MLP Hearing: A Review of Military Food Programs

1[House Hearing, 119 Congress]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34                         [H.A.S.C. No. 119-11]56                       U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND78                      NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES910                       IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION1112                               __________1314                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES1516                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES1718                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS1920                             FIRST SESSION2122                               __________2324                              HEARING HELD2526                             APRIL 9, 20252728[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]2930                              __________3132                     U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE3361-487                      WASHINGTON : 202634-------------------------------------------------------------------------3536                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES37                    One Hundred Nineteenth Congress3839                     MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman4041JOE WILSON, South Carolina           ADAM SMITH, Washington42MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut43ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Vice    JOHN GARAMENDI, California44    Chair                            DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey45AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia                SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts46SAM GRAVES, Missouri                 SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California47ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York          RO KHANNA, California48SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee          WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts49TRENT KELLY, Mississippi             CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania50DON BACON, Nebraska                  JASON CROW, Colorado51JACK BERGMAN, Michigan               MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey52RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine53PAT FALLON, Texas                    SARA JACOBS, California54CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida           MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington55NANCY MACE, South Carolina           PATRICK RYAN, New York56BRAD FINSTAD, Minnesota              GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico57MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas               CHRISTOPHER R. DELUZIO,58JENNIFER A. KIGGANS, Virginia            Pennsylvania59JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam                JILL N. TOKUDA, Hawaii60CORY MILLS, Florida                  DONALD G. DAVIS, North Carolina61RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia           GILBERT RAY CISNEROS JR.,62LANCE GOODEN, Texas                      California63CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana              ERIC SORENSEN, Illinois64DERRICK VAN ORDEN, Wisconsin         MAGGIE GOODLANDER, New Hampshire65JOHN J. McGUIRE III, Virginia        SARAH ELFRETH, Maryland66PAT HARRIGAN, North Carolina         GEORGE WHITESIDES, California67MARK B. MESSMER, Indiana             DEREK TRAN, California68DEREK SCHMIDT, Kansas                EUGENE SIMON VINDMAN, Virginia69JEFF CRANK, Colorado                 WESLEY BELL, Missouri70ABRAHAM J. HAMADEH, Arizona7172                      Chris Vieson, Staff Director73               Mark Morehouse, Professional Staff Member74               Spencer Johnson, Professional Staff Member75                    Brooke Alred, Research Assistant7677                            C O N T E N T S7879                              ----------80                                                                   Page8182              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS8384Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,85  Committee on Armed Services....................................     186Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking87  Member, Committee on Armed Services............................     28889                               WITNESSES9091Noh, John, Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of92  Defense For Indo-Pacific Security Affairs......................     493Paparo, ADM Samuel, Commander, USN, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific94  Command........................................................     595Brunson, GEN Xavier T., USA, Commander, United Nations Command,96  Combined Forces Command, U.S. Forces Korea.....................     79798                                APPENDIX99100Prepared Statements:101102    Noh, John....................................................    67103    Paparo, ADM Samuel...........................................    74104    Brunson, GEN Xavier T........................................   102105106Documents Submitted for the Record:107108    Military.com article submitted by Ms. Houlahan entitled109      ``Army Planners Are Weighing Force Reductions of Up to110      90,000 Active Duty Soldiers''..............................   121111    Article submitted by Mr. McGuire entitled ``Aircraft112      Carriers: Still Indispensable,'' written by Admiral Paparo.   128113114Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:115116    Mr. Garamendi................................................   137117    Ms. Houlahan.................................................   137118    Mr. Bacon....................................................   137119    Ms. Strickland...............................................   137120    Mr. Moylan...................................................   138121    Mr. Vindman..................................................   138122123Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:124125    Mr. Bell.....................................................   157126    Mr. Bergman..................................................   153127    Mr. Crow.....................................................   151128    Mr. Davis....................................................   156129    Mr. Gimenez..................................................   155130    Mr. Kelly....................................................   151131    Mr. Moulton..................................................   150132    Mr. Ryan.....................................................   156133    Mr. Scott....................................................   142134    Ms. Sherrill.................................................   154135    Mr. Tran.....................................................   157136    Mr. Wilson...................................................   141137    Mr. Wittman..................................................   142138139  U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE INDO-140                             PACIFIC REGION141142                              ----------143144                          House of Representatives,145                               Committee on Armed Services,146                          Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 9, 2025.147    The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room1482118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers [Chairman149of the Committee] presiding.150151 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM152        ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES153154    The Chairman. The meeting will come to order. Today we155continue our posture hearings with INDOPACOM [United States156Indo-Pacific Command] and U.S. Forces Korea.157    I want to thank our witnesses for being here, for their158service to our nation, and the time it took for them to prepare159for this hearing. These are very helpful, and I appreciate your160commitment.161    Last week China carried out large-scale military exercises162off Taiwan's coast. China practiced assaulting maritime and163ground targets and cutting Taiwan off from the world. This is164not new.165    In recent years, China has increased the size, scope, and166complexity of its drills around Taiwan. As Admiral Paparo has167said, these are not exercises, these are rehearsals forforceful168reunification. And these rehearsals are backed by real169capability.170    China now has the world's largest navy and a ship-building171capacity over 200 times greater than our own. It is rapidly172expanding its nuclear arsenal and is expected to double its173warheads by 2030. And China leads the world in hypersonic174missile systems.175    China's growing defense budget shows it isn't slowing down.176Last month it announced a 7.2 percent increase in defense177spending, the 4th straight year it increased by more than 7178percent. Its military modernization is also being assisted by179Moscow. In return for supporting Putin's war machine, China is180receiving advanced submarine, missile, and nuclear technology.181    China is also working closely with Iran and North Korea to182further its effort to undermine American influence and183alliances around the world, and we cannot let them succeed. Yet184year after year, the billions in INDOPACOM's unfunded185priorities have shown we are not giving our warfighters the186tools they need to defeat China or to deter China. That must187change.188    China is our pacing threat, and our defense investments189must reflect that. We must fund Guam missile defense as part of190President Trump's Golden Dome initiative. We must boost our191ability to blind Chinese forces while hardening our command and192control.193    We must refill our munitions stockpiles, especially long-194range fires. We must expand the production of attritable195unmanned systems to create the hellscape Admiral Paparo196envisions.197    And we must rebuild and modernize U.S. shipbuilding198capabilities. Delivering these capabilities will take serious199investment. That is why I am pushing for increased spending in200our military, including through reconciliation, through the201reconciliation process, with robust defense spending.202    Ultimately, deterring China is not something we should do203alone. As Secretary Hegseth said during his recent trip to the204region, America First does not mean America alone. And he is205right. That is why I supported the upgrade of U.S. Forces Japan206to a Joint Force Headquarters. It will strengthen our combined207deterrence and response capabilities with Japan.208    We must also accelerate AUKUS [trilateral partnership209agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United210States], especially efforts to field cutting-edge interoperable211systems. And we need more co-production, co-development, and212co-sustainment with our regional allies and partners.213     We must also deliver weapons and training to Taiwan214faster. That is why I strongly supported the Taiwan Security215Cooperation Initiative in last year's NDAA [National Defense216Authorization Act]. And I intend to authorize it at a robust217level again this year.218    We know Xi instructed the PLA [People's Liberation Army] to219be ready for operations against Taiwan by 2027. However, I220don't believe he has yet decided whether to pursue unification221by force. Our job is to make sure Xi knows a cross-strait222invasion would be too costly and ultimately futile.223    While China is our primary strategic adversary, North Korea224remains a growing threat. In October 2024, Kim tested a new225ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] that could strike the226U.S. homeland while carrying multiple nuclear warheads.227    I am concerned these advances would accelerate as Kim228strengthens his ties with Vladimir Putin. Especially given229North Korea supplied Russia with millions of shells and230thousands of troops, Putin owes him.231    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how we can232establish or reestablish deterrents against these threats posed233by China and North Korea and what they need from us and this234committee to do that.235    With that, I yield to my friend and ranking member for any236opening statement he may have.237238  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM239    WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES240241    Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.242    I welcome our witnesses and appreciate their service and243their leadership in a very, very complicated part of the world.244And I agree with the chairman that the primary goal for us in245that part of the world is to deter conflict.246    Certainly, deterring conflict with China and North Korea247presents challenges in that regard as well. And it is248problematic, because China is in the midst of a massive249military buildup, and we see increasing cooperation, as the250chairman outlined, between China and North Korea, Russia, Iran,251and all of our adversaries in a way that will really stress our252ability to deter that conflict.253    So it is most important to hear from the witnesses what do254we need from an equipment standpoint in order to be in the best255possible position to deter our adversaries.256    Now, there is one challenge here, and that is that we have257a, what is it, $36 trillion dollar debt, and a massive deficit.258So the thing I am always anxious to hear from is what choices259are we going to make. Because as we sit before this committee,260every single group that comes before us tells us that they need261a lot more than what they have.262    We simply don't have the money or the resources to meet all263of those demands across every sphere of our national security264needs. So we need to start making choices and looking for ways265to effectively deter in a more cost-effective manner.266    We can't imagine that we can just throw money at the267problem. We have to be really smart about what is going to268work. So I am very curious to hear from our witnesses what269lessons they have learned from conflicts elsewhere in the world270about what we truly need to be deterrent and where we might be271able to do that in a more affordable way. Not less effective,272but more affordable.273    We have got the great example of Ukraine, who doesn't even274have a navy, that has been able to blunt the force of the275Russian navy in the Black Sea with basically one-way attack276surface-level drones. They have been able to really leverage277that to get a good military outcome. We need to be smart about278how we do that going forward.279    So that is going to be a key part of getting us to280deterrence. But ultimately, I think we need to be mindful of281the fact that one goal here needs to be to figure out how we282can peacefully coexist with China.283    China is not going anywhere, we are not going anywhere.284There is no sort of win in the sense that one side is going to285ultimately defeat the other. China is a major economic power.286They are a major military power, and so are we.287    So what is the plan to peacefully coexist with China? How288do we get there, admitting that deterrence has to be part of289that. We have to be strong to get to that point. But constant290conflict with China does not seem like a wise course of action291if we ultimately want to deter conflict.292    And then the last part of this, the chairman mentioned the293importance of partners and allies, and Secretary Hegseth's294comment about America First doesn't mean America alone. Right295now, yes it does, all right.296    I cannot see a single, solitary thing that the Trump297administration has done to build and strengthen relationships298with any partner in the world, except maybe Russia. They are299about the only place I can see where the President has said300things about how he wants to get along with Russia.301    We have launched a trade war against every, single one of302our partners in the Asia region. Every last one of them. No303matter how much they have worked with us. Frankly even in the304case of Australia, where Australia, we have a trade surplus305with Australia. But we are going to shoot at them too.306    How on earth is that not America alone? And our307partnerships have been really important, and I want to thank308our witnesses and others. In the last 5 or 6 years, we have309built very strong relationships with Japan, with South Korea,310with the Philippines. We are building stronger relationships311with India and Indonesia. Australia has been a tremendous312partner.313    And this has been the greatest thing that has really314frustrated China. They are now surrounded by a group of nations315who don't want to be bullied by China, so they are looking to316us for support, and that has worked very well. And now, we are317trying to out-bully China. That seems to be the strategy.318    We are going to show Australia and Japan and all these319countries that we can punch them just as hard as China can320punch them. I am deeply concerned that that is going to321undermine our ability to deter the region towards no particular322end.323    So I really hope, I will close with two things. One, let's324push back on this. Let's build partnerships. And then also back325to the budget point, I knew I was forgetting something, you326can't cut taxes by $6 trillion and claim that you want to spend327more money on defense.328    It just, well, unless you think debt, the debt and deficits329don't matter. And I thought that was an argument for the far330left, not for the far right.331    So we have to be realistic about the choices we face if we332are going to meet the very important deterrence goals that we333have in the Indo-Pacific region. Thank you. I yield back.334    The Chairman. I thank the ranking member.335    Now I would like to introduce our witnesses. We have Mr.336John Noh, who is performing the duties of Assistant Secretary337of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs; Admiral Paparo,338who is the Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command; and General339Brunson, who is Commander of United Nations Command Combined340Forces Command and the United States Forces, Korea.341    With that, Mr. Noh, we will start with you. You are342recognized for 5 minutes to summarize your opening statement.343344 STATEMENT OF JOHN NOH, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE ASSISTANT345SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, OFFICE346                  OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE347348    Mr. Noh. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and349distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the350opportunity to be here today to discuss our military posture351and the national security challenges in the Indo-Pacific. And352it is a distinct honor to speak with you alongside Admiral353Paparo and General Brunson.354    Let me begin by reaffirming our mission as laid out by the355Commander-in-Chief, President Donald Trump. We will achieve356peace through strength. And Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth357has provided us very clear guidance on how the Department will358achieve that mission: revive the warrior ethos, rebuild our359military, and reestablish deterrence.360    China is undertaking an unprecedented military buildup. The361PLA is developing a large and advanced arsenal of nuclear,362conventional, cyber, and space capabilities. Xi Jinping has363ordered the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. China364aims to dominate the Indo-Pacific and displace the United365States as the world's most powerful nation.366    To counter the growing threat from China, it is critical367that we reestablish deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, resource368with combat-credible military forces postured forward, while369rebalancing burden-sharing with our allies and partners and370investing in our defense industrial base to support our371warfighters.372    The bottom line is that we need to accelerate efforts to373strengthen our force posture and increase operational374capabilities in the Indo-Pacific, given China's historic and375rapid military buildup and the urgent need to reestablish376deterrence.377    And we will pursue an America First approach, but America378First does not mean America alone or America only. It means379that America is supported by and standing capable, like-minded380allies and partners who will do their part to restore and381sustain deterrence. Stronger allies lead to stronger alliances,382and stronger alliances deter aggression and create dilemmas for383our adversaries. And this is what the Department, this384Department and the team seated here before you today are385delivering.386    In closing, thank you for your support and leadership and387for the opportunity to testify before you today. And I greatly388appreciate your continued commitment to and support for the men389and women of the Department of Defense. Thank you for your390time, and I look forward to your questions.391    [The prepared statement of Mr. Noh can be found in the392Appendix on page 67.]393    The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Noh.394    Admiral Paparo, you are recognized.395396 STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL SAMUEL PAPARO, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. INDO-397                        PACIFIC COMMAND398399    Admiral Paparo. Chairman and Ranking Member and400distinguished members of the committee, thanks for much for the401chance to appear before the committee to discuss the Indo-402Pacific region.403    First, with me over my right shoulder is United States404Indo-Pacific Command's senior enlisted leader, Fleet Master405Chief Dave Isom, who is retiring after 38 years of selfless406service as a Navy SEAL and special operator.407    Indispensable to any commander, this senior enlisted leader408is in charge of key duties involving a region that spans over40950 percent of the globe, four out of five of the world's410major's threats, and most of much of the world's economic411activity.412    Roughly 50 percent of the U.S. military's operational413forces falls under his charge. And as all know, the414noncommissioned officer corps is one of the Joint Forces'415absolute asymmetric advantages.416    Fleet Master Chief Isom's leadership in this critical duty417has been exemplary. I honor his service. He has been418indispensable to me in making the transition as the commander419for the last year. And this summer, having bid farewell to420Master Chief Isom, we will welcome Marine Sergeant Major Eric421Cook to this post.422    INDOPACOM faces a confluence of challenges. Foremost among423them is China's increasingly aggressive and assertive behavior.424Their unprecedented military modernization, encompassing425advancements in artificial intelligence, hypersonics, space-426based capabilities, among others poses a real and serious427threat to our homeland, to our allies, and to our partners.428    In 2024, the People's Liberation Army demonstrated growing429capabilities through persistent pressure operations against430Taiwan, escalating by 300 percent. China's aggressive military431actions near Taiwan are, as the chairman said, not just432exercises, they are rehearsals.433    And while the PLA attempts to intimidate the people of434Taiwan and demonstrate coercive capability, these actions435backfire, drawing increased global attention and accelerating436Taiwan's own defensive preparations.437    North Korea's development of advanced nuclear weapons and438ballistic missiles, including a new intercontinental ballistic439missile capable of reaching the United States, poses a direct440threat to our homeland and to our allies. Further, as441discussed, North Korea is deepening its relationship with442Russia, receiving military support and assistance to advance443its own military capabilities.444    Russia's growing military cooperation with China adds445another layer of complexity, creating a compounding challenge446with the deepening cooperation between China, Russia, and North447Korea. U.S. INDOPACOM deters threats to the regional stability448in competition and in crisis, while ensuring the ability to449prevail in conflict. That ability to prevail is indispensable450to deterrence.451    In 2024, the command conducted 120 joint exercises, among452them 20 major joint exercises across the region, including453allies and partners, demonstrating our capability and our454combined capacity.455    We continue to strengthen relationships with Japan, South456Korea, Australia, Republic of the Philippines, India, Taiwan,457the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] nations, the458Pacific Island countries, and European partners in INDOPACOM,459including the United Kingdom and France.460    Multiple groupings such as the Quad and trilateral461arrangements further enhance our capabilities. We must strive462for dominance in space and across the information environment,463including cyber, leveraging capabilities to counter command and464control, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and465targeting.466    This enables the command to gain a non-linear advantage467over potential adversaries. And while the scale of our effort468is substantial, the ability to master information is absolutely469paramount to projecting power and safeguarding our interests.470    To maintain credible deterrence, U.S. INDOPACOM requires471sustained investment in counter-C5ISRT [counter command,472control, computing, communications, cyber, intelligence,473surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting], in fires, in474integrated air and missile defense, in force sustainment, and475as discussed, in autonomous and artificial intelligence-driven476systems. And all under greater ability to maintain domain477awareness.478    As the most consequential opponent, China poses real and479serious challenges to our military superiority, but this also480presents opportunities for reform and for establish enduring481advantage. While INDOPACOM faces significant challenges, I do482remain confident in our deterrence posture and the ability to483defend U.S. interests and maintain regional stability. But the484trajectory must change.485    China is outproducing the United States in air, maritime,486missile capability, and accelerating their space and counter-487space capabilities. Though we face serious challenges, the488Joint Force remains confident, resolute, and determined to489prevail. Deterrence remains our highest duty.490    Thank you for your continued support for INDOPACOM.491Together we advance the security, freedom, and prosperity of492the American people and our allies and partners. I look forward493to your questions. Thank you.494    [The prepared statement of Admiral Paparo can be found in495the Appendix on page 74.]496    The Chairman. Thank you, Admiral.497    General Brunson, you are recognized.498499STATEMENT OF GENERAL XAVIER T. BRUNSON, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED500  NATIONS COMMAND, COMBINED FORCES COMMAND, U.S. FORCES KOREA501502    General Brunson. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and503distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the504opportunity to speak to you today. I am honored to sit505alongside Mr. Noh and Admiral Paparo here in the first of my506posture hearings, the first of what I hope to be many more in507the future.508    I would like to take a moment to thank you all for your509continued and steadfast leadership and support to510servicemembers, the civilians that serve alongside us, and511their families. I would also like to thank you especially for512your continued assistance to those soldiers, sailors, airmen,513Marines, and Guardians who are serving in Korea.514    I would be remiss if I failed to recognize and give my515condolences publicly to the family of a Republic of Korea516special operations solider who lost his life in a free-fall517parachute accident yesterday. It is a reminder that there is a518high cost associated with wearing the cloth of our respective519nations.520    In my career, every opportunity I have had to lead our521nation's men and women has been honor. And it is a privilege to522serve alongside our allies, partners, and friends as we work523together to further our shared interests, strengthen our ties,524and further security, freedom, and prosperity in all our525nations.526    The Korean Peninsula is directly linked to the national527interests of the United States. What happens in this vital528region has a direct impact on American families, businesses,529and our nation's future.530    For over 75 years, we have invested our national treasure531in the region. Northeast Asia is a region critical to U.S.532national security and a region where recent authoritarian533collusion between China, Russia, the Democratic People's534Republic of Korea, and Iran has intensified.535    It is a region of emergent challenges. However, there are536also undeniable opportunities. Because our interconnected world537grows closer and closer, any military actions that would occur538on the Korean Peninsula would have worldwide and potentially539global impacts.540    One of the things that we are looking at presently is an541ability to continue to partner alongside others like those in542UN [United Nations] Command, those 18 nations that make up that543command, to continue to build partnerships which will544strengthen not only our capacity in the region, but also be an545indicator of our resolve therein.546    In 2024, DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea]547focused on advancing their cruise missile and hypersonic live548vehicle research and development programs, launching some 47549ballistic missiles, with one failed satellite launch attempt.550    Kim Jong-Un also had two highly publicized visits to his551nuclear sites, clearly conveying an intent to advance his552nuclear weapons capabilities. Over the past year and a half,553DPRK has exported munitions and troop support to Russia,554demonstrating an ability to not only provide for another555conflict, but to continue advancing their domestic556capabilities.557    In the coming year, we expect DPRK to further develop558hypersonic and multiple independently targetable reentry559vehicle, MIRV [Multiple Independently targetable Reentry560Vehicle, capabilities to complete his eighth party congress561goals. At present, he is sitting at five of seven obtained.562    Kim Jong-Un's leadership has shifted from focus on563reunification to declaring his own sovereignty. This change is564evidenced by the hardening of the southern border, the565rejection of reunification discussions, and the destruction of566unification monuments in buildings along the joint security567area.568    DPRK continues to build its nuclear weapons program and569boast a Russian equipment-augmented modernized military force570of over 1.3 million personnel. To contrast that, I would like571to mention the ROK-U.S.-Japan alliance.572    Our trilateral efforts along with those other nations573within the United Nations Command have woven together an574integrated regional defense posture. Together we have achieved575new levels of interoperability and theater-wide combined joint576all-domain exercises and training.577    Our presence in Korea demonstrates American strength. It578imposes cost and deters military aggression by our adversaries.579The ROK-U.S. alliance remains the lynchpin of security in580Northeast Asia.581    I am committed to working with you to ensure the continued582security, freedom, and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula and a583free and open Indo-Pacific. Thank you, and I look forward to584your questions.585    [The prepared statement of General Brunson can be found in586the Appendix on page 102.]587    The Chairman. Thank you, General Brunson.588    I recognize myself first for questions. Admiral Paparo, how589does the growing cooperation between China, Russia, and North590Korea present challenges in your area of operations?591    Admiral Paparo. Chairman, each country compensates for the592others' weaknesses. In this case, it is quite transactional,593and there is a matter of symbiosis among it. So for example,594China has provided 70 percent of the machine tools and 90595percent of the semiconductors that support Russia's rebuilding596its war machine.597    North Korea provides, as discussed, thousands of rounds in598support and troops. And coming back to China and to North Korea599are key capabilities where they would otherwise be behind that600would help close the gap, submarine technology, missile601technology, and surface-to-air missiles, and so forth. This is602a transactional symbiosis that poses a serious challenge.603    The Chairman. Great. General Brunson, what does the U.S.604gain from our presence on the Korean Peninsula? And if in fact605your tri-command of U.S., South Korea, and UN Forces didn't606exist, what would it cost us to reestablish that kind of607foothold on the Asian continent?608    General Brunson. Chairman, as you know, that will be surely609a matter of policy. But from my perspective, what I see is that610we have got positional advantage currently.611    We have had experience, you asked us in your opening to612sort of highlight these things in regard to our experiences,613and I can say that honestly, having been a special operations614joint task force commander in Iraq one year, I found myself on615a FOB [Forward Operating Base] that I had been on as a616battalion commander 6 years before. And we don't want that same617condition.618    I think what we have to recognize is that the way that we619are organized, the way that we posture ourselves in the region,620we ought not seek credit for it, but we ought to at least621acknowledge the fact that we are in all the places that we need622to be. Capacities aside, the capabilities that are resident623within the KTO [Korean Theater of Operations] presently are624right where they need in my military assessment.625    I think that decisions will be made in the future but just626getting back in there and what we might be able to provide,627again, in terms of protection and sustainment, which we are628able to do across the globe, I think is critically important.629    The Chairman. Admiral Paparo, how can the U.S. accelerate630the delivery of U.S. weapons to improve Taiwan's self-defense?631How will the Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative authorized632by the FY2025 NDAA help us to deliver these needed capabilities633to Taiwan?634    Admiral Paparo. Chairman, key is to eliminate and remove635bureaucratic, in some cases bureaucratic limitations in order636to do so. Liberalizing the supply bases, certifying supply637bases, a steady flow of funds in order to fund those638capabilities and downstream long lead item matters would639greatly enhance our ability to produce at speed.640    The Chairman. And do you think that would have a deterrent641effect on China's perceived opportunities?642    Admiral Paparo. Sir, I think it gains three to five to one643leverage for every capability that we provide in defense.644    The Chairman. Great, thank you. With that, I yield to the645ranking member for his questions.646    Mr. Smith. Thank you. Sort of building on that last647question, Admiral Paparo and General Brunson, if you have648anything to add, as I mentioned in my opening statement, what649capabilities, just focusing for the moment on what the U.S.650could do, do you most need, do you think would have the most651deterrent effect?652    I know obviously everyone wants more ships, more planes,653more everything. But if you could, you know, narrow it down to654here are some of the most crucial things that could help you,655just focusing on U.S. needs to deter. Both of you could give us656an answer on that.657    Admiral Paparo. Ranking Member, the most critical need to658focus on is our counter-C5ISRT capability, which gives us659freedom to maneuver, freedom to operate at a lower risk660throughout the area of responsibility.661    Mr. Smith. Secure communications, basically.662    Admiral Paparo. The ability to dazzle, deceive, destroy the663adversary's ability to see and sense, and then hardening our664own ability to give a high-fidelity common operating picture to665units to unlock their ability to operate tactically.666    Mr. Smith. Yeah. Any piece of that in particular where you667see the greatest need right now, understanding that I will ask668you this in the classified session as well and get into more669detail? But because posture hearings are different this year.670We haven't got the budget yet. So it is a little weird.671    But as we lead up to the budget, it would hopefully, will672come in about a month, what would be most important to be in673there to meet that need?674    Admiral