J.Hrg.119

1[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 119 Congress]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34                    THE PRC'S THREATS TO AMERICANS:5                        TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION6                       AND STATE-LEVEL RESPONSES78=======================================================================910                                HEARING1112                               before the1314                         CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE15                           COMMISSION ON CHINA1617                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS1819                             SECOND SESSION2021                               __________2223                              JUNE 4, 20262425                               __________2627 Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China2829                 [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]3031              Available at www.cecc.gov or www.govinfo.gov3233                               ______3435                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE363764-049 PDF                WASHINGTON : 20263839              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA4041                    LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS4243Senate                               House4445DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska, Chair          CHRIS SMITH, New Jersey, Co-chair46TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa47JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                 ELISE STEFANIK, New York48TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois            DALE STRONG, Alabama49ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 JEN KIGGANS, Virginia50LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware       JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts51                                     THOMAS SUOZZI, New York52                                     SUHAS SUBRAMANYAM, Virginia53                                     JAMES WALKINSHAW, Virginia5455                     EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS5657                           Not yet appointed5859                      Scott Flipse, Staff Director6061                   Mary Vigil, Deputy Staff Director6263                                  (ii)6465                            C O N T E N T S6667                              ----------6869                               Statements7071Opening Statement of Hon. Chris Smith, a Representative from New72  Jersey; Chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on China.....     173Statement of James P. McGovern, a Representative from74  Massachusetts..................................................     375Statement of Suhas Subramanyam, a Representative from Virginia...     676Statement of Stephen J. Cox, Counsel to the Governor, State of77  Alaska.........................................................     878Statement of Eliot Bostar, Nebraska State Senator................    1079Statement of Arthur Liu, owner, Inter-Pacific Law Group..........    1280Statement of Anna Kwok, Board Director and former Executive81  Director, Hong Kong Democracy Council..........................    158283                                APPENDIX84                          Prepared Statements8586Cox, Stephen J...................................................    2987Bostar, Eliot....................................................    3188Liu, Arthur......................................................    3489Kwok, Anna.......................................................    359091Smith, Hon. Chris................................................    3692Sullivan, Hon. Dan...............................................    3793McGovern, Hon. James P...........................................    389495                       Submissions for the Record9697Submission of Levi Browde and James Yu, Falun Dafa Information98  Center.........................................................    4199Submission of Dr. Henryk Szadziewski, Director of Research,100  Uyghur Human Rights Project....................................    53101102CECC Truth in Testimony Disclosure Form..........................    57103Witness Biographies..............................................    59104105                                 (iii)106107                    THE PRC'S THREATS TO AMERICANS:108                        TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION109                       AND STATE-LEVEL RESPONSES110111                              ----------112113                         THURSDAY, JUNE 4, 2026114115                            Congressional-Executive116                                       Commission on China,117                                                    Washington, DC.118    The hearing was held from 1:34 p.m. to 3:07 p.m., in Room119106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC,120Representative Chris Smith, Co-chair, Congressional-Executive121Commission on China, presiding.122    Also present: Representatives McGovern and Subramanyam.123124  OPENING STATEMENT OF CHRIS SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW125              JERSEY AND CO-CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-126                 EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA127128    Co-chair Smith. The Commission will come to order. And129thank you all for being here, and my good friend and colleague,130Jim McGovern, at this hearing of the CECC. I want to thank all131of you in advance. Before we begin I want to mark a solemn132anniversary. Today marks the 37th anniversary of the Tiananmen133Square massacre. Thirty-seven years ago millions of Chinese134citizens peacefully asked for political reform, democratic135openness, and basic human dignity. Their hope was met with136tanks. The Chinese Communist Party unleashed the People's137Liberation Army on peaceful demonstrators.138    Mothers lost sons, fathers lost daughters, and China lost139an idealistic generation to the violence of June 4th, 1989.140There has been no full accounting of those killed, imprisoned,141or disappeared. The Party still tries to erase a massacre the142world must never forget. But Tiananmen cannot be erased. The143enduring image of that day is the Tank Man, the solitary figure144standing before a column of tanks. His courage reminds us that145the desire for freedom is not Western, not foreign, and it's146not imposed from the outside. It is universal.147    As I have said before, a choice has been made by all of us.148You either stand with the Tank Man or you stand with the tank.149There is no middle ground. Tiananmen is not a detour for this150hearing. It is the key to understanding it. The same party that151tried to crush truth at home now tries to chase truth abroad.152The tactics have not changed. The technology has changed, the153reach has expanded, but the purpose is the same--to make people154afraid to speak the truth, by almost any means necessary.155Inside China, the CCP uses surveillance, censorship, prison,156the pervasive use of torture, forced disappearance, and fear to157maintain their grip on power.158    But what happens in China no longer stays in China. The159Party wants to control what is said about China here, and to160control who says it. The CECC has warned about the CCP's long161arm for years. Long before transnational repression became a162common phrase, I held a dozen hearings or so of this Commission163and in my Subcommittee on Human Rights, documenting and164exposing a consistent pattern of global abuse, starting with165Confucius Institutes back in 2014. Over time, tactics have166become more digital and more ruthless--detaining family members167in China, doxing, the use of spyware, deepfakes, Hong Kong168bounties, and the illegal169police stations right here in the United States.170    It is outrageous and unacceptable, and it absolutely must171stop. Transnational repression is not only a threat to172Americans, it's a broader, interconnected CCP strategy. We see173that strategy in scam networks stealing from U.S. citizens,174fentanyl poisoning of our cities and our young people, PRC-175linked land purchases near military installations, efforts to176corrupt politicians and elections, steal private personnel and177biometric data, and intellectual property theft from businesses178and universities.179    I would note parenthetically, when I held a hearing on how180Google, Microsoft, and Cisco were enabling the Chinese arm of181repression in China by censoring what people could see when182they did a Google search, my personal computer, my committee's183computers, were all hit. Everything was taken. And it was all184traced to Beijing. That was in 2005. They have gotten far more185effective at doing that kind of repression. Everything was186gone. And, you know, including personally identifiable187information on me, and I'm not the only one. Many other people188had the same thing happen.189    We see that strategy replicated in other countries as well.190It's not just the United States. It's Canada and elsewhere.191These may all look like separate problems, but they share a192common purpose--193exploit our openness, gather leverage, weaken our institutions,194spread propaganda, and make Americans pay a price for standing195up to Beijing. But I have news for them. We're not backing196down. The members of this Commission, the people who are here197today, our very distinguished witnesses, we will never bow down198to this tyranny. Transnational repression is the most personal199form of that strategy. It brings pressure campaigns to the200doorstep of students, the journalists, dissidents, artists, and201family members.202    That is why state and local responses matter. A victim may203first call the police. A student may go to a university204official. A state attorney general may see the pattern. A state205legislator may realize the existing law does not fit the206threat. So the questions are practical. Do local officials and207officers recognize this threat? Do universities know how to208protect their students? Do states have the tools they need? And209does the Federal Government have a real strategy? And are we210deploying enough of our capacity and capability to mitigate211this threat?212    That's why I'm so proud to work with Chairman Sullivan,213Senator Merkley, and Jim McGovern on the Transnational214Repression Policy Act. This bipartisan, bicameral legislation215would define the abuse, improve coordination, train officials,216support targeted communities, and hold perpetrators217accountable--because victims need more than just sympathy; they218need protection and a place to turn, where those to whom they219turn are well informed and equipped with tools to stop it.220    But let me make one point clear. A regime that fears a221student's question, a refugee's protest, an artist's statue, or222the simple memory of the Tiananmen Square massacre is not223strong. It's not a confident superpower. I remember when we did224that hearing--we brought in the Google people. We had them225testify, as well as Cisco, Microsoft, and Yahoo. And I put up226on the board what you get in China when you put in the227Tiananmen Square massacre. You get nothing but pretty pictures228of people smiling and taking snapshots and videos there on the229square. Nothing about the massacre or the protests. They live230in a culture of denial, and that denial has to be eradicated.231    I would say that any so-called superpower that does that232lives in fear, and they are very afraid. It makes them perhaps233even more dangerous. But they are not operating out of a234position of confidence or power. Fear in the hands of a235dictatorship, like I said, is dangerous. It becomes coercion.236It becomes censorship. It becomes repression. It crosses237borders and reaches right into our own communities. So our238answer must be unmistakable. If the CCP threatens people here,239there must be investigations and prosecutions. If it reaches240across our borders to spread fear, there must be sanctions. If241it takes family members hostage to silence a critic, which they242do all the time, we will demand their release and expose the243cruelty of that tactic. And if it tries to censor a free244people, we will defend and spread the rights that Beijing fears245most--freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of246assembly, and the right to tell the truth without fear. Because247in the United States of America, unlike China, no one needs the248Party's permission to speak, to worship, to protest, to249remember, or to be free. And that's why this hearing matters.250And that's why having four very distinguished people testifying251will help us get that message across. Thank you so much.252    [The prepared statement of Co-chair Smith appears in the253Appendix.]254    Jim.255256                STATEMENT OF JAMES P. McGOVERN,257              A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MASSACHUSETTS258259    Representative McGovern. Thank you very much. I want to260thank my colleague from New Jersey, Congressman Smith, for his261words and for his commitment to human rights, not only in China262but all around the world. Good morning, everybody. I want to263welcome our witnesses and our guests to today's hearing on264transnational repression.265    Today is June 4th, and as Co-chair Smith pointed out, 37266years ago the Chinese government directed the military to267attack civilians who were exercising their right to freedom of268expression to call for economic and political reform. Let us269never forget those who bravely stood for freedom in Tiananmen270Square and other cities, the mothers who never knew the fate of271their children, and those who continue to tell the stories in272the face of a government that seeks to silence them. And let us273not forget that any society whose leaders are willing to use274lethal force against peaceful protesters is a society at risk275of losing its fundamental liberties.276    I am glad that the Commission continues to address277transnational repression. In 2020, Co-chair Marco Rubio and I278created a new chapter called ``Human Rights Violations in the279U.S. and Globally'' in the annual report. And CECC staff have280just released a new special report on transnational repression.281I always appreciate the dedication of the nonpartisan subject282matter experts who work for this Commission. This report is283absolutely worth reading.284    China is the world's worst perpetrator of transnational285repression. Freedom House lists the PRC with the most286incidents, 319 since 2014. And that only accounts for reported287incidents. Who knows how many people have gotten threatening288texts or calls that they are too scared to report. But289transnational repression is more than China. Freedom House290lists Tajikistan, Rwanda, Russia, Egypt, and Belarus among the291biggest violators. Last year I chaired a Tom Lantos Human292Rights Commission hearing highlighting TNR by India, Pakistan,293and Hong Kong. Yesterday afternoon Co-chair Smith and I294convened a hearing on Turkiye, listed with 160 TNR incidents.295    You know, hearings are fine, but it really is time for296action. Advocates tell us that their number one goal is to297create a standard definition of transnational repression. I am298proud to join with CECC leaders Senators Merkley and Sullivan,299and Co-chair Smith, in sponsoring the Transnational Repression300Policy Act. It defines TNR in statute, strengthening efforts to301counter it at the federal, state, and local level. This bill302was first introduced in the House three years ago, but it has303gone nowhere. In March, Freedom House led a coalition of 35304organizations, including Uyghur, Tibetan, Chinese, and Hong305Kong human rights groups, in a statement to the chairs of the306House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign307Relations Committee, asking them to mark up the bill. Foreign308Affairs has scheduled four markups since that letter, but the309Transnational Repression Policy Act never makes the agenda. I310ask Chairman Mast in the House to schedule it, to act.311    Our bill is important. It would give the U.S. the tools to312lead on TNR. Equally important, we must acknowledge that the313tools will only be effective if we avoid double standards. I314worry that we're falling short. One, President Biden started,315and President Trump completed, the rehabilitation of Saudi316Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who directed the murder of317Jamal Khashoggi in Turkiye. We lose credibility when the U.S.318Government allows impunity for transnational repression.319    Two, this Commission characterized the deportation by320Thailand of 40 Uyghurs to China as transnational repression,321yet the Trump administration has deported individuals who have322been transnationally repressed in the U.S. by Iran and by323Russia, back to those countries. We lose credibility to ask324other countries to protect TNR victims when the U.S. Government325refuses to protect TNR victims.326    Three, to the extent we label political interference by327China and the U.S. as transnational repression, then we must328consider Senator Bernie Moreno's meddling in the Colombian329election as transnational repression. We lose credibility when330U.S. officials act like CCP officials.331    Four, last year the Trump administration sanctioned a332Brazilian judge who brought insurrectionists to justice,333falsely portraying legitimate accountability as transnational334repression. We lose credibility when U.S. officials pervert TNR335to help political allies.336    In September, our credibility will be again tested. Xi337Jinping will visit Washington at President Trump's invitation.338The last time he was in the U.S., thugs associated with the339Chinese consulate in San Francisco beat up anti-Xi protesters.340    We must be prepared to defend the right of protest here.341The question is, will we? And I mean, this administration has342deployed security forces to suppress Americans' right to343protest. They're doing it right now outside of Delaney Hall ICE344facility in Newark, New Jersey. If Xi Jinping asked President345Trump to contain or control