J.Hrg.119

1[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 119 Congress]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34                       DARK NETS, ILLICIT LABOR_5                    CONFRONTING CHINA'S IUU FISHING6                        AND SEAFOOD SUPPLY CHAIN78=======================================================================910                                HEARING1112                               before the1314              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA1516                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS1718                             SECOND SESSION1920                               __________2122                             APRIL 16, 20262324                               __________2526 Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China2728                [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]2930              Available at www.cecc.gov or www.govinfo.gov3132                                ______3334                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE353663-610 PDF                WASHINGTON : 20263738              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA3940                    LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS4142Senate                               House4344DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska, Chair          CHRIS SMITH, New Jersey, Co-chair45TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa46JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                 ELISE STEFANIK, New York47TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois            DALE STRONG, Alabama48ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 JEN KIGGANS, Virginia49LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware       JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts50                                     THOMAS SUOZZI, New York51                                     SUHAS SUBRAMANYAM, Virginia52                                     JAMES WALKINSHAW, Virginia5354                     EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS5556                           Not yet appointed5758                      Scott Flipse, Staff Director59                   Mary Vigil, Deputy Staff Director6061                                  (ii)6263                            C O N T E N T S6465                              ----------6667                               Statements6869Opening Statement of Hon. Dan Sullivan, a U.S. Senator from70  Alaska; Chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on China.....     171Statement of Hon. Chris Smith, a Representative from New Jersey72  and Co-chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on China......     573Statement of Hon. Dale Strong, a Representative from Alabama.....     674Statement of Ian Urbina, director and founder, The Outlaw Ocean75  Project........................................................     776Statement of Hon. Sheldon Whitehouse, a Senator from Rhode Island     977Statement of Scott W. Clendenin, RADM, USCG (Ret.), owner, Dog78  Zebra Solutions LLC and strategic advisor to ``The Geopolitics79  of the Ocean--Why Healthy Seas Are Vital to America's National80  Security,'' (World Wildlife Fund, 2025)........................    1081Statement of Hon. Dean A. Pinkert, former commissioner and Vice82  Chairman of the U.S. International Trade Commission and special83  advisor, Corporate Accountability Lab..........................    1284Video testimony of fisherman Muhammad Sahrudin...................    138586                                APPENDIX8788                          Prepared Statements8990Urbina, Ian......................................................    2791Clendenin, Scott W...............................................    2992Pinkert, Dean A..................................................    349394Sullivan, Hon. Dan...............................................    3695Smith, Hon. Chris................................................    389697                       Submissions for the Record9899Questions for Admiral Clendenin from Chair Sullivan..............    41100Submission of the Southern Shrimp Alliance.......................    45101102CECC Truth in Testimony Disclosure Form..........................    57103Witness Biographies..............................................    59104105                                 (iii)106107                       DARK NETS, ILLICIT LABOR--108                    CONFRONTING CHINA'S IUU FISHING109                        AND SEAFOOD SUPPLY CHAIN110111                              ----------112113                        THURSDAY, APRIL 16, 2026114115                            Congressional-Executive116                                       Commission on China,117                                                    Washington, DC.118    The hearing was held from 10:09 a.m. to 11:36 a.m., in Room119562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC, Senator120Dan Sullivan, Chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on121China, presiding.122    Also present: Co-chair Chris Smith, Senators Kim and123Whitehouse, and Representative Strong.124125 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN, A SENATOR FROM ALASKA126     AND CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA127128    Chair Sullivan. The Commission will come to order. We are129here today to examine illegal, unreported, unregulated fishing130by the People's Republic of China. What we're dealing with is a131state-backed system run by the Chinese Communist Party that132combines illegal fishing, market manipulation, some of the133worst environmental standards on oceans in the world, gray134fleets that don't abide by any international treaties, and135forced labor, all in one supply chain. And it's happening at136scale--what we call IUU fishing. This system has real137consequences for American workers, for law-abiding American138fishermen--particularly in my state, the great state of139Alaska--and for the integrity of the entire global seafood140market. The PRC has built the world's largest distant-water141fishing fleet. These vessels do not simply compete, they142overwhelm.143    And as China always does, they cheat. They show up in other144countries' waters, hundreds if not thousands of these gray145fleet vessels. They push into exclusive economic zones, where146they're not supposed to be. They ignore quotas and147environmental standards. They transship and relabel the catch148to hide its origin. And they use forced labor, slave labor.149This is not fair competition. Alaska fishermen can't compete150against slave labor. It is a strategy of economic coercion that151has direct consequences here at home, but also overseas.152    My state I like to refer to as the superpower of seafood.153We produce over 60 percent of the wild-caught seafood in the154United States--commercial, subsistence, sport. In Alaska, we155have some of the best-managed fisheries in the world. We156certainly have challenges like bycatch, but our fishermen157generally follow the law. They respect environmental standards.158They manage sustainably. They are very focused on preserving159resources for future generations. Alaska fishermen, American160fishermen, should not be forced to compete against gray fleets161from China that disregard rules, benefit from state subsidies,162flood global markets with cheap products tied to illegal163practices, all the while destroying fish stocks through164trawling and other operations on the high seas.165    Again, this is not fair competition. And it gets worse.166There's credible evidence that parts of the PRC seafood supply167chain involve forced labor, slave labor, including Uyghur labor168and North Korean labor, in seafood processing. North Koreans169and Indonesians, and others, are also being used on Chinese170fishing boats in conditions that resemble slave labor. So when171we talk about IUU fishing, we are not just talking about172resource theft and environmental degradation. We are talking173about a system in which illegal fishing, hidden sourcing, labor174exploitation, market distortion, and horrendous environmental175standards for sustainable ocean fisheries are all connected.176This should concern all of us.177    Then add Russia to this mix. Russian seafood can be178processed in China, relabeled, and then pushed back into global179markets. This undermines sanctions and further distorts prices.180It should not be possible, but it is happening now as we speak.181This is a serious problem, and it deserves serious