"Reforming FEMA: Bringing Common Sense Back to Federal Emergency Management"

1[House Hearing, 119 Congress]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34    REFORMING FEMA: BRINGING COMMON SENSE BACK TO FEDERAL EMERGENCY5                               MANAGEMENT67=======================================================================89                                (119-13)1011                                HEARING1213                               BEFORE THE1415                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON16    ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT1718                                 OF THE1920                              COMMITTEE ON21                   TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE22                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES2324                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2526                             FIRST SESSION2728                               __________2930                             MARCH 25, 20253132                               __________3334                       Printed for the use of the35             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure3637          GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT3839     Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-40     transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/41                             transportation4243                        ______4445             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE46 60-422 PDF          WASHINGTON : 20254748             COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE4950  Sam Graves, Missouri, Chairman51 Rick Larsen, Washington, Ranking52              Member53Eleanor Holmes Norton,               Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford,54  District of Columbia               Arkansas,55Jerrold Nadler, New York               Vice Chairman56Steve Cohen, Tennessee               Daniel Webster, Florida57John Garamendi, California           Thomas Massie, Kentucky58Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgiaott Perry, Pennsylvania59Andre Carson, Indiana                Brian Babin, Texas60Dina Titus, Nevada                   David Rouzer, North Carolina61Jared Huffman, California            Mike Bost, Illinois62Julia Brownley, California           Doug LaMalfa, California63Frederica S. Wilson, Florida         Bruce Westerman, Arkansas64Mark DeSaulnier, California          Brian J. Mast, Florida65Salud O. Carbajal, California        Pete Stauber, Minnesota66Greg Stanton, Arizona                Tim Burchett, Tennessee67Sharice Davids, Kansas               Dusty Johnson, South Dakota68Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois   Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey69Chris Pappas, New Hampshire          Troy E. Nehls, Texas70Seth Moulton, Massachusetts          Tracey Mann, Kansas71Marilyn Strickland, Washington       Burgess Owens, Utah72Patrick Ryan, New York               Eric Burlison, Missouri73Val T. Hoyle, Oregon                 Mike Collins, Georgia74Emilia Strong Sykes, Ohio,           Mike Ezell, Mississippi75  Vice Ranking Member                Kevin Kiley, California76Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan        Vince Fong, California77Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina   Tony Wied, Wisconsin78Christopher R. Deluzio, Pennsylvania Tom Barrett, Michigan79Robert Garcia, California            Nicholas J. Begich III, Alaska80Nellie Pou, New Jersey               Robert P. Bresnahan, Jr.,81Kristen McDonald Rivet, Michigan     Pennsylvania82Laura Friedman, California           Jeff Hurd, Colorado83Laura Gillen, New York               Jefferson Shreve, Indiana84Shomari Figures, Alabama             Addison P. McDowell, North85                                     Carolina86                                     David J. Taylor, Ohio87                                     Brad Knott, North Carolina88                                     Kimberlyn King-Hinds,89                                       Northern Mariana Islands90                                     Mike Kennedy, Utah91                                     Robert F. Onder, Jr., Missouri92                                     Vacancy93                                ------                                79495      Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and96                          Emergency Management9798    Scott Perry, Pennsylvania,99             Chairman100  Greg Stanton, Arizona, Ranking101              Member102Eleanor Holmes Norton,               Mike Ezell, Mississippi103  District of Columbia               Kevin Kiley, California104Kristen McDonald Rivet, Michigan     Tom Barrett, Michigan105Shomari Figures, Alabama             Robert P. Bresnahan, Jr.,106John Garamendi, California           Pennsylvania107Dina Titus, Nevada                   Kimberlyn King-Hinds,108Laura Friedman, California,            Northern Mariana Islands109  Vice Ranking Member                Mike Kennedy, Utah110Rick Larsen, Washington (Ex Officio) Robert F. Onder, Jr., Missouri,111                                       Vice Chairman112                                     Sam Graves, Missouri (Ex Officio)113114                                CONTENTS115116                                                                   Page117118Summary of Subject Matter........................................     v119120                 STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE121122Hon. Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress from the123  Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on124  Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency125  Management, opening statement..................................     1126    Prepared statement...........................................     3127Hon. Greg Stanton, a Representative in Congress from the State of128  Arizona, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Economic129  Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management,130  opening statement..............................................     4131    Prepared statement...........................................     5132Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of133  Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and134  Infrastructure, opening statement..............................     7135    Prepared statement...........................................     8136137                               WITNESSES138139Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S.140  Government Accountability Office, oral statement...............    10141    Prepared statement...........................................    11142Kevin Guthrie, Executive Director, Florida Division of Emergency143  Management, oral statement.....................................    22144    Prepared statement...........................................    23145Jaime Laughter, County Manager, Transylvania County, North146  Carolina, oral statement.......................................    27147    Prepared statement...........................................    30148Adrian Garcia, Commissioner, Harris County, Texas, on behalf of149  the National Association of Counties, oral statement...........    36150    Prepared statement...........................................    38151152                       SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD153154Statement of Matthew Jewell, President, St. Charles Parish,155  Louisiana, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Mike Ezell.........    45156157                                APPENDIX158159Questions to Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and160  Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office, from Hon.161  Kristen McDonald Rivet.........................................    65162163                             March 21, 2025164165    SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER166167    TO:      LMembers, Subcommittee on Economic Development,168Public Buildings, and Emergency Management169    FROM:  LStaff, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public170Buildings, and Emergency Management171    RE:      LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Reforming FEMA:172Bringing Common Sense Back to Federal Emergency Management''173_______________________________________________________________________174175                               I. PURPOSE176177    The Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings,178and Emergency Management of the Committee on Transportation and179Infrastructure will meet on Tuesday, March 25, 2025, at 10:00180a.m. ET in 2167 of the Rayburn House Office Building to receive181testimony at a hearing entitled, ``Reforming FEMA: Bringing182Common Sense Back to Federal Emergency Management.'' The183hearing will broadly examine the current state of emergency184management, including ways to reform the Federal Emergency185Management Agency (FEMA) and Federal disaster assistance. At186this hearing, Members will receive testimony from stakeholders187and experts in emergency management and disasters.188189                             II. BACKGROUND190191FEDERAL ASSISTANCE FOR DISASTERS192193    FEMA is the Federal Government's lead agency for preparing194for, mitigating against, responding to, and recovering from195disasters and emergencies related to all hazards--whether196natural or man-made.\1\ FEMA's primary authority in carrying197out these functions stems from the Robert T. Stafford Disaster198Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) (P.L. 100-199707, as amended).\2\ The Stafford Act authorizes three types of200declarations: (1) major disaster declarations; (2) emergency201declarations; and (3) fire management grant (FMAG)202declarations.\3\ The Stafford Act authorizes the President to203approve states' requests for a Federal disaster declaration204when ``the situation is of such severity and magnitude that205effective response is beyond the capabilities of the state and206affected local governments.'' \4\207---------------------------------------------------------------------------208    \1\ Dep't of Homeland Security, FEMA, (Feb. 3, 2023), available at209https://www.dhs.gov/employee-resources/federal-emergency-management-210agency-fema.211    \2\ Stafford Act, Pub. L. No. 100-707.212    \3\ Id.213    \4\ Id.214---------------------------------------------------------------------------215216PRESIDENTIALLY DECLARED MAJOR DISASTER217218    When state and local resources are overwhelmed and the219``disaster is of such severity and magnitude that effective220response is beyond the capabilities of the state and the221affected local governments,'' \5\ the Governor of the affected222state may request the President declare a major disaster.\6\223FEMA's primary Stafford Act programs for disaster recovery in224the aftermath of a major disaster are in the Public Assistance225(PA) Program and the Individual Assistance (IA) Program.\7\226Following a major disaster declaration, FEMA also provides227Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) funds.\8\228---------------------------------------------------------------------------229    \5\ FEMA, A Guide to the Disaster Declaration Process and Federal230Disaster Assistance 1, available at https://www.fema.gov/pdf/rebuild/231recover/dec_proc.pdf.232    \6\ Id.233    \7\ Id.234    \8\ Id.235---------------------------------------------------------------------------236    The PA Program, authorized primarily by Sections 403, 406,237and 428 of the Stafford Act, reimburses state, tribal, and238territorial governments, as well as certain private non-profits239for rebuilding damaged buildings and infrastructure.\9\ The240Federal cost-share for PA is 75 percent, but may be increased241by the President.\10\242---------------------------------------------------------------------------243    \9\ See FEMA, Assistance for Governments and Private Non-Profits244After a Disaster, (Feb. 23, 2023), available at https://www.fema.gov/245assistance/public.246    \10\ 42 U.S.C. Sec.  5172.247---------------------------------------------------------------------------248    The IA Program is authorized primarily by Section 408 of249the Stafford Act. The IA program includes the Individuals and250Households Program (IHP), Mass Care and Emergency Assistance,251the Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program, Disaster252Unemployment Assistance, Disaster Legal Services, and Disaster253Case Management. IHP is the primary FEMA program used to assist254disaster survivors; it includes housing assistance and other255needs assistance. Housing assistance includes money for repair,256rental assistance, or ``direct assistance,'' such as the257provision of temporary housing.\11\ The current limits for IHP258assistance is $42,500 for housing assistance and $42,500 for259other needs assistance.\12\260---------------------------------------------------------------------------261    \11\ FEMA, Individuals and Households Program, (Feb. 3, 2023),262available at https://www.fema.gov/assistance/individual/program.263    \12\ 42 U.S.C. Sec.  5174.264---------------------------------------------------------------------------265    Section 404 of the Stafford Act authorizes HMGP, which is266based on a percentage of PA funding, to provide grants to267state, tribal, and territorial governments for mitigation268projects that: (1) are cost effective and (2) reduce the risk269of future damage, hardship, and loss from natural hazards.\13\270The purpose of this grant program is to fund practical271mitigation measures that effectively reduce the risk of loss of272life and property from future disasters. State, tribal, and273territorial governments may use their HMGP funds to assist274families in reducing the risk to their homes from natural275disasters. The Federal cost share for HMGP is 75 percent and276the remaining 25 percent can come from a variety of sources277(i.e. a cash payment from the state or local government).\14\278---------------------------------------------------------------------------279    \13\ FEMA, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), (Dec. 27, 2022),280available at https://www.fema.gov/grants/mitigation/hazard-mitigation.281    \14\ Id.282---------------------------------------------------------------------------283284                III. FEMA'S RESPONSE TO RECENT DISASTERS285286HURRICANES HELENE AND MILTON287288    In 2024, FEMA provided assistance for 120 Presidentially289declared emergencies and major disasters including: five290hurricanes that made landfall, multiple unnamed severe storms,291wildfires, and an active tornado season that impacted many292states across the country.\15\ However, the most significant293disaster of 2024 was Hurricane Helene, which made landfall near294Perry, Florida on September 26, 2024, as a Category 4295hurricane.\16\ As Helene traveled across the Appalachian296Region, it resulted in catastrophic flooding, landslides, and297tornadoes. Six states (Florida, Georgia, Tennessee, Virginia,298North Carolina, and South Carolina) received a major disaster299declaration associated with Helene.\17\ Alabama received an300emergency declaration.\18\ The destruction of Hurricane Helene301resulted in 219 storm-related deaths,\19\ including 106 in302North Carolina alone.\20\ That makes it the deadliest storm to303hit the mainland United States since Hurricane Katrina.\21\304---------------------------------------------------------------------------305    \15\ FEMA, Declared Disasters, available at https://www.fema.gov/306disaster/declarations.307    \16\ Kate Payne, Hurricane Helene Kills At Least 44 and Cuts A308Swath of Destruction Across the Southeast, AP News, (Sept. 27, 2024),309available at https://apnews.com/article/hurricane-helene-florida-310georgia-carolina-e5769b56dea81e40fae2161ad1b4e75d.311    \17\ FEMA, Hurricane Helene, available at https://www.fema.gov/312disaster/current/hurricane-helene.313    \18\ Id.314    \19\ NOAA, National Centers for Environmental Information, U.S.315Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters, available at https://316www.ncei.noaa.gov/access/billions/events.317    \20\ North Carolina Dep't of Health and Human Services, Hurricane318Helene Storm Related Fatalities, available at https://www.ncdhhs.gov/319assistance/hurricane-helene-recovery-resources/hurricane-helene-storm-320related-fatalities.321    \21\ Ana Faguy & Brandon Drenon, Helene is Deadliest Mainland US322Hurricane Since Katrina, BBC, (Oct. 3, 2024), available at https://323www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1k70rnrp4xo.324---------------------------------------------------------------------------325    Just two weeks later, Hurricane Milton formed in the Gulf326of Mexico and rapidly intensified to a Category 5327hurricane.\22\ By the time Milton made landfall near Siesta Key328on October 9, 2024, the storm had weakened to a Category 3329hurricane, but it brought a front of deadly tornadoes and storm330surges to Florida.\23\ This was the third hurricane in 13331months to impact Florida's Big Bend region.\24\332---------------------------------------------------------------------------333    \22\ Brad Brooks and Leonora LaPeter Anton, Hurricane Milton Leaves334At Least 10 Dead, Millions Without Power in Florida, Reuters, (Oct. 10,3352024), available at https://www.reuters.com/world/us/hurricane-milton-336weakens-it-marches-across-central-florida-homes-destroyed-2024-10-10/.337    \23\ Id.338    \24\ Chelsea Harvey, Third Hurricane in 13 Months Slams Florida's339Big Bend, E&E News by Politico, (Sept. 27, 2024), available at https://340www.eenews.net/articles/third-hurricane-in-13-months-slams-floridas-341big-bend/.342---------------------------------------------------------------------------343    According to the February Disaster Relief Fund Report to344Congress, FEMA has obligated $6.65 billion for Hurricane Helene345and $2.7 billion for Hurricane Milton.\25\ While 2020 holds the346all-time record for Presidentially declared emergencies and347major disasters due to declarations related to COVID-19, at348230, the size and severity of Stafford Act declarations in 2024349has drawn Congressional attention to FEMA's resource350constraints and response challenges.\26\351---------------------------------------------------------------------------352    \25\ FEMA, February 2025 Disaster Relief Fund Report, (Feb. 12,3532025), available at https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/354fema_ocfo_feb-2025-disaster-relief-fund-report.pdf [hereinafter355Disaster Relief Fund Report].356    \26\ Adam B. Smith, 2023: A Historic Year of U.S. Billion-Dollar357Weather and Climate Disasters, NOAA, (Jan. 8, 2024), available at358https://www.climate.gov/news-features/blogs/beyond-data/2023-historic-359year-us-billion-dollar-weather-and-climate-disasters; Letter from Sam360Graves, Chairman, H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure to Deanne361Criswell, Administrator, FEMA (Oct. 11, 2025) (on file with Comm.).362---------------------------------------------------------------------------363364LOS ANGELES WILDFIRES365366    Starting on January 7, 2025, a series of 12 wildfires,367including the Palisades and Eaton fires, burned more than36840,000 acres across the greater Los Angeles area.\27\ The369wildfires burned for several weeks and were only 100 percent370contained on January 31, 2025.\28\ Twenty-nine people died as a371result of the wildfires, and more than 18,000 structures were372destroyed.\29\373---------------------------------------------------------------------------374    \27\ CAL Fire, 2025 Incident Archive, available at https://375www.fire.ca.gov/incidents/2025.376    \28\ Id.377    \29\ Minyvonne Burke & Liz Kreutz, What We Know About the Victims378Killed in the California Wildfires, NBC News, (Feb. 12, 2025),379available at https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/california-wildfires-380what-we-know-victims-killed-rcna188240.381---------------------------------------------------------------------------382    According to the February Disaster Relief Fund Report to383Congress, FEMA has obligated $1.27 billion for the Los Angeles384wildfires.\30\ The Los Angeles wildfires sparked a wider debate385about California's resource management, after reports began386circulating that water systems used to fight the Palisades and387Eaton fires could not maintain the continuous high water388pressures needed for fire hydrants at high elevations. In the389first days of the fires, firefighters were forced to overly390rely on water supplied by fire hydrants to suppress the391wildfires since hurricane force winds meant they could not use392planes and helicopters to drop water.\31\393---------------------------------------------------------------------------394    \30\ Disaster Relief Fund Report, supra note 25.395    \31\ Karla Rendo, More Pacific Palisades Residents Join Lawsuit396Against LADWP, City Over Water Supply Failure, News4 Los Angeles, (Mar.3978, 2025), available at https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/california-398wildfires/more-pacific-palisades-residents-join-lawsuit-against-ladwp-399city-over-water-supply-failure/3649420/.400---------------------------------------------------------------------------401402                   IV. HISTORICAL ISSUES AND REFORMS403404    FEMA was originally created by Executive Order to carry out405the President's authority in providing Federal disaster406assistance.\32\ FEMA was later merged into the Department of407Homeland Security (DHS) and its authorities dispersed408throughout the Department under the direction of the Secretary409of DHS.\33\ Following the poor response after Hurricane Katrina410in 2005, Congress enacted the Post Katrina Emergency Management411Reform Act (PKEMRA) in 2006. PKEMRA re-established FEMA as a412distinct entity within DHS, designated the FEMA Administrator413as the President's advisor on Federal emergency management, and414authorized FEMA for the first time in statute.\34\415---------------------------------------------------------------------------416    \32\ Exec. Order No. 12127 (Apr. 1, 1979).417    \33\ Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296.418    \34\ Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 109-419295.420---------------------------------------------------------------------------421    Since PKEMRA, Congress has enacted several other major422reforms to improve FEMA, including:423424     LIn 2013, Congress passed the Sandy Recovery425Improvement Act (SRIA, P.L. 113-2) which included reforms to426speed up and streamline recovery efforts, reduce costs, and427improve the effectiveness of several disaster assistance428programs authorized by the Stafford Act, namely the PA Program,429the IA Program, and the HMGP.\35\430---------------------------------------------------------------------------431    \35\ Sandy Recovery Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 113-2.432433     LIn 2018, Congress passed the Disaster Recovery434Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA) following Hurricanes Maria and Irma435which hit Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands.\36\436DRRA made additional reforms to speed up and improve disaster437response and recovery as well as established funding for FEMA's438pre-disaster mitigation program, currently called Building439Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC).\37\ In 2018,440Congress also enacted the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 that441included additional reforms intended to improve disaster442recovery, generally, as well as specifically in Puerto Rico and443the United States Virgin Islands.\38\444---------------------------------------------------------------------------445    \36\ FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254.446    \37\ Id.447    \38\ Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123.448449    In addition to these major reforms, the Committee has450moved, and Congress has enacted, targeted reforms intended to451improve FEMA assistance and coordination across the Federal452Government in responding to disasters. Despite these reforms,453issues remain. For example, there are currently over 1,000 open454major disaster, emergency, and fire management declarations455dating back to Hurricane Katrina in 2005.\39\ There are over4565,000 open projects from 2005 and 2017 (prior to Hurricanes457Maria and Irma).\40\458---------------------------------------------------------------------------459    \39\ E-mail from FEMA Congressional Affairs to Elizabeth Granger,460Professional Staff, H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure (Mar. 3,4612025, 4:48 PM EST) (on file with Comm.).462    \40\ Id.463---------------------------------------------------------------------------464465                     V. RECENT PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS466467    On January 24, 2025, President Trump announced, through468Executive Order, the creation of the Federal Emergency469Management Agency Review Council (Council).\41\ The stated470purpose of the Council is to, ``[evaluate] whether FEMA's471bureaucracy in disaster response ultimately harms the agency's472ability to successfully respond.'' \42\ The Executive Order473highlights the need for the Council to review FEMA in the wake474of recent disasters, like Hurricane Helene. The Executive Order475also points out that despite spending $30 billion in disaster476aid each of the past three years, FEMA has left many disaster477survivors without the resources they need.\43\478---------------------------------------------------------------------------479    \41\ Exec. Order No. 14180, (Jan. 24, 2025), available at https://480www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/council-to-assess-the-481federal-emergency-management-agency/.482    \42\ Id.483    \43\ Id.484---------------------------------------------------------------------------485    The Council will be co-chaired by the Secretary of Homeland486Security and the Secretary of Defense, with any additional487members of the Council being appointed by the President. The488Council must hold its first public meeting before April 24,4892025, and will need to issue a report to the President 190 days490after that first meeting.\44\491---------------------------------------------------------------------------492    \44\ Id.493---------------------------------------------------------------------------494495                             VI. CONCLUSION496497    Last year was a challenging year for disaster response and498recovery. Hurricanes Helene and Milton highlighted the need for499additional reforms to our Nation's current emergency management500system. The more recent California wildfires further charged501the debate about what role states should play in reducing their502own disaster risks. These disasters, along with President503Trump's Federal Emergency Management Agency Review Council,504have begun a broader conversation about what the future of FEMA505should look like going forward. As this Subcommittee looks to506bring back common sense in emergency management, the following507witnesses will provide much-needed insights from a variety of508perspectives.509510                             VII. WITNESSES511512     LMr. Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and513Justice Team, United States Government Accountability Office514     LMr. Kevin Guthrie, Executive Director, Florida515Division of Emergency Management516     LMs. Jaime Laughter, County Manager, Transylvania517County, North Carolina518     LAdrian Garcia, Commissioner, Harris County,519Texas, on behalf of the National Association of Counties520521    REFORMING FEMA: BRINGING COMMON SENSE BACK TO FEDERAL EMERGENCY522                               MANAGEMENT523524                              ----------525526                        TUESDAY, MARCH 25, 2025527528                  House of Representatives,529      Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public530               Buildings, and Emergency Management,531            Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,532                                                    Washington, DC.533    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in534Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Scott Perry535(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.536    Mr. Perry. The Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public537Buildings, and Emergency Management will come to order.538    The Chair asks unanimous consent that the chairman be539authorized to declare a recess at any time during today's540hearing.541    Without objection, so ordered.542    The chairman also asks unanimous consent that Members not543on the subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee544at today's hearing and ask questions.545    Without objection, so ordered.546    As a reminder, if Members wish to insert a document into547the record, please also email it to DocumentsTI@mail.house.gov.548    The Chair now recognizes himself for the purpose of an549opening statement for 5 minutes.550551    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SCOTT PERRY OF PENNSYLVANIA,552    CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC553              BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT554555    Mr. Perry. I want to thank our witnesses for being here556today to discuss reforming FEMA and how we can bring common557sense back to Federal emergency management.558    After witnessing the Federal Government's response to559Hurricane Helene last year and the recent Los Angeles560wildfires, I, like many Americans, was shocked by many of the561stories I heard coming from these communities. I know members562of this committee have proposed, and Congress has enacted,563reform after reform to make FEMA and the Federal emergency564management system work better. Despite these efforts, it seems565that nothing improves.566    This is not meant to be a beatdown of FEMA, but we can't567just keep going the way we have been and expect different568outcomes. In fact, the bureaucratic labyrinth seems to have569only become more complicated, causing unnecessary delays when570disaster strikes.571    Taxpayers fund FEMA grant programs for States and local572governments to invest in mitigation, preparedness, and573response, yet many of these programs move too slowly,574preventing timely and effective action when it is most direly575needed.576    I mean, for 46 years, individual regions should have been577reducing risk, the impact of emergencies, and the number of578emergencies themselves. Unfortunately, the metrics, including579the cost and impact, have all gone in the wrong direction.580    What we saw in the case of Hurricane Helene is581demonstrative of that fact. FEMA was ill-prepared to support582the response and recovery in the mountains of North Carolina.583In California, we saw a lack of preparedness by State and local584officials--from a lack of water for firefighting to585disorganization on the ground, despite literally billions of586taxpayer dollars going to California for mitigation,587preparedness, and firefighting.588    On top of all that, there are still over 1,000 open FEMA589disaster declarations dating back to Hurricane Katrina--which590is over 20 years ago--and well over 5,000 open projects. This591raises serious questions about the Federal Government being the592best institution to respond to localized disasters.593    Federal disaster assistance was created to support State594and local governments when absolutely necessary, when the595resources required exceed the ability of local agencies to596respond. Unfortunately, the result has been to utilize FEMA as597the first responder to every disaster occurring throughout the598Nation.599    This almost absolute reliance on the Federal Government is600dangerous and costly. FEMA was not designed to be the first601responder in disasters. States and local governments are. They602know their communities best. They understand the risks, what603their communities need, the terrain, and how to navigate it to604respond quickly to emergencies.605    It is critical, therefore, that State and local governments606make disaster preparedness a priority and that they budget for607it--let me say that again--and that they budget for it, have608the right people and training in place, and ensure that they609have the capacity and capability to respond.610    The current system creates a perverse incentive for States.611States are mostly off the hook for meaningfully investing in612their own emergency response and preparedness plans because613they know they can rely on FEMA stepping in every time even if614it is inartful at best.615    Meanwhile, FEMA is stretched thin and is so weighed down by616self-imposed bureaucratic requirements that they can't respond617effectively when called upon or even close out projects going618back 20 years.619    FEMA's ability to function effectively was further620undermined as the previous administration pushed its open621border, equity, and climate agenda onto the Agency, resulting622in disaster funding being diverted to ridiculous projects like623planting trees to address urban heat islands. It's no wonder624that President Trump created the FEMA Review Council and issued625an Executive order on State and local preparedness.626    I am hopeful that this hearing will provide valuable627insight, as T&I is the lead House committee on FEMA and Federal628emergency management, because meaningful reform is, obviously,629absolutely urgently needed.630    With that, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on631these topics.632    [Mr. Perry's prepared statement follows:]633634 Prepared Statement of Hon. Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress635 from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on636    Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management637    I want to thank our witnesses for being here today to discuss638reforming FEMA and how we can bring common sense back to federal639emergency management.640    After witnessing the federal government's response to Hurricane641Helene last year and the recent Los Angeles wildfires, I, like most642Americans, was shocked by many of the stories I heard coming from these643communities. I know Members of this committee have proposed, and644Congress has enacted, reform after reform to make FEMA and the federal645emergency management system work better. Despite these efforts, it646seems that nothing has improved. This is not meant to be a beatdown of647FEMA, but we cannot just keep going the way we have been and expect648different outcomes. In fact, the bureaucratic labyrinth has only become649more complicated, causing unnecessary delays when disaster strikes.650    Taxpayers fund FEMA grant programs for states and local governments651to invest in mitigation, preparedness, and response, yet many of these652programs move too slowly, preventing timely and effective action when653it is most direly needed. For 46 years, individual regions should have654been reducing risk, the impact of emergencies, and the number of655emergencies themselves. Unfortunately, the metrics, including the cost656and impact, have all gone in the wrong direction.657    What we saw in the case of Hurricane Helene is demonstrative of658that fact. FEMA was ill-prepared to support response and recovery in659the mountains of North Carolina. In California, we saw a lack of660preparedness by state and local officials--from a lack of water for661firefighting to disorganization on the ground, despite billions of662taxpayer dollars going to California for mitigation, preparedness, and663firefighting.664    On top of all of that, there are still over 1,000 open FEMA665disaster declarations dating back to Hurricane Katrina, and well over6665,000 open projects. This raises serious questions about whether the667federal government is the best institution to respond to localized668disasters.669    Federal disaster assistance was created to support state and local670governments when absolutely necessary--when the resources required671exceed the ability of local agencies to respond. Unfortunately, the672trend has been to utilize FEMA as the first responder to every disaster673occurring throughout the nation.674    This increase in reliance on the federal government is dangerous675and costly. FEMA was not designed to be the first responder in676disasters. States and local governments are. They know their677communities best--they understand the risks, what their communities678need, the terrain, and how to navigate it to quickly respond to679emergencies.680    It is critical, therefore, that state and local governments make681disaster preparedness a priority--that they budget for it, have the682right people and training in place, and ensure that they have the683capability to respond.684    The current system creates a perverse incentive for states. States685are mostly off the hook for meaningfully investing in their own686emergency response and preparedness plans because they have come to687rely on FEMA stepping in every time.688    Meanwhile, FEMA is stretched thin and is so weighed down by self-689imposed bureaucratic requirements that they can't respond effectively690when called upon or even close out projects going back 20 years.691    FEMA's ability to function effectively was further undermined as692the previous administration pushed its open border, equity, and climate693agenda onto the agency, resulting in disaster funding being diverted to694projects like planting trees to address urban ``heat islands.'' It is695no wonder that President Trump created the FEMA Review Council and696issued an executive order on state and local preparedness.697    I am hopeful this hearing will provide valuable insight, as T&I is698the lead House Committee on FEMA and federal emergency management,699because meaningful reform is urgently needed.700701    Mr. Perry. And the Chair now recognizes the ranking member,702Representative Stanton, for 5 minutes for his opening703statement.704705  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GREG STANTON OF ARIZONA, RANKING706MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS,707                    AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT708709    Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.710    Thank you all for attending this important hearing titled711``Reforming FEMA: Bringing Common Sense Back to Federal712Emergency Management.''713    I am the new ranking member of this subcommittee, and I714take Federal disaster assistance delivery very seriously, and I715look forward to conducting oversight on FEMA's important work.716    FEMA is where Americans look for help, critical help after717what is likely the worst day of their lives. So it is critical718that the Agency be postured to respond at all times. For most719of its life, FEMA has been an apolitical entity: red State or720blue State, it didn't matter. FEMA stayed focused on the721mission to help all Americans and kept out of the political722fray. Sadly, that is no longer the case today.723    Following the recent catastrophic disasters in California724and South Carolina, President Trump has focused more on725spreading misinformation than helping Americans in need.726Specifically, after the tragic wildfires in Los Angeles, he727threatened to condition disaster relief on policy matters that728have nothing to do with emergency management. This is simply729wrong and shakes the trust that Americans have in their730Government to come to their aid after a catastrophe. That is731what FEMA is all about.732    We should have a discussion about how to improve FEMA, but733as a baseline, we should acknowledge the need that we have in734the Federal Emergency Management Agency, specifically there to735help States and localities when an emergency goes beyond their736ability to immediately deal with it.737    Yesterday, DHS Secretary Noem added to that uncertainty738facing disaster survivors when she said that we are, quote,739``we're going to eliminate FEMA,'' unquote, in a Presidential740Cabinet meeting. President Trump responded by saying, quote,741``great job,'' unquote.742    I will never support eliminating FEMA or conditioning aid743for emergency disaster assistance. Whether a State is red or744blue, they are American, and they are entitled to the support745of their fellow Americans on their worst day. So I condemn746calls to condition emergency disaster assistance in the747strongest possible terms and urge elected leaders to never make748such comments again.749    Unfortunately, threats of conditioning lifesaving750assistance is not the only partisan game happening at FEMA. In751February, Elon Musk's Department of Government Efficiency752entered FEMA and has been wreaking havoc ever since. They have753accessed secure Government systems that include disaster754survivors' personal information and slowed the delivery of FEMA755assistance.756    I am deeply troubled to learn that all FEMA grants are now757subject to additional review to ensure that they are758complementary to President Trump's political agenda. And759Federal employees are living in fear that they will be fired if760they approve the wrong grant payment.761    Federal employees should not be concerned about approving762grant disbursements approved by this body, Congress, in a763bipartisan way. In fact, it is the law that FEMA disburse764payments that are mandated by Congress. Plain and simple. I765will not stand by quietly if we see illegal action related to766the disbursement of FEMA grants. The Agency cannot violate the767Impoundment Control Act.768    I am deeply concerned at the influence of DOGE at FEMA,769which contains no emergency management experts at DOGE, and770that they are going to steer the Agency in the direction of771another Katrina.772    Prior to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA was overhauled and tucked773into the Department of Homeland Security without proper774consultation from professional emergency managers. FEMA was775weakened by being subsumed into DHS without proper consultation776with emergency management professionals. The result was777unnecessary catastrophic loss of life, the worst in modern778disaster history. We cannot afford to repeat the mistakes of779the past.780    That said, reforming FEMA properly does not mean we should781avoid change altogether.782    In Arizona, we know that FEMA can do better. Last summer,783extreme heat caused temperatures in my district that were784nearly unlivable. We lost over 600 of our fellow citizens to785extreme heat and extreme heat islands.786    We experienced unending 100 degree temperatures for over a787month. In the past, a break from the heat could be enjoyed788during the night, but that is a luxury we no longer have. The789heat in our State literally caused roads to crack, cars to790melt, and hundreds of lives lost.791    However, FEMA was not to be found in Arizona because the792Agency has not yet adapted to emergency disasters like extreme793heat. Heat is a silent killer. It advances quietly and lingers.794The longer it lingers, the more devastating the impact.795    So, we must reform FEMA to address extreme heat. I look796forward to working with the Agency to ensure that they have the797resources and authority they need to respond to disasters all798across the country.799    So, I look forward to this important hearing, hearing from800my colleagues.801    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.802    [Mr. Stanton's prepared statement follows:]803804 Prepared Statement of Hon. Greg Stanton, a Representative in Congress805from the State of Arizona, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Economic806        Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management807    Thank you, all, for attending today's hearing entitled, ``Reforming808FEMA: Bringing Common Sense Back to Federal Emergency Management.'' As809the new Ranking Member of this Subcommittee, I take federal disaster810assistance delivery very seriously, and I look forward to conducting811oversight of FEMA's important work.812    FEMA is where Americans look for help after what may have been the813worst day of their life. So it is critical that the Agency be postured814to respond at all times. For most of its life, FEMA has been an815apolitical entity--red state or blue state, it didn't matter. FEMA816stayed focused on the mission to help all Americans and kept out of the817political fray. Sadly, that is no longer the case today.818    Following the catastrophic disasters in South Carolina and819California, President Trump has focused more on spreading820misinformation than helping Americans in need.821    Specifically, after wildfires devastated Los Angeles, he threatened822to condition disaster relief on policy matters that have nothing to do823with emergency management. This is simply wrong and shakes the trust824that Americans have in their government to come to their aid after825catastrophe.826    Yesterday, Secretary Noem added to the uncertainty facing disaster827survivors when she said that, ``we're going to eliminate FEMA'' in a828cabinet meeting. President Trump responded by saying, ``great job.''829    I will never support eliminating FEMA or conditions for emergency830disaster assistance. Whether a state votes red or blue; they are831American and are entitled to assistance. I condemn calls to condition832emergency disaster assistance in the strongest possible terms and urge833elected leaders to never make such comments again.834    Unfortunately, threats to condition lifesaving assistance are not835the only partisan game happening at FEMA. In February, Billionaire836Musk's so-called ``Department of Government Efficiency'' entered FEMA837and has been wreaking havoc ever since. They have accessed secure838government systems that include disaster survivors' personal839information and slowed the delivery of FEMA assistance.840    I am deeply troubled to have learned that all FEMA grants are now841subject to an additional review to ensure they are complementary to842Trump's political agenda. And federal employees are living in fear that843they will be fired if they approve the wrong grant payment. Federal844employees should not be concerned about approving grant disbursements845approved by Congress!846    In fact, it is the law that FEMA disburse payments that are847mandated by Congress. Plain and simple. I will not stand by quietly if848we see illegal action related to the disbursement of FEMA grants. The849Agency cannot violate the Impoundment Control Act.850    I am deeply concerned that the influence of DOGE at FEMA, which851contains no emergency management experts, are going to steer the Agency852in the direction of another Katrina.853    Prior to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA was overhauled and tucked into the854Department of Homeland Security without proper consultation from855professional emergency managers. FEMA was weakened by being subsumed856into the Department of Homeland Security without proper consultation857with emergency management professionals. The result was the most858catastrophic loss of life in modern disaster history. We cannot afford859to repeat the mistakes of the past.860    That said, reforming FEMA thoughtfully does not mean we should861avoid change altogether. In Arizona, we know that FEMA can do better.862    Last summer, extreme heat caused temperatures in my district were863nearly unlivable. We experienced unending 100 degree temperatures for864over a month. In the past, a break from the heat could be enjoyed865during the night, but that is a luxury we no longer have. The heat in866our state literally caused roads to crack, cars to melt--and hundreds867of lives were lost.868    However, FEMA was nowhere to be found because the Agency has not869yet adapted to emerging disasters like extreme heat. Heat is a silent870killer. It advances quietly and lingers. The longer it lingers; the871more devastating the impact.872    We must reform FEMA to address extreme heat. I look forward to873working with the Agency to ensure they have the resources and authority874they need to respond to disasters all across the country--not just875hurricanes on the east coast.876    That is why I am grateful that this Committee has invited a panel877of emergency management experts to testify here today about their878suggested reforms for emergency management. You are all the kind of879folks we should be consulting before making any change to FEMA880function. Thank you for taking the time to be here today, and I look881forward to hearing your testimony.882883    Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman.884    The Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the full885committee, Representative Larsen, for 5 minutes.886887 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICK LARSEN OF WASHINGTON, RANKING888     MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE889890    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, subcommittee Chair891Perry and subcommittee Ranking Member Stanton, for convening892today's hearing.893    Emergency management in the U.S. today stands at a894crossroads. As the Nation grapples with the devastation caused895by Hurricanes Helene and Milton, the wildfires in L.A., and896other disasters across the country, FEMA's role has come under897intense scrutiny.898    The combined damage and economic losses from Hurricane899Helene and the L.A. wildfires alone exceed $200 billion.900Successfully managing recovery efforts for such catastrophic901events will require robust congressional oversight,902supplemental funding, and Presidential leadership.903    Instead of uniting the Nation, though, to rebuild what has904been lost, the administration has unfortunately exploited and905politicized these disasters. The President has spread906misinformation in the wake of these tragedies, threatened to907condition disaster aid, and doubled down on the suggestion to908eliminate FEMA altogether.909    Just yesterday, Secretary Noem said, quote, ``we're going910to eliminate FEMA,'' end quote, during a Cabinet meeting. No,911we are not.912    These actions are harmful to disaster survivors and the913women and men who work at FEMA and have dedicated their lives914to helping fellow Americans respond to and recover from915disasters.916    FEMA's mission is clear: to assist people before, during,917and after disasters.918    States turn to FEMA when they have exceeded their capacity919to respond to a disaster. As Pete Gaynor, FEMA Administrator920during President Trump's first term, aptly stated, ``Emergency921management is locally executed, State managed, and federally922supported.''923    FEMA provides a critical backstop when all other options924and resources are exhausted. Eliminating FEMA would not make925communities safer, would not reduce insurance premiums, would926not improve outcomes for disaster survivors. Instead, it would927shift the burden of disaster response and accountability from928the Federal Government to State and local governments.929    The Democrats have long championed improvements to the930delivery of disaster assistance. It isn't new to us that FEMA931needs to be reformed. Last year, many bipartisan FEMA-related932bills were discussed in this committee, and we attempted to933pass them out of the House: Representative Titus' Disaster934Survivor Fairness Act to reform FEMA's Individual Assistance935Program; Representative Stanton's Wildfire Response Improvement936Act to make FEMA's programs better equipped to address the937impacts of wildfires; and Representative Neguse's Disaster938Management Costs Modernization Act to build State and local939emergency management capacity.940    Democrats remain committed to pursuing bipartisan FEMA941reforms and getting reform right. However, it requires careful942consideration and input from emergency management943professionals.944    For example, the President has suggested that disaster945assistance could be fixed by simply providing block grants for946recovery to impacted States. FEMA already offers a block grant947option through the Public Assistance Alternative Procedures948program authorized by section 428 of the Stafford Act. However,949States rarely use this authority due to the perceived risks950involved.951    The Department of Housing and Urban Development's long-term952disaster recovery block grant program has faced challenges in953delivering outcomes and similarly has been the subject of954bipartisan scrutiny.955    If you want these reforms to Federal emergency management956to succeed, the reforms must be informed by the challenges957faced by existing programs and built on recent progress.958    For instance, in 2019, Congress authorized the creation of959a predisaster mitigation grant program, known as BRIC, to960enhance community resilience against disasters while reducing961recovery costs for individuals, as well as State and local962governments as part of the Disaster Recovery Reform Act. And I963want to thank the Trump 1.0 administration for advocating for964this and for the President for signing that bill.965    So, any reforms to FEMA should focus on expanding the966Agency's capability to support resilience projects and not967diminishing them.968    So, I look forward to discussing possible solutions to969improve FEMA and outcomes for disaster survivors with the panel970of qualified experts that we have before us today.971    I want to thank you all for being here, and I look forward972to your testimony.973    I yield back.974    [Mr. Larsen of Washington's prepared statement follows:]975976 Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress977    from the State of Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on978                   Transportation and Infrastructure979    Thank you, Subcommittee Chairman Perry and Subcommittee Ranking980Member Stanton, for convening today's hearing.981    Emergency management in the United States stands at a critical982crossroads.983    As the nation grapples with the devastation caused by Hurricanes984Helene and Milton, the wildfires in Los Angeles and other disasters985across the country, FEMA's role has come under intense scrutiny.986    The combined damage and economic losses from Hurricane Helene and987the Los Angeles wildfires exceed $200 billion.988    Successfully managing recovery efforts for such catastrophic events989will require robust congressional oversight, supplemental funding and990presidential leadership.991    Instead of uniting the nation to rebuild what has been lost, the992Administration has unfortunately exploited and politicized these993disasters.994    The President has spread misinformation in the wake of these995tragedies, threatened to condition disaster aid and doubled down on his996suggestion to eliminate FEMA altogether.997    Just yesterday, Secretary Noem said, ``we are going to eliminate998FEMA'' during a cabinet meeting. No, we are not.999    These actions are harmful to disaster survivors and the women and1000men who work at FEMA and have dedicated their lives to helping their1001fellow Americans respond to and recover from disasters.1002    FEMA's mission is clear: to assist people before, during and after1003disasters.1004    States turn to FEMA when they have exceeded their capacity to1005respond to a disaster.1006    As Pete Gaynor, FEMA Administrator during President Trump's first1007term, aptly stated, ``Emergency management is locally executed, state-1008managed and federally supported.''1009    FEMA provides a critical backstop when all other options and1010resources have been exhausted.1011    Eliminating FEMA would not make communities safer, would not reduce1012insurance premiums, would not improve outcomes for disaster survivors.1013    Instead, it would shift the burden of disaster response and1014accountability from the federal government to state and local1015governments.1016    Democrats have long championed improvements to the delivery of1017disaster assistance.1018    It isn't new to us that FEMA needs to be reformed.1019    Last year, among many FEMA-related bills, we attempted to pass:1020      Rep. Titus' Disaster Survivor Fairness Act to reform1021FEMA's Individual Assistance Program;1022      Rep. Stanton's Wildfire Response Improvement Act to make1023FEMA's programs better equipped to address the impacts of wildfires;1024and1025      Rep. Neguse's Disaster Management Costs Modernization Act1026to build state and local emergency management capacity.10271028    Democrats remain committed to pursuing bipartisan FEMA reforms.1029Getting reform right, however, requires careful consideration and input1030from emergency management professionals.1031    For example, President Trump has suggested that disaster assistance1032could be fixed by simply providing block grants for recovery to1033impacted states.1034    FEMA already offers a block grant option through the Public1035Assistance Alternative Procedures program authorized by Section 428 of1036the Stafford Act.1037    However, states rarely use this authority due to the perceived1038risks involved.1039    The Department of Housing and Urban Development's long-term1040disaster recovery block grant program has faced challenges in1041delivering outcomes and has similarly been the subject of bipartisan1042scrutiny.1043    If we want reforms to federal emergency management to succeed, they1044must be informed by the challenges faced by existing programs and built1045upon recent progress.1046    For instance, in 2019 Congress authorized the creation of a pre-1047disaster mitigation grant program, known as BRIC, to enhance community1048resilience against disasters while reducing recovery costs for1049individuals as well as state and local governments.1050    This passed as part of the Disaster Recovery Reform Act, and I want1051to thank the Trump 1.0 Administration for advocating for this and for1052the President signing that bill.1053    Any reforms to FEMA should focus on expanding the Agency's1054capability to support resilience projects--not diminishing it.1055    I look forward to discussing possible solutions to improve FEMA and1056outcomes for disaster survivors with the panel of qualified experts1057before the Subcommittee today.1058    Thank you all for being here, and I look forward to your testimony.10591060    Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman.1061    I would like to welcome our witnesses and thank them for1062being here, especially the ones who have traveled a great1063distance today.1064    Briefly, I would like to take a moment to explain the1065lighting system to our witnesses who may not have been here1066recently or maybe ever. There are three lights in front of you.1067Green means go, yellow means you are running out of time, and1068red means to conclude your remarks.1069    The Chair asks unanimous consent that the witnesses' full1070statements be included in the record.1071    Without objection, so ordered.1072    The Chair also asks unanimous consent that the record of1073today's hearing remain open until such time as our witnesses1074have provided answers to any questions that may be submitted to1075them in writing.1076    Without objection, so ordered.1077    The Chair also asks unanimous consent that the record1078remain open for 15 days for any additional comments and1079information submitted by Members or witnesses to be included in1080the record of today's hearing.1081    Without objection, so ordered.1082    As your written testimony has been made part of the record,1083the subcommittee asks that you limit your oral remarks to 51084minutes.1085    With that, Mr. Currie, you are recognized for 5 minutes for1086your testimony, sir.10871088  TESTIMONY OF CHRIS CURRIE, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND1089JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; KEVIN GUTHRIE,1090 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, FLORIDA DIVISION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT;1091  JAIME LAUGHTER, COUNTY MANAGER, TRANSYLVANIA COUNTY, NORTH1092   CAROLINA; AND ADRIAN GARCIA, COMMISSIONER, HARRIS COUNTY,1093    TEXAS, ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES10941095  TESTIMONY OF CHRIS CURRIE, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND1096         JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE10971098    Mr. Currie. Thank you, Chairman Perry, Ranking Member1099Stanton, and other members of the subcommittee. It is an honor1100to be here today to talk about GAO's work on FEMA.1101    I think the hearing and the discussions around reform are a1102great opportunity to address many longstanding challenges that1103we and many others have identified for years and years.1104    We have looked at Federal response and recoveries for1105years, going from Guam to Puerto Rico and everywhere in1106between. And what we have seen is an increasingly complicated,1107fragmented, inflexible, and lengthy process that seems to get1108harder and harder by the year.1109    FEMA and the rest of the Federal Government have spent over1110$500 billion in the last 10 years on disaster aid. There are1111currently over 30 Federal agencies that are involved in1112disaster assistance, and many of these programs, which pay for1113rebuilding the same types of infrastructure, have overlapping1114or duplicative requirements.1115    Just as an example, the Department of Transportation, FEMA,1116and HUD programs can all be used to build similar1117infrastructure, but they may require completely different1118paperwork, different environmental reviews, have different1119rules, and, most difficultly, are on different timelines, which1120makes it virtually impossible to synchronize those programs for1121recovery.1122    This is a major reason why recovery takes up to 20 years,1123as you said, Mr. Chairman. Two years ago, we actually issued a1124report outlining the systemic problem and came up with a number1125of options that Congress could take to reform the system. These1126ranged from simple options to better streamlining current1127programs, registration websites, things like that, all the way1128to more significant changes like complete reorganizations and1129overhauls of disaster agencies themselves.1130    On top of this, as you said, FEMA's workforce is1131overwhelmed. There are over 600 major disasters and, as you1132said, over 1,000 fire disasters, and all types of disasters1133going back many, many years that require staffing to address1134each one of those, and thousands of projects.1135    Last we looked at it, FEMA was 35 percent short of its1136staffing needs based on the expectations on the Agency, and1137there is now a never-ending disaster season.1138    The workforce structure was created at a time when large1139disasters were very rare, and it needs to be reformed. And it1140is not just about the numbers, but the whole structure needs to1141be reformed to be more responsive.1142    Also, I want to talk about individual survivors. We have to1143shift to programs that are not Government centric but are1144survivor centric. And when I say that, I mean they have to be1145geared towards helping a person get the assistance they need at1146the worst time of their life.1147    A big problem at FEMA are antiquated technology and1148financial management systems. These need to be fixed in order1149for FEMA to be able to deliver the technology solutions that we1150already have in the private sector to try to intake people and1151get them the assistance they need.1152    The last thing I would like to talk about are just a few1153cautions to consider for this committee as you look to reform1154the system and for the administration. First is the National1155Response Framework. I think we have to be really careful not to1156break what is not broken. We have to not forget Hurricane1157Katrina and what we fixed after that.1158    The National Response Framework provides steady funding and1159coordination mechanisms that all levels of Government1160understand at this point, and I think the structure works well.1161    We also have to remember the capacity differences across1162the country. Some States and counties and cities have the1163resources and the capacity to manage disasters. Many others we1164see just don't, and that is not going to change any time soon.1165These are always going to need State and Federal support to1166provide the response that we need to help those citizens.1167    And then last, it is not just about FEMA. If we look to1168reform FEMA but don't fix the whole disaster response and1169recovery system, it is not going to fix the problem, and I1170think that is very important to consider as we move forward.1171    So I look forward to your questions and the discussion.1172    [Mr. Currie's prepared statement follows:]11731174  Prepared Statement of Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and1175             Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office1176          Disaster Assistance: Improving the Federal Approach1177                               Highlights1178What GAO Found1179    There is a growing emphasis on how the federal government can1180improve its approach to disaster recovery. In the last 10 years,1181appropriations for disaster assistance totaled at least $448 billion,1182plus an additional $110 billion in supplemental appropriations so far1183in fiscal year 2025. Recent disasters such as Hurricanes Helene and1184Milton, the wildfires in California, and this month's destructive1185tornadoes across the Midwest and South demonstrated the need for1186government-wide action to deliver assistance efficiently and1187effectively and reduce its fiscal exposure (see figures 1 and 4). Given1188the rise in the number and cost of disasters and increasing challenges1189related to the delivery of federal disaster assistance identified in1190GAO's work, Improving the Delivery of Federal Disaster Assistance was1191added to GAO's High-Risk List in February 2025.1192    To improve the federal government's delivery of disaster1193assistance, GAO has found that attention is needed to improve processes1194for assisting survivors, reduce fragmentation across federal disaster1195assistance programs, strengthen the disaster workforce and capacity,1196and invest in resilience. For example, GAO has recommended that1197Congress should consider establishing an independent commission to1198recommend reforms to the federal approach to disaster recovery, which1199is fragmented across more than 30 federal entities. GAO also reported1200on various options for reforming the federal approach to disaster1201recovery, such as better coordinating and consolidating programs across1202agencies and simplifying processes for survivors, among other things.1203    Further, GAO recommended that the Federal Emergency Management1204Agency (FEMA) develop and implement a methodology that provides a more1205comprehensive assessment of a jurisdiction's ability to respond to a1206disaster without federal assistance. Without an accurate assessment,1207FEMA runs the risk of recommending to the President that federal1208disaster assistance be awarded to jurisdictions that may not need it.1209FEMA has taken past steps to do this but has not fully implemented this1210recommendation. GAO also found that FEMA's workforce is overwhelmed by1211the increasing number of disasters and other emergencies. Strengthening1212the disaster workforce will be a critical part of better delivering the1213assistance that communities and survivors need to recover.1214Why GAO Did This Study1215    Natural disasters have become costlier and more frequent. In 2024,1216there were 27 disasters with at least $1 billion in damages, compared1217to 14 in 2018. Disasters in 2024 resulted in 568 deaths nationwide.1218    Further, federal disaster declarations and the expectation for1219federal support have increased. In addition, federal support for1220disaster recovery can last for years. For example, FEMA is managing1221over 600 open major disaster declarations--some of which occurred1222almost 20 years ago, according to the agency.1223    This statement discusses GAO's new disaster high-risk area, and1224related work on reducing fragmentation of the federal approach to1225disaster assistance, among other things.1226    This statement is based on products GAO issued from May 20201227through February 2025. For this work, GAO analyzed federal law and1228documents related to disaster assistance and interviewed officials1229across relevant federal, state and local agencies. GAO also conducted1230site visits to recent disasters areas, among other actions.1231What GAO Recommends1232    As of March 2025, GAO has approximately 60 open recommendations1233related to disaster assistance. There are also four matters for1234congressional consideration. These recommendations and matters are1235designed to address the various challenges discussed in this statement.1236Agencies have taken steps to address some of these recommendations. GAO1237will continue to monitor agency efforts to determine if they fully1238address the challenges GAO has identified.1239                               __________1240    Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Stanton, and Members of the1241Subcommittee:1242    Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our past work on the1243federal approach to disaster recovery.1244    Hurricanes, floods, wildfires, earthquakes, and other natural1245disasters affect hundreds of American communities each year. Due to the1246rising number of natural disasters, there has been a growing emphasis1247on how the federal government can improve its approach to disaster1248recovery. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration1249calculated that, in 2018 the U.S. experienced 14 disasters that each1250cost more than $1 billion in total economic damages. By 2024, the1251number of disasters costing at least $1 billion almost doubled to125227.\1\ That same year, at least 568 people died, directly or1253indirectly, as a result of those disasters. Recent disasters1254demonstrate the need for the federal government to take action to1255deliver assistance efficiently and effectively and reduce its fiscal1256exposure.1257---------------------------------------------------------------------------1258    \1\ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's National1259Centers for Environmental Information, ``U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather1260and Climate Disasters'' (2025). These data are not direct costs to the1261federal government and are produced using a detailed methodology1262reflecting overall U.S. economic damages, including insured and1263uninsured losses to residential, commercial, and government/municipal1264buildings.12651266      Hurricanes Helene and Milton occurred within 2 weeks of1267one another in 2024 and affected some of the same areas in the1268Southeast (see fig. 1). These two disasters resulted in over 200 deaths1269and are expected to cost over $50 billion, according to the National1270---------------------------------------------------------------------------1271Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.12721273      On January 8, 2025, the President approved a major1274disaster declaration for historic wildfires in Los Angeles County,1275California. The wildfires were unprecedented in their size, scope, and1276the damage they caused. The Palisades and Eaton fires resulted in 291277deaths and the expected financial cost is still unknown as of March12782025.12791280      In mid-March 2025, destructive tornadoes and severe1281storms occurred across the Midwest and South over a three-day period.1282The storms resulted in over 40 deaths, and the number of states that1283will need federal assistance is still unclear as of March 2025.12841285    Figure 1: Road Repair Following Hurricane Helene, North Carolina12861287    My statement today is based on our most recent High-Risk update in1288February 2025 as well as our prior work identifying key programmatic1289challenges the federal government faces related to the delivery of1290federal disaster assistance.\2\ This statement includes information on1291our work related to 1) improving processes for assisting survivors, 2)1292reducing fragmentation of the federal approach to disaster assistance,12933) strengthening Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) workforce1294and capacity, and 4) investing in resilience.1295---------------------------------------------------------------------------1296    \2\ GAO, High-Risk Series: Heightened Attention Could Save Billions1297More and Improve Government Efficiency and Effectiveness, GAO-25-1077431298(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2025).1299---------------------------------------------------------------------------1300    To conduct our prior work, we analyzed relevant statutes such as1301the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act,\3\1302regulations, agency guidance and interagency coordination documents,1303such as the National Disaster Recovery Framework.\4\ We also1304interviewed officials across relevant federal agencies and state and1305local officials involved in disaster assistance, and conducted site1306visits to communities impacted by recent disasters in California,1307Florida, and North Carolina, among other actions. More detailed1308information on the scope and methodology of our prior work can be found1309within each of the issued reports cited throughout this statement.1310---------------------------------------------------------------------------1311    \3\ 42 U.S.C. Sec.  5121 et seq.1312    \4\ Department of Homeland Security, National Disaster Recovery1313Framework, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2024).1314---------------------------------------------------------------------------1315    We conducted the work on which this statement is based in1316accordance with all sections of our Quality Assurance Framework that1317are relevant to our objectives. The framework requires that we plan and1318perform the engagement to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to1319meet our stated objectives and to discuss any limitations in our work.1320We believe that the information and data obtained, and the analysis1321conducted, provide a reasonable basis for any findings and conclusions1322in this product.1323                               Background1324    Disaster assistance includes providing support to communities and1325survivors for response to, recovery from, and resilience to man-made1326and natural disasters. For fiscal years 2015 through 2024,1327appropriations for disaster assistance totaled at least $4481328billion.