Chinese, Uyghur, and Tibetan346protesters, will he do that? Or will he be wind at the backs of347those engaged in legitimate dissent? You know, this348administration has deported people for exercising their free349speech rights under the First Amendment and the ICCPR to350criticize the Israeli government. If Xi Jinping, you know,351asked President Trump to deport people, for whatever reason,352back to China, we must make it clear that that is unacceptable,353and we will not do that, and we will not stand for that.354    Transnational repression is a human rights violation. All355human beings are entitled to the same rights, no matter where356they live or how they feel about their government. And I thank357the witnesses for being here today. I welcome the insight. I358want to apologize in advance that I think--I don't know if359we'll get to my questions, but we just got word that--I'm on360the Rules Committee--at 2:30 we're taking up the rule. So,361anyway--frustrating--but I want to be here for your testimony.362Thank you. I yield back.363    [The prepared statement of Representative McGovern appears364in the Appendix.]365    Co-chair Smith. Thank you. I want to thank our Ranking366Member. And you know, we do have some disagreements on some367issues; you know, Delaney Hall is in my state, and I have been368closely monitoring everything going on there. There are people369who are credibly accused of rape, child sex trafficking--and I370wrote five laws on human trafficking, including the Trafficking371Victims Protection Act--who are in that facility. And the372federal law enforcement, ICE, Immigration and Customs373Enforcement, police have been bitten. They've been kicked,374punched. The level of restraint that they have shown is375incredible. Our governor brought in the state police, and now376the Newark police are there as well. So, you know, there are a377lot of people in that facility. They were claiming that the378food wasn't good. It is good. I just can't believe--you know,379just because somebody said, Oh, this water stinks, doesn't make380it stink. We've got to be very careful. So this isn't the381place, I guess, to debate that.382    We are here, united and standing with our friends, both383here as part of the diaspora, as well as people inside of China384who are suffering the cruelty of Xi Jinping each and every day.385I'm barred from going to China. I have tried to go. I've been386put on the list. Global Times named me as an enemy--they also387named Marco Rubio as an enemy, and Jim, you know, so we need to388push back as never before against the monstrous dictatorship of389Xi Jinping. And, again, you, the four witnesses, help bring a390great deal of light and scrutiny as to what to do next391concerning this important issue.392    Congressman Subramanyam, do you want to say something?393394                STATEMENT OF SUHAS SUBRAMANYAM,395                 A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA396397    Representative Subramanyam. Thank you so much to my398colleagues on the Commission for all your leadership. I want to399sort of home in on one particular issue when it comes to the400People's Republic of China, and that's the treatment of the401Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities. This is a campaign402conducted using digital threats, coercion, and essentially403taking families hostage to enforce silence here in the United404States, and co-opting countries to detain exiles. I've heard405stories firsthand from the Uyghur population in my district. I406hosted a town hall with members of the Uyghur community last407year, and the top concern they brought up was transnational408repression.409    Here's some of what I heard. You know, one quote from410someone who wanted to remain anonymous was, ``Our families do411not face abstract threats, but we are enduring active,412multilayered, state-sponsored transnational repression by the413Chinese Communist Party right now.'' One Virginian, who many414here may know, Rushan Abbas, spoke publicly about the mass415internment camp system back in 2018, and within a week, her416sister Gulshan was abducted by the Chinese government. She was417subjected to a secret trial and then sentenced to 20 years in418prison without any due process. On June 12th, she will be419turning 64, and this is her eighth birthday in a row spent in420jail.421    Another constituent of mine shared how the Chinese422government has also blocked communication between Uyghurs423abroad and their relatives in China, and used families as424leverage to prevent Uyghurs from speaking out. He said, ``My425family and I have not been able to speak with our loved ones426back home for 10 years. We still do not know what happened to427them. We've been trying to get information through multiple428channels, but we have not been able to communicate. My wife,429who is a U.S. citizen, only learned about her aunt's death in430China nearly a year after it happened. And my daughter even431asked if we have any relatives at all, because she can't speak432to them.''433    It makes people crazy. It makes people sad. It's a terrible434situation. And I could keep going. We have story after story of435transnational repression, the silencing of American citizens436because of what's going on in the Uyghur communities in China.437And we will continue to speak out about this. We will not be438silent. And we will certainly give those folks a voice. So439thank you, and I yield back.440    Co-chair Smith. Before we go to our witnesses, I did want441to announce--you probably all already know this--that the442Congressional-Executive Commission on China today released a443new report on the PRC's transnational repression and malign444influence. The report documents in highly disturbing detail how445the Chinese Communist Party continues to extend its long arm446beyond the Chinese borders. The report is available today. I do447hope people will read it, use it, hopefully effectively. I want448to especially thank Deanna Pelsang, Andrew Hartnett, and Rita449Cheng, as well as our Chief of Staff Scott Flipse, for this450important report.451    Now I'll go to our witnesses, beginning first with Stephen452Cox, counsel to the Governor of Alaska. Mr. Cox has served as453U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Texas and in senior454roles at the Department of Justice. In Alaska, his work is455focused on public safety, consumer protection, and PRC-related456risks, including illegal imports, counterfeit products, and457technology threats. We are grateful for his perspective on how458state law enforcement officials can better respond to the459threats from foreign adversaries.460    Let me say, Mr. Cox, you have a great Senator from Alaska.461We do thank him for his leadership. We have worked together on462many Chinese bills, including the FISH Act, which, amazingly,463he got through the Senate. There have been several hearings,464and he chaired the last one several months ago, on how the465Chinese government has taken over fish. Half of all the466calamari in the world is coming from forced labor with Chinese467boats. I mean, it's a despicable thing. He has gotten passed a468comprehensive human rights and real pro-trade bill called the469FISH Act, and now we're looking to get it out on the House470floor, his bill, ASAP. So I want to thank the Senator for that.471    We'll then hear from Nebraska State Senator Eliot Bostar.472Senator Bostar has introduced many bills in Nebraska to protect473his state from foreign adversary threats, positioning Nebraska474as a national leader in state-level security policy. One such475bill, LB 644, was passed in June 2025. That legislation476included the Crush Transnational Repression in Nebraska Act,477another bipartisan provision to protect Nebraskans from malign478influence from foreign countries. The federal government has a479vital role to play, but states are on the front line as well,480of this China challenge. And we look forward to hearing from481him the lessons that Nebraska may offer to all of our states on482how to combat this.483    Our third witness is Arthur Liu, an attorney from the San484Francisco Bay area and a longtime advocate for democracy and485human rights in China. Mr. Liu was a student activist during486the 1989 pro-democracy movement. He came to the United States487as a political refugee after the June 4th massacre. He has488continued his advocacy here, including outside PRC diplomatic489facilities. His story shows the reach of transnational490repression. Mr. Liu and his amazing daughter, Olympic gold491medalist Alysa Liu, were targeted by PRC spying back in 2022 at492the Winter Olympics. No family in America should live under493intimidation from a foreign dictatorship. On the anniversary of494Tiananmen Square, and in great recognition for the495achievement--I mean, my wife and I watched her performances--496they were amazing. And she got the gold medal, so that's497fantastic.498    Our final witness is Anna Kwok, a Hong Kong organizer and499policy analyst based here in Washington. Anna serves as a board500chair of the Hong Kong Democracy Council, where she supports501Hong Kong's pro-democracy movement in the United States. She502has testified before this Commission before, has provided vital503testimony about human rights conditions in Hong Kong. And, of504course, we got passed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy505Act, written by this guy over here, [Scott Flipse] our chief of506staff. It is law. And Anna has been just amazing in what she507has done there.508    After Beijing imposed the so-called national security law509on Hong Kong, Anna continued her advocacy publicly, despite510serious risk. Hong Kong authorities later issued an arrest511warrant and a bounty against her. Her father was imprisoned as512retaliation for her work. The Chinese Communist Party wants513brave men and women like Anna to believe there is no safe place514to speak the truth, not even in the United States. She is the515polar opposite of that, because she speaks the truth and does516so with great grace and courage.517    We thank all of our witnesses. I now yield to Mr. Cox.518519                  STATEMENT OF STEPHEN J. COX,520            COUNSEL TO THE GOVERNOR, STATE OF ALASKA521522    Mr. Cox. Co-chair Smith and members of the Commission, I523want to thank you for inviting me to testify today. Thanks in524particular to Senator Sullivan for inviting me. I know he525couldn't make it today, but I want to thank the Commission for526all the work that you have been doing over the last 25 years. I527appreciate the opportunity to contribute to your good work,528especially today on June 4th, the 37th anniversary of Tiananmen529Square. As for me, I stand with the Tank Man.530    My own interest in the broader China threat, particularly531the threat that it poses to Americans here at home, goes back532almost 20 years. When I served in the Bush administration at533the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency, I worked534for the director. We encountered PRC gamesmanship surrounding535removals and repatriation. And we realized that we were not536just dealing with an immigration problem. It was an537intelligence problem.538    During the first Trump administration, I served at the539Department of Justice under Attorney General Jeff Sessions and540Attorney General Bill Barr. And they carried on the China541initiative. And they recognized, we recognized, that the PRC542challenge touched nearly every dimension of American life,543especially IP theft and commercial espionage. And most544recently, when I served as Alaska's 28th attorney general, I545stood up a counter-China initiative to examine how we could546respond, using our own consumer protection authorities. That547work continues in my new capacity as counsel to the Governor.548    To my mind, for the first time, consumers are on the front549lines of our geopolitical conflict with China. When I say550consumers, I'm not just talking about families and individuals.551I'm talking about businesses and governments as well. Virtually552all of us and our connected technology that we use can become553an access point. That is where state attorneys general can play554an important role. Consumer protection laws allow us to pursue555deception and undisclosed risks, areas where foreign influence556often hides in plain sight. Alaska's consumer protection laws557are among the strongest in the558nation.559    We're actively looking for opportunities to use those560authorities both on our own and in partnership with attorneys561general from around the country, including my co-panelist's562attorney general from Nebraska, Mike Hilgers. Attorney General563Hilgers, if I can just indulge a little bit, has been a564national leader in this space using traditional consumer565protection authorities to address risks involving Chinese-566linked technologies that are sold to American consumers. These567efforts and others demonstrate that traditional state568authorities can play an important role in protecting Americans569from risks that often have a national security dimension.570    Another area of concern, and the focus of today's hearing,571of course, is transnational repression. We have not seen572significant reported incidents in Alaska to date, but I would573caution that this is not the sort of threat that is easy to574identify without training and awareness. It may look like575harassment or intimidation, unusual pressure on students,576deepfakes, or threats directed at relatives overseas, but if577law enforcement does not know what to look for, it can be578happening right under our noses. That is why I strongly support579efforts to educate state and local law enforcement on this580threat, to train personnel to recognize it, and to coordinate581closely with our federal authorities and federal partners when582these situations arise.583    Looking ahead, I believe the next frontier will involve584closer coordination between attorneys general and585administrative enforcement agencies, too. One area that has586drawn my particular attention involves cross-border payment587platforms and money transmitters operating inside the United588States. I want to give kudos to Senator Tom Cotton on this589Commission, who deserves a lot of credit for publicly raising590concerns about Airwallex with the U.S. Department of Justice,591and the potential exposure of sensitive American financial data592to CCP influence or access.593    I share those concerns about Airwallex and this industry594more broadly, and I have begun to have conversations in Alaska595about whether our state licensing and regulatory authorities596should take a harder look at money transmitters that are597connected to foreign adversary governments. A money transmitter598license is a privilege. It's not a right. And I believe state599regulators should be asking whether companies entrusted with600sensitive financial information can satisfy their state law601obligations when data, operations, and key personnel may be602subject to foreign adversary influence.603    States do not need to, and we shouldn't, conduct foreign604policy to play an important role here. But states can protect605consumers. States can safeguard critical infrastructure. States606can ensure that Americans are not unknowingly exposed to607foreign adversary leverage. That mission resonates particularly608strongly in a state like Alaska. Alaskans have an express609constitutional right to privacy, and we take that right very610seriously. If Alaskans are paying a premium for products and611services, and we are, they deserve to know what they are612getting and what risks may come with it. We are also America's613Arctic state and a Pacific state. We sit at the intersection of614strategic cargo, telecom, critical minerals, ports, fisheries,615and Arctic logistics. As a result, many of the threats that we616might be discussing today are not abstract for us.617    So my message is simple. Many of the Chinese Communist618Party's threats to Americans increasingly manifest themselves619through areas traditionally governed by states--public safety,620consumer protection, licensing, and infrastructure. And because621of that, states have both the authority and the responsibility622to act carefully and lawfully and strategically, alongside our623federal partners. Thank you again for having me, and I welcome624any questions.625    [The prepared statement of Stephen Cox appears in the626Appendix.]627    Co-chair Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Cox, for your628testimony and insight. I'd like to now yield to Senator Bostar.629630                   STATEMENT OF ELIOT BOSTAR,631                     NEBRASKA STATE SENATOR632633    Mr. Bostar. Co-chair Smith and honorable members of the634Commission, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.635Over the last four years, the Nebraska legislature has passed a636slate of laws designed to protect Nebraskans from transnational637repression, safeguard Nebraska's data and critical638infrastructure, combat malign influence operations, and enhance639resilience to prepare for conflict. Nebraska is home to the640U.S. Strategic Command at Offutt Air Force Base, as well as641numerous nuclear missile installations, that make it a target642for foreign adversaries. However, every state has critical643industries, infrastructure, and institutions that our644national security relies on.645    The People's Republic of China is a threat to every state646and every community in our country. Our work to address the647threats facing Nebraska from the PRC began when we were alerted648to Pentagon concerns about the pervasiveness of Huawei649technology near our critical defense infrastructure. In 2020,650the U.S. Government took formal action to designate Huawei651technologies as a threat to national security, but Huawei652technology was still in use and being newly installed653throughout Nebraska years later.654    In 2023, we drafted legislation to prohibit655telecommunications companies from receiving state funds if they656use or provide communications equipment deemed a national657security threat. Additionally, telecom companies must annually658certify that they don't use equipment designated as a threat by659the FCC. The law also clears redtape obstacles to enhance660security by stipulating that no additional permits