attention.182Fortunately, we are beginning to act. I weighed in extensively183with the Trump administration to communicate how much Alaska184fishermen need a comprehensive ban on Russian seafood imports185into the United States to continue. Russia banned the186importation of American seafood in 2014.187    We have not been able to export one fish to Russia since1882014. You want to talk about an unlevel playing field? We were189able to get a ban on Russian seafood into the United States.190When they tried to launder their seafood through China, we191clamped down on that as well. I was happy to see the Trump192administration renew that ban just a few weeks ago to help193maintain and strengthen Federal measures, ensure a level194playing field against Russia, and promote Alaskan and American195fishermen and coastal communities that support them.196    Congress has also begun to respond. Two weeks ago, the197Senate unanimously passed my Fighting Foreign Illegal Seafood198Harvests Act, the FISH Act. This is an effort, a comprehensive199effort that I've been working on for many years with my friend200and colleague Senator Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island, that201recognizes the huge threat of IUU fishing, not just as an202environmental issue, but as an economic issue, a labor issue, a203national security issue. When Senator Whitehouse and I were at204the Munich Security Conference--not this year but last year and205the year before--the AFRICOM commander, the four-star Marine206general in charge of U.S. AFRICOM, the combatant commander for207AFRICOM, met with a bunch of Senators saying the number one208national security issue he's dealing with right now is IUU209fishing from China off the coast of Africa, if you can believe210that.211    This is an issue that combines national security, forced212labor, human trafficking, environmental degradation, and213sustainable oceans, all wrapped up in one. Our FISH Act is the214most comprehensive enforcement effort to combat IUU fishing in215the history of Congress. And it passed in a unanimous way in216the U.S. Senate. So we're hoping our House colleagues will get217that one over the goal line soon, and I'm confident that we218will. Congress also passed, and the President signed into law,219a provision that I included in the NDAA last year, barring the220Pentagon from selling or procuring any Chinese seafood imports221into our commissaries or military dining facilities. Our222servicemen and women and their families should not be eating223communist fish. We should be eating freedom fish from Alaska224and America, and we were able to start an important way in225which to do that. I'm pretty darn sure Chinese military members226are not eating great wild Alaskan salmon, so we shouldn't be227eating their fish, especially given how it's harvested.228    I've also been the leading advocate for elevating the role229of seafood within the U.S. Department of Agriculture. I'm very230honored to announce that just yesterday the Secretary of231Agriculture, the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of232Commerce, and the NEC Chairman Kevin Hassett and I announced233the USDA Office of Seafood Policy--this is something I've been234working on for 10 years and we finally did it--to enable the235farmers of the sea, our great American fishermen, to have many236of the same benefits that our farmers have from USDA and have237the White House fully coordinate American seafood policy. In238our press conference and roundtable yesterday with many239American fishermen throughout the country, we talked a lot240about the issues we are going to be focused on in this hearing.241It's progress.242    If illegal seafood can still be caught in one place,243processed in another, relabeled, and sold in the United States,244then we have significant gaps to close. If Withhold Release245Orders from Customs are not brought robustly, if traceability246remains incomplete, and if import controls are still too easy247to circumvent, then bad actors will continue to exploit these248weaknesses. That is why this hearing matters. We need to249understand more fully where our enforcement tools are working,250where they are falling short, and what more should be done.251    I'm particularly interested in hearing from our experts252today on the utility of tools like the Uyghur Forced Labor253Prevention Act. That was a bill that Chairman Smith and Senator254Rubio, now our Secretary of State, got passed into law, that255banned the importation of products from China that use Uyghur256forced labor. One of my questions today will be, if the Chinese257are using forced labor for fisheries, why are we allowing any258fish from China into the United States, not just the fish going259to our commissaries and military dining facilities? Senator260Merkley and I have introduced a bill to follow on that, the261Uyghur Genocide Accountability and Sanctions Act, that262reinforces some of these provisions. As it moves through the263process, maybe there's more we can do with it. We're certainly264open to suggestions from our witnesses.265    At this time this is not a challenge the United States266faces alone. Countries around the world are dealing with the267same tactics--as I mentioned, African countries, Latin American268countries. The same coercive patterns, the same gray fleets,269Chinese fleets, that ravage the ocean, the same difficulty of270enforcing rules against these fleets that operate at scale and271in the shadows. We need to work with our partners to improve272enforcement capacity and increase the cost of this illegal IUU273behavior. Though China's IUU fishing is a global and complex274problem, at the end of the day the principle here is simple. If275you are engaged in illegal fishing, if you are exploiting276workers, if you are using slave labor, if you are hiding all of277these things, then you should not have access to the American278market, period. That should be the standard.279    If we banned all Russian seafood, which we have, why280shouldn't we also ban all Chinese seafood, which we should.281This hearing is an opportunity to expose the Chinese IUU282fishing system that impacts more than just sustainable and283healthy oceans. It's a human trafficking racket. It is an284opportunity to identify where our policies need to be stronger285and make clear that the United States intends to defend lawful286producers, uphold human rights, and enforce the laws--287particularly [former Commission] chairman and Senator, now288Secretary, Rubio.289    [The prepared statement of Chair Sullivan appears in the290Appendix.]291    I want to thank our witnesses for helping bring292transparency to what is designed to stay hidden. I want to293introduce them, because we have an expert panel.294    Ian Urbina is the founder and director of The Outlaw Ocean295Project, a Washington, DC.-based nonprofit journalism296organization that investigates human rights, environmental, and297labor abuses across the world's oceans. Before launching the298project, he spent nearly 17 years as a staff reporter for the299New York Times. His work has earned numerous awards. His New300Yorker articles and political articles were exceptional, and301I've cited them many times in testimony. His awards include a302Pulitzer Prize, two George Polk Awards, and an Emmy. This is303journalism at its finest and most important.304    Rear Admiral Scott Clendenin has served 33 years on active305duty in the U.S. Coast Guard and retired as Assistant306Commandant for Response Policy where he oversaw operational307policy across seven mission areas. He spent 14 years at sea on308six Coast Guard cutters, commanded four of them, and led309international multi-mission patrols involving narcotics310interdiction, fisheries enforcement, mass migration response,311search and rescue, and disaster response. Ashore he held senior312intelligence and policy roles supporting national operations313and interagency efforts. He is a 1990 graduate of the U.S.314Coast Guard Academy.315    And finally, the Honorable Dean Pinkert, who is an316international trade and human rights lawyer and consultant who317serves as a special advisor to Corporate Accountability Lab. He318spent 10 years as a commissioner at the International Trade319Commission, including two as the vice chairman. He has320testified before Congress and has written and spoken widely on321trade policies, including U.S. efforts to prevent the322importation of goods produced by forced laborers.323    I want to welcome the witnesses. I want to hear from our324Co-chairman--his opening statement. Then we look forward to the325statements from our witnesses.326    