\5\ In total, FEMA approved over two million households for1329federal disaster assistance in 2024.1330---------------------------------------------------------------------------1331    \5\ This total includes $312 billion in selected supplemental1332appropriations to federal agencies for disaster assistance and1333approximately $136 billion in annual appropriations to the Disaster1334Relief Fund for fiscal years 2015 through 2024. It does not include1335other annual appropriations to federal agencies for disaster1336assistance. Of the supplemental appropriations, $97 billion was1337included in supplemental appropriations acts that were enacted1338primarily in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, in1339December 2024, the Disaster Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act,13402025, appropriated $110 billion in supplemental appropriations for1341disaster assistance, not included in the $448 billion. Pub. L. No. 118-1342158, div. B, 138 Stat. 1722 (2024).1343---------------------------------------------------------------------------1344    The Disaster Relief Fund, administered by FEMA, pays for several1345key disaster response, recovery, and mitigation programs that assist1346communities impacted by federally declared emergencies and major1347disasters. Annual appropriations to this fund have varied but generally1348increased from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2024, as shown in figure13492. Other federal agencies have specific authorities and resources1350outside of the Disaster Relief Fund to support certain disaster1351response and recovery efforts.13521353Figure 2: Disaster Relief Fund Appropriations in Fiscal Year (FY) 20231354                         Dollars, FY 2000	202413551356      Note: Fiscal year 2013 numbers do not reflect the impact of1357sequestration. Supplemental data include contingent appropriations and1358    all appropriations under the heading of ``Disaster Relief'' or1359  ``Disaster Relief Fund'' including the language ``for an additional1360 amount.'' Appropriations do not account for transfers or rescissions.1361  Deflator used was drawn from the FY2024 Budget of the United States1362    Government, ``Historical Tables: Table 1.3_Summary of Receipts,1363Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits (-) in Current Dollars, Constant (FY1364         2012) Dollars, and as Percentages of GDP: 1940-2028.''13651366    We have also previously reported that long-term recovery can be1367challenging, and project costs can increase the longer a recovery1368lasts.1369    For example, in February 2024, over 6 years after Hurricanes Irma1370and Maria made landfall in Puerto Rico in 2017, we reported that FEMA1371and Puerto Rico had taken actions, such as providing advance1372disbursements of funds to grant recipients to help jump-start permanent1373work construction to rebuild.\6\ However, grant subrecipients that1374received awards from FEMA through an expedited process identified1375increased project costs that pose risks to the completion of work. For1376example, officials from Puerto Rico's Aqueduct and Sewer Authority said1377that the costs for one water treatment plant project exceeded its1378original estimate by 42 percent.1379---------------------------------------------------------------------------1380    \6\ GAO, Puerto Rico Disasters: Progress Made, but the Recovery1381Continues to Face Challenges, GAO-24-105557 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13,13822024).1383---------------------------------------------------------------------------1384    Further, the number of federal disaster declarations and the1385expectation for long-term federal support have increased. As shown in1386figure 3, federal support for disaster recovery can last for years. For1387example, according to FEMA, the agency is managing over 600 open major1388disaster declarations--some of which occurred almost 20 years ago--in1389various stages of response and recovery. For instance, as of February13902025, FEMA continues to make obligations for recovery projects as part1391of the Public Assistance program for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in13922005.\7\1393---------------------------------------------------------------------------1394    \7\ FEMA's Public Assistance program provides assistance for debris1395removal efforts; life-saving emergency protective measures; and the1396repair or replacement of disaster-damaged publicly owned or certain1397private non-profit facilities, roads and bridges, and electrical1398utilities, among other activities.1399---------------------------------------------------------------------------14001401    Figure 3: Time Frames and Activities in Disaster Preparedness,1402                   Response, Recovery, and Resilience14031404    The frequency and intensity of recent disasters have severely1405strained FEMA, affecting its ability to deliver assistance as1406effectively and efficiently as possible. We added Improving the1407Delivery of Federal Disaster Assistance to our High-Risk List in1408February 2025, given the rise in the number and cost of disasters and1409increasing programmatic challenges identified in our work.\8\1410---------------------------------------------------------------------------1411    \8\ At the beginning of each new Congress, we issue an update to1412our High-Risk series, which identifies government operations with1413serious vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or1414in need of transformation. See GAO-25-107743.1415---------------------------------------------------------------------------1416    There are approximately 60 open recommendations related to this new1417high-risk area, as of March 2025. In addition, there are four open1418matters for congressional consideration to help address the nation's1419delivery of disaster assistance, specifically related to fragmentation,1420property acquisitions, and housing issues.\9\1421---------------------------------------------------------------------------1422    \9\ GAO-25-107743.1423---------------------------------------------------------------------------1424              Improving Processes for Assisting Survivors1425Rural Assistance1426    Survivors face numerous challenges receiving needed aid, including1427lengthy and complex application review processes. Federal agencies are1428taking steps to help improve disaster assistance to survivors. For1429example, in 2023, the Small Business Administration (SBA) implemented1430the Disaster Assistance for Rural Communities Act to simplify the1431process for a governor or tribal government chief executive to request1432an agency disaster declaration in counties with rural communities that1433have experienced significant damage.\10\1434---------------------------------------------------------------------------1435    \10\ Pub. L. No. 117-249, Sec.  2, 136 Stat. 2350 (2022) (codified1436at 15 U.S.C. Sec.  636(b)(16)). See also at 13 C.F.R. Sec.1437123.3(a)(6).1438---------------------------------------------------------------------------1439    We found in February 2024 that rural areas face unique challenges1440in seeking SBA assistance following a disaster.\11\ For example, we1441found that disaster survivors may not be aware of SBA's disaster loans.1442We recommended that SBA should distinguish between rural and urban1443communities in its outreach and marketing plan and incorporate actions1444to mitigate the unique challenges rural communities face in accessing1445its Disaster Loan Program. SBA agreed with our recommendation, and we1446will continue to monitor its progress to address it.1447---------------------------------------------------------------------------1448    \11\ GAO, Small Business Administration: Targeted Outreach about1449Disaster Assistance Could Benefit Rural Communities, GAO-24-1067551450(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 22, 2024).1451---------------------------------------------------------------------------1452Block Grants1453    Administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development1454(HUD), the Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG-1455DR) funds provide significant, flexible federal recovery funding for1456states and localities affected by disasters and generally support long-1457term recovery. However, in December 2022, we reported that HUD does not1458require CDBG-DR grantees to collect accurate data on critical1459milestones.\12\1460---------------------------------------------------------------------------1461    \12\ GAO, Disaster Recovery: Better Information is Needed on the1462Progress of Block Grant Funds, GAO-23-105295 (Washington, D.C.: Dec.146315, 2022).1464---------------------------------------------------------------------------1465    A HUD-funded 2019 study on the timeliness of CDBG-DR housing1466activities found that all but one of the eight grantees in the study1467faced challenges in developing a grant management system. HUD could1468better ensure that its grantees identify problem milestones and address1469delays in assisting survivors by requiring grantees to collect and1470analyze timeliness data, as we recommended. As of February 2025, HUD1471said it had explored options for requiring grantees to collect1472milestone data and was evaluating how best to address this1473recommendation to ensure the needs of disaster survivors are met in a1474timely manner. We will continue to monitor its progress to address this1475issue.1476Flood Insurance1477    Federal law created the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) to1478reduce the escalating costs of federal disaster assistance for flood1479damage, while also keeping flood insurance affordable. The NFIP1480transferred some of the financial burden of flood risk from property1481owners to the federal government. In our 2025 High-Risk List we1482reported that FEMA has developed a legislative proposal to improve the1483program's solvency and address affordability, among other reforms.\13\1484---------------------------------------------------------------------------1485    \13\ See GAO-25-107743.1486---------------------------------------------------------------------------1487    However, Congress has yet to enact comprehensive reforms to NFIP1488that would address the program's challenges. We have other ongoing work1489about the state of the homeowner's insurance market, including concerns1490about the availability and affordability of coverage, and the issue of1491a lack of flood insurance coverage and what can be done to address it.1492 Reducing Fragmentation of the Federal Approach to Disaster Assistance1493    The federal approach to disaster recovery is fragmented across more1494than 30 federal entities. These entities are involved with multiple1495programs and authorities and have differing requirements and1496timeframes. Moreover, data sharing across entities is limited. This1497fragmented approach can make it harder for survivors and communities to1498successfully navigate multiple federal programs.1499    Congress and federal agencies have taken steps to better manage1500fragmentation, such as through interagency agreements and reducing1501program complexity, but challenges remain. In our November 2022 report,1502we identified 11 options to improve the federal government's approach1503to disaster recovery based on our review of relevant literature,1504interviews with federal, state, and local officials; and a panel of1505experts.\14\ See table 1.1506---------------------------------------------------------------------------1507    \14\ The panel included 20 experts with diverse backgrounds related1508to disaster recovery. They participated in discussions of each option1509and identified their strengths and limitations as they relate to1510improving the federal government's approach to disaster recovery. We1511attribute statements from experts collected as part of the panel1512discussions to the ``panel of experts'' or ``experts.'' This includes1513statements made by individual experts. See, GAO, Disaster Recovery:1514Actions Needed to Improve the Federal Approach, GAO-23-1049561515(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2022).15161517    Table 1: Options To Improve the Federal Government's Approach to1518                            Disaster Recovery1519------------------------------------------------------------------------15201521-------------------------------------------------------------------------15221. Develop new coordinated efforts to clearly and consistently1523 communicate about recovery programs.15242. Provide coordinated technical assistance throughout disaster1525 recovery.15263. Develop models to more effectively coordinate across disaster1527 recovery programs.15284. Develop a single, online application portal for disaster recovery1529 that feeds into one repository.15305. Standardize requirements of federal disaster recovery programs.15316. Simplify requirements of federal disaster recovery programs.15327. Further incentivize investments in disaster resilience as part of1533 federally-funded recovery programs.15348. Identify desired recovery outcomes and develop a mechanism to track1535 these across programs.15369. Prioritize disaster recovery funding for vulnerable communities1537 across all federal programs.153810. Consolidate federal disaster recovery programs.153911. Adjust the role of the federal government in disaster recovery.1540------------------------------------------------------------------------1541Source: GAO analysis of relevant literature; interviews with federal,1542  state, and local officials; and a panel of experts. GAO-25-10821615431544    Certain options identified could be acted on within one or more1545agencies' existing authorities, while others may require congressional1546action to implement.\15\ In our report, we detailed the key strengths1547and limitations that the panel of experts identified about each of1548these options. For example, one option is to develop a single1549application for disaster recovery assistance that feeds into one1550repository. This portal could help applicants, including state and1551local governments and individual disaster survivors, identify which1552federal programs fit their specific recovery needs based on their1553eligibility.1554---------------------------------------------------------------------------1555    \15\ Other than where we have made prior recommendations related to1556certain options, we do not endorse any particular option. Rather, our1557November 2022 report identifies possible implementation methods and the1558strengths and limitations of each option. Experts who participated in1559our panel agreed that the federal government's approach to disaster1560recovery needs to be improved. They discussed ways to make it operate1561more efficiently and effectively and to better incorporate incentives1562for improving disaster resilience and address equity concerns. See GAO-156323-104956.15641565      For strengths, experts said implementing this option1566could improve the applicant experience by streamlining the application1567process for disaster survivors and state and local applicants. This1568option could also help address state and local government capacity1569limitations by reducing the amount of work needed to complete multiple1570---------------------------------------------------------------------------1571applications for different disaster recovery programs.15721573      In terms of limitations, experts discussed the costs1574associated with the development and management of the system, cross-1575agency privacy and data sharing concerns, and the fact that this option1576would not necessarily reduce the complexity of the federal disaster1577recovery programs.15781579    Another identified option is to consolidate disaster recovery1580programs across federal agencies. This option could be implemented by,1581for example, providing a single federal disaster recovery block grant1582that identifies funding options by sector. It could also be implemented1583by reorganizing existing federal disaster recovery programs into a1584single agency focused on disaster resilience and recovery efforts.15851586      For strengths, experts said that consolidating federal1587disaster recovery programs could reduce the administrative burden on1588disaster survivors and state and local governments. They also said that1589implementing this option could reduce the number of federal funding1590streams for disaster recovery, which could reduce the complexity of1591carrying out disaster recovery projects.15921593      In terms of limitations, experts said that implementing1594this option by reorganizing government agencies would be difficult and1595may create additional risks. Specifically, experts noted that1596consolidating programs or creating a new agency would not necessarily1597reduce the complexity of implementing programs.15981599    In our November 2022 report, we recommended that Congress should1600consider establishing an independent commission to recommend reforms to1601the federal approach to disaster recovery.\16\ Such a commission should1602follow our leading practices for interagency collaboration.\17\ In1603January 2025, a bill was introduced in the U.S. Senate that would1604establish a Commission on Federal Natural Disaster Resilience and1605Recovery to examine and recommend reforms to improve the efficiency and1606effectiveness of the federal government's approach to natural disaster1607resilience and recovery, and for other purposes.\18\ We will continue1608to monitor the progress of this bill.1609---------------------------------------------------------------------------1610    \16\ GAO-23-104956.1611    \17\ GAO, Government Performance Management: Leading Practices to1612Enhance Interagency Collaboration and Address Crosscutting Challenges,1613GAO-23-105520 (Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2023).1614    \18\ S. 270, 119th Cong. (2025).1615---------------------------------------------------------------------------1616    In addition, on January 24, 2025, the President established the1617Federal Emergency Management Agency Review Council (FEMA Review1618Council).\19\ According to DHS, the goal of the FEMA Review Council is1619to advise the President on the existing ability of FEMA to capably and1620impartially address disasters occurring within the United States. The1621council shall also advise the President on all recommended changes1622related to FEMA to best serve the national interest.1623---------------------------------------------------------------------------1624    \19\ 90 Fed. 10,082 (Feb. 21, 2025).1625---------------------------------------------------------------------------1626    As administrator of several disaster recovery programs, FEMA should1627also take steps to better manage fragmentation across its own programs,1628as we recommended in 2022. Such actions could make the programs1629simpler, more accessible and user-friendly, and improve the1630effectiveness of federal disaster recovery efforts.1631    Reforming the federal government's approach to disaster recovery1632and reducing fragmentation could improve service delivery to disaster1633survivors and communities and improve the effectiveness of recovery1634efforts. In response to our November 2022 recommendations, as of1635February 2024, FEMA had taken steps to streamline the applications for1636two of its recovery programs. However, FEMA will need to demonstrate1637that it has thoroughly considered available options to (1) better1638manage fragmentation across its own programs, (2) identify which1639changes FEMA intends to implement to its recovery programs, and (3)1640take any necessary steps to fully implement the recommendation to1641better manage fragmentation across disaster recovery programs.\20\1642---------------------------------------------------------------------------1643    \20\ GAO-23-104956.1644---------------------------------------------------------------------------1645    Further, we have found that communities continue to face challenges1646obtaining support to address wildfires. FEMA and multiple other federal1647entities have responsibilities for federal wildfire mitigation,1648response, and recovery efforts, to include the award and management of1649contracts awarded before and during wildfire seasons. Additionally,1650state, local, and tribal governments can enter into mutual aid1651agreements with federal agencies to enable coordinated wildfire1652responses.1653    In response to the challenges that wildfires pose for the nation,1654the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act required the establishment1655of the Wildland Fire Mitigation and Management Commission in 2021.\21\1656In September 2023, the commission issued a set of policy priorities and1657recommendations calling for greater coordination, interoperability,1658collaboration, and simplification within the wildfire system. In1659addition, we have found that as the incidence and severity of massive1660wildfires increases, FEMA and other agencies could find additional1661opportunities to ensure their programs are effective.\22\ For example,1662we recommended in December 2024 that FEMA assess ways to provide1663immediate post-wildfire mitigation assistance and establish a process1664to collect, assess, and incorporate ongoing feedback from Fire1665Management Assistance Grants recipients.\23\ Taking these steps would1666help foster more resilient communities and reduce the future demand on1667federal resources. We are monitoring efforts to address this1668recommendation. See figure 4 for example of wildfire damage.1669---------------------------------------------------------------------------1670    \21\ Pub. L. No. 117-58, Sec. Sec.  70201-07, 135 Stat. 429, 1250-167158 (2021).1672    \22\ See GAO, Wildfires: Additional Actions Needed to Address FEMA1673Assistance Challenges, GAO-25-106862 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2025)1674and GAO, Disaster Contracting: Action Needed to Improve Agencies' Use1675of Contracts for Wildfire Response and Recovery, GAO-23-1052921676(Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2023).1677    \23\ GAO-25-106862.1678---------------------------------------------------------------------------16791680    Figure 4: Fire Damage Following the Palisades Fire Los Angeles,1681                               California16821683          Strengthening FEMA's Disaster Workforce and Capacity1684    FEMA has long-standing workforce management issues that make1685supporting response and recovery efforts difficult. In recent years,1686the increasing frequency and costs of disasters, the COVID-19 pandemic,1687and other responsibilities have placed additional pressures on FEMA.1688FEMA's management of its workforce challenges and staffing levels has1689limited its capacity to provide effective disaster assistance.1690    In May 2020, we reported that FEMA has faced challenges with1691deploying staff with the right qualifications and skills to meet1692disaster needs.\24\ We recommended that FEMA develop a plan to address1693challenges in providing quality information to field leaders about1694staff qualifications. In June 2022, FEMA provided a plan that included1695both completed and ongoing actions to address our recommendation. FEMA1696officials told us that the actions in the plan enhance reliability of1697FEMA workforce qualifications and increases field leadership1698accessibility of workforce information. Such actions should better1699enable the agency to use its disaster workforce flexibility as1700effectively as possible to meet mission needs in the field.1701---------------------------------------------------------------------------1702    \24\ GAO, FEMA Disaster Workforce: Actions Needed to Address1703Deployment and Staff Development Challenges, GAO-20-360 (Washington,1704D.C.: May 4, 2020).1705---------------------------------------------------------------------------1706    In May 2023, we reported that FEMA uses different processes under1707various statutory authorities to hire full-time employees and temporary1708reservists.\25\ We found that FEMA had an overall staffing gap of1709approximately 35 percent across different positions at the beginning of1710fiscal year 2022. While the gaps varied across different positions,1711Public Assistance, Hazard Mitigation, and Logistics generally had lower1712percentages of staffing targets met--between 44 and 60 percent at the1713beginning of fiscal year 2022. These positions serve important1714functions, including administering assistance to state and local1715governments, creating safer communities by managing risk reduction1716activities, and coordinating all aspects of resource planning and1717movement during a disaster.1718---------------------------------------------------------------------------1719    \25\ GAO, FEMA Disaster Workforce: Actions Needed to Improve Hiring1720Data and Address Staffing Gaps, GAO-23-105663 (Washington, D.C.: May 2,17212023).1722---------------------------------------------------------------------------1723    In October 2024, FEMA had only 9 percent of its disaster-response1724workforce available for Hurricane Milton response as staff were1725deployed to other disasters such as Hurricane Helene in the southeast1726and flooding in Vermont.\26\ In addition, FEMA had only 20 percent of1727its disaster-response workforce available for Los Angeles fire response1728in January 2025.\27\ We have made numerous recommendations to help FEMA1729better manage catastrophic or concurrent disasters.1730---------------------------------------------------------------------------1731    \26\ FEMA National Watch Center, National Situation Report (Oct. 8,17322024).1733    \27\ FEMA, National Watch Center, Daily Operations Briefing (Jan.17348, 2025).1735---------------------------------------------------------------------------1736    For example, we recommended that FEMA should develop and implement1737a methodology that provides a more comprehensive assessment of a1738jurisdiction's response and recovery capabilities including its fiscal1739capacity.\28\ Without an accurate assessment, FEMA runs the risk of1740recommending to the President that federal disaster assistance be1741awarded to jurisdictions that may not need it. FEMA has taken steps to1742update the factors considered when evaluating a request for a major1743disaster declaration for Public Assistance, specifically the estimated1744cost of assistance, through the federal rulemaking process three1745times--in 2016, 2017, and 2020. However, as of January 2025, the agency1746has not issued a final rule updating the estimated cost of assistance.1747---------------------------------------------------------------------------1748    \28\ GAO, Federal Disaster Assistance: Improved Criteria Needed to1749Assess a Jurisdiction's Capability to Respond and Recover on Its Own,1750GAO-12-838 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2012).1751---------------------------------------------------------------------------1752    The COVID-19 pandemic marked the first time the Disaster Relief1753Fund has been used to respond to a nationwide public health emergency.1754FEMA used its typical process to estimate its obligations for COVID-19.1755However, in July 2024 we reported that FEMA did not meet its accuracy1756goal for actual obligations for COVID-19 in any fiscal year from 20211757through 2023.\29\ By identifying and documenting lessons learned for1758estimating obligations based on its experience with COVID-19, as we1759recommended, FEMA can better position itself to adapt to similar1760estimation challenges in the future. FEMA did not concur with our1761recommendation; however, we maintain that it is warranted. In January17622025, FEMA told us it believes the analyses it has already conducted,1763including an analysis of COVID-19 expenditure drawdowns, are sufficient1764to meet the intent of the recommendation. We have requested1765documentation of this analysis and of any associated lessons learned1766related to cost estimation. We will continue to monitor FEMA's efforts1767and provide further information when we confirm any actions taken to1768address the recommendation.1769---------------------------------------------------------------------------1770    \29\ FEMA has a goal for its actual obligations to fall within 101771percent of the baseline estimate by the end of the fiscal year. This is1772for individual disasters and for the Disaster Relief Fund overall. See,1773GAO, Disaster Relief Fund: Lessons Learned from COVID-19 Could Improve1774FEMA's Estimates, GAO-24-106676 (Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2024).1775---------------------------------------------------------------------------1776                        Investing in Resilience1777    Disaster resilience can reduce the need for more costly future1778recovery assistance. In our Disaster Resilience Framework, we reported1779that the reactive and fragmented federal approach to disaster risk1780reduction limits the federal government's ability to facilitate1781significant reduction in the nation's overall disaster risk.\30\1782---------------------------------------------------------------------------1783    \30\ GAO, Disaster Resilience Framework: Principles for Analyzing1784Federal Efforts to Facilitate and Promote Resilience to Natural1785Disasters, GAO-20-100SP (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 23, 2019).1786---------------------------------------------------------------------------1787    FEMA's hazard mitigation assistance programs provide assistance for1788eligible long-term solutions that reduce the impact of future1789disasters, thereby increasing disaster resilience. However, we have1790reported that FEMA can improve its hazard mitigation assistance grant1791programs.1792    For example, the Safeguarding Tomorrow through Ongoing Risk1793Mitigation Act of 2021 authorized FEMA to award capitalization grants--1794seed funding--to help eligible states, territories, Tribes, and the1795District of Columbia establish revolving loan funds for mitigation1796assistance.\31\ In response, FEMA established the Safeguarding Tomorrow1797Revolving Loan Fund grant program in 2022. In February 2025, we found1798that while FEMA has identified some tools to collect information on the1799Revolving Loan Fund program, FEMA does not have a process for1800systematically collecting and evaluating the information to assess1801program effectiveness across all phases of the program.\32\ We1802recommended that FEMA document and implement a process to regularly1803assess program effectiveness using evidence-based decision-making1804practices to help instill confidence in program participants and better1805ensure the long-term sustainability and success of the program. FEMA1806concurred with our recommendation.1807---------------------------------------------------------------------------1808    \31\ Pub. L. No. 116-284, 134 Stat. 4869 (2021) (codified at 421809U.S.C. Sec.  5135).1810    \32\ GAO, Disaster Resilience: FEMA Should Improve Guidance and1811Assessment of Its Revolving Loan Fund Program, GAO-25-1073311812(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 24, 2025).1813---------------------------------------------------------------------------1814    FEMA's Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities program1815provides pre-disaster mitigation grants to help eligible state,1816territorial, federally recognized tribal and local governments invest1817in a variety of natural hazard mitigation activities. These activities1818focus on infrastructure projects and building capability and capacity1819among local communities. During the 5-year period from fiscal years18202020 through 2024, FEMA made about $5.5 billion available for these1821grants. As of January 2025, FEMA had announced awards of about $11822billion.\33\ We are currently reviewing this program.1823---------------------------------------------------------------------------1824    \33\ FEMA, The Disaster Relief Fund: Monthly Report as of January182531, 2025. (Washington D.C. Feb. 12, 2025) For example, of the $5001826million made available in fiscal year 2020, FEMA had announced awards1827for $252 million, as of January 2025.1828---------------------------------------------------------------------------1829    In addition, individuals who lack sufficient insurance coverage1830often face greater challenges in recovery. If disaster survivors are1831uninsured or underinsured, they may have to rely more on federal1832disaster assistance. Until recent regulatory changes, FEMA did not1833award any housing assistance to individuals who received at least the1834maximum FEMA award for housing repairs from their insurance company,1835even if there was a gap between their insurance coverage and their1836losses. For disasters with Individual Assistance declared on or after1837March 22, 2024, FEMA will now award housing assistance to those who1838receive insurance payouts that exceed the FEMA maximum award for their1839losses, up to the statutory maximums, if they have eligible unmet needs1840or uncovered losses.\34\ FEMA officials said they expect the amounts of1841Individual Assistance awards to increase due to this change.1842---------------------------------------------------------------------------1843    \34\ FEMA's Individual Assistance program provides financial1844assistance and direct services to eligible individuals and households1845who have uninsured or underinsured necessary expenses and serious needs1846as a result of a disaster. FEMA has also made other regulatory changes1847to the Individual Assistance program intended to improve access to1848assistance for survivors. 