or661authorization from any state agency or local government will be662required to remove prohibited equipment.663    Robust lobbying pressure was employed to keep Beijing-664linked technologies in use, but elected officials from both665parties ultimately rejected this pressure. After this law666passed, my office was inundated with threat information from667national security professionals who encouraged us to push668forward. And we passed several more laws in 2024 to protect669Nebraska against foreign adversaries. The Foreign-Owned Real670Estate National Security Act prevents any person, foreign671government, or entity determined to be a foreign adversary from672holding land within 10 miles of a military installation,673including nuclear missile silos. In cases of noncompliance, the674law provides the Nebraska attorney general with authority to675force divestment.676    The Pacific Conflict Stress Test Act created a joint677legislative and executive committee on Pacific conflict to678assess how a conflict in the Pacific could disrupt and endanger679Nebraska. The committee meets quarterly to evaluate the state's680supply chains, export markets, critical infrastructure, and681security apparatus, and makes recommendations to strengthen682resilience.683    Last, in 2024 we passed the Foreign Adversary Contracting684Prohibition Act. The legislation prohibits companies controlled685by foreign adversaries from procurement contracts involving686communications technology, network systems, and critical687infrastructure.688    As we worked to pass these laws, we learned about local689government officials being contacted by the CCP, and we started690to hear from victims of transnational repression. Reporting691emerged regarding an alleged Chinese overseas service station692operating in Omaha, highlighting the threat of intelligence693activity and transnational repression within Nebraska. We694sought to limit the CCP's ability to influence, manipulate, and695hurt people in our state by introducing the Foreign Adversary696and Terrorist Agent Registration Act and the Crush697Transnational Repression in Nebraska Act in 2025.698    The Registration Act illuminates political propaganda and699influence activities conducted by agents of foreign adversaries700by requiring that they register with the Nebraska attorney701general. Any informational material they distribute must be702notated with a conspicuous statement identifying it as such and703be submitted to the attorney general within 48 hours. The704legislation also stipulates that if an individual or entity is705representing a principal designated by the Pentagon as a706Chinese military company, they must begin all lobbying707activities by disclosing that they are representing such a708company that is a foreign adversary of the United States.709Violation of this provision results in a $100,000 fine, which710increases by $100,000 for each subsequent violation, up to a711maximum fine of $1 million per violation. Any individual who712provides information leading to a penalty under this act is713entitled to receive a $50,000 reward from the state.714    The Crush Transnational Repression in Nebraska Act defines715covered offenses as specific crimes already existing in law716that will now receive an enhanced charge if the person717committing the offense is an agent of a foreign principal. This718legislation also punishes unauthorized foreign law enforcement719by establishing that an agent of a foreign adversary commits a720felony by deliberately trying to enforce a foreign government's721law or rule in Nebraska.722    Our final 2025 reform conformed with what Congress723accomplished with the BIOSECURE Act and the most recent724National Defense Authorization Act. Our genetic protection law725establishes that no medical or research facility shall use any726genetic sequencer or software for genetic sequencing if such727device or software is produced in or by a foreign adversary.728    Chinese companies sanctioned by the Pentagon have developed729some of the world's largest gene banks for the Chinese730military, supporting potential genetically targeted bioweapons,731about which senior Chinese military officials have written.732This law takes every measure possible to cut off Chinese733military companies from accessing the genetic data of734Nebraskans, complementing the federal BIOSECURE Act.735    Just this spring, we enacted a new and unique protection736for critical infrastructure focused on denying foreign737adversary companies access that could be used for operational738control or sabotage, either in person or remotely. Furthermore,739we codified new enhanced penalties for crimes that we define as740bioterrorism, including bringing in different pathogens for the741purpose of damaging our farmlands.742    Although each of these pieces of legislation faced743opposition, we were able to pass them into law with bipartisan744support. The effects are already visible. Awareness among state745and local officials has increased significantly. Procurement746standards have hardened, infrastructure protections have747expanded, law enforcement coordination has improved, and748Nebraska now evaluates infrastructure and investment questions749through a national security framework that simply did not exist750several years ago. Other states are emulating these models.751Congressional leaders, executive agencies, and even other752nations, such as the United Kingdom, have learned from753different facets of what Nebraska has achieved.754    Most importantly, Nebraska's leadership in combating malign755foreign influence has demonstrated that states have power and756responsibility in this space. In fact, both President Biden and757President Trump have called upon states to lead in driving758solutions where we are closest to the security risks. We know759our adversaries are coordinated and adept at attacking us at760every layer of government. We must be able to defend ourselves761utilizing this same whole-of-government approach. We must762strengthen coordination between the states themselves, and763between the states and the federal government. Our work in764Nebraska has been made possible with guidance from national765security experts and practitioners. More established and766formalized systems of coordination will help us further767identify vulnerabilities, protect critical assets, and768contribute fully and comprehensively to the defense of the769American homeland. Thank you again for this opportunity to770testify. I look forward to your questions.771    [The prepared statement of Eliot Bostar appears in the772Appendix.]773    Co-chair Smith. Senator, thank you for your leadership.774Thank you for what you are doing in leading the country. I hope775that776everybody follows suit. There are some states, like Texas, like777Utah, Georgia, but far too few. So thank you for that778leadership.779780                   STATEMENT OF ARTHUR LIU,781                 OWNER, INTER-PACIFIC LAW GROUP782783    Mr. Liu. Good afternoon, Co-chair Smith and distinguished784members of the Commission. Thank you for inviting me to testify785here today. My name is Arthur Liu. I came to the United States786as a political refugee back in 1989, after the Tiananmen Square787massacre. I'm also the proud father of Olympic gold medalist788Alysa Liu, and four other wonderful children.789    Today is an especially sad day for me. Thirty-seven years790ago, on June 4th, 1989, the Chinese government sent tanks and791soldiers to kill students and civilians in Tiananmen Square,792and also in Beijing. At that time, thousands of students and793civilians just gathered peacefully to call for democracy,794freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the rule of law, and795for basic human rights in China. Thousands of them lost their796lives, and hundreds more were797severely injured. At that time, I was in Guangzhou, attending798graduate school at Zhongshan University. I was one of the799principal organizers of the democracy movement in Guangzhou,800China.801    When news of the massacre reached Guangzhou, I was802devastated. I could not understand and believe how a government803that claimed to serve the people could turn its weapons against804its own young people and civilians. In response, I organized805more protests in Guangzhou against the massacre. Of course,806soon afterwards I became one of the most wanted democracy807activists in southern China. I was very fortunate to be able to808escape from China to Hong Kong. After I came to America, I809continued to organize protests in front of the Chinese810consulate in San Francisco and also in front of the Chinese811Embassy in Washington, D.C., calling upon the Chinese812government to release political and religious prisoners in813China. I have spoken publicly many times about the human rights814abuses in China.815    Like many refugees, I believed that once I arrived in816America I had left political persecution behind me. But an817incident in late 2021 proved me wrong. To explain what818happened, I must tell you a little bit about my daughter, Alysa819Liu. Alysa recently won two gold medals for the United States820of America at the 2026 Winter Olympic Games. Before that, she821became the youngest U.S. women's champion in history when she822won the U.S. Figure Skating Championship at the ages of 13 and82314. She set records as the youngest female skater in history to824ever land a triple Axel in international competition at the age825of 12. And she was the first female skater in history to have826landed a triple Axel and a quadruple jump in the same827competition program. In 2021, it was clear that she was on her828way to represent the United States of America in the 2022829Winter Olympic Games in Beijing, China.830    Alysa posted a piece of news about the human rights831violations in Xinjiang back in 2018, when she was only 12-13832years old. And I guess the Chinese government never forgot833about that. And since she was most likely going to Beijing for834the Olympic Games, I may also be going as well, so they were835concerned. One day in late October or early November in 2021, I836received a phone call. The caller identified himself as an837official from the U.S. Olympic Committee. He told me that he838was conducting international travel preparedness and needed my839passport and Alysa's passport. He gave me a fax number for me840to fax our passports to him. I told him I would do it the next841day.842    I never did. I was smarter than that. But later on I got a843phone call. Just a few days later, I got a phone call from the844FBI. And he told me he needed to meet with me. And I met him at845a Starbucks. And he told me that a Chinese spy, acting on846behalf of the Chinese government, was already in the San847Francisco Bay area. That was in early November 2021. He would848be tracking my movements. He would be surveilling my daily849activities. He would be placing a GPS tracker on my car. And he850would try to collect our personal information, like Social851Security numbers, and particularly our passport information.852The FBI told me to watch out for my surroundings and be853careful.854    I was very worried when I heard the news, because Alysa was855most likely going to Beijing. And I was also concerned that the856spy might do something to her in the United States. At that857time, Alysa was competing in Japan. So the next day, when she858came back to America, I took her away from the San Francisco859Bay area to another location for training. As we were boarding860the plane I received a phone call from the FBI. He told me that861the spy was right on his way to our house. I couldn't believe862it. It was like a scene right out of a movie. It could not have863been so coincidental that we were boarding the plane and the864spy was right on his way to our house.865    The FBI agent informed me that they were ready to arrest866those spies acting on behalf of the Chinese government at that867time, but as a father I was terrified for the safety of Alysa868when she goes to Beijing to compete for the United States of869America. So I told them, can you please wait until she comes870back from the Olympic Games? And the FBI said yes. I also871requested additional security for Alysa. When she was in872Beijing she was accompanied at all times by two adults, from873venue to venue throughout the Olympic Games. On March 16th,8742022, the Department of Justice announced criminal charges875against the spies. One of them was876Matthew Ziburis, the guy who called me posing as an official877from the U.S. Olympic Committee, and who spied on me in the San878Francisco Bay area.879    When the news came out, a neighbor from my office came over880and told me that he had seen this guy, Matthew Ziburis, many881times. He was lingering in the lobby right in front of my882office. And of course, Matthew Ziburis was charged, along with,883I believe, four other people in the spying on me and also on884another dissident from China, and an artist in Los Angeles. I'm885really grateful to the FBI agents who provided security for me886and also my daughter. And I appreciate that the U.S. Government887took forceful action to prosecute those spies to the fullest888extent under the law.889    But America cannot stop there. We can't just prosecute890them. We must understand that not just me, a political891dissident from China, the Uyghurs, or the people from Hong892Kong, we have to understand we will not be safe--America will893not be safe--until China becomes a democracy. We must894understand China must have a government which respects basic895human rights and that honors the rule of law. We must also896understand that America will not be safe until people all over897the world can live peacefully and harmoniously together. We898have a lot of work to do in America. Thank you for inviting me899to testify here today. I look forward to answering your900questions.901    Co-chair Smith. Mr. Liu, thank you for your testimony, your902courage, and again, congratulations on such a fine performance903by your daughter. To think that something that she wrote when904she was very young would still be in the hands of the Chinese905Communist Party to intimidate and threaten, again underscores906the pervasiveness of this dictatorship. Thank you.907    [The prepared statement of Arthur Liu appears in the908Appendix.]909    Anna Kwok.910911                    STATEMENT OF ANNA KWOK,912913         BOARD DIRECTOR AND FORMER EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,914915                  HONG KONG DEMOCRACY COUNCIL916917    Ms. Kwok. Members of the Commission, thank you for inviting918me to share my experience as a target of intensifying919transnational repression in the United States. In this battle920against the Chinese Communist Party, a regime that fears921opposition, feeling safe is a privilege. I am among hundreds of922thousands of rights defenders in America who live every single923day knowing we're being watched and threatened. All incidents924of transnational repression I share today took place on925American soil. Together, they illustrate the varied tactics of926a transnational repression campaign.927    I served as the executive director of the Hong Kong928Democracy Council, a U.S. advocacy organization sanctioned by929the PRC. In May 2023, after I testified before this very930Commission on the loss of Hong Kong's political autonomy and931its implications for the U.S., the regime swiftly retaliated by932issuing a HK$1 million bounty on my head. My assets were frozen933and my passport was revoked, crippling my international934advocacy work. More bounties were also later issued on American935citizens and residents.936    The bounty put a huge target on my back. State media, pro-937CCP extremists, and individual propagandists launched a938coordinated campaign to discourage the American public from939associating with me. Explicit threats to hurt, kidnap, rape,940and even execute me on American soil flooded my social media.941The lawfare and digital threats became physical in November9422023, during Chinese leader Xi Jinping's visit to the United943States. When I organized protests against Xi and campaigned944successfully to bar the sanctioned chief executive of Hong Kong945from entering the country, the regime decided to retaliate on946the streets of San Francisco.947    Masked men assaulted fellow protesters with metal poles,948while WeChat groups circulated my whereabouts on the streets of949San Francisco. I escaped physical harm only because fellow950protesters protected me. Local police were completely oblivious951to the existence of transnational repression and refused to952intervene. To this day, none of the perpetrators, including953American nationals, have been convicted. For the first time I954felt as if I had been transported back to the lawless streets955of Hong Kong; even though I was in the land of the free, I was956not free.957    The online campaign and real-life violence achieved a958chilling effect across America. Some supporters of the pro-959democracy movement stopped showing up to events. A few went as960far as to erase their digital footprints. Their response is all961too familiar. It happened once in my first home in Hong Kong,962and it is now happening again in my second home in America.963Nonetheless, I964refused to back down. I led a campaign to expose the foreign965influence and transnational threats brought by the Hong Kong966Economic and Trade Offices. In response, the regime unleashed967its cruelest weapon, psychological warfare.968    Last May the regime arrested my father in Hong Kong. He was969later convicted on fabricated charges. The state-run trial970centered on an insurance policy my father had purchased when I971was just a 2-year-old learning to say ``papa.'' My father is972imprisoned simply because he is my father. He's now a hostage973serving a sentence for crimes neither of us committed. The CCP974weaponized my love for my family in an attempt to silence me975forever. I speak to you today as my 70-year-old father sits in976a cell 8,000 miles away. I speak as someone with a HK$1 million977bounty on my head. I speak as a target of rampant transnational978repression, and I speak as someone who is standing my ground to979combat an urgent threat to American national security.980    When a hostile foreign power launches centralized efforts--981spanning