Mr. Chairman.327328STATEMENT OF HON. CHRIS SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY329                  AND CO-CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-330                 EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA331332    Co-chair Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and333thank you for your extraordinary leadership on the FISH Act.334You know, I've been in Congress now 46 years. Very often,335because of the filibuster and the unbelievable power one member336has to stop a bill . . . you were able to navigate, overcome337just tremendous odds to get this piece of legislation passed by338the Senate. It will pass in the House. I've already talked to339the Chairman, that you have continually talked to--Bruce340Westerman--who's a great chairman. He's all in. He's had his341hearings himself.342    But you did--and people have to know this--the nearly343impossible. Because there would be a hold on this bill. I know344the four or five people who would have done it. You navigated345that just brilliantly, and I want to thank you for that. The346bill will pass, I think people know, unanimously. And again,347it's comprehensive. It is a historic, landmark piece of348legislation to combat foreign, illegal, unreported, and349unregulated--IUU--fishing. The Sullivan FISH Act will blacklist350offenders from U.S. ports, bolster the U.S. Coast Guard's351enforcement capabilities, and advance international and352bilateral negotiations to achieve enforceable agreements.353Again, we will just back your leadership in the House and get354this over the finish line and signed by the President.355    Let me also say too, your amendment that you got into the356NDAA to ban the purchase of these products by our commissaries,357the PXs, we had written the Biden administration--and that358would be Marco Rubio and I--frequently saying, all of the359agencies of government who buy fish, and were the biggest360purchasers of fish in the world, how could we be doing that361when it is being made with forced labor in violation of the362Uyghur Act, as well as the Uyghur Human Rights Act? And we get363crickets. You know, they didn't do a thing. You've now put it364into law, and I can't say [enough] how grateful all of us are365for your extraordinary leadership. It's just amazing, and it's366going to make the difference.367    And I do hope your constituents know, because in addition368to being a fundamental human rights issue, it also is a great369issue for your fishermen. I have many in my state of New370Jersey. They can't compete against unfair trading of that kind,371where you force people to be on these boats. And again, Ian, at372great risk to his investigators--and I mean great risk, being373on the boats themselves--were able to expose this. And yet we374really--until your law, and it's going to be a law--we got375nothing. You know, we got a lot of, Oh, wow, that's something.376But nobody would say, let's really do something. And again,377four years of the Biden administration, crickets. They wouldn't378do it. And I can't tell you how upset I am with them.379    At our Commission hearing in 2023, we did hear from Ian,380who did a tremendous job. I like the way you [the Chair] said,381you know, outstanding leadership on the journalistic side. You382[the Chair] have shown us outstanding legislative leadership,383Mr. Chairman, to get this legislation passed by the U.S.384Senate. We did have a hearing. We called it ``From Bait to385Plate: How Forced Labor in China Taints America's Seafood386Supply Chain.'' And across the board, whether it be calamari or387whatever it might be, we're talking about a highly tainted388industry with forced labor. And you know, nobody does forced389labor as horribly and as egregiously as Xi Jinping does. Of390course, a whole industry now has been tainted. And again, Ian,391you're the one who broke the story on all this.392    You know, I want to thank you. I do have a long statement,393but we do want to get to our witnesses. I ask, with unanimous394consent, that it be made a part of the record. But I can't395thank you enough, Mr. Chairman. I mean, this is leadership. I396hope people realize how hard it is to get a human rights bill397passed in the U.S. Senate, and you've achieved it. Thank you.398    [The prepared statement of Co-chair Smith appears in the399Appendix.]400    Chair Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It was a team401effort. Senator Whitehouse, I think, is going to show up here402in a little bit. He was my partner on this.403    Congressman, do you have an opening statement?404405                 STATEMENT OF HON. DALE STRONG,406                 A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA407408    Representative Strong. Well, Mr. Chairman, it's an honor to409be back again with each of you. Thank you all for being here410today, our witnesses. This is a very distinguished group that411is before this Commission. Think about this: China's illegal412fishing practices and forced labor systems--totally413unacceptable. Alabama's red snapper fishery is one of the most414well managed and profitable in the Gulf, yet our local415fishermen are forced to compete with cartel-backed poachers and416subsidized foreign fleets that ignore conservation standards.417And I think that that right there is working against America. I418just commend both of you, especially because this wasn't an419easy fight. But I think we're definitely going in the right420direction.421    In this opening statement, I just want to commend both of422you for this. And we'll roll with questions later. I thank each423of you for being here. And Ian, I thank you for your hard work.424Not an easy lift that you went through, but I can tell you, the425world saw it. There's no doubt. And I thank each of you for426being here. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.427    Chair Sullivan. Thank you.428    We're going to begin, speaking of forced labor, with a very429quick video. We will start with the testimony of our three430distinguished witnesses, and then we'll wrap that up with the431short video. Then we will have questions for the panel.432    It's good to see Senator Kim here as well. Do you want to433say anything? Okay.434    Why don't we begin? I've already introduced our witnesses,435again, three distinguished witnesses. I want to begin with Ian436Urbina, who's done such a great job on The Outlaw Ocean437Project, and hear from him. You have five minutes for an438opening statement, and if you wish to submit a longer written439statement for the record, we will certainly accept that. Mr.440Urbina.441442                    STATEMENT OF IAN URBINA,443         DIRECTOR AND FOUNDER, THE OUTLAW OCEAN PROJECT444445    Mr. Urbina. Thank you for that. I'll try to make the five-446minute deadline. I'll read fast.447    Chair Sullivan. That's all right, I didn't make my five-448minute deadline. There's a lot to say here.449    [Laughter.]450    Mr. Urbina. Thank you, Chair Sullivan, Co-chair Smith, and451the rest of the Commission for inviting me to speak. It's an452honor to be back before you. Last time I was here was in 2023,453when the Commission asked me to testify about an investigation454by my news team, The Outlaw Ocean Project, into China's role in455global seafood. That reporting focused on China's more than4566,500 industrial fishing vessels and its hundreds of processing457plants. It documented debt bondage, passport confiscation,458avoidable deaths, fatal beatings, trafficked workers, illegal459fishing, and a state-coordinated program forcing thousands of460workers from Xinjiang and North Korea into seafood processing461plants.462    Much of the product from those plants was bound for the463U.S., including U.S. military bases and congressional464cafeterias, in violation of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention465Act (UFLPA) and the equivalent law tied to North Korean labor466known as CAATSA. In the wake of that reporting, Congress, the467executive branch, and a small handful of seafood companies took468action. I'm here today to discuss our current investigation,469which will be published in the coming weeks, and which examines470the global aquaculture industry, including China's role in it.471By way of context, seafood is the world's most heavily traded472food commodity by value, and aquaculture, or fish farming, is473the industry's fastest growing sector. As of 2022, more than474half of all seafood worldwide was farmed, rather than caught at475sea.476    This growth has been driven in part by a marketing claim477that fish farming is sustainable because it reduces