89 Fed. Reg. 3990 (Jan. 22, 2024). See also1849FEMA, Biden-Harris Administration Reforms Disaster Assistance Program1850to Help Survivors Recover Faster, (Washington, D.C.: 2024) for more1851information.1852---------------------------------------------------------------------------1853    In conclusion, by identifying and taking steps to better manage1854disaster assistance and the negative effects of the fragmented approach1855to disaster assistance, federal agencies could improve service delivery1856to disaster survivors and communities, improve the effectiveness of1857disaster recovery, and potentially reduce the federal government's1858fiscal exposure. Our recommendations to the various agencies involved1859in disaster assistance can help Congress identify key areas to address1860the nation's delivery of disaster assistance and reduce the1861government's fiscal exposure. We will continue to monitor agency1862progress and congressional actions.1863    Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Stanton, and Members of the1864Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased1865to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.18661867    Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman for his1868testimony.1869    The Chair now recognizes Mr. Guthrie for 5 minutes.18701871    TESTIMONY OF KEVIN GUTHRIE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, FLORIDA1872                DIVISION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT18731874    Mr. Guthrie. Thank you, Chairman Perry, Ranking Member1875Stanton, also Ranking Member Larsen, and other distinguished1876members of the committee for the invitation to testify today.1877    I am Kevin Guthrie. I am the executive director of the1878Florida Division of Emergency Management. Throughout my tenure,1879I have led the division through numerous major events,1880including hurricanes such as Ian, Michael, Dorian, Isaias; as1881well as wildfires, floods, tornadoes, and the Surfside building1882collapse.1883    I have also assisted in national immigration efforts, like1884Operation Vigilant Sentry in Florida and Operation Lone Star in1885Texas. In my 30-plus years of experience at the local and State1886level, I have responded to over 50 major incidents.1887    Under Governor Ron DeSantis' leadership, FDEM has become a1888model for the future of emergency management. This is due to1889our professionals' dedication and the lessons learned from our1890experience in a disaster-prone State.1891    Florida looks forward to working with you and President1892Trump's administration to improve the Federal Emergency1893Management Agency. We have learned the importance of effective1894coordination across all levels of Government.1895    FDEM allows the philosophy that emergencies are federally1896supported, State managed, and locally executed. We emphasize1897collaboration with local governments supporting the response1898efforts instead of dictating them. This approach has allowed us1899to build on local best practices and continuously improve1900Florida's emergency management capabilities. This collaborative1901model is enhanced by the critical support that the Federal1902Government provides.1903    FDEM operates year round, requiring funding even for1904nondisaster periods. While Federal grants help maintain our1905capabilities, we need to focus Federal support on expanding1906State and local capacities.1907    States must have flexibility to build their systems without1908relying on Federal funding during a noncrisis period. One way1909to solidify this approach is through Federal block grants for1910emergency management. Block grants will allow States to quickly1911allocate funding for response and recovery operations, reducing1912bureaucratic delays and staffing needs at the Federal level.1913    As we look to future improvements, one key area, as1914mentioned, is the integration of modern technology into our1915response systems. Florida has led the way and has modernized1916emergency management by digitizing workflows and improving data1917input processes. This has improved our efficiency, reduced1918delays, and expedited payment processing, cutting the time it1919takes to process invoices from 61 days during Hurricane Ian to1920just 16 days in recent hurricane season.1921    Our use of technology has also reduced administrative costs1922and helped streamline disaster response. Data sharing among1923Federal, State, and local agencies is essential to improving1924response times. Leveraging advanced analytics machine learning1925has empowered decisionmakers in Florida to act faster and be1926more accurate than ever before.1927    Another critical component of Florida's success has been1928our ability to collaborate with our other States through the1929Emergency Management Assistance Compact, known as EMAC. EMAC,1930which is financially supported by the Federal Government, has1931been essential in States receiving aid that they need when they1932lack the necessary resources to respond and recover1933independently.1934    Since 2022, Florida has leveraged EMAC in 6 major disasters1935receiving crucial support from 39 States. While collaboration1936has been effective, there are still areas where Federal1937processes could be streamlined to enhance disaster response.1938    There are several ways the Federal Government can improve1939disaster response, such as creating a combined Federal disaster1940declaration process. This would eliminate delays caused by1941separate declarations for separate agencies. Additionally,1942streamlining disaster case management. And last, grant closeout1943procedures would accelerate recovery efforts and reduce1944displacement for survivors.1945    All three of these have impacted me directly during my1946tenure with the State of Florida.1947    As we continue to enhance our capabilities, Florida also1948emphasizes the importance of operational readiness. FDEM1949maintains a network of strategically located warehouses for1950rapid resource deployment and implements emergency standby1951contracts to ensure fast access to critical resources.1952    Routine communication with State, local, and Federal1953partners through the State Emergency Response Team in Florida1954keeps Florida prepared for disaster.1955    Sir, in conclusion, I would like to express my gratitude1956for the opportunity to testify before you today. Emergency1957management is a public safety entity that is essential for1958protecting lives and property. By improving Federal support, we1959can strengthen our Nation's disaster response capabilities and1960ensure faster recovery for all Americans.1961    I look forward to continued collaboration with you, the1962committee, and the administration to improve these systems.1963    Thank you.1964    [Mr. Guthrie's prepared statement follows:]19651966   Prepared Statement of Kevin Guthrie, Executive Director, Florida1967                    Division of Emergency Management1968                              Introduction1969    Thank you, Chairman Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, and other1970distinguished members of the Committee for the invitation to testify1971here today.1972    I am Kevin Guthrie, Executive Director of the Florida Division of1973Emergency Management (FDEM). Today I want to share with you what I know1974about Emergency Management. Due to the leadership of Governor Ron1975DeSantis, the State of Florida and FDEM are proud to have become a1976model for the future of emergency management. Florida's success is also1977directly tied to the dedication of our emergency management1978professionals and experience that comes with being in a disaster-prone1979state.1980    Leading the profession in prepared and resilient communities, staff1981members provide technical assistance to local governments as they1982prepare emergency plans and procedures, as well as conduct emergency1983operations training for state and local governmental agencies with the1984mission of coordinating, collaborating and communicating with all1985community stakeholders for a more resilient Florida. As Executive1986Director and on behalf of my colleagues in State and Local emergency1987management, we thank you for this opportunity to provide a state1988perspective on the future of Federal Emergency Management. We are1989excited to work with you and President Trump's Administration to1990empower states in their emergency management efforts.1991                            Disaster History1992    Regarding disasters, as Executive Director, I have led the agency1993through numerous significant events, including Hurricanes Debby,1994Helene, Milton, Idalia, Ian, Nicole, Michael, Dorian, Isaias, Sally,1995and Eta, as well as Tropical Storms Elsa and Fred. Besides tropical1996systems, I have provided support to Floridians through a variety of1997events, including the tragic Surfside Building Collapse, wildfires,1998tornadoes, floods and more. We have also assisted efforts in the1999nation's fight against illegal immigration through Operation Vigilant2000Sentry in Florida and Operation Lone Star in Texas. Additionally, in my2001broader 30 plus years of experience, I have responded to, assisted in2002leading, or led the operations of over 50 additional incidents or2003events in Florida or across the nation.2004                            State Management2005    We maintain our emergency management approach with conservative2006principles, emphasizing that emergencies should be federally supported,2007state-managed, and locally executed. Where possible, we utilize the2008federal government to bolster, rather than obstruct, state and local2009disaster response efforts. Local response efforts are amplified and2010supported by the State rather than dictated. Where additional support2011is needed, the Florida Division of Emergency Management does not2012hesitate to fill the need but does not take control or micromanage a2013response. We do not dictate what a local response looks like. Our2014willingness to support locals in their varied response efforts allows2015us to identify the best practices which are then shared and improved2016disaster after disaster. Again, we lead the industry in the field, but2017we are not perfect and believe in constant improvement at all ends of2018the emergency management system.2019    Regarding federal support, the potential implementation of block2020grants for emergency management is an exciting development. With a2021block grant, an allocation of funding is provided to meet a given2022purpose such as response or recovery operations. If it is properly and2023consistently utilized within the criteria determined by the federal2024government, bureaucratic delays at the federal level are removed and2025states can push out the funding more quickly and effectively. Block2026grants may also allow for large-scale decreases in the administrative2027functions at the federal level.2028             Amplification of Efforts Through Partnerships2029    FDEM is made up of 225 full-time employees and approximately 1702030temporary employees. During a disaster, we activate our State Emergency2031Response Team (SERT) to maximize our capabilities. The SERT consists of2032our federal partners, State agencies, local emergency management, and2033private sector industries such as power, water, lodging, grocery,2034equipment, and materials. Additionally, Florida's First Lady, Casey2035DeSantis, has activated charitable foundations, volunteer2036organizations, and the faith community as part of our State Emergency2037Response Team (SERT). These entities provide tremendous assistance to2038disaster survivors without cost to the State. This assistance includes2039disaster cleanup, reconstruction, housing assistance, meal service,2040transportation, and more.2041    We are not afraid of leaning on and empowering the private sector2042to improve our response and recovery efforts. In many facets of2043emergency management, the State and local governments rely on the2044private sector to do the essentials, whether that be restoring power,2045removing debris, or getting businesses operational as quickly as2046possible to create the necessary environment for a speedy recovery. We2047are not afraid of the private sector and do not care about logos or2048patches during a disaster. We care only about getting the job done.2049    State and Local Emergency Management Enhanced by Federal Support2050    FDEM operates 24/7, 365 days a year regardless of activation level2051or disaster status. Our staff must maintain operations continually to2052be ready to respond to natural and man-made disasters. In the event of2053a weather event, we usually have notice and ability to make final2054preparations prior to the disaster. In other cases, no-notice disasters2055specifically, our team activates to full capacity and may activate the2056entire SERT. To satisfy continual operations for the State and local2057emergency management agencies, funding is necessary on a non-disaster2058cycle. Base FEMA grants currently fund much of these continual2059operations. Any change or end to these base grants would necessitate an2060alternative funding source either through the State or local2061governments. In the same way that a government continually funds its2062Law Enforcement and Fire Departments, State and local governments must2063find a way to establish emergency management functions without Federal2064financial support for blue sky periods. This will look different state-2065by-state and government-by-government. For more populous states, a2066stand-alone State-funded emergency management agency is certainly2067possible. In less populous states, incorporating the functions of an2068emergency management agency into existing capabilities such as the2069National Guard could be an option. Locally, in rural areas,2070incorporating the emergency management functions into the Sheriffs'2071offices or fire departments is expected. In metropolitan areas, the2072emergency management functions could be stand-alone due to the larger2073tax base.2074    When public safety, health, and critical infrastructure agencies2075need help they call on Emergency Management. Therefore, Emergency2076Management is a public safety agency and it is incumbent upon each2077government to treat it as such. This means providing funding and2078resources within existing resources and capabilities. Regardless of how2079each state or local government would establish emergency management2080functions without federal financial assistance, it is critical that all2081federal support be focused on expanding capability rather than2082maintaining capability. Federal grants should not support long-term2083staffing at the State or local level.2084    With this new paradigm in place, federal support can be targeted2085specifically for disaster events as the needs arise, and without a2086large bureaucracy in place at the federal level.2087       Embracing Standardization of Data and Improved Technology2088    FDEM has embraced modern technology to improve how data is used for2089operations. The first step in embracing technology is to streamline2090business operations and gain efficiencies to digitize current document2091workflows. The second step is to focus on the inputs of good,2092structured, digital information into the system(s) at the lowest2093possible level eliminating the need for bureaucratic reviews and2094approvals. In Florida, this has accelerated disaster response efforts,2095improved efficiency, reduced bureaucratic delays, and expedited payment2096processing after disasters. Efforts have not only helped the State work2097faster during an emergency but also ensure taxpayer money is managed2098responsibly. Embracing technology and activating data assets directly2099impacts our ability to ensure residents can recover and the economy can2100get back up and running faster than ever before.2101    We have seen tremendous returns on investment in technology. For2102every dollar targeted at technology modernization, we have an estimated2103$530 in business efficiency. Additionally, the time it takes to process2104thousands of invoices following a disaster has decreased by 73%. During2105Hurricane Ian, FDEM averaged 61 days to process invoices. For2106Hurricanes Debby, Helene, and Milton, this improved to just 16 days.2107    The inability of data to flow from local to state to federal2108government through efficient use of technology is responsible for the2109delays and years long frustrations experienced in emergency management.2110We have proven that these delays can be reduced by up to 90% in some2111cases, all while decreasing long-term and temporary staffing needs.2112    Collecting, analyzing, and governing relevant data is integral for2113providing reliable, actionable information for emergency operation2114decision-makers before, during, and after an emergency. We deployed an2115anomaly detector to identify and mitigate financial risks, including2116potential fraud, waste, and abuse, by detecting abnormalities when2117processing invoices for payment. With 99% accuracy, the anomaly2118detector identified three major invoice irregularities in the first 302119days.2120    Data is essential for Federal, State, and local officials as well2121as emergency management leaders charged with protecting and serving2122residents. By leveraging advanced analytics and machine learning, FDEM2123has empowered its leaders to transition from manual information2124collection and research into a modern, data-drive approach.2125             Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)2126    In the event of large disasters, the Federal government has2127supported Florida financially and operationally. Additionally, states2128across our nation have lent support to Florida when we have needed it2129most.2130    Since 2022, Florida has leveraged the Emergency Management2131Assistance Compact (EMAC) to request aid during six (6) disaster2132events. Over these incidents, 39 states across the nation stepped up to2133assist Florida by providing crucial assistance and bolstering Florida's2134response efforts. Through EMAC, Florida has received essential assets2135such as Swiftwater and Urban Search & Rescue (USAR) teams, fire2136response units, Incident Management Teams (IMTs), Emergency Operations2137Center (EOC) support, voluntary liaisons, and National Guard2138assistance. These resources play a critical role in ensuring an2139effective disaster response.2140    Throughout the six (6) disasters since 2022, including Operation2141Vigilant Sentry (OVS) and five (5) hurricanes--Ian, Idalia, Debby,2142Helene, and Milton, Florida has received a total of 7,444 personnel and2143associated equipment with total costs amounting to $74,731,312.50.2144These coordinated efforts have been instrumental in helping the state2145navigate disaster impacts over the past several years.2146    The successful coordination of the EMAC, financially supported by2147the federal government, has been essential in ensuring states receive2148the aid they need when they lack the necessary resources to respond and2149recover independently. We want the federal government to continue2150administering and supporting EMAC to facilitate efficient and effective2151disaster response across the country.2152    While many states, including Florida, have received significant2153financial support from American taxpayers during disasters, few states2154could fully fund disaster response and recovery without federal2155assistance. Thanks to responsible fiscal stewardship and a positive2156economic climate, Florida remains resilient--but ongoing federal2157support remains critical in times of crisis.2158                    Additional Federal Efficiencies2159    Combined Federal Disaster Declaration: When a disaster occurs, the2160federal government often claims to bring all forces to bear in2161response. Unfortunately, this is not always the case due to separate2162disaster declaration processes for different federal agencies. While a2163declaration by the President may be declared quickly for FEMA, other2164agencies such as the US Department of Agriculture or the US Department2165of Commerce (Fisheries and Aquaculture) require a separate lengthy2166process for disaster declaration. This separate process leads to2167significant delays in response to the agriculture and aquaculture2168industries. A combined declaration for all federal agencies would end2169these delays.2170    Data Sharing: During response and recovery, the State and Federal2171agencies are often duplicating data gathering efforts as there is no2172``one-stop-shop'' for services. Disaster survivors are constantly2173filling out federal and state forms, applications, portals, and more.2174While there are challenges associated with data sharing, it is2175absolutely crippling for federal agencies to be prohibited from data2176sharing agreements with the State and locals. Remedying data sharing2177issues, as part of an annual ``blue sky'' process, will ensure a2178coordinated and less burdensome delivery of services to survivors,2179rather than duplicative and siloed data collection efforts and2180programs.2181    Disaster Case Management: For disaster survivors, case management2182is a lengthy process, severely limiting available services and2183resources to survivors until months after the event occurred. By the2184time resources become available, many survivors have moved away or2185missed crucial deadlines in applications for assistance. The recovery2186of a community is stifled when its population moves away. Ensuring2187rapid deployment of disaster case management and funding can get2188survivors back on their feet more quickly will reduce the long-term2189costs of extended displacement.2190    Disaster Grant Closeout Procedures: Current policy implies that all2191work must be completed on a public assistance project prior to2192application for reimbursement. This requirement causes excessive delay2193and long-term extension of disaster closeout and creates significant2194vulnerability to de-obligation. Allowing grants to cover partial work2195will facilitate quicker project accomplishment while getting funding to2196those communities that struggle to facilitate project completion due to2197limited revenues and cash flow.2198                             Best Practices2199    Warehousing & Deployable Resources: The Florida Division of2200Emergency Management (FDEM) maintains a network of strategically2201located warehouses, each designed to fulfill critical functions in2202statewide emergency response and disaster preparedness. These2203facilities serve as primary distribution hubs for essential resources,2204ensuring that life-sustaining supplies such as food, water, and2205emergency equipment are readily available for rapid deployment when2206disasters strike. In routine operations and smaller-scale emergencies,2207we are responsible for maintaining operational readiness, overseeing2208inventory management, and coordinating response efforts. However, in2209the event of a large-scale activation, additional surge personnel,2210including contractors, National Guardsmen, and State Guardsmen--are2211mobilized to expedite the efficient deployment of critical commodities.2212Beyond basic supplies, FDEM's warehouses are equipped with a wide range2213of specialized assets designed to support complex emergency operations.2214These include power generation equipment, high-capacity water pumps,2215personal protective equipment (PPE), flood prevention systems, mobile2216command vehicles (MCVs), heavy machinery, and sleeper trailers to2217accommodate on-site response teams. By maintaining these resources, we2218bolster the state's ability to respond swiftly and effectively to2219emergencies, mitigate disaster impacts, and safeguard lives and2220property.2221    Emergency Standby Contracts: FDEM has implemented Emergency Standby2222Contracts as a proactive disaster management strategy, recognized as a2223national best practice. These pre-established agreements allow vendors2224to stage and procure critical resources in advance, ensuring faster,2225more efficient response efforts. This approach streamlines logistics,2226reduces delays, and helps protect lives and property by securing2227essential personnel, equipment, and supplies ahead of time. The2228contracts cover vital resources such as disaster support personnel,2229incident management teams, shelter staffing, medical personnel, care2230sites, transportation services, equipment, and emergency fuels.2231Contracts for emergency supplies and services--mirror best practices2232found in our state-level logistics operations (e.g., resource bundling,2233turn-key solutions, multiple vendors, allow for state/local level piggy2234backing, etc.). This cuts red tape during procurement, accelerates2235resource deployment, and leverages economies of scale.2236    Routine Cycle of Preparedness: Throughout the year, the Florida2237State Emergency Resource Team (SERT) focuses on routine communication2238with our local, state, and contracted partners. Florida's emergency2239management framework is robust. The SERT is one of the most experienced2240in the Nation and is well-suited to address a wide range of complex2241incidents and events. For most natural and man-made emergencies, our2242state-level capacity, including rapid incident monitoring, logistical2243support, and specialized technical expertise (e.g., nuclear and2244radiological preparedness), ensures we can respond effectively. To2245better respond to these disasters, the SERT has digitized many of our2246mutual aid processes to include the FEMA reimbursement document. These2247efforts have allowed for quicker response and reimbursement for our2248first responders. Florida is the centralized emergency management2249coordination hub for disasters. To continue to excel in this, the SERT2250coordinates meetings with city, county, and tribal partners to forecast2251potential challenges and develop plans to address concerns. Quarterly,2252the SERT meets with command staff to strategize and discuss how to2253better respond to natural and man-made disasters. It is through these2254partnerships and routine communications that Florida leads the nation2255in mutual aid support provided across the country and our response2256times during a disaster.2257                               Conclusion2258    To conclude, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you2259today. Emergency Management is critical, and the time is now to2260implement improvements that will change the way we do business and2261ultimately better serve the citizens of the United States.22622263    Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman for his2264testimony.2265    The Chair now recognizes Ms. Laughter. You are recognized2266for 5 minutes.22672268   TESTIMONY OF JAIME LAUGHTER, COUNTY MANAGER, TRANSYLVANIA2269                     COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA22702271    Ms. Laughter. Thank you, Chairman and members of the2272committee.2273    Nine days. For 9 days, my county's emergency responders and2274I bore witness to the aftermath of the most devastating natural2275disaster to hit our community in over 100 years.2276    We witnessed a family's terror when their little boy was2277injured in a landslide, taking their home off its foundation.2278We witnessed a very pregnant mother desperately trying to dry2279out her empty trailer with dehumidifiers so that she would have2280somewhere to bring her baby home to--all of her possessions in2281a dumpster nearby.2282    We witnessed the elderly man in his home too overwhelmed to2283start the process, with mold creeping up the walls around him2284within days of the flood.2285    For those 9 long days, our community was trying to grapple2286with the destruction of Helene, trying to chart a path forward,2287searching for answers to questions, and without the key partner2288who was supposed to be at our aid, without FEMA. And it would2289be 2 weeks after the storm before more than a single worker2290arrived, despite repeated pleas for help.2291    Locally, we knew housing was going to be one of the2292greatest challenges. Immediate needs post-storm are the basic2293necessities we all understand: Clean water, food, and shelter.2294    FEMA's temporary shelter assistance is ill-fitted to meet2295the needs of rural America. Our citizens who qualified for TSA2296found hotel choices to be in Greenville, South Carolina, or2297Charlotte, North Carolina, both 2 hours outside of our county,2298leaving untenable options to stay in damaged homes, bunk with2299family and friends, or leave their job, school, and community2300behind for an unknown time.2301    Appalachians don't leave our home, our land, or the fabric2302of our community. So the TSA vouchers may as well have been2303Monopoly money.2304    Even after FEMA's arrival, the negative impact of delay in2305FEMA response was compounded by ongoing communication2306challenges, changing FEMA staff assignments, and contradicting2307information and directions that stalled progress for my2308community.2309    In the written testimony, you will even see where our2310sheriff and I were repeatedly given opposite updates on door-2311to-door response by FEMA representatives that could have2312resulted in conflicting public messages, except for the fact2313that in my community, the sheriff and I work side by side in2314emergency response, communicating regularly.2315    At 21 days and with tireless advocacy, we were granted a2316meeting with FEMA housing mission leaders. We received an2317overview of the housing options coming, along with identifying2318some obstacles that we would face.2319    For instance, we were able to explain the inadequacy of2320HUD's fair market rent methodology in our rural community and2321how that would hamstring any possibility of rentals being an2322option if the FMR was used to establish allowable rents.2323    We were heard and a request was elevated immediately to2324approve an increase in the allowable FEMA rate. Even with the2325increase, rental assistance could not meet the needs of those2326whose homes were destroyed, and more options would be needed.2327    Ultimately, we found that housing process requirements2328under FEMA are too rigid to apply effectively in our2329mountainous community. For those who could leverage that2330assistance option, progress was only made after establishing2331weekly FEMA and State EM calls with us locally to cut through2332miscommunication and establish accountable discussions.2333    At times, our county would face contradictions from2334different FEMA siloes, as you will also find documented in the2335written testimony. While putting our county resources to task2336trying to support the FEMA mission, we would also feel the2337sting of the deep conflict and contradiction of FEMA being both2338disaster response and regulator of local flood plain management2339programs.2340    Threats of losing NFIP status and future disaster funding2341in our community made it harder to assist families in repairing2342their homes, meet immediate human needs post-disaster, while at2343the same time, other FEMA workers were working with us to2344support housing among limited solutions.2345    Contradicting guidance and unclear processes were also2346frustrating to vulnerable survivors, and lack of answers led to2347deteriorating public trust and faith in FEMA, but not because2348the people deployed were not genuine and service-oriented2349people. It was because the workers themselves were stuck in a2350system designed to prioritize process and policy over common2351sense and responsiveness.2352    We saw these workers hamstrung to help us with a lack of2353training across functions and a system difficult to navigate2354even for them. While there were genuine attempts to be2355responsive to the local needs, like approving private roads and2356bridges for assistance in western North Carolina, the decisions2357on requirements attached were made in bubbles far away from our2358community that did not engage local leadership, meaning that2359guidance is still fraught with concerns about the ability to2360meet the requirements that will be imposed.2361    Transylvania County lost homes, infrastructure, and2362possessions, but somehow we did not lose lives [inaudible].2363What I can't imagine is how our sister counties who lost whole2364towns are navigating these processes when the recovery is far2365more complex and the sting of loss so much deeper.2366    Communities facing recovery need assistance with our2367counties representing the frontline response and need realistic2368solutions and meaningful engagement before a disaster.2369    The stated mission of a responsive FEMA can be achieved,2370but only when the local voice is not just heard, but is also2371involved in solution building so that practical boots-on-the-2372ground insight can be engaged upfront. Only then can we2373effectively and efficiently support our survivors.2374    My community, all of our communities, our people across the2375country, and the FEMA workers themselves deserve better.2376Together we must do better.2377    Thank you for the opportunity to share about my community's2378experience.2379    [Ms. Laughter's prepared statement follows:]23802381  Prepared Statement of Jaime Laughter, County Manager, Transylvania2382                         County, North Carolina2383   County Post-Hurricane Helene Response and Recovery Experience and2384                                Feedback2385    This document is intended to provide constructive feedback with our2386conclusive statements in bold and explanation of the elements of the2387response and recovery experience in Transylvania County post Hurricane2388Helene that led us to those conclusions. We have included suggestions2389for improvements from our perspective. The appendices included provide2390backup documentation to this document but are not the full scope of2391documented and undocumented communication that has occurred between2392Transylvania County and FEMA.23932394    Statement 1: When a widespread disaster occurs, there must be a2395system in place to support response and recovery because local2396governments do not have the capacity to maintain the ability to handle2397a response at that scale during non-response times. Overall, FEMA staff2398our county engaged with seemed genuine in their desire to help, but2399faced some of the same frustrations with communication, procedures,2400processes, and difficulty navigating the system as we did. Any redesign2401of a system to deliver that support needs to prioritize the local2402government voice, be adaptable to different conditions and ensure2403responsiveness to local needs during and after disaster.2404    This document expresses the experience and frustrations that we2405faced with FEMA because that is the jurisdiction of the hearing, but we2406recognize that in some situations there seemed to be blame to be shared2407for difficulties between both state and federal agencies, but our main2408concern is that the system work at the point of delivery locally and we2409do not have a clear perspective on how the interface between state and2410federal helped or hindered the response. County government is the2411closest governance to our citizens and the very people who form local2412government live disasters alongside the community while also2413responding. There must be response infrastructure to support those2414efforts from other levels of government.24152416    Statement 2: Transylvania County was left to manage emergency2417response without FEMA in early days and did not get FEMA support until2418numerous and repeated phone calls and emails were made to appeal for2419assistance. Even our federal legislators were puzzled by the delay in2420FEMA arriving or responding. No official reason has ever been offered,2421but this delayed citizens' being able to start the application process,2422left local resources strained without information and lowered2423confidence in the FEMA response from the beginning with our leaders and2424our community.2425    No FEMA representatives were present in Transylvania County until 92426days after Hurricane Helene created the worst disaster to hit our area2427in over 100 years. Flooding, landslides, and wind/tree damage left our2428county looking and feeling like a war zone with the vast majority2429without power, without communication and with devastating damage. Our2430Emergency Operations Center (EOC) received one phone call on day 6 from2431a FEMA representative stating they would be on site the following day2432without any arrival or additional call. Receiving any level of service2433took constant advocacy meaning some of our local resources were spent2434trying to get FEMA to engage instead of accomplishing other response2435activities. Status of damage incurred, and needs were communicated for2436days without response.2437    When I discussed the delay with one FEMA worker, they suggested the2438lack of assistance uptake from our county, such as those utilizing2439Transitional Sheltering Assistance (TSA), made it appear as if there2440was less need in our community because of low reported utilization of2441TSA. This seems like it could be a factor, and the data does reflect a2442lower measure of initial assistance uptake; however, data reports did2443not accurately convey the reasons people were not accepting assistance.2444Data points from these reports may still be limited in understanding2445the full impact of Helene in our county. Even damage assessment figures2446were slow to reflect total impact because flooding could be easily2447identified by inspecting floodplain areas, but our county suffered2448landslide and tree damage to homes that were spread out across the2449county and took longer to inventory.2450    I recently spoke with a county manager on the other side of the2451disaster in North Carolina that indicated they were not even sure why2452they were in the disaster declaration because they saw very little2453impact from the storm, but that FEMA representatives arrived promptly2454and unannounced right after the storm. The only other plausible reason2455for the delay we have been able to identify is that the main operation2456was put in Hickory, NC and our county was one of the furthest away from2457that base; but plenty of FEMA staff were in neighboring Buncombe and2458Henderson counties well before arriving here and even present in some2459counties during the storm. The FEMA shelter set up immediately at the2460NC Agriculture Center is less than 15 minutes from our county line.24612462    Statement 3: Both short- and long-term housing response processes2463instilled in FEMA are not suited to be effective in rural America or in2464environments like the mountains. This created a disconnect in the2465practical connection of those who needed help and the options available2466to them with specific issues around what those options meant for their2467families. A lesson learned in our experience is that the FEMA data2468around assistance uptake in long term housing does not adequately2469reflect degree of need in a community and that options that allow2470people to stay on their own property would have been more supportive2471and utilized. Policy makers should consider how protocols apply in2472different settings with the ability to be responsive to communities,2473instead of a one-size-fits-all approach.2474    Once life safety is secured in an emergency, our priorities pivot2475to the basic immediate human needs of clean water, food, and shelter.2476The Temporary Shelter Assistance (TSA) program, FEMA's first line of2477assistance to those displaced from their homes, is not set up to2478provide immediate assistance in rural areas because the availability of2479major hotel chains, capacity and established contracts are inconsistent2480or unavailable completely. Our citizens who applied for assistance and2481were approved for TSA in the initial weeks following the disaster found2482that the closest availability for hotels accepting the TSA program were2483in Charlotte, NC, or Greenville, SC, requiring anywhere between a 1-2484and 3-hour drive away from their homes, jobs, and schools. The TSA2485numbers for our county do not reflect the ultimate need for housing2486after the storm because many were not willing to uproot their lives and2487either stayed with friends and family or in their damaged homes. We saw2488the most success for immediate housing needs with North Carolina2489Emergency Management and nonprofits that were able to secure RV units2490for households that could be placed at damaged home sites quickly and2491that did not require meeting floodplain elevation standards and other2492more stringent restrictions since they are mobile units. Unfortunately,2493those resources were not robust enough to assist to the full extent2494needed; however, similar resources could be an improved option in rural2495emergency response both for immediate needs and for the longer term2496while households navigate the lengthy process of determining whether to2497tear down, rebuild, relocate, etc.2498    FEMA housing leadership met with us to explain the options coming2499for our residents and explained that long-term housing implementation2500would take time. The long-term housing program has requirements that2501take a significant amount of time to deploy, with some of those found2502to be unrealistic for our community; so, there