Censorship-Industrial Complex: The Need for First Amendment Safeguards at the State Department

1[House Hearing, 119 Congress]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34                 A RETURN TO MAXIMUM PRESSURE: COMPREHEN-5                SIVELY COUNTERING THE IRANIAN REGIME'S6                MALIGN ACTIVITIES REGIME'S MALIGN ACTIVITIES78=======================================================================910                                HEARING1112                               BEFORE THE1314                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS15                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES1617                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS1819                             FIRST SESSION2021                               __________2223                             April 1, 20252425                               __________2627                           Serial No. 119-102829                               __________3031        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs3233[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]3435Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov, http://docs.house.gov,36                       or http://www.govinfo.gov3738                               __________3940                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE4160-454 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 20254243-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------4445                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS4647                    BRIAN J. MAST, Florida, Chairman48MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York,49CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey         Ranking Member50JOE WILSON,, South Carolina          BRAD SHERMAN, California51SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia52DARRELL ISSA, California             WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts53TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee              AMI BERA, California54MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee             JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas55ANDY BARR, Kentucky                  DINA TITUS, Nevada56RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 TED LIEU, California57YOUNG KIM, California                SARA JACOBS, California58MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida        SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK,59BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan                  Florida60AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN,       GREG STANTON, Arizona61    American Samoa                   JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida62WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio                JONATHAN L. JACKSON, Illinois63JAMES R. BAIRD, Indiana              SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California64THOMAS H. KEAN, JR, New Jersey       JIM COSTA, California65MICHAEL LAWLER, New York             GABE AMO, Rhode Island66CORY MILLS, Florida                  KWEISI MFUME, Maryland67KEITH SELF, Texas                    PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington68RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana               GEORGE LATIMER, New York69JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam                JOHNNY OLSZEWSKI Jr, Maryland70ANNA PAULINA LUNA, Florida           JULIE JOHNSON, Texas71JEFFERSON SHREVE, Indiana            SARAH McBRIDE, Delaware72SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina          BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois73MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington      MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania74RYAN MACKENZIE, Pennsylvania7576              James Langenderfer, Majority Staff Director77                 Sajit Gandhi, Minority Staff Director7879                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S8081                              ----------8283                            REPRESENTATIVES8485                                                                   Page86Opening Statement of Chairman Brian Mast.........................     187Opening Statement of Subcommittee Chairman Michael Lawler........     288Opening Statement of Ranking Member Gregory W. Meeks.............     38990                               WITNESSES9192Statement of Norman T. Roule, Non-Resident Senior Advisor,93  Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program, The Center94  For Strategic and International Studies........................     595  Prepared Statement.............................................     896Statement of Claire Jungman, Chief of Staff, United Against97  Nuclear Iran...................................................    1598  Prepared Statement.............................................    1799Statement of Dana Stroul, Director of Research and Shelly and100  Michael Kassen Senior Fellow, The Washington Institute For Near101  East Policy....................................................    29102  Prepared Statement.............................................    31103104                                APPENDIX105106Hearing Notice...................................................    76107Hearing Minutes..................................................    78108Hearing Attendance...............................................    79109110 A RETURN TO MAXIMUM PRESSURE: COMPREHENSIVELY COUNTERING THE IRANIAN111         REGIME'S MALIGN ACTIVITIES REGIME'S MALIGN ACTIVITIES112113                              ----------114115                         Tuesday, April 1, 2025116117                  House of Representatives,118                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,119                                                    Washington, DC.120121    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in122room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brian123Mastchairman of the committee) presiding.124    Chairman Mast. The Committee on Foreign Affairs will come125to order.126    I ask everybody to rise and join me in reciting the Pledge127of Allegiance.128    All. I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States129of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one130Nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for131all.132133            OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BRIAN MAST134135    Chairman Mast. As we open this hearing to outline maximum136pressure on Iran, I'm going to deliver just a short message137before I pass this gavel off to Mr. Lawler, who will actually138be chairing this hearing, as he has a keen interest in the139issues, as all of us do, and a firm knowledge in everything140that we are about to discuss. And because I stole this hearing141from him--he was going to do it at the subcommittee level--I142thought it would only be right that he chair this committee.143So, he will be doing that.144    But the message that I wish to deliver is this, and it is145simply to Ayatollah Khamenei, and I would deliver this to you:146President Trump will work with you to peacefully end your147nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program or President148Trump will destroy your nuclear weapons and ballistic missile149program. You get to choose the remedy, Ayatollah.150    I now pass the gavel to Mr. Lawler.151    Mr. Lawler. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Chairman.152    The purpose of this hearing is to explore policy options to153effectively curtail Iran's illicit revenue streams and address154the nexus with Iran's malign activities, particularly relating155to its sponsorship of terror proxies and the nuclear weapons156program.157    I now recognize myself for an opening statement.158159   OPENING STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN MICHAEL LAWLER160161    Mr. Lawler.Good afternoon.162    And again, thank you, Chairman Mast, for putting on this163hearing, and to Ranking Member Meeks, for presiding today.164    I also want to thank our witnesses for their expertise and165their attention to this pressing matter.166    When President Trump left office over 4 years ago, the167Iranian regime and its terror proxies were on their heels. The168Trump administration's maximum pressure policy had devastated169Iran's economy and denied the regime access to critical170resources.171    Diplomatically, Iran was cornered and isolated like never172before. The Abraham Accords saw Israel normalize relations with173three Arab nations. It was a direct blow to Iran's influence174and put the Middle East on a path toward unity against Tehran's175aggression.176    Militarily, the message was unmistakable: the United States177would not flinch. The decisive strike that took out Soleimani,178Iran's mastermind of its terror proxies, crushed Iran's179confidence and deterred provocations.180    By 2021, the Middle East stood on the brink of a new era of181peace and stability. Iran was contained, its proxies weakened,182and the region almost freed from the looming threat of Iranian183terror.184    Enter Joe Biden. President Biden desperately tried to185revive a dead nuclear deal with Iran. Even as the regime186continued to expand its nuclear program in violation of its187non-proliferation-treaty-related obligations, the Biden188administration pursued deals that would have provided the189regime with sanctions relief, while also allowing it to190continue to expand its enrichment capabilities, including with191support from Russia.192    And when the Biden administration came up short on a193nuclear deal, it pursued a misguided $6 billion giveaway to194Iran. And less than 2 months later, Hamas, with support from195Iran, launched the heinous October 7th terrorist attack on196Israel.197    Under the last administration, we occasionally heard tough198language, but that was rarely backed-up with concrete action.199This lack of resolve emboldened Iran and its proxies, offering200them a free hand to escalate attacks against the United States201and its partners and allies--with few, if any, consequences.202    Under the Biden administration, Iran, China, and Russia203joined forces to form an unholy alliance aimed at destabilizing204the free world. Yet, even as Iranian missiles and drones were205targeting Israel, fueling Putin's illegal war of aggression206against Ukraine, and being used to threaten U.S. service207members, the Biden administration did little to prevent the208lapse of the U.N.'s missile embargo on Iran in October 2023. As209a result, Iran now has a free hand to proliferate its missiles210and long-range drones unchecked.211    Joe Biden's foreign policy decisions in the Middle East212were ill-conceived, disorganized, and at times fatal, including213for U.S. service members, as we tragically saw at Tower 22 in214Jordan. And in the end, he left the world more volatile and215less safe than he found it.216    It is clear that the Biden administration's blatant refusal217to enforce sanctions against Iran contributed to instability218across the region and the globe. Under his administration, we219witnessed an unprecedented trade in illicit oil between Iran220and China, opening a lifeline for the IRGC to fund its malign221activities.222    It didn't work. Appeasing terrorists does not work. And223that is why I'm pleased that President Trump has since put U.S.224policy toward Iran back on track--restoring the much-needed and225most effective maximum pressure campaign.226    Since taking office just over 2 months ago, the Trump227administration has made great strides to implement an228aggressive and comprehensive Iran policy that restores much-229needed deterrence. This is a welcome change from the days of230handwringing we saw under President Biden, whose policy toward231Iran was all carrots and no sticks.232    The strategy now is to execute the maximum pressure233campaign and deny the regime every ounce of grace given to them234by the Biden administration. As part of this strategy, we must235clamp down on the Iranian oil trade. Last year, Iran made over236$50 billion from its illicit oil trade, much of which is237controlled by its Revolutionary Guard Corps.238    As part of the maximum pressure, we must fully enforce239existing sanctions to stop this illicit oil trade,240specifically, cutting off Iran's oil trade with China, which241accounts for, roughly, 90 percent of oil exports.242    We must also take all available steps to stop Iran from243ever obtaining a nuclear weapon. A nuclear Iran is not an244option, and the safety of the American people and everything we245love is dependent on our success here. One way or another,246Iran's nuclear ambitions are finished. And once Iran loses hope247for nuclear capacity and we have decimated their bank accounts248with the halt of the oil trade, they won't be able to fund249terror proxies any longer.250    President Trump's support for Israel and the war against251Iran-backed terror is absolute, and I hope to see other252partners in the region step up their commitment to working with253the United States and Israel to address this shared threat, to254ensure Iran no longer threatens our security or that of the255free world.256    As this hearing will demonstrate, there are a number of257measures that can and should be taken, and I look forward to258exploring that with our witnesses today and seeing the path259forward.260    I now recognize Ranking Member Meeks for his opening261remarks.262263       OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER GREGORY MEEKS264265    Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Lawler, and I want to thank266Chairman Mast for calling this timely hearing.267    Thank you to all of our witnesses for joining us this268afternoon.269    There is strong bipartisan understanding on this committee270regarding the threat posed by the government of Iran, the271world's foremost State sponsor of terrorism, and how it272threatens the United States, Israel, the broader Middle East,273and the entire globe.274    With our quality panel, I know we will leave this hearing275better informed on various aspects of the Iranian threat--276ranging from its illicit nuclear program to support of277terrorist proxies.278    We are living in a dangerous time when it comes to Iran.279Over the last year, we have seen Iranian proxies attempt to280destroy Israel. Hundreds of ballistic missiles and drones281launched by Iran threatened Israelis and Palestinians alike.282    The United States Armed Forces have been targeted in283hundreds of Iranian-sponsored attacks. An Iranian proxy has284crippled shipping through the Red Sea and directly targeted the285U.S. Navy in international waters.286    Iranian drones are aiding Vladimir Putin in his illegal and287brutal war on Ukraine, and China continues to purchase Iranian288oil in the face of U.S. sanctions.289    We know, based upon public reports, though, that Iran is290now closer than ever to having a nuclear weapons capability.291Now, during the time of the JCPOA agreement, Iran was292verifiably at least a year away from having enough highly293enriched uranium for a single bomb. But, as a result of the294Trump administration, because he was the President before295Biden, as a result of him abandoning that agreement, Iran is296now only days away from having enough highly enriched uranium297for many bombs. By every measure, we are less safe today298because we left the JCPOA than we were while we were in that299agreement.300    We are now reading press reports that Prime Minister301Netanyahu is planning a potential military strike on Iranian302nuclear infrastructure as soon as this month. And reporting303indicates that Mr. Netanyahu is aggressively lobbying President304Trump to support such a strike.305    A military strike on Iran is no easy task, not a sure306thing, and comes with significant risk of escalating into a307destructive regional conflict. It is unlikely to deter Iran's308nuclear weapons aspirations for a significant period of time309and could have enormous impact on regional security, as well as310the United States and global economies.311    You may have noticed that the U.S. economy is already312facing troubling volatility, as a result of the President's313reckless threats of tariffs. Rattling energy markets,314disturbing trade routes, and unleashing additional regional315instability is not something to be taken lightly.316    So, no military solution will permanently deny Iran the317bomb, nor will it usher in a democratic Iranian government.318That's pure fantasy.319    Like most observers of Iran, I'm acutely certain both the320Iranian and American people would be better served by Iranian321leadership who respect human rights at home and peace abroad. I322hope we can protect foreign assistance efforts that support the323Iranian people from further arbitrary cuts.324    We know Iranians do not broadly support their corrupt325theocratic government that abuses women and minorities and326wastes Iran's financial resources supporting terrorists that327undermine their own security and bring no benefit to the328Iranian people.329    Despite all these serious challenges, solutions are not330impossible. I would always argue that diplomacy must always be331kept on the table alongside credible threats. Diplomacy may not332solve all of our challenge with Iran, but direct engagement333with Iran has proven successful in lowering tensions and334addressing the nuclear program--the main issue of concern.335    President Trump was right to send a letter to Iranian336leaders opening the door to diplomatic engagement. We must337encourage this effort and utilize all means of American power338to address Iranian threats and to do so in lockstep with our339allies. We should be involving our allies and bringing them in340closer for this effort, not push them away.341    We have three excellent witnesses with us today to help342think through the challenges before us. This is an excellent343panel to assess the threats posed by Iran and help us formulate344appropriate responses to keep the United States and our friends345and allies safe.346    So, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.347    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Ranking Members Meeks.348    Other members of the committee are reminded that opening349statements may be submitted for the record.350    [No statements have been submitted:]351    Mr. Lawler. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of352witnesses before us today on this important topic.353    Mr. Norman T. Roule, non-resident senior advisor, Warfare,354Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program, The Center for355Strategic and International Studies.356    Ms. Claire Jungman, chief of staff, United Against Nuclear357Iran.358    And Ms. Dana Stroul, director of research and Shelly and359Michael Kassen Senior Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near360East Policy.361    This committee recognizes the importance of the issues362before us and is grateful to have you here to speak with us363today.364    Your full statements will be made part of the record, and I365will ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks to 5 minutes366in order to allow more time for member questions.367    I now recognize Mr. Roule for his opening statement.368369                  STATEMENT OF NORMAN T. ROULE370371    Mr. Roule. Chair Lawler, Ranking Member Meeks, and372distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the373opportunity to appear today. I will make brief comments, and374with your concurrence, submit a statement for the record.375    For over two decades, Iran has used its nuclear program and376regional militias as its primary tools of power projection.377Tehran's role in the death of hundreds of Americans and tens of378thousands of citizens in the Middle East is routinely379acknowledged. Iran's missiles and drones kill Ukrainians and380threaten global shipping in the Red Sea.381    But it has evaded meaningful consequences, in part, due to382Western concerns that it would respond to significant383retaliation by undertaking the final steps to acquire a nuclear384weapon. These aggressive policies gradually have become385entwined as Iran's malign sword and shield of its foreign386policy. Recent seismic changes in the region give us an387unprecedented opportunity to deal with these challenges.388    Despite the intelligence community's assessment that Iran389is not undertaking nuclear weaponization, recent reports by the390International Atomic Energy Agency are alarming. Tehran has391built a nuclear program which has no justifiable civilian392purpose. Iran now appears capable of producing its first393quantity of 90 percent enriched uranium, sufficient for one394nuclear weapon, in about a week. Tehran's current stockpile of39560 percent enriched uranium is sufficient for about seven396nuclear weapons. Assuming use of Iran's entire stock of397enriched uranium and centrifuge capacity, some experts believe398Iran could produce fissile material sufficient for399approximately 10 nuclear weapons in a month. Let those numbers400sink in.401    Tehran has also increased the number and sophistication of402its centrifuge cascades, allowing for rapid weaponization when403it so chooses. Iran routinely hampers IAEA efforts to verify404its nuclear program, which, absence solid intelligence, reduces405confidence in detecting any diversion of nuclear material or406equipment to any possible covert weapons program.407    In short, Iran looks like a country building a nuclear408weapons program, albeit one yet to make the final steps409required, because it either fears discovery and the subsequent410military consequences or believes its current approach offers411diplomatic advantages beyond those found in possession of an412actual nuclear weapon. Its long-range ballistic missile program413appears to be following a similar path.414    Turning to Tehran's proxy network, Israeli and ongoing U.S.415military actions have severely weakened its proxies in Lebanon,416Gaza, Syria, and Yemen, but these groups survive along with its417other partners in the region. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard418Corps Quds Force aims to revive these groups, including in the419Red Sea region, where its strategy involves securing naval420access via Sudan, where it likely hopes to establish weapons421transshipment and militant training centers in East Africa to422threaten the Arabian Peninsula, Israel, and the Eastern423Mediterranean.424    Iran's proxy operations remain vulnerable, however, to425pressure on their logistics, finances, and personnel.426Diplomatic and economic sanctions are important, although427Europe's actions here have been insufficient. The United States428needs to make it clear to Iran that, if the Quds Force operates429as a terrorist organization, its personnel and logistics will430be targeted accordingly, including by our military assets.431Yemen presents an opportunity to demonstrate this decision.432    Tehran recognizes its unprecedented vulnerability to433external military threats, particularly after Israel's October4342024 strikes demonstrated the ineffectiveness of their air435defenses. The Israeli strikes and Iran's failed counterattacks436also show the potency of U.S. military technology and our437regional partnerships.438    Domestically, Iran faces severe economic and political439challenges which exceed its policy capabilities. Millions of440Iranians have fallen into poverty in recent years. Inflation441hovers at 35 percent. The return of the maximum pressure442sanctions campaign has accelerated the collapse of Iran's443currency against the dollar. The regime now appears to resemble444the late Soviet Union, holding power through coercion and stale445ideology.446    Between 2002 and 2003, and then, between 2013 and 2014,447Iran navigated similar Western military threats, regional448instability, and domestic discontent by blending belligerent449rhetoric with lengthy diplomatic talks designed to soften450sanctions. Tehran avoided actions which could have sparked a451conventional war with the United States.452    This strategy led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of453Action. This deal committed Tehran to potentially reversible454nuclear concessions in exchange for long-term or permanent455sanctions relief that it used to sustain the regime and456resource its regional militias and missile program.457    We and our partners must use this period to foster debate458among Iran's leadership that leads to the abandonment of459regional adventurism and the pursuit of a nuclear weapon.460    Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your461comments and questions.462    [The prepared statement of Mr. Roule follows:]463    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]464465    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Roule.466    I now recognize Ms. Jungman for her opening statement.467468                  STATEMENT OF CLAIRE JUNGMAN469470    Ms. Jungman. Chairman Lawler, Ranking Member Meeks, and471members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to472testify today.473    The topic of this hearing and disrupting Iran's malign474behavior is a matter of urgent national security. At the heart475of Iran's malign behavior is its oil sector. Despite U.S.476sanctions, Iran continues to export over 1.5 million barrels of477oil per day, earning tens of billions of dollars annually.478These revenues are not just supporting Iran's economic; they479are directly funding terrorism, nuclear escalation, and480regional destabilization.481    That's because up to half of Iran's oil exports are now482controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC.483This means that every barrel of Iranian oil sold on the black484market strengthens the IRGC's hand, bankrolling groups like485Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis--underwriting weapons486development and fueling nuclear expansion.487    We have seen the consequences. Iran-backed militants have488launched attacks across the region, emboldened by the financial489cushion that oil exports have provided. New enforcement actions490in late 2024, including designations on nearly 50 tankers and491sanctions on Chinese refiners, have started to make an impact.492    Iran's oil exports have dipped and its access to hard493currency is beginning to tighten. But this campaign must494continue and expand. The goal should be to drive Iran's oil495revenues as close to zero as possible, cutting off the496financial oxygen that allows the regime to operate abroad and497repress at home.498    Beyond oil, Iran is increasingly turning to other illicit499revenue streams: crypto mining and laundering, shadow banking500networks, dollar smuggling from Iraq, and barter trade with501Russia and Syria. These activities are harder to track, but502deeply dangerous.503    In total, we estimate Iran has generated over $100 billion504in oil revenues since 2021 and additional billions through505crypto and smuggling networks. These funds have empowered its506proxies and enabled nuclear brinksmanship, but sanctions can507still work. When properly enforced, they limit Iran's budget,508disrupt its ability to pay militias, and increase the costs of509escalation.510    To that end, I offer a few recommendations:511    First, continue aggressive enforcement against Iran's ghost512fleet and shipping facilitators. Sanction every vessel,513registry, insurer, captain, and port that helps move Iranian514oil.515    Second, target foreign enablers, especially in China and516Malaysia, who knowingly buy or store Iranian crude.517    Third, expand maritime interdictions and use AI tools to518identify suspicious tanker behavior in real time. Each vessel519seized directly cuts into Iran's revenue and deters further520evasion.521    Fourth, establish a multilateral task force, modeled on the522Russian sanctions coordination effort, to enable real-time523intelligence-sharing on Iranian oil smuggling, front companies,524and crypto laundering. Unified action will help close off525evasion pathways faster and more effectively.526    Fifth, strengthen crypto enforcement by tracing wallets527linked to Iran and sanctioning mining operations.528    And finally, Congress should ensure that secondary529sanctions remain a powerful deterrent, holding accountable any530foreign entity that transacts with the IRGC or its proxies.531    In closing, the United States must send a clear message:532Iran cannot continue to fund terrorism, threaten its neighbors,533and defy nuclear commitments without consequences. We must534remain united, vigilant, and unyielding in our pursuit of535financial pressure. Because cutting off the money is our best536tool to constrain Iran's most dangerous activities.537    Thank you.538    [The prepared statement of Ms. Jungman follows:]539    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]540541    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Ms. Jungman.542    I now recognize Ms. Stroul for her opening statement.543544                    STATEMENT OF DANA STROUL545546    Ms. Stroul. Chairman Lawler, Ranking Member Meeks, and547distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the548opportunity to testify today.549    Let me associate myself with Mr. Roule; the Iranian regime550is on its back foot. The pillars of its security strategy--the551nuclear weapons program, the network of terrorists and proxies,552and the conventional missile and drone arsenal--are more553vulnerable today than at any time in the history of the regime,554making 2025 a decisive year.555    In the aftermath of Hamas' attack, Israel, with U.S.556support, dismantled Iran's proxy network in Gaza, Lebanon, and557elsewhere, disrupting the regime's ability to project power558through asymmetric capabilities.559    In Syria, Tehran lost its regional strategic partner with560the ouster of Bashar al-Assad, who permitted the use of Syrian561territory for Iranian terror.562    From the validation of a U.S.-led regional air defense563coalition in April of last year to Israel's defeat of a large-564scale ballistic missile attack last October, we now know that565Iran's complex conventional attacks and missile threats can be566defeated. Israel's strikes inside Iran targeted key missile567production facilities and degraded its strategic air defense568systems.569    In addition, the regime is under economic and social570pressure. The sanctions architecture from the 2019 maximum571pressure campaign remains in place and has been strengthened.572    The window is open for the United States to work with its573partners and advance opportunities in a region no longer held574back by Iran's nefarious influence. To emphasize, this is a575window of opportunity. How the United States proceeds in the576coming months will determine whether a more stable and secure577region emerges from the post-October 7th environment.578    In the coming months, the administration should test579Tehran's willingness to reach a diplomatic agreement, while580also preparing to set the nuclear weapons program back through581military means. A good deal, as National Security Advisory582Waltz emphasized, would be one that permanently blocks Iran583from obtaining a nuclear weapon rather than just delaying its584capability.585    Yet, the time window to test Iran's openness to negotiate586is short, partly due to the looming October expiration of587remaining U.N. Security Council restrictions and, also, because588of Iran's current exposure to military strikes.589    Policymakers should assume that Russia and China will help590Iran rebuild its military capacity and air defenses. Moscow and591Beijing are already supporting Tehran diplomatically. So,592Washington will need to prepare for a complex negotiation in593which these powers do not contribute to a diplomatic process594like they did as part of the P5+1.595    The following steps will strengthen the U.S. hand as it596pursues a negotiated settlement:597    The administration can incentivize Iran to negotiate by598articulating how sanctions relief would be structured if Iran599dismantles its nuclear weapons program.600    The administration must keep its military options open by601maintaining a robust U.S. military posture in the region;602strengthening regional air and missile defense capabilities,603and reinforcing America's commitment to deterring Iranian604aggression against Israel and Arab allies.605    Congress can begin the process to conditionally authorize606the use of military force against Iran's nuclear program if the607regime proves unwilling to quickly take sufficient steps.608    Consultations with allies and partners, particularly in the609Middle East and Europe, will ensure a unified approach to610countering Iran, reinforce the legitimacy of any negotiated611settlement, and maintain pressure on Tehran. This will be612crucial to blunting spoiler policies from Russia and China.613    Engaging regional leaders is also essential for preventing614Iran from reconstituting its threat network. Providing military615assistance and intelligence-sharing to partners will enhance616their ability to counter Iran.617    Restoring assistance to emerging leaders, while pressing618for reforms, particularly in Lebanon and Syria, can further619incentivize cooperation, ensuring they remain resilient against620malign Iranian influence.621    In Yemen, the administration should ensure that its current622air campaign exclusively targets military assets of the Houthis623and mitigates civilian harm, while seeking ways to support the624Yemeni people.625    Increasing maritime and overland interdiction efforts will626prevent Iran from resupplying the Houthis.627    Additionally, working closely with the Saudis and Emirates628on a political process aimed at ending Yemen's civil war will629create a pathway for peace and stability.630    In conclusion, real opportunities exist to block Iran from631pursuing a nuclear weapons capability and consolidate military632gains against its destabilizing activities. To press the633advantage, the United States must be prepared to bring more to634the table.635    Military force and sanctions are critical elements of636strategy, but insufficient on their own. The United States must637lean into diplomacy as well, testing the possibility of a638negotiated settlement, while supporting new leaders across the639region that oppose Tehran's interest in rebuilding its axis of640resistance.641    Thank you.642    [The prepared statement of Ms. Stroul follows:]643    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]644645    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Ms. Stroul.646    I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.647    Last year, two of my bills that became law targeted Iran's648oil trade. The SHIP Act gave the President the authority to649sanction foreign ports and refineries that processed illicit650Iranian oil, and the Iran-China Energy Sanctions Act allowed651for sanctions against Chinese financial institutions that652processed transactions involving Iranian oil.653    And I'm currently working on legislation that further654expands sanctions authority, the Iran Enhanced Sanctions Act.655Anyone or any entity that knowingly facilitates the Iranian oil656trade will be found and cutoff until they are no longer doing657so.658    Ms. Jungman, just over a week ago, the President sanctioned659the Luqing Refinery in China under the SHIP Act authorities.660Have we seen any impact since this recent designation, and do661you believe this designation and the Trump administration's662clear intent to enforce more of these types of sanctions may663deter other refineries from continuing to accept Iranian oil?664    Ms. Jungman. Chairman Lawler, thank you for your question,665and thank you for your work on the SHIP Act and associated666acts.667    I do think that the first designations here on this668refinery, it's still a little bit too soon to see an impact,669given that it was only, you know, a week or so ago. But we need670more of these. One refinery designated doesn't have a big671impact. Iran is going to move its oil to be offloaded at672another refinery. We need to continue the pressure. We need to673continue the designations on the refineries and it shouldn't be674piecemeal. It needs to all happen at once in order to really675cut the lifeline.676    Mr. Lawler. Last week, reporting indicated that U.S. naval677forces stopped a group of oil tankers in the Gulf. While678originally thought to be Iraqi origin, they were found to be679using forged Iraqi documents and the tankers were Iranian.680    This instance really raises the larger issue of this being681a consistent problem in the Gulf. So, what do you believe we682are doing now to stop vessels from obscuring their origin? And683how our are allies and strategic partner countries like Iraq684helping us? And what more can be done?685    Ms. Jungman. Unfortunately, I don't think our strategic686partners are doing enough here. I think we need to have more687diplomatic engagement with them and encourage them to try to688stop these associated activities.689    We see Malaysia, Singapore, Iraq, Amman; these are all690serving as hubs for Iran to blend its oil, rebrand its oil, and691again, continue the lifeline of the oil to be exported. So, we692need to continue pressure on them and encourage more diplomatic693efforts from them.694    Mr. Lawler. Mr. Roule, you mentioned in your opening695statement that it's important to demonstrate the credibility of696a U.S. military offensive, should Iran undertake nuclear697weaponization in the future. What alternatives to diplomacy698would you recommend in attempting to constrain Iran's nuclear699program? And what other factors need to be considered before700any decision is made to pursue one of these.701    Mr. Roule. Diplomacy, of course, should remain our primary702route, and the President has appropriately made this the703forefront of his approach to the Iranians and engaged with our704partners. The Iranians must understand, if they complete the705final steps, that we will take that military final approach as706well.707    There needs to be more action done to prevent Iran from708acquiring the materiel they need to complete those last steps,709and we need to make sure that our partners who are providing710that equipment--the Chinese or the Europeans--shipping lines711are punished severely, as they move that material.712    But in the end of the day, Iran has pretty much everything713it needs to complete those last steps for its nuclear program.714Unfortunately, the can has been kicked down the road for many715years and we are at the end of the road. So, it's up to the716Iranians to take those last steps, and they either come to a717deal or they must face nuclear reaction--nuclear response,718military response.719    Mr. Lawler. So, given that the can has been kicked down the720road, what factors, in your estimation, need to be considered721before any decision is made to pursue a non-diplomatic722response?723    Mr. Roule. The location of the nuclear material. The IAEA724has lost track of some aspects of Iran's program because Iran725no longer provides full access to its production of centrifuge726equipment.727    We need to make sure we understand exactly where all of728Iran's sites are located, so that Iran simply doesn't reproduce729its program in an alternative facility730    And in the end, even if there is a military strike, sir,731we've got to make sure the Iranians understand our intent in732the long term is to prevent reconstruction, or simply, we are733going to be the process. So, it has got to be an international734approach that says, with the United States and its partners, we735are not going to tolerate Iran building a nuclear weapon.736    Mr. Lawler. Thank you.737    I now recognize Ranking Member Meeks for 5 minutes.738    Mr. Meeks. Thank you.739    Ms. Stroul, let me just go to you first. Thank you for your740service to our country.741    And I said in my opening remarks that there's more to be742done to try to bring Iran and the United States to the table to743negotiate the core issues of concern here, which is Iran's744nuclear program, because of that tough assignment.745    But I also believe that, you know, when I look at it thus746far, Iran's response has been that they reject talks with the747United States, but has left the door open to multilateral748diplomacy. And what was important for me at the time of749negotiating the JCPOA was that it was a multilateral agreement.750There were things that were going on in negotiations that our751allies wanted; that's how we got the agreement, because we752figured it wouldn't be just us by ourselves. So, as Mr. Roule753just said, getting them in, so that we could box Iran in,754because it is not just the United States; it is the United755States and our allies, which I think is important.756    And then, also, I think some credibility has been gone from757the United States when we unilaterally pulled out and the other758allies stayed in and wanted to work something together. So,759there's a lack of trust that then develops, you know, in that760regard on both sides.761    So, how do you think we could build some confidence