pressure on478wild fisheries. The problem is that, for much of the industry,479that claim is false. Roughly two-thirds of global aquaculture480depends on feed made from wild-caught fish, in the form of481fishmeal and fish oil--think of seafood that people eat most--482so salmon, shrimp, tilapia, sea bream. In other words, many483farmed fish are fed the very wild fish the industry claims it's484helping to spare. Not all aquaculture works this way. Roughly a485third of global fish farming focuses on non-fed species, such486as clams, oysters, and mussels. That form of aquaculture can487indeed be sustainable.488    But most fish farming depends on fed fish. And our489investigation found that this segment of the industry prefers490to begin the story of sustainability and ethical sourcing at491the farm. If you start the story earlier, however, with the492feed, a very different picture emerges. Our recent493investigation, called ``Food for Feed,'' did just that. Over494the past two years we mapped and reported on roughly 1,400495fishmeal plants worldwide. We boarded and inspected ships496supplying them. We traced the farms to which the feed goes. And497we tracked the resulting seafood. Our goal was to document the498hidden costs of fish farming.499    In Russia's Far East, we found forced labor on ships,500farms, and in factories. In Western Sahara, we revealed the501industry helping prop up Morocco's military occupation. In502Gambia and Mauritania, we discovered fish that once fed local503communities increasingly diverted into fishmeal factories for504export, worsening food insecurity in countries including India505and Peru, the industry was tied to at least 80 incidents of506civil unrest, some quite violent, often labor strikes and507community protests over polluted water and stench from508factories cooking thousands of tons of decomposing fish. These509are what economists call externalities, costs pushed onto510distant countries and communities while wealthier consumers511enjoy the luxury seafood produced as a result.512    So what does any of this have to do with China? China is513the largest producer, exporter, and consumer of seafood in the514world. It's also the single biggest exporter of seafood to the515United States. And it is rapidly expanding fish farming so it516does not have to send so many vessels onto the high seas or517into foreign waters. China now grows about four times as much518fish as it catches, and huge quantities of that farmed seafood519are exported, including to the United States. What's striking520is where much of this expansion is happening--Xinjiang and521Tibet.522    Fish farming typically takes place, elsewhere in the world,523along coasts, in near-shore cages or pens. But China is524expanding it in mountainous and desert regions that are among525the most landlocked places on Earth. Our investigation mapped526the supply chains of more than 1,200 fish farms in Xinjiang and527Tibet. We found seafood from these farms going to dozens of528countries, including the U.S., and to companies supplying529public institutions such as military bases, public schools, and530congressional cafeterias.531    Not only is that a violation of the UFLPA, but some of532these farms in Xinjiang are certified as sustainable by U.S.-533based programs such as Best Aquaculture Practices, which seems534mystifying in light of the U.S. law. I do not need to remind535this Commission that Tibet and Xinjiang are among the most536repressive regions in China. In Tibet, the government has537relocated roughly half a million people, leveling villages and538monasteries for projects including hydroelectric dams and fish539farms. In Xinjiang, more than a million people have been held540in detention camps while the government has carried out large-541scale land seizures, forced sterilizations, and criminal542penalties for speaking native languages or practicing religious543and cultural traditions.544    That seafood from these regions is still reaching the545United States shows how much work remains. American seafood546producers, grocers, and food service companies such as Sysco547continue to rely on certification schemes that claim to police548sustainability and forced labor in places like China, where549spot checks at factories, ships, or farms are effectively550impossible. China is also a place where asking tough questions551about Uyghurs, Tibetans, or human rights generally can get a552company, civil society group, or journalists expelled. Yet the553cost savings are so enticing that industry and certifiers and554journalists continue to make that Faustian bargain.555    Let's be clear: Repression in these regions is one of556China's hidden costs. It is the externality that helps produce557cheap seafood. It is part of China's competitive advantage and558helps explain the trade surplus in this commodity. The UFLPA559was enacted partly to level that playing field. So were tools560like the Global Magnitsky Act. Customs and Border Protection561has used Withhold Release Orders to stop imports suspected of562being tied to forced labor. Congress has pressed companies563through letters and hearings like this one, and tightened564purchasing rules for federally funded institutions. Congress565has also, in rare cases, forced companies to do due diligence,566putting the burden on industry, rather than on journalists or567civil society groups, to prove that supply chains are free of568illegal or unethical hidden costs. The bottom line then is569this: The tools exist. The question now is whether they'll get570used.571    Thank you for your time.572    [The prepared statement of Ian Urbina appears in the573Appendix.]574    Chair Sullivan. Thank you, Ian. I'm going to call an575audible here and have Senator Whitehouse say a few opening576lines before we turn to our other witnesses. Senator577Whitehouse.578579             STATEMENT OF HON. SHELDON WHITEHOUSE,580                  A SENATOR FROM RHODE ISLAND581582    Senator Whitehouse. Thank you, Chairman. I appreciate you583allowing me to interrupt the proceedings with a statement. You584and I have worked together on the FISH Act, which has recently585passed the Senate by unanimous consent and which I believe has586the support of the Trump administration, at least the587Department of State, and which has cleared, in the past, all of588its House obstacles at one time or another. So I think we're in589a good place to get it across the finish line at last. It590addresses the problem of the international pirate fleet, which591exists in a shadowy world of shell corporations and false592flags. It is a machine of exploitation, both of common593resources like international fisheries, and of human beings.594Many of the pirate fleet vessels qualify as slave ships by any595rational definition of that term.596    The Chinese fishing fleet has its own set of problems, the597first of which is that it's not just a fishing fleet. If you598have any doubts about that, go to the recent New York Times599article that had an interactive display of the geolocation of600the Chinese fishing fleet deployed in the Pacific, in the sort601of South China Sea area. They were spread all over the place,602and suddenly they all moved to create a strategic line across603the sea. That was not ordinary fishing behavior. I went to an604oceans conference in an island nation, and there was a Chinese605fishing ship anchored, or just offshore--anchored or just606holding position. It was not engaged in anything that looked607like fishing behavior, but a lot of diplomats and people had608come to that place for that conference, and I suspect that this609vessel was trying to pick up whatever signals they could to610find out what was going on among the people at that conference.611    So they're not just fishing, and we should be aware of612that. When they are fishing, they're also a danger because they613behave horribly with respect to fisheries. We heard about this614for quite a long time. Mr. Urbina, your work on this has been615good. Thank you. But particularly it came in a meeting at the616Munich Security Conference, where the four-star general in617charge of AFRICOM, without provocation by me, said, One of the618things we need to do to be more effective in my command is to619provide resources to our coastal partner nations to help them620better understand when somebody is fishing illegally in their621waters, who is fishing illegally in their waters, and maybe622even give them some resources to go out and challenge the623illegal fishing in their waters. Because the Chinese fishing624fleet is going through other nations' economic zones and just625shredding the