Paparo. Leveraging the United States' ability,675having 90 percent of the space lift in the world, to bring676counter-space capability. And then to continue to enhance our677cyber capability.678    And you know, many others in the form of long-range679weapons, in the form of unmanned and AI [artificial680intelligence] systems that effect air denial and sea denial in681enclosed places, such as the Taiwan Strait, augment these.682    Mr. Smith. Yeah. I am just going to ask this. So General683Haugh got fired, he is the head of NSA [National Security684Agency] and Cyber [United States Cyber Command]. How has that685impacted your ability to work with NSA and Cyber on those very686critical issues that you just outlined?687    Admiral Paparo. I say we are ready to work with whatever688competent individual is in place. And we will continue to try689to enhance that ability.690    Mr. Smith. Did you think General Haugh was a competent691individual who you could work with?692    Admiral Paparo. Yes.693    Mr. Smith. General Brunson, on the first question about694capabilities, what would you most need in your command?695    General Brunson. Sir, as I had the opportunity to mention696in that HACD [House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense]697closed session, all of my requests are inhabited within the IPL698[Integrated Priority List] of INDOPACOM. I would tell you that699as I look at the more ephemeral domains of cyber, EW700[electronic warfare], and space, I am looking to be engaged in701those in a more fulsome manner.702    And I think that that is where we can talk in closed about703some of those particular capabilities that we need to bring to704bear on the peninsula.705    But to an earlier question that you mentioned, Ranking706Member, I would like to say that, you know, if we are trying to707project strength, one of the things that we are continuing to708work on right now is the assailable flank that is United709Nations Command.710    There are 18 total nations there. And so I see the KTO as711being a bit wider. And being able to leverage those other712nations in the Republic of Korea and beyond is a way for us to713continue to sort of underpin the things that we are doing on714the peninsula with legitimacy--715    Mr. Smith. I am running out of time, that is really716important, I want to get to that. But I want to ask Mr. Noh717those questions.718    So as I mentioned in my opening statement, we are719alienating every single partner in the region. And you made the720statement, you know, ``America First doesn't mean America721alone.''722    I am puzzled. What are we doing to enhance relationships? I723think we have all seen on display what we are doing to sort of724make those relationships more problematic. But what is the725administration doing to try to strengthen partnerships when726they are launching a trade war against all of our partners?727    Mr. Noh. Ranking Member Smith, so as you know, Secretary728Hegseth just came back from his first trip to the Indo-Pacific,729where he visited both the Philippines and Japan. He had a730chance to reaffirm our commitment to those important alliances731with--732    Mr. Smith. What is that commitment? I mean, we can all go733on vacation to Japan and say how much we love the country, but734what is that commitment? Because there didn't seem to be any735commitment, other than threats and bullying.736    Mr. Noh. It is reaffirming our commitment, our treaty737obligations to both the Philippines and Japan. He announced a738number of things that the Department is currently doing to work739with both the Philippines and Japan to accelerate and740strengthen our relationships.741    In the Philippines, for example, he made an announcement742about bilateral SOF--I am sorry, special operations forces that743we are conducting.744    Mr. Smith. Just one last question, how much damage do you745think the trade war that has just been launched does to all of746what you just said?747    Mr. Noh. Ranking Member Smith, in all the engagements and748the personal engagements I have had and all the engagements749that I have seen the Secretary has had, our relationships with750our allies and partners in the region are strong and remain751strong.752    Mr. Smith. This only started a couple days ago, so we will753see where it goes.754    I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.755    The Chairman. Thank the ranking member. And I recognize the756gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Wittman.757    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank758our witnesses for joining us. Thanks again for the incredible759job that you all are doing.760    Admiral Paparo, I want to begin with you. You talked about761the importance of shipbuilding, but very specifically762shipbuilding in certain areas. We have a distinct asymmetric763advantage under the sea.764    Can you give us a perspective about what that looks like in765relation to what we have as that advantage versus what the766Chinese have, what they are building in relation to what we767have?768    Secondly, too, is that we know that the Marine Corps is769going to be the stand-in force there in the Indo-Pacific. They770are going to be the tip of the spear, have that ability to make771sure that they are the crisis response team.772    The challenge for us today is we don't have enough773amphibious ships and the ones that we do have have an774operational availability of 41 percent. So when your call goes775out, the challenge is, is can it be met.776    Because today, we cannot put together an Amphibious Ready777Group/Marine Corps Expeditionary Unit, better known as an ARG/778MEU. Can't do it. We can put a single ship out there, but we779can't put the complement of ships that we need for an ARG/MEU.780    Can you tell where are we in relation to the need for781getting to that 2.33 submarines a year for AUKUS and ourselves,782why that is important? And then what do you see as your783alternative in a crisis response if when you call for an ARG/784MEU, there is not one to be had?785    Admiral Paparo. Thank you, sir. Great to see you again.786    Presently we have a generational advantage from a submarine787standpoint against our adversaries. And this key, critical, and788indispensable to the ability to prevail.789    The PRC [People's Republic of China], though not perfectly790linear, but the PRC is outproducing the United States by a rate791of 2.0 per year to 1.28 presently attack submarines per year.792Required to get there are continued investments in the defense793industrial base, liberalizing the long lead time supply chains,794and giving a steady flow of funding.795    On the Marine stand-in forces and on amphibious ships,796amphibious ships are absolutely critical to this effort. And we797are not meeting mission globally on doing so. It is a matter of798the maintenance of the current capability that we have, and799frankly it is also a matter of the number of amphibious ships800that we have.801    So the ops [operational] analysis does not lie on that802matter.803    Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you. Let then move from that.804You talk about the need for us to get above the 1.28805production. That is not only to meet our requirements, but also806to fulfill the obligations we made under AUKUS to make sure we807have that partnership.808    Partnerships are incredibly important in that region, and809we talk about AUKUS, but we also talk about the Quad Agreement.810Can you give us your sense about are there any barriers that811are standing in the way for us to fully operationalize AUKUS,812whether it is pillar one or pillar two, and all the813opportunities that are there for us with the Quad?814    We see what our adversaries are doing in trying to create815more relationships there. We have to do more at the pace of816relevance to make sure we have substantive outcomes of these817agreements. Can you give us a perspective about where you see818things and what we need to do to accelerate that?819    Admiral Paparo. AUKUS pillar one, operationally we are820meeting every milestone. The biggest risk driver to AUKUS821pillar one is getting to that production rate by the time that822Australia purchases its own Virginia class submarine. That is823the greatest barrier that I see right now presently.824    On pillar two, the other capabilities, missiles and825unmanned and cyber, on this case, the biggest barrier are our826barriers to our administrative and bureaucratic barriers to co-827production. Co-production among our partners, not just our828AUKUS partners, but all of our partners, would greatly enhance829our missile magazines for all of us.830    Mr. Wittman. Would you say that ITAR [International Traffic831in Arms Regulations] currently has been modified enough to open832the door for pillar two? Because I know as we talked to the833Australians, they are not very happy with still the impediments834with ITAR.835    Admiral Paparo. I would agree with them.836    Mr. Wittman. Okay, very good. Let me ask, are there other837ways that we can get the most out of technological cooperation838with our friends, not just there with AUKUS, but also with the839Quad, where there is great opportunities with India and more840opportunities with Japan? Give us your perspective on that.841    Admiral Paparo. Yes, that multilateral India, Japan, the842United States, and Australia, that is critical and it is843growing. And we have seen some progress also with co-production844among us, and we see some progress on exercises.845    But again, our limits to co-production and speeding up the-846speeding up our ability to release key technologies to our847partners, under conditions of trust and under the scrutiny of848trust, that leads us to do so with confidence will enhance that849effort.850    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair851now recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney.852    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the853witnesses for your testimony this morning.854    Again, at the outset I just would note on Saturday, the85524th Virginia class submarine was commissioned into the Navy.856There are four more that are coming online between now and the857end of 2026.858    So you know, there is no question that the cadence is not859where it should be, but if you look at tonnage, and again, if860you look at the fact that post-Covid, the yards are recovering.861We just had the new Secretary of the Navy at Quonset Point on862Friday, who, again, got an eyeful in terms of just the chock-a-863block activity that is going on there.864    So just to go back to AUKUS for a second, Admiral, this865committee in record time enacted all the authorities in 2023866per optimal pathway to get, again, that engaged. There still867is, in my opinion, a misperception that AUKUS is primarily868about just helping Australia.869    Can you talk a little bit about what it means in terms of870the U.S. as far as making our nation safer, and also the Indo-871Pacific safer?872    Admiral Paparo. Yes, AUKUS delivers something to INDOPACOM873that is critical and could be a key advantage, and that is an874Indian Ocean submarine base. This gives us a faster response875time to the South China Sea than in Hawaii, in Washington, in876San Diego. It gives us the key ability to maneuver into the877Indian Ocean without the burden of having to go through878straits. And so it is key.879    And then Australia is making key investments in the880submarine industrial base. As I utter these words, there are 11881Australians stationed on attack boats in Hawaii and scores that882are working in the Pearl Harbor shipyard. These are just but a883few of their contributions.884    Mr. Courtney. And again, the plan is also to have the885rotation of Virginias starting in 2027, I believe, in Henderson886in western Australia, which again, they are making huge887investments in terms of the infrastructure that is necessary888for that effort.889    You know, one of the authorities, Mr. Noh, that we enacted890vis-a-via AUKUS was we have actually passed a law to allow891Australia to invest $3 billion into our industrial base. It was892such a novel, extraordinary component of the optimal pathway893that we actually, as I said, had to change the Treasury894Department's rules to accept that money.895    As you I think should know, the Defense Minister from896Australia went in his visit with Mr. Hegseth, brought the first897check for a half-billion dollars, which was deposited in the898U.S. Treasury.899    And to follow up Mr. Smith's question regarding, you know,900the trade war that is happening right now, Australia has a free901trade agreement with the U.S. There are zero tariffs on U.S.902goods that come into Australia.903    As Adam said, there is a two-to-one trade surplus from the904U.S. into Australia. They are putting money in our industrial905base, and yet we are tariffing Australia at the same level as906the country of Iran.907    And I will tell you that in, you know, maybe you have had908sort of conversations where this hasn't come up. That is not909the case for some of us who, you know, are in touch with910members of Parliament in Australia. There is definitely911collateral damage to our allies in terms of what is happening912out there.913    And the picture that was in the news the other day of914representatives from the South Korean Government and Japan915shaking hands with China to announce a new anti-tariff effort916by those countries, I mean, we are just pushing people in the917wrong direction in this part of the world.918    And we need more from you in terms of just what is the919Department's position in terms of advising the White House920about the fact that this is driving our allies in the wrong921direction?922    Mr. Noh. Congressman, on the issue of tariffs, I mean, that923is an issue that is beyond the purview of my personal position924to comment on. It is not something the Department of Defense925focuses on.926    But you mentioned the $500 million contribution that927Australia made. I was there when Secretary Hegseth met with928Deputy Prime Minister Marles. We were grateful and we are929grateful for the contribution Australia is making. That is part930of a larger $3 billion investment into our submarine industrial931base.932    Secretary Hegseth said at that meeting that there is more933that needs to be done to increase our--934    Mr. Courtney. I have just a few seconds left. I mean, this935is an all-of-government situation, and you cannot stovepipe the936Department of Defense in terms of just what is happening with937other parts of the administration. And this trade war, as I938said, is driving our allies in the wrong direction, and we need939to stop it.940    I yield back.941    The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired. The chair942now recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson.943    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I want944to thank each of you for your service. It is humbling to be in945your presence. And what a difference you make, and how946important it is, where we are today, sadly in the conflict we947did not choose. And that is dictators with rule of gun invading948democracies with rule of law.949    And what we can do to deter, and that is your field. And we950saw, sadly, dictator, war criminal Putin to invade Ukraine on951February 24, 2022, under the theory that Ukraine doesn't exist.952Then we know that the puppets of Iran invaded Israel on October9537, 2023, under the theory that Israel doesn't exist from the954river to sea.955    But it is just so important that we be as strong as we can956for peace through strength to deter the Chinese Communist Party957that claims, of course, Taiwan does not exist. There is a958parallel there, and it is before us. And so what you are doing959is just so important.960    And with that in mind, I want to thank all of you for your961service. And I had the opportunity last year to have my third962visit in the Republic of Korea to visit at Camp Humphreys. What963a world-class facility that is.964    I was there when the groundbreaking occurred, and then to965go back and see this facility, a $10.8 billion investment, 90966percent paid for the by the very appreciative people of the967Republic of Korea. And the American people need to know that968nearly 9, almost 10 billion dollars was spent by the people of969Korea to appreciate having an American presence there, which is970a deterrence to the maniac that is in charge of Pyongyang.971    Keeping that in mind, I visited with troops from South972Carolina, and it is just so important that we remain ironclad973in supporting the people of Korea with the instability of974indeed the regime in Pyongyang. And we have 28,000 troops in975Korea, and the message of that is to protect Korea of course,976but Japan, all of our interests in the Pacific, which are so977critical.978    And with that indeed, General Brunson, I am very grateful979myself that I am the only member of Congress who has actually980been to Pyongyang. I was on a delegation in 2003. And so I saw,981again firsthand, the oppression of the people of North Korea982and how sad that is.983    But Kim Jung-Un has laid out a plan to advance missile984technology of North Korea, and he is proceeding, with this year985eight ballistic missile that are being developed that possibly986could reach the United States.987    With that in mind, and we also note the increasing988relationship and war criminal Putin, with North Korea sending989troops to kill Ukrainians with the technology that indeed war990criminal Putin is providing to North Korea, but ultimately the991ability to attack the United States.992    With this in mind and the strengthening ties with war993criminal Putin and the Chinese Communist Party, General, what994actions can we take to minimize the risk?995    General Brunson. Congressman, thank you for the question.996As a son of a sergeant major retired from Manning, South997Carolina, I appreciate this question today.998    The first thing I would like to say is that the Korean999people are incredibly resilient, as noted in the constitutional1000crisis that was occurring recently, now resolved. Expect a new1001presidential election on the third of June.1002    They also provide for us, as you mentioned, an environment1003wherein we can build readiness across the Joint Force. And I1004have seen that in the short 90 days that I have been in1005command, whether it be Marines coming or a carrier strike group1006coming to the peninsula.1007    And so those things are absolutely sound, and I thank the1008Korean people for what they provide us. As Admiral Paparo1009mentioned, the things are going there, we can see it very well.1010We can see, we can sense, we can understand, we can track, we1011can even target things that are going. We do not, however, but1012we can see that.1013    What is most, as Admiral Paparo said, is what is coming1014back. The technology development that they are able to almost1015cut in half in terms of developing the ballistic missile1016technology, to develop air vehicles for their missiles. All1017those things that they are getting back in terms of the ability1018to jam in the West Sea, which has now made that a contested1019area.1020    I think that is what we keep our eyes on. And we deter that1021by continuing to bring those strategic assets to bear in the1022KTO.1023    Mr. Wilson. And I am grateful to see a son of Clarendon1024County do well.1025    And Admiral, just a point, I appreciate Donald Trump naming1026the INDOPACOM. And I appreciate every effort made to work with1027our defense allies. Of India, what a great ally they can be,1028and particularly with the development of an industrial base of1029their own, not to be depending on war criminal Putin for1030inferior--1031    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair1032now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi.1033    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for1034your opening remarks as well Ranking Member Smith about this1035set of issues.1036    I am going to very quickly, Mr. Noh, your response to my1037colleague Courtney was totally inadequate. It was wrong. You1038have got to send back to the Secretary that the trade war1039significantly diminishes our power throughout the world. To do1040anything other than to send that message back is simply a1041dereliction of your duties as an Acting Assistant Secretary. So1042be aware.1043    Last night, it appears as though Trump's tariff war seems1044to be at least in part a gambit to open negotiations with1045individual countries. His message last night to the Republican1046conference was to open those negotiations with this message:1047kiss my ass.1048    You might ask the Secretary just how well will that work in1049maintaining good relationships that are absolutely essential in1050the Pacific. Don't expect a response, but I expect you to do1051your job. Send the message back that these negotiations, this1052trade war is a very serious challenge toward the Indo-Pacific1053region and other parts of the world.1054    Now, from my perspective this administration's approach to1055addressing China is reckless and misusing our national1056instruments of power.1057    So Admiral Paparo, let's talk about the Pacific Islands.1058Are they important in your strategies in the Pacific?1059    Admiral Paparo. Congressman, just as in the Second World1060War the Pacific Island countries, Guadalcanal, throughout the1061Indo-Pacific to Bora Bora are important as well. And that is1062why the People's Republic of China has efforts of elite1063capture, of the attempted partnership with their security1064apparatuses.1065    And so on history, on geography, and on interests they are1066quite important.1067    Mr. Garamendi. Good. Are we missing the opportunities with1068the trashing of USAID [U.S. Agency for International1069Development] and also not using the Coast Guard to full effect1070in the Pacific Islands?1071    Admiral Paparo. The USAID aid is under review, and I will1072be advocating most strongly for that aid for all of the1073countries.1074    And the Coast Guard provides a critical role in the South1075Pacific, and that is counter-lawfare, counter illicit1076trafficking, counter illegal, illicit, and unregulated fishing.1077And those are key advantages, the Coast Guard is uniquely1078capable of doing that, and they have done a wonderful job for1079us.1080    Mr. Garamendi. Are they available 365/24/7?1081    Admiral Paparo. Presently they are on another task, but,1082and we are compensating for that with appropriate naval1083capabilities and air capabilities. But they are quite critical1084to that mission.1085    Mr. Garamendi. I am told it cost about $140 million to have1086a Coast Guard cutter available, operating in the Pacific1087Islands. Is that an investment that you are willing to make1088from the Pacific Defense Initiative?1089    Admiral Paparo. Yes, sir.1090    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. I appreciate the direct response.1091140,000,000.1092    There are also issues of basing relationships with various1093ports in the Pacific. Will you be using the Defense Initiative1094to enhance those facilities that are necessary for the Navy as1095well as for the Coast Guard?1096    Admiral Paparo. Yes, sir, those bases, places, the1097airfields, the ports, the piers are absolutely critical. They1098are key to our principles of expanded maneuver that enables us1099to put geography to work to deter and if necessary to win.1100    Mr. Garamendi. Good. I don't think I will go back to the1101fact that we are imposing tariffs on islands that do not have1102any exports to the United States, but that is another silly,1103sloppy piece of work that the administration is doing with1104regard to the tariff issue.1105    I want to spend a few moments on logistics. The support of1106the Navy, some of this came up with the military ships, the1107amphibs. Could you talk to us about the necessity of TRANSCOM1108[United States Transportation Command] and non-kinetic ships1109providing support in the Pacific?1110    Admiral Paparo. The combat logistics--1111    Mr. Garamendi. I think we are going to take that in1112writing, my time is expired.1113    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix1114on page 137.]1115    Admiral Paparo. Thank you, sir.1116    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much.1117    The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. The chair now recognizes1118the gentleman from Tennessee, Dr. DesJarlais.1119    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Chairman.1120    Admiral Paparo, good to see you. You noted that PLA1121activity around Taiwan jumped 300 percent last year, including1122what you described as dress rehearsals for potential invasion.1123What indicators are you watching most closely to assess whether1124those rehearsals are moving towards actual preparations for1125imminent conflict?1126    Admiral Paparo. We watch the transloading of equipment, of1127personnel, of ordinance. We look deeper into some of the non-1128military instruments of national power for the People's1129Republic of China in order to gain back strategic and1130operational warning to give us early leverage to position a1131force to respond to conflict.1132    Dr. DesJarlais. And you have spoken publicly about1133hellscape plan to deter invasions through unmanned systems. And1134you were very generous with your time on CODEL KELLY in1135February at your headquarters in laying that out in great1136detail.1137    In open source, can you walk us through how this fits into1138your broader deterrence framework and how we are helping ensure1139Taiwan is investing in the right capabilities to make this1140concept viable?1141    Admiral Paparo. Yes, sir. As discussed in the Black Sea,1142there are spaces where the force need not gain air superiority1143or maritime superiority, but just deny it to the other, at low1144human cost. And this is the essence of hellscape, undersea1145unmanned, undersea vehicles, unmanned surface vehicles,1146unmanned air, the air systems, and loitering munitions.1147    Summing those, operating them within one common command and1148control framework to be able to put them to that best use. And1149Taiwan, for that matter, is also making those investments. And1150those investments are and must be aligned with the investments1151that we are making.1152    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you. And Admiral, last week the U.S.1153and Chinese military officials held their first working level1154maritime security talk since the start of this administration.1155Can you update the committee on how these conversations went1156and how you see their value in the current environment?1157    Admiral Paparo. Both sides were very direct. They were1158conducted professionally. And we lodged several inputs into the1159discussions about unsafe, unprofessional behavior, the1160deployment of flares in front of our partner nations' vehicles1161and I should say aircraft, dangerous maneuvers around ships.1162    And it is an important dialog that we had. And I feel1163confident that the People's Republic of China caught the1164message.1165    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay, and you touched on this briefly with1166Mr. Wittman, but just a little deeper dive. We often hear that1167alliances are our asymmetric advantage, and I agree with that1168in principle.1169    But how do we ensure that those relationships may net1170contributors to deterrence rather than creating dependencies?1171And what have you already seen that you would like to see over1172the next year or two that would signal they are stepping up in1173the face of the PLA threat?1174    Admiral Paparo. Greater investment in their own defense1175from the standpoint of a percentage of their GDP, their gross1176domestic product is an indicator. Acquiring the right systems1177that are interoperable among all of the partners.1178    And of course there is Australia's historic investment in1179AUKUS, and the United Kingdom, I might also add. There is1180Japan's investment in a counterstrike capability with the1181acquisition of 400 Tomahawk land attack missiles. These are1182some of the examples of how this is operationalized.1183    Dr. DesJarlais. Are there gaps that we still need to fill1184to close and make those efforts more strategically impactful?1185    Admiral Paparo. There are always gaps because we are never1186satisfied with how ready we are. But yes, we have to speed up1187our ability to co-produce capabilities. We have to speed up the1188bureaucratic barriers to executing those faster. And we must1189reform the industrial base so that those capabilities deliver1190on time.1191    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, sir. And with that, I will yield1192back.1193    The Chairman. Thank the gentleman for yielding. The chair1194now recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Moulton.1195    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1196    Mr. Noh, you said in your testimony that stronger alliances1197is what this team is delivering. Are alliances with Japan,1198South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, Australia, the1199Philippines, and India included in your stronger alliances? Are1200those important allies for us in the Indo-Pacific?1201    Mr. Noh. Congressman, absolutely.1202    Mr. Moulton. So you are raising tariffs 24 percent on1203Japan, 25 percent on South Korea, 32 percent on Taiwan, 361204percent on Thailand, 46 percent on Vietnam, only 10 percent on1205Australia, 18 percent in the Philippines, and 26 percent on1206India. How do these tariffs strengthen our alliances?1207    Mr. Noh. Well, Congressman, as I said before, the issue of1208tariffs is beyond the purview of my--1209    Mr. Moulton. Oh, so it doesn't matter? You don't think our1210allies care about tariffs? You seem to care about our allies1211and the relationship we have with them. You don't think tariffs1212have any influence on that?1213    Mr. Noh. Congressman, I have had multiple engagements,1214personal engagements with allies and partners throughout--1215    Mr. Moulton. Does weakening our allies' economies help our1216alliance?1217    Mr. Noh. All the engagement that I have had, that I have1218seen the Secretary have with his counterparts lead me to1219believe that our alliances and partnerships are very--1220    Mr. Moulton. That they like the tariffs? That that is a1221good move, it strengthens our alliances, is that what you are1222saying, Mr. Noh?1223    Mr. Noh. Our alliances and partnerships are in a very1224strong place.1225    Mr. Moulton. These tariffs are also going to raise prices1226for American consumers, including American troops. Will this be1227good for your soldiers, General Brunson? Do they have a lot of1228extra disposable income to spend?1229    General Brunson. Congressman, in answer to the extra1230disposable income, I have got two college-age daughters that I1231am still putting through college and a 15-year-old at home. I1232don't know that disposable income is what I would look at here.1233    Mr. Moulton. Admiral Paparo, will the tariffs raise the1234prices that your sailors and Marines pay at the commissaries1235for groceries, the PX [Post Exchange], whatever, does that, is1236that good for your sailors and Marines, higher prices for them1237and their families?1238    Admiral Paparo. Higher prices will hurt our servicemembers.1239    Mr. Moulton. I appreciate the direct answer, thank you. Mr.1240Noh, you mentioned that Secretary Hegseth recently traveled to1241the region to reaffirm our commitment to our allies. Is South1242Korea one of those important allies?1243    Mr. Noh. South Korea is a very important ally. And in his1244call several weeks ago with the--1245    Mr. Moulton. But I wonder if the reason why you have to1246reaffirm those alliances is because of this trade war the1247President has started. But regardless of that, can you explain1248how pulling out Patriot batteries from South Korea demonstrates1249that commitment?1250    Mr. Noh. Congressman, we face a very dangerous security1251environment. The Department will--1252    Mr. Moulton. Yes, in the Indo-Pacific, which is your No. 11253priority. So, why are you pulling Patriot batteries out of1254South Korea to send them to the Middle East? I thought that1255China was the pacing threat.1256    Mr. Noh. Well, Congressman--1257    Mr. Moulton. Do you disagree with that?1258    Mr. Noh. Congressman, the Department will continue to1259address threats as--1260    Mr. Moulton. General Brunson, is it helpful to you in South1261Korea and your alliance with the South Koreans to pull out a1262Patriot battery?1263    General Brunson. Congressman, if I could be given just a1264second to explain the way we handled that?1265    Mr. Moulton. No, I don't want to know.1266    General Brunson. Okay.1267    Mr. Moulton. I just want to know if it is helpful or not. I1268don't want an explanation. I just want an answer. And it would1269be helpful if you could give direct answers like Admiral1270Paparo.1271    Admiral Paparo, back to you. I recently heard from a1272commanding officer under your command expressing frustration1273and disgust over Secretary Hegseth's illegal disclosure of Top1274Secret targeting information detailing when American pilots1275would be over enemy territory on an unclassified platform that1276we know is targeted by our adversaries, including China. I have1277never heard from this commander about an issue like this1278before. He seemed concerned about the example that this sets1279for our troops.1280    You have to make rapid operational decisions. Do you use1281Signal chats to discuss operational plans and other classified1282information?1283    Admiral Paparo. No, Congressman.1284    Mr. Moulton. Do you allow sailors under your command to1285keep their jobs when they knowingly disclose classified1286information?1287    Admiral Paparo. No, sir.1288    Mr. Moulton. Do you criminally prosecute people under your1289command who knowingly illegally disclose Top Secret information1290upon which the lives of our pilots depend?1291    Admiral Paparo. We would if we encountered that.1292    Mr. Moulton. Do you allow your sailors and marines to drink1293on the job?1294    Admiral Paparo. No, sir.1295    Mr. Moulton. Admiral Paparo, I assume you expect1296accountability from your commanders. Secretary Hegseth said,1297``Accountability is back at DOD [Department of Defense].'' When1298you instill accountability in your subordinates, do you advise1299them to lie about the disclosure of classified information?1300    Admiral Paparo. No, sir, I expect integrity.1301    Mr. Moulton. Mr. Noh, you talked about restoring the1302warrior ethos. Is part of the warrior ethos disclosing Top1303Secret information, and then, lying about doing so? Yes or no,1304is that part of the warrior ethos? You were in the Army. Is1305that what the Army taught you?1306    Mr. Noh. Congressman, there is, there is--1307    Mr. Moulton. Yes or no, did the Army teach you that, Mr.1308Noh?1309    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.1310    The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi,1311Mr. Kelly.1312    Mr. Moulton. My guess is no.1313    The Chairman. Mr. Kelly?1314    Mr. Kelly. It's unfortunate that this committee, which has1315always been bipartisan--this is Ways and Means, tariffs and1316those things, but I'm going to address something.1317    Is being a weak and feckless leader, does that make you1318more respected by your allies and partners? And I don't expect1319an answer.1320    But I can tell you we lived through 4 years of a weak and1321feckless and non-existent leader, and I'm trying to remember1322whether or not Russia invaded Ukraine under President Trump or1323whether he invaded under a weak and feckless Biden. I'm trying1324to remember over the last 4 years whether China has become more1325aggressive or less aggressive, and I know for a fact that they1326have become more aggressive, because weakness invites bullies1327to attack.1328    I will talk about tariffs just a little bit. Is1329appeasement, giving everyone everything that they want at your1330expense--that is not a partnership. I'm reminded, in 2017, when1331President Trump said NATO needs to pay their 2 percent fair1332share. And I remember the same kind of reactions across the1333aisle, ``Oh, my God, how dare we ask our allies. They're going1334to hate us. They're going to get away.'' But if you look back1335now, they have increased their ability to defend themselves and1336to help us defend them in NATO.1337    I will tell you that tariffs, being taken advantage of is1338not how we become strong leaders in the community. Giving your1339kids everything they want is not good parenting. It is not1340about likability; it is about respect.1341    And so, with that said, Admiral Paparo, in the INDOPACOM,1342it is, arguably, the most consequential theater of this1343century, specifically, as