with762our adversary Iran, so that we could begin negotiations? And763how do we bring back a diplomatic track with our allies, so764that we are not by ourselves? I think Mr. Roule just talked765about how significant and important that it is. How do you766think that we can do that?767    Ms. Stroul. Thank you so much for this question.768    I couldn't agree with you more that we have seen in the769past Iran has been willing to negotiate when it feels770diplomatic isolation, coupled with economic pressure and the771threat of military force.772    Right now, we have tremendous sanctions pressure, and I773believe there is a credible threat of military force on the774table. And there is a unilateral offer to negotiate from775President Trump, but what is missing is this multilateral776element.777    So, first of all, there is an eagerness in some of our778previous partners from the P5+1, specifically, in Europe, to779begin coordinating with Washington as soon as possible ahead of780this deadline in October, later this year, when the remaining781restrictions on Iran's nuclear program expire. Our European782allies--and they are still our allies--are very interested in783negotiating, in aligning with us in order to have a unified784front approaching Iran.785    Second, we have been using and relying on partners in the786Middle East to pass messages to Iran and receive messages from787Iran. I think that is very important, but our partners in the788Middle East also need to have confidence that, if the Iranians789lash out and threaten them or use military force against them,790like we saw in the 2015 situation, that Washington is going to791have their back and be willing to put security guarantees on792the table and support their defense, just as the United States793has done for Israel in supporting its defense.794    One is clarifying our commitment to our partners' defense.795Two is making a meaningful and genuine effort to include them796and consult with them on these talks. That will also strengthen797any negotiation on the other side.798    Mr. Meeks. Thank you.799    And this is to you again, Ms. Stroul and Mr. Roule.800Hopefully, we will have time to get both of you.801    Could you maybe tell us about the challenges that it would802be in setting back the Iranian nuclear program militarily?803Would there be any challenges? Are there challenges there? Mr.804Roule? Ms. Stroul?805    Ms. Stroul. I will try to do 20 seconds and hand it over to806Mr. Roule.807    So, the greatest challenge is that you cannot bomb away808knowledge. Iran has mastered the cycle of nuclear fuel809enrichment. And we know, based on intelligence community810reporting in an unclassified manner, that they are undertaking811the activities to position themselves to go across the812threshold and weaponize, should the Supreme Leader make the813decision to do so. So, we are at a perilous moment.814    Their nuclear program is geographically diverse. Some of it815is aboveground; some of it is buried deeply underground. This816means it is not a one-night military campaign. We are talking817about a serious campaign to set back a program in order to,818then, buy time to negotiate or figure out what steps would819happen on the other side of military action. It is a serious820piece of business.821    Mr. Meeks. I think my time has expired.822    Mr. Lawler. Thank you to the ranking member.823    I now recognize for 5 minutes the gentleman from South824Carolina, Mr. Wilson.825    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.826    And thank you for being here today.827    What an important topic, as we face the threat from Iran.828And to me, the regime in Tehran is very clear; they believe829death to Israel; death to America. They believe that by830developing a nuclear capability that would be existential to831Israel, it would be existential to the United States,832particularly, as they develop an ICBM capability, which could833only have one purpose, and that is to deliver a nuclear attack834on the American people.835    And so, over and over again, I'm so grateful to the836leadership of Donald Trump to let the dictatorship in Tehran837know that they should not develop a nuclear capability and838nuclear bomb, and it should not be developed.839    And then, we need to get to, if we determine they are not,840there must be actual verification, not some charade, of841determining whether it has been stopped or not. And so, I have842absolute faith.843    And I'm really grateful for Chairman Mast to bring up,844indeed, that we need to do all we can to stop the financing of845the dictatorship, with it being revealed that 90 percent of the846oil and gas being sold goes to the Chinese Communist Party.847Let's connect the dots, and then, we connect another dot.848    And I was very grateful for President Donald Trump over the849weekend to identify the dots that are connected between War850Criminal Putin and the sale of oil to maintain his dictatorship851and the call for secondary sanctions. And these will be852secondary sanctions that would be against allies of--not853against, but working with allies of the United States, that854they should be part of sanctions.855    So, over and over again, we are in a situation as we face856the malign influence, the topic today, and we have a857circumstance that is so clear to me, and that is that we are858involved in a war we did not choose. And that is dictators with859rule of gun invading democracies with rule of law.860    It began February 24, 2022, with the invasion of Ukraine.861Then, October 7, 2023, the puppets of Iran, Hamas invading862Israel. And then, over and over again, we just need to be863working together.864    And with that in mind, I would like each of you--but, in865particular, Mr. Roule--the issue of sanctions, what more866sanctions can we have? And I want you to know that many of my867colleagues here, that we have introduced a number of bills868today, the Maximum Support Act, bipartisan, with Congressman869Jimmy Panetta.870    We also have the Free Iraq from Iran Act--I had two of my871sons serve in Iraq--to liberate Iraq. We didn't mean for it to872be liberated, for Iran to come in with militias to control the873country. And so, that needs to be achieved.874    And then, I'm really grateful that we have got legislation875pending--and I need people really smart like Congressman876Huizenga to be part of this--and that is to address the network877of Hezbollah here in the Western Hemisphere working with drug878cartels.879    With all of that, what can we do in terms of sanctions to880help the people of Iran, not the dictatorship?881    Mr. Roule. Superb question, sir.882    Very quickly, any legislation should ensure that we loudly883and clearly say that the Iranian people can obtain food and884medicine from the United States and elsewhere. Because their885own government's corruption and inefficiency prevents them from886doing do, to include during COVID, where over a billion dollars887of corruption cost them medicine that they so desperately888needed.889    I would say that anything that could be done to deny the890Quds Force resources, because that goes directly to terrorism,891terrorism in the Homeland, and supporting proxies overseas who892are attempting to kill Americans and individuals in the region,893is important.894    Thank you.895    Mr. Wilson. And, Ms. Jungman, indeed, the tanker tracking896is so important, and we are talking about ghost ships of War897Criminal Putin. We are talking about refineries of the Chinese898Communist Party over and over again. So, how is this being899processed?900    Again, President Trump has made every effort and been clear901he is going to act.902    Ms. Jungman. Thank you for the question.903    I think it is important to remember that the revenue Iran904accumulates from its oil sales is not revenue going back to the905people of Iran. This revenue is going into the regime, into the906regime's pockets.907    And I think it is also important to remember that the908maritime industry is a large industry. There's a number of909Western touchpoints that these vessels have that can be910sanctioned or you can threaten sanctions on.911    For example, the classification societies. Essentially,912every vessel needs to have a safety certification which is913given from a classification society to ensure that it is safe914to sail the seas. Without that classification certificate, a915vessel cannot sail into a port. We have yet to see any916sanctions on these classification societies. Flag registries as917well and insurance companies.918    Mr. Wilson. And my time is up. I yield back.919    But tell you thank you for your insight.920    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.921    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.922    I now recognize for 5 minutes the gentleman from923California, Mr. Sherman.924    Mr. Sherman. What we learned early this century is that925just an American leader pounding the table, as several did, and926say, ``This country will not be allowed to have nuclear927weapons'' is not exactly effective.928    That is why I was here, saw several Presidents make that929declaration with regard to North Korea. And now, North Korea930has scores of nuclear weapons.931    I'm going to ask our witnesses to give us an answer in932writing about North Korea. Because 20 years ago North Korea933provided not nuclear weapons to Syria, but the technology to934build them. The reason for that is North Korea didn't have a935surplus of nuclear weapons at the time, didn't want to give up936their nuclear weapons, but they are happy to have Syria have937nuclear weapons and to make some money off of it.938    So, I would like each of our witnesses, for the record, to939detail ideas on what we do to prevent Iran from buying a940nuclear weapon from North Korea, which today does not have a941surplus of money and does have a surplus of nuclear weapons.942And in particular, I would like you to address what steps we943could take to force China to agree, at least privately, that no944plane would be allowed to go directly from North Korea to Iran945without stopping for inspection.946    I might add that I discussed this with President Obama in947the Oval Office long ago and was unable to--and while he948pointed out to me that we intercept certain ships leaving North949Korea, he was unwilling to take action to prevent direct plane950flights. At least he didn't think it was a good idea at the951time.952    The MAHSA Act, named after Mahsa Amini who was brutally953murdered by the Iranian regime, directed the administration to954make targeted sanctions determinations on senior officials in955the Iranian regime.956    Ms. Stroul, what can the administration do to better957utilize those authorities and go after particular individuals958responsible for human rights deprivations in Iran?959    Ms. Stroul. Well, thank you for that question, Congressman.960    The administration should certainly make use of the961authorities granted to it by Congress in the MAHSA Act and962continue to shine a light and impose----963    Mr. Sherman. Any particular individuals you would want to964name today?965    Ms. Stroul. I don't have particular individuals.966    Mr. Sherman. Okay.967    Ms. Stroul. I don't know----968    Mr. Sherman. I add them for the record and I'll ask our969witnesses to do that.970    [No statements have been submitted:]971    Mr. Sherman. But I will point out our witnesses have972pointed out that you can't bomb knowledge away; that even an973agreement with Iran is valid only so long as they adhere to it.974Nothing will permanently prevent the Islamic Republic of Iran975from having a nuclear weapon, except the permanent end to976Islamic Republic of Iran and the creation of a truly democratic977Iranian government.978    I am, therefore, shocked that the administration has cut,979eliminated all the democracy and civil society programs in980Iran, all of our support for grassroots political movements,981all of our support for independent media.982    Now, I know that USAID spent a few tens of thousands of983dollars doing stupid things that don't reflect American values,984and certainly don't reflect our strategic needs.985    But we saw just yesterday the Chinese were rescuing people986in Myanmar and we did not have the capacity to save a single987life in Myanmar. We sent some people recently, long after, I988think, all the survivors would have been deceased, to go scout989out the situation. That's what happens when you lose USAID.990    Ms. Stroul, I would like you to focus just on the Trump991years, 2017 to 2021. During that 4 years, did Iran increase its992missile capacity? Yes or no?993    Ms. Stroul. Yes.994    Mr. Sherman. During those 4 years, did Iran expand its995stockpile of enriched uranium?996    Ms. Stroul. Yes.997    Mr. Sherman. During those years, did Iran increase its998capacity to refine uranium through banks of centrifuges?999    Ms. Stroul. Yes.1000    Mr. Sherman. So, well, I hope that Trump 2.0 works better.1001    Ms. Jungman, you have brought the importance of1002cryptocurrency. I would point out that our sanctions that got1003us in 2015 were pretty much based on our power to control1004international currency, because it was all dollars.1005    The crypto enthusiasts and the leaders in that industry1006have said they want to take that away from the United States1007because they think it is illegitimate for America to have that1008power. Do you think that we should give up the power that we1009get from having the dollar being the world's reserve currency?1010    Ms. Jungman. No, I don't think we should give up that1011power, but I do think that there needs to be stronger1012regulations and monitoring of what's being done----1013    Mr. Sherman. And my time is expired.1014    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Sherman,1015    I now recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith,1016for 5 minutes.1017    Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.1018    Let me just ask two basic questions.1019    You know, despite presenting itself as a U.S. partner,1020Azerbaijan under Aliyev--and I have met with him twice in Baku1021and raised human rights issues with him, and recently,1022obviously, he committed genocide against the people of Nagorno-1023Karabakh--he signed a cooperation agreement with both Iran and1024Russia, including a significant guest swap deal with Tehran.1025These actions, in my opinion, directly benefit the two regimes1026that the United States is actively working to counter. And I'm1027wondering what your thoughts might be on that.1028    Second, if I could, Rob Malley, you know, we know that the1029Office of Inspector General--I have read the report. It was a1030good report about the fact that the State Department did not1031follow its own clearance guidelines. But the bigger issue is1032having someone who was seemingly very much in favor of Tehran's1033policy in such a strategic position as Special Envoy does raise1034the question what damage might have been done, has been done,1035and might even carry forward right into today, especially as to1036Tehran's perceptions of what we are all about.1037    And do you think the FBI will ever get to the bottom of it?1038And if you could speak to that as well? But those two1039questions, if you could.1040    Norman?1041    Mr. Roule. In order to restrict Iran's access to funds and1042to apply the appropriate diplomatic and economic pressures, it1043is critical that Iran not have the capacity to undertake1044economic deals such as it conducted with Azerbaijan with1045anyone.1046    As Ms. Stroul correctly stated, Iran is under the greatest1047pressure when it faces multilateral economic and diplomatic1048isolation, and that must be absolute. Whenever there are1049exceptions to that, Iran benefits and that weakens the pressure1050on Iran itself.1051    Regarding Mr. Malley, it is out of my level of competence1052and I would defer to the Federal Bureau of Investigation or1053others.1054    Thank you.1055    Mr. Smith. Would any of you want to comment on either of1056those two issues?1057    Ms. Stroul. I would simply note that, in the Biden1058administration, and again, in this administration, there is an1059aligned objective of pursuing negotiations first for a1060verifiable deal that blocks all Iran's pathways toward a1061nuclear weapon.1062    And I think it underscores the importance of an independent1063and strong Inspector General in the State Department, as well1064as an FBI who is allowed to conduct credible and important1065investigations.1066    Mr. Smith. Claire?1067    Ms. Jungman. No.1068    Mr. Smith. Do any of you have any sense as to when the FBI1069may reveal where it is in terms of this investigation? It seems1070like Malley just fell off the face of the earth. And to have1071someone of his Special Envoy in such a strategic position seems1072to me would undermine what this country was all about in our1073dealings with Iran. Would you agree with that at least?1074    Nobody? Okay.1075    I do hope that we will followup on the Azerbaijan1076connection. Again, I have met with a number of people who have1077political prisoners sitting in his horrible jails. He is so1078brazen that in the past he put a stringer who was an1079Azerbaijani woman into jail, gave her an over 7-year prison1080sentence, and she worked for Radio Free Europe.1081    So, I actually convened a hearing and had the head of Radio1082Free Europe come and testify about how horrible it was. And1083what was her crime? She pointed out how corrupt Aliyev is.1084    And now, we have a situation again where he is getting into1085deals with a country that needs hard currency extremely hard.1086We know that Xi Jinping and the Communist Party, they enable1087dictatorships and bad actors everywhere. But this man, who gets1088a free pass in this town--and that is Aliyev-needs to be called1089out.1090    I thank you and yield back.1091    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Smith.1092    I now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr.1093Keating, for 5 minutes.1094    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1095    Ms. Stroul mentioned how important our allies are to us in1096this regard, even though we did move away from them and left1097many of them hanging from pulling out of the JCPOA. But I want1098to just comment on that.1099    First, last year our allies did participate with an Iran1100proxy, the Houthis, in an attack with fighter jets, with ship-1101based cruise missiles, with targets like, you know, Houthi1102missile launchers, air defense systems, radar, weapons systems.1103We worked together. The UK participated in this. Canada1104participated in this. Australia and the Netherlands1105participated in this.1106    Well, what has happened to our allies now with the Trump1107administration's latest actions and talks, deliberately1108irrigating--and this really takes a great deal of effort--our1109allies, Canada, wanting to make that the 51st State and1110bullying them with tariffs without negotiating the way you1111would with an ally.1112    How does Canada respond? Well, Canada responded just last1113month with a $4.2 billion investment in cutting-edge radar with1114Australia, despite our geographic location in the Western1115Hemisphere--with Australia. And they are partaking with other1116European countries right now in alternative military buildup1117discrete from the United States, because of these actions.1118    Denmark is part of NATO. And how are they reacting when1119they say they will take Greenland by force if necessary?1120    Portugal, a NATO country, and other NATO countries, they1121are reconsidering buying F-35s because of their fear of the1122U.S. control over the parts and software. These are our allies.1123These are people that are instrumental to our success1124worldwide, but also in the Middle East.1125    And let's talk about the leaked Signal chat that was there.1126Our Vice President saying, ``I just hate bailing out Europe1127again.''1128    And what about our Secretary of Defense saying, ``I fully1129share your loathing of European freeloading.''