fisheries.626    When I used to travel in Asia with Senator McCain, pretty627much everywhere we stopped that was a coastal nation, when we628had our major meeting with the head of state and I asked about629how things were going with the Chinese fishing fleet, their630heads practically exploded. Everybody had a story about abuses,631damage, violent behavior, threatening behavior by the Chinese632fishing fleet. So we have an enormous amount of work to do. The633recent High Seas Treaty I think is a help. It'd be great if we634could join that. In the meantime, the FISH Act is going to be635really important. What it does is encourage investigations and636sanctions and blacklisting of the bad behavior in these fleets.637In addition to thanking Senator Sullivan for his partnership on638the FISH Act, I also want to thank him for bringing us together639repeatedly with Deputy Secretary of State Landau, who has640become a convert, having heard from Dan and me about this641subject, and who I think is increasingly making it a State642Department priority.643    I'm delighted that these witnesses are here. For far too644long the pirate fishing fleet and the Chinese fishing fleet645have been allowed to do untold damage in not only international646waters, but also in unenforced sovereign waters. The quicker we647put an end to it, the better off we all will be. My Rhode648Island fishermen and your Alaska fishermen will be well served649when the international fisheries are less pressured by illegal650fishing, leaving more for them to catch under law. Thank you.651    Chair Sullivan. Great. Thank you, Senator Whitehouse. Thank652you for your leadership and partnership on these issues.653    We'll now return to our expert witnesses. Admiral, the654floor is yours.655656             STATEMENT OF SCOTT W. CLENDENIN, RADM,657          USCG (RET.), OWNER, DOG ZEBRA SOLUTIONS LLC658659    Admiral Clendenin. Well, distinguished members of the660Commission, I greatly appreciate the invitation to testify on661this mission, which is just a very deep passion of mine. A lot662of my comments will affirm the excellent introduction of the663Commission to this topic.664    Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, IUU fishing,665is not just a conservation problem alone. It is a national666security and food security issue that fuels global conflict.667While other nations have large distant IUU fishing fleets, as668has been said here, China has by far the largest, and has669deployed it in a deliberate strategy to dominate the global670seafood supply. Its distant-water fishing fleets operate in the671waters of over 90 countries, often with state subsidies. IUU672fishing fleets practice AIS manipulation and transshipments at673sea to launder their illegal catch. They take critical fishing674resources from countries in the Indo-Pacific, West Africa, and675South America, where their fisheries are critical for their676needed subsistence. They build dependencies and are responsible677for human rights abuse at sea through forced labor, as we've678discussed here.679    Admiral Paparo, Commander INDOPACOM, noted that 8 of the 10680worst IUU fishing violators in the world are state-owned681enterprises of the PRC. And they are a real driver of conflict682in his AOR. China also uses fishing fleets as maritime militia683in gray zone operations, creating what amounts to regional684conflict through the proxy of coast guards and fishing fleets.685Between 2011 and 2024, the Indo-Pacific saw 156 conflicts tied686to fishing competition, and fisheries-related conflicts have687increased twentyfold since the 1970s. IUU fishing is a vector688for other transnational crime, including narcotics smuggling.689    Turning to the U.S. economy--the seafood sector, as has690been discussed here, is worth over $320 billion and employs 2.3691million Americans, yet 75 to 85 percent of the seafood consumed692in America is imported, directly exposing us to IUU-tainted693supply chains. As the President's recent EO on fisheries694stated, this is unfair to our very well regulated fishing695industry, just as was discussed here. Estimates suggest that up696to one-third of wild-caught seafood consumed in the United697States is linked to illegal fishing. This is the seafood on698American dinner tables.699    So what can be done? I recommended three strategic shifts700that are detailed in my written testimony. I'll be very brief701here to summarize them. First, we should reinvigorate American702maritime governance to counter IUU fishing. As a start, this703issue should be treated with the same seriousness as we treat704narcotics smuggling and piracy. Congress's MSAFE Act is the705best U.S. initiative to counter IUU fishing to date. However,706their work needs to be elevated strategically in importance and707fully funded. Despite years of effort, they have had minimal708impact on the tide of IUU fishing globally.709    Second, we need to protect America's maritime interests710through alliances and trade. Regional fisheries management711organizations have been forged through diplomatic compromise,712where any member can block enforcement measures. That needs to713evolve. We have proven that coordinated international714operations, broad intelligence sharing, and collective715diplomatic pressure can change IUU fleet behavior. U.S. trade716negotiations are a critical instrument as well. All this needs717to be consistently done at scale.718    Third, we need to strengthen public-private partnerships,719developing a whole-of-society effort. As an example, in720collaboration with the seafood industry, we need to improve721seafood traceability and import controls that require722documented legal origin for seafood entering U.S. markets. As723another example, Operation JADE SPEAR showed what is possible724when law enforcement, Customs, Department of Defense,725regulatory actions, and the financial sector are combined, and726resulted in the delisting of IUU-linked companies from NASDAQ.727However, that was but one operation. To be effective, these728types of operations must be replicated at scale.729    The opportunity before this Congress is to reframe our730counter-IUU effort as the strategic national security and food731security imperative that it is. I look forward to your732questions.733    [The prepared statement of Admiral Clendenin appears in the734Appendix.]735    Chair Sullivan. Thank you, Admiral.736    Mr. Pinkert.737738               STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN A. PINKERT,739         SPECIAL ADVISOR, CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY LAB740741    Mr. Pinkert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the742Commission for the opportunity to testify on one of the most743urgent tasks in U.S. trade enforcement, enhancing efforts to744address systematic use of forced labor in China's seafood745industry. As you indicated, Mr. Chairman, I'm a special advisor746to Corporate Accountability Lab, or CAL, a human rights non-747profit organization in Chicago. CAL is active in petitioning748U.S. Customs and Border Protection for forced labor import bans749under Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930.750    China is the world's largest seafood producer and exporter,751as was indicated in prior testimony, supplying a substantial752share of the fish and shellfish reaching American consumers.753There is a documented state practice of using Uyghur and other754minority group workers under coercive conditions in Chinese755seafood production. Goods produced under these conditions enter756U.S. commerce at a price advantage underwritten by human757suffering.758    Congress has assembled a flexible toolkit of legislation759that can be used to address this problem, including Section760307, the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, or UFLPA, Section7611595a civil penalties, and Section 301 of the Trade Act of7621974. The issue is not an absence of statutory authority. It is763the failure to use these tools at scale, in combination, and764with the creativity the circumstances demand.765    Section 307 prohibits the importation of goods produced in766whole or in part by forced labor. And the UFLPA creates a767rebuttable presumption that any goods mined, produced, or768manufactured in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or by769entities on the UFLPA entity list are made with forced labor770and are therefore inadmissible. These are powerful tools, but771their effectiveness depends on, first, the U.S. Government's772ability to trace goods from point of harvest through processing773to the port of entry; two, the Forced Labor Enforcement