it pertains to fuel, both in the air1344and on the sea. Are there gaps? Are there things that we can do1345as far as air and sea and fuel delivery?1346    Admiral Paparo. Yes, sir, there are gaps in defense fuel in1347support points. Those are those locations where aircraft and/or1348ships would load fuel and distribute fuel. There are shortfalls1349in our tanker fleet, in keeping enough fuel in the case of a1350contingency, and there are gaps in the combat logistics force1351in order to sustain the force. And I would like to work with1352the committee to identify those gaps.1353    Mr. Kelly. And, Admiral Paparo, we have talked about USAID,1354but another strength that we have is our state partnership1355program where our National Guards partner with allies and1356partners. In the Indo-Pacific are there any of those that are1357valuable or are there places where we need new ones?1358    Admiral Paparo. Everyone is highly valuable, sir, and1359indispensable to our capability. They build long-lasting1360relationships and the continuity of the training that we1361execute.1362    I will tell you, there are no gaps partner-to-partner, just1363because of the good faith of the state partners and the good1364faith of the National Guard Bureau that assigns those, but1365there is always room for improvement everywhere, because we can1366never be satisfied with good enough. We must always strive for1367excellence.1368    Mr. Kelly. And I want to address just a little bit, because1369I also sit on the House Select Committee on Intelligence, the1370Signal chat. While ill-advised--and I will be the first to say1371that--there is no indication that any classified real-time1372information about strikes that are not specific in the1373location, that would not be Top Secret information, would it,1374if it doesn't disclose location, time, systems? That would not1375be Top Secret unless it disclosed beforehand sources or methods1376or direct specific things that could be used, is that correct?1377To Admiral Paparo and General Brunson.1378    Admiral Paparo. Agreed, sir.1379    General Brunson. Yes, sir.1380    Mr. Kelly. And, Mr. Noh, you have had a lot of hard1381questions and I hate to put you all--listen, you all as1382Secretary, you all work for the Department of Defense, not the1383Department of Commerce, or for the Ways and Means Committee in1384tariffs.1385    But I want to ask you, relationships, Mr. Noh, when we are1386looking for strength of partnerships and alliances, are we1387looking at someone who just takes everything we give them and1388gets mad when we want something back? Or are we looking for1389mutually beneficial relationships with nations where we both1390can be more successful?1391    Mr. Noh. Absolutely mutually beneficial relationships,1392Congressman.1393    Mr. Kelly. And do you agree, under the Trump1394administration, the last time, and this time also, that he is1395striving to build relationships that are dually--help both1396sides, not just one side of the equation, their side?1397    Mr. Noh. Absolutely, Congressman.1398    Mr. Kelly. Okay. With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.1399    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.1400    The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Pennsylvania,1401Ms. Houlahan.1402    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you very much for the conversation.1403    Admiral Paparo, I read that you went to Villanova1404University, which is just down the road from my district.1405    And I want to--actually, I don't even need to probably draw1406your attention to the recent earthquake in Myanmar, as some of1407the conversation earlier in our hearing talked about USAID and1408the earthquake in Myanmar that has claimed at least 2,000 lives1409that we know of. And the United States was very noticeably1410absent in terms of our response from USAID. No USAID presence,1411no visible coordination or relief efforts, even as China and1412Russia, in fact, stepped in to rescue people, children and1413elderly, from collapsing buildings.1414    Given that recent earthquake in Myanmar and the most likely1415fact that there will be other sorts of natural disasters such1416as these and some that are not natural, what should the DOD be1417doing? How does this impact our strategic posture in the Indo-1418Pacific region? Should the DOD have a posture in place, in the1419absence of USAID, to help provide resources in disasters such1420as these?1421    Admiral Paparo. Congresswoman, thank you, and thank you for1422the recognition of our home state.1423    Yes, we are postured in places, in certain locations, with1424crisis response forces, and in partnership with USAID, there1425are key and critical stores that enable us to respond to these1426natural disasters. And the outcome of this is an enhanced1427ability to gain access, basing, and overflight in combat.1428    Ms. Houlahan. So, I happened to have been flying through1429Hawaii on our way to Australia when the Maui fires happened,1430and the response was pretty forceful from our military because1431we were still waiting for FEMA [Federal Emergency Management1432Agency] to respond. This has to not be the most efficient way1433for our government to respond to natural disasters that happen1434for our own people and, also, for those around the world. There1435has to be a better way of doing that than to distract and1436deploy our military in those sorts of situations.1437    Do you feel as though that might be the case?1438    Admiral Paparo. As we do defense support to civil1439authorities stateside, and as we do humanitarian assistance1440disaster relief, the military is frequently a key and critical1441partner to our other government agencies to deliver this at1442first. But then, as the aid organizations step in, we execute a1443graceful transfer of those capabilities to get back on our1444primary mission of deterrence.1445    Ms. Houlahan. In many ways, I feel as though we are sort of1446inviting our adversaries into the region to take that place. Of1447course, the military will still be there. We still are America1448and we still care.1449    But do you believe that we are also increasing the1450possibility of influence in the region from places like China?1451    Admiral Paparo. The People's Republic of China sees these1452opportunities and they seize them.1453    Ms. Houlahan. My final or my second-to-last question is for1454General Brunson. I'm going to quote an article from April 3rd1455from Military.com titled, ``Army Planners Are Weighing Force1456Reductions of Up to 90,000 Active Duty Soldiers.'' Are you1457aware of this article?1458    General Brunson. No, ma'am, I'm not.1459    Ms. Houlahan. I would love to introduce that, if that's1460okay, for the record.1461    The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.[The1462information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page1463121.]1464    Ms. Houlahan. It says that the military Army planners are1465weighing reductions as a result of Secretary Hegseth's1466requirement to find 8 percent cuts. To your knowledge--the1467picture is actually of a live fire exercise in Indonesia, so it1468is specific to the conversation that we are having today--you1469are not aware of any conversations of any reduction in force of147090,000 Army soldiers?1471    General Brunson. No, ma'am, I'm not.1472    Ms. Houlahan. I would love it if I might be able to follow1473up with you all and understand if there's any truth to this1474article because it is sort of alarming to me.1475    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix1476on page 137.]1477    With what remains of my time, Mr. Noh, I want to talk to1478you as well. Many of my colleagues have spoken to you about1479trade tariffs, and yesterday we had a very similar conversation1480with your colleague who had a similar position in Europe. And I1481really was frustrated with her answers and I'm also frustrated1482with yours, that there is not a whole-of-government1483understanding of the implications of tariffs being levied on1484our allies in the region and other nations in the region, too.1485    Is it really your position that this is not something that1486is yours to opine on or to talk about?1487    Mr. Noh. Congresswoman, yes, tariffs is simply beyond the1488purview of my position to--1489    Ms. Houlahan. But my understanding is that at the end of1490March, South Korea, China, and Japan held an economic dialogue,1491that they agreed that they would work together now as a result1492of what the United States is levying upon them. Are you aware1493of that?1494    The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.1495    The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska--1496    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. I yield.1497    The Chairman. --Mr. Bacon.1498    Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1499    I appreciate all three of you being here.1500    And we have got our hands full, the United States. We have1501got China as the pacing threat, the long-term threat. They want1502to be the regional hegemon now and they want to be the world's1503superpower in the decades to come.1504    I will also submit that Russia is the near-term threat by1505its behavior with Ukraine, severing cables to united airliners,1506and then, we also have Iran, the world's largest exporter of1507terror.1508    And we have to deal with all three of these, which means we1509have to have the capabilities, but we also have to have close1510allies.1511    I appreciate the job our two four-star generals are doing1512in the Pacific. I'm grateful to you.1513    My first question is to Admiral Paparo. I was a 30-year1514electronic warfare guy in the Air Force. I think we were1515dominant in the 1990s, but we have a little bit of atrophy.1516Could you talk about the importance of EW in your theater?1517    But also the Air Force has funded 10 EA-37s, Compass Call1518aircraft, which I used to fly the earlier version. I don't1519think that is adequate for your needs. So, if you could talk1520about the importance of electronic warfare and the EA-37?1521    Admiral Paparo. Thank you, Congressman.1522    Yes, as discussed, our highest priority is counter command1523control communications and intelligence surveillance response1524and targeting. And the electronic means, whether that is1525through internet protocol, that is through radio1526communications, is the absolute linchpin. And to be able to1527target that non-kinetically is absolutely critical. And I1528couldn't agree more with our need to strive even harder to gain1529and to maintain dominance in those critical spectra.1530    Mr. Bacon. Is 10 EA-37s adequate?1531    Admiral Paparo. I'll have to get back to you on that, but1532you are talking to somebody that's never satisfied with where1533we are.1534    [Laughter.]1535    Mr. Bacon. Well, I have had some access to studies that I1536think PACOM [Pacific Command] needs 21. So, I would like to1537make sure we could fund more Compass Call aircraft, so you have1538those capabilities.1539    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix1540on page 137.]1541    Admiral Paparo. Exactly--1542    Mr. Bacon. I was going to talk to you about attack1543submarines, but you have already done that. So, let me pivot to1544the Ohio class SSGN [Subsurface Guided Missile Nuclear]. They1545are aging out. They are going to be deactivated at 6001546Tomahawks. And when I visited with you in February, you were1547also pointing out some of the cruisers that were going to be1548deactivated. So, can you talk about the gap that we are1549starting to build here and the impacts of losing these1550submarines and cruisers?1551    Admiral Paparo. Yes, sir. Having quantity of vessels that1552can impose costs, I'm probably quoting the wrong guy, but1553``quantity has a quality all its own.'' And so, to the extent1554that our capability decreases, that's bad for us.1555    Mr. Bacon. General Brunson, a question for you. Can you1556talk a little about why is North Korea sending thousands of1557troops to Russia? And how do you think they're benefitting from1558this?1559    General Brunson. Yes, Congressman.1560    So, one of the reasons is it helps them to circumvent the1561normal course of business and sanctions that exist on them1562presently. It allows them to get around some of that because1563there is materiel that is coming back to the Democratic1564People's Republic of Korea.1565    They are also able to get a technological boost, if you1566will, on things that they are seeking to develop. It is cutting1567their development time in half. They are also receiving some1568materiel that we can talk about in the closed session that is1569causing us some problems in the operating environment1570currently.1571    Mr. Bacon. I will come back to the attack submarine since1572it is already touched on. We have been producing about one a1573year right now. What your take on that, Admiral Paparo?1574    Admiral Paparo. It is inadequate and we have got to work1575harder in order to do that. And it is a combination of a steady1576stream of funding. It is a combination of liberalizing the1577defense industrial base, reforming the industrial base. And so,1578we have to work harder. We have to get to 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 per1579year and we can't rest until we do so.1580    Mr. Bacon. Thank you very much. I appreciate all three of1581you.1582    And I would just close by saying: leader of the free world1583and we can only produce one attack submarine. We have got to do1584better.1585    I yield.1586    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman for yielding.1587    The chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr.1588Ryan.1589    Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1590    Thank you all for being here. I appreciate you making a1591long trip, especially for two of the three of you.1592    Admiral Paparo, thank you for hosting myself and others out1593in February, along with my colleague Mr. Bacon. I think it is1594important to say in front of the American people and the whole1595committee, I left with an incredibly optimistic and, frankly,1596very proud view of your leadership--all the subordinate1597component commands, all aligned, clear-eyed about the threat,1598clear-eyed about the urgency of the moment. And I commend you1599on that.1600    And I also commend you on that. And I also commend you on1601always coming to us and letting us know in a productive way1602what we can be doing to enable and continue to up that.1603    I want to share something specifically that you said at the1604Honolulu Defense Forum when I was out there that I think is1605really aligned with the chairman's leadership and the ranking1606member's leadership and where we want to focus on acquisition1607reform.1608    You talked about ``procurement that moves at the speed of1609combat, not the speed of committees,'' or Congress, or we could1610use other ``C-words.'' I just want to foot stamp that and thank1611you for saying that so directly.1612    And again, I really appreciate the chair and the ranking1613member's leadership in pushing us as a whole-of-committee to1614drive on that. And I know that you will continue to let us know1615specific reforms and needs, as that goes through.1616    I want to shift now to a separate, but related topic. And1617again, I know we are talking about this a lot, but I share, Mr.1618Noh, my colleague's concern and disappointment that we are not1619getting candid answers. Frankly, as a very junior military1620officer, I understood that all the elements of national power--1621diplomatic, information, military, and economic--have to be1622synchronized effectively. So, I do think the committee and the1623American people are owed an answer on this. So, I want to talk1624about the impacts to our allies that other colleagues have1625highlighted.1626    The hypocrisy of asking allies and partners in INDOPACOM to1627up their defense spending, up their burden-sharing, and then,1628hitting them with nonsensical, uninformed, and I think now1629clearly shown to be not even technically correct tariffs, is, I1630think, a massive ``own goal,'' as we would say with my 5- and16313-year-olds that I'm teaching soccer.1632    Your testimony specifically calls out empowering our allies1633and commanders in your opening remarks as one of the keys to1634reestablishing deterrence in INDOPACOM and achieving peace1635through strength.1636    Yes or no, please, do you think a 46, or does the1637Department think a 46 percent tariff empowers Vietnam? Yes or1638no?1639    Mr. Noh. Congressman, I can't give a yes-or-no answer1640because the issue of tariffs is not in the purview of my1641position?1642    Mr. Ryan. Do you think that a 25 percent tariff on South1643Korea empowers our allies and partners?1644    Mr. Noh. The same, the same answer, Congressman.1645    Mr. Ryan. General Brunson, do you think that empowers our1646allies and partners in South Korea?1647    General Brunson. Congressman, if I could just ask for a1648point of clarification? Now, we are down to 25 percent. I would1649say that it impacts their budget. And so, that is something1650else they will have to work through the Korean government to1651solve.1652    Mr. Ryan. Do you think it strengthens our partnership? Yes1653or no?1654    General Brunson. Congressman, I cannot say that yet because1655I don't know the impacts of it. I have been here for a week,1656but we come through our recent exercise series. There have been1657no impacts to what I understand are purchases that are ongoing1658for the military element within Korea, and I believe that we1659are sound.1660    Mr. Ryan. Thank you, General.1661    On Australia, who everyone has acknowledged is our most1662strategic partner in INDOPACOM--and Mr. Courtney spoke about1663this--Admiral Paparo, you called them our most strategic1664partner. Mr. Noh, you called them a key logistics hub. It is1665clear that they were blindsided, in particular, by this tariff,1666which I find particularly offensive, given the time and1667investment all of us have spent in building that relationship1668and nurturing and growing that relationship--to the point that1669the Prime Minister said, quote, ``The Trump administration's1670tariff's have no basis in logic and they go against the basis1671of our two nations' partnerships.'' He is absolutely right.1672    Does that tariff--can you at least acknowledge on AUKUS,1673given all the bipartisan work that has been done there, that1674that hurts our relationship, Mr. Noh?1675    Mr. Noh. Congressman, we have a very strong relationship1676with Australia.1677    Mr. Ryan. Yes or no, does that help or hinder our1678partnership--1679    Mr. Noh. Congressman--1680    Mr. Ryan. --to blindside an ally with such a forceful1681tariff?1682    Mr. Noh. I'm not, I'm not here to talk about tariffs,1683Congressman.1684    Mr. Ryan. I yield back, Mr. Chair.1685    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.1686    The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.1687Fallon.1688    Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1689    Admiral, thank you for being here and, General, as well,1690and Mr. Noh.1691    I like to keep things simple, basic. 20 years ago, would1692you agree, Admiral, that in the last 20 years China's1693capabilities and ambitions have grown exponentially?1694    Admiral Paparo. I have a direct view of that, over that 201695years. Yes.1696    Mr. Fallon. And you would agree they are our military peer1697now?1698    Admiral Paparo. I do.1699    Mr. Fallon. Okay. The same question, General.1700    General Brunson. Sir, looking through the DPRK lens, I1701would say yes on both counts.1702    Mr. Fallon. Thank you.1703    So, Admiral, how many marines do we have on Okinawa today?1704    Admiral Paparo. 18,000.1705    Mr. Fallon. And was it, roughly, the same 20 years ago?1706    Admiral Paparo. 20 years ago, it was about the same, yes,1707sir.1708    Mr. Fallon. What is the end-strength goal right now?1709    Admiral Paparo. Presently, right now, III Marine1710Expeditionary Force is at end-strength, as it is stationed1711where it is. It really is optimized.1712    Mr. Fallon. Okay. So, there's no plans to reduce it from1713this 18,000-19,000 to about half, 10,000?1714    Admiral Paparo. There is a--there is the Defense Policy1715Renew Initiative, our agreement with Japan, and it is a1716conditions-based process. And ultimately, 5,000 U.S. Marines1717are planned to be in Guam and another 2,700 Marines are planned1718to be in Hawaii.1719    Mr. Fallon. So, given the considerations that, you know, we1720are talking about with China and the threat, something that I1721would recommend we do is to renegotiate with our Japanese1722friends and keep those 18,000 or that strength of 18,000-172319,000.1724    Because if, God forbid--General, how many troops did we1725have in Korea in the 1980s, roughly? Was it about 50,000? Is1726that right?1727    General Brunson. Congressman, it was a bit lower than that.1728    Mr. Fallon. In the forties, 45,000 or so?1729    General Brunson. A little bit lower than that.1730    Mr. Fallon. 40?1731    General Brunson. 28.1732    Mr. Fallon. So, in the 1980s, 30 years ago, we only had--1733I'm not talking today. What was it then? What was our high1734strength?1735    General Brunson. Probably about 60,000 when the division--1736    Mr. Fallon. Okay. And what is it now? About 30? About half?1737    General Brunson. About 30, sir.1738    Mr. Fallon. Okay. So, we have established that this threat1739has grown exponentially, and yet, we have reduced our1740footprint. So, God forbid--it is a simple question and an1741obvious answer--but, God forbid, there is a conflict on the1742Korean Peninsula; God forbid, the Chinese do cross the1743Taiwanese Straits. Would you rather have 45,000 or 50,0001744American troops on the peninsula or would you rather have 30?1745You know, it is obvious, right?1746    General Brunson. Yes. Yes, Congressman, it is an obvious1747answer. You always want more, but--1748    Mr. Fallon. Of course.1749    But the same thing, Admiral, in Okinawa, right?1750    Admiral Paparo. If a little bit is good, a whole lot is1751better, sir.1752    Mr. Fallon. Yes, you know. And I'm not worried that it is1753going capsize, either. I think that is going to be solid.1754    So, Admiral, we have a great many allies in the region,1755wonderful allies. You know, certainly, so many of them come to1756mind. But what I want to ask is, what country, in your view, is1757already an established model ally that we could--what is that1758model ally and how can we foster more of our relationships to1759look like that one?1760    Admiral Paparo. INDOPACOM has five of the Nation's six1761treaty allies in its AOR [area of responsiiblity]. And I have1762got tremendous pride in our execution of that alliance itself.1763Japan, South Korea, and Australia are very much model allies in1764their ability to provide capability, and the Philippines is1765growing. And we have recently had a very good engagement with1766Thailand and they continue to contribute.1767    Mr. Fallon. Yes, Thailand is worrying me a little bit about1768cozying up to China. That is why this is so important, what we1769do here.1770    So, another question; I'm very curious to hear your answer.1771Which friend or friendly nation in INDOPACOM presents the most1772promise and potential benefit for the United States and our1773interests in the future?1774    Admiral Paparo. Vietnam and Indonesia, and India--1775    Mr. Fallon. Yes.1776    Admiral Paparo. --absolutely India above all others.1777    Mr. Fallon. I noticed in India in 2007 they only bought1778about $230 million or so worth of military equipment, and1779today, is neighboring around $24 billion, and it is very1780promising, but they are still playing with the Russians. And I1781get why, legacy systems and such. But they are still buying1782more from Russia. So, we really do need to do--what do you1783think we can do to pull India more towards our sphere, if you1784will?1785    Admiral Paparo. India's security cooperation sales with1786Russia is approximately 30 percent of the gear. No new buys on1787this. It is all buys to maintain the vestigial equipment that1788they had with India. They will continue to treasure their1789nonaligned status, but they will move more and more in1790partnership with the United States and the other market1791democracies, as we move forward.1792    Mr. Fallon. And just for the record, Mr. Chairman, I really1793hope that we do increase our footprint on the Korean Peninsula1794and in Okinawa. I think it is strategically important and1795vital.1796    And I yield back. Thank you.1797    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.1798    The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Hawaii, Ms.1799Tokuda.1800    Ms. Tokuda. Thank you, Mr. Chair.1801    Section 356 of last year's NDAA directed the Department of1802Defense to establish an advanced manufacturing facility to1803support submarine, shipbuilding, and the broader defense1804industrial base in the Indo-Pacific. I was proud to help secure1805this provision and I'm keen to better understand how the1806Department is implementing it.1807    Admiral Paparo, as a primary user of this advanced1808manufacturing program, how does it support your requirement, as1809the combatant commander, and how are you providing direction to1810the Services and other entities to guide ongoing efforts1811related to advanced manufacturing in Hawaii to best support1812your needs?1813    Admiral Paparo. Aloha, Congresswoman. Good to see you.1814    Ms. Tokuda. Good to see you.1815    Admiral Paparo. We are implementing, in partnership with1816Hawaii Community College and on Wheeler Airfield and Schofield1817Barracks, to bring additive manufacturing in order to gain as1818much leverage as we can on the ability on-scene to provide1819replacement capabilities, replacement parts, and to speed up1820our supply chains. And I think this is a model everywhere, is1821to be at the point of need there.1822    And greater investment in these capabilities, additive1823manufacturing aided by AI, is critical to us. I have made it a1824focus, as you know, having been on this mission for a good1825while.1826    And I think one of the biggest barriers to it is going to1827be to ensure that the systems commands quickly assess the1828applicability of those components, and when they are finding1829them wanting, we run to the problem and improve it, and when1830they are adequate, quickly give authorities to employ those1831additive manufacturing capabilities to move faster to repair1832gear and to get it on the line faster.1833    Ms. Tokuda. Thank you, Admiral. I'm sure we will have many1834more discussions on this.1835    Right now, if I can pivot slightly a bit, Admiral, is it1836helpful to your work in the Indo-Pacific when our European1837allies support our deterrence in the Pacific, such as when1838Germany and France conducted Taiwan Straits transits last fall?1839    Admiral Paparo. It is, and I commend our European partners1840for having been especially robust in 2024.1841    Ms. Tokuda. Thank you.1842    And, Mr. Noh, going back to the discussions about whether1843America First means America alone, Mr. Noh, does this1844administration agree that our European and NATO allies have an1845important role to play in the Indo-Pacific?1846    Mr. Noh. Congresswoman, the Department does believe they1847have a role.1848    Ms. Tokuda. Is it an important role that they play--1849    Mr. Noh. It's an important role.1850    Ms. Tokuda. --given that China is our pacing threat?1851    Mr. Noh. It is an important role. However, the Secretary1852has asked our European partners to, first and foremost,1853prioritize European continental security, to do more for their1854own backyard, first and foremost. But we will look for--1855    Ms. Tokuda. So, you see it in a bit of a siloed effect in1856terms of: stick to your region?1857    Admiral Paparo, do you think China is watching our1858commitment in Ukraine? Do you believe China is engaging in the1859European theater--not sticking to their own region? I believe1860just recently Ukraine captured two men of Chinese origin1861fighting for Russia.1862    Admiral Paparo. They did. And any success offensively in1863Europe will embolden the PRC in their own offensive ambitions.1864    Ms. Tokuda. Clearly, we can't disentangle the theaters,1865like perhaps some in the administration might think we can. And1866I would hope that the administration's comments and actions1867going forward would reflect the global impacts, that what1868happens in Ukraine does matter in terms of our ability to1869safeguard the Indo-Pacific and provide stability there.1870    I just want, with the time I have remaining, to go to1871another question. Transactional relationships don't work in1872defense; they don't. Whether you are talking about tariffs1873that's been talked about today or demanding increased burden1874for defense costs, it undermines trust; it undermines1875commitment and our ability to withstand adversity going1876forward.1877    The President has talked about providing our allies even1878with toned-down versions of aircrafts because they may not1879always be our allies. Now, this does not, to me, project1880confidence to people that we want to fight side-by-side us in1881the case of aggression.1882    Admiral Paparo, does this kind of transactional1883relationship that is being projects, and these statements being1884made about providing our allies with substandard aircraft or1885equipment, does this help or hurt us in the Indo-Pacific?1886    Admiral Paparo. Congresswoman, there are operational1887security requirements for those, based on the ability of our1888partners to secure that information. We do our very best to get1889our partners--1890    Ms. Tokuda. But do you feel, in the time I have remaining,1891that transactional relationships are a good foundation for1892defense partners in any region, especially the Indo-Pacific?1893    Admiral Paparo. You know my commitment to authentic1894relationships with our allies and partners.1895    Ms. Tokuda. Thank you very much.1896    Mr. Chair, I yield back.1897    The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady for yielding.1898    The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Guam, Mr.1899Moylan.1900    Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member.1901    I am happy to be here on such an important security hearing1902about my backyard in INDOPACOM and the importance of Guam,1903where it is my home, and to relay to our panel that we feel the1904pressures you do. We feel distress and we understand the threat1905from our adversaries in this region. And I'm so happy you are1906there focusing on that, because Guam is where our day begins.1907We are U.S. soil. We have many allies in the INDOPACOM and we1908are the closest body of land that the United States has to our1909allies. Allies are our friends, but Guam is USA and we are1910family. So, I appreciate your importance in making that1911interest No. 1 for you folks.1912    And part of that, as we grow, we know that the Marine Corps1913is building up, building up in Guam, with our Camp Ben Blaz.1914And that agreement has gone since 2012, when the United States1915and Japan came together, where Japan made an investment. Would1916you have an idea of that investment amount that Japan made for1917that move from Okinawa to help build the Camp Ben Blaz?1918    Admiral Paparo. I believe it is in the neighborhood of $31919billion.1920    I will also say, if I may, sir, hafa adai.1921    Mr. Moylan. Hafa adai.1922    Admiral Paparo. And your backyard is America's front yard1923in the homeland.1924    Mr. Moylan. Amen. Thank you.1925    How about the investments that the United States has made1926thus far for the buildup of the Camp Ben Blaz?1927    Admiral Paparo. I believe the majority of the burden has1928been borne by the Japanese.1929    Mr. Moylan. Okay. And we are still pumping in money to get1930the continuation of getting that built. And there's a great1931investment the island of Guam has done with our infrastructure,1932working closely to ensure our power, our water, our roads are1933built to withstand all this movement coming from Okinawa to1934Guam, the 9,000, or as you mentioned, close to 5,000 marines,1935to facilitate being on Guam. It has a great impact on Guam's1936economy and our community, and we have been focusing on this1937since 2012 and up to the future, and we have still got years to1938go for its completion.1939    So, the concern is, though, there has been made a comment1940by a senior military officer that says possibly the move for1941marines going from Okinawa to Guam was going in the wrong1942direction. But we have already invested since 2012 in the NDAA1943for this investment to happen.1944    So, Admiral Paparo, the Department of Defense, do you feel1945they are still committed to the agreement of the Marine forces1946to move from Okinawa to Guam?1947    Admiral Paparo. Congressman, the DPRI, the Defense Policy1948Review Initiative, remains the program of record and we are1949committed to executing it in a conditions-based manner.1950    Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Admiral.1951    In addition to all this investment with moving the marines1952from Okinawa to Guam, we also have other natural disasters that1953have happened. Specifically, in 2023, we had Typhoon Mawar,1954causing nearly $43 billion in damage to our island.1955    One of the major things that was damaged, also, and is one1956storm away from being completely destroyed, is the Glass1957Breakwater. Investments have been made. Construction is1958happening. But this is the key. This is our only port for our1959supplies that supply our community and our military. If that1960fails, it is total destruction, and that is our only supply1961chain to get these ships unloaded.1962    So, since this is being rebuilt, I would ask you for an1963update on the progress of the project and the estimated1964completion date of the Breakwater repairs.1965    Admiral Paparo. Congressman, to my situational awareness,1966it is on track, but I owe you a more defined answer, and I will1967give that to you in written form. But I believe it is on track.1968It can't happen fast enough for me. But I will give you the1969specifics.1970    Mr. Moylan. I appreciate that.1971    And recently, I was talking to Joint Regional Micronesia1972Admiral Huffman, and he said he watched the rocks being1973replaced with the crane. So, we are moving forward, but I would1974appreciate your updates on that as well.1975    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix1976on page 138.]1977    Just a few more minutes here I have got to ask some1978questions.1979    But we also have some big investments going into the1980repairs in the Air Force. O&M investment is repairs for that.1981One specific thing, the category, when our storm tracker was1982tracking that, it was at a Category 4 of destruction force,1983but, then, it blew away. So, we need all these things to be1984repaired in time to properly prepare for the next battle with1985the next storm, if not our adversaries.1986    So, I want to know--we had some unfunded priority lists--1987how are you looking for that to be funded and what you want1988Congress to help you with your priority list of unfunded1989priorities? We only have 16 seconds.1990    Admiral Paparo. The Guam defense system is first and1991foremost in our mind that, that remain on track and it deliver1992on time for Guam's defense as the homeland.1993    And then, in addition, our improvements to Andersen Air1994Force Base, to the northwest airfield, to those capabilities,1995and the continued improvements to the submarine base are--1996    Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Admiral.1997    Thank you.1998    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.1999    The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.2000Carbajal.2001    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.2002    INDOPACOM is a region of consequence. China, our pacing2003challenge, is obviously there. So are some of our strongest2004allies, like Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Then, there are2005other nations we want to strengthen our relationships with to2006counter Chinese influence.2007    I would argue that actions taken by this administration,2008like cutting off all our foreign aid and imposing severe2009tariffs on multiple nations in the Indo-Pacific, friends and2010foes alike, has significantly diminished our soft power.2011    Admiral Paparo, is soft power important in building and2012maintaining relationships with countries, so we can provide an2013alternative to China?2014    Admiral Paparo. Congressman, soft power is important.2015    Mr. Carbajal. No more?2016    Admiral Paparo. Well, I--2017    Mr. Carbajal. I like that answer, though.2018    