was no interim support2503unless citizens wanted to leave the area to use TSA. Rental assistance2504is one of the easier options, but there was an existing lack of rentals2505before the storm in our county. FEMA housing leadership explained that2506HUD's fair market rents are used to determine rental assistance limits2507early in our conversations. We provided a history of advocacy and data2508that shows that the methodology to estimate rural community fair market2509rent levels is not an accurate depiction of our county. FEMA2510representatives heard us on this issue and raised the request to2511increase the amount allowed. Even with an approval of doubling the fair2512market rent allowance, our county only saw 10 units immediately2513available under those limits. Households that pursued rental assistance2514and FEMA workers had challenges finding units within the limits.2515Addressing FMR helped the housing mission because it was responsive to2516the local characteristics of the community.2517    For long-term housing, FEMA units could not be placed in the2518floodplain, but the homeowners who needed a unit to allow them to2519repair or to have time to go through hazard mitigation/buy out2520processes to determine their best options are in the floodplain and2521could not use the FEMA units unless they could find property outside of2522the floodplain for placement. Most of the commercial mobile home parks2523are in or near the floodplain because in the mountains, floodplains2524provide flat land that can be developed and used for those purposes.2525Additionally, the mobile home parks had limited availability due to the2526pre-existing short housing supply. Our county even pulled tax record2527data to provide all commercial mobile home park sites in the county to2528FEMA personnel to facilitate locating sites, and few were identified as2529possibilities for either available space or for being in the2530floodplain.2531    People in our rural community did not want to leave their homes;2532around half those qualifying for long-term housing chose to stay in2533their damaged dwellings, as reflected in FEMA data, often because the2534options offered were not realistic. Even the federally owned campground2535in Pisgah National Forest was eventually excluded as a mass housing2536site because it is in a floodplain, despite it being a federally owned2537site and easily accessible in our county. Additionally, the logistics2538baked into the long-term housing unit placement--such as required2539inspections to meet standardized requirements--are lengthy processes2540even under ideal circumstances. The first FEMA unit placed in our2541county saw an over two-week delay because the fire suppression unit was2542not working, leading to attempted repairs and eventual replacement.2543Typical mobile home placements under building code do not even have2544similar fire suppression units.2545    Communication was a challenge in housing planning and response as2546detailed in another section, but systemic issues of policy, procedure2547and protocol were apparent once communication improved, and the2548requirements were understood locally. Weekly calls--which we2549established with NCEM and FEMA in December after repeated communication2550frustrations expressed by the county manager--were instrumental in2551getting consistent information on housing, understanding of the rules2552(such as learning that sites in the floodplain would be rejected) and2553having clear status updates on those being approved for housing and the2554process being followed. While it is our perspective that the process2555needs to be made more responsive and efficient with fewer obstacles,2556understanding the rules made the participation of local officials more2557effective and the communication with the public clearer.25582559    Statement 4: Some processes were overly complicated, costing time2560and diverting resources from areas that would have addressed more2561immediate needs in the local community. This also created barriers to2562providing efficient and effective service, in addition to eroding trust2563in FEMA as a response partner.2564    An example of these overly complex processes occurred when we2565offered a conference room to house a Disaster Resource Center (DRC) to2566get one operational in our county. The site visit required review of2567the conference room to see if it could be used for a DRC involving at2568least 7 FEMA representatives on the site visit and, while here, a call2569had to be made to see if a handicapped bathroom stall in our public2570county government building being an inch too short could be approved in2571order for the DRC to locate. After over a week post-inspection and2572multiple follow-ups from our staff, we were finally cleared to get a2573DRC. We were then told on a Tuesday that the DRC would soft open on a2574Thursday, with staff and resources arriving on Thursday morning, and2575then officially open on Friday. We scheduled our county operations and2576IT staff to be available to assist for Thursday. Wednesday morning, we2577were contacted by our staff in that building that FEMA representatives2578were there to set up the DRC. We diverted our operations and IT staff2579immediately to assist, only to find that the people to staff the DRC2580had been sent to our location, but that the equipment necessary to2581operate had been sent to another county so setup could not occur that2582day. Later that day, a higher-level FEMA official assigned fault to the2583county for the failure to open on time, even though the issue was2584caused by FEMA staff and required equipment being sent to two different2585places.2586    When teams arrived to go door to door in impacted neighborhoods, we2587assigned a county staff person to accompany them for the two days we2588were told they would be going door to door. (Note: A third day they2589scheduled without informing county staff resulted in an incident2590referenced elsewhere in this report.) Including a county staff member2591on the visits was to help assure our citizens that these were not scams2592and to facilitate getting assistance to more of our households. While2593in one neighborhood, a homeowner came up to the team and said he knew2594an elderly man in one of the houses needed help with the application.2595He offered to go let the man know the team was coming and then came2596back to let them know he spoke to the man, who was ready and waiting to2597receive help. When the team got to the driveway, one of the FEMA2598workers stated they could not go to the door because there was a no2599solicitation sign and started to move on to the next house. While it is2600understandable to avoid issues with no trespass or no solicitation2601signs, there must be some flexibility when it is clear that help is2602welcomed, like in this situation.26032604    Statement 5: Siloed internal FEMA communications and no clear2605communication protocols, along with inconsistent communication to the2606County Level Emergency Operations Center, created barriers and2607frustration. Communication challenges seemed to frustrate FEMA staff2608themselves when they worked with us to find answers to questions or2609connect to resources. Prior communication directly with counties before2610an event occurs and not just coordination through state without2611engagement of local government would improve this by establishing2612relationships in advance. This could be even more effective by having2613non-emergency regular opportunities for training and relationship2614building.2615    Communication between federal, state, and local governments and2616communication within FEMA posed challenges. Multiple examples2617throughout the response showcase those challenges; a few include:2618      After receiving a phone call from FEMA to our EOC that2619someone would be coming the next day and then seeing two days pass with2620no arrivals, the county manager reached out to Congressman Edward's2621office to ask who we could contact at FEMA because we were still2622without support. A name and number were provided, and the county2623manager called that number. She was then handed off because the2624``internal affairs person'' for our county had changed multiple times2625in the same day. Transylvania County staff communicated via phone and2626email with the internal affairs liaison assigned to the county once2627that person was finally identified. When the local government liaison2628arrived in person, it was a different person than anyone who had been2629identified days before, with no communication with us at the local2630level that a change had occurred. We also found none of the information2631we had shared prior had been passed to the new person. Details can be2632found in the timeline attached.26332634      The FEMA coordinator for our county arrived at our EOC on2635day 9, but with no communication to indicate he was coming that day. He2636began engaging with county staff to understand needs and submitting2637reports into some system, but did not seem to be getting any answers or2638information back. On day 13, the internal affairs liaison arrived with2639no prior communication to the FEMA coordinator already there; because2640the coordinator was unaware anyone else was coming, he could not2641coordinate the meeting who had no prior knowledge of the arrival. This2642prevented him from coordinating with our leadership.26432644      The Sheriff for our county is part of county government2645with the county manager, and his office is in the same building as the2646EOC. On numerous occasions, the county manager was told that FEMA teams2647were not going door to door, while Sheriff Chuck Owenby was receiving2648phone calls from a FEMA representative in Washington, DC, telling him2649teams were going door to door. This resulted in contradictory messages2650being pushed out to county residents. Both leaders shared with FEMA2651representatives that this was unacceptable, but the issue occurred and2652even damaging to have mixed messages, but it occurred at least two more2653times, and further confusion was only averted because the manager and2654Sheriff were coordinating locally with each other to prevent the2655contradictions from confusing the public. A FEMA representative from DC2656also called Transylvania County dispatch asking racially inappropriate2657questions referencing a racially charged incident has allegedly2658occurred four days prior that was never reported or documented with2659Transylvania County. See timeline and CAD report included in2660attachment.26612662      Transylvania County staff was given four different2663instructions for how to submit possible housing sites and followed all2664of them in the first six weeks after the storm. The concern over2665housing challenges in the community was communicated in writing prior2666to any FEMA staff arriving, because county staff were well aware of the2667lack of rentals and the challenges with available housing prior to the2668storm. County staff continued to raise the question about sites,2669including an easily accessible campground in the federally owned Pisgah2670National Forest and two private sites owners had offered for2671consideration.26722673       When county staff inquired about the status of the consideration2674of these sites for housing, FEMA staff would provide a new, different2675method to submit the sites for review, and there appeared to be no2676continuity of information shared among FEMA staff. After the manager2677requested weekly calls on housing with FEMA and NCEM representatives in2678December, the first meeting began with a discussion of the status of2679those sites being considered. The FEMA representative on the call2680pulled up a database which did not have any of the sites submitted by2681the county in it, meaning none of the site submittal pathways given2682previously had worked. The lack of clear pathways and having to re-2683explain community conditions around housing meant time and effort from2684our team that could have been spent addressing other recovery issues.26852686    Statement 6: Changing contacts and inconsistent handoff of2687information established shaky infrastructure that impacted2688communication, trust in partnership and efficiency. We had to re-2689explain our local needs, challenges, culture and practical information2690over and over again without getting answers to questions or progress on2691addressing issues. A solid human resource infrastructure is necessary2692to make collaboration effective.2693    The timeline included in this report reflects examples of FEMA2694contacts being changed, often with no notice to the county EOC staff2695that a change was being made. Additionally, staff handoff of2696information was inconsistent, ranging from no transfer of information2697at all to a written handoff report and coordinated meetings. When an2698effective handoff occurred, it relieved local staff from the resource2699drain of having to keep re-orienting new FEMA representatives. An2700example of a handoff being well done in the timeline was Heather Long,2701who organized a handoff meeting and prepared a status report to review2702with the incoming replacement, as well as scheduling a meeting with2703county staff to introduce the incoming replacement and ensure2704information on challenges, current issues and needs was addressed in2705the meeting. The re-orientation required by local staff when those2706handoffs were not well facilitated was frustrating, time consuming and2707demoralizing to county staff, in addition to stalling progress of the2708response.27092710    Statement 7: Conflicting guidance for public assistance process and2711items eligible for reimbursement created confusion and frustration. It2712also led to decisions being made on faulty information to spend local2713funds or make decisions on resource usage based on erroneous2714information that may create additional financial impact to the county2715budget already impacted by the impacts of the disaster.2716    The impact of contradicting and changing guidance on the county has2717been challenging and creates financial risk for the county. Guidance2718about reimbursable expenses created additional resource devotion to2719tracking expenses that would later be said could not be reimbursed.2720Early direction included that the local volunteer fire departments had2721to file their own public assistance only to find later that they could2722have fallen under the county's effort, meaning they had to figure out2723how to navigate that process or chose not to seek reimbursement due to2724the amount of resources it would take to pursue it.2725    Some of the contradictions and financial impact to the county were2726county resources used by FEMA and the Red Cross in the response. We did2727not charge FEMA or Red Cross rent on any of our properties used for2728shelters or DRC locations because staff recalled being told during a2729meeting the County would be able to claim dates of use and be2730reimbursed per square foot for the space used. This would offset2731utilities and programs that had to be cancelled from those locations so2732that those functions could occupy the space in response and recovery.2733After the DRC closed and all shelters closed, we added this information2734to our Cat B expenses and were then told this was not reimbursable2735despite the earlier guidance. We were told by PDMG we should have2736created a rental agreement with FEMA and Red Cross before they moved2737into those spaces to recoup the cost of our operations. There is no2738reimbursable claim for our facilities being inaccessible to regular2739entities renting space or programs that had to be cancelled. We had2740similar conflicting guidance on covering fees on behalf of survivors2741for debris disposal, permit fees for repair and other expenses that2742have a direct impact on county resources and budget.27432744    Statement 8: The Just in Time training approach in the field was2745frustrating because there was not anyone available with broader2746knowledge and training, which impacted trust with county citizens. To2747be effective, this training method requires a readily accessible lead2748with a broader knowledge of disaster management.2749    An example of just-in-time training having an ineffective result2750occurred with the FEMA teams sent to go door to door for applications.2751County management was initially told the teams would be able to assist2752people who had applied and either did not know the status of their2753application or had been rejected and needed help. Instead, the teams2754told residents they would have to call the FEMA 1-800 number for any2755questions. Residents were not able to get through on the hotline and2756reported waiting hours, only to get disconnected (possibly because2757communications across the county were running on temporary cell2758infrastructure due to the storm damage). In speaking with those on the2759FEMA teams, we learned they had received ``just in time training'' and2760were only trained to help fill out applications. They could not assist2761beyond the form or even refer for assistance beyond the 1-800 number.2762While just in time training can be an efficient tool for deployment of2763resources, teams are ineffective if there is not someone deployed2764alongside that has broader information and context to support the2765services being delivered. The inability to assist beyond filling in2766information on tablets and referring to the hotline frustrated citizens2767and made them lose confidence in the FEMA support they were seeing.27682769    Statement 9: Flexibility is required to meet unique needs in2770different disasters. Our county's recovery depends on the ability to2771address private roads and bridges, but decisions are made only to have2772FEMA's guidance shift (i.e. recent letter on requirements). It is2773unclear how the funding for this will be managed and what requirements2774would be imposed on local government in the process.2775    Western North Carolina has many bridges and roads privately owned2776and maintained. Initially private roads/bridges were not going to be2777eligible for any FEMA assistance except through individual assistance2778means. After consideration of the need in our area, FEMA changed course2779and announced that funds could be used for repair of damaged private2780roads and bridges, but processes and requirements are not yet clear. A2781recent FEMA memo indicates these bridges and roads will be required to2782have an engineer's certification stating the bridge/road was built to2783the same or greater level than prior to the storm. No reliable records2784exist on many of these bridges and roads, however, meaning it is2785unreasonable to expect an engineer to be able to provide this2786certification universally. Lack of clarity about how funds will be2787administered, who will be responsible for holding bonds, guarantees or2788where liabilities will fall mean that repairs are being delayed2789further.27902791    Statement 10: FEMA as floodplain protection ordinance enforcer and2792FEMA as disaster response created conflicting purposes that were2793logistical challenges to the county being effective at meeting the more2794immediate needs in the community. Disaster funding assistance should2795not be tied to having floodplain control ordinances and programs in2796place as it has historically. The incentive for having floodplain2797management programs should solely be eligibility for subsidized flood2798insurance through NFIP in those communities. Early in the response,2799staff for the Flood Management and Insurance section put pressure on2800the county floodplain administrator to increase requirements on flood2801victims and institute unrealistic requirements for repair permits to be2802issued. Later in March, representatives from FEMA came to audit sample2803assessments conducted by the county floodplain administrator2804determining Substantial Damage or Non-Substantial Damage. Yet FEMA has2805still not resolved all housing placements for those who qualify for2806long term housing assistance from the disaster. The focus on compliance2807and the threat of loss of NFIP status, without consideration of2808immediate human needs, created contradictory priorities and additional2809pressure on the county.2810    Transylvania County administers a floodplain protection ordinance2811as required for the county to be eligible to receive funding and2812support from FEMA in a disaster. After the storm occurred, many of our2813residents were committed to staying at their property instead of using2814TSA that would take them out of the area. To restore their damaged2815homes to a livable condition, they were eager to make repairs.2816Initially, our building inspections department that administers the2817floodplain ordinance and our city planning department who also2818administers a floodplain ordinance were told by FEMA staff that they2819needed to require non-conforming structures to come into compliance2820before permitting any repairs. The steps to raise a home or flooded2821trailer include having a surveyor shoot base floor elevations and an2822engineer design the measures to safely raise the structure. There were2823no surveyors and engineers in the area available to even provide this2824kind of service, and the process would require time that the pending2825cold weather would not allow these families. Our staff witnessed2826families throwing away all their possessions and desperately trying to2827use dehumidifiers to make a safe place for their family to stay. I2828toured a flooded mobile home with a woman who was 9 months pregnant.2829Their outlets had been inundated, and there were volunteers eager to2830assist in repair; but our staff was told we might endanger our NFIP2831status if we did not require the floodplain compliance before issuing2832permits to make those repairs. Another elderly man was still living in2833his home even though mold had reached a foot high in the home, posing a2834health hazard to him while awaiting repairs.2835    Our staff found a document issued by FEMA indicating we had2836flexibility in the administration of repair permits and timeline of2837compliance with floodplain ordinances. We decided to use temporary2838occupancy permits to address the immediate need for healthy and safe2839shelter over forcing immediate floodplain compliance. FEMA staff from2840the floodplain administration side of the agency also put pressure on2841our building department to propose an increase in base floor elevation2842requirements in the ordinance, while the same department was in the2843middle of trying to address immediate assessment and building2844inspections needed to make homes livable for these families. The2845proposed FEMA changes would have increased the standard those impacted2846would have had to meet in the middle of the recovery.2847    An email included in this packet shows where a FEMA representative2848advised the city staff that the county was trying to skirt the2849ordinance because a county structure was being listed by the city as2850having flooded to 50% damage. This occurred despite both photographic2851evidence to the contrary and a sworn building inspector and a2852contractor providing written letters that the building did not have2853water above the basement of the structure. The push by these FEMA2854representatives on floodplain ordinance issues--and even implied2855threats of noncompliance and resulting ineligibility for future2856disaster funding--worked directly against the most urgent mission to2857restore safe shelter to affected families with winter weather pending.2858NFIP eligibility should be enough incentive for local governments to2859have floodplain administration ordinances, and assistance in a disaster2860should not be held hostage over floodplain compliance. Forcing2861compliance should never take precedence over meeting immediate needs in2862a disaster. (Additional documentation attached in appendix.)28632864    Conclusion: FEMA workers generally want to support communities in2865disasters and are genuine in their desire to help, as evidenced by2866their willingness to leave their own communities to come serve. Our2867experience has been that the issues in process, protocol,2868organizational structure, and ill-designed communication make those2869employees' efforts less effective and efficient in meeting the local2870community's needs. Improvements to the system and well thought out2871methods of creating flexibility to meet the unique needs of an impacted2872community will better serve those impacted in a disaster, as well as2873those who work within the FEMA system. Our county is thankful for the2874progress that has been made in response and recovery, but at the same2875time we recognize that more positive impact could be achieved in a more2876responsive and organized system. We appreciate the opportunity to share2877our experience and feedback.2878                              Appendices:2879Appendix A: Timeline of FEMA communication through 11-2-24 and sample2880communication challenges28812882Appendix B: Sample Documentation of Flood Management and Insurance2883Challenges28842885Appendix C: Sample Documentation Challenges Specific to Housing28862887Appendix D: Sample Documentation of Conflicting Public Assistance Rules2888from FEMA28892890Appendix E: Documented Example of Effective Handoff between FEMA2891Liaisons by Heather Long28922893    [Editor's note: The appendices, totaling 174 pages, are retained in2894committee files and available online at: https://docs.house.gov/2895meetings/PW/PW13/20250325/117940/HHRG-119-PW13-Wstate-LaughterJ-289620250325.pdf]28972898    Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentlelady for her2899testimony.2900    The Chair now recognizes Mr. Garcia for 5 minutes.29012902TESTIMONY OF ADRIAN GARCIA, COMMISSIONER, HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS,2903       ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES29042905    Mr. Garcia. Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Stanton, and2906distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for having2907me today.2908    My name is Adrian Garcia, and I am a county commissioner in2909Harris County, Texas, and I am here on behalf of the National2910Association of Counties where I serve as the cochair of the2911Intergovernmental Disaster Reform Task Force.2912    Among the many responsibilities entrusted to counties, we2913are on the frontlines of disaster mitigation response and2914recovery. Nearly 900 counties each year receive at least 12915disaster, Presidential disaster declaration. This results in2916major economic losses, serious effects on communities, and2917immense pressures on local resources.2918    Following a disaster, local elected officials and emergency2919managers are the first on the scene and play a key role in2920recovery and rebuilding efforts so our residents can return to2921their lives as quickly as possible.2922    As major owners and operators of public infrastructure,2923counties are uniquely positioned to mitigate the impacts of2924disasters. America's 3,069 counties, parishes, and boroughs own292544 percent of public roads, 38 percent of the national bridge2926inventory, over 900 hospitals, and directly support one-third2927of the Nation's airports.2928    I am here today to underscore the county role in2929strengthening our Nation against disasters and to discuss how2930we can best work together to meet the challenges of today and2931the demands of the future.2932    First, FEMA is crucial for communities before, during, and2933after disasters. That said, inefficiencies in the Agency do2934demand urgent reform. Disaster response, recovery, and2935mitigation starts local and absolutely ends local. However,2936these efforts would not be possible without the support from2937critical Federal programs. One such program that counties rely2938on is FEMA's Public Assistance Program.2939    PA is crucial for helping communities rebuild after2940disasters, but the lengthy process to receive reimbursement can2941delay recovery efforts and hinder our ability to restore2942critical services post-disaster.2943    Last year, NACo conducted a survey of its members that2944concluded that one in five counties' longest open PA claim had2945been in processing between 4 and 6 years. Counties urge2946Congress to take decisive action to expedite funding from this2947PA Program, ensuring communities receive the critical resources2948we need for timely disaster recovery and rebuilding.2949    Second, removing barriers to funding and resources for2950underserved and disadvantaged communities is absolutely2951critical. Requiring the completion of complex and burdensome2952paperwork by communities who are unfamiliar with the process2953during the most stressful times of their lives can2954significantly impede progress when it is most needed.2955    Populations that feel the biggest impact are often our2956underserved and disadvantaged communities who lack the2957resources and capacity to complete applications and meet2958critical deadlines. Implementing plain language into2959applications, reducing bureaucratic redtape, and identifying2960resources available to assist applicants is paramount to2961improving the overall resilience of our Nation.2962    Counties are supportive of bipartisan legislation like the2963Disaster Survivors Fairness Act and the Disaster Assistance2964Simplification Act, which would streamline the application2965process and reduce redundant paperwork.2966    Finally, counties understand that improving our Nation's2967disaster system relies on a strong Federal, State, local2968partnership. Counties are not merely stakeholders in this2969conversation. Rather, we are a part of the Federal, State, and2970local partnership of Government that together can work together2971to share the responsibility of protecting our Nation and its2972residents from disasters.2973    While disasters are inherently local, counties rely on our2974State and Federal partners for critical disaster recovery tools2975like funding, human capital, and technical assistance.2976Rebuilding our communities and making them more resilient is2977only possible with the support of our Federal and State2978partners.2979    Counties stand ready to work side by side with you to2980improve our Nation's disaster response, recovery, and2981mitigation capabilities to ensure the health, well-being, and2982safety of our Nation and our residents.2983    Chairman Perry and Ranking Member Stanton, thank you again2984for the invitation to discuss this critical issue on behalf of2985America's counties.2986    This concludes my testimony, and I am happy to take any2987questions. Thank you.2988    [Mr. Garcia's prepared statement follows:]29892990   Prepared Statement of Adrian Garcia, Commissioner, Harris County,2991        Texas, on behalf of the National Association of Counties2992                              Introduction2993    Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Stanton and distinguished members of2994the Subcommittee, on behalf of the National Association of Counties2995(NACo), thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the important2996role counties play in disaster response, recovery and mitigation.2997    My name is Adrian Garcia, and I serve as a Commissioner in Harris2998County, Texas. I also serve as the Chair of the Justice and Public2999Safety Policy Steering Committee and Co-Chair of the Intergovernmental3000Disaster Reform Task Force at NACo.3001    NACo is the only national organization that represents county3002governments in the United States, including Alaska's boroughs and3003Louisiana's parishes. Founded in 1935, NACo assists America's 3,0693004counties in pursuing excellence in public service to produce healthy,3005vibrant, safe and resilient communities. NACo works to strengthen3006county resiliency by advocating for federal policies and programs that3007help county leaders identify and manage risk and allow counties to3008become more flexible and responsive to disasters. Through sustainable3009practices and infrastructure, counties become better prepared to3010address these issues in a manner that can minimize the impact on our3011residents and businesses.3012    Harris County is home to over 4.8 million residents to whom we3013provide critical services, including public safety and emergency3014services, public housing, health and human services, transportation and3015more. We predominantly rely on local property taxes to ensure our many3016responsibilities are met; however, due to constraints on local revenues3017that are enforced at the state level, a strong intergovernmental3018partnership is critical as we work to meet the challenges of today and3019plan for the future.3020    For example, in 2017 Harris County was struck by Hurricane Harvey.3021This catastrophic event resulted in widespread flooding, affecting3022approximately 300,000 structures and displacing thousands of residents.3023The storm resulted in at least 89 fatalities in Harris County, with3024many occurring outside designated flood zones, underscoring the3025unpredictable nature of such disasters. The storm's unprecedented3026rainfall overwhelmed our infrastructure, leading to significant3027economic and social repercussions3028    More recently, Hurricane Beryl made landfall in July 2024, causing3029extensive power outages that affected over 2.7 million households and3030businesses. The prolonged loss of electricity, combined with extreme3031heat, led to at least six heat-related fatalities in Harris County.3032    Paramount among other critical county responsibilities is the role3033of counties in community preparedness. Counties are on the front lines3034of defense before, during and after disasters strike. While state3035statutes and organizational structures vary, local emergency management3036responsibilities are most commonly vested in county governments.3037Following a disaster, local elected officials and emergency managers3038are often the first on the scene and play a key role in the3039coordination of local emergency management efforts. Other key county3040staff involved in pre- and post-disaster efforts include local police,3041sheriffs, firefighters, 911 call center staff, public health officials3042and public records and code inspectors. In the aftermath of disasters,3043we coordinate clean-up, recovery and rebuilding efforts so our3044residents can return to their lives as quickly as possible.3045    Furthermore, because counties are major owners of public3046infrastructure, we are also uniquely positioned to mitigate the impacts3047of disasters before they occur. Collectively, we own 44 percent of3048public road miles, 38 percent of the National Bridge Inventory, 9603049hospitals, more than 2,500 jails, over 650 nursing homes and directly3050support a third of the nation's airports and public transit systems. We3051also own and maintain a wide variety of public safety infrastructure,3052including roadside ditches, flood control channels, stormwater culverts3053and pipes and other infrastructure used to funnel water away from low-3054lying roads, properties and businesses. Counties provide extensive3055outreach and education to residents on water quality and stormwater3056impacts prior to and following disasters, and we work to reduce water3057pollution, adopt setbacks for land use plans and are responsible for3058water recharge areas, green infrastructure and water conservation3059programs.3060    Over the past 20 years, natural and man-made disasters have3061increased in frequency, severity and cost. On average, 25 percent of3062counties have experienced at least one disaster in each of the last3063three years. In 2023, 849 counties experienced at least one federally3064declared major disaster, 720 counties had at least one disaster3065declaration and 312 counties had at least one emergency declaration3066and. That same year, the nation experienced 28 separate billion-dollar3067disasters, which totaled approximately $93 billion in damages.3068    As a result of this uptick in frequency and cost, NACo has launched3069the Intergovernmental Disaster Reform Task Force to strengthen our3070nation's disaster mitigation, response and recovery capabilities. The3071Task Force brings together county officials from across the country to3072advocate for practical, common-sense reforms that improve disaster3073response, recovery and mitigation. Given that counties are on the3074frontlines of disaster management, our direct involvement in federal3075policy reforms is essential to ensure that policies are practical,3076effective, and address the unique challenges faced by local3077communities. By having a seat at the table, counties can advocate for3078streamlined processes and resources tailored to their specific needs,3079leading to more resilient and prepared communities nationwide.3080    Counties are not merely stakeholders in this conversation. Rather,3081we are a part of the federal-state-local partnership of governments3082that together share the responsibility of protecting our nation and its3083residents from both natural and man-made disasters. Like the federal3084government, counties are entrusted by taxpayers to provide a variety of3085important services to our residents, and we stand ready to work with3086our intergovernmental counterparts to improve community resiliency and3087mitigate the impacts of future disasters. To this end, counties offer3088the following considerations:30893090    1.  