Task774Force's, or FLETF's, ability to maintain a timely cadence of775placing companies on the entity list; and three, the776willingness of CBP to move, under Section 307, directly when777the UFLPA itself does not satisfy enforcement objectives. And I778believe, Senator Sullivan, that this addresses the point that779you made in your opening statement that sometimes we've got to780move over to general enforcement rather than just the UFLPA.781    Chinese seafood supply chains are deliberately opaque. Fish782caught in distant waters can be transshipped through783intermediary ports, relabeled, commingled with locally sourced784product, and reexported to the United States. This can render785conventional documentation-based compliance less than fully786effective. CBP should therefore require positive traceability787documentation, vessel-level catch certificates, processing788facility records, and chain of custody statements for high-risk789seafood species and sourcing regions. Importers who cannot790provide this documentation should simply not be permitted U.S.791Customs entry of their merchandise.792    Now I mentioned very briefly about the entity list. I just793want to underscore that the UFLPA entity list should be794expanded and the FLETF should devote particular attention in795this regard to Chinese seafood processors, cold chain logistics796firms, and fishing fleet operators. It's also very important797that Section 1595a authorizes civil penalties for importations798made contrary to law. Forced labor importations in violation of799Section 307 fit precisely into this authorization, yet800penalties are rarely imposed in the forced labor context, and801their deterrent potential has largely gone unrealized.802    A robust Section 1595a enforcement program would provide803two benefits that detentions alone cannot. First, penalties804impose a financial cost on importers who have not self-policed805their supply chains and thereby create a direct economic806incentive for upstream due diligence. Second, penalty807provisions can generate evidence through CBP's demand for808importer documentation and the importer's responses,809documentation revealing supply chain structures otherwise810hidden from regulators. And I hope, by the way, that we get to811talk about the new regulations in China that seek to impose812penalties on just that very kind of investigatory activity813that's so important.814    Perhaps the most sophisticated challenge in this space is815the practice of supply chain bifurcation--companies maintaining816nominally compliant product lines for export to the United817States while continuing to use state-imposed forced labor in818lines destined for other markets or sold domestically.819Compliance, in other words, is purely performative. Section 301820authorizes the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to investigate821and respond to foreign acts, policies, or practices that are822unreasonable or discriminatory and that burden or restrict U.S.823commerce. A foreign government policy that induces companies to824simulate compliance while preserving state-825imposed forced labor in non-U.S.-destined production is exactly826the kind of state-implicated anticompetitive practice that827Section 301 was designed to address. In short, it's harmful to828U.S. producers.829    In conclusion, we have the legal tools to address forced830labor in seafood supply chains, including where, as in China,831it is an instrument of state policy. The myriad laws in this832space are mutually reinforcing. When deployed with strategic833coordination and resolve, they can impose meaningful costs on834companies that seek to benefit from this egregious human rights835violation. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.836    [The prepared statement of Dean Pinkert appears in the837Appendix.]838    Chair Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Pinkert. I want to thank all839the witnesses again. Excellent testimony. Before we turn to840questions we have a short video that will be indicative of some841of the forced labor issues that we wanted to show at this842hearing. It puts a human face on modern slavery in the Chinese843fishing fleet.844    (Video presentation begins.)845    Mr. Sahrudin. (Translated.) Conditions onboard were very846poor. The captain was harsh. I worked hard day and night847without any break days, and I was treated badly by the captain.848Even I often got punched. I was even whipped using a mainline,849the gear to pull the fish. Even worse, every time I got extra850duty to guard behind the steering wheel, I was often stabbed851with needles. And the food was not suitable to consume--it was852like food fed to the ducks.853    My friends have the same fate as me. They were often854stabbed with needles and slapped. At one point, the workers got855united and demanded to go home because the bad treatment was856frequent. The area that was punctured by a needle left a wound857and got infected to the point of pus coming out and even858swelling. I found it difficult just to walk.859    We united to demand the captain to send us home. Then the860captain didn't allow me to go home, nor my colleagues. In the861end the workers, including me, agreed to go on strike,862demanding to be sent home. From there I asked the captain again863for permission to be sent back to Indonesia. Eventually, the864captain allowed me to go home, one month later.865    (Video presentation ends.)866    Chair Sullivan. Again, just an example of what our867witnesses testified to, and some of the basic elements of the868huge problem that we are facing here.869    I want to begin--Mr. Pinkert, I want to get your sense--it870was very effective testimony--on the authorities that we have.871And I'm wondering, from your perspective, we've banned the872importation of Russian seafood--that's through Executive order.873As I mentioned in my opening statement, the Trump874administration recently875reauthorized that Executive order. I've been working on this876issue for many, many years. We finally got it done. We had a877lot of American importers who were relying on Russian seafood878who were fighting this measure. They said this is going to hurt879them. And what it actually ended up doing, when it finally went880into effect, is it had a positive impact on American fishermen,881because they said, Well, I can't afford to not source my fish882from Russia. And when I had discussions with these guys, I883said, Well, sure you can. There's a great source. It's called884American seafood from American fishermen.885    The Chinese and Russians are famous not just for their886abusive practices, but for dumping seafood into our markets.887Really, really drove down the price. So the benefit of banning888the importation of Russian seafood--they tried to launder it889through China and we nailed that down--was that the importers890in America started to say, Well, I guess I should get it from891the Alaskans, who are catching freedom fish sustainably. So892it's actually really benefited our fishermen across the893country. So I have two questions related to that experience.894One, just a warning, right? If you're an American importer of a895lot of Chinese seafood and you're watching this hearing, I896would start kind of looking at new supply chains because I897think your days are numbered. Because the goal here is to ban898the importation of Chinese seafood under the laws that you899currently say exist in the authority.900    But I think our CBP officials are getting better at the901issue of traceability because of all the good work they've done902on implementing the ban on Russian seafood, and then the903laundered Russian seafood through China. They're getting quite904good. But my question to you is, Do you think--under current905law, all the laws that you mentioned--should we be looking to906implement a ban, not just the bill that I got passed in the907NDAA, which is banning the importation of Chinese seafood for908military commissaries and military dining facilities, but a909comprehensive ban on Chinese seafood?910    Do you think that, given current practices, given what you911know, given what others have testified to and have provided912evidence of, whether it's the Section 307, the UFLPA, Section913301, is there enough evidence and authority for a comprehensive914ban on Chinese seafood into the United States under current915law? Do you think we meet that standard? And do you think that916CBP is gaining the ability--I know the traceability issues are917challenging--but do you think the CBP is gaining the ability to918implement such a ban, since they are currently doing it