terrorism technologies?2352Is the rate of approval keeping up with the threat landscape?2353    Answer. The SAFETY Act program is one of the most impactful tools2354available to the Federal Government in promoting the private sector's2355role in counterterrorism. From LNE's perspective, it serves as both a2356legal incentive and an operational benchmark--encouraging organizations2357to invest in technologies, services, and programs they may not2358otherwise have pursued. The program's liability protections create a2359unique value proposition that not only reduces risk but helps justify2360security investments to corporate boards and leadership. It is no2361exaggeration to say that the SAFETY Act has become a de facto standard2362across much of the live entertainment and venue operations industry,2363with many organizations aligning their security posture to meet its2364expectations and protections2365    As a result, companies are doing more in the fight against2366terrorism. They are adopting technologies sooner, refining processes to2367meet rigorous SAFETY Act standards, and participating in internal and2368external audits that drive accountability and continuous improvement.2369These enhancements translate directly into better protection for the2370public.2371    Despite this growing importance, the SAFETY Act Office has not2372received a commensurate increase in resources. Over the last several2373years, both the volume and complexity of applications have increased2374significantly, yet the staffing and budget allocated to the program2375have remained flat. This imbalance has led to extended review time2376lines that now regularly exceed the Congressionally-established target2377of 120-150 days. Delays of this kind not only create uncertainty for2378applicants but also delay the deployment of advanced security2379capabilities.2380    The program's impact could be significantly expanded with2381appropriate resourcing. A more robustly staffed and funded SAFETY Act2382Office would not only reduce delays but also allow DHS to more2383proactively engage with sectors facing emerging threats--further2384amplifying the program's value to homeland security and the private2385sector alike.2386    Question 2c. Are there any critical anti-terrorism technologies or2387groups of technologies which have yet to receive official approval2388under the SAFETY Act?2389    Answer. Yes. From LNE perspective, there are several high-priority2390security capabilities that have yet to achieve consistent or wide-2391spread SAFETY Act coverage--despite their increasing importance in the2392current threat environment.2393    Foremost among these is the deployment of drone mitigation2394technologies. While venues have begun implementing systems to detect2395unauthorized unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in their air space,2396detection alone is not enough. The ability to identify a drone's2397operator and--when necessary--safely bring the drone down before it can2398cause harm is critical. Given the low cost, high accessibility, and2399growing weaponization potential of drones, this represents one of the2400most urgent and sophisticated threats facing mass gathering venues2401today. Yet many drone mitigation solutions, particularly those capable2402of countermeasure functions, face regulatory and legal uncertainty that2403has delayed their pursuit of SAFETY Act coverage. Assisting in the2404change of legislation to allow companies to even use drone mitigation2405technologies would be an important start.2406    Expanding the SAFETY Act's application to high-priority categories,2407such as drone mitigation systems, would have a meaningful impact on2408public safety. It would also provide venue operators with the legal2409protections and confidence needed to accelerate adoption and further2410professionalize these critical capabilities.2411          Questions From Honorable Nellie Pou for John Junell2412    Question 1. What role, if any, will Live Nation have in the2413security planning and/or broader planning efforts for the 2026 World2414Cup and 2028 Olympics? Please provide details regarding any and all2415involvement of Live Nation in these events.2416    Answer. Thank you for your questions, Congresswoman Pou.2417    Live Nation is not directly involved in the core security planning2418for the 2026 FIFA World Cup or the 2028 Los Angeles Olympics. However,2419certain affiliated companies are supporting aspects of these events and2420as more events are being planned, we are more than willing to2421coordinate and share best practices.2422    For example, Live Nation and Diversified Production Services (DPS)2423are producing the FIFA Championship Game halftime show and the 39-day2424Fan Fest for the FIFA NY and NJ Host Committee. In that role, Live2425Nation and DPS are coordinating closely with the Host Committee and the2426New Jersey State and local police on security and event operations.2427    We have also had conversations with representatives from the FIFA2428World Cup and understand that they share similar concerns about gaps in2429temporary flight restriction (TFR) coverage for their events. Like us,2430they are focused on ensuring strong coordination with Federal partners2431to address evolving threats, including the risk posed by unauthorized2432drones.2433    If our venues are used for official events, concerts, or affiliated2434programming during the World Cup or Olympics, we will fully coordinate2435with all relevant security and public safety stakeholders to ensure a2436safe experience for all attendees.2437    Question 2. On November 5, 2021, a tragic stampede at the2438Astroworld Music Festival killed 10 people and injured hundreds more.2439What lessons, if any, did Live Nation learn from the Astroworld and2440other tragedies to prevent future security failures?2441    Answer. The tragedy at the Astroworld Music Festival on November 5,24422021, remains a sad and difficult memory for everyone who puts on2443concerts. We continue to extend our deepest sympathies to the victims,2444their families, and everyone impacted by the event. Live Nation2445continues to take major steps to evolve and strengthen its approach to2446event security through:2447   Industry-leading Safety and Security Standards.--Recognizing2448        that security measures must be continually assessed and2449        refined, Live Nation conducts on-going reviews of festival and2450        event operations and routinely updates its code of practice to2451        ensure consistent standards for crowd safety, security,2452        emergency response, and risk management aligned with global2453        best practices.2454   Incident Response Technology.--Live Nation has invested in a2455        comprehensive incident management system platform that has been2456        implemented across its global portfolio of venues and festivals2457        to streamline communication and improve coordination during2458        emergencies.2459   Research-driven Enhancements.--Live Nation has partnered2460        with MIT Lincoln Laboratory to assess and validate crowd2461        barrier deployment standards, and with the University of Sussex2462        to study crowd psychology and collective behavior.2463   On-going Training and Technology.--Live Nation continues to2464        invest in best-in-class security and counter-terrorism measures2465        as part of its on-going DHS SAFETY Act designation efforts. The2466        company also partners with leading crowd safety management2467        experts to deliver advanced training for operational teams and2468        supports on-going improvements in crowd management through2469        emerging technologies.2470    As public attendance at live events reaches historic levels, Live2471Nation remains committed to advancing safety through data, technology,2472and close coordination with public safety partners at every level.24732474                                 [all]