Admiral Paparo. I want to just give you something direct2019and plain-spoken. You know, I can't speak to the policy; I2020execute it as a military officer. But soft power is very2021important to us.2022    Mr. Carbajal. As a marine, I understand your answer.2023    Mr. Noh, the same question to you.2024    Mr. Noh. Congressman, yes. Yes, it is important.2025    Mr. Carbajal. Then, why is the administration cutting?2026    Mr. Noh. So, Congressman, on the issue of foreign aid, as2027you know, the State Department has the lead for approving most2028foreign assistance programs. Department of Defense, we fully2029support reviews to ensure that American taxpayer dollars are2030spent to support concrete American interests. We will have2031honest conversations with our allies and partners about what2032America is able to do in the region, but we will absolutely2033make sure, as the Department, that these foreign assistance2034programs are aligned with both the President and the2035Secretary's priorities and policies.2036    Mr. Carbajal. Well, it is contradictory to what this2037President and his administration is doing. So, I appreciate2038your response.2039    Admiral Paparo, do you feel you have the space capabilities2040and support you need in your AOR, including tactical2041surveillance, reconnaissance, and tracking? And what are the2042risks of losing space superiority?2043    Admiral Paparo. We have shortfalls in our air-breathing ISR2044[intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] for persistent2045STARE [Search, Track, Acquire, Radiate, Eliminate], and I would2046like to make up those shortfalls. And space superiority, domain2047awareness, space and counter-space are critical, indispensable,2048and would be the first battle and are critical to determining2049strategic, operational, tactical warning, and gaining early2050leverage. That is the first battle and it is primus et2051principes in ensuring our own capability to deter and to2052prevail.2053    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.2054    China is producing aircraft, ships, missiles, and2055satellites at rates we cannot match. They are closing the gap2056in the quality and systems and have passed us on quantity. Even2057combined with Japan, South Korea, and Australia, their systems2058outmatch ours by numbers. This war is something that we must2059try to avoid.2060    Admiral Paparo, do China's actions from their intense2061procurement of systems to aggressive actions in the South China2062Sea suggest there is a way to continue deterrence? And what can2063the United States and our allies do to detour a conflict with2064China?2065    Admiral Paparo. Congressman, my first comment there is that2066we can match their capability and it is a matter of will, and2067we have to get after it.2068    And second of all is that we can deter them in those areas2069and we have to work towards it. But we have got to preserve our2070combat capability that we have, and then, we have got to build2071the right capabilities at the right time to continue overmatch.2072    And I say that we can match and it is a matter of will not2073as a snarky way, but just as an expression of hope and2074determination.2075    Mr. Carbajal. Admiral, you can always be snarky here. It is2076welcomed.2077    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.2078    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.2079    The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Mr.2080Messmer.2081    Mr. Messmer. Thank you, Chairman.2082    And I would like to thank all the witnesses for their2083service and for being here today.2084    Admiral Paparo, last year, your predecessor was asked about2085the hypersonic threat in your AOR. He stated that hypersonic2086weapons would be a major threat to U.S. Forces in a potential2087conflict in the region.2088    2 years ago, Vice Admiral Jon Hill, the MDA [Missile2089Defense Agency] Director, testified before this committee that2090fielding a defensive system against hypersonic threat in 20352091was irrelevant and didn't meet the threat.2092    Do you agree with that testimony?2093    Admiral Paparo. We have a now threat, sir, and I do agree.2094    Mr. Messmer. Thank you very much.2095    Are you able to satisfy your requirements, when the2096previous administration consistently came to Congress with an2097anemic Missile Defense Agency budget request?2098    Admiral Paparo. Presently, I think the most important2099element is to keep those hypersonic weapons on the rails with2100counter-C5ISR, but I will not admit any complacency about our2101ability to execute that mission.2102    Mr. Messmer. Okay. Thank you.2103    Would you agree that, in the absence of the glide phase2104interceptor, we should look at stop-gap measures?2105    Admiral Paparo. Absolutely, yes, sir.2106    Mr. Messmer. While we are at it, can you comment on how our2107depletion of exquisite effectors in the CENTCOM [United States2108Central Command] AOR against cheap drones is affecting your2109ability to maintain the required magazine depth for your AOR?2110    Admiral Paparo. We should equip our forces in the field2111with the right kind of capabilities that gets the numbers in2112the right way, so that we are not expending capabilities that2113cost millions against something that costs thousands.2114    Mr. Messmer. Yes, I agree.2115    Also, Admiral Paparo, in your testimony, you state that the2116survivable long-range fires are a key priority for your area,2117AOR. When I hear that, I immediately think of hypersonic2118weapons. The Conventional Prompt Strike Program (CPS) is2119intended to provide much-needed long-range strike capability2120for deep in the targets. How important to you is that CPS gets2121deployed to your command on a submarine?2122    Admiral Paparo. Critical on submarines, critical on the2123surface as well for the Army.2124    Mr. Messmer. Okay. Also, the Navy is targeting 2028 for CPS2125to go on Zumwalt. If that program does not come to fruition, is2126it acceptable to wait until CPS is available to be put on a2127Block 5 Virginia submarine?2128    Admiral Paparo. We need the capability now and we need to2129go faster to get it on Zumwalt as well, and get those Zumwalts2130stationed in Hawaii, where they can be on point.2131    Thank you, sir.2132    Mr. Messmer. Perfect. Thank you.2133    You have also previously testified that SLCM-N [Nuclear-2134Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile] enduring forward presence in2135the Western Pacific offers range flexibility and survivability2136to extend deterrence and assurance.2137    Admiral Paparo. Congressman, I strongly endorse the2138acquisition of SLCM-N as soonest availability.2139    Mr. Messmer. Not 2034?2140    Admiral Paparo. ``20-now,'' sir.2141    [Laughter.]2142    Mr. Messmer. Thank you.2143    Has your command defined operational scenarios in which2144SLCM-N could be integrated into your theater operational plans?2145    Admiral Paparo. Yes, sir, and we will continue to do so.2146    Mr. Messmer. Thank you.2147    Also, Admiral Paparo, contested logistics will be critical2148capability to maintain our lethality and resupply not only of2149our forces, but of our allies in the Indo-Pacific. And your2150recent operational energy initiatives have been distracted with2151electrification and solar effects. What changes will you make2152to INDOPACOM's operational energy effects, specifically,2153related to investing in new, more resilient energy2154capabilities, like advanced micronuclear reactors?2155    Admiral Paparo. I'm strongly in favor of providing the2156right kind of energy into the theater and not to be at any2157deficit at all. And if small modular reactors deliver that,2158which I believe they do, I'm strongly in favor of them,2159provided that they are operated safely.2160    Mr. Messmer. Thank you.2161    Also, last year, the Department announced it was cutting2162missile defense sites from 22 to 16 on Guam. Can you explain2163the plan for the committee, where you are in developing and2164implementing those plans?2165    Admiral Paparo. Sir, Guam Defense System tranche one will2166deliver in 2027, and I think to have our Guam Defense System,2167to have the effectiveness of the system be the driver for the2168acquisition, and to look at opportunities for directed energy,2169for electronic warfare, and to not fall in love with the plan,2170but to fall in love with the ability to defend effectively the2171homeland and Guam.2172    Mr. Messmer. Thank you very much. I will yield back the2173rest of my time.2174    The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.2175    The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts.2176    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.2177    Our overall strategy with China is one of deterrence. Given2178the strong support that China has had, critical support, to2179Russia during its illegal and aggressive actions in Ukraine,2180and the fact that, even recently, two soldiers were captured2181who were Chinese--and we will wait to see the implications of2182that, whether it is isolated or what the background is--how2183important is it in terms of deterrence that the United States2184and our allies, over 50 countries that are participating in2185this, be successful in Ukraine and continuous in that effort to2186underscore our deterrence with China?2187    Admiral Paparo. Congressman, I know that China is watching.2188I know China is directly supporting that effort. And I think2189that Russian success will embolden China, and Russian failure2190will give China pause and would enhance our deterrence.2191    Mr. Keating. And also, what effect would it have if somehow2192that 50-country coalition, and the United States not working in2193concert with that 50-country coalition that it has led, have to2194do with our other alliances in the Indo-Pacific, particularly,2195you know, countries like Australia and our Pacific allies as2196well? That kind of fragmentation could be a signal to China as2197well in terms of deterrence.2198    Admiral Paparo. Well, sir, without a comment on policy and2199not having much insight into that coalition, just side-to-side2200insight, the credibility of our alliances and partnerships and2201the credibility of American commitment is critical to our2202alliances and partnerships. And that remains a key and critical2203strategic center of gravity for the United States.2204    Mr. Keating. And how would you assess the evolving threats2205posed by China, Russia, and North Korea, particularly in the2206multi-domain operations, such as cyber and space warfare?2207    Admiral Paparo. I give them great respect, and that great2208respect that I give them deserves a robust dominating response2209from the United States of America. And they have got a lot of2210gain in those domains and we have got to stay on top of it.2211Even North Korea, with the way they operate in the crypto2212markets which requires a lot of attention and the ability to2213thwart that.2214    Mr. Keating. Okay. Well, I just want to thank you for your2215service, all of you.2216    And I yield back.2217    The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.2218    The chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina,2219Mr. Harrigan.2220    Mr. Harrigan. Thank you, Mr. Chair.2221    Gentlemen, thanks for your testimony this morning. Very2222much appreciate it, and I have just got a couple of questions2223for you.2224    One thing I have noticed--and I think we all understand--is2225that the Indo-Pacific is truly the pacing threat and theater2226for strategic competition. That is happening right now. And2227there is no doubt that the lessons that we are learning in2228Ukraine show us that low-cost innovation is starting to2229dominant the battlefield.2230    This is of particular concern for me as we look at China2231because of the discrepancy between what China can produce2232against our dollars versus what we can produce here in our2233country. I think sometimes, most times, when a product is2234purchased in China, and then, sold in the United States, it is2235sold for approximately three to six times, depending on the2236distribution model, what it actually costs to produce in China.2237    So, when we look dollar-to-dollar against what China is2238spending on their defense and what the United States is2239spending on our defense, what we are spending here, actually,2240you can't compare it dollar-for-dollar because those dollars2241are representative of a very different production capacity.2242    And this has me very concerned, particularly with SUAS2243[Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems] and small drones, as we wrap2244in the lessons that we are learning from Ukraine. And I think2245that we have come to a point where we have $2500 drones that2246are truly threatening multi-hundred-million-, if not billion-,2247dollar assets.2248    The ranking member talked about how Russia's Black Sea2249naval fleet has been, in part, scuttled by a force that has no2250navy of its own. Truly remarkable times and incredible threats.2251    80 percent of the Russian casualties that are being caused2252in the Ukrainian theater are being caused by FPV [First-Person2253View] drones. And it is estimated right now that China's drone2254output in 2024 was $29.4 billion, which is at least four times2255the amount of money that the United States is spending,2256obviously, with far lower, by an order of magnitude, unit cost.2257China has continued modernizing its FPV swarm and biomimetic2258drone capabilities.2259    So, I want to talk about the Chinese drone advantage that2260we see today. What threats does China's dominance in the global2261drone market pose for U.S. national security in the event of a2262potential conflict?2263    Admiral Paparo. Congressman, China dominates the drone2264industry, just by dint of their capacity to build them. Many of2265the long-lead critical items that go into any drone are made in2266the People's Republic of China. So, diversifying our supply2267chains in order to ensure that we are not dependent on China to2268acquire the drones that we need to deter China is absolutely2269critical.2270    Mr. Harrigan. General Brunson, do you have anything to add2271for that?2272    General Brunson. Yes, I would, Congressman, and thank you.2273I can see without my glasses that you have served. So, thank2274you for that, sir.2275    One of the things that we want to try to bring to Korea2276is--I think what we might be able to do is to innovate better.2277So, if you are familiar with the Army's Transforming in Contact2278Part 1.0 and 2.0, there is some technology that is being put2279forward now that is going to allow us to 3D print drones. And2280so, we can have our own autonomous swarms that we could go2281counter with.2282    We are also looking to invest in other counter-UAS2283technologies. As we have seen the hardening along the DPRK2284border within the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone], we have got to be2285able to see a bit further.2286    And other things that we might be able to do in order to2287improve our ability to understand our operating environment is2288the use of technologies that already exist that would give us2289the same advantages. High altitude balloons, for example, could2290be used to great effect, in particular, on the peninsula.2291    Mr. Harrigan. Are we doing any of these initiatives at the2292scale we need to do them in order to accomplish your strategic2293objectives that you have been given?2294    Admiral Paparo. I'm dissatisfied with the scale. I'm2295dissatisfied with the speed, and we have to go faster, work2296harder, and get better.2297    Thank you, sir.2298    Mr. Harrigan. Thank you, gentlemen.2299    Mr. Chair, I yield back.2300    The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.2301    The gentleman makes an excellent point, though, about2302China's spending. You cannot compare it dollar-for-dollar with2303the budgets of our country for defense spending or any other2304country. It is not apples-to-apples. And that is just one of2305many illustrations that I am glad that you pointed out.2306    We now turn to the gentlelady from California, Ms. Jacobs.2307    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.2308    And thank you to our witnesses for being here.2309    Mr. Noh, first, I want to turn to you. In your testimony,2310you frequently emphasized the importance of a whole-of-2311government approach to counter Chinese influence in the Pacific2312Islands. Yet, the administration has significantly cut funding2313to USAID and other humanitarian programs that traditionally are2314a part of a whole-of-government, integrated strategy.2315    Building on the question from my colleague Mr. Carbajal,2316can you clearly explain how the reduction in U.S. economic and2317humanitarian engagement undermines our ability to implement2318this whole-of-government approach and directly hands China2319greatly leverage?2320    Mr. Noh. Congresswoman, as I stated earlier, the State2321Department has lead for approving--2322    Ms. Jacobs. I'm not asking about the State Department. I'm2323asking about your testimony about whole-of-government approach.2324    Mr. Noh. So, I would be happy to talk about what the2325Department of Defense is doing in the Pacific Island countries.2326We have extensive engagements in security cooperation programs.2327Under Title 10, Section 333, we work with these countries to2328improve their cybersecurity, enhance their maritime domain2329awareness. We conduct regular exercises. Of course, the focus2330is on posture and warfighting capabilities, but these are2331things that we do with many of these countries.2332    The COFAs, the Compacts of Free Association, that we have2333with three countries, in particular, Palau, the Federated2334States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Marshall Islands,2335that is another big emphasis of the Department. We are doing a2336lot of great work with them.2337    Ms. Jacobs. Yes, I understand all of the work that the2338Department is doing in the Pacific Islands. But your testimony2339mentions ``full-of-government,'' and DOD-only is not a whole-2340of-government approach.2341    Admiral Paparo, in response to a question by my colleague2342Mr. Garamendi, you said that, while review of USAID is ongoing,2343you would advocate for a robust USAID in your AOR. Can you2344expand on why you think USAID funding is so important and how2345it helps you succeed in your overall mission?2346    Admiral Paparo. Our USAID programs, particularly the ones2347that work on necessities--food, water, medical, and critical2348infrastructure--they are key and critical to these poor areas2349and they enable us to compete against the People's Republic of2350China, who operate in the same domains.2351    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you.2352    Now, I want to turn to Taiwan. I think it is important for2353us to recognize what kinds of U.S. actions actually help shore2354up Taiwan's defenses and what kind of actions can contribute to2355escalation and actually make Taiwan less safe.2356    For instance, the training and weapons the United States2357has provided over the years has helped Taiwan's ability to2358defend itself in the event of invasion. And we haven't actually2359seen that spark escalation with the PRC.2360    On the other hand, symbolic types of support like high2361profile visits or Secretary Hegseth's over-the-top rhetoric2362during his recent trip to Panama seem to have a more escalatory2363effect without actually making Taiwan any safer.2364    So, Admiral Paparo, could you discuss ways in which the2365Department is ensuring we are not unnecessarily escalating2366tensions and maintaining open lines of communication with the2367PRC?2368    Admiral Paparo. Congresswoman, the policy enshrined in the2369Three Communiques, the Six Assurances, and the Taiwan Relations2370Act stipulates that defensive services and defensive capability2371shall be provided to Taiwan, while the Department maintains the2372capacity to resist any resort to force that jeopardizes the2373social, political, and economic system of Taiwan.2374    Sticking strictly to that policy and ensuring that that2375policy has the credibility that it requires, what comes to mind2376is the Third Communique from August of 1982, I believe it was,2377which was that those services shall decrease with the2378demilitarization of the Taiwan Straits.2379    And so, being sensitive to affirm the Three Communiques,2380but to also execute them in accordance with the letter and2381spirit that they were initiated with is very important to us.2382    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Admiral Paparo.2383    Mr. Noh, do you believe Secretary Hegseth's very over-the-2384top rhetoric on Taiwan actually aligns with our stated policy2385as the United States?2386    Mr. Noh. Congresswoman, I would disagree that anything2387Secretary Hegseth stated about Taiwan is over the top. He has2388emphasized the importance of reestablishing deterrence and2389doing so in the Indo-Pacific. And the Department is moving with2390urgency and focus to do just that.2391    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you.2392    Deterrence is very important. Things we do that2393unnecessarily escalate without actually making Taiwan any safer2394are the opposite of deterrence.2395    And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.2396    The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady for yielding.2397    The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.2398McGuire.2399    Mr. McGuire. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.2400    And thank you to our witnesses for being here today.2401    Mr. Noh, you are doing a great job. I really appreciate2402what President Trump is doing, what Pete Hegseth is doing, to2403return our military to lethality. We are eradicating the2404divisive ideologies from our military and it is working.2405    What I understand is recruitment is up. And I have spoken2406with soldiers, airmen, and marines, and others around my2407district, and even on the southern border, and morale is way2408up.2409    You know, we wouldn't have a country without our men and2410women in the military. So, for all our servicemembers, all our2411veterans here, thank you for what you do to keep us safe.2412    It is great to see my Navy SEAL brother, Fleet Master Chief2413David Isom, here today.2414    And I see this as a way to continue service to our country.2415    I think we would all agree that we have many threats at2416home and abroad, and you guys have covered a lot of territory2417today.2418    And I would like to talk about aircraft carriers. I would2419like to focus on their role, Admiral, in your area of2420operation, air responsibility. I know you are pleased that the2421USS George Washington CVN-73 has rejoined the forward-deployed2422naval forces in Yokosuka, Japan.2423    I will also note that the USS Carl Vinson CVN-70, the2424French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, and the Japanese2425aircraft carrier Kaga all participated in a recent joint2426exercise in the Philippine Sea.2427    The USS Nimitz CVN-68, our Nation's oldest aircraft2428carrier--I must have been around a while because I remember2429when that came into service nearly 50 years ago--is now2430deployed on what is likely her final deployment and heading2431West.2432    The Secretary of Defense has emphasized the need to restore2433deterrence of our military and to achieve peace through2434strength.2435    How do you see aircraft carriers' role in the deterrence2436mission, especially in the Indo-Pacific area, your area of2437responsibility?2438    Admiral Paparo. Congressman, carriers are absolutely2439critical in the weight of fires that they can bring, which is2440many, many times X almost any other capability. And when2441knitted together with the rest of the Joint Force, they are2442part and parcel of an all-domain force executing every mission2443from ASW [Anti-Submarine Warfare] to strike to air superiority.2444It is a mobile, capable airfield that the enemy would have to2445work very hard to target, and they work hard to target them2446because they are so afraid of them.2447    So, absolutely critical--critical with the Joint Force, not2448at the exclusion of any other force, but in complement to that,2449to achieve those critical missions.2450    The PRC demands information, air, and maritime superiority2451as a pretext for their operations. Aircraft carriers are2452critical to contesting and gaining those superiorities.2453    Mr. McGuire. Well, I certainly support those efforts. And,2454Admiral, I would like to thank you for your response.2455    Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit for the record a2456recent U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings article entitled,2457``Aircraft Carriers: Still Indispensable,'' written by Admiral2458Paparo, that provides an excellent summary of the case for2459aircraft carriers as a cornerstone for our national defense.2460    The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.2461    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix2462on page 128.]2463    Mr. McGuire. All right. Admiral, as well, when you consider2464the potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific, contested logistics2465will be a critical capability to maintain our lethality and2466resupply, not only for our forces, but also our allies in the2467region. Do you share this sentiment?2468    Admiral Paparo. Most strongly. Our adversaries note/believe2469that the Pacific War was built on the ability to sustain, and I2470agree with them.2471    Mr. McGuire. What changes would you make to INDOPACOM's2472operational energy efforts? You know, in my district we build--2473we have a nuclear power plant. We are building a small modular2474reactor. But I believe the world's first microreactor is about2475to come from my district. And how important is that to helping2476you do your job?2477    Admiral Paparo. Sir, accepted, I mean, particularly, the2478incredible efficiency of a nuclear reactor with uranium2479delivering at its own critical levels 3 million megajoules for2480power per kilogram. It is incredibly efficient. It is small,2481modular, and I can't endorse that enough.2482    Mr. McGuire. It sounds great. But what can we do here in2483Congress--I think we are all supportive--but in your words,2484what can we do to better support the warfighters to give you a2485chance to win the fight and come home?2486    Admiral Paparo. Sir, continued funding streams, and if a2487CR, if Continuing Resolutions are a feature and not a bug--I'm2488not making a comment on that--putting the kind of provisions2489within Continuing Resolutions to be able to execute every2490program that we have, and authorities that enable a steady flow2491of funding, which provides a steady flow of predictability for2492the defense industrial base, which enables them to recruit,2493hire, train, retain workforce, so that we can be at full2494capacity.2495    Mr. McGuire. Thank you.2496    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.2497    The chair now recognizes Ms. Strickland.2498    Ms. Strickland. Thank you, Chairman Rogers and Ranking2499Member Smith.2500    I have the honor of representing Joint Base Lewis-McChord,2501home to tens of thousands of active duty servicemembers,2502including the first Multi-Domain Task Force and the future2503elements of the third MDTF [Multi-Domain Task Force], 5th2504Security Forces Assistance Brigade, 1st Special Forces Group,2505and America's First Corps.2506    And it is great to see you, General Brunson. Those stars2507look good on you.2508    All of these things are regionally aligned toward the Indo-2509Pacific theater, and JBLM [Joint Base Lewis-McChord] plays a2510central role in the United States' ability to ensure a free and2511open Indo-Pacific.2512    I'm going to talk about two issues. I will start with2513climate change, and then, the alliances and partnerships of2514AUKUS.2515    Admiral Paparo, how are the U.S. military operations and2516plans being affected by factors like rising sea level, extreme2517heat, and displacement in heavily populated coastal areas?2518    Admiral Paparo. Some of our efforts align our Pacific2519partnership and our operations with the typhoon season within2520the Pacific, so that we can be more ready to respond to2521humanitarian assistance disaster relief. Similarly, many of our2522expeditionary engineering capabilities work on key critical2523infrastructure, particularly through the Pacific Island2524countries. And so, that ability to respond is front of mind.2525    Ms. Strickland. Thank you.2526    Mr. Noh, under President Trump and Secretary Hegseth's2527leadership, DOD is now cancelling programs that do a few2528things: extend range and on-station time; mitigate contested2529logistic challenges, and make our forces more easier to detect2530by lowering thermal signatures--all because these programs also2531happen to have a climate benefit.2532    In his approach, Secretary Hegseth said, quote, ``We do not2533do climate change crap.'' And this approach is actually curbing2534innovation and making us less ready. They don't make us more2535lethal; they don't protect our troops, and they don't help us2536confront a peer competitor.2537    How can the Department prepare for the realities of a2538conflict in INDOPACOM in an environment of censorship where key2539decisions are being made because of a catch phrase, instead of2540the actual benefits that protect our warfighters?2541    Mr. Noh. Congresswoman, the focus of the Department is, and2542will remain, on strengthening our posture and warfighting2543capabilities. And I believe the President's budget, which will2544be released soon, will reflect both the priorities of the2545President and the Secretary's priority of reestablishing2546deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.2547    Ms. Strickland. Okay. So, the three things I mentioned2548specifically--extending range and station time; mitigating2549contested logistics, and making our forces harder to find by2550lowering thermal signatures--are those things actually going to2551happen, even though the Secretary said that this was climate2552change crap?2553    Mr. Noh. Congresswoman, that is an issue I will have to2554take back and follow up with you on.2555    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix2556on page 137.]2557    Ms. Strickland. Okay. So, you don't know?2558    Mr. Noh. I'm not sure, no.2559    Ms. Strickland. Okay. Thank you.2560    Now, I want to switch over to AUKUS. And we know that this2561particular partnership is incredibly important. It prevents2562Chinese malign influence and actually reduces costs for the2563United States.2564    So, Admiral, can you talk about how this partnership has2565already benefitted the United States and what capabilities it2566is delivering to our Australian allies?2567    Admiral Paparo. Congresswoman, first is that it has2568benefitted us in the contributions that Australia has made to2569the defense industrial base, to the amount of $3 billion, in2570order to enhance the submarine industrial base's capability to2571deliver on Pillar One.2572    Second, working towards Submarine Rotational Force Sterling2573would give the United States an Indian Ocean capability which2574is more responsive to the South China Sea and gives us the2575ability to operate submarines with impunity without having to2576go through straits in the Indian Ocean and its approaches2577through the critical Straits of Malacca, of Lombok, and of2578Sunda, among others.2579    And then, on Pillar Two, Australia hits way, way above its2580weight from a cyber standpoint. It does some critical things2581that really complement what we do. So, AUKUS is a winner in2582every way for Indo-Pacific Command.2583    Ms. Strickland. Thank you.2584    And then, Mr. Noh, are there any obstacles that you think2585the United States faces in fully implementing AUKUS, and2586specifically, upholding our partnership, particularly in2587transferring three to five Virginia Class submarines?2588    Mr. Noh. Congresswoman, I think our industrial capacity2589remains a limiting factor. We are able to produce 1.28 Virginia2590Class submarines a year. That number needs to be above two for2591us to both fulfill our own submarine requirements and to2592fulfill our obligations to Australia under Pillar One. So,2593that--2594    Ms. Strickland. Thank you.2595    And you may want to tell your boss that some of the trade2596decisions that are being made actually have--2597    The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.2598    The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Virginia, Mrs.2599Kiggans.2600    Mrs. Kiggans. Thank you, Mr. Chair.2601    And thank you so much to our panelists and for your years2602of service to our great Nation.2603    I have the privilege of representing Hampton Roads, which2604is home to the Atlantic Fleet; also home to East Coast Ship2605Repair and shipbuilding, and just thousands of military2606families and personnel, especially that are Navy members. So, I2607want to focus on the Navy for a few minutes.2608    But, Admiral Paparo, we know that, if conflict were to2609arise in the INDOPACOM area of responsibility, the men and2610women of Hampton Roads would be on the front lines of that2611fight. And I know that we are very focused on the Pacific and2612on the West and on the West Coast, but can you just speak to me2613about the importance of the Atlantic Fleet in your mission in2614the Indo-Pacific?2615    Because we know that when things arise in the Middle East--2616Israel is a perfect example. After October 7th, we sent the2617Ford and the Eisenhower to that region of the world. But the2618Indian Ocean and the Indo-Pacific is not too far away. So, just2619speak to me about the important role of the Atlantic Fleet and,2620specifically, the carrier air wings from Naval Air Station2621Oceana in my district, what that means to your mission.2622    Admiral Paparo. Congresswoman, thank you, also, for your2623service to the Nation as a U.S. naval aviator and those of the2624many members of your family that have served or are serving at2625this very time.2626    And you make a great point, and that point is that all of2627the Joint Force is designed that it must be responsive to any2628threat anywhere; that the rebalance to the Pacific has got to2629have the capability to have the total balance going to the2630Pacific within weeks.2631    And so, presently, in our plans of record, the Atlantic2632Fleet is very well represented in the Indo-Pacific, and not2633just in the Indian Ocean, but in the Pacific itself. It would2634be key and critical and indispensable to combat success.2635    Mrs. Kiggans. And how important to your mission is2636investment in the upkeep of places like our East Coast Master2637Jet Base to provide those carrier air wings?2638    Admiral Paparo. There can be no difference across the force2639from a standardization standpoint about the readiness of the2640facilities to support training and operations. And that is2641precisely because every force has got to be ready to fight the2642pacing threat.2643    Mrs. Kiggans. And so, we currently have F-18 squadrons2644which are great in fulfilling the mission, but are also aging.2645And so, I just want to ask you specifically, how would an F-352646integration help with your mission?2647    Admiral Paparo. F-35s are critical and we cannot make that2648transition fast enough across the force, and F-35s must be a2649part of the Atlantic Fleet in my humble opinion.2650    Mrs. Kiggans. Thank you for that answer.2651    And now, I want to move to shipbuilding. And we continue to2652decommission ships at a rate that far outpaces new2653construction, even as many of these platforms are still2654operational and actively deployed. In some cases, we are2655investing in maintenance and upgrades, only to retire the ship2656as soon as it returns to port from deployment.2657    Given our growing global commitments and the urgent need2658for naval presence, how does this approach make sense, Admiral2659Paparo, and why are we decommissioning ships when we are2660clearly short on capacity?2661    Admiral Paparo. Given the fact that the ship is relevant,2662and given that there is the proper balance of investment in the2663ship, so that the return on investment is right, and getting2664absolutely the most relevance out of the most relevant ships2665until the capacity of the United States is built up, so that2666they can be replaced, I think I'm not a proponent of divest to2667invest. I'm a proponent of make before break. And I would2668prefer not to decommission combat-relevant capabilities until2669its replacement is onboard. So, its sailors and marines can2670properly transfer to that platform and get into the fight.2671    Mrs. Kiggans. Agree. We need all the ships we can get, and2672even an old ship is better than no ship.2673    And speaking again about shipbuilding, I know that when we2674had an opportunity to visit Pearl Harbor, you spoke about the2675fact that, I think it was only 17 percent of your high school2676graduates are attending colleges and universities, and the2677lines of the shipyard for those skilled trade jobs are so long.2678So, what are you doing in Pearl Harbor, in Hawaii, that is2679working; that we might apply to other shipbuilding and ship2680repair locations like Hampton Roads?2681    Admiral Paparo. And so, Hawaii is very unique, in that2682Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard is an incredibly valued profession2683in Hawaii, which confers that there is a waiting list in order2684to get onto the rolls as a shipyard worker. And as a result,2685because of the experience of the shipyard force, Pearl Harbor2686delivers its projects ahead of schedule and usually below2687budget. And that's a great model.2688    And I think outreach in individual communities that2689similarly reflect and model that process where it is a highly2690valued profession, making sure that we keep pace from a pay2691standpoint, that we are not outcompeted for pay for shipyard2692workers, because 90 percent of any organization's hiring2693problems can be solved with pay and applying ourselves--2694    The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.2695    Mrs. Kiggans. Thank you. Thank you.2696    The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from2697California, Mr. Cisneros.2698    Mr. Cisneros. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.2699    And I want to thank our witnesses for being here today.2700    And, Admiral, I want to thank your Fleet Master Chief for2701your career, sir, and everything that you have done for this2702Nation.2703    Chiefs from the Navy, I'm a former naval officer, I can2704tell you one thing, when I left the Navy, I wish I still had--I2705wish I could have taken my chief with me there. The senior2706enlisted are a valuable asset to our military and we need to do2707what we can to make sure that we support them in any way2708possible.2709    I also want to say, just go back to Mr. Courtney's comments2710about the tariffs and what they are doing, Mr. Noh. You know,2711the fact that we have three nations--Japan, South Korea, and2712China--that are coming together because of these tariffs, and2713these are three nations that have a history of contention. You2714may say the tariffs don't affect the military, but it is going2715to have an effect later on in the military. And so, the2716Department of Defense should definitely be speaking up on that2717there because it is going to affect us at some point.2718    General Brunson, I'm going to start with you, sir. We have2719seen the PRC, the DPRK, and Iran provide support to Russia2720during the Ukrainian conflict, supplying soldiers, munitions,2721critical minerals. The strengthening of these relationships2722continues to undermine the security and stability of the Indo-2723Pacific region.2724    What are we seeing in the reverse as far as--I mean, those2725Russia, China supplying materials, technology, and things to2726North Korea? And really, what have we learned from the North2727Korean army with their experience there in Ukraine that is2728going to benefit you and your knowledge?2729    General Brunson. Yes, sir. So, one of the first things I2730would say is I'm looking at and I'm concerned with, more2731importantly, what is coming back versus what is going out.2732    Mr. Cisneros. Uh-hum.2733    General Brunson. I can see very, very well all the things2734that are going out, but coming back is technology. Coming back2735is critical munitions that are coming back there. What is2736coming back is critical materiel which is changing our2737operating environment in a large way.2738    And then, what it is causing us to really do is look at how2739we might counter those things; that we might be able to2740continue to deter them or have Kim Jong Un say, "Not today. Not2741today."2742    And some of that has to do with the posture that we take,2743as we sort of organize ourselves differently within our2744operating environment.2745    And I think that another thing that I'm looking at2746routinely is, how am I communicating those things back out? How2747am I going back to ensure that not only our friends, partners,2748and allies are also witting to this, but how am I communicating2749back with INDOPACOM to ensure that we are able to talk about2750the changes that we might have in our OE [Operating2751Environment] as well?2752    Mr. Cisneros. Have you learned lessons about the North2753Korean army, about how they have been operating and what they2754have been doing in Ukraine that are going to be valuable to2755you?2756    General Brunson. Yes, sir, we most certainly have.2757    Mr. Cisneros. Good. Thank you.2758    Admiral, you know, you and your fellow COCOMs [combatant2759commands] are competing for assets continually, whether it be2760the aircraft carriers, air squadrons, Special Operations2761Forces, Patriot missile batteries.2762    Can you discuss the challenges that you are facing there in2763trying to respond to China's operations while you are competing2764for those assets?2765    Admiral Paparo. Yes, Congressman. Understanding that there2766is a high demand for the global forces is just my job. So,2767mitigating that, when the Department, when the Commander-in-2768Chief makes a decision to shift one capability to another2769theater, and to be able to mitigate for that, sometimes it is2770the substitution of other relevant capabilities. Sometimes it2771is knowing what the response time is of that capability to2772restore it to the Indo-Pacific. All those are important2773factors.2774    And so, our job is to take the policy decisions and to2775mitigate those, to express the risk, and to do our very best to2776restore deterrence and to provide the indications and warnings2777if it has to return to a theater that has more exigent needs.2778    Mr. Cisneros. Okay. With that, thank you very much for that2779answer, Admiral.2780    And I have got about 30 seconds left. So, I'm just going to2781yield my time back. Thank you.2782    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman for yielding.2783    The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.2784McCormick.2785    Dr. McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair.2786    It is great to see you again. First of all, congratulations2787for a well-served career, for a Fleet Command Master Chief,2788just phenomenal. That steely stare just kind of gives me2789flashbacks of when I was on the drill field, just wondering2790what my next fate was going to be. But I have got a coin for2791you in the fine military tradition, when we get done with this.2792I would love you to accept it.2793    You know, Admiral, when I was out there with your command2794recently, you gave the best brief I have ever gotten.2795Literally, I just thought a phenomenal overview of the2796importance of that region--70 percent of the world's wealth2797going through that for trade, 70 percent of the world's2798population, a bunch of military forces. I'm really excited2799about what you bring to the future vision of the military, and2800really what a great visionary you are.2801    And I'm looking forward to working with you, too, General,2802in that really important region. I'm sure we would love to turn2803in our ties for a flight suit or an M4 and go out there and be2804on the point end of the spear, but yet, here we sit,2805determining the fate of the world as we seek it.2806    I'm curious right now with what is going on in North Korea.2807And either one of you can speak on this. The instability of2808that region right now and seeing what their government is2809doing, their former government, their current government, and2810the importance of somebody we fought alongside of, not just in2811Korea, but in Vietnam and other regions. What they can bring to2812the table still and can we count on them in this regional2813conflict?2814    General Brunson. Thank you for the question, sir, and I2815appreciate it sincerely.2816    I can just share with you what I'm seeing there in Korea2817right now. Their system works. That is the first and foremost2818thing I would want everyone to know, is that the Korean system2819works.2820    We will have an election soon. We will have a new2821president. Our Commander-in-Chief recently made a call to the2822acting president of the Republic of Korea, and our military2823relationships are absolutely sound and solid.2824    We most recently exercised in large scale during Freedom2825Shield, one of our largest exercises, which includes the2826Republic of Korea's government as part of the exercise. We had2827some 4,000 marines in the KTO exercising live, virtual,2828constructive, some 51 separate events that went on there.2829    I believe that the situation we find ourselves in right now2830is one where we are going to continue to increase our capacity.2831There was talk earlier of investments being made. I'm very2832pleased with the investments that are being made by the2833Republic of Korea military writ large across their joint force,2834and I'm especially excited about the opportunities that we have2835to collaborate in a combined fashion to produce effects on the2836Korean Peninsula.2837    Dr. McCormick. Fantastic. Yes, as a guy who spent several2838tours over there with the ROK [Republic of Korea] marines,2839knowing their motto ``Pil Sung!'' which means, you know, ``must2840win,'' ``victory,'' they only have one objective. They only2841have one battlefield, one enemy, and if they lose, they are all2842dead. So, I hope they resonate around that message and2843understanding their mission and their importance to us in that2844regional conflict.2845    There's been a lot of questions, Mr. Noh, about the tariffs2846and the impact on the relationships between our countries. I'm2847going to ask you to agree with something I'm about to state.2848Because you say, you know, ``This is not really my field.'' And2849they said, ``But you've got to bring it back to the Secretary2850of Defense. Make sure he understands.''2851    One thing that we all understand, as military guys who have2852seen what everybody understands around the world, is strength.2853It doesn't matter if you are Asian. It doesn't matter if you2854are Arab. It doesn't matter if you are African. It doesn't2855matter if you are Latino. Everybody understands strength. And I2856think if we come from a position of strength, the results are2857obvious.2858    What I have seen with the tariffs is now, for the first2859time in my lifetime, zero/zero tariffs reciprocating from2860Japan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Israel, India, the entire European2861Union, and more to follow. 50 countries coming to the table2862saying zero/zero. Could we ask for a better result in tariff2863negotiations that puts it in a position of strength? Because2864everybody understands fairness, and there's nothing more fair2865than a zero/zero tariff.2866    And it is more beneficial to the United States because we2867have been at a disadvantage all this time, and I think it puts2868us in a position where people understand strength and fairness2869as well as anybody, especially in the Indo-Pacific region,2870where people understand the Bushido. They understand strength.2871They understand fairness. They understand honor. And I think it2872puts us in a very good position. If you have any comment on2873that?2874    Mr. Noh. Congressman, of course, the President emphasizes2875needing to negotiate from a position of strength, and that is2876something Secretary Hegseth strongly believes in as well.2877    Dr. McCormick. I think that pretty much sums it up.2878    I'm out of time at this point. But, once again, to the2879Commander Master Chief, congratulations on a well-deserved2880career ending and we look forward to fine things in the2881afterlife. Semper Fi.2882    The Chairman. All right. The chair now recognizes the2883gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Sorensen.2884    Mr. Sorensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.2885    Good morning. Welcome to our witnesses, Mr. Noh, Admiral2886Paparo, and General Brunson. Thank you for your insights, for2887your leadership, as we face a new realm in the Indo-Pacific.2888    I would like to, first, take a minute to acknowledge2889Taiwan, both as a democracy and a strategic ally. While we work2890to boost our own domestic semiconductor manufacturing2891capabilities, we must ensure that Taiwan is able to contribute2892to our supply chains. Working together to develop new2893technology and innovation means that we work together to make2894both of us secure. That means that we must also remain2895steadfast partners in the region, as China continues to develop2896its offensive power.2897    Mr. Noh, I will begin with you. Last week, President Trump2898announced that he would impose a 32 percent tariff on Taiwanese2899goods. I don't know if that number has changed in the past 152900minutes or not. If we hurt the Taiwanese economy, how can the2901administration demand that Taiwan spend more on its own2902defenses?2903    Mr. Noh. Congressman, the Department is working to2904prioritize our security assistance to Taiwan currently. We are2905leveraging the different tools we have at our disposal, whether2906that is PDI [Pacific Deterrence Initiative]US, FMF [Foreign2907Military Financing], FMS [Foreign Military Sales], or TSCI, the2908Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative.2909    Arming Taiwan and strengthening Taiwan's defense2910capabilities is extremely important for not only the defense of2911Taiwan, but for strengthening our posture and reestablishing2912deterrence. So, we are moving quickly to do that and we are2913committed to doing so.2914    Mr. Sorensen. So, what I am hearing from you is there is2915100 percent connection between Taiwan and the United States2916with this relationship?2917    Mr. Noh. Congressman, the future of Taiwan does matter to2918American interests.2919    Mr. Sorensen. Admiral Paparo, in your written testimony,2920you mentioned how critical our European allies like the UK and2921France are to security in the Indo-Pacific. How important is2922the ``all of the above'' approach to keeping the region secure?2923    Admiral Paparo. Congressman, the more partners and allies2924that demonstrate that they have concurrence on the security2925interests of the world, noting that the world globally will be2926highly, if not completely, affected by conflict in the Indo-2927Pacific, and when a partner demonstrates their expression of2928will by putting key capability in the Indo-Pacific, it confers2929more legitimacy and more leverage on the cause that the Taiwan2930Strait matter shall not be changed by force.2931    Mr. Sorensen. I appreciate that.2932    Mr. Noh, I want to go back to the discussion of North2933Korea. Besides strengthening our force posture in the region,2934how is the Trump administration planning to address North2935Korean aggression and will President Trump be sitting down with2936Kim Jong Un?2937    Mr. Noh. Congressman, on your last question, I cannot speak2938for the President on whether he will do so, but I will focus on2939and explain to you what the Department is doing.2940    North Korea poses a serious threat, not just because of its2941nuclear arsenal, but due to its development of missiles that2942are capable of targeting not only our allies in the region, but2943also the United States homeland. So, we will continue to work2944with our South Korean allies, and, of course, General Brunson2945and our team at USFK [United States Forces Korea], to make sure2946we have a strong deterrence posture to deter the North Korean2947threat.2948    Mr. Sorensen. Both the admiral and the general have2949mentioned in their testimonies that North Korea is seeking2950Russia's help in developing more advanced satellites and2951drones, missiles, and submarines.2952    Mr. Noh, what is being done to prevent coordination between2953Russia and North Korea, especially since we have just found out2954the news yesterday that we have Chinese fighting alongside2955Russians against Ukraine?2956    Mr. Noh. Congressman, I would be happy to have this2957discussion more in-depth in a classified setting. I'm happy to2958follow up there.2959    Mr. Sorensen. Okay. We will do that.2960    And I will yield back the balance of my time.2961    The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.2962    The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr.2963Crank.2964    Mr. Crank. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.2965    Mr. Noh, Admiral, General, thank you all for your service2966to our country. I know each of you has served and I appreciate2967all the years and decades that you have served our country.2968    Admiral--and I apologize, I missed a lot of your verbal2969testimony; we have got another subcommittee and I had 322970amendment votes in that committee, so I'm sorry about that--but2971I'm really encouraged. I did read your testimony. I'm really2972encouraged to see a sizable section of your written testimony2973dedicated to discussing INDOPACOM's collaboration with Space2974Command and how vital intelligence, surveillance,2975reconnaissance, and tracking capabilities are to winning the2976fight.2977    And I fully agree with you when you say, quote, ``Space2978superiority is essential to INDOPACOM's operations across all2979domains.'' Unquote.2980    And I want to start by asking you the same question that I2981have asked all of our combatant commanders. And I understand2982that it is difficult to answer in detail in open forum. But, in2983your opinion, is the space-based threat to the United States2984posed by Russia and China greater, lesser, or the same than it2985was 4 years ago?2986    Admiral Paparo. Sir, Congressman, it is unequivocally2987greater and growing by leaps and bounds for China by year, and2988also, Russia is working very hard on it.2989    Mr. Crank. And we may follow up in closed session a little2990more on that as well.2991    Admiral, you also say in your testimony ``USINDOPACOM2992requires enhanced, ground-based space surveillance networks2993throughout the Indo-Pacific region.'' Can you provide more2994information on the systems or capabilities you need to win the2995fight?2996    Admiral Paparo. Sir, may I please defer to our classified2997session?2998    Mr. Crank. Of course. Thank you.2999    And then, we can talk about some other questions there, I3000guess, in classified session.3001    Will the needs that you have in these areas--and we can3002talk about them more later--will they be reflected in the3003budget request submitted to this committee?3004    Admiral Paparo. Sir, they are reflected in detail in my30051313 report and are provided in detail.3006    Mr. Crank. Okay. Thank you, Admiral. I appreciate it.3007    And I will yield back.3008    The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.3009    The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from New Hampshire,3010Ms. Goodlander.3011    Ms. Goodlander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.3012    And thank you to our witnesses for being here today.3013    Admiral, you are the commander of America's oldest and3014largest combatant command. I just want to begin by talking3015about the threats we face. Can you confirm for us what your3016current assessment is of the top threat to our national3017security that America currently faces in the Indo-Pacific3018region?3019    Admiral Paparo. Congresswoman, the People's Republic of3020China and their capabilities they have built within the3021People's Liberation Army are the biggest threat to the3022security, the freedom, and the well-being of the Nation. Russia3023also has a sizable Pacific fleet with whom they are growing in3024their exercises with the PRC.3025    And, you know, I also acknowledge the threat of North3026Korea, which is significant and growing in cooperation with the3027others, and violent extremist groups as well.3028    Ms. Goodlander. Thank you for that, Admiral, and thank you3029for your testimony on the importance of public shipyards in3030this country.3031    My home state that I am proud to represent of New Hampshire3032plays a central role in our maritime security, and protecting3033the livelihood of our shipyard workers is a top priority for me3034here in Congress.3035    I want to ask you about China's growing aggression in the3036maritime domain. We just saw last month the threat that Chinese3037warships posed to our partner Australia. How should we be3038thinking about China's growing naval capabilities and who will3039our most important partners and allies be in addressing this3040line of threat?3041    Admiral Paparo. Well, thanks for affirming the role of,3042Congresswoman, thanks for affirming the role of public3043shipyards. My dear father was a shipyard worker at a shipyard3044that is no longer in commission. That is what he did for his3045life's work. So, thank you for that.3046    And Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is tops, absolutely tops, and3047we affirm that and we benefit directly from that in INDOPACOM.3048    The People's Republic of China is building six combatants3049per year. They are actively building aircraft carriers and they3050are getting better. They have embarked on a program of nuclear3051ballistic missile attack submarines. They are working on the3052next generation. They are working on nuclear-powered submarines3053in their Shang III series. And they are building at a high3054rate.3055    But as we think about it, too, it is not just navy-on-navy.3056Because when we say all-domain, that is really the capability3057of the entire Joint Force to action that which is threatening3058us and to do so in unison, affecting it across-domain.3059    So, these rates of build are concerning and we have got to3060pace that with the entire Joint Force, but that includes3061significantly increasing our shipmaking capability.3062    Ms. Goodlander. Thank you for that.3063    You have testified that America's network of allies and3064partners is our most significant asymmetric advantage in the3065Indo-Pacific region. We heard testimony yesterday about the3066importance of the role that our support for Ukraine has in3067deterring threats in Europe. Does our support for Ukraine deter3068threats in the Indo-Pacific region?3069    Admiral Paparo. Congresswoman, Russian failure and/or3070Russian success has a direct bearing on the PRC's calculus, and3071they are watching very closely.3072    Ms. Goodlander. So, I want to ask more about how we3073strengthen our partners and allies. I agree with what has been3074said by many of my colleagues in this hearing. I'm very3075concerned about what impacts the global trade war against some3076of our most important allies in the region will have on our3077national security and our national defense.3078    General, I want to ask you about South Korea. You testified3079just a few minutes ago that the South Korean system is working.3080It is in the midst of a constitutional crisis right now. What3081do you see--why is that system working? What have been the most3082important checks in that system for the continuance of South3083Korea's democracy?3084    General Brunson. Briefly, I will say simply that they read3085their rules. They understand the rule of law well. They also3086are following exactly what they said they were going to do:3087they were going to send things to a constitutional court; they3088were going to continue to move forward.3089    What I would like to note is the stabilizing force that the3090military has been in that country. Whether it be wildfires in3091the east or a training incident which affected a great portion3092of the population, the military has been able to do all the3093things that are necessary for that country to give time and3094space for their constitution to do exactly what it said it was3095going to do.3096    The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.3097    The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.3098Gooden.3099    Mr. Gooden. Thank you.3100    And thank you all.3101    Admiral, I have just some brief questions for you about,3102first, artificial intelligence. Successful integration of AI3103and machine-learning into command-and-control functions is a3104key challenge for our military. And near-peer conflict will3105require robust C2 [command and control] systems that cannot3106only ingest massive quantities of data across the kill chain,3107but can also generate operational insight at the tactical edge3108and into night environments.3109    Given the commercial platforms that have been validated by3110INDOPACOM, how are you using commercial capabilities to meet3111these needs?3112    Admiral Paparo. Congressman, we are in run at USINDOPACOM3113as an AI-enabled headquarters, not to replace human judgment,3114but to augment it. And so, the employment of AI models--I won't3115tell you what the names of them are, just in the interest of3116ethics--in conjunction with cutting-edge command-and-control3117systems, and then, linking both our Top Secret databases, our3118Secret databases, and its own open-source learning models, from3119which there is a rich data field, is enabling us to make better3120decisions faster at the strategic level, at the operational3121level as we link the functions of command-and-control,3122information, intelligence, movement, maneuver, fires, security,3123and protection.3124    And this has got to take place at the strategic level for3125decision-making, operationally in linking those functions, and3126on the tactical edge from swarming capabilities, just to3127increase the efficiency and the effectiveness of the force that3128we have far above what our adversaries can.3129    Mr. Gooden. Do you feel like we are ahead of the curve in3130that respect?3131    Admiral Paparo. You pay me to be never ahead of the curve.3132And so, I never view that we are ahead of the curve. I think we3133are doing some cutting-edge things. I know that our adversaries3134are working on it, too, and you pay me to do those things3135better and faster than the other guys do.3136    Mr. Gooden. Thank you.3137    I still want to keep visiting, changing course here. In3138October of 2023, the Defense Logistics Agency conducted a3139wargames simulation known as CAMOLAND, and that demonstrated3140severe domestic production capability gaps in the clothing and3141textile supply chain. And the wargame also showed that DLA3142[Defense Logistics Agency] stockpiles were unable to fully3143mitigate wartime demand and would have resulted in the military3144personnel lacking uniforms, combat boots, and the corresponding3145physical protection.3146    There was language in the 2025 year NDAA directly DOD to3147expedite this Presidential Determination that action needed to3148be taken, and DOD has not requested a PD [Presidential3149Determination] for items such as American-made body armor,3150ballistic helmets, ballistic plates, and organizational3151clothing, and individual equipment.3152    And I know I'm catching you off guard perhaps. So, we can3153visit offline if we need to. But, as a combatant commander, can3154you explain the impacts to your ability to conduct operations3155or even execute an operation plan in your AOR without the3156materials and resources, as discovered by the CAMOLAND wargame?3157And if a Presidential Determination is granted allowing DLA to3158use DPA [Defense Production Act] Title III funds to help the3159defense textile industrial base capacity, would that give you3160the flexibility needed in your operational planning?3161    Admiral Paparo. Congressman, from a wargaming standpoint,3162bad news is good news because we act on it and we run to the3163problem. As I have discussed earlier in my testimony, World War3164II was won every bit as much on our ability to supply, to3165sustain the force, as any. We frequently overlook items that we3166take for granted. This is why we do wargames. And we embrace3167that data and it is our duty to act on it.3168    Mr. Gooden. Well, I just want to thank you all. I'm very3169impressed. And thank you for all you are doing for our Nation.3170Keep up the great work.3171    Thank you. Yield back.3172    The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.3173    The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Maryland, Ms.3174Elfreth.3175    Ms. Elfreth. Thank you, Mr. Chair.3176    Thank you for your service and thank you for being here3177today in this candid conversation.3178    I would like to follow up on some questions started by my3179colleague from Virginia, Mrs. Kiggans, and Ms. Goodlander here.3180I'm really grateful to be on a committee that has a bipartisan3181focus, particularly on shipbuilding. But equally important to3182shipbuilding and our economy is the workforce that we3183discussed, but also ship maintenance and repair. Particularly,3184I don't know if you can do your job if we don't have a3185thoughtful strategy on repair.3186    So, I would like to focus there. Admiral, you mentioned3187earlier today about the defense industrial base and how we need3188to liberate long lead times of supply chains. And I kind of3189want to dig into this, as we are also talking about acquisition3190reform here that is much needed.3191    Can you walk us through how you are advising big Navy to3192better balance the need to have a robust investment stateside3193in our domestic shipyards, while also ensuring that our ships3194can be maintained in a potentially contested environment in3195INDOPACOM?3196    Admiral Paparo. Congresswoman, good morning.3197    I think there are four drivers to shipyards not meeting3198rate, and it is new, unpredicted work. It is having to rework3199systems. It is the workforce efficiency and the availability of3200on-hand supplies. And we have to get better and faster, more3201data-centric; use AI tools in order to anticipate problems and3202to do the data analytics to get better.3203    Number 2, we need a steady funding flow, so the downstream3204suppliers can lead the long lead times.3205    We need a diversification of the downstream suppliers.3206Particularly, take advantage of the promise of AI-enabled3207additive manufacturing. And I have gone to places in Torrance,3208California, where I have just seen some cutting-edge stuff.3209    And we have to quickly certify those systems in order to3210move faster.3211    So, steady funding; database orientation to fixing our3212problems in those four fields; diversifying our downrange3213supply chain, and getting faster, getting simpler at the3214technical warrant holders in order to get to that.3215    Ms. Elfreth. That is very helpful.3216    I want to talk about prepositioning of equipment,3217particularly, again, since you are far away from most of any3218shipyard domestically adjacent. So, it is my understanding3219that, of late, the military has done a better job or made3220progress on prepositioning of equipment and parts at bases and3221depots in your region, but across the world.3222    But just yesterday--and I don't mean to catch you off3223guard; I would just love your genuine feedback here--the Army3224issued a stop work order on efforts to maintain these3225prepositioned stocks, the hard-to-get supplies for various3226reasons here.3227    How critical is your ability to have this prepositioned3228equipment to your ability to operate during a conflict,3229particularly in a high area denial environment?3230    Admiral Paparo. Prepositioning is what gains you leverage3231on the initial deployment of capability. And so, the speed of3232getting capability there, to get that head start on that,3233everything in the 21st century moves much, much faster. So, the3234more relevant gear that we can get forward, the better.3235    You are likely talking about Army Prepositioned Stock 3.3236And on that front, I work closely with the Department on the3237Army as well about identifying what are the really relevant3238air, missile, space, maritime capabilities, because the Army3239does play in the maritime game, that should be prepositioned.3240And how are we gaining the authority to position those in3241places, so that we can respond to that change?3242    And so, I think it is an ongoing process, as we make those3243calculations. I prefer that it was mission reasons why we3244didn't versus fiscal reasons. And I work very closely with the3245Services to advocate that the only reason that we don't3246position something forward is for reasons of mission and not to3247save a buck. Because, you know, INDOPACOM is not the place to3248go for your savings.3249    Ms. Elfreth. Right. And also, preparedness will ultimately3250save us money down the road.3251    Admiral Paparo. Save us money, lives. Lives, capability,3252people, and time--3253    Ms. Elfreth. Thank you.3254    Admiral Paparo. --in that order.3255    Ms. Elfreth. Thank you.3256    With my remaining seconds, Mr. Noh, I want to follow up on3257my colleague from Hawaii's conversation. I represent the U.S.3258Naval Academy in Annapolis, which is going to be underwater in3259a matter of decades. Now, thankfully, the Navy is preparing for3260that, but I also would be remiss if I did not urge this3261administration to take seriously the rising tides that are3262coming, not just for the Academy, but across our installations.3263    And with that, Mr. Chair, I yield my time back.3264    The Chairman. The gentlelady yields back.3265    The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.3266Vindman.3267    Mr. Vindman. Thank you, Mr. Chair.3268    I have the privilege of being last. And I congratulate you3269all on sitting through this long hearing. And thank you for3270your service.3271    And Fleet Master Chief, I congratulate you on your upcoming3272retirement. It is great to serve, but it is also great to be3273retired.3274    China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran represent decades-long3275alignment of leading authoritarian states. They represent,3276really, the antithesis of American values and ideals in many3277ways.3278    Recently, Iran has been weakened in its Middle East3279conflict with Israel, and Russia in its protracted engagement3280in Ukraine--so much so that they could not reinforce their3281bases in Syria and had to mostly withdraw.3282    Admiral Paparo, does this axis of authoritarians3283demonstrate an increased threat environment inside and outside3284of INDOPACOM, including to our homeland?3285    Admiral Paparo. Congressman, unequivocally, yes.3286    Mr. Vindman. Does helping Ukraine remain a strong,3287sovereign, independent country weaken Russia in this axis?3288    Admiral Paparo. Sir, Russia's failure and/or Russia's3289success will have a direct correlation on deterrence in the3290Pacific, and Russia is a significant threat in the Indo-3291Pacific.3292    Mr. Vindman. And I agree, and I think it is the best3293observable way to weaken Russia, rather than trying to entice3294them with some sort of carrot approach.3295    In fact, this weakening of this axis, two members of the3296axis, comes at no cost to American servicemember lives,3297although there have been Americans that have gone over and3298volunteered and, tragically, lost their lives in Ukraine, but3299it does come at a cost in material and treasure. And as a 25-3300year Army vet, that is what I call a good deal.3301    So, Mr. Noh, unlike the United States, there's no daylight3302between China's commercial and military sectors. They are one3303and the same in many ways. You mentioned to my colleagues that3304you don't look at tariffs. However, the military and commercial3305sectors are intertwined. Then, in your role, and certainly the3306Secretary, must take the impact of tariffs into consideration.3307    I mean, I think back on history and the U.S. oil embargo on3308Japan in the prelude to War World II and Japan's attack on3309Pearl Harbor.3310    In your assessment, does this constitute a major escalation3311with China and escalate military tensions?3312    Mr. Noh. Congressman, I will talk about what I know and3313what I have been working on, which is that the Department has3314been moving quickly, at the direction of our Secretary of3315Defense, to strengthen our posture, to strengthen our alliances3316and partnerships with our allies and partners throughout the3317region; to reestablish deterrence, and to deter China. So, we3318have been doing so and we will continue to do so.3319    Mr. Vindman. So, I mean, has the Department conducted a3320risk assessment of the administration's tariffs impact on the3321risk of additional conflict or potential conflict with China?3322And does the Department have--will the Department do so?3323    Mr. Noh. Congressman, I'm not sure if the Department has3324conducted such an assessment. That is something I can take3325back--3326    Mr. Vindman. Okay.3327    Mr. Noh. --and report back.3328    Mr. Vindman. I encourage you to do so.3329    If we are choking them off economically, and they have3330already indicated an intent to seize Taiwan, it seems like we3331might be further driving them into an aggressive posture3332against us. So, it is something we should look at, certainly,3333from the Department's perspective.3334    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix3335on page 138.]3336    Now, looking at the impact of tariffs on our partners, we3337are asking our partners to raise their spending to 5 percent.3338If at the same time we are looking at the risk of a global3339recession and a U.S. recession, what are the chances that they3340are going to be able to increase their spending in a3341recessionary environment?3342    Mr. Noh. Congressman, Secretary Hegseth has communicated3343the message, not only during his visit to the Indo-Pacific in3344Japan and the Philippines, but when speaking with counterparts3345throughout the region, that they need to step up and do more.3346    Mr. Vindman. And I understand that, but what I'm asking you3347to do--and you may not be prepared to answer this now, and I3348don't have much time left--but I encourage you to look at what3349the imposition of these tariffs does to the request to increase3350military spending.3351    So, thank you and I yield back.3352    The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.3353    The chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina,3354Mr. Davis.3355    Mr. Davis. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.3356    And I believe I might get to be the last one today before3357you.3358    But thank you so much for your patience and being before us3359today, to Admiral Paparo, to General Brunson, and to Mr. Noh.3360    Any deterrence or offensive maneuvers in the Indo-Pacific3361region require a resilient and modernized amphibious fleet.3362Newport News Shipyard, with great hope for revitalizing the3363domestic shipbuilding industry, employs more than a thousand3364residents, and that is the 1st Congressional District. We go3365right across the line and this becomes a very important3366pipeline for us.3367    And I have listened and heard your remarks. And so far,3368when we talk about workforce, data, AI, you know, looking for3369steady funding flow, going through the certification process--3370in all the concepts and ideas, as you reflect on where we need3371to be, what would you say is the greatest challenge, if there3372is one or two?3373    Admiral Paparo. For manpower, sir?3374    Mr. Davis. Yes.3375    Admiral Paparo. The greatest challenge is pay. It is being3376able to outcompete other employers that match the work, and the3377work is not as arduous, as tough. And so, when we are competing3378with a job that is just not as hard on the--you know, I just3379say shipyard work is hard trade work and you can't compete with3380a services-type industry on equal pay.3381    Mr. Davis. I just want to follow up. How is INDOPACOM3382partnering with, for instance, TRANSCOM to balance older,3383foreign-made vessels with procuring new ships to maximize3384sealift capability?3385    Admiral Paparo. Well, first, we collaborate--as Military3386Sealift Command, the component of TRANSCOM, we hire out CONSOL3387[consolidated cargo operations] tankers to be able to hire3388commercial providers to be able to take up some of that3389capability. We hire out commercial air services to execute3390tanking airborne. And we do a great deal of movement via3391contracted air.3392    But in the unforgiving hour, the best way that we are going3393to be able to get to contested areas is with gray hauls and3394gray tails for our ships and for our aircraft.3395    Mr. Davis. Yes. Well, I want to again thank the witnesses3396for being here.3397    And, Mr. Chair, we are going to yield back the balance of3398the time.3399    The Chairman. The gentleman yields.3400    The chair now recognizes the ranking member.3401    Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chair.3402    I just wanted to follow up a little bit on some of the3403earlier comments around the tariff thing--not trying to be3404excessively argumentative, but I'm curious about the answer to3405this question.3406    So, the premise that was given us is that, basically, the3407reason we are doing all the tariffs is we have bad3408relationships with all of these countries; that they are using3409us, in essence. It is not a mutually beneficial relationship.3410It is one where we are giving too much and they are taking too3411much. And that is at least a theory.3412    But I'm just curious, General Brunson, you work with South3413Korea. Do you view our relationship with South Korea as3414mutually beneficial or do you think they are taking advantage3415of us?3416    General Brunson. Congressman, I view it as mutually3417beneficial.3418    Mr. Smith. Thank you.3419    And, Admiral Paparo, it is tougher with you because you3420have got a whole bunch of different countries to worry about.3421But is there a country out there that you think is taking3422advantage of us, that we are partnering with in Australia, the3423Philippines, Japan, Taiwan, any of these places? Or do you view3424our relationships with these countries--right now, you know,3425prior to all the current contested stuff--is it mutually3426beneficial or are we being taken advantage of?3427    Admiral Paparo. Ranking Member, from my seat with the3428military instrument, it is mutually beneficial.3429    Mr. Smith. And, Mr. Noh, I know you docked all of this3430because, you know, DOD doesn't put tariffs in place, but it is3431a whole-of-government thing, as you said in your statements,3432and diplomacy, development, certainly trade and business is an3433important part of it. It impacts your job. I mean, it clearly3434impacts it. If we have an antagonistic relationship with a3435country in Admiral Paparo's region, I would trust that you3436would think about that.3437    I mean, what you do about it is highly debatable. But it is3438not really your answer that tariffs and trade relationships3439have nothing to do with our national security interests or with3440the Department of Defense's mission in the Indo-Pacific, is it?3441    Mr. Noh. Ranking Member, I will speak to what I know, which3442is the defense relationship that we have, the relationships we3443have with our allies and partners throughout the region. In3444that regard, we have strong, very strong relationships. And3445like I indicated earlier, the engagements that I have3446personally had, that I have seen the Secretary have with his3447counterparts, all indicate that we have very strong3448relationships and--3449    Mr. Smith. So, you would not say that we are being taken3450advantage of by these countries? You would view the3451relationships, much as Admiral Paparo and General Brunson have3452said, as mutually beneficial?3453    Mr. Noh. I will say two things, Ranking Member.3454    Mr. Smith. Sure.3455    Mr. Noh. One, they are mutually beneficial, but, two, our3456allies and partners absolutely need to do more. And that means3457spend more. That means buy more of the right capabilities to3458strengthen our deterrence posture. So, there is absolutely more3459that they can be--3460    Mr. Smith. Do we need to do more?3461    Mr. Noh. Oh, we all need to do more, Ranking Member.3462    Mr. Smith. So, it is a mutually beneficial relationship?3463    And the last thing--and I know you are in an acting3464position; I confess, I didn't look to see if somebody has been3465picked yet for your position--so, I know you are not going to3466be there in a little while.3467    But, for everyone listening, for everyone involved, it is3468just not an acceptable answer for the Department of Defense to3469say, ``Well, that's not us. We're not paying any attention to3470it.''3471    And I'm not going to pin you down whether or not you3472support it or not, but it definitely is connected to our3473mission in the region, to have all of this interrelated, and it3474really frightens me to think that you are like, ``Well, the3475State Department is doing their thing. You know, the trade3476folks are doing their thing, and we're over here and we really3477don't pay any attention to them.'' That is not the right3478approach. It definitely needs to be more interrelated with3479that.3480    And I thank the chairman for his indulgence, and I yield3481back.3482    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.3483    The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from South3484Carolina, Ms. Mace.3485    Ms. Mace. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.3486    And I want to thank our witnesses for being here today.3487    The Indo-Pacific region is a dynamic region strategically3488critical to the United States, as you all know, and our3489national security. China's rapid military expansion,3490significant advances in technology and cyber warfare, and its3491aggressive pursuit of economic and political influence3492represent its very aggressive and calculated effort to reshape3493the region and to displace the United States. We now recognize3494that a formidable adversary is systematically working to3495undermine our influence and reshape the region.3496    President Trump is committed to ensuring peace through3497strength, and Congress must act to ensure the Department is3498resourced to meet the challenges we face. Through increased3499capabilities and robust partnerships, we will create a network3500of deterrence that can effectively counterbalance the CCP's3501malignant goals.3502    And dare I say we have a President who is the strongest3503President we have seen in my lifetime who can stand up to Xi3504Jinping, stand up to Communist China, and the threats that they3505are pursuing against the United States and our allies.3506    The challenges we face in the Indo-Pacific region are not3507fleeting. We have to respond with a comprehensive, whole-of-3508government approach. Our strategy must be defined by3509preparedness, innovation, capability, and also, swiftness,3510decisive action, being nimble, being fast, which is something3511we need to work on these days, as you all know.3512    The PLA has made significant progress towards fielding a3513joint force that is capable of challenging the United States in3514every domain. So, my first question is to Admiral Paparo today.3515    There have been many reports on the staggering pace of the3516PLA's navy shipbuilding activities. How does the U.S.3517shipbuilding measure up?3518    Admiral Paparo. Congresswoman, the PLA is building surface3519combatants at the rate of six per year. The United States is3520building surface combatants at the rate of 1.6 per year.3521    PLA is building two submarines per year. The United States3522is producing 1.28 presently, attack submarines per year. We are3523working on Columbia-Class SSBN [nuclear-powered ballistic3524missile submarine]--3525    Ms. Mace. How does the quality of the Chinese manufacturing3526of their naval ships and submarines compare to the United3527States?3528    Admiral Paparo. I think from a capability stand--3529    Ms. Mace. Uh-hum.3530    Admiral Paparo. --just numerically, they are not as capable3531on range. You know, the SM-2 [Standard Missile-2], SM-33532[Standard Missile-3], SM-6 [Standard Missile-6] dominates their3533capability. The Tomahawk Land Attack Missile dominates their3534capability.3535    Our sonars are better. SPY-6 radar is going to be a better3536radar. Our ships are more capable from a tonnage standpoint.3537They are more capable from a weapons standpoint and in the3538electromagnetic spectrum.3539    Ms. Mace. And then, in the event of a conflict, do we have3540sufficient naval yard capacity to repair and refit our vessels?3541    Admiral Paparo. I assess we do not, Congresswoman.3542    Ms. Mace. And what do we need? I mean, how quickly do we3543need to move on that?3544    Admiral Paparo. We need to fire up more shipyards and we3545need to fire up more shipmaking capability, unequivocally.3546    Ms. Mace. How would you rate the PLA's ability to conduct3547joint operations between the air and naval forces with the3548First Island Chain?3549    Admiral Paparo. Inferior to the United States in every way,3550working to get better every single day, and I see the palpable3551progress.3552    Ms. Mace. And how does that affect their anti-access/area3553denial strategy?3554    Admiral Paparo. They get better at it and it requires me to3555counter it, us to counter it more effectively. But they are3556getting better at it. They are proliferating more and they are3557getting more and more joint in their exercises, and more3558farther afield.3559    Ms. Mace. And we have all seen them. They engage in3560destabilizing behavior in the South China Sea, as they seek to3561advance expansive territorial claims. It has increasingly3562resorted to non-militarized tactics to bully their neighbors.3563    Mr. Noh, how is the Department working with partners to3564increase their capability to withstand the CCP's coercive3565actions in the South China Sea?3566    Mr. Noh. Congresswoman, we are doing a great deal in the3567South China Sea to work with our allies and partners to3568strengthen our posture, to enhance their capabilities.3569    I think one good example is the Philippines.3570    Ms. Mace. Uh-hum.3571    Mr. Noh. We are conducting monthly bilateral operations3572with the Philippines. We provide them ISR support.3573    Ms. Mace. When did we increase that, the joint operations?3574How long has that been going on, the increased frequency with3575them?3576    Mr. Noh. The exact timeline, Congresswoman?3577    Ms. Mace. Uh-hum.3578    Mr. Noh. I will have to get back to you on that.3579    Ms. Mace. Yes, sir.3580    Admiral Paparo. Congresswoman, we have greatly expanded the3581Balikatan series, the Salknib series, the Archipelagic Defense3582Continuum series, and we are working towards heel-to-toe3583exercises with the Philippines at greater numbers and with3584greater joint and combined capability, and bringing in more3585partners--Japan, Australia, among others.3586    Ms. Mace. And it seems you are being more effective,3587particularly the last 2 years, I would argue.3588    But thank you so much, gentlemen, for being here today.3589    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.3590    The Chairman. The gentlelady yields back.35913592    This concludes the open portion of this hearing. We will3593reconvene in room 2212 at 1:15.3594    This hearing is adjourned.3595    [Whereupon, at 1:06 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]3596=======================================================================35973598                            A P P E N D I X35993600                             April 9, 202536013602=======================================================================36033604              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD36053606                             April 9, 202536073608=======================================================================36093610    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]36113612=======================================================================36133614                   DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD36153616                             April 9, 202536173618=======================================================================36193620   [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]36213622=======================================================================36233624              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING36253626                              THE HEARING36273628                             April 9, 202536293630=======================================================================36313632            RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI36333634    Admiral Paparo. USINDOPACOM relies heavily on USTRANSCOM to3635coordinate the massive logistics network necessary to support3636our operations across our area of responsibility. We cannot3637project forces without USTRANSCOM's partnership. Our amphibious3638fleet provides essential capabilities, but USTRANSCOM's ability3639to leverage military assets and commercial partners through3640programs like the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, Voluntary Intermodal3641Sealift Agreement and Maritime Security Program ensure rapid3642deployment and sustainment of our forces both in peacetime and3643conflict. This partnership with the Department of3644Transportation, USTRANSCOM and their commercial carriers is3645critical for day-to-day operations and will be heavily relied3646upon in contested environments.  [See page 18.]3647                                ------36483649            RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HOULAHAN36503651    General Brunson. Representative Houlahan, thank you for3652raising this important question. While this question has been3653redirected to the Army's Legislative Liaison, I welcome the3654opportunity for a future discussion.  [See page 24.]3655                                ------36563657              RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON36583659    Admiral Paparo. China's aggressive investment in electronic3660warfare capabilities across the Indo-Pacific creates a growing3661challenge for the region. We need enhanced electronic warfare3662capacity, including platforms like the EA-37, to effectively3663counter this threat and maintain our competitive advantage.3664Although the EA-37 modernization program provides critical non-3665kinetic capabilities, acquiring only ten EA-37s to replace3666fourteen EC-130Hs will not fully address the growing electronic3667warfare requirements in the Indo-Pacific. Bolstering our3668overall capacity in this area remains essential for ensuring3669spectrum dominance.  [See page 25.]3670                                ------36713672           RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STRICKLAND36733674    Mr. Noh. The Department is focused on strengthening our3675posture and warfighter capabilities. The Department remains3676committed to improving the resilience of military3677installations. Additionally, energy resilience is key to3678maintaining the readiness of our installations and force3679projection capabilities. We continue to identify energy3680resilience gaps for critical missions and prioritize3681investments for addressing risks to capabilities critical for3682readiness.  [See page 43.]3683                                ------36843685             RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOYLAN36863687    Admiral Paparo. Phase 1 of the $571 million Glass3688Breakwater repair project in Apra Harbor commenced April 1st,3689ahead of schedule. This initial phase includes relocating 10-369015-ton armor stones to create a temporary protective barrier.3691Crews will then install 42-ton interlocking concrete armor3692units to ensure long-term stability. The project is expected to3693be complete by July 2029. As repairs continue, there will be3694incremental improvements in the resiliency of the breakwater3695over time. We will continue to assess the condition of the3696breakwater as repairs proceed, and work to capitalize3697opportunities to accelerate construction efforts where3698possible, prior to the estimated completion date of July 2029.3699[See page 32.]3700                                ------37013702             RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. VINDMAN37033704    Mr. Noh. To my knowledge, the Department has not conducted3705such an assessment. The Department of Defense is committed to3706reestablishing deterrence and prioritizing efforts to deter3707China.  [See page 56.]37083709=======================================================================37103711              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING37123713                             April 9, 202537143715=======================================================================37163717             RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON37183719    Mr. Wilson. Mr. Noh, in your testimony you stated how the US and3720South Korea have deepened their cooperation in the industrial base and3721other areas. You also stated that the US has relied on South Korea for3722some pilot projects, such as support ship maintenance, repair, and3723overhaul.3724    Does the Department foresee expanding these types of projects with3725South Korea and our regional partners? Do you believe the US will3726expand the number and types of ships for maintenance and repair in3727foreign ports?3728    Mr. Noh. The United States and South Korea have continued to expand3729defense industrial cooperation, particularly on maintenance and3730logistics of U.S. military assets. We have a long history of sustaining3731U.S. air platforms in South Korea under the Special Measures Agreement3732(SMA) and are actively expanding the scale and scope of these efforts.3733We have also increased the number of co-sustainment initiatives under3734the Regional Sustainment Framework to include additional air and sea3735assets. Recently, South Korea successfully demonstrated its capacity3736and capability to efficiently perform maintenance, repair, and overhaul3737on U.S. naval vessels by conducting repairs on the USNS Wally Schirra3738and the USNS Yukon. We will continue to explore maintenance and repair3739opportunities with our allies and partners that are consistent with the3740Administration's America First policies and the Executive Order on3741Restoring America's Maritime Dominance.3742    Mr. Wilson. Integrated Air and Missile Defense in the Indo-Pacific3743is vital to protecting our bases and infrastructure as well as3744deterring against regional aggressors like China and North Korea. Last3745year, the Missile Defense Agency conducted a successful missile3746interception from Guam. This is part of the Guam Defense System that3747provides 360-degree defense for Guam against various missile and air3748threats.3749    Admiral Paparo, with the Guam Defense System in progress, are3750options being considered to add more anti-air systems in the region,3751especially with China's continuous development and integration of3752hypersonic and advanced missile capabilities?3753    Admiral Paparo. While the Guam Defense System's Increment 1 is3754scheduled for 2027, we continue to explore additional kinetic and non-3755kinetic defensive capabilities. This would include a comprehensive3756approach to develop and field effective layered missile defeat3757capabilities. My preferred defense against hypersonic weapons uses3758counter-C5ISR to keep them "on the rail," but we continue to explore3759developing defensive capabilities.3760    Mr. Wilson. Admiral Paparo, I am grateful to hear of the work being3761done by Secretary Hegseth and yourself to improve defense cooperation3762with our allies in the Indo-Pacific. Especially with the recent news3763that we will be deploying the NMESIS anti-ship missile system to the3764Philippines for an exercise. Can you explain the importance of3765expanding our cooperation with our allies in the region? Are there3766obstacles that are preventing us from doing so in the region?3767    Admiral Paparo. Our alliances in the Indo-Pacific bolster3768legitimacy and deterrence, add key capabilities and capacity, provide3769essential access, basing, and overflight rights, enabling power3770projection across multiple domains, and fundamentally provide our3771strongest asymmetric strategic advantage. While we have strong ties3772with our treaty allies, some potential partners gravitate toward3773China's economic influence, and India's defense relationship with3774Russia presents a challenge despite its growing partnership with us. We3775must actively strengthen all our relationships, remaining vigilant3776against adversaries who attempt to undermine them through coercion and3777encroachment.3778    Mr. Wilson. Admiral Paparo, in your statement you said space3779superiority is essential to our operations across all domains. With our3780adversaries expanding their space and counter-space capabilities, the3781US must not fall behind.3782    Can you explain some of the current capabilities that our3783adversaries possess in the region?3784    Admiral Paparo. China and Russia have devoted considerable economic3785and technological resources to growing all aspects of their space and3786counter-space programs. Operational capabilities include a range of3787satellites for intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance;3788communications; and precision navigation and timing. North Korea has3789very limited capabilities. China and Russia also possess advanced3790counter-space capabilities including direct-ascent anti-satellite3791weapons, co-orbital threats, directed energy weapons, and advanced3792jamming systems, often in both fixed and mobile configurations.3793                                 ______37943795             RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN3796    Mr. Wittman. The Navy has established one unmanned surface vessel3797squadron and is in the process of establishing a second squadron to3798operate and maintain small unmanned surface vessels (sUSVs). You have3799previously commented on the need for unmanned platforms for area denial3800operations in the event of a conflict in the Western Pacific. How do3801autonomous vessels, specifically sUSVs, factor into the U.S. Indo-3802Pacific Command's strategy for countering China in the Pacific? What is3803the plan and timeline for fielding these capabilities to meet demand3804and operational requirements?3805    Admiral Paparo. Small unmanned surface vessels (sUSVs) are crucial3806to some of our denial operations concepts, which use coordinated3807unmanned systems across all domains to deny adversaries air and3808maritime superiority at low human cost. These systems offer affordable3809asymmetric advantages and - integrated with conventional forces - can3810defeat numerically superior opponents. We are focusing on sUSV3811procurement, storage, operational testing, concept refinement,3812training, and maintenance and need these capabilities delivered as3813quickly as they can be produced.3814    Mr. Wittman. Admiral Paparo, do you believe the current ISR3815allocation process gives you the flexibility and responsiveness needed3816to adapt to changing threat dynamics in the Indo-Pacific? If not, if3817Congress were to provide additional ISR funding modeled after the3818previous ISR Transfer Fund designed to deliver immediate capabilities3819to combatant commanders, would you utilize it to surge unmanned ISR3820assets, and if so, what specific gaps or operational needs would you3821prioritize addressing with those funds?3822    Admiral Paparo. The ISR requirements have grown exponentially since3823FY21, yet available airborne ISR meets less than 10% of the needs.3824Divestment of platforms like the RQ-4B30, E-8 JSTARS, EP-3, and U-23825without fully operational replacements exacerbates this shortfall.3826Additional funding would be prioritized toward unmanned and contractor-3827owned, contractor-operated ISR platforms capable of operating in3828contested environments, addressing our most critical unmet ISR3829requirements.3830    Mr. Wittman. Given the need to detect, classify, identify, and3831track Chinese threats inside the first island chain, what additional3832persistent surveillance assets would be valuable to the INDOPACOM3833theater that can sense across a wide range of sensor modalities and3834active and passive collection techniques and that can communicate in3835real-time across the joint force?3836    Admiral Paparo. USINDOPACOM needs persistent, integrated space-3837based sensor networks for broad area coverage, advanced ISR platforms3838for contested environments, and multi-modal sensing systems such as3839SeaVision Maritime Domain Awareness that incorporates satellite3840synthetic aperture radar, a visible infrared imaging radiometer,3841electro-optical imagery, radio-frequency geolocation, and upgraded3842undersea sensor arrays. Real-time information sharing through3843unclassified systems is crucial for bilateral and multilateral3844collaboration with regional partners.3845                                 ______38463847              RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT3848    Mr. Scott. There's evidence North Korea uses Illegal, Unreported,3849and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF) to fund its regime, sneaking into3850foreign waters. How is USFK tracking this, and what's the plan to choke3851off that revenue stream without escalating tensions?3852    General Brunson. Although the prevention of illegal DPRK fishing is3853not a USFK mission, USFK does work closely with the Republic of Korea3854(ROK) and United Nations Command Member States in a concerted effort to3855restrict North Korea's stream of illegal revenue including illegal,3856unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUUF). To this end, USFK closely3857coordinates through the ROK Navy with the ROK Coast Guard as they3858monitor and restrict DPRK fishing vessels that enter ROK sovereign3859waters and their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The DPRK also continues3860to generate revenue by selling fishing licenses to China, whose fishing3861vessels also operate off the western coast of the DPRK. USFK is3862committed to address North Korea's unlawful activities and violations3863of UN Security Council resolutions in conjunction with the ROK3864government.3865    Mr. Scott. In the event USINDOPACOM or USFK captures enemy weapons,3866will your command have to undergo the lengthy Civil Asset Forfeiture3867process under United States law or can the enemy weapons be immediately3868provided to our allies and partners? What logistical hurdles does your3869respective command anticipate in cataloging, securing, and processing3870captured enemy weapons for forfeiture under wartime conditions in3871Europe? Are you expected to comply with U.S. forfeiture procedures of3872enemy weapons, such as documenting the chain of custody, while3873operating in a dynamic combat environment?3874    General Brunson. USFK would not have to undergo the lengthy Civil3875Asset Forfeiture process under US law in accordance with the Law of3876Armed Conflict. All personal (movable) property belonging to an enemy3877State that has a military use, which includes any weapons, may be3878possessed and utilized for the benefit of occupying power. The law of3879civil forfeiture is neither designed nor intended to apply to foreign3880battlefields. As a result, there would be no need to comply with any of3881the US forfeiture procedures, to include documenting chain of custody.3882While US forfeiture procedures are not applicable, documenting the3883chain of custody is still essential and to create records of the3884capture, handling, and transfer of enemy weapons to ensure3885accountability and compliance with military regulations, regardless of3886the environment and component.3887    Mr. Scott. Has the intelligence and data provided by Ukraine on3888Russian technology, captured equipment, battlefield operational guides,3889weapon performance, and countermeasures against U.S. and Allied systems3890been useful to your command? Will it have saved the lives of U.S.3891service personnel in a war against an enemy peer nation?3892    General Brunson. USFK continues to benefit from an intelligence3893relationship, through EUCOM, with Ukraine. Most notable are the regular3894updates on lessons being learned by the DPRK's military and their level3895of implementation. DOD foreign material exploitation of debris of DPRK3896missiles launched from Russia and recovered by Ukrainian partners is3897currently refining DPRK missile capabilities analysis and helping to3898identify options for missile defeat to protect US interests in Eastern3899Europe and in the ROK. These exchanges help us better understand the3900DPRK military we may have to face in the future rather than the legacy3901force of the past - knowledge which will almost certainly save American3902lives in the case of a resumption of hostilities.3903    Mr. Scott. How does the U.S. Coast Guard collaborate with U.S.3904Forces Korea to enhance maritime security in the Korean Peninsula,3905particularly in addressing threats like illegal fishing or maritime3906smuggling?3907    General Brunson. When operating in the region, US Coast Guard3908(USCG) cutters receive taskings from 7th Fleet, which is under U.S.3909Pacific Fleet. While there is currently no direct engagement or3910collaboration between the USCG and USFK, USCG taskings and missions in3911the AOR enhance maritime security on the Korean Peninsula.3912    Mr. Scott. Does the Coast Guard engage with South Korean maritime3913forces, such as the Republic of Korea Coast Guard, under the USFK3914framework to build regional maritime security capacity?3915    General Brunson. The US Coast Guard (USCG) and Korean Coast Guard3916(KCG) partner to enhance regional maritime security, with the KCG3917modeling its development after the USCG. This collaboration includes3918USCG training for KCG officers in areas like law enforcement, search3919and rescue, and leadership. The USCG is also encouraging the KCG to3920establish a Mobile Training Team program similar to its own, aimed at3921providing instruction to partner nations. The USCG collaborates with3922the KCG and Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) on regional capacity building.3923Joint efforts include workshops for Asian and Pacific Island partners3924hosted in Korea. USCG, KCG, and JCG signed a trilateral agreement3925formalizing future cooperative capacity-building initiatives in3926Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands in 2026.3927    Mr. Scott. Are there opportunities to further integrate Coast Guard3928assets, such as cutters or maritime patrol aircraft, into USFK's3929operational plans?3930    General Brunson. The US Coast Guard (USCG) is integrated into3931USFK's operational plan, but their presence in the Republic of Korea3932(ROK) is limited during armistice. Visits consist of an annual National3933Security Cutter deployment and occasional Maritime Patrol Aircraft3934(MPA) operation from Japan. Permanent USCG presence in the ROK consists3935of a single O-5 Attache at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul. Increased USCG3936support for maritime security missions and capacity building in the3937region would require additional resources and assets beyond current3938funding levels.3939    Mr. Scott. How could South Korea's potential role as a provider of3940lethal aid to Ukraine reshape the U.S.-ROK defense relationship,3941particularly in terms of joint exercises, technology sharing, or global3942security cooperation?3943    General Brunson. The strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance rests on the3944foundation of our Mutual Defense Treaty and our shared commitment to3945regional stability. While we understand the Republic of Korea's3946sovereign decision-making regarding international lethal aide, my3947priority as the UNC/CFC/USFK Commander is ensuring those decisions do3948not detract from our ability to maintain a high level of readiness3949through combined exercises, technology sharing, and security3950cooperation focused on our treaty obligations.3951    Mr. Scott. South Korea faces domestic legal constraints and3952international pressure to avoid direct lethal aid to conflict zones.3953From a USFK perspective, how can the ROK balance these constraints3954while responding to calls from allies, including the U.S., to support3955Ukraine more actively?3956    General Brunson. I consider ROK's decisions regarding external3957lethal aid to be a sovereign concern. I do not routinely engage with3958ROK leadership on their desires to provide external lethal aid.3959However, from a USFK perspective, our alliance with ROK is paramount3960for maintaining stability and deterring aggression in the Korea Theater3961of Operations (KTO). Our focus remains steadfastly on strengthening our3962combined readiness and interoperability to fulfill our treaty3963obligations in this critical region. As the UNC/CFC/USFK Commander, it3964is incumbent on me to ensure that the ROK's balance of such decisions3965does not impact on our ability to fulfill our mutual commitment.3966    Mr. Scott. How do you view the potential for South Korea's weapons3967support to Ukraine to strengthen trilateral cooperation with the U.S.3968and Japan, or broader partnerships with NATO allies, in addressing3969global security challenges?3970    General Brunson. While I view the Republic of Korea's decision to3971provide external lethal aid as sovereign, I assess that such decisions3972would not directly enhance our existing trilateral security cooperation3973with Japan, which remains focused on regional defense and deterrence.3974Our trilateral exercises serve as a visible demonstration of our3975collective and enduring commitment to regional stability.3976    Mr. Scott. Reports last year indicated South Korea was considering3977supplying lethal weapons such as 105mm shells to Ukraine in response to3978North Korea's deployment of troops and arms to Russia. How would the3979ROK's potential decision to provide offensive weapons to Ukraine impact3980the security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula, particularly in the3981context of the U.S.