state agencies, united front groups, and individual982extremists--to silence people inside the U.S., the government983must respond with centralized, coordinated mechanisms. That's984why I urge Congress, in particular the House Foreign Affairs985Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to mark up986the bipartisan Transnational Repression Policy Act immediately.987Passing this legislation will provide a bedrock for building988long-term cross-agency mechanisms that are necessary to protect989America.990    This is a litmus test for the country. If the U.S. does not991draw a hard line and act quickly, the PRC will continue to push992our boundaries, from running secret police stations to co-993opting state officials. States like Nebraska and Utah are994gearing up to protect their people, and the nation should get995ahead, too. We must confront the threat of transnational996repression urgently, before it becomes a normalized pattern997that cannot be undone. Thank you.998    [The prepared statement of Anna Kwok appears in the999Appendix.]1000                              ----------10011002    Co-chair Smith. Anna, thank you very much for your bravery1003and testimony, bearing witness to an ugly truth that you are1004facing every day. You did say the word ``intensifying,''1005clearly denoting or conveying that it's getting worse. You1006know, Xi Jinping will be coming here again soon. We tried very1007hard when he came last time for the APEC summit, and it was,1008like--and when you say the local police were oblivious to what1009was actually happening on the ground, that's got to change, and1010a federal law could help that. The state laws obviously help1011it, with your own state police and other law enforcement1012assets, but it seems to me that we--I'm sure you will agree, we1013need a federal law.1014    I have asked Chairman Mast to mark up the bill. I thought1015it might be up at our last markup, which just occurred, and it1016was not on there. I argued--as it turned out, not1017persuasively--to do so. So I'm taking all of your testimony1018back to the Chairman--and he's a good man, Chairman Mast--and1019his staff, and say, This has got to happen. It's got to happen1020now. The sooner it happens the better, especially--and we saw1021it in San Francisco, the way so many people--I had hearings1022then, and had press conferences, as you know, pointing out how1023brutal the people were, some of them seemingly coming out of1024the trade mission there. I have a bill that would close that1025thing down, but that too passed the House, never got through1026the Senate. Here we go again with that reprise. So we need this1027bill. I'm sure you all agree with that, so we will push really,1028really hard. It's got to be done before Xi Jinping comes again,1029because that will be the pivot catalyst for them to unleash1030hell on the best and the bravest and the brightest who have1031come here from China. And many of those, obviously, are still1032in China, their family members.1033    You did say, Mr. Bostar, that with regard to the1034legislation, Senator, that there was some opposition. It's1035faced opposition. Who was against what you guys were doing?1036    Mr. Bostar. Thank you, sir, for the question. We've faced1037opposition from a number of sources, but what tends to be1038utilized the most in Nebraska is primarily corporate-aligned1039opposition, linked to Chinese interests and corporations. And I1040think fundamentally that's mostly the case because they have1041the most robust lobbying presence in the state. We see that1042consistently, businesses themselves that are linked to China as1043well as the associations that they belong to, consistently1044trying to fight progress when it comes to guarding against CCP1045threats.1046    One example I'll use and give you that was sort of shocking1047at the time--Nebraska is, obviously, a pretty significant1048agricultural state. When we were attempting to pass our foreign1049adversary registration requirements into law, we received1050thinly veiled threats from Smithfield, which is owned by the1051Chinese now, that if we went through with this and passed these1052bills that there was the potential that they could shut down1053operations, disrupting the economy of Nebraska certainly, as1054well as the food supply for the United States. So that's just1055one example that we faced, but we faced many.1056    Co-chair Smith. Thank you for persevering. You know, I1057would just--back in 1994 I was one of those who led the effort1058to link most favored nation status with trade to China. Bill1059Clinton, sadly, de-linked human rights and trade on May 26,10601994. But on one trip to Beijing I met with the U.S. Chamber of1061Commerce, and I couldn't believe how kowtowing they were to the1062Chinese dictatorship to get the next deal.1063    That goes for Microsoft and Bill Gates and all these other1064people who--anything to get the next deal and to continue1065their--we had Enes Freedom testify here, and talked about how1066the NBA just threw him out because he spoke about the Uyghurs.1067Again, another brave man--a great basketball player, but a1068brave man. And he lost it all. He lost his whole career. And he1069says some of his fellow NBAers wanted to support him, but they1070said, we can't. We don't want to lose, you know, that NBA slot1071that we have. And so it's--you know, it's amazing how corporate1072America just capitulates so easily under the false impression1073that somehow China will matriculate from a dictatorship to a1074democracy if we just trade more. No. They'll become a more1075aggressive power with more capability, command and control,1076right on down the line, if we give them all that capacity,1077which they've gotten.1078    You know, Chris Cox, you all recall, the former Member of1079Congress, did an amazing report back in the 1990s about how all1080the dual-use items that they were procuring that had a--1081ostensibly a civilian purpose, but also a very serious military1082purpose. So thank you for persevering against all of that1083pressure. But we've got to get a federal law and get more1084states to do the same with their laws, and to resist that1085pressure because it has been shameful how the almighty buck1086has--you know, you hold a dollar in front of some of these1087corporations--I had people that were part of the U.S. Chamber1088of Commerce in Beijing telling me they have full religious1089freedom here. I said, really? If you believe that, I'll sell1090you the Brooklyn Bridge. It just does not happen. Thank you for1091doing that.1092    You know, you did say, Mr. Cox, about--suggested that the1093central point is that consumers are on the front lines of the1094geopolitical conflict with China--phones, apps, routers,1095cameras, payment platforms, cloud services, and connected1096services can become access points for PRC-linked data1097collection and leverage. Doesn't McAfee, and some of the things1098that we all buy--I have McAfee--does that not protect against1099that? Or are we being naive and somehow they could easily1100pierce that and get whatever they want?1101    Mr. Cox. Thank you for the question. I wouldn't purport to1102be an expert on that kind of a question, but I will say that I1103do think that the Chinese are technologically very advanced.1104And a lot of times our defenses are just keeping up with the1105black hats. So I think it's right to be concerned. I think this1106is why I think state AGs, like Attorney General Hilgers, and1107Attorney General Paxton, and Attorney General Uthmeier have1108teamed up to target some of these consumer protection1109violations, where this technology has potential kill switches1110and back doors that allow information that belongs to American1111citizens to go back to China. And we know that China has1112certain laws, like the National Intelligence Law of 2017, that1113require, with severe penalties, cooperation by Chinese1114companies and individuals to cooperate with intelligence1115services like that, on command. And so I think it's right to1116look into this, to investigate, and to bring righteous cases.1117And we intend to do that in Alaska.1118    Co-chair Smith. Are we deploying a sufficient number of1119federal assets, FBI for example, to combat this? Or do we need1120to beef this up significantly?1121    Mr. Cox. I'll take that. Thank you for the question. I1122can't--I've worked with the FBI over the course of my career. I1123worked on the Fort Hood Commission with Judge Webster. I've1124worked for five state and federal law enforcement agencies over1125the course of my career. And I've never known a law enforcement1126agency to refuse more resources and more investigative1127resources. So, though I can't speak for the FBI, I suspect that1128they would love to do more with more resources.1129    Co-chair Smith. Yes, Anna.1130    Ms. Kwok. I would agree with Mr. Cox there, that the FBI1131definitely would appreciate more resources. And in my previous1132experience from working with the FBI, I've also noticed that1133there have not been enough resources being put into1134investigating the foreign influence and transnational1135repression into the United States. And often civil society has1136to also help share reports and research results with the FBI,1137just because they do not have adequate time or resources to1138conduct their own research. But of course, there is certain1139information or intelligence that we're not able to get from1140civil society. So if the FBI would be able to dedicate more1141resources into investigating transnational repression and1142foreign influence, I'm sure it will help protect American1143national security.1144    Co-chair Smith. Let me just ask you, if I could, about AI,1145which is transforming, seemingly, everything. What additional1146threat does that pose? Just--this was not related to the1147Chinese, as far as we know--but just yesterday my top sheriff1148told me how some boys took pictures of two girls, 14 years old,114913 years old, and then created a whole sex scenario with them.1150You know, it was all AI, but it's devastating. They found the1151kids, the two boys, and they arrested them, and they'll be1152prosecuted. I know in Europe and elsewhere that's being done1153now to diaspora and human rights advocates. Again, another1154devastating way of trying to demoralize and hurt people who1155speak out. How bad is that right now? And do you see that1156getting worse?1157    Ms. Kwok. The CCP definitely uses artificial intelligence1158to further repression on diasporas around the world and rights1159defenders. For example, my fellow activists, Carmen Lau in the1160UK, and Laura Harth, they are both being targeted with1161deepfakes generated by AI, and with explicit images and videos1162that are used to defame them. And I think that is a very1163devastating development, especially for women defenders in this1164space.1165    At the same time, we are also seeing more impersonation1166attempts getting more sophisticated to try to conduct phishing,1167identity theft, and to procure information from the human1168rights community. For example, my colleagues would often now1169receive emails impersonating myself with very sophisticated1170methods that sound like me and write like me, in order to get1171more information.1172    And, last but not least, we're also seeing the rise of AI1173being used to generate propaganda materials on social media.1174With the use of AI, the CCP is able to now generate more1175materials that are dedicated to talking to the American public,1176to get into the rhetoric, and to form better narratives, or1177more effective narratives, in bringing false information to the1178United States.1179    Co-chair Smith. Yesterday Marco Rubio testified before the1180Foreign Affairs Committee. And I asked him--we don't get much1181time. As you know, you get five minutes. I asked him about1182Jimmy Lai, I asked him a few other questions, and I did so--1183even more so privately. I asked him to help us get the Stop1184Forced Organ Harvesting Act passed. It passed 406 to 1 in the1185House last year. It passed in the Congress before that. You1186know, it's my bill. It's one of the most serious human rights1187abuses imaginable, and it's being done--it's hiding in plain1188sight. We just can't seem to get it out of the Senate, but1189we're trying, and we're hopeful.1190    But if Marco were sitting here, and he used to sit right1191here. He co-chaired this Commission and did so--like the1192current Senator from Alaska--with great distinction. And I mean1193that. You know, we've got a great co-chair here. He brings an1194intel capacity and an understanding of Taiwan and elsewhere1195like no other that I know. He is just amazing, and he would1196have wanted to be here, but he just couldn't make it, but he1197sends his best. But what would you tell the President and Marco1198Rubio, again, on the eve of what will be another summit soon,1199and this is when the planning goes into it to try to make sure1200that everything we can do to mitigate Xi Jinping's cruelty is1201tried. What would you say to the President and to Marco?1202    Mr. Cox. Thank you for the question. I'll say this, and1203this is a point that I think you have made at this hearing and1204others. There are certainly things that the states can do, but1205nothing speaks more loudly than federal action. And that can1206mean executive action, and it can mean legislative action. You1207know, the awareness about Huawei and the telecom threat1208increased a lot based on what was done with Huawei. The1209prosecution of the spies that targeted Mr. Liu, that increases1210awareness. Legislation that would also arm state and local law1211enforcement with the training and capabilities to spot the1212transnational repression behind some of these otherwise1213ordinary crimes would be very helpful. And all of that is1214federal.1215    Mr. Liu. Thank you for that question, Mr. Smith. You know,1216I would tell President Trump and Secretary of State Rubio that1217the United States must take a tougher stand against the CCP's1218transnational repression and also against their human rights1219violations. I would call upon them to urge the Chinese1220government to release all political prisoners, including Mr.1221Bingzhang Wang. He has been in prison in China for over 201222years. And I would urge Mr. Rubio and President Trump to call1223for the release of Jimmy Lai and other political prisoners in1224Hong Kong. And really push them to come to the international1225stage as a civil society, as a government which respects basic1226human rights and the rule of law. I think this is another1227opportunity--to be honest with you, without any political1228prisoners released with President Trump's visit in China--to1229bring those major issues up in the next visit. Thank you.1230    Co-chair Smith. Thank you.1231    Ms. Kwok. First, I would like to thank Secretary Rubio and1232President Trump for commemorating June 4th in Hong Kong.1233Because today we saw that the U.S. consulate in Hong Kong1234lighted candles in a place where vigils are no longer allowed.1235And for1236Hong Kong, currently we have 1,946 political prisoners. I want1237to1238urge President Trump to seriously consider calling for the1239release1240of Jimmy Lai, Chow Hang-tung, and other Hong Kong political1241prisoners.1242    At the same time, the upcoming visit, where Xi would be1243visiting D.C., it would be the perfect opportunity to establish1244better TNR response. The last time Xi was in the United States,1245we have seen how it really opened up the devastating can of1246transnational repression. And once they widened the scope and1247widened the possibility of transnational repression, it was1248hard to push back. This would be the perfect opportunity for1249the United States to push back, to set, actually, better1250protocols for foreign visits, for diplomats who will be on the1251scene, and for Chinese nationals here in the United States, on1252how to behave, how to respect human rights, and how not to1253conduct transnational repression against people here on1254American soil.1255    Co-chair Smith. Let me just ask you what your view might be1256of what people inside of China understand, especially today,1257being the remembrance of the Tiananmen Square massacre. I've1258met with many students who come visiting, including at the high1259school level, who say the Tiananmen Square massacre never1260happened. If you Google over there, and I went to one of their1261internet cafes once and googled ``Tiananmen Square massacre''1262and got nothing. I googled ``human rights'' and I got1263everything about--it was during the Bush administration--how1264bad he was, but nothing about there. And I even put in1265``torture,'' because Manfred Nowak, who was then the special1266rapporteur for torture for the United Nations, had done a1267scathing report about the use of torture in China. So I put his1268name in, and it came up with everything but China.1269    Is there really a serious lack of any kind of information1270in this culture of denial that they live in, perpetrated by the1271government, that they don't even know this stuff is happening,1272or happened, past tense? Because it's just--I met with a group1273of high school students at a school in my state who said I was1274lying about Tiananmen Square. And then this--as I might have1275indicated--Chi Haotian, who was the butcher of Beijing, who1276ordered the actual bayoneting and killing, he came to this1277country, went down to the Clinton White House. He got a 19-gun1278salute, because by then he had been elevated to head of their1279Department of Defense, the equivalent of our defense secretary,1280got a 19-gun salute. I said he should have been taken to The1281Hague for crimes against humanity.1282    So we did a hearing. He goes to the Army War College and1283says nobody died at Tiananmen Square. And all over, you know,1284the Global Times, the People's Daily, because I read the1285English versions, were extolling how he had said all this. And1286I had a hearing two days after he said it. We had all these1287witnesses, most of whom were Chinese witnesses, who said it did1288happen. The Time magazine correspondent who watched people die.1289But he got away with it. You know, Clinton himself should have1290said: Hey, pal, a