with919Russia, and they're doing it quite effectively? And maybe I'll920pose that to you first, but I think I can pose that question to921all the witnesses.922    Mr. Pinkert. Thank you, Senator, for that question. I would923start by saying I agree with you that the capabilities have924improved dramatically just in the past two years, two and a925half years, when I've been watching it very, very carefully.926Having said that, I think that the answer, and I kind of927touched on your question in the testimony, the more aggressive928use of Withhold Release Orders by CBP, including regional929Withhold Release Orders, I think would go a long way toward930addressing the concerns that you're expressing. I think that931it's one thing to say we have the Uyghur Forced Labor932Prevention Act, and that has very specific triggers, and933there's a rebuttable presumption, as you know, under the UFLPA.934But more generally, can we use the Section 307 process to do935regional Withhold Release Orders in a way that doesn't hinge936specifically on the use of Uyghur forced labor?937    Chair Sullivan. Okay. Good.938    Admiral, do you have a view on this?939    Admiral Clendenin. Yes, sir. I think, more strategically--I940was a co-chair in the early days of the MSAFE with my NOAA and941State Department colleagues--every time we had public comment,942traceability was one of the number one issues and suggestions943that came up. I think----944    Chair Sullivan. As a way to not take action, or what?945    Admiral Clendenin. No. Traceability had to be pursued and946had to be implemented and had to be part of our customs947procedures. Our interagency partners at that point were not948very aggressive with that, as far as seafood, and now it looks949like they are forming around that.950    Chair Sullivan. I think they're getting much better, right?951    Admiral Clendenin. They're getting much better.952    Chair Sullivan. The ban on Russian seafood has been953comprehensive and not always easy to enforce, but I think954they're actually doing a really good job.955    Admiral Clendenin. Yes, sir. And it does take resources,956obviously, to make sure they have those, and it requires957consistency across the board. So I think if you read public958opinion right now, there's still room to improve there, but I959think we're moving in the right direction with that. I think960we've done a good job on the southern border. I think as we961look at the importation of things like this into the Nation,962there's some things that we can do to do better on that front.963    Chair Sullivan. So let me ask, Mr. Urbina, your testimony--964you have expertise. How do you think we are doing? I want to965have, in some ways, a followup on the great work you've done966previously on the forced labor on ships and processing967facilities. And then, to your testimony today, if there is a968rebuttable presumption under the UFLPA on forced labor in969certain parts of China, and you are going to publish something970here very soon that shows there's enormous amounts of971aquaculture going on in this part of China--which, as your972testimony reveals, kind of makes no sense, right? You're not973near an ocean. They're doing it probably because of the labor974costs of using slave labor.975    So do you think that that's going to highlight again the976potential to ban any aquaculture from China, given how much977they produce in the Xinjiang province and other areas? And then978if you want to comment with an update on where you think we979have been from your previous excellent reporting, and what the980law, from your perspective, demands that we do, given that981there is a lot of slave labor, forced labor, going on in the982seafood supply chain directly from China?983    Mr. Urbina. I think, on your first question about a China-984wide ban, I don't have an answer, but I do have a restatement985of the question, in the sense that the UFLPA is a fairly986circumscribed and effective tool. But there's also law that987clearly says products tied to forced labor in general should988not be coming into the U.S. And yet we have a place that989produces a lot of products where that law is unenforceable990because it's so opaque and impenetrable. To me, that's the991simplification of the point you're making. If we have a law but992we can't enforce it vis-a-vis any products coming from one993certain place because it's a black box, we can't do real994audits, we can't check on the truthfulness of papers coming995from that place, then there needs to be some strong action to996fix that so that we can ensure the forced labor law that's in997general is enforceable.998    How you do that is your job, but I think it needs to be999much wider. I do think the genius in UFLPA is the element of1000rebuttable presumption, which shifts the burden off of the1001likes of us, and even you, and puts it back on those who are1002making money from this Faustian bargain. And says if you want1003to do business there, you need to prove that it is legal. We1004don't have to prove that it's illegal. So to me, that's a1005formula for moving forward.1006    To your second question, how are things going--you know,1007Dean has the best view. He's down in the weeds and watching1008these cases. My kind of high-altitude, removed view of how1009things are going in the last couple of years is there was a lot1010of action from you folks in Congress, thankfully. And executive1011departments sat up and took notice. There was a lot less action1012from within the industry in terms of solving [this]. And many1013of the key players we identified as relying on North Korean or1014Uyghur labor changed their name and kept their address, and1015suddenly they were not on the list anymore.1016    This sort of gimmickry is a very simple solution to get1017around the tools we have. And we did document that happening1018right after the reporting. But I do agree with you that Customs1019and Border and other agencies began figuring out how they need1020to take this more seriously, and try to staff up to enforce1021those tools better.1022    Chair Sullivan. Mr. Chairman.1023    Co-chair Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.1024    Let me just ask a couple of questions. In 1992, Frank Wolf,1025Scott Flipse--our chief of staff who's behind me here--and I1026visited China. We went to Beijing Prison No. 1, where Tiananmen1027Square activists had been--unfortunately, about 40 of them were1028still there, incarcerated under slave-like conditions. And we1029were there in large part to focus on forced labor. The fact1030that the Laogai was producing unbelievably large numbers of1031products that were at all of our stores, K-mart, you name the1032place, you would find it. If you traced it back, you would all1033of a sudden say, Oh my God, it was made by an activist or1034religious freedom prisoner, prisoner of conscience. And totally1035against Smoot-Hawley, totally against our laws.1036    And Clinton pushed this idea, because I held a whole series1037of hearings on it--a whole series of hearings, that we had an1038MOU with China. So I looked at it carefully, asked a lot of1039hard questions, met with our people in the Beijing embassy, who1040were part of the enforcement. And they were like the Maytag1041repairman. Remember that old commercial? They have no work to1042do because they just had no work to do. It was so flawed as an1043agreement. We would tell them when we suspected something, and1044then they would investigate and get back to us within about 601045days. We had trouble getting visas for people to go and1046investigate.1047    So we actually had proof. We got socks, jelly shoes. Scott1048actually put some of those socks in his back pocket. We went to1049Customs, and they put an import ban on anything coming out of1050that, because we had actionable information. But other than1051that, the MOU was an absolute farce. The whole idea of proof of1052origin, and trying to determine that, has been a vexing1053problem. And rebuttable presumption has helped, to a large1054extent, but not fully, to at least shift that paradigm in our1055favor, and in the favor of exploited workforces.1056    We've had hearings in this Commission, as the Chairman1057knows, where we focused on the fact that the so-called1058investigators for our big corporations were denied access when1059they went. They come back and they say, See, it's all good--we1060got a certification. So we asked the hard questions. In one1061case they interviewed people who told them, with the communist1062minders sitting right there, the secret police, you know, What1063is going on? You think you're going to say