-ROK alliance?3982    General Brunson. My key consideration on the ROK's sovereign3983decision on external lethal aid, would be to assess and prevent any3984potential effect on the progress of the Bilaterally Agreed Upon3985Operational Control (OPCON) Transfer Plan. Maintaining momentum on the3986COT-P is critical to ensuring a stable and effective alliance capable3987of deterring aggression on the Korean Peninsula. Any unilateral3988decisions that could jeopardize our mutual security objectives would be3989a key concern.3990    Mr. Scott. If South Korea moves forward with providing lethal aid3991to Ukraine, how would USFK coordinate with the ROK military to ensure3992that such a policy shift does not compromise readiness or deterrence3993against North Korean threats?3994    General Brunson. I would coordinate directly with the ROK CJCS to3995ensure that ROK readiness and depth is not impacted by their sovereign3996decision. I would identify risks and risk mitigation strategies to3997ensure readiness and adjust posture, if required, to maintain3998deterrence. The priority remains a robust ROK defense posture, and I3999would request the ROK balance their support elsewhere with their4000requirements at home.4001    Mr. Scott. Given North Korea's growing military cooperation with4002Russia, including troop deployments and potential technology transfers,4003how does USFK assess the risk of North Korean retaliation or escalation4004on the Korean Peninsula if the ROK begins supplying weapons to Ukraine?4005    General Brunson. The ROK has already provided non-lethal aid to4006Ukraine. Additionally, the ROK has publicly warned it was considering4007sending lethal aid to Ukraine several times. Until now, DPRK reaction4008has been muted. Recently, DPRK publicly acknowledged providing direct4009lethal aid including troop deployment to Russia, therefore DPRK is4010unlikely to take retaliatory actions against the ROK for doing the4011same. DPRK likely will respond with harsh rhetoric against the ROK4012supplying weapons to Ukraine. The risk of North Korean retaliation or4013escalation on the Korean Peninsula could slightly increase but would4014likely remain low.4015    Mr. Scott. Beyond economic losses, how is Illegal, Unreported, and4016Unregulated Fishing (IUUF) fueling other threats in your AOR-like4017piracy, human trafficking, or even cover for military ops? Are you4018seeing patterns that tie fishing violations to broader adversary4019playbooks?4020    Admiral Paparo. We see little evidence linking Illegal, Unreported,4021and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF) to other criminal activities. However,4022China uses its state-sponsored fishing fleet as cover for broader4023malign activities. Their maritime militia, backed by the PLA Navy4024(PLAN) and Coast Guard, uses fishing vessels as a front to advance4025territorial claims and harass regional partners in the South and East4026China Seas. China attempts to legitimize sovereignty claims through the4027continuous presence of fishing and maritime militia vessels, escorted4028by Coast Guard cutters with PLAN warships in overwatch.4029    Mr. Scott. Countries like Japan, Australia, and the Philippines are4030hit hard by IUUF. How is INDOPACOM working with them to track and deter4031it, and where could USDA or NOAA fisheries expertise plug gaps in that4032effort?4033    Admiral Paparo. USINDOPACOM enhances partners' and allies' maritime4034domain awareness through initiatives like the Indo-Pacific Maritime4035Domain Awareness (IPMDA) program to combat Illegal, Unreported, and4036Unregulated Fishing (IUUF). We use the Pacific Quadrilateral4037coordination forum and SQUAD framework with Japan, Australia, and the4038Philippines to routinize multilateral activities, improve4039interoperability, and counter IUUF. We welcome interagency support,4040such as NOAA Office of Law Enforcement's decade-long counter-IUUF4041capacity building engagement with the Philippines.4042    Mr. Scott. What tools-drones, satellites, AI-is INDOPACOM using to4043monitor IUUF across such a huge maritime domain? Are there blind spots4044where illegal fleets slip through, and how could ag-tech from USDA or4045partners help close them?4046    Admiral Paparo. USINDOPACOM employs a multi-layered approach to4047maritime surveillance with the SeaVision Maritime Domain Awareness4048tool, integrating multiple data sources to include Automatic4049Identification System (AIS) signals, satellite imagery, and radio4050frequency geolocation, enhanced by machine learning algorithms to4051identify suspicious patterns. We are expanding partnerships to close4052surveillance gaps, with five Indo-Pacific partners among our top4053SeaVision users. USINDOPACOM welcomes USDA's agricultural technology4054expertise to enhance detection capabilities. However, we still meet4055less than 10% of our ISR requirements, creating significant blind spots4056that require immediate attention.4057    Mr. Scott. Small island nations rely on fisheries but lack4058enforcement muscle. How does IUUF undermine their sovereignty, and is4059INDOPACOM prioritizing capacity-building-like joint patrols-to counter4060it?4061    Admiral Paparo. Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF)4062significantly threatens the sovereignty, food security, and economies4063of Indo-Pacific nations, particularly small island states with vast4064exclusive economic zones and limited enforcement capabilities. We4065actively combat IUUF alongside allies and partners through initiatives4066that improve surveillance, enforcement, and partner capacity. These4067include expert exchanges, formal agreements, equipment provision, and4068maritime domain awareness development. The Coast Guard is crucial in4069this fight, and additional cutters would greatly enhance our ability to4070support these missions.4071    Mr. Scott. If you could tap one resource-real-time USDA fisheries4072data, legal frameworks, or training for local navies-to tackle IUUF in4073the Indo-Pacific, what would it be?4074    Admiral Paparo. Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF)4075requires a multi-faceted approach, but I would prioritize expanding4076SeaVision Maritime Domain Awareness capabilities, a proven platform4077with five of our Indo-Pacific partners ranking among the top 10 global4078users. SeaVision integrates multiple data sources, including AIS4079signals, satellite synthetic aperture radar, a visible infrared imaging4080radiometer suite, electro-optical imagery, and radio-frequency4081geolocation, providing comprehensive surveillance capabilities our4082partners need to combat IUUF in their territorial waters.4083    Mr. Scott. China's been snapping up farmland and fishing rights4084across the Indo-Pacific. How does INDOPACOM view this as a strategic4085play, and could USDA insights on crop production or trade patterns help4086counter that dominance?4087    Admiral Paparo. China uses economic competition, including4088acquiring farmland and fishing rights, as a central facet of its4089strategic approach to gain access and influence across the Indo-4090Pacific. China aims to achieve regional supremacy, becoming the center4091of Asian cultural, economic, social, and political authority. While4092China has seen some success, most of the region recognizes its self-4093serving and exploitative tactics. We always welcome insight and4094analysis from interagency partners like the USDA.4095    Mr. Scott. Small island nations depend on subsistence farming and4096fishing, but they're vulnerable to disruption. How is INDOPACOM4097factoring their agricultural resilience into your partnerships, and4098could USDA expertise in sustainable practices strengthen those ties?4099    Admiral Paparo. Food, water, medical care, and critical4100infrastructure programs are vital for regional stability. We deploy4101Civil Affairs teams to provide permanent forward presence and surge4102capabilities as needed. Through Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and4103Civic Aid (OHDACA) funding, we enhance partner resilience in disaster-4104prone nations, particularly in places like Fiji and other Pacific4105Island countries. We welcome assistance in these resiliency efforts4106from all able interagency partners, including UDSA.4107    Mr. Scott. With dense farming and aquaculture systems in countries4108like Indonesia or Thailand, has INDOPACOM picked up any intel on4109agricultural sabotage-like fish farm diseases or crop pests-as a4110potential threat? How would you coordinate a response?4111    Admiral Paparo. We are unaware of any specific threats to4112agriculture, food storage, or distribution systems, but we cannot rule4113out the possibility of adversaries using this tactic. All three major4114state threats in the Indo-Pacific have active biological research and4115development programs that could support such an effort. A coordinated4116response would require an inter-agency approach to share information on4117threats, countermeasures, mitigation strategies, and response options.4118    Mr. Scott. Small island nations depend on subsistence farming and4119fishing, but they're vulnerable to disruption. How is INDOPACOM4120factoring their agricultural resilience into your partnerships, and4121could USDA expertise in sustainable practices strengthen those ties?4122    Admiral Paparo. Food, water, medical care, and critical4123infrastructure programs are vital for regional stability. We deploy4124Civil Affairs teams to provide permanent forward presence and surge4125capabilities as needed. Through Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and4126Civic Aid (OHDACA) funding, we enhance partner resilience in disaster-4127prone nations, particularly in places like Fiji and other Pacific4128Island countries. We welcome assistance in these resiliency efforts4129from all able interagency partners, including USDA.4130    Mr. Scott. How do the Baltic States' contributions to NATO, as4131steadfast allies, enhance the broader security framework that supports4132U.S. objectives in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in countering4133authoritarian influences?4134    Admiral Paparo. The Baltic states' steadfast commitment to NATO4135reinforces U.S. objectives in the Indo-Pacific by demonstrating the4136strength of alliance cohesion. Their high per-capita defense spending,4137military modernization, and interoperability enhancements with allies4138demonstrate the potential of collective defense capabilities. Their4139experience under Soviet occupation and willingness to confront4140authoritarian pressure, exemplified by Lithuania's stance on Taiwan,4141demonstrates how strong alliances effectively counter mutual4142adversaries.4143    Mr. Scott. Given the Baltic States' critical role in European4144security against Russian aggression, how does their stability influence4145U.S. efforts to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific region?4146    Admiral Paparo. The Baltic states' stability influences Indo-4147Pacific security in three ways: First, their experience countering4148Russian hybrid warfare and disinformation provides valuable lessons4149against similar Chinese Communist Party tactics. Second, their4150resilience inspires Indo-Pacific nations facing comparable pressures by4151demonstrating that smaller countries can resist larger authoritarian4152powers. Third, their strong democratic institutions and successful4153resistance to authoritarian influence reinforce the credibility of the4154global network of democracy-oriented nations.4155    Mr. Scott. What lessons from military cooperation with Estonia,4156Latvia, and Lithuania-such as joint exercises or cyber defense4157initiatives-can be applied to strengthen partnerships with Indo-Pacific4158allies facing similar hybrid threats?4159    Admiral Paparo. Baltic states' experience countering Russian hybrid4160warfare and disinformation efforts offers valuable lessons for Indo-4161Pacific partners facing similar Chinese Communist Party tactics.4162Mirroring the Baltics' emphasis on unified responses to hybrid threats,4163we are standardizing multilateral activities and enhancing4164interoperability among our Indo-Pacific partners. This network of4165allies, built on shared values, mutual trust, and respect, is our4166asymmetric advantage.4167    Mr. Scott. Estonia, in particular, is a global leader in4168cybersecurity. How can its expertise in countering cyber threats inform4169USINDOPACOM's strategies to protect critical infrastructure and4170networks in the Indo-Pacific?4171    Admiral Paparo. USINDOPACOM welcomes future collaboration efforts4172with Estonia to share cybersecurity best practices, lessons learned,4173and emerging threat awareness to inform and mature our approach to4174identifying and protecting critical infrastructure and key resources4175(CIKR). As an opportunity, we would love to collaborate with Estonia on4176the development of the Guam Cybersecurity Strategy, an FY25 NDAA4177directive, that entails defense in depth analysis of government and4178commercial infrastructure supporting mission requirements. This4179partnership has the potential to assist USINDOPACOM'S effort to harden4180regional CIKR, improving resiliency and availability that enables4181mission success.4182    Mr. Scott. The Baltic States' geographic position makes them a4183frontline for NATO's deterrence efforts. How does their resilience4184against regional threats contribute to broader U.S. deterrence4185strategies in the Indo-Pacific?4186    Admiral Paparo. The Baltic states' resilience demonstrates how4187strong alliances and partnerships effectively deter authoritarian4188aggression. We are strengthening Indo-Pacific relationships,4189recognizing that capable partners are essential for regional stability4190and security, especially given increasing military collaboration4191between authoritarian states. We are building partner capacity,4192enhancing interoperability, and fostering trust-based relationships to4193create multiple dilemmas for potential adversaries, even without a4194NATO-like alliance in our theater.4195    Mr. Scott. How can strengthened economic and technological4196collaboration with the Baltic States, known for their innovation4197ecosystems, support USINDOPACOM's goals of fostering resilient supply4198chains and technological superiority in the Indo-Pacific?4199    Admiral Paparo. Strong partnerships with like-minded nations,4200including the Baltic states, build diverse, trusted supply chains,4201reducing dependence on potential adversaries while advancing shared4202technological capabilities and economic interests.4203    Mr. Scott. The Baltic States have taken measures to limit Chinese4204economic and technological influence in their region. What insights4205from their approaches could guide U.S. and allied efforts to address4206similar challenges in the Indo-Pacific?4207    Admiral Paparo. Our partners are countering Chinese economic4208influence through a multi-layered approach: diversifying economic4209partnerships away from Beijing, building indigenous technologies with4210trusted allies - like Lithuania and Taiwan's drone technology4211collaboration - to reduce exposure to predatory Belt and Road4212Initiative projects, and joining alternative economic frameworks with4213like-minded nations. We've seen Belt and Road investments decrease due4214to international pushback, creating opportunities for us to strengthen4215economic ties with partners through transparent and mutually beneficial4216arrangements.4217    Mr. Scott. In the event USINDOPACOM or USFK captures enemy weapons,4218will your command have to undergo the lengthy Civil Asset Forfeiture4219process under United States law or can the enemy weapons be immediately4220provided to our allies and partners? What logistical hurdles does your4221respective command anticipate in cataloging, securing, and processing4222captured enemy weapons for forfeiture under wartime conditions in4223Europe? Are you expected to comply with U.S. forfeiture procedures of4224enemy weapons, such as documenting the chain of custody, while4225operating in a dynamic combat environment?4226    Admiral Paparo. Under the Law of War and Department of Defense4227procedures, captured enemy weapons may be used immediately by U.S.4228forces or temporarily provided to allies and partners if necessary for4229military necessity, including self-defense. We must document these4230temporary transfers. Longer-duration transfers fall under foreign4231assistance authorities such as Title 10 US Code Section 333, and4232require State Department concurrence.4233    Mr. Scott. Could the battle-tested lessons learned by the4234Ukrainians potentially save the lives of American service personnel in4235any future war against Communist China?4236    Admiral Paparo. Lessons from Ukraine demonstrate how to save lives4237in a potential conflict with China. They serve as a stark reminder of4238the high cost to be paid when lacking sufficient Integrated Air and4239Missile Defense (IAMD), air and long-range fires superiority or the4240Counter-Command, Control, Computing, Communications, Cyber,4241Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Targeting (C-C5ISRT) key to achieving4242it. We have also learned from the Ukrainians' use of low-cost4243autonomous munitions against Russia's fleet despite having no navy of4244their own. Leveraging information campaigns, declassified intelligence,4245and use of social media provided Ukraine additional asymmetric4246advantages. We are incorporating these lessons into our planning to4247deter China and protect our forces.4248    Mr. Scott. Has the intelligence and data provided by Ukraine on4249Russian technology, captured equipment, battlefield operational guides,4250weapon performance, and countermeasures against U.S. and Allied systems4251been useful to your command? Will it have saved the lives of U.S.4252service personnel in a war against an enemy peer nation?4253    Admiral Paparo. Lessons and insights from Ukraine, especially4254regarding unmanned systems and asymmetric capabilities, have been4255valuable to our understanding of modern warfare. Analyzing advanced4256capabilities in combat improves our preparations for future conflict,4257but I cannot speculate on specific life-saving impacts.4258    Mr. Scott. Given the vast distance of your AOR, how do you assess4259the potential role of seaplanes in enhancing INDOPACOM's readiness4260particularly in remote areas?4261    Admiral Paparo. Seaplanes offer valuable capabilities to overcome4262the tyranny of distance and access challenges in the Indo-Pacific. They4263enhance force projection and sustainment, especially within the First4264Island Chain, when equipped with the capability to render assistance to4265battle damage under the principles of distributed maritime operations.4266They complement our C-130s and unmanned platforms, bolstering4267distributed logistics networks. Their ability to operate from remote,4268damaged, or unimproved locations strengthens partner capacity building,4269humanitarian assistance, and ISR operations, contributing to deterrence4270through improved influence and access throughout the Pacific's remote4271islands and atolls.4272    Mr. Scott. How could seaplanes support INDOPACOM's logistics and4273rapid response capabilities, especially for humanitarian assistance,4274disaster relief, or resupply missions to austere locations?4275    Admiral Paparo. Seaplanes enhance our operational resilience across4276multiple Indo-Pacific mission sets, especially in austere environments4277and areas lacking established runways. They strengthen distributed4278operations with the ability to render assistance for ships that have4279battle damage. They also support Agile Combat Employment, search and4280rescue and personnel recovery capabilities, while improving mass4281casualty response. Further, these platforms enhance humanitarian4282assistance, disaster response, and logistics, enabling persistent4283presence and rapid response capabilities that strengthen partnerships4284and contribute to strategic deterrence in contested environments.4285    Mr. Scott. Japan presently operates the ShinMaywa US-2. What4286opportunities do you see for integrating seaplanes into joint exercises4287or operations to strengthen alliances and partnerships?4288    Admiral Paparo. Exercise VALIANT SHIELD offers excellent4289opportunities to integrate seaplanes, especially in terms of search and4290rescue, anti-submarine warfare, and maritime domain awareness.4291Additionally, KEEN SWORD, PACIFIC ANGEL, BALIKATAN, FREEDOM EDGE, and4292COBRA GOLD offer other joint and combined venues to incorporate4293seaplanes and further strengthen alliances and partnerships.4294    Mr. Scott. Could seaplanes, with their ability to operate from non-4295traditional bases, help mitigate challenges posed by adversary A2/AD4296strategies in the Indo-Pacific theater?4297    Admiral Paparo. While not a panacea, seaplanes offer a unique4298approach to mitigating some anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) challenges4299by enabling distributed operations in the Indo-Pacific, especially4300where adversaries threaten airbase infrastructure. Operating seaplanes4301from diverse locations enhances operational flexibility and complicates4302adversary targeting.4303    Mr. Scott. What are the primary challenges (e.g., sea states,4304infrastructure, or maintenance) that INDOPACOM would need to address to4305effectively integrate seaplanes into its force structure?4306    Admiral Paparo. Seaplanes do offer agility in several areas:4307mitigating some anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) challenges, increasing4308flexibility to operate from diverse locations (complicating adversary4309targeting), enabling rapid access to remote areas, minimizing4310logistical burdens and reducing reliance on limited Coast Guard and4311naval assets. Speed of response and access to remote areas are4312especially helpful in responding to disasters or humanitarian crisis,4313like we saw with the 2014 Tsunami in the Indian Ocean. The U.S. ability4314to rapidly respond in times of crisis also strengthens our4315relationships with partners and allies, ultimately contributing to4316deterrence through improved influence and access throughout the4317Pacific's remote islands and atolls. Seaplanes may also add mass in our4318maneuverability and the importance of overcoming the tyranny of4319distance, further supporting force projection and sustainment4320operations, while they potentially relieve some of the burden on our C-4321130s. Any implementation of an enduring nature would require rigorous4322analysis to include: lifecycle costs (moorage, maintenance-related4323labor and repair part costs, etc.), basing agreements, recruiting and4324training aircrews to fly and maintain the aircraft, and an assessment4325of impacts on other existing programs to determine if seaplanes offer a4326viable advantage.4327    Mr. Scott. The Indo-Pacific region frequently faces natural4328disasters and maritime incidents. How could modern seaplanes bolster4329INDOPACOM's SAR capabilities, particularly in remote areas of the4330Pacific?4331    Admiral Paparo. Modern seaplanes would significantly enhance4332theater search and rescue, especially in austere locations, offering a4333potential paradigm shift in disaster response. Seaplanes provide rapid4334access to remote areas, minimizing logistical burdens and reducing4335reliance on limited Coast Guard and naval assets. This rapid response4336capability is critical for disaster-vulnerable low-lying islands.4337    Mr. Scott. The U.S. military has a rich history of using seaplanes4338in the Pacific, notably during World War II. Are there historical4339lessons that INDOPACOM is drawing upon when considering the modern4340application of seaplanes?4341    Admiral Paparo. World War II seaplane operations demonstrated the4342strategic value of flexible basing and persistent reconnaissance,4343particularly their ability to overcome the tyranny of distance and4344access challenges by operating from remote, damaged, or unimproved4345locations across the Pacific in support of distributed maritime4346operations, sustainment, and theater-wide search and rescue. Modern4347seaplanes can enhance these capabilities, and we are applying these4348lessons through other distributed operations concepts that reduce4349significant infrastructure dependence while contributing to strategic4350deterrence in contested environments. We are exploring opportunities to4351extend maritime patrol and reconnaissance capabilities through4352locations like Adak, Palau, Peleliu, and Yap.4353    Mr. Scott. How do you envision the USCG's presence and mission set4354evolving within INDOPACOM to address long-term security dynamics in the4355Indo-Pacific?4356    Admiral Paparo. The Coast Guard provides unique diplomatic,4357military, economic, and law enforcement capabilities in the Indo-4358Pacific, especially where DoD presence is limited. It enhances maritime4359domain awareness and strengthens regional partnerships, as demonstrated4360through work with Malaysian maritime security forces. Coast Guard4361collaboration with Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF West)4362strengthens our ability to combat transnational threats, including4363illegal fentanyl trafficking. Representing a key component of4364USINDOPACOM's counter-lawfare activities to expose and oppose China's4365weaponization of the law, the Coast Guard partners with the Republic of4366Philippines, Palau, and across Oceania to safeguard sovereign rights,4367strengthen legal capacity, and promote legal vigilance. I continue to4368advocate for increased Coast Guard resources, including Arctic4369operations and ice-breaking missions.4370    Mr. Scott. How does the USCG enhance INDOPACOM's maritime domain4371awareness through its unique authorities and capabilities, such as4372vessel tracking and intelligence sharing?4373    Admiral Paparo. The Coast Guard provides unique diplomatic,4374military, economic, and law enforcement capabilities in the Indo-4375Pacific through information and intelligence sharing and patrolling in4376areas where the DoD doesn't typically maintain presence. Programs like4377the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) partnership enhance4378maritime domain awareness by integrating emerging technologies,4379enabling vessel identification, detecting automatic identification4380system (AIS) spoofing, and supporting regional fusion centers. Coast4381Guard liaisons, including embedded officers in USINDOPACOM, and4382partnerships with nations like Malaysia, improve their maritime domain4383awareness and facilitate information sharing between partners.4384    Mr. Scott. What are the primary operational or logistical4385challenges for USCG assets operating in the vast Indo-Pacific theater4386under INDOPACOM, and how are they being addressed?4387    Admiral Paparo. Vast distances, maintenance facilities, and afloat4388refuel (tanker) availability are the primary challenges for Coast Guard4389assets in the Indo-Pacific. USINDOPACOM mitigates these challenges by4390integrating the Coast Guard into our maritime component during4391exercises and day-to-day operations, to share resource requirements,4392improving logistical support. Continuing these efforts will enhance the4393Coast Guard's regional maritime security contributions.4394    Mr. Scott. How does the USCG contribute to INDOPACOM's efforts to4395build maritime security capacity among Pacific Island nations, and what4396specific programs or deployments are proving effective?4397    Admiral Paparo. The U.S. Coast Guard contributes to maritime4398security and capacity building through bilateral law enforcement4399agreements, commonly referred to as ship rider agreements, such as the4400one with Tonga since 2009 to counter Illegal, Unreported, and4401Unregulated Fishing (IUUF). The Coast Guard provides vessel transfers4402through the Excess Defense Article program (e.g., the former U.S. Coast4403Guard Cutter Munro to Sri Lanka and U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Mellon to4404Vietnam). It also conducts joint training and exchanges and helps4405establish new Coast Guard capabilities, such as assisting Malaysia in4406developing their own coast guard. Cutters homeported in Hawaii and Guam4407operate throughout the Indo-Pacific, playing a critical role in4408maintaining regional maritime security. Amid China's increasing4409illegal, coercive, aggressive, and deceptive gray-zone activities4410threating our regional allies and partners, the U.S. Coast Guard4411provides valuable capabilities to address regional maritime security4412challenges, significantly enhancing capacity-building efforts in4413coordination with USINDOPACOM through several targeted initiatives and4414programs. First, the USCG maintains and actively implements bilateral4415law enforcement agreements that allow local maritime law enforcement4416officers to embark on U.S. vessels. These agreements, commonly known as4417Shiprider Agreements, are in place with multiple Pacific Island4418nations, including Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea,4419Vanuatu, Palau, and Samoa. Additionally, the Coast Guard also conducts4420joint exercises, exchanges, and training programs. Notably, the U.S.4421Coast Guard has deployed mobile training teams to support courses4422focused on Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing and4423Maritime Law Enforcement. The Coast Guard transfers decommissioned4424vessels to partner nations through the Excess Defense Articles (EDA)4425program, significantly enhancing their maritime operational4426capabilities. The Philippines has received multiple U.S. Coast Guard4427cutters under this program and employs them to protect its sovereignty4428against gray-zone activities. Japan: USCG has a robust relationship4429with the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) bilaterally, in two separate4430Trilateral Maritime Security partnerships (with Philippines and South4431Korea), and the Quad Maritime Security Dialogue with Australia and4432India. USCG coordinates regional training programs with JCG building a4433true team environment to empower regional partners in South East Asia4434and in Oceania. Operationally, USCG routinely conducts joint sails and4435search and rescue exercises when in the region. USCG Academy also has a4436growing partnership with the JCG Academy. Philippines: The USCG's4437largest recipient for resident training is the Philippines Coast Guard4438(PCG). In addition, the USCG is funded via Department of State INL to4439work with the PCG to develop, strengthen and empower the PCG as they4440grow their force both in personnel, and in capabilities. Operationally,4441when in the region in uncontested waters, the USCG conducts joint4442patrols and has conducted SAR and oil response exercises in addition to4443assisting in two significant oil response incidents. USCG maintains a4444robust tri-lateral partnership with Japan and the Philippines to4445address maritime environmental response, search and rescue and training4446among other topics. Taiwan: The USCG has an excellent working4447relationship with the Taiwan Coast Guard Authority (TCGA), coordinated4448through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), via a 2021 Memorandum4449of Understanding (MOU)establishing a Coast Guard Working Group (CGWG).4450TCGA and the USCGA have conducted HADR and SAR exercises together4451outside of contested waters. In the past five years, the USCG has sent4452six training teams to Taiwan for law enforcement and emergency response4453courses and hosted six students at resident USCG courses in the United4454States. Additionally, two TCGA Cadets are currently attending the U.S.4455Coast Guard Academy, one of whom will graduate in May 2025. Recent4456examples of impactful engagement include: MCA ops off of Philippines4457(C7F request) - National Security Cutter (NSC) STRATTON, ECC ops4458enroute to Busan - NSC STRATTON, CARAT Thailand MIO/VBSS support (C7F4459request) - Maritime Security Response Team-West (MSRT-W), CARAT Timor4460Leste MIO/VBSS support (C7F request) - MSRT-W, SAMA SAMA MIO/VBSS4461support (C7F request) - MSRT-W, CARAT Brunei MIO/VBSS support (C7F4462request) - MSRT-W, SAREX with TCGA (not public) - NSC STRATTON, Tri-lat4463exercise with PCG & JCG - NSC STRATTON, Tri-lat with KCG & JCG - NSC4464STRATTON, TACON to 7th Flt for SCS - NSC STRATTON, QUAD observers sail4465- NSC STRATTON, COFA territorial integrity patrol - NSC STRATTON, 24466port calls in Japan, 1 in PHL - NSC STRATTON, Search and Rescue4467Activities - Exercise BALIKATAN4468                                 ______44694470             RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON4471    Mr. Moulton. Admiral Paparo and General Brunson, what does a4472reduced integrated air and missile defense posture in the region mean4473as far as protecting US assets that are located there?4474    General Brunson. In the event of a directed reduction of our4475Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) posture, the ability to4476protect and defend assets on the Korean Peninsula would be4477commensurately reduced. DPRK's chemical, biological, and nuclear4478weapons programs, formidable missile force (ballistic and cruise), and4479growing drone capability pose a threat to the US military and civilian4480personnel in country, as well as to critical ROK infrastructure such as4481ports and airfields. The US and ROK possess a robust, layered, and4482persistent IAMD network of sensors and shooters ready to defend4483military and civilian critical assets. While the ROK-JPN-USA tri-4484lateral sharing agreement will continue to provide situational4485awareness and early warning for US assets off the Korean Peninsula,4486reduced IAMD within the ROK will reduce capability to mitigate DPRK's4487ability to strike US and ROK forces and critical infrastructure.4488    Mr. Moulton. Mr. Noh, based on Ranking Member Smith's questions4489regarding the Administration's commitment to the INDOPACOM region. Can4490you explain how pulling out Patriot batteries from South Korea4491demonstrates that commitment?4492    Mr. Noh. As directed by the Secretary of Defense, United States4493Forces Korea (USFK) rotationally deployed personnel and equipment from4494the Korean theater of operations. South Korean government and Ministry4495of National Defense were notified. This temporary deployment provides a4496flexible deterrence option to protect U.S. national interests abroad.4497    Mr. Moulton. As the Original Classification Authority for INDOPACOM4498Command, and in accordance with your Security Classification Guidance,4499can you provide the classification of the following:4500    Prior to an imminent, kinetic, INDOPACOM strike, targeting a4501foreign actor:4502    The exact launch time of any portion of the strike package4503Accompanied by the weapons system to be used Accompanied by the weapons4504launch platform The time on target for a specified weapons system The4505time on target for a weapons launch platform Note: Please provide an4506unclassified response, if the question cannot be fully answered in an4507unclassified manner please provide additional details at the necessary4508classification level.4509    Admiral Paparo. The details of the USINDOPACOM security4510classification guide cannot be discussed in this forum. I will provide4511a response in an appropriate venue.4512    Mr. Moulton. Admiral Paparo and General Brunson, what does a4513reduced integrated air and missile defense posture in the region mean4514as far as protecting US assets that are located there?4515    Admiral Paparo. A reduced integrated air and missile defense (IAMD)4516posture significantly degrades our ability to protect critical bases4517and infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific. Patriot and THAAD batteries4518protect our assets and demonstrate commitment to regional stability,4519while also freeing DDG availability for a broader range of missions to4520deter adversaries. We face increasingly sophisticated threats from sUAS4521to hypersonic weapons and maneuverable re-entry vehicles from China and4522North Korea. Without robust IAMD capabilities including air and space4523sensing (including space-based ISR) along with sufficient capacities of4524threat and cost-informed effectors, we increase the risk to our4525forward-deployed forces and infrastructure while simultaneously4526weakening