lot of people died at Tiananmen Square.1291Quit--you know, don't lie about this, because if you lie about1292this, what else are you lying about?1293    But they did lie. But I'm really concerned that it's as if1294it never happened, which is so important. And in Hong Kong, of1295course, they crushed the remembrances there, and of course1296throughout the rest of China. How do we get that through to the1297people as to what has happened in the past and what is1298happening today?1299    Anna.1300    Ms. Kwok. China, or the Chinese Communist Party, certainly1301excels in twisting history and twisting narratives. And right1302now, I would say there is currently an ongoing war on1303narratives and discourse between the U.S. and democracies1304around the world vs. China. Every single day I go on social1305media, and I see China spreading misinformation and1306disinformation about history, about what has happened, and1307especially on June 4th, today. In Hong Kong we are also hearing1308rumors that, starting next year, textbooks will no longer be1309allowed to mention, you know, even one line on June 4th. As of1310now, Hong Kong is not even allowing people to hold candles on1311the streets of Hong Kong.1312    This morning, or last night, we saw news in Hong Kong where1313the police were actually stationed on street corners in Hong1314Kong, waiting to arrest people who dare to just walk around,1315who dared to just express themselves with very creative art,1316and who dared to just share symbols of June 4th, no matter how1317implicit. So we're seeing that China is really being very harsh1318and zoning in on canceling or on erasing any moments of1319history, any memories of history. And that reminds me of a1320scholar currently in the United States, Rowena He, who1321specializes and extensively discusses the importance of1322remembering the Tiananmen massacre.1323    Because it goes beyond just the Tiananmen massacre. It is1324about remembering the atrocities of this regime. It is about1325remembering the present crimes conducted by this regime. And it1326is, most importantly, remembering the people who have been1327sacrificing to fight for democracy and human rights in China.1328So I urge the United States and the American public to remember1329what has happened on June 4th of 1989, but also be cognizant of1330what is happening today on American soil. Thank you.1331    Co-chair Smith. I have one final question. And, again,1332thank you for your time, your expertise, and above all your1333leadership. The Chinese Students and Scholars Associations and1334other PRC-linked campus groups, there's talk of, you know,1335further networking with them. We saw it with the Confucius1336Centers, which were nothing but soft power instruments by the1337Chinese Communist Party. But in 2015 I chaired a hearing with1338NYU Chancellor Jeffrey Lehman, and I raised the issue about1339complicity with the Chinese propaganda organs--you know, they1340were gifted a campus in Shanghai. Imagine that, a whole campus.1341    And yet they were charging an exorbitant amount of money1342for tuition. I asked him, who picks the students, the Chinese1343Communist Party? What's the selection process? If you're1344online, what can you go and visit? Can you talk about the Dalai1345Lama? I don't think so. All those things I asked him. And I1346also invited myself to go speak. And I actually got a visa. And1347he had me there to speak. And I always appreciated that. But1348it's the complicity of many of our institutions of higher1349learning to gain access. One of the most infamous of all was1350back in the early 1980s when Steven Mosher at Stanford1351University, broke the news about the one child per couple1352policy and the use of forced abortion, and the fact that the1353government decreed brothers and sisters illegal. And that even1354with the one, you had to get permission from the Communist1355Party to have that baby. Otherwise, you're forcibly aborted.1356    I did a number of bills that passed in the House, some in1357the Senate, to defund any organization, like the U.N.1358Population Fund, which was getting a great deal of money, and1359Reagan was all for it, and we did just that. Trump has done the1360same thing again with the U.N. Population Fund and others. But1361meanwhile, Stanford, which is where Steven Mosher was earning1362his doctorate, threw him over the side. They threw him out. As1363a matter of fact, it was so bad that the Wall Street Journal1364did a piece that said, ``Stanford Morality'' and talked about1365how he had been disenfranchised from the university because he1366broke a story that they didn't want to have to deal with1367because they wanted access.1368    So my question is, Are we seeing any improvement on the1369part of our colleges and universities to the mega threat that1370the Communist Party poses, how they can be manipulated and1371used, you know, the information transfer that is applicable to1372their military? You know, at the state level you gentlemen are1373doing tremendous work, but we need to do more, seems to me, on1374the federal level on all of this as well. But I keep asking our1375universities, stop partnering with these individuals. Now, if1376they were free, partner away, but they're not. It's a1377dictatorship. And again, anything they glean technology-wise is1378going right into their military-industrial complex. So if1379anybody would want to take a stab at that, on the universities.1380    Mr. Bostar. Thank you for that. In Nebraska we're certainly1381making progress on the university front, as far as attempting1382to decouple where we can with those specific programs. But I1383think your question brings up a broader challenge that we face1384with all of this, which is it's always inconvenient to do what1385we need to do. Whether or not universities are being gifted a1386new campus, or whether or not Chairman Xi is coming to the1387United States, and not wanting to disrupt a possible deal,1388there's always a reason why it's the wrong time to do what we1389should do. And it's exactly for that purpose that we have to1390resist that. We have to take the actions now.1391    It was never convenient for us in Nebraska to pass the1392bills we did, to create the laws we did, to create the1393structures of accountability on the CCP, because there are1394costs. There are political costs. There are economic costs.1395We've allowed ourselves to become so dependent and integrated1396on our adversaries that it is painful to do what we need to do1397and separate ourselves. But it's required, because there's1398never going to be a convenient time to do it. And so, yes, I1399think we're making that progress, but there is so much more1400that we have to do.1401    Ms. Kwok. Co-chair Smith, I'm actually an alumnus from New1402York University. And I have a story to share. Back in 2019,1403during the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong, I tried to1404organize a protest at NYU in support of people on the streets,1405as an anonymous organizer. And initially, we were only1406expecting a few dozen Hong Kongers to show up in solidarity,1407but in the end hundreds of people showed up. And these hundreds1408of people were not supportive of what we did. Instead, they1409were students, faculty members, people, members recruited by1410the CSSA on campus at New York University.1411    When they had such an overwhelming number of people, they1412encircled us, they started taking photos of us, and, at the1413time, even though I was fully anonymous, they tried to identify1414me and dox me online, circulating our photos, videos on WeChat1415groups to try to find out which student this is, what classes1416they were taking, trying to trace where we lived, and things1417like that. And very unfortunately, this was not the only time I1418encountered a CSSA. In 2023, when I was in San Francisco, as I1419talked about before, for the APAC summit, once again CSSA was1420mobilized. And this time at the San Francisco protest, many1421Chinese nationals were mobilized to support Xi Jinping. And1422among all the groups that were on the ground, the CSSA actually1423mobilized the majority of them.1424    They managed to get thousands of Chinese students traveling1425to San Francisco from Los Angeles, from other areas of1426California to support Xi Jinping, and to show that China is the1427kind of leader they wanted, which, of course, we know is a lie.1428And even though they were not the most hostile crowd,they1429definitely were the largest crowd. And we also found evidence1430that the CSSA actually promised paid meals and accommodations,1431telling students that they could just go to San Francisco for a1432trip, while in reality it was for propaganda. And it was also1433for intimidating people like us. So I would say that for higher1434institutions the existence of these Chinese Students and1435Scholars Associations is definitely a problem.1436    And the issue that they are still present in the United1437States allows the Chinese government plenty of apparatuses for1438them to spy on and surveil students in America, including Hong1439Kong students in America who are merely trying to express1440themselves. So that's why I urge higher institutions to really1441reconsider their partnership with the Chinese government and1442also reconsider the existence of CSSAs on campus while there1443has been plenty of evidence that they are acting as adversaries1444of American institutions and the government.1445    Co-chair Smith. To follow up on those students that flocked1446into San Francisco, was there any element of coercion--you1447know, to their families back home, you do this or else? Or was1448it more that they were ideologically simpatico with the Chinese1449Communist Party--naive, perhaps--or what? I mean, or they're1450getting a free trip?1451    Ms. Kwok. Yes. I would say the majority of them actually1452are more naive. They're thinking that they're getting a free1453trip, it doesn't really matter if they go, they're just1454standing there waving flags. That's what we observed the most1455from their WeChat groups. But at the same time there were also1456definitely ideologues who would go out of their way to really1457shout at us on the streets, or try to intimidate us with the1458number of people they have. And I think even though they are1459naive, as we have said in the earlier remarks, sometimes in the1460end you have to pick a side--always, as you said. It's either1461with the Tank Man or with the tanks. And I think for them,1462being naive doesn't excuse them from the fact that they are1463deciding to associate with the tanks.1464    Mr. Liu. I just want to add that, from a diplomatic point1465of view, we must engage the Chinese government, whether it's1466higher education in America, or whether it's the government, or1467businesses. I strongly encourage them to engage in China, deal1468with China. But at the same time we have to take a very strong1469position against human rights violations, and for the release1470of political prisoners. We can't isolate China. We have to1471change China. Thank you.1472    Co-chair Smith. Could states do more on this?1473    Mr. Bostar. I think the short answer is yes. Several states1474have done a lot. Most states have done something. Some states1475have done nothing. But no state has done enough, and so we need1476to be more strategic and coordinated with our actions. We often1477find ourselves--you know, I talk to my legislative colleagues1478from across the country. We spend, frankly, too much time1479reinventing the wheel. We need better mechanisms of1480coordinating among ourselves, and we also need better1481mechanisms of coordinating between the states and the federal1482government.1483    You know, this is a policy area that for too long was left1484simply to the federal government. And because of that, and1485because it's more novel and it's newer for subnational1486political entities to be engaging in this, we don't yet have1487the necessary connective tissue to allow for this to be done as1488efficiently as possible. And so we need to be deliberate about1489developing those relationships and creating those systems and1490partnerships to allow us to really do what we have to do and1491move forward.1492    Co-chair Smith. To conclude, I just hope and pray, and want1493to let you know, if there's anything we can do--especially Anna1494and Arthur--with regard to the ongoing threats that you1495receive, maybe as a result of testifying today. And Anna, as1496you know, this is not your first time. You are just incredibly1497brave; we will do everything we can. So if there's someone, the1498FBI, or otherwise, that we need to further alert to all of1499this--because again, these people are brutal. They are1500absolutely brutal.1501    I would reiterate my request to the Chinese Communist Party1502to allow me to lead a delegation to Xinjiang. I'd love to stop1503in Hong Kong as well and visit prisoners there. You know, even1504during the worst of the Soviet days, because I've been here1505since 1981, Frank Wolf and I--Congressman from Virginia--got1506into Perm Camp 35 in the early 1980s, where Sharansky and all1507of those great political prisoners were, a thousand miles1508outside of Moscow in the Ural Mountains. We talked to the1509procurator general at a big human rights conference. He said,1510Nothing to hide. We said we wanted to go to the Perm Camp. It1511took two years, but we got there. We interviewed every1512prisoner, and one by one, we got prisoners out. And then, of1513course, the Soviet Union fell, and they all got out.1514    But in terms of China, the foreign ministry said anybody1515who wants to go to Xinjiang can go there. So they were already1516attacking my Stop Forced Organ Harvesting Act at the embassy1517right here in town. Really, all lies, lies. No, the lies are on1518your side. But then they also, almost the same week--it was the1519same week--said anybody who wants to go there can go. We did a1520letter immediately saying, We want to go. We want to go. We've1521asked repeatedly. So I'm asking again from the dais here,1522knowing that they'll hear this. I want to lead a delegation, I1523want it to be bipartisan, to go to Xinjiang, to go to the1524camps, to raise these issues, and to do so very, you know,1525professionally. Talk to prisoners without any fear of1526retaliation, and all of that. So the request is, again,1527requested. Because they already said, We have nothing to hide--1528anybody can come. And we've been denied.1529    Thank you. Is there anything you want to add before we1530close? I don't want to keep you longer than--your testimony was1531outstanding. Helps us to do more. You're helping the cause1532mightily. The hearing is adjourned.1533    [Whereupon, at 3:07 p.m., the hearing ended.]15341535=======================================================================15361537                            A P P E N D I X15381539=======================================================================15401541                          Prepared Statements15421543                                ------15441545                   Prepared Statement of Stephen Cox15461547    Chairman Sullivan, members of the Commission--thank you for1548inviting me to testify today, and thank you for the work this1549Commission has done over these 25 years. I appreciate the opportunity1550to contribute to that work.1551    My own interest in the China threat--particularly the threat it1552poses to Americans here at home--goes back almost 20 years.1553    Early in my career, during the Bush administration, I served in the1554Director's Office at U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. One of1555the recurring challenges we dealt with involved the Chinese1556government's gamesmanship in repatriating Chinese nationals who had1557been ordered removed under our immigration laws. At the time, we did1558not see this simply as an immigration problem. We saw it partly as an1559intelligence problem--because of the way the PRC leveraged overseas1560networks, influence relationships, and diaspora connections inside the1561United States.1562    Fast forward to my service during the first Trump administration at1563the Department of Justice. Attorney General Jeff Sessions launched, and1564AG Bill Barr continued, the China Initiative because DOJ increasingly1565recognized that the PRC challenge touched nearly every dimension of1566American life: intellectual property theft, espionage, cyber1567intrusions, economic coercion, higher education, infrastructure,1568research institutions, supply chains, and influence operations.1569    When I moved to Texas in 2020 to become U.S. Attorney for the1570Eastern District of Texas, it was a few months later that the State1571Department shut down the Chinese Consulate in Houston after determining1572that it had become a hub for espionage, intellectual property theft,1573and influence operations directed against the United States. The1574closure was a stark reminder that the PRC threat was not an abstract1575foreign-policy concern overseas--it was operating on American soil,1576targeting American institutions, businesses, and citizens.1577    Most recently, as the 28th Attorney General of Alaska, I began1578standing up what we called a Counter-China Initiative--to consider an1579all-of-government approach to threats posed by the PRC to consumers,1580businesses, infrastructure, and public institutions in Alaska. And in1581my current role as Counsel to the Governor, I intend to continue and1582expand that work with the new Acting Attorney General and across other1583state agencies.1584    To my mind, for the first time, consumers are on the front lines of1585our geopolitical conflict with China, and many of the CCP's threats to1586Americans now arrive through ordinary consumer channels. And when I say1587consumers, I mean not only families, but businesses and governments as1588well. Every phone, app, router, camera, payment platform, and cloud1589service can potentially become an access point. We know in a1590theoretical sense how Beijing's access to massive amounts of American1591data could create a problem. A November article from the Financial1592Times gave one specific example: that a large Chinese technology1593company was providing American data to China's military in order to1594help