? It is pathetic.1130    And what about Stephen Miller in that chat? They had a lot1131to say and our allies were listening. He said, ``We will have1132to make it clear to Egypt and Europe what we expect in1133return.'' ``We also need to figure out how to enforce that1134requirement. If they don't remunerate, then what?'' ``If the1135U.S. successfully restores freedom of navigation at a great1136cost, there needs to be further economic gain extracted from1137them in return.'' That's the Signal chat. Those are the other1138actions, and I could go on.1139    How can we really expect our allies to trust us on such an1140important issue as Iran and dealing with the malign influence1141throughout the Middle East if this is what they are getting in1142return? And we have already seen, as I have shown, some actions1143on their part where they are moving away from us because they1144can't trust us.1145    Ms. Stroul, are we weaker without our allies side by side1146with us?1147    Ms. Stroul. Thank you for that question.1148    Certainly, one of the core elements of American strength1149and its ability to accomplish its national security interests1150has been our unmatched network of allies and partners across1151multiple theaters. Any objective that we want to make the1152American people safer and our country safer is better done in1153coordination with allies and partners.1154    Part of the reason we need to put in effort to align1155diplomatically, share burdens and resources upfront, is because1156there may be a time when we ask our allies and partners to do1157something that is not easy or is inconvenient.1158    Mr. Keating. Like they did after 9/11 in joining with us--1159--1160    Ms. Stroul. Absolutely, sir.1161    Mr. Keating [continuing]. under Article 5.1162    Ms. Stroul. Absolutely, sir.1163    So, as we think through all of our different objectives in1164the Middle East, we have seen our European allies stand up, as1165well as our partners in the Middle East. The Air Defense1166Coalition last April was a good example. France's leadership in1167Lebanon is another example. The European coordination in Syria1168is another example. And absolutely, both the defensive presence1169in the Red Sea to defend against Houthi attacks and the1170offensive military strikes over the past year are great1171examples of our allies and partners putting skin in the game.1172    Mr. Keating. Thank you. I yield back.1173    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Keating.1174    I now recognize for 5 minutes the gentleman from1175Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry.1176    Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1177    Ladies and gentlemen, appreciate your time here today. We1178just get real about this conversation for once. Iran is a1179country that is run by a criminal terrorist regime. That is1180what Iran is. We are talking about having negotiations with1181them and so on and so forth. I guess we have got to.1182    But North Korea is a criminal essentially terrorist regime1183when you look at what it does to its own citizens. It does it1184because it can't afford to export its terrorism. But Iran does.1185And has continued to do so. And even with the fact1186notwithstanding that 80 percent of Hezbollah's drones and1187missiles have been taken out, Assad's regime is gone, Tehran's1188missile factories have been devastated, the Houthis are finally1189under some real fire, Iran still exists. And we are talking1190like there is--well, let me ask you. You guys are the experts.1191    Mr. Roule, is Iran going to give up its nuclear program?1192Have they ever shown any interest whatsoever? But before you1193answer that question, is there any question in anybody's mind1194on the panel that their nuclear program is specifically for1195weapons--it is a weapons program. It is not for power or any--1196or medical research. It is for aggressive military action. Is1197there any question about that? Is there any dissention from1198that?1199    Mr. Roule. Frankly, sir, the question is the--I think the1200best way of putting it is Iran has a civilian nuclear program1201and has kept open the option for a military----1202    Mr. Perry. Why do they need enrich so much for a civilian1203program?1204    Mr. Roule. Not only do they not need to enrich--it is a1205great question--they are now focusing the enrichment aspect of1206their entire nuclear program on non-civilian enrichment. So1207they need to enrich between----1208    Mr. Perry. Yes.1209    Mr. Roule [continuing]. 3 and 5 percent in----1210    Mr. Perry. It is a weapons program.1211    Mr. Roule [continuing]. civilian. They are enriching at 601212percent, which is only military grade. In essence, they are1213shaping their entire civilian nuclear program to make it look1214as if they are aiming for a military program. It has no1215civilian use. It is architecture they are creating. That1216doesn't mean they have decided to make a bomb. And we have1217heard the DNI Gabbard say they are not doing this, but facts1218are facts in that regard.1219    Mr. Perry. Maybe I should have added they are a lying1220criminal terrorist regime, right? They lie about things. They1221use diplomacy to their advantage because the rest of the--to1222the point of the JCPOA, the rest of the world are our allies,1223followed President Obama who didn't want to see a nuclear Iran1224during his term, but didn't mind seeing one 15 years later when1225he was no longer the President. It didn't stop their nuclear1226production, their military nuclear capability. It just delayed1227it. That is all it did. Nobody here wants to acknowledge it.1228    But to my other point, have they ever shown any interest1229whatsoever in getting rid of this nuclear program for whatever1230way you want to describe it?1231    Mr. Roule. No, and in fact it is----1232    Mr. Perry. No.1233    Mr. Roule [continuing]. extremely--their red lines have1234been not giving up industrial enrichment, not closing any1235facilities, and not giving up R&D. And it is very unlikely they1236will give up any of those red lines without significant1237pressure and the threat of military action, unfortunately.1238    Mr. Perry. Ms. Jungman, you disagree with that?1239    Ms. Jungman. I do not disagree. Completely agree.1240    Mr. Perry. Ms. Stroul?1241    Ms. Stroul. I do not disagree.1242    Mr. Perry. Okay. So what are we talking about here? We are1243talking about--like we can have some conversation that is going1244to get them to give it up even while we all know in the room1245they ain't giving it up, right?1246    Ms. Jungman, they got what, 300 ghost ships running around1247selling their oil which is sanctioned, but they sell it to the1248Chinese and whoever they want. And where does that--does that1249money go to the people of Iran? Look, there are probably1250wonderful--I am sure there are wonderful people in Iran that1251don't want to live under this yoke of terrorism. But the money1252is not going to them, is it? It is going to who?1253    Ms. Jungman. No, the money from Iran's oil goes right back1254to its terrorist proxies.1255    Mr. Perry. Yes, it is terrorist proxies, the Quds Force,1256probably to their nuclear weapons program.1257    Ladies and gentlemen, all we are doing is delaying the1258inevitable, right? We are acting like we can talk our way out1259of having this cancer get worse by just having the cancer kind1260of settle down for a little bit. There is a cancer in the1261Middle East. There is a cancer on the globe. The name in this1262case is Iran and the leadership in Iran. That is the cancer.1263    We better get real about what we are talking about because1264they are not going to give it up willingly no matter what the1265negotiation is. And I just wish that we would quit fooling1266around and acting like the IAEA is going to tell us something.1267I mean, they wouldn't even allow an America inspector on the1268team. They wouldn't allow inspectors to visit military sites.1269Who are we kidding here?1270    I am sorry I didn't have any questions. I yield.1271    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Perry.1272    I now recognize for 5 minutes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.1273Castro.1274    Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman.1275    Thank you all for your testimony today.1276    Ms. Stroul, in your testimony you recommended that1277Congress, quote, ``strengthen the administration's hand by1278beginning the process to conditionally authorize the use of1279military force against Iran's nuclear program if the regime1280proves unwilling to take sufficient steps to ensure that it1281will not acquire nuclear weapons.'' And I guess that1282recommendation gives me some concern based on history.1283    This was the same argument made to justify voting for the1284Iraq War in 2002. In debates in the Congress they argued that a1285show of resolve by Congress by preemptively authorizing the use1286of military force against Iraq would strengthen the Bush1287administration's hand in negotiations and force Saddam Hussein1288to come to the table. What ensued with the Iraq War was one of1289the biggest mistakes that our country has made in decades, and1290I don't think any of us, or most of us at least, want to repeat1291that same mistake. And I am concerned with everything going on1292now that we could with Iran.1293    The American people are not looking to get into another1294protracted war in the Middle East. I think most folks would1295agree with that. I am also skeptical that the votes--or that1296the votes are there for such a war, skeptical that the votes1297are there. In February 2020 bipartisan majorities in the House1298and Senate voted to end hostilities with Iran after the strike1299on Soleimani.1300    During the congressional debates on the repeal of the 20021301Iraq AUMF, some Republicans attempted to ensure that the law1302could still be used to strike Iranian-backed proxies. In1303response, a bipartisan majority in the Senate, including with1304the crucial support of now Vice President J.D. Vance, voted 601305to 36 to stop those efforts.1306    And so my question is would you say that we should1307strengthen the administration's negotiating hand by1308preemptively authorizing the use of military force against1309Iran? Do you trust Donald Trump and his administration with1310that responsibility at this time?1311    Ms. Stroul. Thank you so much for this question, and I1312think it is a very important point. So the words I chose were1313``begin the process to conditionally authorize,'' and I think1314those two clauses are important in the point I am making.1315    One is begin the process. That is because I don't think1316that this decision should be left in the hands of any President1317without advice and consent and consultation with Congress. And1318conditionally because I am not recommending preemptive1319authorization. I am recommending that by Members of Congress1320having debate about the conditions and circumstances under1321which it would approve use of military force it will send a1322signal of bipartisan consensus and commitment that that1323credible military option remains on the table should1324negotiations fail.1325    I want to be very clear that my recommendation associated1326with Mr. Roule is that we should pursue negotiations first1327because no military action will eliminate the knowledge and the1328entire program overnight.1329    Mr. Castro. I guess what would the--per your recommendation1330what would that trigger be? When do you start down that road?1331    Ms. Stroul. First I think the intelligence community should1332be providing regular updates to Members of Congress in a closed1333and classified atmosphere on exactly what the steps are that1334the intelligence community understands Iran to be taking. And1335second, I think there should be consultations about exactly1336what is being contemplated when we talk about military strikes1337on Iran.1338    Mr. Castro. Would you require that we go through a JCPOA-1339type negotiation before going down that road?1340    Ms. Stroul. I think that testing the diplomatic waters with1341the regime either in a multilateral context in indirect1342negotiations that appear to be contemplated at this moment.1343Either way, a negotiated settlement is by far more--easier to1344verify in implementation and blocking Iran's pathways to a1345nuclear weapon than military force, which on the other side we1346don't know what regime decisionmaking would be. We don't know1347what Iranian decisionmaking would be. And we don't know what1348the war looks like on the other side of that. And this is why I1349think there is such serious issues that merit congressional1350input.1351    Mr. Castro. Thank you. And also for the other witnesses,1352just for the record as we are having this discussion, do you1353believe that we should to a preemptive AUMF?1354    Mr. Roule. I associate myself with Ms. Stroul's comments.1355We should have a thoughtful process in which Congress plays its1356rightful role as an institution. But the Iranians must1357understand that endless negotiations aren't the only strategy1358of the United States.1359    Mr. Castro. Thank you.1360    Let me check in with you.1361    Ms. Jungman. Yes, and I agree with Ms. Stroul and Mr. Roule1362in their comments.1363    Mr. Castro. Thank you. I yield back.1364    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Castro.1365    I now recognize for 5 minutes the gentleman from Michigan,1366Mr. Huizenga.1367    Mr. Huizenga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1368    And during the last Congress I actually led a letter with1369several of my colleagues on this committee underscoring the1370urgency of suspending the activity of the Iranian ghost armada.1371And, Ms. Jungman, you were--have been a part of a couple of1372those conversations, I think.1373    Dispatched from Iran, these vehicles ferry illicit oil and1374petroleum products to bolster the human rights abuses and1375terrorist acts perpetrated by the Iranian regime. It is their1376funding source. These foreign-owned and flagged ships operate1377undetected within the ghost armada and violate maritime law by1378obfuscating their positioning, thus circumventing U.S., and1379frankly world enforcement.1380    At the time of my letter in 2023 the armada was made up of1381364 vessels with 47 percent of them being flagged by the Panama1382Maritime Authority. That is 171 vessels approximately. As the1383vessel has now grown, I would argue thanks to a lack of action1384in the last administration about enforcement, it is--sanctions1385are only as strong as the enforcement that you are willing to1386put behind it.1387    And by the way, I serve on the Financial Services1388Committee. I am the vice chair of that committee. I have been1389working on this. That is, the origin of many of those sanctions1390is that committee.1391    The latest report indicates it has now grown to 521 vessels1392with 17 percent of those flagged by Panama, which is about 88.1393So it has been cut in half on Panama.1394    I am kind of curious. I will start with you, Ms. Jungman.1395You have worked on this issue by closely tracking these vessels1396engaging in the transportation of illicit Iranian oil. How1397should the United States deal with countries that continue to1398flag vessels that are listed on the Department of Treasury's1399Specially Designated National and Blocked Person, or SDN list?1400And where have those other vessels been flagged?1401    Ms. Jungman. Thank you for your question and thank you for1402your work on this topic. It is a matter of great importance1403given that the revenue Iran accumulates from these oil sales is1404going back to its nuclear program and terrorist activities.1405    If we look to a year ago, like you said, Panama was1406flagging a significant amount of the ghost fleet. And that1407number has dropped drastically, which is showing that1408diplomatic efforts and negotiations with----1409    Mr. Huizenga. Are you exposure?1410    Ms. Jungman. Exposure, yes.1411    Mr. Huizenga. Sunlight discussion like this?1412    Ms. Jungman. Essentially naming and shaming, calling them1413out for enabling this activity has an impact. And so I think1414Panama has taken a significant step, but we would of course1415like to see that 17 percent down to 0 percent.1416    Mr. Huizenga. Where are they getting flagged?1417    Ms. Jungman. So that is a new problem that has come up.1418Unfortunately, as a result of Panama de-flagging these vessels1419we are seeing Iran set up these false registries in Guyana,1420Comoros, Eswantini even and----1421    Mr. Huizenga. Shall we say maybe less well-known maritime1422powers?1423    Ms. Jungman. Sure. Yes. But----1424    Mr. Huizenga. Because they don't have that kind of--1425typically that kind of flagging capability or that kind of1426fleet coming out there.1427    Ms. Jungman. Well, and I think it is important to note that1428they are not necessarily legitimate flag registries under these1429countries.1430    Mr. Huizenga. Yes.1431    Ms. Jungman. They are companies set up in--most likely in1432Dubai or in India that are really run by Iran and providing1433these registrations to these vessels.1434    Mr. Huizenga. We are going fast on time, but this is1435important stuff. I need to jump to Arsenio Dominguez from the1436Republic of Panama. He was elected, has the 4-year term as1437Secretary General of the International Maritime organization,1438IMO. They are the U.N. agency tasked with establishing, quote,1439``the authority for the safety, security, environmental1440performance of international shipping.'' How can he possibly1441effectively lead the IMO while representing a nation that1442knowingly green lights this kind of transportation of Iranian1443oil against international sanctions?1444    Mr. Jungman. That is a great question and I think the IMO1445has done little to nothing on this topic and there should be1446and could be a lot more from them.1447    Mr. Huizenga. Okay. I have got a lot that I am going to1448have to followup with in some written questions as well, but1449let's touch on the teapot refineries and deterring those and1450their willingness to accept Iranian oil. Has there been an1451impact since President Trump designated one of those teapot1452refineries last week?1453    Ms. Jungman. Unfortunately it is still too soon to see an1454impact from that and designating one refinery has little to no1455impact as Iran will just move its oil to other refineries.1456    Mr. Huizenga. Okay.1457    Ms. Jungman. So there needs to be a more comprehensive1458approach on targeting and sanctioning them.1459    Mr. Huizenga. All right. And as I have said, sanctions are1460only as good as the weakest link in the sanctions chain. And1461that has been a huge problem. We need robust multinational buy-1462in from allies and partners, including Europe. I recently had a1463conversation with the Ambassador from the EU who happens to be1464Lithuanian. She understands this ghost fleet also with Russia1465and what has been happening there.1466    Do you sense that there is any appetite, any of you, in1467Europe to push back on Iran's illicit trade with China, whether1468it be illicit oil or not?1469    Ms. Jungman. I don't think I can speak for the Europeans,1470but I think that we are finally starting to wake up to see that1471China is the only one benefiting here. China is getting the1472cheap oil while everybody else is paying real prices and----1473    Mr. Huizenga. Because they sell it at a discount. With1474that, I know I am over time, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it and1475I will be writing some questions as well with everybody. Thank1476you.1477    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Huizenga.1478    I now recognize for 5 minutes the gentlewoman and ranking1479member of the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, Ms.1480Cherfilus-McCormick, of Florida.1481    Ms. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.1482    As we have heard today the United States combined with our1483partners and allies in the region must take all necessary1484measures to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons and to1485halt the support for terrorism. One of the main tools to help1486Iran's development of nuclear weapons and its continued funding1487of its terrorist proxies is sanctions. That is why I was proud1488to introduce bipartisan legislation with Congressman Lawler,1489who is the chairman for the Middle East, to strengthen1490sanctions on foreign entities enabling Iran's illicit oil1491trade.1492    Over the past few years we have witnessed growing alignment1493between Iran, Russia, and China, presenting a significant1494challenge to United States' national security and global1495stability.1496    Ms. Stroul, what steps did the Biden Administration take to1497combat these alliances?1498    Ms. Stroul. Thank you for that question. A variety of1499different elements. The first is to lean into strengthening our1500unmatched network of allies and partners in order to increase1501Russia's isolation in the European theater, China's isolation1502in the Indo-Pacific theater, and Iranian isolation in the1503Middle East. We work with all of our long-time allies and1504partners across those different theaters.1505    No. 2 was to highlight and expose the ways in which this1506axis of upheaval is supporting itself counter to the interests1507of our allies and partners. Iranian drones killing Ukrainians1508via Russia, Iranian support to Russian defense industry,1509Russia's provision of more sophisticated defense technology to1510China, Chinese purchase of Iranian oil at a discount. I could1511go on and on with these examples.1512    We should also talk about North Korean foot soldiers1513fighting on behalf of Russia in Ukraine. All of this suggests1514an emerging axis that is working to challenge the current1515international global order that benefits and keeps Americans1516safe.1517    There was also successive rounds of sanctions to break and1518diminish the different ways in which they are strengthening.1519And again, provision of security support, assistance, military1520aid, and intelligence to our allies and partners so that they1521understand exactly what the negative strategic impact is of1522this emerging axis to their and our security.1523    Ms. Cherfilus-McCormick. What additional measures can you--1524would you recommend be implemented to prevent Russia and China1525from aiding Iran in evading sanctions?1526    Ms. Stroul. Well first of all, we need to continue to1527sanction those activities. And the sanctioning not only cuts1528off and dis-incentivizes it from a financial perspective, but1529it also shines a light on and exposes that nefarious activity.1530    Clearly though I would say that it seems the Chinese1531government doesn't really care if it gets exposed and neither1532does President Putin of Russia. So we are going to have to find1533more ways to dis-incentivize this behavior. And a lot of that1534is making sure that Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran feel the1535consequences of this cooperation not just from Washington, but1536from European capitals and Middle East capitals. Red carpets1537should not be rolled out for the leaders of these countries.1538Sanctions loopholes and certain economic environments should1539not be allowed for these illicit networks, and more has to be1540done to impose consequences and costs.1541    Ms. Cherfilus-McCormick. Well, I want to turn our attention1542for a moment to Syria. We know that the fall of the Assad1543regime was a major blow to Iran's influence in Syria, however1544what America does next is critical to the future of the1545country. Ms. Stroul, do you believe America's current policy in1546Syria is positioned well to further undermine Iran?1547    Ms. Stroul. Right now we have a transitional government in1548Damascus under the leadership of Interim President Ahmed al-1549Sharaa and he is saying that he is committed to fighting Isis1550in Syria and has told Iran that they will not be allowed to use1551Syrian territory the way they did under Bashar al-Assad. And he1552is also looking to impose consequences on Russia and deny it1553use of that naval base that is on the Mediterranean.1554    All of these are interests that align with U.S. security1555objectives as well as having a secure unified Syria under the1556control of one government, but right now U.S. policy is not1557geared toward seizing these opportunities. We need to find ways1558to support the Syrian people through some measured sanctions1559relief benchmarked against performance of the Sharaa1560government.1561    Ms. Cherfilus-McCormick. And before I run out of time I1562just wanted to ask you this last question. Do you believe that1563dismantling the USAID in Syria is helpful or harmful to U.S.1564interests in Syria?1565    Ms. Stroul. I believe that it is harmful. I think what1566Syrian people will remember is an American flag or the USAID1567stamp on emergency food assistance, stabilization assistance,1568clean water, baby formula, and the U.S. actually putting skin1569in the game to demonstrate that we care about the lives and the1570livelihoods of Syrian people. And by taking this precious1571element of American power off the table we undermine our own1572ability to achieve our interests in Syria.1573    Ms. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you. I yield back.1574    Ms. Kim. [Presiding.] Thank you. I now recognize myself for15755 minutes.1576    Ms. Jungman, you talk about the sophisticated and deceptive1577techniques that the Iranian regime is utilizing to evade oil1578sanctions including through foreign front companies. Iran also1579remains heavily dependent on China to sustain its illicit oil1580trade which is like 90 percent of Iran's oil exports go to1581China, primarily independent teapot refineries. So you note1582that Chinese purchase of Iranian oil increased by over 201583percent last year despite the U.S. sanctions.1584    So in your perspective how successful has the U.S. been in1585identifying these teapot refineries and front companies?1586    Ms. Jungman. Thank you for your question. I think it is1587important to remember that until end of 2024 we saw an1588administration that was essentially giving lax sanctions1589enforcement. As a result of that, Iran was able to buildup its1590revenues and in turn is--despite these sanctions is easily able1591to replace the vessels that are designated. And until there is1592a comprehensive designation across the entire ghost fleet these1593vessels will continue to export Iranian oil to China.1594    When looking at the refineries themselves I think that it1595was a great first step from this administration to designate1596the refineries we saw sanctioned I guess 2 weeks ago, but1597unfortunately designation on one refinery has little to no1598impact. There has to be a comprehensive holistic approach on1599all of the refineries that are taking on Iranian oil.1600    Ms. Kim. You talk about the realistic short-term action1601that the U.S. can take to close that loophole. What about the1602long-term actions, short-term and long-term actions that we can1603take to close that loophole?1604    Ms. Jungman. Sure. I think that there needs to be--in1605addition with sanctions there has to be negotiation or a1606diplomatic approach. And I think if there is any President that1607will be able to figure out what to hold over China's head, it1608will be this President.1609    Ms. Kim. Thank you. Mr. Roule, one of the recommendations1610you provide in your testimony to counter the Iranian regime's1611malign activities is to continue investing in the regional1612military, economic, and commercial partnerships, because in1613your testimony, in quote, ``regional economic and social1614success is as essential to our security interests as their1615military strength,'' end quote.1616    So what role do joint security exercises or intelligence1617sharing activities with our allies play in disrupting the1618Iran's illicit activities?1619    Mr. Roule. Thank you, Congresswoman. the relationships we1620have with our Gulf partners and other regional partners played1621a profound role in the defense of Israel during Iran's1622ballistic missile attack on Israel. We saw years of CENTCOM's1623investment in those relationships come to fruition in the1624smooth air defense of the entire region. And thousands of1625lives, perhaps hundreds of thousands of lives were saved as a1626result of that.1627    But this is a broader target set because the Iranians are1628moving, as I say, in the Red Sea Basin. They are moving in the1629Persian Gulf area. They are moving in--throughout the Arabian1630Peninsula. And these relationships require a tremendous1631investment by the CENTCOM team as well as our Department of1632Defense as a whole.1633    Ms. Kim. Thank you. Ms. Jungman, let me come back to you.1634You talk about the IRGC's efforts to diversify its revenue1635streams including through cryptocurrency and how it offers Iran1636a way to bypass financial oversight and quietly move funds1637across the borders. So in your perspective how extensively is1638the IRGC using cryptocurrency to evade sanctions?1639    Ms. Jungman. We saw around I think it was $8 billion of1640transactions from Iran using cryptocurrency. And I think that1641this is an area they are obviously tapping into as sanctions1642are coming out. So they are moving their money there because it1643is harder to track. And I think that it is an area that1644sanctions could be enforced stronger.1645    Ms. Kim. So could you talk about some of the policy changes1646that you think is necessary to improve that effectiveness of1647sanctions? And also, what risks do Iran's cryptocurrency and1648front company activities pose to global financial integrity?1649    Ms. Jungman. This is not my area of expertise, but I am1650happy to followup with a written response there.1651    Ms. Kim. All right. Well, thank you so much. I ask that1652because I want to see if these tactics could set a precedent1653for other rogue actors or states. And I think we have been1654pretty clear on the reason why we need a digital assets1655framework to coordinate with our allies to address those crypto1656crime. So thank you so much for your testimony and I yield1657back.1658    Let's see, who is next? Representative Stanton, I recognize1659you for 5 minutes.1660    Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.1661    Iran has built a network of proxies across the Middle East1662sowing chaos and instability in the region for decades. It has1663funded, trained, and armed Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis,1664and various militia groups to target Israel and other regional1665rivals, all while keeping Tehran out of the direct conflict.1666    The human cost to Iran's offensive is undeniable. On1667October 7, 2023, 1,300 Israelis were murdered by Hamas1668terrorists and attacks by these proxy militia have injured or1669killed American troops. Over the last 18 months Iran has1670continued to support its proxies as they send ballistic1671missiles and drones at Israeli targets and at American Service1672members. But Iran's axis of resistance is waning. Right now we1673are at a critical and fragile moment for the region. Iranian1674proxies are weakened and new leadership in Lebanon and Syria1675are refusing to bow to Tehran's influence.1676    The U.S., acting in partnership with our allies, has an1677opportunity to end Iran's malign influence and to protect our1678ally Israel and expand the Abraham Accords and change the1679trajectory of the region for decades to come. But we can only1680take advantage of this moment if we maintain a focus on1681democracy building, work with and support our allies in the1682region, and fully enforce the U.S. sanctions regime.1683    In a completely self-defeating move the Trump1684Administration has eliminated impactful programs that support1685the rule of law, protect human rights, and counter1686misinformation. Limiting U.S. foreign aid and programs is a1687gift to our adversaries--Iran, but also to China and Russia.1688International investments are an essential instrument of U.S.1689foreign policy and U.S. national security policy, and has been1690for decades under Republican and Democratic administrations.1691    Now, there are still some active aid programs in the region1692and we need to make sure those resources get delivered1693efficiently to the people that need it.1694    Mr. Roule, what can the U.S. do to support foreign aid1695delivery while also preventing Iranian malign activity?1696    Mr. Roule. The best expertise on foreign aid delivery in1697the region are regional partners themselves. They know the1698neighborhood; they know the players; they know where corruption1699exists; they know the needs of their people. And building1700relationships with these actors themselves will allow us to1701know how best to deliver and where are--the impact can be the1702greatest.1703    This goes to the previous question by one of your1704colleagues. Do we have relationships with our reliable partners1705in the region? And we extract utility from that in many1706different areas to include foreign aid. We can build soft-power1707impact as well as our military impact.1708    Mr. Stanton. To successfully deter Iran and our global1709adversaries we should be leveraging our allies and our1710partners. President Trump's go-it-alone foreign policy strategy1711is short-sighted and self-defeating. He started trade wars with1712our neighbors and angering our friends, even causing South1713Korea and Japan to restart trade discussions with China for the1714first time in 5 years. And Vice President J.D. Vance in public1715speeches, and embarrassingly in leaked Signal chats, has spit1716in the eye of our European allies.1717    Europe is the second largest arms supplier to Israel. The1718U.K. critically stepped in to shoot down missiles fired at1719Iran--by Iran, excuse me, at Israel in last October's1720escalation. And France helped broker the critical Lebanon-1721Israel cease-fire. They are vital to achieving Middle Eastern1722peace and supporting democratic goals in the region. In1723addition to those values Europe's presence and our presence in1724the Middle East contribute to stronger global trade and1725business, another vital component of keeping stability.1726    For Ms. Stroul, how has Europe worked to secure the Red Sea1727global shipping lanes and how should we work with them to1728better stop Houthi attacks in the Red Sea?1729    Ms. Stroul. Thank you for the question. The Europeans have1730both participated in a U.S.-led defensive coalition called1731Prosperity Guardian which has kept the critical choke points in1732the southern Red Sea open. Some European partners as well as1733others in other theaters also participated with us in1734multilateral offensive strikes last year to take Houthi1735capabilities off the table in Yemen. And the Europeans maintain1736their own separate defensive coalition as well in the Red Sea.1737    Mr. Stanton. Thank you.1738    The final question is for Ms. Jungman about China, and they1739are unfortunately working with Iran. What is China's role in1740helping Iran avoid oil sanctions?1741    Ms. Jungman. China plays a large role in enabling Iran to1742accumulate this revenue. They purchased 90--90 percent of1743Iranian oil is going to China. It serves as the lifeline for1744Iran's revenue and extremist activity.1745    Mr. Stanton. All right. Thank you very much for those1746answers and I will yield back the rest of my----1747    Ms. Kim. Thank you. I recognize Representative Davidson of1748Ohio for 5 minutes.1749    Mr. Davidson. Thank you, chairwoman.1750    Thanks to our colleagues for hosting this hearing. Thanks1751to our witnesses. Appreciate your testimony today.1752    First, Iran and their despotic regime have just horrible1753human rights abuses. They have been a force really for terror1754and instability in the Middle East for a long time. the 10/71755attacks by Hamas were a profoundly evil act by a network of1756terror groups all linked to Iran. Maximum pressure against1757these groups and their Iranian sponsors is more than warranted1758and I applaud the Trump Administration for doing just that.1759    The second truth about the situation that we are in is that1760a full-blown ground war in Iran is simply not in America--it is1761not our war to fight. As we turn toward strategic competition1762with China we cannot afford to continue to be bogged down in1763the Middle East. For the United States an economy of force1764strategy in the Middle East makes sense so that we can address1765American interests while minimizing the American investment1766there. This allows us to focus on other strategic threats and1767more immediate security risks to our own country.1768    As our committee's State Department authorization process1769move forward I look forward to engaging on pressing issues for1770the Arms Export Control Act and AUMF reforms so that Congress1771is active in confronting the rapidly evolving security1772environment in the world.1773    Mr. Roule, thank you for your testimony today. And I1774personally worry about an overly broad reading of the 2001 AUMF1775providing a blank check for virtually any war in the Middle1776East without Congress really having sometimes even knowledge,1777but certainly input in it. Failure to update the 2001 AUMF1778represents an abdication of congressional war powers.1779    So as we confront really needed security challenges with1780Houthi proxies, for example, who are disrupting sea traffic and1781posing a threat not just in the oceans to our navy and others,1782what is the actual underlying authorization today?1783    Mr. Roule. Congressman, it is a complicated question. And I1784am going to evade some of that because I am not an expert, but1785I will say this: Congress needs to start now, as Ms. Stroul1786stated, with a process to understand what role should be played1787to develop specific authorities. Because the Quds Force needs1788to be taken apart in the region because a nuclear deal that1789simply provides funding for the Quds Force to reestablish its1790proxy network to the region just repeats this entire system of1791violence. And we will face the same situation over and over1792again.1793    So we really do need to understand the prospect of military1794actions against Iran and its personnel and its architecture at1795present. And Congress needs to play its role in that.1796    Mr. Davidson. Yes, thank you for that. That is exactly what1797I have tried to do for a long time. Since I have been here,1798really since the summer of 2016, updating the 2001 AUMF has1799been darn near impossible, frankly. For people like me that1800wanted to do it, we were blocked from even being on this1801committee, blocked from--anybody that really wanted reform1802couldn't get on the Committee of Jurisdiction. And then when1803you try to do it through appropriations, oh, you know, you are1804supposed to do it through the Committee of Jurisdiction. And1805now, even after the Afghan War has wound down, long after we1806have formally left Iraq, we still keep the 2001 AUMF.1807    Does anyone believe that the Houthis or Hamas--let's just1808say Hamas--are they affiliates of Al Qaeda? I mean, that is the1809underlying situation. They are terrorists in that sense, but1810they are not coordinating--they share some similar enemies, but1811they are not really covered by the 2001 AUMF. So I think it is1812urgent that we update them. And I definitely appreciate you1813all's effort to call that out.1814    But, Ms. Jungman, in your testimony you bemoaned the1815existence of cryptocurrency to some extent saying that the1816pseudonym-ist nature of block chain transactions makes1817enforcement challenging. However, you admit that it only makes1818up about $8 billion in transaction.1819    I am the chairman of National Security and Illicit Finance.1820We just had a hearing earlier today where people trying to1821trace the money actually like cryptocurrency because it is on a1822public block chain. So it is easier to follow the money. It1823still presents challenges for on and off ramps, but when it is1824on a block chain, it is easier to detect.1825    So what proportion of Iran's illicit finance is really1826crypto versus conventional finance?1827    Ms. Jungman. In the grand scheme the 8 billion is not that1828significant when you look at 50 billion that was made in oil1829revenues last year or 135 billion in oil revenue that was made1830between 2021 and 2024. So I think that there needs to be1831stricter enforcement and oversight on the block chain and the1832crypto transactions, but it doesn't necessarily need to be----1833    Mr. Davidson. Thank you for that. My time is expired and I1834yield.1835    Ms. Kim. Thank you. I now recognize Representative1836Moskowitz from Florida for 5 minutes.1837    Mr. Moskowitz. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.1838    I want to thank Chairman Lawler and Chairman Mast for1839bringing this hearing. I have supported for months now giving1840the Iranians a period of time to end their nuclear program1841peacefully or that the United States should end it for them. I1842have worked with Chairman Lawler on that in the last Congress1843dealing with Iranian oil. And in this Congress Senator Lindsey1844Graham and I filed a resolution to get a sense of Congress on1845just that issue.1846    Iran is weaker now than they have been in a very long time,1847weaker in the region because of Israel's efforts against Hamas1848and Hezbollah, this administration's intervention on the1849Houthis. Now is the time. There is no question now is the time1850to try to bring this to a peaceful solution, right? And that is1851really up to the Iranians to choose what path they want to go.1852    But I also have to recognize that we are in the third month1853of the administration. And for 3 months now the administration1854has treated Canada and Greenland and Europe and Ukraine and PBS1855and NPR and the Associated Press worse than they have talked1856and treated Iran. I mean, 3 months in they have just noticed1857all of a sudden that perhaps we should turn our attention to1858Iran instead of these distractions of, oh, we are going to get1859Gaza, or Canada is going to be the 51st State, or oh,1860Greenland.1861    I mean, this is the opportunity. And it is an opportunity,1862quite frankly, for the administration that has been very1863partisan over the last 3 months to do something on a bipartisan1864basis.1865    But I am also deeply worried about the Vice President. If1866we look at the text messages on Signal for Signalgate, the Vice1867President seems to be against striking the Houthis. Well, if he1868is against striking the Houthis, then I mean where is he going1869to be on striking Iran if they don't choose a peaceful1870solution? Obviously he is the Vice President. The President1871makes the final decision, but if you look at that conversation,1872a deputy chief of staff had to weigh in from the White House1873putting the Vice President in his place saying the President1874was clear on his direction.1875    So let me ask a question. Based on what you have seen, we1876have all seen publicly in that Signal chat, this isolationist1877trend that is going on in some circles of the Republican1878Party--Ms. Jungman, are you concerned that we may miss an1879opportunity to really curtail Iran's nuclear program? Because1880again, if you look at what the Vice President was saying with1881the Houthis, right, he clearly did not want to do the strike1882that the President had ordered.1883    Ms. Jungman. Thank you for that question. I think it is1884important to look at the efforts that the administration has1885done over the last 3 months which includes designations on1886Iran, its ghost fleet, and a refinery in China.1887    Mr. Moskowitz. Yes, but those are meaningless. The Biden1888Administration--I was critical of the Biden Administration of1889these designations and non-enforcement of certain things. I1890mean, I was very critical when the Biden Administration did not1891enforce the bill that Mike Lawler and I passed dealing with1892Iranian oil.1893    We can sign executive orders for maximum pressure, but1894really--this President is not shy. I mean, he is not shy. He1895tells us how he feels at all times. OK. And so just last week1896all of a sudden we turned our attention to Iran, which I am1897happy about. Better late than never.1898    But there is something going on in this administration that1899should all wake up to, that there is a wing led by the Vice1900President that didn't want to strike the Houthis and probably1901doesn't want to curtail Iran's nuclear program. How are you1902going to deal with that?1903    Ms. Jungman. I don't see that from Treasury right now. I do1904think that there are efforts being made and I think looking at1905the questions we have received there is an--there is bipartisan1906consensus to go after Iran. And the Vice President alone----1907    Mr. Moskowitz. Yes, and look, we have to be clear, right?1908Because Democrats have made this mistake. When you draw a red1909line and then you don't do it, we see problems. That is what1910happened in Syria under the Obama administration. So President1911Trump has drawn a red line. He has said either we are going to1912end it peacefully, which I hope we do--we want--we all want1913that--or the United States is going to end it. That has been1914said now. And that is what we have to hold the President to. I1915yield back.1916    Ms. Kim. Thank you. I now recognize Representative Issa of1917California for 5 minutes.1918    Mr. Issa. Thank you. I am going to pick up where my1919colleague just left off. Better late than never? Has it been 751920days or is it 72? I wouldn't call this late, with all due1921respect. But let's contrast it with the previous 4 years.1922    What was the economic position of Iran on the day that1923President Trump left office?1924    Ms. Jungman. They were a lot weaker than they are today.1925    Mr. Issa. Were they shipping a couple hundred thousand1926barrels a day, not a million-and-a-half barrels a day?1927    Ms. Jungman. That is correct.1928    Mr. Issa. So during the 4-years of the Biden Administration1929perhaps in plain sight while other things were being discussed:1930JCPOA, Iran's nuclear and so on, they went up by more than a1931million barrels a day times $75, right?1932    Ms. Jungman.1933    [Nonverbal response.]1934    Mr. Issa. Most of it was sold to China, correct?1935    Ms. Jungman.1936    [Nonverbal response.]1937    Mr. Issa. So the last administration allowed China to1938enrich Iran. During those 4 years is it accurate to say that1939that money, a great deal of it ended up in the hands of Hamas,1940the Houthis, and Hezbollah?1941    Ms. Jungman. That is correct.1942    Mr. Issa. OK. So I want to go to the go forward. And I know1943my colleague has left, but 72 days is the beginning of an1944administration. Over the next 3 years if maximum pressure1945includes taking ghost ships off the high seas, do you believe1946it is possible to reverse that 1 million or a 1.2 million of1947additional oil and bring Iran economically back to where they1948were 4 years ago?1949    Ms. Jungman. I do, but I don't think taking the ghost fleet1950off alone will do that.1951    Mr. Issa. I am including that because most of that million1952barrels plus is shipped through ghost ships, correct?1953    Ms. Jungman. Correct. Yes.1954    Mr. Issa. Okay. So as part of a maximum effort, recognizing1955that Israel may strike in its own best interest between now and1956the end of October when nuclear legitimacy, according to the1957last administration goes forward--as part of a package economic1958sanctions as we know are not working because people are1959cheating on them. The No. 1 cheater is China. As the President1960uses his pressure with China and tariffs should he include1961reducing the purchases of clandestine oil from China and Russia1962as part of a deal with China? Would that be helpful?1963Additionally, the same thing goes for our European allies who1964either directly or indirectly buy that sanctioned oil.1965    Ms. Jungman. Absolutely. I think that is a great place to1966start and hopefully would have an impact.1967    Mr. Issa. Now just before I spoke we heard about the so-1968called reluctance of the Vice President to strike the Houthis.1969In fact, isn't that one of more major proactive strikes that1970has occurred in the last several years?1971    Ms. Jungman. Correct.1972    Mr. Issa. That particular strike as I understand it was an1973offensive strike to take out capability, not simply a1974retaliatory for a place from which they were fired?1975    Ms. Jungman. I am going to defer to Mr. Roule on that, but1976he has got more expertise in that area.1977    Mr. Roule. They are the most significant strikes we have1978conducted against the Houthis. They are not only taking out--1979degrading the Houthi weapons capability, but taking out Houthi1980leadership and they are starting to impact on the Houthi1981leadership decisionmaking structure itself.1982    Mr. Issa. So Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, the three1983most powerful arms of the--of Iran, in addition to the oil that1984gives them money--if those activities continue at the pace they1985have been going over the last--some of it more than 75 days1986because of Israel's efforts with Hamas and Hezbollah. But if1987those three tentacles of Iran are taken out over the next 31988years, if the clandestine oil is reduced to let's just say1989the--about where it was 4 years earlier, do you believe we can1990avoid all-out war with Iran, but bring Iran back to a situation1991in which they must deal or be unable to function because of1992economic disaster?1993    Mr. Roule. If we could also ensure that the Quds Force does1994not have a logistics line into the region, we could avoid a war1995based on activities such as Hamas and Houthi actions----1996    Mr. Issa. Right.1997    Mr. Roule [continuing]. in the Red Sea. There will be some1998who will say that Iran could be encouraged to build a nuclear1999weapon if it thinks it can get away with it and we won't2000attack. So the President would also have to say if we see you2001building a nuclear weapon, we are going to have to use another2002direction.2003    Mr. Issa. And I will just close with one statement: Many2004people have talked about the nuclear capability, but is it fair2005to say that the ability to build a nuke only allows you to blow2006yourself up if you don't have the ability to launch it? And2007isn't that part of the administration's responsibility, along2008with allies--is to make sure that they do not have the ability2009to launch a nuclear weapon?2010    Ms. Kim. The gentleman's time is up. And the witnesses may2011respond in writing if you would choose to do so. Is that Okay?2012    Mr. Issa. Thank you.2013    Ms. Kim. Yes. Let me now recognize Mr. Olzewski of Maryland2014for 5 minutes.2015    Mr. Olzewski. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.2016    And thank you to our witnesses for your time and your2017testimony today. I will just open by saying how much I firmly2018believe with a lot of what was said and how important it is for2019the U.S. to use all of the tools at our disposal to dismantle2020Iran's support for regional terrorism and its nuclear ambition.2021So thank you for your comments on that.2022    We know that a strong Iranian sanctions regime, which I2023support and this administration has imposed, is critical to2024limit the revenue that Iran uses to fund its military and2025terror proxies in the region.2026    However, we cannot forget about the other national security2027tools at our disposal including both diplomacy and development2028and that the U.S. has to comprehensively counter the regime's2029malign activities and hold them accountable for human rights2030violations. The use of force should be an option, but it should2031also be our last resort option. Again, we need a comprehensive2032tool box to prevent Iran from becoming nuclear-equipped and to2033address the root causes of these abuses.2034    I support a zero tolerance approach for attacks by Iran's2035proxies on the United States and our interests, but again I2036also believe that any U.S. action must also be taken in2037accordance with the law and in ways that protects classified2038information and civilians overseas.2039    It is also worth noting and reiterating that this2040administration's gutting of foreign assistance programs will2041only weaken that response. There was a program implemented by a2042non-profit back in my home State of Maryland that supported2043religious and minorities in Northern Iraq in part not to join2044Iran-backed militias. This project supported thousands of young2045Yazidis and Christians in a youth employment project to provide2046financial incentives not to join these armed groups. In its2047absence we risk migration and radicalization including to these2048Iran-backed proxy groups.2049    We know this program unfortunately is not a one-off.2050Programs to strengthen local capacity and support ethnic and2051religious minorities in Yemen, Gaza, and Lebanon where Iran-2052backed militias continue to hold military and political2053influence were cut. Iranian media even praised the pause2054because it would halt U.S. support for pro-democracy activists2055in the country. Other media compared it to a cold shower for2056the regime's opponents and joked that the U.S. was ``abandoning2057its allies like disposable tissues,'' quote, unquote.2058    Ms. Stroul, can you talk about how these soft-power2059programs like those administered by USAID and the State2060Department play an important role in America's response to2061Iran's activities around the world? How will Iran and their2062proxies be emboldened by these cuts?2063    Ms. Stroul. Thank you so much for this question. When we2064think about all of the different areas where Iran's threat2065network has been degraded: Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, to some extent2066Iraq, right now Yemen, what we need to think about is the other2067side of combat operations.2068    And that is not just humanitarian aid. It is stabilization,2069reconstruction. Societies and communities need to have2070something on the other side in order to buildup their2071resilience to resist what the Iranians are going to do, which2072is try to rebuild their illicit networks for arming, funding,2073training both fighters--and then weapon shipments, drug2074shipments, et cetera. So we have to give those communities2075resources to buildup their resilience and we have to give the2076emerging leaders of these nascent governments the opportunity2077to deliver for their people. And there I am specifically2078talking about Lebanon and Syria.2079    So the pause and dismantling of USAID is not just about the2080humanitarian aid being taken off the table. It is the non-2081humanitarian aid, the stabilization assistance. And then it is2082the decades of U.S. investment in developing our technical2083expertise, our national security practitioners, our development2084and technical assistance providers who understand that2085reconstruction and stabilization on the other side of conflict2086is inherently a political task, not a military task.2087    Mr. Olzewski. Thank you so much for that response. And I2088will just close without an additional question recognizing that2089my time is winding down, but just reiterate what my colleague2090Representative Keating honed in earlier and just advancing my2091concern, Madam Chair, about the reckless use of platforms that2092are not secure and in the sharing of very sensitive data. It is2093not a way to conduct military operations, nor diplomatic2094operations, nor to impose sanctions. And so I am deeply2095concerned about the actions of some of our most highest ranking2096officials and the fact that there has been no accountability.2097And with that, I will yield back. Thank you.2098    Ms. Kim. Thank you. Let me now recognize Mr. Baird from2099Indiana for 5 minutes.2100    Mr. Baird. Thank you, Madam Chair.2101    And thank our witnesses for being here today. The expertise2102you share with us is very beneficial and very helpful. But I am2103going to touch on a couple or three other areas that are of2104interest to me, the first one being what role do you think that2105the Western technology is playing in sustaining Iran, and by2106extension Russia's ability to produce lethal weapons like the2107Shahad 136 drone?2108    Mr. Roule. We have seen Iran use dual-use technology that2109is obtained from Europe, even the United States, through2110sanctions-busting architecture to import this within in its2111drone system and to--well, even use this within drones that it2112has sent to Russia for use against Ukraine. This is something2113that the U.S. law enforcement has worked against successfully2114in some cases for years. Iran has a robust sanctions-busting2115program in this regard and Iran will continue to use this2116system to acquire technology that it can't produce at home.2117    Mr. Baird. Ms. Jungman?2118    Ms. Jungman. I am going to tackle this from a little bit of2119a different angle, and I think it is an area that hasn't had a2120lot of attention. But we have talked a lot today about the dark2121fleet and the ghost fleet. There is Western technology that is2122used on these vessels. Every ship essentially has some Western2123component on it. That is an area that could be looked at2124closer.2125    Mr. Baird. Ms. Stroul?2126    Ms. Stroul. I would associate myself specifically with Mr.2127Roule. The threat is the dual-use technology. So part of this2128is about sanctions and shining a light and exposure. It is also2129about education initiatives with the commercial sector so they2130understand the risk of both the legitimate uses of some of this2131technology and then the illegitimate and illicit ways in which2132a regime like Iran might use it.2133    Mr. Baird. The next part of that is what steps can be taken2134to prevent Iran from procuring that critical technology?2135    And, Ms. Jungman, you kind of started on that conversation,2136so please State.2137    Ms. Jungman. Sure. I think as I have previously mentioned,2138there are still a number of Western entities that are involved2139in the maritime industry and these vessels such as the2140classification societies, the flag states, and the insurance2141companies. It is not enough to just designate the vessels2142themselves. The vessel will move to a new owner, a new company2143and so on. So there needs to be a more comprehensive approach2144to targeting these vessels and their associated networks.2145    Mr. Baird. Mr. Roule?2146    Mr. Roule. We need to ensure that law enforcement partners2147in Europe and Asia working closely with the United States and2148our Gulf partners to identify import actors in Iran who are2149attempting to bring in dual-use technology for Iran's military2150and security services.2151    Mr. Baird. Thank you. Ms. Stroul?2152    Ms. Stroul. I have nothing to add. I think my colleagues2153did a great job answering the question.2154    Mr. Baird. That is a good answer.2155    One other area: Do you believe that the United States and2156its allies are focused enough on preventing the rebuilding of2157the Iranian proxy groups, and what more could we do if that is2158true? Mr. Roule?2159    Mr. Roule. If there is a nuclear deal that provides Iran2160with sanctions relief that allows the Quds Force to rebuild2161Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis over time, we recreate the2162very world we have worked so hard to dismantle today. It is2163critical that any new nuclear deal simply does not allow the2164Quds Force to do this. And this therefore becomes a problem.2165    Do we come up with an approach? Does the international2166community compel Iran to in essence change the nature of the2167Quds Force, to turn it into a counterterrorism element, which2168is something every country should have, and not an element that2169has the job of creating militias and terrorists. Until Iran2170does this it is a terrorist nation.2171    Mr. Baird. Thank you. And I see I only got 26 seconds left,2172and so I am sorry to the other two, but I yield back.2173    Ms. Kim. Thank you.2174    Let me now recognize Representative Schneider of Illinois2175for 5 minutes.2176    Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Madam Chair.2177    Again I want to the witnesses for joining us here.2178    So I keep this next to my desk. It is the JCPOA from 102179years ago. It is tabbed and marked and highlighted. Ten years2180ago I studied it closely because so much was at stake. Iran was2181on the precipice of a nuclear weapon and the world came2182together. And at that time, as we all recall, it was the E3+3,2183it was the P5+1, whatever you called it. But it United States,2184our European allies, U.K., France and Germany, and China and2185Russia.2186    As you discussed earlier, what was available to us then is2187not available to us now. And I had issues with the JCPOA a2188decade ago because while it may have temporary-temporarily2189blocked Iran's pathways to a nuclear weapon, it didn't2190permanently close them. It left it to where we are today.2191    And we meet today. I really believe there is a crossroad,2192as you have touched on. Over the past year we have seen Iran's2193strategic position almost turn 180 degrees. Its proxies are2194diminished. Its air defenses are weakened. At the same time,2195again as was mentioned, Iran's breakout time is almost to the2196goal line. It is measured in weeks, maybe even days.2197    We all know a nuclear-armed Iran would transform the2198strategic map of the Middle East once again. It would not only2199endanger our allies including Israel; it would trigger in all2200likelihood a regional arms race. It would embolden the2201terrorist proxies and it would undercut the global2202nonproliferation regime.2203    Now we know this moment didn't come out of nowhere. Iran2204has been working on a nuclear weapon for more than a2205generation. We can talk about the decision to invade Iraq and2206then empower Iran. We can talk about the JCPOA, which was a2207problem. I think at the end of the day the decision to pull out2208of the JCPOA without a strategy of how