our regional deterrent posture.4527                                 ______45284529              RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KELLY4530    Mr. Kelly. ADM Paparo, one concern I hear often from warfighters is4531about our force posture-not just how much capability we have in-4532theater, but where it's located and how fast it can respond. Do you4533believe our forces are in the right places to respond quickly and4534decisively to a contingency in the Indo-Pacific? Specifically, how4535would moving Marines out of Okinawa impact your ability to respond in4536the region?4537    Admiral Paparo. USINDOPACOM's theater-wide posture strategy ensures4538our joint forces are ready to respond rapidly and effectively to4539regional crises, deter malign activities, and, if necessary, prevail in4540conflict. We are constantly working to improve our posture and are4541making meaningful progress. For example, we have effectively employed4542our expanded unspecified minor military construction authority and4543Defense Wide appropriations to fund and execute posture-improving4544projects across the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of4545Palau, and the Federated States of Micronesia. Regarding the Marine4546relocation from Okinawa, we are working with the Office of the4547Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Government of Japan to ensure the4548right forces are in the right places at the right time. We remain4549committed to executing the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) with4550our Japanese counterparts using a conditions-based approach.4551                                 ______45524553              RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CROW4554    Mr. Crow. In previous iterations of the NDAA, Congress directed DOD4555to develop a plan for updating and expanding existing infrastructure on4556Guam to support U.S. forces and facilities, including improving energy4557resilience for DOD equipment and facilities. What steps has DOD taken4558to incorporate independent renewable energy sources into its planning4559to update and expand the energy infrastructure on Guam?4560    Mr. Noh. The Department supports improving energy resilience for4561DoD operations in Guam. DoD coordinates its investments in Guam across4562Components and integrates its efforts with civilian infrastructure4563partners. Through the Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization4564Act, Congress established the Under Secretary of the Navy as the4565responsible official for coordinating infrastructure projects to4566support members of the armed forces and their families in Guam and the4567Commonwealth of Northern Marianas Islands. I would refer you to the4568Department of the Navy for more information on improving energy4569resilience of Guam.4570    Mr. Crow. Access to energy is particularly critical for enabling4571distributed units to operate effectively in the absence of direct4572logistical support. Renewable energy sources like renewable-powered4573microgrids present both environmental opportunities and strategic4574advantages. That's why I lead a Sustainable Power Initiative, which4575brings defense and energy experts together with policymakers to discuss4576how we improve military readiness and resilience. What steps has4577INDOPACOM taken to incorporate renewable energy sources into its4578sustainment and resiliency efforts?4579    Admiral Paparo. USINDOPACOM focuses near-term energy resilience4580efforts on hybrid-electric technologies and microgrids while expanding4581fuel distribution networks and storage capabilities across 56 key4582locations. We have explored electrification and solar effects, but our4583primary emphasis remains ensuring resilient and redundant energy4584systems throughout the theater that are underpinned by traditional4585capabilities. The immediate solution that we depend upon includes4586advanced digital controls for generators and energy storage to optimize4587utilization of the available fuel while supporting the lethality of our4588forces. Should a service implement advanced capabilities like small4589modular reactors and hydrogen-based energy systems, we are prepared to4590incorporate these into our operational planning and exercises and look4591forward to the opportunity to experiment with associated new4592technologies.4593    Mr. Crow. Based on existing reporting, DOD/military-owned and -4594operated electrical power capability on Guam is limited and the Guam4595Power Authority (GPA) is the primary provider of electrical power for4596the U.S. military. Admiral, is that accurate? What is your assessment4597of the reliability of the GPA's energy infrastructure?4598    Admiral Paparo. Guam Power Authority (GPA) is the primary power4599provider for Guam, including Department of Defense (DoD) installations.4600The existing power plants are aging and require frequent maintenance4601and repair, straining the system. The new Ukudu Combined Cycle4602Combustion Turbine Power Plant is coming online, which will improve4603reliability and allow for the retirement of older plants, some over 504604years old. GPA is modernizing its distribution system by combining4605renewable energy projects with an effort to move distribution lines4606underground.4607    Mr. Crow. PRC aggression is one of the most serious challenges to4608U.S. national security in the Indo-Pacific. Any potential conflict with4609China would likely feature large-scale, joint-domain maritime4610operations with implications for massive civilian population centers4611across the Indo-Pacific, notably in Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines.4612How does INDOPACOM plan to enhance civilian harm mitigation and4613response in the Indo-Pacific? What additional steps are we taking to4614prepare the operational environment to reduce the potential of civilian4615harm?4616    Admiral Paparo. Our ability to precisely apply lethal effects in4617combat while mitigating and responding to civilian harm is critical to4618achieving our strategic objectives. To do this, we apply Civilian Harm4619Mitigation and Response resources, such as intelligence, fires, and4620command and control joint warfighting functions, to improve battlefield4621awareness, reinforcing these functions through exercises, including the4622upcoming PACIFIC SENTRY exercise.4623    Mr. Crow. Policy experts and service members overwhelmingly agree4624that the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMRAP)4625improves our operational effectiveness and provides strategic4626advantages, yet there are individuals within the DoD that seek to4627dismantle civilian protection efforts. What is the importance of CHMR4628during potential large-scale combat operations (LSCOs) against near4629peer adversaries?4630    Admiral Paparo. Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response-which4631enhances lethality-strengthens coalition unity, operational4632credibility, and public support, which are key to countering Chinese4633aggression. In large-scale combat operations, it enables commanders to4634use force precisely while safeguarding mission legitimacy and reducing4635operational friction in complex civilian environments.4636    Mr. Crow. Cultivating alliances and partners in the Indo-Pacific is4637critical to deterring, and if necessary, fighting and winning a4638conflict in the Pacific. The expertise built by INDOPACOM to train,4639advise, and fight alongside partner forces will be invaluable to such4640an effort. What are some of the things your forces are doing there to4641train and enable partner forces? How are we applying lessons learned4642from Europe and the Middle East to the Pacific?4643    Admiral Paparo. Our forces train and enable partners through joint4644exercises, operational partnerships, and security cooperation programs.4645These activities enhance interoperability, strengthen regional defense4646capabilities, and facilitate intelligence sharing. We have expanded4647trilateral cooperation with Japan and Australia through exercises like4648KEEN EDGE and increased engagement with the Philippines through4649Exercise BALIKATAN. USINDOPACOM is adapting lessons from Europe and the4650Middle East by prioritizing multi-domain operations, integrated defense4651systems, and asymmetric warfare, tailored to the Indo-Pacific. This4652includes heavy investment in unmanned systems, information operations,4653cyber capabilities, and initiatives like "Replicator" to enhance4654deterrence through technological superiority.4655    Mr. Crow. I am interested in understanding how we can better assess4656the capabilities and resolve of some of our partner forces' will to4657fight. Can you speak to the current resolve and will of partners like4658Taiwan and Japan to fight in future possible conflicts in the Indo-4659Pacific?4660    Admiral Paparo. I am confident in Japan's and Taiwan's resolve and4661will to stand against unprovoked aggression. Japan demonstrates strong4662resolve through its National Security Strategy, recognizing peace and4663stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to regional4664security. Japan actively works with us to bolster U.S. posture,4665particularly in its southwest islands. Taiwan's resolve, whole-of-4666society approach to defense, and ability to fight are critical for4667deterrence. We continue modernizing capabilities and developing new4668operational concepts with Taiwan, strengthening their defense in4669accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act.4670                                 ______46714672             RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BERGMAN4673    Mr. Bergman. APS-3 ships are currently fully loaded, crewed, and4674able to sail within days. If moved to Reduced Operating Status in4675Texas, reactivation, loading, and transit could take two to three4676months. What is the operational impact of replacing a days-ready4677capability with one that may arrive too late in a high-end contingency?4678    Admiral Paparo. The APS-3 vessels themselves are currently planned4679to transition into a Ready Reserve Status and are expected to be4680maintained by the Military Sealift Command (MSC). A portion of the4681equipment has been downloaded in the theater, with a portion currently4682downloading for a maintenance inspection in South Carolina, before4683being returned to theater in the first quarter of FY26 (based on4684current coordination between USARPAC and Department of the Army). APS-34685includes an infantry brigade set, a sustainment brigade, a theater4686opening/port operations set, engineering, and medical treatment sets.4687These specific capabilities are those we need to rapidly respond in4688crisis to enable the rapid building of combat power and provide options4689to the SECDEF and the President. Going forward, working with the4690Department of the Army, our intent is to preposition the right4691equipment sets in the right places in support of tasks within our4692operational plans and contingency plans. Downloading and prepositioning4693is carefully coordinated and at the invitation and with the permission4694of our Allies, so we can further increase the responsiveness and4695increase its survivability through dispersion. USINDOPACOM has already4696downloaded portions of APS-3 including logistics, engineering, and4697medical equipment sets in the Philippines and Australia.4698    Mr. Bergman. Are you aware that the Army has ordered three of the4699five remaining APS-3 ships to depart the Indo-Pacific this month,4700offload in Charleston, and await transfer to Reserve Operating Status?4701    Admiral Paparo. I am aware of the Department of the Army Execution4702Order.4703    Mr. Bergman. Do you believe the Army's plan to deactivate APS-3 and4704place the five government-owned ships in Reserve Operating Status4705without cargo in Texas strengthens INDOPACOM's readiness for conflict,4706or is it a cost-cutting move that reduces sealift capacity in the4707Pacific?4708    Admiral Paparo. Currently, the APS-3 vessels are planned to4709transition into a Ready Reserve Status and are to be maintained by the4710Military Sealift Command. A portion of the APS-3 equipment was4711downloaded in the USINDOPACOM theater, with the remainder being4712returned to theater in the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2026 based on4713current coordination between USARPAC and Department of the Army. Any4714temporary loss of capacity of APS-3 equipment degrades readiness and4715reduces response options for the Joint Force. I refer you to the U.S.4716Army and USTRANSCOM regarding costs associated with the leasing and4717life-cycle management of these vessels.4718    Mr. Bergman. Given that APS-3 ships are fully loaded, forward-4719deployed, and ready to sail within days, do you consider them a4720critical part of the Indo-Pacific's prepositioned posture?4721    Admiral Paparo. Forward-deployed APS-3 ships do represent important4722capabilities and flexibility for our theater, in which vast distances4723present a hurdle we must overcome in pursuit of any response options.4724While these assets offer significant advantages for rapid force4725projection, I remain open to exploring alternative strategic mobility4726and prepositioning strategies to meet our responsive logistics support4727requirements across the Indo-Pacific.4728    Mr. Bergman. APS-3 ships are Military Sealift Command-operated gray4729hulls. Do they meet the standard of government-owned, mission-ready4730assets required in a contested environment?4731    Admiral Paparo. I would refer you to query USTRANSCOM and Military4732Sealift Command (MSC) to respond to the standards held by these4733organizations.4734    Mr. Bergman. You've identified lift capacity-by sea or air-as a4735major gap. It took 73 C-17 flights to move one Patriot battalion. If4736APS-3's operational status is reduced, how will that sealift gap be4737filled? How critical is APS-3 to providing scalable, ready logistics in4738the Indo-Pacific?4739    Admiral Paparo. Limited air and sealift capacity remains a key4740challenge in the Indo-Pacific where vast distances complicate rapid4741force deployment. As a result, the APS-3 vessels can provide critical4742capabilities to augment sealift requirements. Vessel movements4743complement our airlift options and provide more efficiency in moving4744large quantities of heavy equipment. The movement by aircraft is 10 to474514 times faster but is much more expensive and scales to much greater4746mass and energy. My theater lift requirements remain unchanged, and I4747will continue working with USTRANSCOM to ensure my inter and intra4748theater movement needs are clearly understood.4749                                 ______47504751            RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SHERRILL4752    Ms. Sherrill. Last month, Secretary Hegseth visited Japan where he4753announced the commencement of phase one in upgrading US Forces Japan4754(USFJ) into a Joint Forces Headquarters. This is a vital step in4755strengthening the US-Japan security alliance and will encourage the4756Japanese government to continue modernizing the Japanese Self-Defense4757Forces. Why do you believe it is important for the US to strengthen its4758military partnership with Japan and establish a Joint Forces4759Headquarters?4760    a. What is the estimated timeline and what are the key milestones4761for upgrading USFJ to full Joint Forces Headquarters?4762    b. Are you considering increasing the number of service members4763stationed in Japan as the Joint Forces Head Quarters is established?4764    Mr. Noh. The upgrade of U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) demonstrates the4765significant work the Department is doing to posture American forces and4766the U.S.-Japan Alliance to more effectively deter China. It also4767reflects the progress the Alliance has made towards improving4768interoperability and Japan's own advances in strengthening its4769indigenous capabilities. Through this process, the Department will4770improve U.S.-Japan cooperation on joint operations capabilities as4771Japan establishes its own joint operations command and USFJ expands its4772missions, operations capabilities, and authorities. Developing joint4773warfighting capabilities and enhancing interoperability with Japan will4774greatly strengthen our deterrence posture in the Indo-Pacific region,4775and, if necessary, ultimately allow the Alliance to prevail in a4776conflict.4777    Transforming USFJ into a joint force headquarters (HQ) that can4778more effectively conduct operational activities in Japan - operating as4779a warfighting HQ, if required - and better coordinate with Japan Joint4780Operations Center requires a phased approach. In March, the Secretary4781announced the commencement of Phase One of the upgrade of USFJ to a4782joint force HQ. The most important aspect of this phased approach is4783the expansion of USFJ missions, operational capabilities, and4784authorities.4785    The Department's priority is enhancing the functions of the joint4786force HQ and providing necessary resources for USFJ. The Department4787will carefully review USINDOPACOM resource requirements as we continue4788work to delineate the roles, missions, and functions of the upgraded4789USFJ.4790    Ms. Sherrill. Last month, Secretary Hegseth visited Japan where he4791announced the commencement of phase one in upgrading US Forces Japan4792(USFJ) into a Joint Forces Headquarters. This is a vital step in4793strengthening the US-Japan security alliance and will encourage the4794Japanese government to continue modernizing the Japanese Self-Defense4795Forces. Why do you believe it is important for the US to strengthen its4796military partnership with Japan and establish a Joint Forces4797Headquarters?4798    a. What is the estimated timeline and what are the key milestones4799for upgrading USFJ to full Joint Forces Headquarters?4800    b. Are you considering increasing the number of service members4801stationed in Japan as the Joint Forces Head Quarters is established?4802    Admiral Paparo. The alliance with Japan is vital for Indo-Pacific4803stability and security. Establishing a Joint Force Headquarters for4804U.S. Forces Japan deepens our alliance and integrates us with Japan's4805Self-Defense Forces. This headquarters enhances cross-domain4806coordination (land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace), enabling faster4807decision-making and increased interoperability. We expect full4808implementation within three to five years. Phase one, currently4809underway, focuses on structural changes and aligning operational4810commands to establish command-and-control mechanisms for better joint4811and bilateral force integration in Japan. For example, USFJ serves as a4812standalone Joint Force Headquarters separate from 5th Air Force and its4813other service components in Japan. Phase two will establish integrated4814advanced planning and expand joint capabilities, including further4815U.S.-Japan personnel integration. Additionally, Phase three will4816represent the fully manned and equipped Joint Force Headquarters to4817fulfill all operations through the continuum of conflict and range of4818military operations. USFJ achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC)4819in March 2025 with enhancements to their Headquarters. USFJ is4820comprised of three directorates: the Joint Staff, the Alliance4821Management Directorate, and the Japan Joint Operations Center (JJOC)4822Cooperation Team (JCT). The Joint Staff and the Alliance Management4823Directorate will continue their legacy mission. The recently4824established JCT is based out of Akasaka Press Center/Hardy Barracks and4825represents a tangible commitment to enhancing operational synergy4826between USFJ and JSDF. This transformation drives interoperability by4827streamlining communication and coordination for a more seamless4828response to crises, including natural disasters and security threats.4829The JCT reflects the deepening of our alliance with Japan and our4830shared commitment to regional security. The USFJ upgrade will involve4831personnel growth to support enhanced headquarters functions. These4832adjustments will ensure we have the right people, skills, and4833positioning to effectively execute our mission and deepen cooperation4834with Japan. Currently, USINDOPACOM is already using assigned forces to4835augment USFJ in support of its transformation as a JFHQ. We will4836continue to assess personnel requirements as the headquarters develops4837while optimizing force structure for bilateral operations. Any4838adjustments will balance strategic goals, efficiency requirements, and4839integration with our Japanese counterparts. We will continue to keep4840Congress apprised as the transformation continues.4841    Ms. Sherrill. Do you believe that the PRC is closely watching the4842Russian invasion of Ukraine and are you aware of Russia sharing any4843lessons learned from the conflict with the PRC? a. Have you seen the4844People's Liberation Army incorporate any lessons learned from Russia's4845invasion of Ukraine?4846    b. How do you believe Ukraine's ability to resist the Russian4847invasion has influenced the PRC's calculus for a potential invasion of4848Taiwan?4849    c. Do you believe the US and our allies' military support for4850Ukraine and Russia's failure to achieve a quick victory have had a4851deterrent effect on the PRC's possible invasion of Taiwan?4852    Admiral Paparo. China is clearly studying and applying lessons from4853Ukraine, particularly in information warfare, international support,4854defense self-sufficiency, and economic resilience. These lessons are4855shaping Chinese military operations and wartime doctrine. Taiwan has4856also learned valuable lessons about deterring a more powerful4857aggressor. We are working with Taiwan to modernize their capabilities4858and develop new operational concepts under the Taiwan Relations Act.4859                                 ______48604861             RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GIMENEZ4862    Mr. Gimenez. In the written testimony you provided, you mention the4863grave concern of alliances between China, Russia, and North Korea.4864We've also seen recently that North Korea deployed troops to support4865the Russian war in Ukraine, with reports yesterday that several Chinese4866nationals working with Russian Forces were taken prisoner by Ukrainian4867forces. How do we make the message clear to our allies and partners4868that they need to increase their defense spending, given this increased4869cooperation amongst malign and adversarial nations?4870    General Brunson. The U.S. continues to expose cooperation between4871our adversaries, particularly China, Russia, and the DPRK. Our network4872of allies and partners in the INDOPACOM Area of Responsibility (AOR)4873have responded positively to counter that cooperation and maintain our4874"Fight Tonight" readiness. One prominent example of this cooperation4875revolves around our allies' commitment to the Regional Sustainment4876Framework (RSF) initiative. More than an economic decision for our4877regional partners, our allies recognize the benefits of maintaining,4878repairing, and overhauling U.S. forces ships, aircraft, and major4879equipment in theater. The RSF decreases the "tyranny of distance" in4880sending major end items back to CONUS for repair, keeping them in the4881area for rapid repair and return to warfighting readiness. Faced with4882evolving security challenges on the Korean peninsula and within the4883INDOPACOM AOR, USFK is committed to modernizing its sustainment4884strategy in coordination with our allies and partners to ensure4885agility, effectiveness, and ability to provide a responsive force4886posture capable of supporting both peacetime and crisis scenarios.4887Through continued collaboration between USFK and our allies and4888partners in the region, we are effectively countering the cooperation4889of our adversaries and ensuring we are collectively able to fight and4890win as a team.4891    Mr. Gimenez. In your provided statement, you mention the transition4892to advanced platforms like upgraded ships and new aircraft as a4893required military capability for INDOPACOM. This committee has been4894very focused on Defense Acquisition Processes, and I have concerns4895about our current system producing capabilities for the warfighter in a4896reasonable time. What is your assessment of the current Defense4897Acquisitions Process, do you believe it is producing capabilities for4898the warfighter and speed and scale necessary to deter adversaries like4899China? What changes would you make to the current Acquisitions process?4900As the USINDOPACOM Commander, what struggles do you have with4901individual service components holding most of the buying power for the4902DoD?4903    Admiral Paparo. I need acquisition processes that deliver4904capabilities at the speed and scale required to maintain our4905competitive advantage against China's rapidly advancing military4906modernization. Traditional 10-15 year timelines fail to match4907technological change and our operational requirements in the Indo-4908Pacific. I advocate for expanded rapid acquisition authorities,4909increased experimentation, and greater combatant commander influence4910over procurement decisions to ensure we field the joint, integrated4911capabilities required in the Indo-Pacific.4912                                 ______49134914              RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RYAN4915    Mr. Ryan. Commercial capabilities for AI and data integration are4916able to provide a common operating picture and enable effective C2 in4917order to increase joint warfighting capability and AI-augmented4918decision to significantly increase the scale, speed, and accuracy of4919the targeting process. How are you using commercial capabilities to4920meet these needs, particularly with regard to supporting certain CJADC24921requirements and fill current capability gaps?4922    Admiral Paparo. My command leverages new technologies while4923investing in infrastructure improvements and cybersecurity to enhance4924operational flexibility. We collaborate with the Defense Innovation4925Unit to harness commercial technologies, strengthening our information4926processing and multi-domain data sharing across the Pacific. These4927partnerships and investments improve our ability to respond effectively4928to regional developments throughout the Indo-Pacific.4929                                 ______49304931              RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. DAVIS4932    Mr. Davis. In preparing for conflict in the Indo-Pacific, gathering4933granular, detailed data about how the Taiwanese and Chinese populations4934view the prospect of a potential invasion can be a critical element in4935how we use American soft power.4936    What are some of the innovative technologies and strategies4937INDOPACOM is using to establish strategic deterrence and assess4938Taiwan's capabilities in the event of a Chinese blockade or full-scale4939invasion?4940    Admiral Paparo. We use innovative technologies and strategies,4941including unmanned systems developed under Replicator, to enhance4942deterrence. We advocate for rapidly equipping Taiwan with asymmetric4943defensive systems and work closely with them, in accordance with the4944Taiwan Relations Act, to assess and enhance their ability to resist4945Chinese malign actions and aggression, including blockade or invasion.4946    Mr. Davis. As we assess force posture and influence across the4947Indo-Pacific, how is INDOPACOM incorporating human geography data and4948intelligence information-including localized sentiment, trust in4949institutions, behavioral patterns, and economic vulnerabilities-into4950its planning, intelligence, and operations? Do we have adequate4951capabilities to monitor and assess, at scale and with sufficient4952geographic precision, the cognitive and societal effects of both PRC4953and U.S. actions across the AOR? Specifically, do our existing4954capabilities support robust, data-driven measures of effectiveness to4955assess the impact of PRC and US operations, security cooperation, and4956influence efforts-particularly within China and partner nations4957targeted by PRC soft power and gray zone operations?4958    Admiral Paparo. We monitor key indicators of Chinese activity in4959the Indo-Pacific, but recognize the need to better understand the4960broader societal and cognitive impacts of both U.S. and Chinese4961actions. Improved data analysis capabilities would help measure the4962effectiveness of influence operations and countering CCP gray zone4963tactics. We leverage regional partnerships and information sharing4964networks to develop improved data-driven methodologies to enhance our4965assessments, contributing to regional stability and effective4966competition in the information domain.4967                                 ______49684969              RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TRAN4970    Mr. Tran. As cost-saving measures are being taken across the4971interagency, do you believe there is a greater need to leverage U.S.4972private capital to improve resiliency in the Indo-Pacific and push back4973against China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)? If so, what would that4974look like specifically?4975    Admiral Paparo. There is a critical need to leverage private4976capital given China's continued use of economic statecraft for4977influence. China shifted focus to smaller, green technology Belt and4978Road Initiative projects; offers at-cost communications technology4979under the Digital Silk Road; and use state-owned enterprises to invest4980in key industries and infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region and4981around the world. We must mobilize private equity to invest in enablers4982of lethality - digital infrastructure, energy, strategic ports,4983airfields, and logistics facilities - to support our military posture4984and positioning. Where the national security case exceeds the business4985case, we must use targeted government financing to maintain our4986advantage.4987    Mr. Tran. Huntington Ingalls recently signed an MOU for4988shipbuilding collaboration with South Korean shipyard, HD Hyundai Heavy4989Industries, which may pave the way for greater collaboration between4990our two countries. Do you think agreements such as these - whether they4991include maintenance or shipbuilding - will increase our ability to meet4992our readiness requirements? And what authorities are necessary for the4993services to utilize these kinds of strategic business relationships?4994    Admiral Paparo. Strategic partnerships like the one between4995Huntington Ingalls and HD Hyundai expand our defense industrial base,4996helping address naval maintenance and shipbuilding challenges. This4997agreement strengthens our alliance with South Korea. By maximizing4998these partnerships, we can significantly increase our ship-making4999capability. The PLA is building surface combatants at the rate of six5000per year. The United States is building surface combatants at the rate5001of 1.6 per year. While the PLA is building two submarines per year, the5002United States is presently producing 1.28 attack submarines per year.5003In terms of worldwide ship capacity, the United State is 1% of5004shipbuilding while the global total built in Korea is 23% and Japan is500515%. We've got to keep pace and avail ourselves of our partners' unique5006shipbuilding expertise where it makes sense, while we regain our own5007shipbuilding expertise in the United States.5008    Mr. Tran. As the Department continues to prioritize operational5009readiness and effectiveness, do you believe USINDOPACOM could benefit5010from gaining additional acquisition authorities? What are some examples5011of specific authorities that would be needed?5012    Admiral Paparo. USINDOPACOM requires rapidly developed solutions5013for critical capability gaps exceeding our current Service Component5014contracting capacity. I advocate for acquisition authority and5015increased resourcing for a Joint Rapid Capabilities Office solely5016focused on USINDOPACOM requirements to support this effort. We would5017work with Congress and the services to provide funding to expand and5018sustain these products once they are successfully demonstrated. The5019goal is to develop integrated minimum viable products that can be5020deployed rapidly to the joint force while production can be scaled to5021provide the mass required.5022                                 ______50235024              RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BELL5025    Mr. Bell. With the current Administration dismantling USAID and5026global programs committed to soft diplomacy, what steps is the5027Administration taking to counter China's expanding influence through5028the Belt and Road Initiative and military diplomacy?5029    Mr. Noh. The United States has a strong interest in a securing a5030free and open Indo-Pacific. I will defer to the State Department to5031outline the Administration's diplomatic efforts to counter China's5032growing influence. For the DoD, we are focused on deterring China by5033strengthening our own force posture and capabilities and assisting our5034allies and partners throughout the region to strengthen their own5035defense capabilities.5036    Mr. Bell. We have seen China expand its footprint among Pacific5037Island nations, resulting in nations switching diplomatic recognition5038from Taiwan to China and some signing security agreements with China.5039    Does the Administration have a plan to implement further military5040and security cooperation with Pacific Island nations?5041    Mr. Noh. In the Pacific Islands region, we are accelerating force5042posture projects as part of an overall effort to reestablish deterrence5043in the Indo-Pacific. This includes the Freely Associated States, where5044we enjoy exclusive access rights under the Compacts of Free Association5045and related agreements. The Department also continues to build capacity5046in the Pacific Islands through the DoD State Partnership Program as5047well as regular exercises.5048    Mr. Bell. How is USINDOPACOM addressing China's growing military5049presence and activities, particularly in the South China Sea, Taiwan5050Strait, and the Indo-Pacific region as a whole?5051    Admiral Paparo. Our strategy prioritizes operations and activities5052in the Western Pacific and South China Sea, positioning us to deter5053Chinese aggression and assure allies and partners of our commitment to5054shared interests and security. We are improving interoperability with5055capable and willing allies and partners while expanding the scope and5056scale of bilateral and multilateral exercises and operations.5057Additionally, we are improving our posture and access in U.S. and5058allied territories to keep forces forward longer, while conducting5059operations, activities, and investments to build allied resilience,5060promote innovation cooperation, and increase defense industrial base5061capacity across the region.5062    Mr. Bell. I want to ask you about the F-15EX. With the vast5063geographic expanse of the INDOPACOM region, how valuable is the F-506415EX's extended range and payload capacity in sustaining operations5065across the Pacific?5066    Admiral Paparo. Due to its excellent range, diverse large capacity5067payload options, and multi mission capability, the F-15EX is especially5068well suited for operations in the Indo-Pacific Theater and would5069provide me tremendous capability. It expands decision space through its5070long-range strike, air defense, and maritime domain awareness5071capabilities. Its advanced radar, open mission systems architecture,5072and electronic warfare suite enable effective integration with our 5th5073generation aircraft. The F-15EX directly supports our rapid response5074requirements and contingency options in the Indo-Pacific.5075    Mr. Bell. How does the F-15EX's ability to carry stand-off weapons5076like hypersonic missiles enhance your ability to hold targets at risk5077and maintain deterrence?5078    Admiral Paparo. Diverse long-range precision fires and platforms5079across all domains strengthen our deterrence posture and operational5080resilience. I advocate for a variety of hypersonic strike capabilities,5081including through the F-15EX platform, which provides a flexible and5082survivable capability that adversaries cannot easily counter. The F-508315EX's characteristics enhance our ability to strike emerging targets5084and expand our planning options across the theater.5085    Mr. Bell. Several Indo-Pacific allies still operate legacy F-155086variants. Does the F-15EX provide unique opportunities for5087interoperability, training or burden-sharing with key partners like5088Japan and South Korea?5089    Admiral Paparo. [No answer was available at the time of5090publication.]50915092                                  [all]