them target Americans. This weaponized usage of American data gets1595directly at the threat of transnational repression which we are1596discussing today. State attorneys general are uniquely positioned1597because consumer protection laws allow us to pursue deception, data1598abuse, undisclosed risks, and unfair trade practices--areas where1599foreign influence often hides in plain sight.1600    Alaska's consumer protection laws are among the strongest in the1601country, and I believe consumer protection is one of the most powerful1602state-level tools available to address aspects of the Chinese threat.1603We are actively looking for opportunities to use those authorities--1604both on our own and in partnership with other strong attorneys general1605around the country, like Nebraska Attorney General Mike Hilgers,1606Florida Attorney General James Uthmeier, and Texas Attorney General Ken1607Paxton.1608    General Hilgers has been a national leader in this space. His1609office has pursued actions involving allegedly deceptive data-1610collection practices by Chinese-linked technology platforms and has1611also taken action involving connected camera and surveillance1612technologies sold to American consumers. General Paxton has also been a1613leader here. Texas currently has open claims against TP-Link, the1614largest router provider in America, along with Chinese television1615producers, camera companies, and mobile app providers. These efforts1616demonstrate that traditional consumer-protection authorities can play1617an important role in protecting Americans from risks that often have a1618national-security dimension.1619    We approached the China threat from another angle in Alaska. We1620became concerned about the flood of Chinese vape products entering1621American markets outside normal FDA review and approval processes. Many1622were marketed aggressively to younger consumers, with little1623transparency regarding sourcing, ingredients, or safety. The FDA has1624primary authority here, but we took steps to educate businesses and1625consumers about these risks that consumers, frankly, weren't aware of.1626    Another area of concern from a public safety perspective--and the1627focus of today's hearing--is transnational repression. We have not seen1628significant reported incidents in Alaska to date. But I would also1629caution that this is not the sort of threat that is easy to identify1630without training and awareness. That's because if you do not know what1631to look for, it could be happening right in front of your nose.1632    It may look like harassment. It may look like unusual pressure on a1633student. It may look like intimidation of a family after someone1634attends a protest or speaks publicly. It may involve digital1635surveillance, pressure campaigns, coercive phone calls, or threats1636directed at relatives overseas.1637    I would strongly support efforts to educate law enforcement on this1638threat, how we train personnel to recognize it, and how we coordinate1639with federal authorities when these situations arise.1640    Looking ahead, I believe the next frontier will involve closer1641coordination between attorneys general and administrative enforcement1642agencies--particularly in areas involving financial regulation, money1643transmission, data access, and critical infrastructure. One area that1644has drawn my attention involves cross-border payment platforms and1645money transmitters operating inside the United States, where questions1646of licensing, data security, cloud architecture, and foreign access1647increasingly intersect.1648    On this front, I want to commend Senator Tom Cotton of this1649Commission for publicly urging the Department of Justice to investigate1650reported risks involving Airwallex and potential exposure of sensitive1651American financial data to CCP influence or access.1652    I have my own concerns about this sector generally. A money-1653transmitter license is a privilege, not a right, and it carries1654obligations relating to consumer protection, data security, anti-money-1655laundering compliance, and the overall fitness of the licensee to1656handle sensitive financial information. I think it is reasonable to ask1657whether those obligations are fully compatible with a business model1658that places sensitive data, operational control, or key personnel1659within the reach of foreign-adversary governments, particularly where1660those governments claim legal authority to compel access to1661information. Those are the kinds of questions that state regulators1662increasingly will need to confront, and I've begun to have those1663conversations with our state regulators in Alaska.1664    States do not need to conduct foreign policy to play an important1665role here. But states can protect consumers. We can protect critical1666infrastructure. We can investigate deception, data abuse, and1667undisclosed risks. And we can ensure that Americans are not unknowingly1668exposed to foreign-adversary leverage through the products and services1669they use every day.1670    In other words, states should build upon domestic resilience in1671line with the federal direction on national security threats. The1672federal government tells us who our foreign adversaries are. States can1673be a force multiplier for securing our nation, and provide stronger and1674deeper front-line resilience against global threats.1675    That mission resonates particularly strongly in Alaska. Alaskans1676have an express constitutional right to privacy, and we take that right1677seriously. We also live in a place where consumer products, technology,1678and services are often more expensive and harder to obtain than1679elsewhere in the country. If Alaskans are paying a premium for a1680product or service, they deserve to know what they are getting--and1681what risks may come with it.1682    We are also America's Arctic state and a Pacific state. We sit at1683the intersection of strategic cargo, telecommunications, critical1684minerals, ports, fisheries, and Arctic logistics. As a result, many of1685the issues discussed today are not abstract for us.1686    My message is simple: many of the CCP's threats to Americans1687increasingly manifest themselves through areas traditionally governed1688by the states--public safety, consumer protection, licensing, and1689infrastructure. And because of that, states have both the authority and1690the responsibility to act--carefully, lawfully, and strategically--1691alongside our Federal partners.1692                                 ______16931694                   Prepared Statement of Eliot Bostar16951696    Chair Sullivan, Co-chair Smith, and honorable members of the1697Commission, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.1698    Over the last four years, the Nebraska Legislature has passed a1699slate of laws designed to protect Nebraskans from transnational1700repression, safeguard Nebraska's data and critical infrastructure1701against threats by foreign adversaries, and combat malign influence1702operations. Our first major statewide reform came in 2023. Since then,1703we have either led or partnered with other states in enacting1704pioneering security reforms every legislative session. In 2024, we1705focused on preparing our state for a potential conflict in the Pacific,1706in 2025 we worked to root out foreign influence operations and1707transnational repression, and earlier this year, we passed laws to1708protect our critical infrastructure. Nebraska is creating tangible1709results to protect our state and our citizens and building solutions1710that can serve as a model for other states, Congress, and even allied1711countries.1712    Nebraska is home to the U.S. Strategic Command at Offutt Air Force1713Base as well as numerous nuclear missile installations. We are one of1714the world's leading agricultural producers, and we are deeply1715integrated into America's transportation systems, financial and1716insurance systems, telecommunications networks, and other critical1717infrastructure. These attributes make Nebraska an attractive target for1718foreign adversaries. However, these attributes are also common across1719our nation. Every state has critical industries, infrastructure, and1720institutions that our national security relies on.1721    The People's Republic of China is a threat to every state and every1722community in our country.1723    Our work to address the threats facing Nebraska from the PRC began1724when we were alerted to concerns held by the Department of Defense1725about the pervasiveness of Huawei technology within the vicinity of1726critical defense infrastructure in1727Nebraska, including Strategic Command and nuclear missile sites.1728    Two years prior--in 2020--the U.S. Government took formal action to1729designate Huawei Technologies as a threat to national security, and1730Congress approved $1.9 billion to remove this Chinese-made cellular1731technology from communications systems across America. But Huawei1732technology was still in use--and being newly installed--throughout1733Nebraska years later.1734    In 2023, we drafted legislation to address this security risk by1735prohibiting telecommunications companies from receiving state-directed1736funds, including from the Nebraska Universal Service Fund, if they use1737or provide communications equipment deemed a national security threat.1738Additionally, telecommunications companies must certify annually that1739they are not utilizing any equipment identified as a threat by the FCC,1740and are subject to fines and penalties if they cannot provide that1741certification. The law also incentivizes the removal of prohibited1742equipment by stipulating that any telecommunications company that1743removes or replaces equipment identified as a national security threat1744shall not be required to obtain any additional permits or authorization1745from any state agency or local government for that removal or1746replacement. This provision prevents bureaucratic red-tape from1747endangering our national security.1748    Robust lobbying pressure was employed to keep Beijing-linked1749technologies in use throughout Nebraska's telecommunications1750infrastructure. But elected officials from both parties ultimately1751rejected this pressure and made certain that state funds were not1752subsidizing foreign surveillance. Nebraska enacted this legislation and1753paired it with executive actions restricting other state support for1754telecommunications equipment tied to Huawei and related entities.1755    After passage of this law, my office was inundated with information1756from national security and defense professionals who identified threats1757that could be addressed at the state level. Their expertise and1758partnership encouraged us to push forward, and we passed several more1759laws in 2024 to protect Nebraska against foreign adversaries.1760    The Foreign-owned Real Estate National Security Act works to1761protect strategic land near military installations and restrict foreign1762adversary ownership of critical real estate. This act prevents any1763person, foreign government, or entity determined to be a foreign1764adversary, from holding land within ten miles of a military1765installation, including nuclear missile silos. In cases of1766noncompliance, the law provides the Nebraska Attorney General with1767authority to force divestment.1768    We passed legislation to address the security gap left by the1769expiration of federal Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards. The1770federal standards were created after the September 11, 2001 terrorist1771attacks to ensure that high-risk chemical facilities were secure and1772protected from weaponization by terrorists. With passage of our bill,1773high-risk chemical facilities in Nebraska are now required to1774participate in the otherwise voluntary ChemLock program to promote1775continued security against potential terrorist threats involving1776hazardous chemicals.1777    The Pacific Conflict Stress Test Act created the joint Legislative1778and Executive Committee on Pacific Conflict with a straightforward1779purpose: to assess how a conflict in the Pacific could disrupt and1780endanger Nebraska. The Committee meets quarterly and works to identify1781ongoing vulnerabilities--evaluating the state's supply chains, export1782markets, critical infrastructure, and security apparatus--to make1783recommendations to strengthen state resilience.1784    Lastly, in 2024, we passed the Foreign Adversary Contracting1785Prohibition Act. This legislation prohibits companies controlled by1786foreign adversaries from participation in sensitive procurement1787contracts involving communications technology, networked systems, and1788critical infrastructure.1789    As we worked to pass these laws, we encountered significant1790opposition from a variety of interests. We learned about local1791government officials being contacted by the CCP, and we started to hear1792from victims of transnational repression, who were willing to share1793their stories. Reporting emerged regarding an alleged Chinese1794``overseas service station'' operating in Omaha, which further elevated1795our concerns regarding intelligence activity and transnational1796repression occurring within Nebraska. It became clear that we needed to1797take action to limit the CCP's broader ability to influence,1798manipulate, and hurt people in our state. This confluence of factors1799led us, in 2025, to introduce the Foreign Adversary and Terrorist Agent1800Registration Act and the Crush Transnational Repression in Nebraska1801Act.1802    The Foreign Adversary and Terrorist Agent Registration Act brings1803transparency to political, propaganda, and influence activities1804conducted by agents of foreign adversaries. The Act makes it unlawful1805for any person to act as an agent of a foreign adversary nation or1806foreign terrorist organization unless that person has registered with1807the Nebraska Attorney General. The Act requires any informational1808material distributed by an agent of a foreign adversary to be notated1809with a conspicuous statement identifying it as such, and to be1810submitted to the Attorney General within 48 hours.1811    Additionally, with passage of this Act, it is now against the law1812for an agent of a foreign adversary to communicate in any way with1813local or state government, any political propaganda or information on1814topics of politics, policy, or public interest, unless the1815communication is accompanied by a statement that the individual is1816registered as an agent of a foreign adversary. If an agent of a foreign1817adversary is testifying before the state legislature or any local1818government, they must provide the body with a copy of the most recent1819registration filed with the Attorney General.1820    The legislation also stipulates that if an individual or entity is1821representing a principal designated by the Pentagon as a Chinese1822military company, they must present an affirmative acknowledgment that1823they are working on behalf of, and thereby acting as an agent of, a1824foreign adversary of the United States. They must also disclose that1825they are lobbying on behalf of a Chinese military company and disclose1826that the Chinese military company is a foreign adversary of the United1827States in all lobbying activities, including mail, telephone calls,1828email, in-person meetings, or testimony at legislative hearings.1829    Violation of this provision results in a $100,000 fine, which1830increases by $100,000 for each subsequent violation, up to a maximum1831fine of $1 million per violation. Any individual who provides1832information leading to a penalty under this act is entitled to receive1833a $50,000 reward from the state.1834    The Crush Transnational Repression in Nebraska Act defines covered1835offenses of transnational repression, which are specific crimes already1836existing in law, that will now receive an enhancing charge in Nebraska1837if the person committing the offense is an agent of a foreign1838principal. This legislation also punishes foreign law enforcement, such1839as what reportedly occurs at so-called Chinese police stations, by1840establishing that an agent of a foreign adversary commits a felony if1841such person intentionally attempts to enforce a law or rule of a1842government of a foreign country in Nebraska.1843    We also passed legislation to reform our economic incentive1844programs to prevent foreign adversary companies from accessing any1845benefit from the state of Nebraska.1846    The Chinese Communist Party is adept at creating corporations1847ultimately answerable to the Chinese military apparatus and maneuvering1848those entities into positions where they are receiving American dollars1849to underwrite espionage efforts within our borders. No entity loyal to1850an adversary of this nation should be the beneficiary of any economic1851incentive paid for by our tax dollars.1852    In our final 2025 reform, we passed legislation in line with what1853Congress accomplished with the BIOSECURE Act in the most recent1854National Defense Authorization Act. Our genetic protection law1855establishes that no medical or research facility shall use any genetic1856sequencer, or software for genetic sequencing, if such device or1857software is produced in or by a foreign adversary. Chinese companies1858sanctioned by the Pentagon for human rights abuses have developed some1859of the world's largest gene banks. This genetic information is1860effectively property of the Chinese military and used for surveillance1861and military purposes. These massive stockpiles of genetic information1862provide the People's Republic of China and the Chinese military a clear1863advantage for creating bioweapons. Senior Chinese military officials1864have in fact already argued in favor of creating genetically targeted1865bioweapons that can incapacitate individuals based upon ethnicity. This1866law takes every measure possible to cut off Chinese military companies1867from accessing the genetic data of Nebraskans, and it complements and1868extends the congressional accomplishments in the BIOSECURE Act.1869    Just this spring, we enacted a new and unique protection for1870critical infrastructure, which contains two important provisions.1871First, foreign adversary