The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is vital for3091disaster response and recovery, but operational challenges and3092bureaucratic inefficiencies demand urgent reforms to ensure more3093effective and equitable program delivery.30943095    2.  Federal policymakers must remove barriers to funding and3096resources, particularly for underserved and disadvantaged communities,3097by providing adequate technical assistance and decreasing paperwork.30983099    3.  County officials are effective stewards of federal investments,3100and a strong intergovernmental partnership is needed to meet the3101entirety of our public sector responsibilities.31023103The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is vital for disaster3104response and recovery, but operational challenges and bureaucratic3105inefficiencies demand urgent reforms to ensure more effective and3106equitable program delivery.31073108    Disaster response, recovery and mitigation starts local and ends3109local. Counties across the country are currently managing large scale3110recovery efforts, while simultaneously continuing to meet our daily3111responsibilities around ensuring our communities remain safe and3112resilient to the next disaster. While we are doing our part at the3113local level, effective response and recovery efforts would not be3114possible without the continued support from agencies like FEMA, who3115administer programs that provide vital resources before, during and3116after disasters. Without FEMA, state and local governments would face3117significant challenges in recovering from disaster due to limited3118resources and coordination capabilities.3119    However, FEMA's effectiveness is often hindered by inflexible3120decision-making processes and excessive bureaucratic red tape,3121highlighting the need for reform. The agency's layered approval3122procedures and complex administrative requirements can delay the3123delivery of critical resources to communities in need. We have heard3124countless examples from counties about the challenges of navigating3125FEMA's stringent application processes and slow response times.3126Streamlining decision-making, increasing transparency, and reducing3127unnecessary administrative barriers would allow FEMA to respond more3128swiftly and effectively, ensuring communities receive timely support in3129the aftermath of a disaster.3130    One such program that is in desperate need of reform is FEMA's3131Public Assistance (PA) Program. PA is crucial for helping communities3132rebuild after disasters, but the lengthy process to receive3133reimbursement can delay recovery efforts and hinder our ability to3134restore critical services post disaster. Last year, NACo conducted a3135survey of members that concluded that one in five counties (20 percent)3136longest open PA claim had been in processing between four and six3137years; almost a third of respondents (28 percent) reported processing3138times exceeding six years. For counties with all outstanding claims3139paid, the majority (71 percent) report typical turnaround times between3140one and three years. Because PA operates as a reimbursement, the cost3141of response efforts is paid upfront using county funds placing3142significant financial strain on counties, who are often forced to take3143out large loans to cover upfront disaster costs.3144    NACo has strongly supported the FEMA Loan Interest Payment Relief3145Act--passed by this committee in the 118th Congress--and a proposal3146from the FEMA National Advisory Council to treat the first few months3147of PA as a grant versus a reimbursement, which would dramatically3148improve disaster recovery for localities. By offering immediate relief3149through grants for the initial months, communities would have access to3150essential funds more quickly, allowing them to respond to urgent3151recovery needs without the burden of upfront costs. Additionally, the3152FEMA Loan Interest Payment Relief Act would reduce the financial3153pressure on communities, allowing for any interest incurred on disaster3154loans to be reimbursed by PA. These measures would help ensure that3155recovery efforts are not delayed due to bureaucratic hurdles or3156financial barriers, ultimately allowing communities to rebuild faster3157and more effectively.31583159Federal policymakers must remove barriers to funding and resources,3160particularly for underserved and disadvantaged communities, by3161providing adequate technical assistance and decreasing paperwork.31623163    Unfortunately, bureaucratic red tape follows a disaster. For3164example, requiring the completion of complex and overly burdensome3165paperwork by communities who may be entirely unfamiliar with system3166protocols and who are attempting to undertake these processes during3167the most stressful times of their lives can significantly impede3168progress when it is needed most. Populations that feel the biggest3169impact are often our underserved and disadvantaged communities where3170resources and capacity to complete applications and meet critical3171deadlines can be severely exacerbated.3172    Ensuring no communities are left behind requires reexamining3173current procedures when applying for federal funding. Implementing3174plain language into applications, providing clear timelines and3175identifying resources available to assist applicants during the process3176are paramount to improving the resiliency of our communities. Excessive3177paperwork and lack of clarity can be particularly difficult for3178jurisdictions who may be under resourced or dealing with co-occurring3179disasters, as we saw with many parts of the country throughout the last3180few years.3181    Counties have long supported legislation like the Disaster3182Survivors Fairness Act (H.R.1245)--approved by this committee in the3183118th Congress--and the Disaster Assistance Simplification Act (S.861).3184These critical pieces of legislation would streamline the application3185process for federal aid, reducing redundant paperwork and making it3186easier for survivors to access the support they need. By improving3187coordination between agencies and simplifying eligibility requirements,3188these reforms would alleviate the administrative burden on those3189recovering from disasters.31903191County officials are effective stewards of federal investments, and a3192strong intergovernmental partnership is needed to meet the entirety of3193our public sector responsibilities.31943195    Counties across the country are working daily to address the needs3196of our residents and make decisions that drive the success of our3197jurisdictions. While we are doing our part at the local level, 453198states limit the ability of counties to raise revenue in various ways,3199making the intergovernmental partnership vital to meeting our public3200sector responsibilities. Only 29 states authorize counties to collect3201sales taxes, but almost always under various restrictions. 26 states3202impose a sales tax limit and 19 require voter approval. For western3203counties, who are at great risk of flooding and wildfires, state3204restrictions on local revenues can be even more impactful, as much of3205the land within western county boundaries is considered federal land,3206thus removing the ability of a county to levy property taxes.3207    While disasters are inherently local, counties rely on our state3208and federal partners for critical disaster recovery tools, like funding3209assistance, human capital and technical assistance. Without proper3210federal and state support, county recovery and mitigation efforts may3211lack the full capabilities necessary to rebuild our communities and3212make them more resilient against future disasters. In an environment3213where counties have limited financial flexibility, a strong3214intergovernmental partnership is crucial to community recovery and key3215to the success of future mitigation efforts.3216    With that in mind, Congress should prioritize legislation that3217seeks to strengthen intergovernmental partnerships in disaster recovery3218by enhancing coordination, streamlining communication and supporting3219resource-sharing between all levels of government. By promoting pre-3220disaster planning, simplifying aid processes and supporting local3221recovery efforts, lawmakers can ensure a more effective and coordinated3222response to disasters.3223                               Conclusion3224    Counties are on the front lines of the pre- and post-disaster3225efforts, and without proper federal assistance, recovery and mitigation3226efforts may lack the full support necessary to rebuild our communities3227and return the lives of our residents to normal.3228    Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Stanton and distinguished members of3229the Subcommittee, thank you again for inviting me to testify here3230today.3231    Counties stand ready to work side-by-side with our federal and3232state partners to make our communities more resilient and ensure the3233health, well-being and safety of our citizens.32343235    Mr. Perry. The Chair thanks the gentleman, as well as3236thanking all the witnesses for their testimony.3237    We will now turn to questions for the panel, and the Chair3238recognizes himself for the first round of questions.3239    I am going to start with you, Ms. Laughter. I read through3240a bunch of what you submitted. I will admit I didn't read3241through every single bit of it. It is voluminous: emails and3242correspondence. And as the county manager, I am not sure--maybe3243you never thought about the mission of FEMA, but it is to3244coordinate between the Federal agencies and, of course, State3245and local agencies. But it was never designed to be the command3246and control and do all the work, right. But that is kind of3247what is expected of it now.3248    And it seems to me, as the person that is trying to figure3249that out in the aftermath of this devastating disaster, like,3250you don't have time to figure it out. You are just trying to3251deliver, right.3252    I remember the two times we were flooded out of our home.3253One time we stayed in the fire hall before we moved to a3254neighbor's house that wasn't affected, somebody we didn't even3255know just offered to come take us in. And then the other time3256was at the township building.3257    And I am thinking about it, but it seems to me, as I read3258through your correspondence here, much of your county didn't3259even exist, right. There wasn't any--there might not have been3260a township building, a fire hall, or a neighbor's house to go3261to.3262    And so I am just wondering, from your experience, I mean,3263you couldn't get answers even about a federally owned property3264for which to place temporary housing on. You couldn't get any3265answers on that, let alone the housing.3266    If you were going to give everybody here, which I think are3267very interested in trying to figure out how to make this work,3268what would be the one message--as a person who has lived3269through it and experienced it and have been frustrated by it3270and seen people like you described, living in trailers filled3271with mold and having no prospect whatsoever of anything3272changing any time soon, what would be the one message regarding3273what FEMA--how it would be different in your eyes if it were3274going to work?3275    Ms. Laughter. At local government, we were looking for3276resources. We needed assistance, and what we could not find3277were how to leverage those resources. The resources that we3278were offered, like TSA, were very clearly not suited for my3279community. And so I think the message that I would have is3280that, number one, communication.3281    If there are resources being offered, we need to understand3282what those terms are upfront so we can even evaluate whether or3283not they are going to be effective in the community.3284    The second is, there has to be some responsiveness.3285Wherever we identified issues, whenever we identified resources3286like the Federal property, we had to follow up on that3287ourselves.3288    We were living a disaster in our own lives. We were living3289a disaster with our community, and yet we were having to follow3290up repeatedly in order to try to get any progress or any3291answers or even find out if our requests were being heard3292anywhere.3293    I submitted that property no less than four times in four3294different ways and still when I got on a call in November to3295ask about housing, they pulled up a database, and none of those3296requests managed to get into the database.3297    So I think the two messages are that the communication3298structures have to be robust. They need to happen before the3299disaster so that we know who even to call. And we also need to3300know upfront how to use these resources or make those resources3301more flexible so that whenever we identify what the needs are3302and how that is going to play out in our community, we can use3303them.3304    Mr. Perry. Do you have any indication at this point why it3305took so long for FEMA to even show up? Like, right after this3306happened, obviously everybody knows what has happened, but it3307took days and days. And I think, it is my understanding, when3308they finally did show up, they were headquartered like 90 miles3309away, which is a fair drive, right, especially in bad3310conditions.3311    Do you have any indication now what took them so long?3312    Ms. Laughter. I have never been given a reason. I can3313hypothesize. I think the fact that we are on the edge of the3314disaster was part of it. It is hard to get through the3315mountains. You don't get places very easily.3316    The only other thing I can imagine is that our numbers,3317like, for TSA did not look like they were high, which could3318indicate on a data front point that we didn't need help, but3319they weren't high because it wasn't an applicable solution for3320Transylvania County.3321    Mr. Perry. Okay.3322    I have got a lot of questions and a little bit of time here3323for each one of you.3324    Mr. Guthrie, you perfected I think or at least honed a3325fraud prevention program in your State. Can you briefly outline3326how that might be applicable to FEMA, because there is a huge3327amount of fraud in the FEMA dollars that are spent, and we3328would, obviously, like that not to be the case.3329    Mr. Guthrie. Thank you, Chairman Perry, for that question.3330    In Florida, we knew that there was the propensity to have3331fraud, waste, and abuse, and what we did, starting about 23332years ago, we built a program that we want to get good,3333structured data into our system that helps us get good,3334structured data and it allows us to utilize large language3335modeling machine learning and, to a certain point, some3336generative AI to predict when we may have a duplicate payment3337or the payment doesn't actually check the box for the contract.3338In other words, a vendor has charged us more than they should3339have.3340    So, again, it focuses from a standpoint of getting the3341good, structured data into the system, and then we use machine3342learning on the backside to do that. And we are detecting, just3343in the recent months, we had three situations for about3344$600,000 that we flagged for potential fraud, waste, or abuse.3345And then we put eyes on that to then investigate it and correct3346the anomalies that were in the invoices, and it was just that.3347It was an anomaly in the invoices where we were charged a3348different rate when we should have been charged a lower rate.3349    But it did end up saving taxpayer dollars just in the last33503 months, $600,000.3351    Mr. Perry. I appreciate the response.3352    I am way over my time. So I yield and recognize the3353gentleman from Arizona, Ranking Member Stanton.3354    Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.3355    My first question is for Mr. Guthrie, Florida's executive3356director for emergency management.3357    Florida is arguably one of the States most capable of3358responding to disasters on its own, but you do rely on Federal3359assistance from FEMA and the Emergency Management Assistance3360Compact, EMAC system, when responding to catastrophic events.3361    At yesterday's Cabinet hearing, Secretary Noem did indicate3362her desire to eliminate FEMA. The President indicated support3363for that plan to eliminate FEMA.3364    From your perspective, how would post-disaster outcomes for3365Floridians be impacted if FEMA were eliminated?3366    Mr. Guthrie. Thank you for the question.3367    At the end of the day, we need Federal support. I go back3368to what you mentioned in your opening statement, sir. Federal3369support, State managed, locally executed. We need to focus on3370the State-managed part. That has been a part of that phrase3371since Brock Long was the FEMA Administrator.3372    But we haven't focused on the State-managed piece. We keep3373going back to the Federal Government. We need to focus more on3374that State-managed piece and actually make sure we are managing3375disasters at the State level we are allowing local levels to3376execute in a commonsense approach while we need Federal3377support.3378    Now, if that looks like a FEMA of the future, which I think3379all emergency managers nationwide would agree, FEMA needs to be3380reformed. That is a task that takes, obviously, Presidential3381and congressional action to eliminate FEMA.3382    So we want to work with the Federal Government. We want to3383work with the President. We want to work with the legislature3384on what that looks like in the future.3385    But to the point, we do need Federal support. Florida can3386probably handle 95 to 97 percent of what we do on a day-to-day3387basis, but, for example, in Hurricane Helene and Milton, we3388needed 1 million gallons of fuel. We went to FEMA. We went to3389the Department of Defense and the Defense Logistics Agency to3390meet that need.3391    So, again, even a highly capable capacity State like3392Florida from time to time needs Federal support.3393    Mr. Stanton. I appreciate it.3394    Mr. Currie, the Federal law is very clear about the3395qualification requirements for the FEMA Administrator. The3396President has named Cameron Hamilton the senior official3397performing the duties of Administrator.3398    In your opinion, does he possess the qualifications that3399are legally required to run the Agency?3400    Mr. Currie. Well, we have actually been asked to look at3401this and the legality of him serving in that role under the3402Federal Vacancies Reform Act, which GAO has a role in that. And3403so we will do that and have that result pretty quickly.3404    But I will say that the Post-Katrina Emergency Management3405Reform Act is pretty clear about the requirements for FEMA3406Administrator. It requires two things. One is the person have3407significant emergency management experience, and the other3408thing is at least 5 years of executive experience. So that is3409what the law says.3410    But I want to be very clear that the ideal state is have a3411Senate-confirmed Administrator. The Senate confirmation process3412is the process for vetting a candidate's experience and their3413ability to do that job effectively.3414    Mr. Stanton. We saw in Katrina just how horrifically wrong3415it can go if you have someone who is the head of FEMA who3416doesn't have experience in emergency management. It is3417critical. So we want to get that done as soon as possible.3418    Mr. Currie, in your role at the GAO, you understand the3419risk of overhauling Federal programs without proper3420consideration. FEMA underwent significant reorganization3421without proper input from emergency managers before Hurricane3422Katrina, and that did contribute to those tragic outcomes.3423    What should this administration and this Congress consider3424to ensure that we don't cripple FEMA's lifesaving3425responsibilities when attempting to reform this critical3426agency?3427    Mr. Currie. Thank you, sir.3428    Like I said in my opening statement, we can't break what is3429not broken, and the only people that can tell you that are our3430first line emergency managers and responders.3431    There are things that work well in the current system. The3432problem is, you don't hear good news often. There are things3433that work. We want to keep those. We want to fix the things3434that don't work.3435    The other thing I will say is we have to fix the root3436causes. If we just move agencies, rename agencies, rename3437programs, but don't fix the root causes, none of this is going3438to change.3439    Mr. Stanton. I appreciate it.3440    I want to go next to our local elected official, Mr.3441Garcia. Can you also explain how disaster response in your3442county would be impacted without access to Federal resources or3443support after a disaster?3444    Mr. Garcia. Ranking Member, without access to Federal3445resources or funding, our county's disaster response would3446absolutely be severely compromised. Local governments simply3447don't have the financial capacity or staffing to manage large-3448scale recovery efforts, meaning vital services like debris3449removal, infrastructure repairs, emergency sheltering would be3450delayed or inaccessible.3451    Federal support is essential for ensuring a coordinated and3452effective response, allowing us to restore public safety, and3453meet the needs of our residents as quickly as possible.3454    Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much.3455    Mr. Chair, I yield back.3456    Mr. Bresnahan [presiding]. Thank you. The gentleman yields3457back, and I recognize the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr.3458Ezell, for 5 minutes of questions.3459    Mr. Ezell. That is Ezell, and I appreciate that.3460    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.3461    And thank you all for being here today.3462    Mississippi is no stranger to storms. Most notably, as we3463have talked about, Katrina, where we lost the lives of over34641,300 people and $125 billion in damages.3465    In 2005, Congress enacted the Post-Katrina Emergency3466Management Reform Act, which reestablished FEMA as a distinct3467entity within DHS.3468    As we approach the 20-year anniversary of Hurricane3469Katrina, I am still waiting for FEMA to respond to claims in my3470district associated with this devastating storm. It is3471unacceptable and a perfect example of how the Federal3472Government has let our people down.3473    I am proud to have led, co-led, and passed several bills3474that seek to improve FEMA. Bills like H.R. 2254, the Don't3475Penalize Victims Act; H.R. 152, the Federal Disaster Assistance3476Coordination Act; and H.R. 153, the Post-Disaster Assistance3477Online Accountability Act.3478    I was thrilled when President Trump recently announced the3479creation of the FEMA Review Council to evaluate FEMA3480bureaucracy and disaster response. FEMA has spent $30 billion3481in disaster aid each of the past 3 years, yet many disaster3482survivors and taxpayers still lack the resources they need.3483    I have been working closely with FEMA to address3484outstanding issues in my district, and I look forward to seeing3485how we can improve the process for future disasters because we3486know they are going to happen.3487    Before I get too far, I want to enter a document from St.3488Charles Parish, Louisiana, reflecting some of the reforms we3489have discussed for the Agency.3490    I want to ask Mr. Currie----3491    Mr. Bresnahan [interrupting]. Without objection, so3492ordered.3493    [The information follows:]34943495Statement of Matthew Jewell, President, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana,3496              Submitted for the Record by Hon. Mike Ezell3497    Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Stanton, and Members of the3498Subcommittee: Louisiana is no stranger to disaster. It has certainly3499shaped who we are as people, strengthening our resolve and reminding us3500to take care of our neighbors. As President of St. Charles Parish in3501Southeast Louisiana, I appreciate the opportunity to share some of the3502many challenges I've experienced firsthand with the Federal Emergency3503Management Agency (FEMA) before, during, and after disasters. Thank you3504for allowing me to share the experiences of Southeast Louisiana as you3505consider critical reforms to this agency.3506    In recent years, St. Charles Parish and the State of Louisiana have3507faced significant challenges due to natural disasters coupled with3508skyrocketing insurance costs. Since 2020, five major storms hit the3509State of Louisiana--Hurricanes Laura, Delta, Zeta, Ida, and Francine.3510While we are unfortunately all too familiar with real-time emergency3511management and disaster recovery, I believe this experience makes our3512state a strong voice for the nation in shaping what federal emergency3513management should look like moving forward and ensuring FEMA returns to3514its core mission of helping people when disaster strikes.3515    One of President Trump's initial actions upon taking office this3516year was to sign an executive order establishing the FEMA Review3517Council. I applaud President Trump for taking bold actions early in his3518administration to underscore the importance of restructuring this3519agency. Just about anyone who has encountered FEMA knows all too well3520there is plenty of room for improvement. I welcome the opportunity to3521assist Congress in enacting real reforms to improve the federal3522government's ability to better deliver assistance to those in need.3523    One program in particular is in dire need of attention and has3524already negatively impacted tens of thousands of Americans, many of3525whom live in Southeast Louisiana. The National Flood Insurance Program3526(NFIP) has been essential in safeguarding American property owners3527against the financial devastation of floods. However, time and time3528again, we have been forced to fight with FEMA over the gross lack of3529transparency in the NFIP, particularly with the disastrous Biden-Harris3530enacted Risk Rating 2.0 system.3531    In 2023, I led a lawsuit on behalf of St. Charles Parish after we3532were denied public records requests demanding the calculations behind3533the Risk Rating 2.0 rate-setting system. Policyholders in my state have3534seen their premiums skyrocket, with some expected to increase from $5003535to over $5,000. It is outrageous that FEMA simply will not justify the3536math that led to these premium hikes, even when subject to3537Congressional inquiries. As FEMA itself expected, this policy has3538forced hundreds of thousands to drop their coverage altogether, leaving3539an alarming number of uninsured property owners in Louisiana and across3540the nation and jeopardizing the financial stability of the entire NFIP.3541    This has led to deep mistrust of FEMA because the agency has3542refused to say how local and state mitigation initiatives affect their3543methodology. St. Charles Parish has invested millions of local taxpayer3544dollars to construct new levees and pumps. Yet, we still have residents3545priced out of their homes. Property owners implementing protective3546measures often see little to no reduction in their premiums. This3547oversight discourages proactive risk reduction and fails to reward3548efforts that decrease overall flood risk. Instead, FEMA should work3549with state and local governments to ensure their Risk Rating 2.0 model3550accurately reflects our communities' real risk so we can direct3551resources to mitigate, protect, and achieve affordable flood insurance3552rates. As a public entity, FEMA must reveal the calculations that have3553driven up prices and work with local leaders to implement a policy that3554maintains affordability--a goal it has significantly strayed from under3555the Biden-Harris administration.3556    Another problem that deserves the focus of the FEMA Review Council3557is how to improve the federal government's ability to better deliver3558assistance to those in need. The council should solicit input to3559implement reforms that ensure the swift and efficient deployment of3560FEMA aid to state and local governments, as well as to individuals and3561businesses in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. I believe states3562are better equipped to deliver disaster assistance. Currently, state3563agencies are responsible for administering FEMA regulations. We need to3564explore policy solutions that allow states to deliver aid efficiently3565without the cumbersome bureaucratic processes and environmental reviews3566that drastically slow recovery efforts when people are most in need. To3567that point, St. Charles Parish is still waiting for millions of dollars3568from Hurricane Ida in 2021. I firmly believe streamlining processes,3569cutting red tape, and empowering state and local governments to act3570quickly will accelerate recovery efforts, minimize economic losses and3571alleviate the suffering of impacted communities.3572    As President of St. Charles Parish, I urge the Subcommittee to3573consider the perspectives and recommendations of the local and state3574leaders who have responded to and managed the recovery efforts in the3575wake of natural disasters. By addressing the shortcomings of the NFIP3576and enhancing the efficiency of FEMA's assistance programs, we can3577better serve our communities in their darkest moments, ultimately3578saving lives and livelihoods.3579References:3580      E&E News. ``Hundreds of Thousands Drop Flood Insurance as3581Rates Rise.'' 2024. https://www.eenews.net/articles/hundreds-of-3582thousands-drop-flood-insurance-as-rates-rise/3583      WDSU. ``Louisiana Parish Leads Lawsuit Against FEMA Over3584Flood Insurance Hikes.'' 2023. https://www.wdsu.com/article/louisiana-3585fema-flood-lawsuit/437009663586      NOLA.com. ``How Much Will Your Flood Insurance Rise?3587Check This Map.'' 2023. https://www.nola.com/news/environment/how-much-3588will-your-flood-insurance-rise-check-this-map/article_acc5a67e-e458-358911ed-9482-438f8ebca9f2.html35903591    Mr. Ezell. Thank you.3592    Mr. Currie, the GAO has done a great job, has done great3593reports, on the problems with Risk Rating 2.0. Each community3594across the Nation has invested many resources to manage its3595membership in the NFIP.3596    The primary issue with the Risk Rating 2.0 is a lack of3597transparency regarding the algorithm. This results in3598communities being unable to make decisions to target resiliency3599projects, plan future growth, formulate effective policies, or3600simply ensure that they are not wasting resources.3601    Its impact today is felt more than ever. With the rising3602cost of housing, this policy hides the actual cost of home3603ownership.3604    Mr. Currie, could you reflect on the damage and concerns3605attached to the lack of transparency of Risk Rating 2.0?3606    Mr. Currie. Thank you.3607    FEMA has a huge challenge with the National Flood Insurance3608Program. The idea behind Risk Rating 2.0 is the right one,3609which is you want to assess each house's individual risk to a3610disaster and not just assume that everybody in an area has the3611same exact risk.3612    The challenge is that if your house is at higher rise, your3613premiums are going to be higher. So they are trying to get the3614program to the point of solvency or close to solvency because3615it has never been solvent. It is $20 billion in debt.3616    And honestly, sir, it is up to the Congress now to decide3617what they want this program to be. Do they want it to be an3618insurance program, or do they want it to be a Federal disaster3619assistance program?3620    As long as premiums do not cover the cost of the program, a3621large portion of the flood insurance program is a disaster aid3622program.3623    Mr. Ezell. Thank you.3624    What reforms could resolve the possible damage that Risk3625Rating 2.0 can have on families and communities, in general?3626    Mr. Currie. Well, there are a number of different options3627that have been put out there, for example, State or Federal3628programs to help supplement homeowners of a certain income3629level or a certain income threshold, just like we do with other3630programs who are basically going to be priced out of a certain3631market because they can't afford the flood--well, they barely3632afford the mortgage and then barely afford the flood insurance3633on top of that.3634    So there are a number of options like that, but,3635unfortunately, there are no easy options that will drive down3636the cost. It is going to be very expensive, and somebody has to3637pay for the cost, either the taxpayer, the State, or the3638Federal Government.3639    Mr. Ezell. Thank you.3640    Should some of the procedures within NFIP be standardized3641and transparent to ensure that communities can effectively use3642the resources?3643    Mr. Currie. Absolutely. I mean, that's key. And FEMA,3644through its flood mapping project, should be very transparent3645about the risk of each individual property. And so, I mean,3646they have a long way to go in implementing this program and3647making sure there is transparency.3648    Mr. Ezell. Thank you.3649    If I may have just another 30 seconds?3650    Mr. Bresnahan. No objection.3651    Mr. Ezell. In my home State of Mississippi and also along3652the gulf coast, after the hurricane, FEMA just came in there3653and blanketed just about the whole area that was flooded and3654just moved all the flood maps.3655    Since then and since I have been in Congress, I have worked3656tirelessly trying to get some sort of order back in place so3657that we could--this is a once-in-a-lifetime storm, and it has3658not happened again. And I've just got to say that it has been3659very frustrating. They have the flood maps, but they don't know3660how to implement them, and we are waiting for those things to3661get implemented. And that is very frustrating to people who are3662trying to buy, build, or have a life, a future on the3663Mississippi Gulf Coast.3664    So with that, if you have any way that you can tell them to3665hurry up and get those things adopted, we sure would appreciate3666it.3667    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.3668    Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentleman yields back, and I3669recognize the gentlelady from Michigan, Ms. McDonald Rivet, for36705 minutes of questions.3671    Ms. McDonald Rivet. Thank you very much.3672    I want to start just by thanking Chairman Perry and Ranking3673Member Stanton for holding this hearing on what seems to be a3674bipartisan level of frustration.3675    I represent a community in Michigan, Midland, Michigan,3676that 5 years ago saw multiple dams fail after heavy rainfall.3677In fact, I personally ran one of the evacuation centers. It3678caused massive flooding and water levels reaching as high as 353679feet above normal levels.3680    Thankfully, no one died in that, which I actually just3681think is a miracle. But it resulted in over $200 million in3682damages, and not only did it decimate our infrastructure like3683our roads and bridges, it destroyed homes that families have3684lived in for generations and small businesses that families had3685dedicated their entire lives to.3686    So here we sit 5 years later. Ms. Laughter, I hear your3687story, and it just resonated so deeply with me. It is a3688continuous struggle, a continuing struggling in order to3689resolve the pieces that FEMA came in to help.3690    But what we see over and over again, like multiple Federal3691programs, is that the intent of FEMA and the amazing people who3692work there is dying under a cumbersome bureaucracy that is so3693frustrating, particularly for local people who don't have the3694experience of dealing with big Federal bureaucracies and are3695just at the point of giving up.3696    Our local communities are owed hundreds of thousands of3697dollars, which is nothing in a Federal budget but everything in3698a local budget.3699    So I do want to just say that I understand the frustration,3700but what I am not understanding is the suggested remedy, which3701is a suggested elimination of FEMA and also the suggestion that3702this actually can be solved at a local level if States and3703locals would just budget more appropriately, which having been3704a State senator on the Appropriations Committee, I can tell you3705States cannot handle this just by budgeting, handling this on3706their own and, in particular, when we are simultaneously3707considering extensive cuts, including $880 billion from our3708Medicare program. I mean, it just defies common sense.3709    But I do think we have to do something because we can't3710tolerate this. And my local community still sits there and3711waits, and I hope it doesn't take 5 years for you.3712    But I hear you, Mr. Currie, when you were talking about,3713okay, what can we do. We know that block granting is also a3714very difficult solution because most Federal block grants,3715again, as a State appropriator, come with burdens, like3716incredibly complex and burdensome regulations.3717    But you said, let's address the root causes. Everything3718isn't broken. But I didn't hear you say what those root causes3719are, and I would love to hear them.3720    Mr. Currie. Sure.3721    Let me take the grant issue. And so a lot has been talked3722about recently about switching FEMA to a block grant. I am not3723so much as concerned with the name of the grant. A block grant3724just means, theoretically, that you provide all the funding3725upfront, and the State manages it instead of the Federal3726Government holding the money and doling it out slowly, which is3727what the FEMA process is.3728    The root cause is that the process is too complicated, and3729there are too many rules and overlapping requirements and3730inconsistency for the years that go on with recovery.3731    Turnover in staffing plays into this, too, and different3732cultural changes at FEMA. So the problem is that you have an3733infrastructure project that could take 10 to 15 years to3734rebuild, and all throughout there are cost changes, and you3735have to go back and forth to the Federal Government. It is3736very, very confusing.3737    I think what we are trying to do is we want to come up with3738something where the Federal Government still provides the3739support that the States will never be able to come up with,3740like you said, but it does so in a way that they provide it to3741the States where there is flexibility, but there is still the3742appropriate oversight and control. And that is the balance you3743are trying to strike.3744    With block granting, you give up some of the control at the3745Federal level and the oversight, but you give the States more3746flexibility. But you don't design the block----3747    Ms. McDonald Rivet [interrupting]. I am sorry to interrupt3748you, but I am aware of my time. I just want to say, in your3749experience, and I know this is a bit of an unfair question, but3750have you ever seen a Federal-to-State block grant that did not3751come with its own set of rules and overlapping requirements?3752    Mr. Currie. It does. But we have to build it better in this3753case. So, for example, with the Community Development Block3754Grant, disaster recovery, one of the challenges with that is,3755is that you try to build the whole program upfront and then3756turn it over to the States, and that takes too long.3757    So the money doesn't get there quick enough. We have to3758build this system and the rules and requirements upfront, get3759the States up to speed on it, get everyone familiar with the3760process, build their system, so they can manage this amount of3761money so it can be turned over much quicker. And that is very3762possible to do.3763    Ms. McDonald Rivet. Thank you, Mr. Chair.3764    Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentlelady yields back, and I3765recognize the gentleman from Utah, Mr. Kennedy, for 5 minutes3766for questions.3767    Dr. Kennedy of Utah. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking3768Member Stanton. And today's hearing is more than just about3769FEMA reform. It is about shifting the center of gravity away3770from bloated Federal bureaucracy and toward capable States that3771are closest to the people that they serve.3772    In Utah, we know how to do more with less. We invest wisely3773and build strong partnerships between the State and local3774governments. That same principle--clear, locally led3775coordination between State and local governments--should guide3776how we approach emergency management across the country.3777Whether it is wildfires in California, hurricanes in the3778Southeast or earthquakes and flooding risks in Utah, we must3779ensure the Federal Government is a reliable partner, not a3780bureaucratic bottleneck. FEMA should be empowering States and3781counties, not burying them under redtape.3782    When agencies grow too large and too distant from the3783people they serve, they lose the ability to act with urgency,3784efficiency, or local understanding. Emergency management is3785just one example, but it is a critical one.3786    I support President Trump's Executive order establishing3787the FEMA Review Council. We need that top-to-bottom review, and3788I look forward to working with the committee to play a leading3789role in it.3790    I had a few questions for--we will start with Mr. Currie3791and Mr. Guthrie. We have talked about block grants and both of3792you have mentioned that in your testimonies.3793    Can you give me some more specifics about if we were to do3794something like that, how would you do that without fraud,3795waste, and abuse, but also cut the redtape and allow that money3796to be used immediately? And start with you, Mr. Currie.3797    Mr. Currie. Yes. Sure. Well, I think there is a3798misconception that with a block grant that there is no3799oversight; that Congress appropriates the money, and they write3800a check to the State, and it's done. That is not how it works.3801    Most block grants, the State and the Federal Government3802work together to develop very specific rules and requirements3803and controls and audit processes. It's just more of the money3804is delivered upfront. So it is going to take some time, if you3805develop this into a block grant, to train and build the States'3806capacities. Some States, like Florida, probably is going to be3807very quick; other States it is not, other communities it is3808not.3809    And so it is possible to do this. But I also think this3810needs to be very different than other block grants that we have3811created before.3812    Dr. Kennedy of Utah. Thank you. Mr. Guthrie.3813    Mr. Guthrie. Thank you for the question. And it somewhat3814goes to the previous Congresswoman's question as well.3815    I will give you two examples of where we can really speed3816this up. Number one, environmental historical preservation. In3817the emergency management community--I have several State3818directors sitting behind me--that is where projects go to die.3819It could take 4 to 6 years to get that done.3820    Every State has an environmental and historical3821preservation officer. Why are we duplicating effort on that?3822Let the State do their job, let us document the file and put3823that as a part of the file. We can speed that process up by at3824least 90 percent savings and time.3825    I will give you another example. The Consolidated Resource3826Center. I would move to abolish the Consolidated Resource3827Center. Again, that is where people send us RFIs, numerous3828RFIs, hundreds of RFIs, requests for information. Again, the3829State is responsible for managing its grant. Whether it is a3830block grant or if it is a traditional grant, we do that.3831    But the number of RFIs that come out--and one of our3832individuals from Alabama talked about he literally had to give3833some type of minute piece of information in a debris removal3834claim. That's insane.3835    So those are two examples of where that is already3836happening at the State level. To document those State actions,3837it should be a part of the file, and we move on.3838    Dr. Kennedy of Utah. Thank you for those suggestions.3839    And, Mr. Garcia, if I could ask you a question about the3840counties. And I agree with the potency of counties, and I think3841that was a big part of your statement.3842    The question that I had is, is the hierarchy that you would3843consider associated with counties? Because the Governor is3844generally in charge of the State.3845    The idea of the Federal Government, for example, giving3846grants to a county directly and subverting the role of the3847Governor, I am curious how you would--if you were to see3848Federal funds flowing, would you have those funds go directly3849to counties, or would you have them go to the Governor and3850subsequently to the counties? What is your thought about that?3851    Mr. Garcia. Well, some counties have capacity like Harris3852County. We are very fortunate in that regard. But not everybody3853does. And so we absolutely need to find ways to work with both3854entities where you work through the States in some regards.3855    But, for example, in places like Oregon, Oregon is a State3856that has experienced some delays in reimbursements for the3857recovery process, but places like Hamilton County has had to3858suspend current bids because they are just struggling with some3859of that process. But I think you find ways to work both with3860the counties and the States who have capacity and some who3861struggle with it.3862    Dr. Kennedy of Utah. Thank you very much for that answer.3863    Mr. Chair, I am committed to helping bring common sense and3864efficiency to this program. It is an essential program, but I3865think there are better ways that we can do that. And thank you3866to the witnesses for their willingness to come and educate us3867about this.3868    With that, I yield back.3869    Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentleman yields back, and I3870recognize the gentlewoman from Nevada, Ms. Titus, for 5 minutes3871for questions.3872    Ms. Titus. Thank you very much. Earlier, the ranking member3873of the full committee mentioned--and I appreciated it--the3874Disaster Survivors Fairness Act that I have introduced with my3875colleague from North Carolina, Representative Edwards,3876Republican.3877    This would streamline Federal assistance for disaster3878victims and expand FEMA's authority to help make homes more3879resilient for future disasters. I am pleased that NACo endorsed3880this legislation. It was a pleasure speaking to you,3881Commissioner Garcia, and other members of NACo about this topic3882earlier.3883    In your testimony, you urge Federal policymakers to remove3884barriers to funding and resources for underserved and3885disadvantaged communities. How would creating a universal3886application for individual disaster assistance help in that3887effort that you mentioned?3888    Mr. Garcia. Thank you for the question. The reality is that3889making sure that the barriers were removed, as I mentioned in3890my testimony, is very, very important. It is critical that we3891make it plain language, as suggested in the two pieces of3892legislation that I have mentioned, the survivors and3893simplification acts. Those speak to the challenges that many of3894our underserved and disadvantaged communities struggle with.3895    Ms. Titus. Okay. Well, thank you for that. I appreciate the3896support. I was looking for a little more detail on how it will3897be helpful, but that is good enough.3898    I represent Las Vegas, and we don't have a lot of3899hurricanes in Las Vegas except we could probably make one if we3900decided that would be a tourist attraction. But anyway, one of3901the weather hazards that we do have is extreme heat. And this3902past year, we had the hottest day ever in Las Vegas, 1203903degrees.3904    And statistics from the National Weather Service show that3905heat kills more people than hurricanes, floods, and tornadoes3906combined in any given year. There were over 520 heat-related3907fatalities in Clark County last year alone. So I have an3908Extreme Weather and Heat Response Modernization Act so FEMA can3909more aggressively include extreme temperatures, especially3910heat, in its disaster planning and have the resources to deal3911with it.3912    I wonder if all four of you would take a minute just to3913talk about how extreme heat is impacting the communities you3914serve and how this would be helpful. Maybe we start with Mr.3915Currie.3916    Mr. Currie. Sure. I am familiar with the statistic you3917mentioned, too, that heat kills more people than all the other3918disasters combined.3919    The challenge right now for FEMA is the whole system relies3920on quantifying damage to figure out if they provide help. And3921heat is a very difficult thing to quantify in their current3922system.3923    I agree with you that there is no better thing to quantify3924in terms of an impact and loss of life. But right now, their3925declaration process relies on damage to infrastructure, and it3926is very hard to show acute damage to infrastructure from heat.3927    And so that is one of the reasons that you don't see more3928disaster declarations. So I think we are going to have to look3929at that if we are going to change it.3930    Ms. Titus. Kind of hard to say when it starts and when it3931stops, like a storm or something.3932    Mr. Currie. Yes. And it does damage infrastructure.3933    Ms. Titus. Yes.3934    Mr. Currie. I mean, it damages roads, bridges. I mean, it3935is just harder to quantify it acutely because it happens, like3936you said, over a long period of time.3937    Ms. Titus. Railroads. Anybody else?3938    Mr. Guthrie. We do have extreme heat situations inside of3939southeast Florida, specifically Miami. But this is a great3940example of the federally supported, State managed, locally3941executed.3942    In southeast Florida, they plan for that as a part of their3943hazards that they respond to on a local level, and they do that3944on a day-to-day basis when we have those issues. If they need3945assistance from the State, they ask for assistance from the3946State. So the system does work in Florida.3947    Ms. Titus. With cooling stations and things like that?3948    Mr. Guthrie. Yes.3949    Ms. Titus. I think the chairman mentioned it wasn't a good3950idea to plant trees to offset heat islands. I couldn't disagree3951more with that. But anyway--so locally you are doing some3952things?3953    Mr. Guthrie. Locally. Southeast Florida, southwest Florida,3954those counties approach it differently. But they are locally3955executing on that situation.3956    Ms. Titus. Anybody else real quick?3957    Mr. Garcia. I do want to offer that in my precinct, just as3958an example, I have a public works department. We absolutely and3959my staff told me that the heat damage can be identified in3960various pieces of infrastructure. But as it was stated, it is3961very difficult to quantify.3962    But we do know that extreme heat is an issue for many of3963our NACo members, and we do have data that we can pass along to3964you to help craft some thoughts around that issue.3965    Ms. Titus. That would be great. I know our ranking member3966represents the Phoenix area, and we share some of these common3967problems. So that would be very helpful.3968    Thank you. I yield back.3969    Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentlelady yields back, and I3970recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Kiley, for 53971minutes for questions.3972    Mr. Kiley of California. Good morning. Mr. Guthrie, I3973commend the work you have done in Florida to strengthen your3974State's capacity to respond to disasters quickly and3975effectively and to thereby mitigate and minimize the threat to3976life and property.3977    Unfortunately, my own State of California has not been3978quite so forward-looking in terms of its disaster response3979capabilities, and this was put on shocking display for the3980whole world with the recent tragic catastrophic fires in Los3981Angeles, as we bore witness to an empty reservoir, to fire3982hydrants that wouldn't release water, and other basic failures3983of preparedness for which the residents of Los Angeles are now3984paying such a high price.3985    So do you have, number one, some best practices that you3986might share with our State for how it can do better in the3987future, and, number two, thoughts on how the ongoing effort to3988reform FEMA might actually itself help to spread those sort of3989practices?3990    Mr. Guthrie. Thank you, Congressman, for the question.3991First and foremost, in Florida, we do not respond based on3992whether or not we are going to get federally reimbursed. The3993Governor of the State of Florida, the legislature, support3994emergency management holistically, and they expect us to3995respond not worrying about if we are going to get reimbursed or3996not.3997    Unfortunately, not every State, every city or county has3998that option. They have to wait to respond to see if they are3999going to meet a threshold or so on to seek FEMA reimbursement.4000    I think another thing that was very, very obvious to me in4001that particular disaster is you had the local officials, such4002as a fire chief, sheriff, and things of that nature, but4003nowhere on that dais or that podium did you see the emergency4004manager. They were treating it as--in my opinion, sir, they4005were treating it as still a fire. They were treating it still4006as a traffic issue.4007    They had a much more complex issue, and I know that Nancy,4008the California State director, was involved. But, again,4009emergency management was not there on the day. The Los Angeles4010County Emergency Management director was buried in the back. I4011never saw the city of Los Angeles Emergency Management4012director.4013    And this is more of a systemic problem across the country,4014in that, what is emergency management? That is something our4015own national emergency manager's association is grappling with,4016and we are going to try to help define for Congress and others4017in the future is, what is emergency management. We could all4018agree that this is what emergency management does.4019    I think those are some of the issues. As far as FEMA goes,4020I know that Regional Administrator Bob Fenton was there, and he4021was heavily involved during that timeframe in the Hurst fire4022that you speak of. FEMA was present.4023    However, again, State managed, getting it to the point4024where you can get that State involvement very early on, working4025with your local emergency managers to push funding down, start4026doing the things--for example, in the Hurst fire, the attorneys4027paralyzed that response worried about the environmental hazard4028that was going on to clean up the debris. We deal with that4029every single day across this country. We know what to do. Let4030us separate it, let us put it in the appropriate landfill--tier40311, 2, or 3--based on the hazardous material, and let us move4032forward.4033    Do not stop the operation because there is hazardous4034material. We deal with that every single day.4035    Mr. Kiley of California. Thank you. That is a great4036insight. And I should mention, the individuals you mentioned,4037Mr. Fenton, Ms. Ward, work well with my office. It is clearly a4038systemic issue here that we need to reform.4039    Mr. Currie, a question I had for you is that some of the4040grants that FEMA makes available for sort of predisaster4041efforts--like the BRIC grants, the PDM grants--they don't allow4042for predisaster water infrastructure for fire suppression to be4043an eligible use; so, fire hydrants, upgrading lines, tanks that4044would actually sort of be critical in some cases for immediate4045response.4046    And this is important for several communities I represent4047that are high fire risk, such as the Tahoe Basin. And, in fact,4048the Caldor fire, which is 2021, one of the factors that was4049cited for why it didn't ultimately engulf communities in South4050Tahoe was the availability of water infrastructure for fire4051suppression.4052    So why is it that that is not an eligible use, and is that4053something you think we ought to change?4054    Mr. Currie. Yes. What I found over the years is that a lot4055of times when people say it is not eligible under FEMA, it is4056just because it was not approved. There is not a law or a4057requirement that says they can't do it. All these mitigation4058programs rely on the State or the local government to provide a4059justification or a benefit-cost analysis to FEMA, and then FEMA4060decides based on all the other project requests it is getting,4061if it meets their threshold. And then in that case, they4062didn't.4063    It's not that it's not allowed. It's just that--and this is4064a very common problem with these mitigation issues. These are4065very complicated projects, and FEMA oftentimes--the paperwork4066required to get the approvals is just extremely difficult.4067    And if you are a large county or a large State with the4068capacity to do that, then you might have the resources to put4069that together. If you are a smaller county or a Tribe or4070something like that, you don't have the resources to put a good4071justification together, so you don't get the funding.4072    Mr. Kiley of California. I know we are a little over time4073here. But just to clarify, are you saying that for PDM and BRIC4074grants, that is an eligible use; it is just a matter of where4075the threshold is set, or is there a needed----4076    Mr. Currie [interrupting]. I will go back and check on the4077requirement. I am just saying that what I found is a lot of4078times when it is deemed ineligible or it is not approved, it is4079because FEMA--it doesn't meet some sort of cost-benefit4080threshold as opposed to that specific kind of project not being4081able to be approved. It is just they haven't demonstrated that4082the benefits are going to exceed the cost.4083    Mr. Kiley of California. Okay. Thank you. I yield back.4084    Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentleman yields back, and I4085recognize the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Friedman, for 54086minutes for questions.4087    Ms. Friedman. Thank you very much. And I want to thank the4088witnesses for their testimony, being here.4089    I have to say that it is hard as a Los Angeles Congress4090Member sometimes to hear Los Angeles, at the time when it is4091reeling from disasters and when victims are still living in4092hotels, somehow seeming to be blamed for their own disaster.4093    I really appreciate Mr. Guthrie's response to Mr. Kiley's4094question about what California could do better, because it is4095important that we do evaluate our response to disaster, do4096audits to make sure that we improve. And so your very good4097suggestions about disaster management are something that I am4098very interested in, and I appreciate your saying them.4099    I do feel that I have to respond a bit about the idea that4100somehow these fires were caused because of not having pressure4101in hydrants or reservoirs being empty. Yes, a reservoir was4102down for repair, and we should always look at what our4103timetables are, and fire hydrants were not designed to put out4104a thousand fires in a residential neighborhood simultaneously.4105There is not a fire system in this country that would be able4106to function adequately under those kinds of conditions.4107    But due to what's happening with climate change and4108changing conditions, we are going to have to look at our4109infrastructure and make investments to counter conditions that4110this country has never seen.4111    I grew up in Florida. And my entire childhood, I believe4112there were two hurricanes, my whole childhood. And now we see4113multiple hurricanes every single year.4114    So we have extreme weather events happening around this4115country, and we have got to make investments in our4116infrastructure and our emergency response to counter that. And4117we can't pretend that it is not because of climate change as4118well. And so efforts that we can make in this body to slow that4119change down are also going to help save lives.4120    So, I have been working on fire issues for many, many years4121in the California Legislature. California has invested hundreds4122of millions of dollars over the past several years, year after4123year, to beef up our response to, add more resources for4124fighting fires, for fire resiliency, and we saw those resources4125deployed in these fires with hundreds and hundreds of4126firefighters on the line, more air response than we have ever4127seen in this Nation's history; where really hurricane winds4128driving embers in a time of year that normally is wet, and with4129record dryness instead.4130    And we are going to, unfortunately, have to keep putting4131those resources on the ground. Now, I have introduced my first4132two bills around supporting wildfire victims with the Don't4133Penalize Victims Act, which would ensure that charitable4134donations are not used to unfairly penalize victims of natural4135disasters. I appreciate the members of this committee to making4136that a bipartisan bill.4137    We also have introduced a Stop Disaster Price Gouging Act4138to stop price gouging around this country after natural4139disasters.4140    I also believe in holding FEMA accountable. We have had a4141lot of concerns in Los Angeles around air quality, soil, and4142water pollution because of these disasters, and I would love to4143see FEMA doing more monitoring on a regular basis so that the4144people in Los Angeles know whether or not they need to take4145precautions if they send their kids to school in Pasadena or if4146their water has been contaminated or whether or not they can4147plant things in their garden if they are worried that their4148soil has become contaminated. We haven't seen FEMA take that4149seriously, and I would like to see that happen.4150    I do have a quick question about disaster aid, and we have4151heard a little talk about that. But, unfortunately, this4152administration has said that they want to hold Californians4153accountable, and that they, I think, want to punish the people4154of California, not for anything about their response, but just4155because this administration doesn't like their policies around4156things like voting rights or around our commitment to4157diversity.4158    So I have a simple yes-or-no question. For Ms. Laughter,4159when Hurricane Helene hit North Carolina last year, did4160President Biden condition disaster aid against major policy4161changes in that State? It was a yes-or-no question.4162    Ms. Laughter. No.4163    Ms. Friedman. Thank you.4164    Mr. Guthrie, when Hurricane Milton hit Florida last year,4165did President Biden condition disaster aid on the people of4166Florida?4167    Mr. Guthrie. No.4168    Ms. Friedman. Thank you. I appreciate that. And I would4169hope that this administration does not play games with people's4170lives.4171    Lastly, I want to ask about staffing. FEMA has been on the4172ground in Los Angeles helping people, and they are very4173grateful that there are FEMA officials there. I am very worried4174about the mass layoffs that we are seeing to public employees,4175and I have had people in Los Angeles say, when I show up to4176that office, are there going to be enough people there to help4177me?4178    I want to know whether you think workplace cuts are going4179to make it easier or harder for people after a disaster to get4180a live person on the phone or someone to sit in front of them4181and help them out with whatever issue they have. I will start4182with Mr. Garcia, I think.4183    Mr. Garcia. Absolutely, workforce depletions do bring4184challenges. Local communities and NACo county members need in4185many regards that human capital that brings that technical4186assistance that helps to get the funding necessary to help4187those communities recover and rebuild.4188    So we do need the people behind all the other Federal4189guidelines and framework.4190    Ms. Friedman. Thank you. Mr. Currie, would you like to4191respond?4192    Mr. Currie. It is not going to help. That is my easy4193answer.4194    FEMA will always marshal the resources towards response and4195the disasters that have just happened. What the cuts do is it4196affects the disasters that happened 6 months ago, 1 year ago, 64197years ago. So it is a cumulative effect because of how many4198disasters they are dealing with.4199    Ms. Friedman. Thank you, and I yield back.4200    Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentlelady yields back, and I4201recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions.4202    Some of my professional background lends a voice to this4203topic. In my previous life, I worked in the heavy highway4204construction, and my family company partnered with States and4205local communities on all efforts, like rebuilding Interstate I-420695 after the tragic collapse. We also worked in Fort Myers4207after Hurricane Ian, rebuilding power distribution systems4208where I saw firsthand the devastation and how locally executed,4209State-managed, and federally supported programs could be4210exceptionally beneficial. I have also seen how bureaucratic4211redtape can impede relief.4212    During COVID, FEMA offered grants to hospitals to address4213challenges, like finding adequate PPE and medical supplies, as4214well as address workforce shortages. Even though the public4215health emergency ended nearly 2 years ago, Pennsylvania4216hospitals are still waiting on $690 million in grant4217applications.4218    In September of 2023, Lackawanna and Luzerne Counties in my4219district experienced historic flooding. Our State emergency4220agency estimated the damage to be $25 million, including the4221loss of lives. In April of 2024, FEMA denied the State's4222request for major disaster declaration.4223    As GAO points out, there are more than 30 Federal entities4224involved in disaster recovery. This was a clear sign to4225Pennsylvania that we can't always count on the support of FEMA4226for disaster relief, which brings me to my questions on how4227States can best prepare for and deliver relief before, during,4228and after disasters.4229    So my first question for Mr. Guthrie, in your written4230testimony, you discuss Florida's Division of Emergency4231Management implementing emergency standby contracts as part of4232your proactive management strategy.4233    How can States replicate this practice to have dedicated4234vendors on standby ready to deploy for various types of natural4235disasters that States can experience?4236    Mr. Guthrie. Thank you for the question, sir. It is very4237easy to do.4238    These are zero-dollar contingency contracts put in place4239where we already know who the bidders are. One of the issues4240with FEMA is, when you need a--for instance, a direct housing4241program, they have to then go to contracting right then and4242there. We know we are going to need direct housing all over4243this country. We should have that already done so that that4244speeds that process up by months.4245    We have done that in Florida. I will make it available--as4246I have already told my partners from other States, I will make4247all of our contracts available as a starting point to take the4248scope of work, copy and paste it, put it into their terms and4249conditions and fast forward that methodology for any State, any4250city, or any county that wants to do that, sir.4251    Mr. Bresnahan. So not all disasters can be predicted. What4252are some best practices Florida uses to have flexibility with4253these contracts to ensure adequate response from vendors while4254protecting taxpayer money?4255    Mr. Guthrie. So I have some of the best attorneys in the4256world. They always get to a yes. And what they allow us to do4257is they advise me of risk where we may be getting outside the4258four corners of a document, or they will get me to a yes where4259I can stay within the four corners of the document so that I4260don't have to do another emergency procurement to get into the4261four corners of the document.4262    And those that are attorneys understand what I am saying4263there. That is one way; having a good attorney that knows their4264job, which is to advise the principle on risk versus reward.4265Sometimes we have to take the risk. And knowing the4266consequences of that ahead of time, it is always good to have a4267good attorney for that.4268    Mr. Bresnahan. Mr. Guthrie, Ms. Laughter, and Mr. Garcia,4269when communities suffer from disasters, it can also be an4270opportunity to build back stronger, more resilient4271infrastructure. But oftentimes, we see 21st-century communities4272being rebuilt with 20th-century infrastructure.4273    How have your respective States and counties engaged in4274long-term planning to ensure rebuilt infrastructure is more4275resilient, more secure, and incorporates the latest in digital4276technologies and digital infrastructure? Mr. Garcia, Honorable4277Garcia.4278    Mr. Garcia. Thank you. In Harris County, we are absolutely4279putting the Federal resources that we have been fortunate to4280receive into resilient initiatives. For example, in Harris4281County, we received $51 million to help with the buyout program4282to take people out of flood-prone areas. And we are doing a4283whole lot more to make sure that resilience is at the top of4284our work process.4285    Ms. Laughter. We are interested in any way that we can4286improve for the future. I think one of the things that has to4287be taken into account, though, is that whenever we receive4288grants or we receive support from Federal or State agencies, if4289there are restrictions around that that make it harder for us4290to make decisions and make those investments, then it becomes4291counterproductive.4292    Mr. Guthrie. So we have done a comprehensive reform on4293this. We have come out with Florida legislation that preempts4294cities and counties from doing bureaucratic things when it4295comes to permitting. That is one thing that we have done.4296    We have worked with the Federal Alliance for Safe Homes and4297the national BuildStrong Coalition for ensuring we have good4298building codes. We have the best building code in the United4299States, and strong building codes do work. You can see that all4300up and down our coastline.4301    Those are just a couple of examples that we have done where4302we have been able to do this much faster.4303    Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you for the testimony and your time,4304and I yield back.4305    I recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi,4306for 5 minutes for questions.4307    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you4308for the issues that you are raising. I would like to just pick4309up on what Ms. Friedman was referring to earlier and make sure4310that we fully understand where we are with requirements in4311order to receive FEMA assistance.4312    Mr. Currie, is there any example in the past where a FEMA4313assistance program, disaster assistance, was conditioned on in4314any number, in any way? Are you familiar with any of that?4315    Mr. Currie. I am not familiar. The only thing I would be4316familiar with is if it is conditioned on using that for4317resilience purposes, for building back better than it was4318before.4319    Mr. Garamendi. I do want to come to that.4320    Mr. Guthrie, you answered no to the question that Ms.4321Friedman raised about conditions. Is it your view that there4322should be conditions for the emergency assistance being4323available to a disaster area? Should there be preconditions?4324    Mr. Guthrie. There should not be preconditions. However,4325again, to the mitigation piece, benefit-cost analysis, should4326we be applying a BCA to a situation where we want a house out4327of the flood plain, we want to build a house stronger; just4328because we meet a number, does that make sense? I don't think4329so.4330    So I think there should be some preconditions to some4331programs that say we should waive this or we should make this4332stronger.4333    Mr. Garamendi. Fair enough. And I would appreciate your4334coming back with the specifics that you are referring to.4335Certainly, flood, we have been in and out of that for the 154336years I have been here; and, yes, we are making some progress.4337    The other area that I want to go to deals with the GAO4338report. You had 60 recommendations in the GAO report. It would4339seem to me that this committee would be--its time would be very4340usefully spent going through those.4341    Mr. Currie, in your testimony, you highlighted, I think,4342four specific areas. I would like you to revisit those in the4343next minute or so, the four priorities that are on your mind4344for the legislative policy changes that this committee should4345spend time on--that you believe we should spend time on.4346    Mr. Currie. Yes. Those 60 recommendations cut across four4347areas, as you said. First is streamlining the Federal disaster4348recovery process because it is fragmented.4349    Mr. Garamendi. Fragmented among multiple agencies.4350    Mr. Currie. Exactly; 30 agencies, to be sure.4351    Better delivering disaster aid to survivors, making that4352easier for individual survivors.4353    Reforming the FEMA workforce is number three.4354    And then number four is using our resilience dollars and4355making resilience programs easier to navigate for State and4356local governments.4357    Mr. Garamendi. All right. And in each of those areas you4358had specific ways in which the improvements could be4359accomplished, that is, legislative.4360    Mr. Currie. Yes, absolutely. Well, actually, 2 years ago,4361before the reform discussions even started, we recommended that4362Congress set up its own commission to look at disaster4363recovery, because we were so frustrated that the agencies for4364years, we were making recommendations, they weren't4365implementing them. And also, this issue cuts across so many4366committees of jurisdiction. So it is rare that we recommend4367something like that, but we thought the problem was large4368enough that it was warranted.4369    Mr. Garamendi. Well, you have given me direction on how I4370should spend my time, and hopefully the committee would4371similarly spend time on the details of each of these,4372streamlining multiple Federal agencies, maybe eliminate or at4373least change the way in which they, presumably, should work4374together.4375    Individual Assistance Programs, could you be a little more4376specific about that?4377    Mr. Currie. Well, changing our aid programs to the4378individual survivor from being Government centric to customer4379centric. And what I mean by that is, right now, the survivor4380has to extract the money out of the Federal Government through4381a lengthy, frustrating process. And because of that, they don't4382get everything they could possibly get.4383    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. Mr. Guthrie, you are nodding your4384head, and the rest of you would think this is something we4385ought to deal with?4386    Mr. Guthrie. Yes, sir. I mean, the mere fact that a4387homeowner may have to wait 4, 5, or 6 years to get back to4388where they need to be. What we want, all of us want, is that4389homeowner back on their property in their home.4390    Mr. Garamendi. I am almost out of time. For the four of4391you, if you could present to the committee, and certainly to me4392and my colleagues, the specific kinds of reform that you think4393are most necessary on the Individual Assistance.4394    On the workforce, we have already talked about the current4395reductions in workforce, and there has been a discussion on4396that.4397    With regard to resiliency, FEMA does have a bit of a4398problem in that build back better is not in their lexicon, at4399least in the regulations that they administer. So we need to be4400aware that we need to change and encourage FEMA to look to4401resiliency that is really do build back better, more details.4402    I am out of time. Thank you very much, gentlemen and lady.4403    Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentleman yields back, and I4404recognize the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Onder, for 5 minutes4405for questions.4406    Dr. Onder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the4407witnesses for being here today.4408    Mr. Currie, the GAO has conducted numerous audits of FEMA's4409disaster relief spending. Has your office identified instances4410where FEMA funds have been used to provide aid to illegal4411immigrants, whether it be housing assistance or otherwise, and4412could you provide examples?4413    Mr. Currie. Yes. We did a report a year or two ago--I will4414have to get back to you on the specifics--on the Emergency Food4415and Shelter Program, which, as you know, Congress authorized4416that program for FEMA to provide assistance to cities to help4417support the influx of migrants.4418    Dr. Onder. Okay. Do you recall when Congress authorized4419that program?4420    Mr. Currie. It was in the last Congress, but I have to get4421back to you on the details.4422    Dr. Onder. It was 118. Okay. Okay. Given FEMA's mission to4423assist American citizens and legal residents, are there4424oversight mechanisms currently in place to ensure that funds4425are used appropriately for disaster recovery as opposed to4426being diverted to other uses?4427    Mr. Currie. Yes, sir. The Disaster Relief Fund is closely4428monitored, and there are many controls over the payments that4429come out of that and go to the States. And it is not just at4430the Federal level. FEMA has its own controls, but then it goes4431to the States.4432    Like Mr. Guthrie's State, they have their own controls4433before it goes down to the local level, too. So it is a very4434highly overseen pot of money.4435    Dr. Onder. Thank you.4436    And, Ms. Laughter, as a county official, have you4437encountered concerns about FEMA's aid distribution being4438inconsistent, influenced by nondisaster factors, perhaps4439political factors?4440    Ms. Laughter. We have not seen that. We have seen4441frustration from our survivors of being able to access the4442funds that they should be able to access and difficulty in4443getting any answers.4444    The 800 number that a lot of our survivors were referred to4445for a long time could not be connected. So they really4446expressed a lot of the frustration around those components.4447    Dr. Onder. Got it. So in your testimony, you also stated4448that, ``When a widespread disaster occurs, there must be a4449system in place to support response and recovery because local4450governments do not have the capacity to maintain the ability to4451handle a response at that scale during nonresponse times.''4452    Based on your experience with Hurricane Helene, what role4453do you think the Federal Government should play versus the4454State governments and perhaps the local governments?4455    Ms. Laughter. I think they both need to play a role. And at4456the end of the day, at the local government level, we just need4457a system that works.4458    Dr. Onder. What do you think can be done to improve4459communication between FEMA employees and the State and local4460officials involved in disaster recovery?4461    Ms. Laughter. What we experienced was a lot of siloes where4462we could ask a single question to one worker, they did not even4463know themselves how to get an answer to a question that was4464outside of their training or outside of their silo. So4465communication is a huge component in training.4466    Dr. Onder. Thank you. I yield back.4467    Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentleman yields back, and I4468recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Figures, for 54469minutes for questions.4470    Mr. Figures. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Mr. Ranking Member,4471for hosting this hearing and for all of the witnesses being4472here.4473    I want to start by recognizing Alabama's Director of4474Emergency Management, Jeff Smitherman, who is in the audience4475with us and also thank you for your near 30 years of service to4476this Nation's military. So thank you and thank you for being4477here, and thank you for what you do in the State.4478    Our State was just hit by a round of thunderstorms, and4479your office kept us abreast of what was going on and kept us4480well-prepared. Fortunately--well, I guess both fortunately and4481unfortunately, the damage did not rise to a level of a4482Federal--or at least that is my understanding as of this4483morning, that it will not likely rise to the level of a Federal4484emergency, but yet some rural areas did take hits and there4485were some lives lost in that storm.4486    Ms. Laughter, I want to do something that I don't think you4487have probably gotten in this process. And that is, I believe it4488was Maya Angelou who once said that people don't remember4489everything about you, but they will certainly remember how you4490made them feel. Sounds like FEMA didn't make you and your4491community feel very good.4492    And so on behalf of all of us--I was not in Congress at the4493time--but on behalf of everybody on this committee and4494everybody that serves in Federal Government, I want to say that4495I am sorry, because our Government should be there for our4496people, and I know you guys experienced that in Florida as4497well. So I want to apologize on behalf of all of us and commit4498to doing better and using my position here to make sure that we4499are not making other communities feel the way that you felt.4500And I mean that.4501    As a kid that was born in hurricane alley, where names like4502Erin and Opal and Danny and Georges and Katrina and Ivan, they4503mean a little bit something different to me. Hell, I was4504literally born during a hurricane in September 1985, Hurricane4505Elena.4506    So I know a little bit about FEMA, I know a little bit4507about communities that need their recovery, need their help.4508But we need it to be efficient, and we need it to be quick, and4509we need it to be effective.4510    And so, I want to start--at least my first question is, it4511seems that this problem is bigger than just FEMA. You have4512mentioned 30 agencies being involved in this process. So how by4513fixing FEMA are we resolving the entire problem, or is there a4514broader scope of inquiry that we need to be addressing these4515efforts on?4516    We can just go down the row. Mr. Currie.4517    Mr. Currie. Yes. Unfortunately, FEMA is the face of4518response and recovery for the Federal Government. But when you4519look at the funding, it is spread all over the Federal4520Government. And each of those agencies has their own rules,4521programs, requirements, and timeframes.4522    And so when those all come together, it creates a very4523confusing system and process if you are a State or local4524emergency manager.4525    Mr. Figures. Mr. Guthrie.4526    Mr. Guthrie. Thank you, Congressman. I would say yes, we4527need a comprehensive review of the scope, mission, and4528structure of FEMA, but I would even say take that to the back4529row. We need a comprehensive review of the scope, mission, and4530structure of every agency that is a part of the Federal family4531that responds to disasters.4532    Because, again, FEMA is a coordinating element. They are4533not the command and control element. They are the coordinating4534element. But when you have--if you are a fishery or4535aquaculture, you have to go through, I believe it is the4536Department of Commerce; if you are in agriculture, you go4537through the U.S. Department of Agriculture; if you have4538something that is on an FHWA roadway, you are going through4539DOT. That is at the public level.4540    Imagine if you were an individual that is dependent on4541section 8 housing, you are going through HUD, if you are with4542DCF, you are going through maybe another HHS agency. We have4543got to figure out, again, comprehensive review of the scope,4544mission, and structure of the Federal family to streamline that4545into one single application, whether it is for public sector or4546Individual Assistance sector, we've got----4547    Mr. Figures [interrupting]. I don't want to cut you off. I4548want to get Ms. Laughter because I want to get one more4549question in for Mr. Garcia.4550    Ms. Laughter. I agree. I think it is more complicated than4551just FEMA. We have an example right now of private property4552debris removal. We have a farmer that has 300 bales of spoiled4553hay from a flood, and he cannot access the private property4554debris removal because he falls under USDA.4555    And he also cannot get direction from the same agency of4556how to access USDA in order to get relief. He just needs help.4557    Mr. Figures. Mr. Garcia.4558    Mr. Garcia. With so many agencies involved, it does cause4559confusion--or would cause confusion--at all levels for the4560local community, as well as the residents at heart. So4561comprehensive review absolutely is necessary.4562    Mr. Figures. All right. Now, Mr. Garcia, just for you. You4563mentioned in your opening testimony, you mentioned about4564underserved and disadvantaged communities. And that4565particularly resonates with me. I am in a very poor district.4566For the most part, individual median income is just around4567$30,000. So these are people that can't afford to rebuild on4568their own.4569    So my question for you is, in those communities that have4570been hit by storms, particularly hurricanes, tornadoes where we4571see those blue tarps go on those roofs, we go back too often,4572and those blue tarps are still there years later; in fact,4573sometimes decades later. How can we better streamline resources4574to getting to those communities?4575    Mr. Garcia. Thank you. And I will tell you that4576streamlining the process is absolutely critical. As I4577mentioned, both the legislation that is being proposed, the4578Disaster Survivors Fairness Act and the Disaster Assistance4579Simplification Act, all those things are going to help us4580remove the barriers that the communities could face. And so we4581need the support by FEMA. So staff shortages at FEMA do not4582help us move forward. All of this is important for us to4583address.4584    So simplification, plain language, universal portals, those4585things are absolutely helpful to get the resources where they4586are needed.4587    Mr. Figures. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank4588you for the overage.4589    Mr. Bresnahan. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.4590    Are there further questions from any members of the4591subcommittee who have not been recognized?4592    Seeing none, that concludes our hearing for today.4593    I would like to thank each of the witnesses for your4594testimony. The subcommittee stands adjourned.4595    [Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]45964597                                Appendix45984599                              ----------46004601  Questions to Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice,4602U.S. Government Accountability Office, from Hon. Kristen McDonald Rivet46034604    Question 1. My office received outreach from a number of4605constituents still affected by the historic 2020 Midland floods. The4606following questions are asked on behalf of members of my community.4607Thank you for your review and prompt response.4608    Question 1.a. Is there a process for FEMA to annually review4609Individual Assistance, Public Assistance, and Hazard Mitigation4610programs, by interviewing people who are impacted by the process to see4611what is working and what isn't?4612    Answer:4613Individual Assistance4614       In 2020, GAO found that the Federal Emergency Management Agency4615(FEMA) conducted three different telephone surveys to assess disaster4616survivors' experiences with its Individuals and Households Program and4617used these results to assess program performance.\1\ However, GAO found4618that the methodology FEMA used did not fully align with federal4619standards for statistical surveys, limiting FEMA's ability to use the4620results to determine how well their efforts are working. As a result,4621GAO recommended that FEMA correct and refine the methodology used to4622survey survivors. In December 2022, FEMA took steps to correct and4623refine its methodology used to survey survivors.4624---------------------------------------------------------------------------4625    \1\ These surveys are (1) an initial survey to measure the quality4626of disaster assistance information and services received by survivors4627during the initial application process; (2) a contact survey to measure4628the quality of disaster assistance information and services received by4629survivors while they checked the status of their case online or during4630interactions with FEMA staff; and (3) an assessment survey to measure4631the quality of disaster assistance information and services received by4632survivors after FEMA determines their eligibility for Individuals and4633Households Program assistance. GAO, Disaster Assistance: Additional4634Actions Needed to Strengthen FEMA's Individuals and Households Program,4635GAO-20-503 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2020).4636---------------------------------------------------------------------------4637Public Assistance4638       GAO is not aware of an annual review of the Public Assistance4639program or interviews with applicants for the purposes of identifying4640what is working well and what is not. However, in 2021, FEMA did4641conduct customer satisfaction surveys of Public Assistance applicants4642and grantees with the goal of program improvement. According to FEMA,4643the information collected from customers and stakeholders will help4644ensure that users have an effective, efficient, and satisfying4645experience with the Agency's programs. This feedback will provide4646insights into customer or stakeholder perceptions, experiences and4647expectations, provide an early warning of issues with service, or focus4648attention on areas where communication, training or changes in4649operations might improve delivery of products or service.46504651       Additionally, in 2023, FEMA issued a report that included4652stakeholder feedback from Public Assistance applicants. The survey4653results were used to further program improvement and develop4654recommendations to FEMA management on streamlining the program.4655Hazard Mitigation4656       In March 2020, FEMA issued a Summary of Stakeholder Feedback4657report summarizing stakeholder feedback on its hazard mitigation grant4658programs.\2\ According to the report, FEMA solicited input from4659stakeholders as part of its effort to develop the BRIC program and4660reported that stakeholders were overwhelmingly dissatisfied with4661benefit-cost analysis requirements and said that they were a barrier to4662completing grant applications. FEMA received over 5,000 comments and 754663letters and summarized the contents of these in the Summary of4664Stakeholder Feedback report.4665---------------------------------------------------------------------------4666    \2\ See, FEMA, Summary of Stakeholder Feedback: Building Resilient4667Infrastructure and Communities, (Washington D.C.: March 2020). See,4668GAO, Disaster Resilience: FEMA Should Take Additional Steps to4669Streamline Hazard Mitigation Grants and Assess Program Effects, GAO-21-4670140 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2, 2021).46714672       In February 2021, GAO reported on challenges state and local4673officials faced when applying for FEMA hazard mitigation grants. GAO4674found that FEMA had developed resources to help hazard mitigation4675applicants--guidance, Fact Sheets, project examples, studies, and4676technical publications.\3\ However, the resources could be difficult to4677locate on FEMA's website and there was no centralized inventory of4678resources to help applicants locate the information. As a result, GAO4679recommended that FEMA create a centralized inventory of hazard4680mitigation resources on its website. FEMA concurred and has since taken4681steps to do so. In June 2022, FEMA finished re-designing portions of4682their website to centralize guidance and other resources on their4683hazard mitigation programs. The reorganization makes these resources4684easier to find and better positions FEMA to help state and local4685applicants successfully apply for grants for mitigation projects that4686enhance disaster resilience. As a result, this recommendation is closed4687as implemented.4688---------------------------------------------------------------------------4689    \3\ GAO, Disaster Resilience: FEMA Should Take Additional Steps to4690Streamline Hazard Mitigation Grants and Assess Program Effects, GAO-21-4691140 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2, 2021).46924693    In February 2025, GAO added Improving the Delivery of Federal4694Disaster Assistance to its High-Risk List.\4\ In the new segment GAO4695emphasized the need for FEMA to take steps to better manage4696fragmentation across its own programs, as GAO has recommended. Such4697actions could make the programs simpler, more accessible and user-4698friendly, and improve the effectiveness of federal disaster recovery4699efforts. Reforming the federal government's approach to disaster4700recovery and reducing fragmentation could improve service delivery to4701disaster survivors and communities and improve the effectiveness of4702recovery efforts.\5\ As of February 2024, FEMA had taken steps to4703streamline the applications for two of its recovery programs. However,4704FEMA will need to demonstrate that it has thoroughly considered4705available options to reduce fragmentation across its own programs,4706identified those FEMA intends to implement, and then taken steps to4707fully implement this recommendation.4708---------------------------------------------------------------------------4709    \4\ GAO, High-Risk Series: Heightened Attention Could Save Billions4710More and Improve Government Efficiency and Effectiveness, GAO-25-1077434711(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2025).4712    \5\ GAO, Disaster Recovery: Actions Needed to Improve the Federal4713Approach, GAO-23-104956 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2022).4714---------------------------------------------------------------------------4715    In addition, GAO has found that as the incidence and severity of4716massive wildfires increases, FEMA and other agencies could find4717additional opportunities to ensure their programs are effective.\6\ For4718example, GAO recommended in December 2024 that FEMA assess ways to4719provide immediate post-wildfire mitigation assistance and establish a4720process to collect, assess, and incorporate ongoing feedback from4721state, local, and tribal Fire Management Assistance Grants recipients.4722Taking these steps would help foster more resilient communities and4723reduce the future demand on federal resources.4724---------------------------------------------------------------------------4725    \6\ GAO, Wildfires: Additional Actions Needed to Address FEMA4726Assistance Challenges, GAO-25-106862 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2024).47274728    Question 1.b. Has FEMA measured the number of disconnects between4729the initial approved project amount and the actual costs at closeout of4730said projects?4731    Answer. GAO has not assessed whether FEMA has systematically4732measured the initial costs of Public Assistance projects against their4733actual costs at closeout. However, it is common that initial project4734costs would increase as the project is completed and eventually closed4735out. For example, GAO reported in 2024 that in Puerto Rico, Public4736Assistance awardees have faced challenges related to disaster recovery4737projects due to the increased costs.\7\ For example, GAO reported that4738subrecipients that have received Public Assistance awards under the4739Accelerated Award Strategy identified increased project costs that pose4740challenges to the full recovery of their facilities. According to4741officials from the four Accelerated Award Strategy subrecipient4742entities, inflation and labor shortages have increased the costs of4743projects beyond their anticipated estimated costs.4744---------------------------------------------------------------------------4745    \7\ GAO, Puerto Rico Disasters: Progress Made, but the Recovery4746Continues to Face Challenges, GAO-24-105557 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13,47472024).47484749    Question 1.c. Has FEMA considered having a FEMA employee who walks4750through the whole recovery journey with the municipality rebuilding?4751What resources would be necessary?4752    Answer. GAO is not aware of any FEMA effort to assign an employee4753to each municipality to walk through the recovery process. However, GAO4754has found that FEMA staffing turnover throughout the lifecycle of4755public assistance projects is a long-standing challenge cited by state4756and local officials. For example, in March 2019 GAO reported that FEMA4757and Puerto Rico municipality officials cited concerns about FEMA staff4758turnover and lack of knowledge about how the Public Assistance4759alternative procedures are to be applied.\8\ FEMA officials4760acknowledged that more personnel with expertise in the alternative4761procedures process were needed to administer Public Assistance and4762assist subrecipients.4763---------------------------------------------------------------------------4764    \8\ GAO, Puerto Rico Hurricanes: Status of FEMA Funding, Oversight,4765and Recovery Challenges, GAO-19-256 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2019).4766---------------------------------------------------------------------------4767    FEMA officials stated that they faced additional responsibilities4768due to COVID-19, while also managing the traditional seasonal peaks of4769disaster activity during the year, which created burnout for many4770employees and increased employee attrition.\9\ Such attrition and an4771increasing workload make it difficult for FEMA to provide individual4772technical support to all grantees as needed. FEMA's workforce4773challenges are a key area identified in GAO's recent high-risk report.4774In recent years, the increasing frequency and costs of disasters, the4775COVID-19 pandemic, and other responsibilities have placed additional4776pressures on FEMA. FEMA's management of its workforce challenges and4777staffing levels has limited its capacity to provide effective disaster4778assistance.4779---------------------------------------------------------------------------4780    \9\ GAO, FEMA Disaster Workforce: Actions Needed to Improve Hiring4781Data and Address Staffing Gaps, GAO-23-105663 (Washington, D.C.: May 2,47822023).4783---------------------------------------------------------------------------4784    For example, GAO found in May 2023 that FEMA had an overall4785staffing gap of approximately 35 percent across different positions at4786the beginning of fiscal year 2022. The gaps varied, but Public4787Assistance, Hazard Mitigation, and Logistics generally had lower4788percentages of staffing targets filled--between 44 and 60 percent at4789the beginning of fiscal year 2022. These positions serve important4790functions, including administering assistance to state and local4791governments, creating safer communities by managing risk reduction4792activities, and coordinating all aspects of resource planning and4793movement during a disaster.4794    GAO also found that FEMA has fallen short of its yearly staffing4795target between 2019 and 2022, and that gap continues to grow. For4796example, FEMA only had nine percent of its disaster-response workforce4797available for Hurricane Milton response, according to its daily4798operations brief. Many responders have declined deployments in recent4799disasters because of burnout or severe conditions in the field. GAO has4800made numerous recommendations to help FEMA better manage catastrophic4801or concurrent disasters.48024803    Question 1.d. Instead of each municipality learning to navigate the4804FEMA assistance process independently, has FEMA considered assigning a4805staffer to that municipality as their recovery expert?4806    Answer. GAO is not aware of any FEMA effort to assign an employee4807to each municipality to walk through the recovery process. However,4808FEMA does have methods for coordinating with municipalities following a4809disaster. Two of these methods include FEMA's Integration Teams and4810FEMA's Public Assistance Program Delivery Managers:4811    FEMA Integration Teams. Officials in all 10 FEMA regions that GAO4812interviewed in 2024 stated that they provide resources and support to4813states through FEMA Integration Teams, which are FEMA staff embedded4814within state emergency management offices.\10\ Officials from six FEMA4815regions said that Integration Team members serve as liaisons between4816FEMA and the states in various aspects of responding to disasters. For4817example, officials from these six FEMA regions said that Integration4818Team members provide situational awareness during a disaster response.4819Officials in one region said they have an Integration Team member who4820serves as an Individual Assistance subject matter expert during4821Preliminary Damage Assessments. GAO has not comprehensively assessed4822this program to further determine how these teams may assist4823municipalities.4824---------------------------------------------------------------------------4825    \10\ The FEMA Integration Teams were established in July 2017 with4826the goal of embedding FEMA staff with state and territorial partners,4827and to work alongside tribal partners. FEMA Integration Teams provide4828technical assistance and coordination to state, tribal, and territorial4829emergency management agencies in areas such as planning, logistics,4830recovery, and grants management.4831---------------------------------------------------------------------------4832    Public Assistance Program Delivery Managers. In addition, FEMA4833provides Program Delivery Managers following a disaster declaration. In48342017, GAO reported that FEMA redesigned the delivery of the Public4835Assistance program to address past workforce management challenges,4836such as shortages in experienced and trained Public Assistance staff4837and high turnover among these staff.\11\ As part of the redesigned4838program, FEMA created, among other things, Program Delivery Managers to4839ensure more consistent guidance to Public Assistance applicants.4840However, in February 2025, GAO reported that FEMA continues to have4841long-standing workforce management issues that makes supporting4842response and recovery efforts difficult.\12\ GAO has started work4843examining FEMA's staffing gaps.4844---------------------------------------------------------------------------4845    \11\ GAO, Disaster Assistance: Opportunities to Enhance4846Implementation of the Redesigned Public Assistance Program Grant4847Program, GAO-18-30 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 8, 2017).4848    \12\ GAO-25-10774348494850    Question 1.e. How does FEMA measure if the disaster assistance4851process is working? Does FEMA measure the amount of time from the time4852of the incident to full recovery?4853    Answer. FEMA tracks the amount of time from the initial disaster to4854full recovery but does not set any targets or metrics for how long this4855process should take. Disaster recovery can take years to complete4856depending on the severity of the disasters and many other factors, such4857as state and local resources and capacity to manage the recovery. For4858example, according to FEMA, the agency is managing over 600 open major4859disaster declarations--some of which occurred almost 20 years ago--in4860various stages of response and recovery.\13\ For instance, as of4861February 2025, FEMA continues to make obligations for recovery projects4862as part of Public Assistance for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005.4863---------------------------------------------------------------------------4864    \13\ GAO-25-1077434865---------------------------------------------------------------------------4866    GAO previously recommended in February 2021, that FEMA use data on4867the timeliness and performance of the Public Assistance application4868process.\14\ GAO made this recommendation to help identify4869inefficiencies and root causes of delays in the Public Assistance4870process and provide FEMA and its local partners with the information4871needed to address them. To address this recommendation, in March 2021,4872FEMA's Recovery Analytics and Public Assistance Divisions published a4873live dashboard tool with timeliness metrics on FEMA's internet,4874accessible to FEMA staff, that captures metrics at the FEMA and4875applicant level and provides data under five performance goals. As a4876result, this recommendation was closed as implemented.4877---------------------------------------------------------------------------4878    \14\ GAO, 2018 Pacific Island Disasters: Federal Actions Helped4879Facilitate the Response, but FEMA Needs to Address Long-Term Recovery4880Challenges, GAO-21-91 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2021).4881---------------------------------------------------------------------------4882    FEMA also has a performance measure on timeliness of4883assistance.\15\ Specifically, FEMA measures the average timeliness of4884Individuals and Households Program awards in days. This measure4885assesses how quickly the program provides the first financial4886assistance received by qualified individuals and households through the4887Individuals and Households Program. By evaluating how quickly disaster4888survivors receive financial assistance, the program can assess the4889effectiveness of a critical, customer-facing element of the agency's4890mission.4891---------------------------------------------------------------------------4892    \15\ Department of Homeland Security, Annual Performance Report4893Fiscal Year 2024.48944895    Question 1.f. Does FEMA measure and/or track the amount of time it4896takes the municipality to receive its money at the time of closeout?4897    Answer. As noted above, FEMA does track the amount of time from the4898initial disaster to full recovery but does not set any targets or4899metrics for how long this process should take. Project closeout is4900dependent on a on a number of factors including the severity and4901complexity of the disaster and amount of time it takes for the state or4902municipality to provide all necessary projects documentation and4903justifications.4904    According to FEMA's Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide,4905project closeout requires timely and complete project-level information4906from the Recipient as work is completed.\16\ To initiate project-level4907closeout, the Subrecipient must inform the Recipient that its project4908is complete and the date the work was completed. To ensure a timely4909closeout process, the Subrecipient should notify the Recipient4910immediate as it completes each Large Project and when its completed its4911last Small Project.4912---------------------------------------------------------------------------4913    \16\ FEMA, Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide, Version 4 FP4914104-009-2 (June 1, 2020).4915---------------------------------------------------------------------------4916    Further, the Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide states that4917they have a process for obligating Public Assistance funding based on4918the Applicant's schedule to execute the work. If a project is greater4919than one million and the applicant does not need funds for more than4920180 days from the time the Project is ready for obligation, FEMA4921obligates funds based on the project completion schedule. In addition,4922according to FEMA's Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide, FEMA4923only provides Public Assistance funding for work completed and costs4924incurred within regulatory guidelines.49254926    Question 1.g. Does FEMA measure the number of issues suffered by4927the municipality during the process, such as finding that key items4928were left off the disaster-recovery punch list and the assistance ($)4929estimated vs. the result of the bids?4930    Answer. FEMA has a performance measure that assesses the percent of4931applicants satisfied with the Public Assistance process and customer4932service. According to FEMA documentation, FEMA conducts a Public4933Assistance Assessment survey that collects satisfaction information4934from applicants after they received an award.4935    In addition, in May 2021, GAO reported on Puerto Rico's disaster4936recovery efforts, including its use of Public Assistance awards and4937difficulties it has faced implementing recovery projects.\17\ For4938example, GAO reported that FEMA made progress in approving Public4939Assistance projects, but that FEMA had not comprehensively identified4940or assessed the risk that could affect the success of the remainder of4941Puerto Rico's recovery, such as Puerto Rico's ability to start4942construction on recovery projects. GAO recommended that FEMA, in4943coordination with Puerto Rico and relevant federal agencies, identify4944and assess the risks to Puerto Rico's recovery, including Puerto Rico's4945capacity to carry out projects, and identify potential actions to4946manage the risks. In 2024, FEMA finalized a risk management plan that4947documented its framework to manage and monitor risks to the remainder4948of Puerto Rico's recovery. Further, FEMA provided a memorandum4949documenting the FEMA executive leadership's approval to implement this4950plan. FEMA also provided additional documentation on its efforts to4951engage and coordinate with the Government of Puerto Rico on efforts to4952continuously manage and monitor risks to the recovery. As a result,4953these recommendations were closed as implemented.4954---------------------------------------------------------------------------4955    \17\ GAO, Puerto Rico Recovery: FEMA Made Progress in Approving4956Projects, But Should Identify and Assess Risks to the Recovery, GAO-21-4957264 (Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2021).4958---------------------------------------------------------------------------4959    Additionally, GAO has reported that the federal approach to4960disaster recovery is fragmented across more than 30 federal4961entities.\18\ These entities are involved with multiple programs and4962authorities and have differing requirements and timeframes. This4963fragmented approach can make it harder for survivors and communities to4964successfully navigate multiple federal programs. Congress and federal4965agencies have taken steps to better manage fragmentation, such as4966through interagency agreements and reducing program complexity, but4967challenges remain. In November 2022, GAO identified 11 options to4968improve the federal government's approach to disaster recovery based on4969our review of relevant literature, interviews with federal, state, and4970local officials; and a panel of experts.\19\4971---------------------------------------------------------------------------4972    \18\ GAO, Disaster Recovery: Actions Needed to Improve the Federal4973Approach, GAO-23-104956 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2022).4974    \19\ The panel included 20 experts with diverse backgrounds related4975to disaster recovery. They participated in discussions of each option4976and identified their strengths and limitations as they relate to4977improving the federal government's approach to disaster recovery. GAO4978attributed statements from experts collected as part of the panel4979discussions to the ``panel of experts'' or ``experts.'' This includes4980statements made by individual experts. See, GAO, Disaster Recovery:4981Actions Needed to Improve the Federal Approach, GAO-23-1049564982(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2022).4983---------------------------------------------------------------------------