to move forward and make2209sure that Iran couldn't get closer to a weapon left us at the2210point we are in today: Iran literally at the goal line. And2211that is the challenge we have.2212    Now, part of the problem I think in pulling out of the2213JCPOA was there wasn't a plan, that it was more about the2214headlines than about making actual progress. It was not very2215serious. And this has been a challenge that I have seen with2216the administration, first term of the Trump Administration, and2217today with the return of the administration perhaps even2218greater.2219    The dismantling of USAID, the freezing of aid to camps like2220Al-Hol where Isis remnants remain active, the whiplash of2221threats followed by back-channel talks with Hamas, all of it2222suggests a governing style that is far more impulsive,2223theatrical, and dangerously un-tethered from strategy. I wish2224we could trust that this renewed maximum pressure approach2225being discussed was grounded in facts, deliberation, and2226interagency coordination. I wish I believed that President2227Trump had read the briefings, sought our dissenting views, or2228agonized over the details of a strike plan, but I don't have2229that confidence and I am very concerned about where we are2230right now.2231    Serious policy means aligning sanctions, intelligence, and2232diplomacy. It means working with allies to close loopholes, not2233just naming problems, but resourcing, developing solutions. It2234means being honest about what air strikes can and cannot2235accomplish and about what it takes to truly dismantle Iran's2236nuclear weapons program.2237    We know this challenge won't get easier with time, as has2238been discussed earlier. Iran's nuclear program isn't just a2239bargaining chip; it is a shield from behind which Tehran wages2240war through proxies in Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.2241And that is why I was proud last Congress to join with then2242Chairman McCaul to introduce H. Res. 559 declaring it the2243policy of the United States that a nuclear Islamic Republic of2244Iran is not acceptable under any circumstances.2245    So with that, let me turn to you, Ms. Stroul. You have2246spoken previously about the need for regional architecture. Can2247you speak our seriously you think our Gulf partners view the2248risk of a nuclear Iran and whether they believe the U.S. is2249still--or U.S. does have at all a coherent plan to stop it?2250    Ms. Stroul. Thank you so much for that question,2251Congressman. Many of our Gulf partners are hedging because they2252are uncertain as to what U.S. commitments are and whether or2253not U.S. commitments to the region and to their defense will be2254enduring. So almost every U.S. partner in the Gulf has pursued2255their own rapprochement with the Iranian regime, exchanging2256Ambassadors, maintaining economic relations, as well as very2257consistent diplomatic engagement back and forth.2258    We are using some of these channels for the passing of2259messages, but the bottom line is if there is going to be2260military strikes used against Iran, we are going to need the2261support of our partnership the Gulf, we are going to need2262flexibility with the bases we have where U.S. forces are2263present, and we are--and if we are going to achieve a2264negotiated settlement, Iran is going to need to hear from our2265partners in the Middle East that they are as serious about2266getting to a negotiated settlement that blocks all Iranian2267pathways to a nuclear weapon as Washington is. And those are2268some of the I think security commitments both to their self-2269defense and to our long-term commitment in developing this2270regional architecture that could benefit from clarification at2271this moment in time.2272    Mr. Schneider. Thank you. I have gone over time.2273    Ms. Kim. Thank you, Ms. Stroul.2274    Mr. Schneider. I appreciate the extension. I yield back.2275    Ms. Kim. Of course. I know recognize Mr. Kean,2276Representative Kean from New Jersey for 5 minutes.2277    Mr. Kean. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And thank you to our2278witnesses for being here today.2279    Mr. Roule, what type of support is Russia providing Iran's2280nuclear program and what role is Russian State owned energy2281giant Rosatom playing and supporting Iran's nuclear ambitions?2282    Mr. Roule. Russia's role in the joint comprehensive plan of2283action was limited to support for the Bushehr civilian nuclear2284power plant on Iran's southwest coast. The development of that2285plant, there were discussions on the--perhaps building of other2286nuclear power plants in country and part of the deal under2287JCPOA was that, in essence, Iran would send spent nuclear fuel2288in Russia in exchange for fresh nuclear fuel. Now that, of2289course, stopped when Iran ceased to do this.2290    I think the most important question is whether Russia is2291providing Iran with capabilities to allow it to move closer to2292a nuclear weapon? Now there is no public information of which I2293am aware that that is occurring. And it is also a fact,2294however, that Russia does have a presence in country through2295Bushehr and that were we to have a multi-lateral negotiation2296with Iran on its nuclear program, Russia would be a prominent2297part because of that element. China, as well, because of2298China's role with the Iraq power plant, its former plutonium2299plant which is due to come online in 2026.2300    Mr. Kean. And what types of support is Russia currently2301providing Iran's proxies? And what does Russia hope to gain2302from its outreach to the Houthis and what might trigger the2303Kremlin to step this support up or decrease it?2304    Mr. Roule. There have been reports that Russia has2305attempted to provide weapons to the Houthis and that diplomatic2306pressure from regional actors have prevented this and Russia2307may have told these actors that the purpose of this support was2308to complicate the lives of western powers who were supporting2309Ukraine. There has also been some reporting of Russian weaponry2310that has found its way to Hezbollah, although the evidence of2311Russia's direct engagement with Hezbollah is more tenuous and2312Russia has, of course, provided intelligence engagements with2313its counterparts in Iran on how to defeat western intelligence.2314    Mr. Kean. So in your view what, therefore, does the Iranian2315regime hope to gain from its increasingly cozy relationship2316with the Kremlin and what threats does that pose to U.S.2317national security priorities?2318    Mr. Roule. Although Russia is a sometimes competitor with2319Iran, it is a malign actor. It has blocked all pressure on Iran2320at the United Nations. So for example, regarding Yemen, Russia2321has made sure that there has been no significant investigation2322of Iran's support for the Houthis at the United Nations for2323many years. So Russia's support for Iran is significant. It is2324malign. It is pervasive. And it impacts global economy.2325    Mr. Kean. Are there points of friction within that2326bilateral relationship that the U.S. could effectively exploit?2327    Mr. Roule. I am not aware of any, but Dana, do you have2328anything you would like to add on that?2329    Ms. Stroul. I think the bottom line here is that Russia and2330Iran share the objective of challenging the United States, our2331influence, and our investment in the current global and2332international order. And that strategic convergence is stronger2333than any wedge we might want to draw between the two.2334    Mr. Kean. Thank you, all, for your testimony here today and2335I yield back.2336    Ms. Kim. Thank you. I now recognize Representative Amo from2337Rhode Island for 5 minutes.2338    Mr. Amo. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to our2339witnesses for being here. I know it has been a little while2340that you have been sitting there.2341    Ms. Stroul, good to see you again. The last time we were2342here was last April and I discussed with you the growing2343cooperation between Ayatollah Khomeini and Vladimir Putin. And2344back then, we saw Iran transfer drones to Russia. The same2345Iranian drones which were turned on Israel were used by Putin2346to attack Ukraine. One year later, Putin's drones are still2347taking the lives of innocent civilians and the ties between2348Russia and Iran have grown stronger.2349    Earlier this year, Russia and Iran signed a 20-year2350strategic partnership treaty with a military cooperation2351agreement. And the duo has expanded to include a third, Xi2352Jinping's China. In March, warships from all three countries2353conducted joint naval exercises in the Gulf of Oman, the2354strategic corridor for more than one quarter of the world's2355seaborne oil. That same week, China hosted Russia and Iranian2356diplomats to discuss Iran's nuclear program.2357    So in the aftermath of Trump 1.0 and the withdrawal of2358commitments to contain Iran by leaving the JCPOA, Iran has2359continued in its acceleration of its development of its nuclear2360program. Now as we are in Trump 2.0, as President Trump2361continues our surrender on the global stage, as we have seen in2362the last 70 plus days, China is racing to fill that vacuum. Xi2363is strengthening Iran's hands, thanks to Trump's retreat.2364    The annual threat assessment of the U.S. intelligence2365community released last month found that China, Russia, and2366Iran were three of the largest foreign threats to the United2367States.2368    Ms. Stroul, what actions should President Trump continue2369from the Biden administration to deter this growing alliance2370and ensure that Russia and China do not continue to help Iran2371evade sanctions?2372    Ms. Stroul. Thank you so much for that question,2373Congressman. Good to see you as well.2374    What we have seen since last year is continued coordination2375and strategic convergence across Russia, Iran, China, and2376sometimes North Korea. So it is diplomatic protection of Iran2377at the U.N. Security Council and across many international2378institutions. It is not just exchanging lessons learned on how2379to evade sanctions. It is also deeper economic cooperation,2380working on how to de-dollarize their economies, how to increase2381banking transactions between these different capitals to make2382themselves less exposed to U.S. sanctions. It is increasing2383exchanges in sophisticated defense technology. It is the2384military exercises, as you note, and then it is even trading2385and exchanging lessons learned on how to exert domestic control2386inside their countries, to suppress human rights and popular2387protests, not to mention nuclear cooperation.2388    So all of this requires a whole of government approach from2389the administration. It is investing in our unmatched network of2390allies and partners in order to counter this access. It is2391restoring the elements of U.S. soft power, USAID investing in2392our diplomats in order to counter the diplomatic actions of2393these different malign actors. It is strengthening our foreign2394military sales processes, our own military exercises, our own2395defense and security cooperation in order to counter that, and2396also making sure that we continue to have the most professional2397U.S. military in the world because partners and allies should2398want to do military exercises with us, not with Russia or2399China.2400    Mr. Kean. And Ms. Stroul, with my remaining time, what can2401we do or what changes can we make to disrupt the growing ties2402between a lot of those points that you just referenced on how2403we engage with our partners and our allies, but what can we do2404to disrupt the close ties between Iran, Russia, and China as2405this connection grows even stronger in their opposition to us?2406    Ms. Stroul. We are going to have to disincentivize the2407interests of those leaders and in those capitals to deepen2408their coordination with each other, to make it less attractive2409to do that and for them to perceive that the consequences of2410that deeper coordination that run counter to U.S. interests2411will be more painful than pursuing this course. And again, it2412means demonstrated resolve to maintain U.S. military2413partnerships, to invest and provide security assurances, and2414support for the defense of our allies and partners so that they2415are working with us and not hedging toward this other access2416and it is fielding a strong diplomatic corps and a strong2417network of development professionals.2418    Mr. Kean. Thank you. I yield back.2419    Mr. Mills. [Presiding.] Thank you. At this time, I2420recognize I recognize myself. I am unfortunate that my2421colleague left with his JCPOA binder as that would have been2422very helpful. We have got a small chair in the back that is a2423little bit wobbly and that is about the only thing you could2424have put under it to actually stabilize it, since there is2425nothing to stabilize Iran.2426    Ms. Stroul, you really love the quick fire, rapid fire2427stuff when it came to the Biden administration. I kind of want2428to follow suit here, if you will, and I want to make this2429quick. Did oil exportation increase under the Biden2430administration?2431    Ms. Stroul. Sanctions enforcement is an area that could2432have been improved.2433    Mr. Mills. Did it increase under the Biden administration?2434Yes or no?2435    Ms. Stroul. Chinese purchase of discounted Iranian oil2436increased under the previous administration.2437    Mr. Mills. Okay, did Biden delist the Houthi rebels?2438    Ms. Stroul. Yes.2439    Mr. Mills. Did that disrupt 12 percent of global trade2440through the Red Sea?2441    Ms. Stroul. The delisting itself was not the cause of the2442disruption of the global trade.2443    Mr. Mills. Did the increase in actual tax as a result of2444delisting the Houthis increase the amount of disruption of2445global trade through the Red Sea resulting in 12 percent of2446global trade being disrupted?2447    Ms. Stroul. Iranian provision of support to the Houthis is2448part of the----2449    Mr. Mills. Did the unfreezing of assets and the increase of2450oil trade give more money to Iran to be able to fund proxy2451militias?2452    Ms. Stroul. I can't speak to the exact fungibility of the--2453--2454    Mr. Mills. I actually thought that was your job. Did the2455currency of the Iran--the rial go up in value versus the dollar2456during the time the Biden administration was in place?2457    Ms. Stroul. My colleague would be better positioned on2458that.2459    Mr. Mills. I will allow you to answer.2460    Ms. Stroul. Yes.2461    Mr. Mills. Yes, it did because under max pressure it is at2462about a million rials to the dollar, something we haven't seen2463in a long time.2464    So I noticed that you had a lot of really quick, rapid2465fired things in the previous administration, but not a whole2466lot when it came to the increase in maximum pressure that2467actually resulted in the Iranian regime reducing the amount of2468attacks that it has right now.2469    Wasn't it the Biden administration that actually requested2470the IDF and Israel to launch themselves into a cease-fire for2471negotiations?2472    Ms. Stroul. I can't speak to the specifics of that. What I2473know----2474    Mr. Mills. Well, the answer is yes. And had they done that,2475we wouldn't have eliminated Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah. We2476would not have eliminated Sinwar. We would not have eliminated2477many of the actual terrorist organization leads that has2478basically been put in place and enforced to grow stronger as a2479result of the weakness that the administration have shown.2480    Look at what we have today. We talk all the time about how2481Russia, we are so weak on Russia, but was it not the Trump2482administration actually removed us from the failed INF treaty,2483something that no other administration was willing to do2484before? Was it not the JCPOA that both General Secretary Ban2485Ki-moon and Guterres said had been violated when Iran was still2486shipping mid-range ballistic missiles to the Houthis when they2487were launching against Saudi Aramco?2488    This is preposterous to even assume that the Biden2489administration had done anything to prevent the enrichment of2490nuclear that the JCPOA or Jake Sullivan or any of the others2491had done anything that would weakened the regime.2492    I want to be very clear. There is a difference and I think2493it is important to always point out the differentiation of2494this. There is a difference in the regime and the Iranian2495people. The Iranian people want a free Iran. I can tell you2496that those who are bravely protesting in the streets, those who2497are continuing to try and risk their lives every single day2498like Mahsa Amini did to say enough is enough shouldn't be2499lumped in so when our colleagues very recklessly just says2500Iran, I think that that is a very big misnomenclature and I2501want to correct that for the record.2502    I want to go into sanction enforcements. Do you feel, Ms.2503Jungman, that sanctions were enforced under the Biden2504administration?2505    Ms. Jungman. Not until late 2024.2506    Mr. Mills. And do you feel that Iran is at a stronger or2507weaker position right now than they were previously?2508    Ms. Jungman. As a result of the sanctions that have been2509rolled out over the last few months and at the end of 2024,2510they are weaker, but not as weak as they could have been if2511sanctions were fully enforced under the Biden administration.2512    Mr. Mills. I completely agree. And what I notice from Iran2513is that not only are they concerned about this administration2514more so than the last, they have actually moved and relocated2515their surface-to-air missiles around Qom, around Natanz, around2516Isfahan because they know that unlike the Obama-Biden drawn red2517line that this administration has actually proven to take real2518enforcement.2519    Do you think, Mr. Norman, that if we actually--not actually2520hurting or impacting or having a lot of collateral damage as2521you would if you hit cities like Tehran or others, but went2522after the nuclear facilities, that would send a direct message2523to the regime that we will not continue to play weak with them?2524    Mr. Roule. It certainly would send a powerful message to2525the regime that we would not play weak with them, sir.2526    Mr. Mills. And I think that that is really what this2527administration has proven, both in the first administration and2528now is that we are not going to continue to play weak with our2529adversaries. The China, Russia, Iran, North Korea geopolitical2530alignment has grown stronger in the previous regime and as2531President Trump and this administration is continuing to try2532and make the necessary steps to enforce sanctions to guarantee2533that we re-list the Houthis, to stop the sea of navigation from2534being disrupted and to actually for once and for all actually2535see that the Iranian people have support from the United2536States, overthrow a regime that has been a dictatorship,2537tyrannical, and continue to do but only build and embolden2538themselves under the Biden administration.2539    With that, I will now recognize if it pops up here and I am2540not sure they are updating it. There we go, we will recognize2541the gentlelady from Pennsylvania, Ms. Dean.2542    Ms. Dean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Bear with me, and let's2543restart the clock, please.2544    Mr. Mills. Restarted the clock.2545    Ms. Dean. Thank you very much. I thank Chairman Mast and2546Ranking Member Meeks for holding this hearing and I thank all2547of you, your expertise, your passion, and your intellect around2548these issues. It is very valuable to us in these incredibly2549challenging times.2550    Going back to the JCPOA, in 2015, the P5+1, the EU, and2551Iran agreed to the JCPOA choosing diplomacy over aggression to2552ensure that Iran's nuclear program would be peaceful,2553constrained. The JCPOA was an historic deal in ensuring2554verification and compliance and the IAEA had previously warned2555that its failure would be a loss for nuclear verification and2556multi-lateralism. Unfortunately, in 2018, even though the IAEA2557verified that Iran was implementing its nuclear-related2558commitments, President Trump, in my mind, recklessly withdrew2559the United States from the JCPOA and without a plan as my2560colleagues, Mr. Schneider, spoke about.2561    Mr. Roule, I would like to go back to the very beginning of2562your testimony. It is stunning testimony that I think bears2563repeating. You said in page 1 and page 2 first the IAEA notes2564that Iran continues to expand