companies are prohibited from providing1872critical infrastructure or contracting with critical infrastructure1873providers in such a way that would allow them to exercise operational1874control over critical infrastructure. Second, critical infrastructure1875providers are prohibited from utilizing network-connected technologies1876that would allow for remote operational control and sabotage.1877    Furthermore, we codified new enhanced penalties for crimes that we1878define as bioterrorism, including bringing in different pathogens for1879the purpose of damaging our farmlands as a tactic of hybrid warfare. We1880have seen several Chinese nationals1881arrested in Michigan for this type of crime over the past year alone.1882    Although we faced significant opposition to each of these pieces of1883legislation, we were able to pass them into law with bipartisan1884support.1885    The effects of Nebraska's actions are already visible. Awareness1886among state and local officials has increased significantly.1887Procurement standards have hardened. Infrastructure protections have1888expanded. Law enforcement coordination has improved. And Nebraska now1889evaluates infrastructure and investment questions through a national1890security framework that simply did not exist several years ago. Some of1891our most impactful reforms have received inquiries from other states1892that have replicated them. Congressional leaders, executive agencies,1893and even other nations like the United Kingdom have learned from1894different facets of what Nebraska has achieved.1895    Most importantly, Nebraska's leadership in combating malign foreign1896influence has demonstrated that states have power and responsibility in1897this space. America is a continental power. Our country is1898geographically massive, and our constitutional system is strongly1899federalist. States have dual sovereignty, and state leaders are closer1900to many of the national security risks that our citizens face. It only1901makes sense that states drive reforms that are aligned with or layer on1902top of federal protections. In fact, both President Biden and President1903Trump have called upon states to lead in driving solutions where we are1904closest to the security risks. We know our adversaries are coordinated1905and adept at attacking us at every layer of government--we must be able1906to defend ourselves utilizing this same whole-of-government approach.1907    We must strengthen coordination both between the states themselves1908and between the states and the federal government. Our work in Nebraska1909has been made possible by the guidance and partnership we have received1910from national1911security experts and practitioners. To meet the challenge across our1912nation, we need more established and formalized systems of1913coordination. We must ensure that we all have access to timely threat1914information, clear guidance, and meaningful partnerships so that we can1915identify vulnerabilities, protect critical assets, and contribute fully1916and comprehensively to the defense of the American homeland.1917    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward1918to your1919questions.19201921                    Prepared Statement of Arthur Liu19221923    Chairman Sullivan, Co-Chairman Smith, and members of the1924Commission: Thank you for inviting me to testify here today. My name is1925Arthur Liu. I am a political dissident from China and the father of1926Olympic Gold Medalist Alysa Liu.1927    It is especially meaningful to testify before this Commission on1928June 4, the anniversary of the Tiananmen Massacre, because the story I1929am telling today began in 1989 and, in many ways, continues to this1930day.1931    June 4 is a day that I will never forget. Thirty-seven years ago1932today, the Chinese government sent tanks and soldiers into the streets1933of Beijing and used military force against its own people. Thousands of1934students and civilians who had gathered peacefully to call for1935democracy, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the rule of law,1936and basic human rights lost their lives. Hundreds more were severely1937injured.1938    At that time, I was in Guangzhou attending graduate school at1939Zhongshan University. I was one of the principal organizers of the1940democracy movement there.1941    When news of the massacre reached Guangzhou, I was devastated. I1942could not understand and believe how a government that claimed to serve1943the people could turn its weapons against its own young people. In1944response, I organized additional peaceful protests and demonstrations1945condemning the violence. Soon afterwards, I became the most wanted1946democracy activist in southern China.1947    I was fortunate to escape to Hong Kong. I came to America as a1948refugee at the end of 1989.1949    After I came to America, I continued to organize protests in front1950of the Chinese Consulate in San Francisco and in front of the Chinese1951Embassy here in Washington, D.C. calling upon the Chinese government to1952release political and religious prisoners in China. I have spoken1953publicly many times about the human rights abuses in China.1954    Like many refugees, I believed that once I arrived in America, I1955had left political persecution behind. An incident in late 2021 proved1956me wrong!1957    To explain what happened, I must first tell you a little bit about1958my daughter, Alysa Liu. Alysa recently won two gold medals for the1959United States of America at the 2026 Winter Olympic Games in Milan-1960Cortina. Before that, she became the youngest U.S. women's champion in1961history when she won the U.S. Figure Skating Championship at ages 131962and 14. She set records as the youngest female skater in history ever1963to land a triple Axel in international competition, at the age of 12,1964and she was the first female skater in history to land both a triple1965Axel and a quadruple jump in the same competition program. In 2021, it1966was clear that she was on her way to represent the United States of1967America in the 2022 Winter Olympic Games in Beijing, China.1968    One day in late October or early November 2021, I received a phone1969call. The caller identified himself as an official associated with the1970United States Olympic and Paralympic Committee. He told me that he was1971conducting travel preparedness for international travel for me and my1972daughter and needed copies of our passports. He gave me a fax number to1973fax them to him. I told him that I would do it the next day. But I1974never did. That request felt unusual to me given that I knew how to1975submit our passports to the U.S. Figure Skating Association for1976international1977competitions.1978    A few days later, I got a phone call from the FBI, and they wanted1979to meet with me. During that meeting, agents informed me that my1980daughter and I were the targets of a Chinese government intelligence1981operation. They told me that an individual operating on behalf of the1982People's Republic of China had come to the San Francisco Bay area and1983was attempting to obtain personal information about us, including1984passport information.1985    I was shocked. My first thought was not about myself. It was about1986my daughter. I felt fearful for Alysa's safety not only in Beijing, but1987also in the United States. When Alysa returned from a competition in1988Japan, I decided to take her to another city for training.1989    As we were boarding our flight, I received a telephone call from1990the FBI. The agent informed me that the spy was on his way to our home.1991I will never forget that moment. It's a scene straight out of a movie!1992I was feeling chills in my bones.1993    The FBI agent informed me that they were prepared to move forward1994with the arrest of the spies. But I was terrified for Alysa's safety in1995Beijing and mental stress if the spying operation came to light. I1996asked the FBI not to take any action until after the Olympic Games and1997until Alysa returned home safely from China. I also requested1998additional security precautions for her during the Olympic Games.1999    Throughout her time in Beijing, Alysa was accompanied by two adults2000as she traveled between venues and participated in the Olympic Games.2001That gave me some comfort. But it never completely eliminated my fear2002for her safety. As a father, I was worried every day and prayed for her2003safe return to America, every day.2004    On March 16, 2022, after the Olympic Games, the Department of2005Justice announced criminal charges against the spies; one of them was2006Matthew Ziburis.2007    According to the federal criminal complaint, I was identified as2008``Dissident 3,'' and Alysa was identified as the ``family member.'' The2009complaint alleged efforts to obtain information about me and my family,2010including passport information, personal identifying information, and2011details about our lives. The complaint further alleged surveillance2012efforts directed at me, including placing a GPS tracker on my car to2013track my daily activities.2014    After the spying operation came to light in the news, a neighboring2015business owner came over to me and told me that he had seen the spy2016identified as Matthew Ziburis several times lingering around the lobby2017in front of my office.2018    I am personally grateful to the brave FBI agents who provided2019security for me and my daughter. I appreciate that the U.S. Government2020took forceful action to prosecute those spies. However, America cannot2021just stop there.2022    We all must understand that America will not be safe until China2023becomes a democracy! We all must understand that America will not be2024safe until China has a government which respects basic human rights and2025honors the rule of law! We all must understand that America will not be2026safe until people all over the world can live peacefully and2027harmoniously together.2028    America, we have a lot of work to do! Thank you!2029    Thank you again for inviting me to testify here today. I look2030forward to answering your questions.2031                                 ______20322033                    Prepared Statement of Anna Kwok20342035    Distinguished Members of the Commission:2036    Thank you for inviting me to share my experience as a target of2037intensifying transnational repression in the United States.2038    In this battle against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)--a regime2039that fears opposition--feeling safe is a privilege. I am among hundreds2040of thousands of rights defenders in America who live every single day2041knowing we are being watched and threatened. All incidents of2042transnational repression I share today took place on American soil.2043Together, they illustrate the varied tactics of a transnational2044repression campaign.2045    I served as the Executive Director of the Hong Kong Democracy2046Council, a U.S. advocacy organization sanctioned by the PRC. In May20472023, after I testified before this very Commission on the loss of Hong2048Kong's political autonomy and its implications for the U.S., the regime2049swiftly retaliated by issuing a 1 million HKD bounty on my head. My2050assets were frozen, and my passport was revoked, crippling my2051international advocacy work. More bounties were later issued on2052American citizens and residents.2053    The bounty put a huge target on my back. State media, pro-CCP2054extremists, and online propagandists launched a coordinated campaign to2055discourage the American public from associating with me.2056    Explicit threats to hurt, kidnap, rape, and even execute me on2057American soil flooded my social media.2058    The lawfare and digital threats became physical in November 20232059during Chinese leader Xi Jinping's visit to the U.S. When I organized2060protests against Xi and campaigned successfully to bar the sanctioned2061Hong Kong Chief Executive from entering the country, the regime2062retaliated on the streets of San Francisco: masked men assaulted fellow2063protesters while WeChat groups circulated my whereabouts. I escaped2064physical harm only because fellow protesters protected me; local police2065were completely oblivious to the existence of transnational repression2066and refused to intervene. To this day, none of the perpetrators,2067including American nationals, have been convicted. For the first time,2068I felt as if I had been transported back to the lawless streets of Hong2069Kong; even though I was in the land of the free, I was not free.2070    The online campaign and real-life violence achieved a chilling2071effect across America: Some supporters of the pro-democracy movement2072stopped showing up to events; a few went so far as to erase their2073digital footprints. Their response is all too familiar: it happened2074once in my first home, Hong Kong, and it is now happening in my second2075home, America.2076    Nonetheless, I refused to back down. I led a campaign to expose the2077foreign influence and transnational threats brought by the Hong Kong2078Economic and Trade2079Offices (HKETOs). In response, the regime unleashed its cruelest2080weapon: psychological warfare.2081    Last May, the regime arrested my father in Hong Kong. He was later2082convicted on fabricated charges. The state-run trial centered on an2083insurance policy my father had purchased when I was just a two-year-old2084learning to say ``papa.'' My father is imprisoned simply because he is2085my father. He is now a hostage serving a sentence for crimes neither of2086us committed. The CCP weaponized my love for my family in an attempt to2087silence me forever.2088    I speak to you today as my 70-year-old father sits in a cell 8,0002089miles away. I speak as someone with a 1 million HKD bounty on my head.2090I speak as a target of rampant transnational repression. And I speak as2091someone who is standing my ground to combat an urgent threat to2092American national security.2093    When a hostile foreign power launches centralized efforts--spanning2094state agencies, united front groups and individual extremists--to2095silence people inside the U.S., the government must respond with2096centralized, coordinated mechanisms. I urge the House Foreign Affairs2097Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee to mark up the2098bipartisan Transnational Repression Policy Act immediately--passing2099this legislation will provide the bedrock for building long-term cross-2100agency mechanisms that are necessary to protect America.2101    This is a litmus test for the country. If the U.S. does not draw a2102hard line and act quickly, the PRC will continue to push our2103boundaries, from running secret police stations to co-opting state2104officials. States like Nebraska and Utah are gearing up to protect2105their people; the nation should get ahead, too. We must confront the2106threat of transnational repression urgently, before it becomes a2107normalized pattern that cannot be undone. Thank you.2108                                 ______21092110                 Prepared Statement of Hon. Chris Smith21112112    Before we begin, I want to mark a solemn anniversary. Today marks2113the 37th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre. Thirty-seven2114years ago, millions of Chinese citizens peacefully asked for political2115reform, democratic openness, and basic human dignity. Their hope was2116met with tanks.2117    The Chinese Communist Party unleashed the People's Liberation Army2118on peaceful demonstrators. Mothers lost sons. Fathers lost daughters.2119And China lost an idealistic generation to the violence of June 4,21201989. There has been no full accounting of those killed, imprisoned, or2121disappeared. The Party still tries to erase a massacre the world must2122never forget.2123    But Tiananmen cannot be erased. The enduring image of that day is2124the Tank Man--the solitary figure standing before a column of tanks.2125His courage reminds us that the desire for freedom is not Western, not2126foreign, and not imposed from outside. It is universal.2127    As I have said before, a choice has to be made by us all: you2128either stand with the Tank Man, or you stand with the tank. There is no2129middle ground.2130    And there is no middle ground in the subject before us today.2131Tiananmen is not a detour from this hearing. It is the key to2132understanding it. The same Party that tried to crush truth at home now2133tries to chase truth abroad.2134    The tactics have changed. The technology has changed. The reach has2135expanded. But the purpose is the same: to make people afraid to speak2136the truth--by almost any means necessary. Inside China, the CCP uses2137surveillance, censorship, prison, torture, forced disappearance, and2138fear to maintain power.2139    But what happens in China no longer stays in China. The Party wants2140to control what is said about China here, and control who says it.2141    The CECC has warned about the CCP's long arm for years. Long before2142``transnational repression'' became a common phrase, I held a dozen or2143so Commission hearings documenting and exposing a consistent pattern of2144global abuse--starting with the Confucius Institutes in 2014.2145    Over time, tactics have become more digital and more ruthless:2146detaining family members in China, doxxing, spyware, deepfakes, Hong2147Kong bounties, and illegal police stations right here in the United2148States. It is outrageous and unacceptable and must be stopped.2149    Transnational repression is not the only threat Americans face, but2150it is part of a broader, interconnected CCP strategy. We see that2151strategy in scam networks stealing from U.S. citizens, fentanyl2152poisoning our cities, PRC-linked land purchases near military2153installations, efforts to corrupt politicians and elections, steal2154private personnel and biometric data, and intellectual property theft2155from businesses and universities.2156    These may look like separate problems, but they share a common2157purpose: exploit our openness, gather leverage, weaken our2158institutions, spread propaganda, and make Americans pay a price for2159standing up to Beijing.2160    Transnational repression is the most personal form of that2161strategy. It brings the pressure campaign to the doorstep of the2162student, journalist, dissident, artist, and family member. That is why2163state and local responses matter. A victim may first call local police.2164A student may go to a university official. A state attorney general may2165see the pattern. A state legislator may realize existing law does not2166fit the threat.2167    So the questions are practical: Do local officers recognize this2168threat, do universities know how to protect students, do states have2169the tools they need, and does the federal government have a real2170strategy?2171    That is why I am proud to work with Chairman Sullivan, Senator2172Merkley, and Representative McGovern on the Transnational Repression2173Policy Act. This bipartisan, bicameral legislation would define the2174abuse, improve coordination, train officials, support targeted2175communities, and hold perpetrators accountable--because victims need2176more than sympathy. They need protection and a place to turn.2177    Let me make one point clear. A regime that fears a student's2178question, a refugee's protest, an artist's statue, or the simple memory2179of Tiananmen is not a strong and confident superpower. It is afraid.2180And fear in the hands of a dictatorship is dangerous. It becomes2181coercion. It becomes censorship. It becomes repression that crosses2182borders and reaches into our communities.2183    So our answer must be unmistakable. If the CCP threatens people2184here, there must be investigations and prosecutions. If it reaches2185across our borders to spread fear, there must be sanctions. If it takes2186family members hostage to silence a critic, we will demand their2187release and expose the cruelty of that tactic. And if it tries to2188censor a free people, we will defend and spread the rights Beijing2189fears most: freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of2190assembly, and the right to tell the truth without fear.2191    Because in the United States of America, unlike in China, no one2192needs the Party's permission to speak, to worship, to protest, to2193remember, or to be free.2194    That is why this hearing matters.2195    Thank you. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.2196                                 ______21972198                Prepared Statement of Hon. Dan Sullivan21992200    Today's hearing comes at a pivotal moment. Because one of the2201clearest lessons of the last decade is this: what happens in China does2202not stay in China.2203    The Chinese Communist Party is not content to repress people inside2204China's borders. It is increasingly trying to export that repression2205abroad, including here in the United States. And that is what this2206hearing is about: threats to Americans, on American soil.2207    Let me say at the outset, very clearly: That is unacceptable, it is2208outrageous and it has to stop. And the title of this hearing goes2209directly to legislation that Congressman Smith and Congressman McGovern2210are leading in the House, and that Senator Merkley and I are advancing2211in the Senate: the Transnational Repression Policy Act.2212    That bill starts from a very basic principle. If the CCP is going2213to harass, surveil, threaten, and intimidate people living in freedom2214in the United States, then the United States needs to respond--2215seriously, strategically, and on a bipartisan basis. Because this is2216not some secondary issue. It is about protecting Americans.2217    Let me make this concrete. Alaska may not sit at the center of the2218PRC's transnational repression apparatus, but even Alaska has not been2219spared. An Alaskan constituent recounted to me that, during a high-2220level CCP official's visit to2221Alaska, he was intimidated and surrounded by Chinese security officials2222after staging a one-person protest. He said that a local Chinese2223community group was then contacted to register displeasure over his2224exercise of free speech.2225    Think about that. One person, standing alone, on American soil,2226exercising a constitutional right. And that was enough to trigger an2227effort by the Chinese Communist Party to intimidate him into silence.2228    That incident took place some time ago. Since then, the CCP's2229tactics have evolved, its operations have expanded, and its reach has2230grown much more sophisticated. Freedom House has described the PRC's2231transnational repression campaign as the most sophisticated,2232comprehensive, and far reaching in the world. But the goal is still the2233same--to use the power and pressure of the party-state to coerce,2234censor, and silence critics far beyond China's borders.2235    That is why this hearing matters.2236    And more and more, the CCP is not just targeting the critic. It is2237targeting the family. It threatens relatives, jails family members,2238uses exit bans, and pressures loved ones back in China in order to2239silence people living freely here in America. We should call that what2240it is: hostage diplomacy. It is a way of telling people in the United2241States that if they speak out, somebody they love may pay the price.2242    Chinese students and scholars are intimidated on university2243campuses. Chinese military-backed companies are forging ties with2244university researchers and buying land near sensitive military sites.2245We have even seen efforts to establish Chinese police stations here in2246the United States. The CCP is targeting critics, pressuring families,2247stealing from Americans through scam centers tied to Chinese criminal2248networks, and making people in this country think twice before they2249speak.2250    These may look like different problems on paper, but they reflect2251the same basic approach: project power, spread fear, gather leverage,2252and probe for weakness here in the United States.2253    One encouraging sign is that states are not waiting around for2254Washington. Texas took action in 2024 to protect Texans from PRC-led2255transnational repression. And in 2025, lawmakers in Texas, Nebraska,2256and Arizona--Republicans and Democrats--passed bipartisan legislation2257to strengthen penalties and improve law-2258enforcement responses.2259    We should be learning from those efforts. What is working? Where2260are the gaps? What tools do state and local officials need and how can2261the federal government actually be helpful?2262    These are practical questions. But they are also urgent ones.2263Because every day this goes unanswered, the CCP gets a little bolder.2264And we cannot allow that to become normal.2265    People who come to America for freedom should not have to live in2266fear on American soil. People exercising rights protected by our2267Constitution should not have to look over their shoulder because2268Beijing is threatening their family members back home. Chinese students2269on American campuses should not have to wonder whether the regime is2270watching them. And the Chinese Communist Party should never come to2271believe that it can use surveillance, intimidation, or deepfakes to2272police speech or spread fear inside the United States without a2273response.2274    Threats to Americans are unacceptable. That is the bottom line. And2275if the CCP thinks it can intimidate people in the United States and get2276away with it, then this hearing should send a very clear message: Not2277here. Not in this country. And not without a concerted and tough2278response.2279                                 ______22802281              Prepared Statement of Hon. James P. McGovern22822283    I want to thank my colleague from New Jersey, Congressman Smith,2284for his words and for his commitment to human rights, not only in China2285but all around the world.2286    Good morning. I join my colleagues in welcoming our witnesses and2287guests to today's hearing on transnational repression.2288    Today is June 4th. And as Co-chair Smith pointed out, 37 years ago,2289the Chinese government directed the military to attack civilians who2290were exercising their right to freedom of expression to call for2291economic and political reform.2292    Let us never forget those who bravely stood for freedom in2293Tiananmen Square and other cities, the mothers who never knew the fate2294of their children, and those who continue to tell the stories in the2295face of a government that seeks to silence them.2296    And let us not forget that any society whose leaders are willing to2297use lethal force against peaceful protesters is a society at risk of2298losing its fundamental liberties.2299    I am glad that the Commission continues to address transnational2300repression. In 2020, Co-chair Marco Rubio and I created a new chapter2301called ``Human Rights Violations in the U.S. and Globally'' in the2302Annual Report.2303    CECC staff have just released a special report on transnational2304repression. I always appreciate the dedication of the non-partisan2305subject matter experts who work for the Commission. This report is2306absolutely worth reading.2307    China is the world's worst perpetrator of transnational repression.2308Freedom House lists the PRC with the most incidents (319) since 2014--2309and that only accounts for reported incidents. Who knows how many2310people have gotten threatening texts or calls that they are too scared2311to report?2312    But transnational repression (TNR) is more than China. Freedom2313House lists Tajikistan, Rwanda, Russia, Egypt, and Belarus among the2314biggest violators. Last year I chaired a Tom Lantos Human Rights2315Commission hearing highlighting TNR by India, Pakistan, and Hong Kong.2316Yesterday afternoon Co-chair Smith and I convened a hearing on Turkiye,2317listed with 160 TNR incidents.2318    Hearings are fine. But it really is time for action.2319    Advocates tell us their #1 goal is to create a standard definition2320of transnational repression. I am proud to join with CECC leaders2321Senators Merkley and Sullivan and Co-chair Smith in sponsoring the2322Transnational Repression Policy Act. It defines TNR in statute,2323strengthening efforts to counter it at the federal, state and local2324level. This bill was first introduced in the House three years ago. But2325it has gone nowhere.2326    In March, Freedom House led a coalition of 35 organizations,2327including Uyghur, Tibetan, Chinese, and Hong Kong human rights groups,2328in a statement to the chairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and2329Senate Foreign Relations Committee, asking them to mark up the bill.2330    Foreign Affairs has scheduled four mark-ups since that letter. But2331the Transnational Repression Policy Act never makes the agenda. I ask2332Chairman Mast in the House to act.2333    Our bill is important because it would give the U.S. the tools to2334lead on TNR. Equally important, we must acknowledge that the tools will2335only be effective if we avoid double standards. I worry we are falling2336short:23372338        1.  President Biden started and President Trump completed the2339        rehabilitation of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who2340        directed the murder of Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey. We lose2341        credibility when the U.S. Government allows impunity for2342        transnational repression.23432344        2.  This Commission characterized the deportation by Thailand2345        of 40 Uyghurs to China as transnational repression. Yet the2346        Trump administration has deported individuals who have been2347        transnationally repressed in the U.S. by Iran and Russia back2348        to those countries. We lose credibility to ask other countries2349        to protect TNR victims when the U.S. Government refuses to2350        protect TNR victims.23512352        3.  To the extent we label political interference by China in2353        the U.S. as transnational repression, then we must consider2354        Senator Bernie Moreno's meddling in the Colombian election as2355        transnational repression. We lose credibility when U.S.2356        officials act like CCP officials.23572358        4.  Last year the Trump administration sanctioned a Brazilian2359        judge who brought insurrectionists to justice, falsely2360        portraying legitimate accountability as transnational2361        repression. We lose credibility when U.S. officials pervert TNR2362        to help political allies.23632364    In September, our credibility will again be tested. Xi Jinping will2365visit Washington at President Trump's invitation. The last time he was2366in the U.S., thugs associated with the Chinese consulate in San2367Francisco beat up anti-Xi protesters. We must be prepared to defend the2368right to protest here.2369    The question is: Will we?2370    The Trump administration has deployed security forces to suppress2371Americans' right to protest. They're doing it now outside the Delaney2372Hall ICE facility in Newark, New Jersey. If Xi Jinping asks President2373Trump to contain or control Chinese, Uyghur, and Tibetan protesters,2374will he do that, or will he be wind at the backs of those engaged in2375legitimate dissent?2376    The administration has deported people for exercising their free2377speech rights under the First Amendment and the ICCPR to criticize the2378Israeli government. If Xi Jinping asks President Trump to deport2379people, for whatever reason, back to China, we must make it clear that2380that is unacceptable, and we will not do that, and we will not stand2381for that.2382    Transnational repression is a human rights violation. All human2383beings are2384entitled to the same rights, no matter where they live, or how they2385feel about their2386government.2387    I thank the witnesses for being here and I welcome their insight.23882389              [THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]23902391[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]23922393              [THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]23942395[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]23962397              [THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]23982399                          Witness Biographies24002401    Stephen J. Cox, Counsel to the Governor, State of Alaska24022403    Stephen J. Cox serves as Counsel to the Governor of Alaska and2404previously served as Alaska's 28th Attorney General. In state service,2405he has advised the Governor and executive agencies on major legal,2406constitutional, and policy matters, including litigation, public2407safety, regulatory initiatives, resource development priorities,2408consumer protection, and risks connected to China such as illegal2409imports, counterfeit and unsafe products, and technology concerns2410affecting vulnerable Alaskans. He previously served as Senior Vice2411President and Chief Legal and Strategy Officer at Bristol Bay2412Industrial, and earlier as principal attorney for Apache Corporation's2413Alaska operations. Cox also served in senior roles at the U.S.2414Department of Justice, including as Deputy Associate Attorney General2415and U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Texas, where his work2416included corporate enforcement policy, regulatory reform, white collar2417crime, elder fraud, and violent crime prosecutions.24182419    Eliot Bostar, Nebraska State Senator24202421    State Senator Eliot Bostar represents District 29 in the Nebraska2422Legislature, where he was first elected in 2020 and re-elected in 2024.2423A nonprofit executive and graduate of St. John's Northwestern Military2424Academy and Embry-Riddle University, he serves on the Banking, Commerce2425and Insurance Committee, the Revenue Committee, the Committee on2426Committees, the Reference Committee, the Rules Committee, the Executive2427Board, the Legislature's Planning Committee, the Streamlined Sales and2428Use Tax System Committee, and the Statewide Tourism and Recreational2429Water Access and Resource Sustainability Committee. Senator Bostar2430introduced LB644 at the request of Nebraska's Governor; the measure,2431approved by the Governor in June 2025, adopted the Foreign Adversary2432and Terrorist Agent Registration Act and the Crush Transnational2433Repression in Nebraska Act, among other provisions related to foreign-2434adversary contracting and genetic sequencing data.24352436    Arthur Liu, Owner, Inter-Pacific Law Group24372438    Arthur Junguo Liu is an attorney in the San Francisco Bay area and2439the father of two-time Olympic gold medalist figure skater Alysa Liu.2440Born and raised in China, Liu was attending graduate school at2441Zhongshan University in Guangzhou in 1989 when he organized student2442demonstrations calling for democracy, human rights, and an end to2443corruption. After the June 4 Massacre, he became one of the most wanted2444student activists in South China and came to the United States as a2445political refugee at the end of 1989. He later earned an MBA and JD in2446California and has practiced law for more than 27 years. Liu has2447continued his advocacy for democracy and human rights in China by2448organizing protests outside the Chinese Consulate in San Francisco and2449the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C. After PRC-linked efforts to2450recruit Alysa Liu to compete for China, Liu and his daughter became2451targets of PRC spying operations before the 2022 Winter Olympic Games.24522453    Anna Kwok, Board Director and former Executive Director, Hong Kong2454Democracy Council24552456    Anna Kwok is a Hong Kong organizer and policy analyst based in2457Washington, D.C. She is a Board Director and former Executive Director2458of the Hong Kong2459Democracy Council, a nonpartisan nonprofit organization that supports2460Hong Kong's pro-democracy movement and Hong Kongers in the United2461States through policy advocacy, diaspora empowerment, and research and2462education. Kwok previously worked as an anonymous activist on major2463international campaigns, later choosing to make her identity public2464after the imposition of Hong Kong's National Security Law in order to2465resist the climate of fear affecting Hong Kong activists abroad. In24662023, Hong Kong authorities issued an arrest warrant and offered a HK$12467million bounty in connection with her advocacy work. In 2025, Kwok's2468father was arrested and imprisoned in what she and other advocates have2469described as retaliation for her advocacy.24702471                              [all]