its production of 60 percent2565enriched uranium. Is that correct?2566    Mr. Roule. That is correct, ma'am.2567    Ms. Dean. You say Iran appears capable of producing its2568first quantity of 90 percent enriched uranium. Can you speak to2569that? What leads us to know that?2570    Mr. Roule. That is based on International Atomic Energy2571Agency's access to Iran's nuclear program at present which is2572limited, but it still takes place.2573    Ms. Dean. And when you use the expression, as experts do,2574they would have the possibility of 90 percent enriched uranium2575sufficient for one nuclear weapon in about a week, what does2576about a week mean to a layman like me?2577    Mr. Roule. Well, it means they have centrifuges which spin2578gas and basically produce highly enriched uranium that would2579then have to be converted into material for a warhead that2580could then be used as a weapon. This is the first stage of that2581process so this is before the warhead construction starts. So2582they don't have a weapon. They just have the material that2583would begin the process toward the weapon. So they don't have a2584bomb, but they have the fissile material that would then begin2585the process for a weapon.2586    Ms. Dean. What stages were they at prior to President Trump2587removing the United States from JCPOA? What were the numbers2588then?2589    Mr. Roule. They had a very, very tiny amount of enriched2590uranium at a level that was much, much reduced to this--it was2591below 5 percent. They had a very small number of centrifuges.2592But I should also say, ma'am, that when President Trump left2593JCPOA, they did not significantly increase their centrifuge2594production until, frankly, diplomatic talks began under the2595Biden administration. It wasn't because of the Biden2596administration itself. It was just because the Iranians just2597decided to expand their program even when diplomacy was2598offered.2599    Ms. Dean. And then you said, let me see here, second, you2600said Iran continues to increase the number and sophistication2601of its centrifuge cascade. Can you speak to that a little bit?2602    Mr. Roule. Yes. In essence, the centrifuges have--the more2603advanced the centrifuge is, the greater efficiency, the faster2604it can produce highly enriched uranium and what that means is2605the faster it can produce the fissile material for a weapon.2606And the faster it can produce something means the fewer number2607of centrifuges which means the footprint is smaller, it means2608the smaller the installations can be and easier you could hide2609it.2610    So in essence, Iran's nuclear architecture right now2611appears to be designed to produce the highest enriched uranium2612in the fastest way possible and not the lowest enriched uranium2613in just an average speed possible. So it is not producing2614enriched uranium in a way that you would expect for a civilian2615nuclear program. It is also producing this enriched uranium in2616centrifuge cascades, in facilities that are deeply buried that2617look as if they are designed to survive a military attack. That2618is all very suspicious.2619    Ms. Dean. Very suspicious. I see my time is up. Where does2620this leave our partners, our former partners in the JCPOA, if2621you could answer that?2622    Mr. Roule. Well, Europeans have been attempting to revive2623negotiations for some time without success, in part because the2624Iranians themselves refuse to cooperate in negotiations as they2625refused to cooperate under the Biden administration, which is2626why then the Secretary of State in the Biden administration2627called the negotiations to an end.2628    Ms. Dean. I thank you very much all of you. I am sorry I2629wasn't able to get to everybody. Thank you. I yield back.2630    Mr. Mills. Thank you. At this time, we recognize our good2631friend from Texas, Mr. Self, for 5 minutes.2632    Mr. Self. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In 2015, President Obama2633flew a plane with $400 million in cash to the Ayatollah and2634released billions more. In 2021, President Biden rescinded2635President Trump's maximum pressure campaign, as we have heard.2636They went from like $4 billion, I think in reserves, to2637somewhere around $100 billion today, perhaps more.2638    We have suffered through multiple inept leadership in terms2639of Iran and now we have a strong commander in chief who sees2640maximum pressure working. However, as an Article 1 branch of2641government, Congress must have jurisdiction over sanctions.2642Some say so over the sanctions for Iran and for any future2643administration. That is why I have reintroduced the Iran2644Sanctions Relief Review Act which passed the House last2645session, but my bill will give us a seat at the table and the2646American people a voice and view. We must strengthen Congress'2647hand to produce future generations from emergency existential2648threats to our Nation's survival and the Iranian nuclear weapon2649might do that. We have a duty to do that.2650    So I want to start with you, Mr. Roule. What is the center2651of gravity of the Iranian nuclear program? Is it the warhead?2652Is it the guidance system? Is it the missile itself? Is it the2653facilities? Is it the potential for software from your years in2654the CIA? What is the center of gravity?2655    Mr. Roule. It is a broad, federated program that exists in2656many locations across a broad geography. For many years, the2657center would have been the development of fissile material, but2658as we just discussed, that is produced at a number of locations2659at a very advanced rate at present, so understanding their2660number of centrifuges, their production rate of highly enriched2661uranium is the most important aspect of the program at present.2662    Mr. Self. So you think they can quickly link the material2663with a guidance system with a missile because they never tested2664this, did they?2665    Mr. Roule. No, sir. I didn't say that.2666    Mr. Self. Okay.2667    Mr. Roule. But it is unlikely they would be able to do2668quickly or efficiently in my view. They have not done that and2669in the time it would take for them to do that, it depends upon2670the amount of testing, how quickly and securely they would wish2671to do that. And the metallurgy to shape a warhead, and by the2672way, that is also saying they decide they wouldn't put it into2673a gravity bomb into an airplane or some other system to deliver2674it.2675    Mr. Self. Or sneak it into a port somewhere.2676    Mr. Roule. Or sneak it into a port, sir. But at this point,2677it is the creation of fissile material in the enrichment2678program.2679    Mr. Self. Interesting. I would have said it would have been2680the building of an actual warhead on a missile.2681    But anyway, Ms. Jungman, we know that the Ayatollah stopped2682the program, supposedly in early 2000. He is now, what 86, 872683years old. Do you think that they may be doing something behind2684his back, seeing that his days are numbered? What are the2685chances that is happening that somebody surreptitiously is2686moving the nuclear program forward?2687    Ms. Jungman. Unfortunately, that is not my area of2688expertise. I am going to defer to my colleagues.2689    Mr. Self. Okay. Mr. Roule, I think you have been nominated.2690    Mr. Roule. Minimal.2691    Mr. Self. Minimal.2692    Mr. Roule. Minimal. It is not how the country works. It is2693a very small circle of people and it is extremely unlikely2694something like that would happen without his knowledge.2695    Mr. Self. Okay, very good. So regime change. I have heard2696that discussed here. I think that is a horrible concept because2697we haven't defeated a nation for decades now, but we do know2698that there have been several uprisings in Iran and they are put2699down brutally. So how in the world do we encourage the people2700of Iran to actually go through the pain to change the regime?2701Is that possible? Because we are assuming some external force,2702U.S. or somebody else, will have to make this happen because if2703we do have a successor to the Ayatollah standing in the wings,2704how do we encourage them to do this themselves?2705    Mr. Roule. The people of Iran need to know that America2706stands with them, but we need to be very careful and cautious2707as to how we do this because people are risking their lives.2708They will pay a terrific price in the prisons of Iran, the2709hands of Iran's extraordinarily cruel security forces when they2710are punished. And we need to be very careful that we don't--we2711aren't too cavalier about how this is handled. It is up to the2712people of Iran to determine their future and as they do take2713steps to change that future, they need to know that we will2714support them and perhaps even provide safe haven if they need2715security if it is in such a situation. But we just need to be2716careful on how we move forward because if there is a situation2717where they are caught in the hands of Iran's security, they2718will be handled very roughly.2719    Mr. Self. Thank you. I yield back.2720    Mr. Mills. Thank you. At this time, we recognize the2721Representative of Delaware, Rep. McBride.2722    Ms. McBride. Thank you, Mr. Acting Chairman. Thank you very2723much to our witnesses for your perseverance with us today.2724    Around the world, we are watching a clash unfold between2725democratic values and authoritarian oppression, from Europe to2726the Middle East, to this very continent. This is the story of2727our moment, democracy versus authoritarianism. Iran sits at the2728center of a growing alliance of authoritarianism, an access2729that includes not only hostile nation states like Russia and2730China, but also a network of terrorist organizations and armed2731militias across the Middle East. Iran props up groups like2732Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, using them as tools to2733destabilize democracies and challenge U.S. interests. This is a2734part of Iran's global strategy to withstand authoritarian2735influence and erode the norms of international law and human2736rights. And while we sit here warning of Iranian malign2737activities, President Trump's national security team has been2738carelessly handling classified and mission-sensitive2739information about the Houthis in open.2740    The problem isn't just that they mistakenly added a2741reported to a text chain. The bigger problem is that these2742officials, some of the most surveilled people on the planet,2743were communicating in a way that allowed that mistake to even2744happen. How many Signal chats contained sensitive or classified2745material right now? How many have occurred over the last2746several months? Reporters may have not been able to see them,2747but Iran, Russia, and China very easily could.2748    It is entirely possible that Iran or one of its partners2749was following along on the Signal chat that we know about and2750because of that, it is a miracle, it is a miracle that we are2751not mourning dead American troops right now. Had there been2752retaliation waiting in response because of that breach, that2753could have handed the Houthis and Iran a major victory. That is2754not just embarrassing, it was dangerous.2755    As Hamas is weakened and Iran looks to recalibrate its2756strategy, we must ensure that Iran does not have additional2757proxies to fall back on. I am proud to co-lead the bipartisan,2758Bicameral Accountability For Terrorist Perpetrators of October27597th Act introduced by my colleagues, Representatives Sherman2760and Lawler which would finally sanction the Popular Resistance2761Committees, a brutal terrorist organization in Gaza and an2762active participant in the horrific attacks in Israel on October27637th. These terrorists have carried out attacks against2764Americans, Israelis, and Palestinians for decades and their2765deep ties to Hamas make them a credible candidate for Iran if2766they are looking to increase support for other proxies in the2767region.2768    So Mr. Roule, my question for you is despite having been2769responsible for American civilians being murdered since 2003,2770the Popular Resistance Committees has never been sanctioned. As2771Iran's adjusted strategy in response to the weakening of its2772primary proxies, how should the U.S. Government and our allies2773monitor and preempt the rise of new or lesser known Iranian-2774backed groups that could fill the vacuum?2775    Mr. Roule. Superb question. I go back to a previous2776statement. As long as the Quds Force exists as an organization2777created to sponsor militias and terrorists, we will see more2778and more of this. There are Quds Force training camps in Iran2779designed to train multi-national terrorists to, in essence, go2780out and become train the trainer individuals. Some of the best2781training Iran provides to the Houthis, to Hezbollah and others2782is provided within Iran itself. Until Iran is compelled to2783change the Quds Force itself, we are fated to deal with this2784issue.2785    So I would encourage legislation that insists that our2786partners in Europe and the region can do what they can to2787constrain Iran's--from the Quds Force's activity. Until this2788happens, we are fated to watch this movie play again and again.2789    Ms. McBride. Thank you. And quickly, Ms. Stroul, given2790Iran's strategy of using proxies, destabilized fragile2791democracies, and suppressed civil society from Lebanon to Iraq,2792how can the U.S. more effectively support democratic2793institutions and counteract the malign influence of these2794authoritarian-backed actors?2795    Ms. Stroul. The ability of societies and communities to be2796resilient in the face of what the Iranians will try to do which2797is reconstitute their threat network is to empower our2798diplomats and our development assistance professionals. So that2799would particularly be the U.S. Agency for International2800Development and to allow our diplomats to do what they do best2801which is political and diplomatic engagement.2802    Ms. McBride. Thank you, I yield back the balance of my2803time.2804    Mr. Mills. Thank you, I would remind, just for2805clarification, Rep. McBride, that those sitting in the chair2806are chairman or chairwoman, there is no acting and so I would2807assume we know the difference between real and acting. And at2808this time, I will recognize the gentleman from Indiana, Mr.2809Shreve.2810    Mr. Shreve. Thank you, Mr.--gentleman in the chair. I2811appreciate the testimony from the witnesses. I know we have2812spent a long afternoon and I appreciate that.2813    Ms. Jungman, nearly 3 hours ago, as we opened up, you2814discussed the establishment of a global maritime no dock list2815as a means of curtailing this shadow fleet. What might the U.S.2816do to encourage other countries to uphold this no dock list at2817their ports?2818    Ms. Jungman. Thank you for bringing that up and thank you2819for the question. I think it is important to recognize again2820that there are western entities touching the vessels involved2821in this activity, whether that is the Classification Society,2822the flag State. The Classification Society, for example, have2823offices here in the U.S. or the flag states provide the flags2824to these vessels, we can essentially say none of their vessels2825would be able to sail to the U.S. For example, if that is2826Panama or Comoros or Cook Islands, if we said if you are going2827to flag these vessels, your vessels will not be able to come to2828the U.S. So I think there is a number of different ways that we2829can encourage them, but essentially the thought behind the no2830sail list or kind of monitored off a no-fly list is that the2831enforcement of sanctions can take time and having this list of2832vessels that are involved in this type of activity would send a2833warning and hopefully deter them from off-loading their oil at2834different areas.2835    Mr. Shreve. So that deterrence would be second hand. They2836can't prescribe those vessels on the no dock list directly at2837foreign ports, but we could get to the bad actor states by2838prohibiting their docking into our ports? Is that a fair2839characterization?2840    Ms. Jungman. Yes.2841    Mr. Shreve. All right, well, thank you. Thank you, sir, I2842yield back.2843    Mr. Mills. Thank you so much. At this time, we recognize2844the gentlelady from South Carolina, Rep. Biggs.2845    Ms. Biggs. Thank you, sir, and thank you to our witnesses2846for being here today.2847    So the denuclearization of Iran remains a cornerstone of2848U.S. policy and it is critical to ensuring regional stability2849and global security given Iran's history of pursuing nuclear2850capabilities that threaten its neighbors and international2851communities. The Obama administration's Iran nuclear deal, the2852JCPOA, notably failed to achieve this goal as it allowed Iran2853to retain significant nuclear infrastructure and did not2854mandate the verifiable dismantlement of its nuclear weapons2855program. Moreover, the Obama administration sought to obligate2856the United States to remove key sanctions on Iran, notably2857those with Section 1245 of Fiscal Year 2012 NDAA, which2858enforced significant financial and oil restrictions. The Obama2859administration's agreement boiled down to a trade which simply2860stated temporary nuclear restriction in exchange for permanent2861sanctions relief.2862    Yet, these efforts fell well short of the denuclearization2863standard mandated by the CIFADA, a bill signed into law by2864President Obama, which explicitly requires Iran to cease the2865pursuit, acquisition, and development of nuclear weapons and to2866dismantle its nuclear program as one of a number of conditions2867terminating significant U.S. sanctions. The law's mandate is2868clear and indisputable and Obama administration's agreement2869failed significantly short raising serious concerns about its2870effectiveness and security implications for the United States2871and for our allies.2872    Only strict adherence to the law will ensure the permanent2873removal of nuclear threat from Iran.2874    So my question is simple. To each of our witnesses, I just2875want to know does anyone disagree with this fundamental2876principle?2877    And I will start with Mr. Roule.2878    Mr. Roule. Sorry, ma'am, could you give it a question,2879please?2880    Ms. Biggs. I just want to know if you disagree or agree2881with this fundamental principle.2882    Mr. Roule. Of?2883    Ms. Biggs. What I just stated about what the Obama--how we2884fell short and how it affects us now.2885    Mr. Roule. You are correct, ma'am. The JCPOA provided a2886permanent sanctions relief and permanent relief of a number of2887restrictions in return for, in many cases, a temporary or2888finite restrictions on Iran's nuclear program and with a2889government of malign individuals who sponsored proxies, did a2890number of oppressive activities against their own people, and2891led us to the current State where we are today.2892    And if I can just go a little farther, in essence, the2893problem with JCPOA is it has become an issue about us and when2894it should be an issue about Iran. OK? This was Iran's chance to2895turn a new chapter of history and it didn't. And it is Iran's2896fault, OK? And that is the issue here. So yes, ma'am.2897    Ms. Biggs. Thank you.2898    Ms. Jungman. I would agree with the comments made by Mr.2899Roule.2900    Ms. Stroul. I would also agree and I think it is even more2901important that whatever deal is contemplated and negotiated,2902this has to be much stronger than the JCPOA, particularly2903because of the perilous advances in Iran's nuclear program2904today.2905    Ms. Biggs. Absolutely. I believe that is why our past is so2906important to pay attention to as we move forward. And thank you2907to our witnesses. And I yield back my time.2908    Mr. Mills. Thank you so much. I want to thank our witnesses2909for their valuable testimony and the members for their2910questions. Members of the committees may have some additional2911questions for the witnesses and we may ask you to respond to2912these in writing.2913    Pursuant to committee rules, all members may have 5 days to2914submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the2915record, subject to the length limitations.2916    Without objection the committee stands adjourned.2917    [Whereupon, at 5:17 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]29182919                                APPENDIX29202921                              ----------29222923               Material Submitted for the Hearing Record29242925[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]29262927                                 [all]