they don't have1064bargaining rights--but there's not any kind of protection for1065workers. So my point is that origin, the exploitation of the1066workforce, we kid ourselves if we think, absent the FISH Act1067and the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, very aggressively1068implemented, will ever stop Xi Jinping from dumping all of1069these slave-made goods on our shores.1070    So I would ask you again, it's been a problem. The MOU1071was--and they would come up, they being the Clinton leaders,1072Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Democracy and Labor1073and others--and say, We've got this MOU. And I said, Doesn't1074work. Quit using that as a false defense for your lack of due1075diligence to try to stop this. And I think we're now dealing1076with it. And when the Chairman's bill becomes law, and I do1077believe it will become law, it will be the biggest game changer1078on this issue ever. The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act is1079important. It had problems with de minimis, you know, numbers,1080although that's been reduced. They were gaming that big time,1081they being the Chinese Communist Party. And there's always a1082problem of suggesting it's coming from somewhere else.1083    I would point out that the video we just watched and the1084lawsuit against Bumble Bee is being undertaken pursuant to my1085law, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, which awaits1086fuller implementation even as we meet, but at least--and the1087judge--Judge Bashant, has denied Bumble Bee's motion to1088dismiss. And that was good. She's a district judge. And1089hopefully that will proceed. I mean, exploiting people in plain1090sight. So certification procedures, we've got to do a better1091job on that. The law will be there, I think, on the fish.1092    There's also the issue of farmed fish, and concerns about1093how healthy farmed fish are. I did not know until you just said1094it that there's four times the number of farmed fish as they1095catch. I mean, that's a frightening statistic because it breeds1096sickness and a lot of other things that are underappreciated by1097so many. So I would ask you maybe to elaborate on that. We've1098got tools. We need more tools. And I can't say enough--and I1099hope the people in Alaska, the people of New Jersey, the people1100in Rhode Island, and all the other places where fish are so1101important, realize--that this historic bill, soon to become1102law, by the Chairman, is the game changer.1103    Because, as you pointed out, Admiral, there's concerns that1104the AFRICOM general pointed out as well--the commander--that1105we're dealing with a nefarious fleet for other reasons too, not1106only the way they're exploiting workers and undercutting1107anything that even comes close to free and fair trade, and1108completely violative of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act.1109But this law will make all the difference in the world.1110    Ian, if you want to--and, again, I can't thank you enough1111for what you have done. I mean, when we met before The New1112Yorker article came out, you briefed our whole staff about how1113important it was, and we coincided our hearing to try to1114amplify the message of what you and your investigators have1115done. Again, you're the great journalist, and [Chair Sullivan],1116you're the great lawmaker who made all the difference on this1117issue. And I can't thank you enough.1118    Ian.1119    Mr. Urbina. Thank you. I would just touch on the TVPA and1120its importance, and also the importance of what's happening1121with that Bumble Bee case. It's a bit in the weeds, but the1122judge rejected the argument by the company in that case that1123the company was not liable for what happened to that guy that1124you saw because of the sort of shell-game nature of how1125globalized product handoff happens now, that that company1126couldn't possibly know what was going on on the ship and1127therefore that company shouldn't be held responsible for it.1128This is the sort of fundamental playbook maneuver of modern1129litigation when it comes to these cases, and it's problematic1130beyond seafood.1131    And the judge in that case said, You know, you were1132certified and participant in a shared program, and therefore1133you're clearly connected with what was coming off of that ship1134and what was going on on the ship. Therefore, I'm not going to1135allow that argument to fly. This is important precedent and1136should be watched very closely to see if that holds, because it1137will be the first big step toward, A, making TVPA, your1138legislation, more enforceable, and connecting the entities that1139are really getting wealthy off of the forced labor that's way1140down the supply chain, and ensuring that these supply chains1141have accountability and responsibility all the way up to the1142ones who really care the most, which are the branded, profiting1143institutions. So I would only say that the law is very1144important, but the way it's being gamed in the courts is also1145really important. And that case could be a boon for better1146enforcement going forward.1147    Co-chair Smith. Thank you.1148    Chair Sullivan. Senator Kim.1149    Senator Kim. Yes, thank you, Senator. Thank you,1150Congressman, for your leadership on this.1151    I only have a couple minutes here before I have to run for1152votes, but I wanted to ask Mr. Urbina--I wanted to start with1153you. I mean, what you talked about in terms of the growth of1154the aquaculture industry in Xinjiang and in Tibet. I mean, it's1155very alarming. And I wanted to just get a little bit more sense1156from you just what you see as motivating this. I mean, is it1157driven primarily by just the low cost of the forced labor, or1158are there other political considerations, or other things of1159that nature?1160    Mr. Urbina. It's a great question. It's not driven by a1161desire to cash in on forced labor. It's driven by a larger1162state-building agenda by the Chinese government. Very wise.1163Very Chinese. It's one part--look, there are 68,000 fish farms1164on the east coast of China. There are 1,200 in western1165landlocked Tibet and Xinjiang. So it's a small percentage. It's1166also the fastest growing. It's a half billion dollars of export1167coming out of that region. And in the last two years, it's1168grown by 16 percent, more than anywhere else in the country. So1169while it's small, it's cutting edge. It's the tip of the spear.1170And it has a lot to do with two big motivations. One is, China1171needs to settle that inland west. It's a restive, challenging1172population, to put it diplomatically. And China wants to1173consolidate it, to control it, so pushing more and more1174industry in there--hydroelectric, solar, tomatoes, cotton, fish1175farms--is one way to settle it. That's part of the big agenda.1176The other agenda is China put 30 percent of its aquaculture1177along its--well, 30 percent of its eastern coast is taken up by1178aquaculture. Extremely polluting and extremely overfished. So1179those waters have plummeted. So they need to figure out how to1180decrease the pressure--of what their industry is doing on their1181own coasts. How? Move inland. Where? Move to depopulated1182inland. Where's that? Far west.1183    Third, there's a great PR story of Chinese state-led1184ingenuity that it's eager to push--Look at what we've done with1185solar, look at what we're doing on climate. All commendable and1186impressive, but also part of the China PR program to show that1187Xinjiang isn't a human rights story, it's an innovation story,1188it's an engineering story. Growing fish in the desert is a1189great engineering story, right? And so they're pushing that on1190social media. These are the big reasons they're pushing inland.1191    Senator Kim. And you're testifying here saying that some of1192the seafood is reaching the United States, you know, reaching1193public institutions. Where is the biggest enforcement failure1194here? Is it the importer due diligence? Is it customs1195screenings? And what is it that we can do better to try to1196verify--you know, to be able to push back on this and be able1197to have credible ways for certification bodies to be able to1198verify the labor and sustainability claims from that region?1199    Mr. Urbina. Sorry to do this to Dean again, but the nuts1200and bolts of how UFLPA works, how Withhold Release Orders work,1201are super important here. Oftentimes it's how slow it is, the1202bar of evidentiary standard for getting a company added. These1203are some of the biggest reasons that those two tools alone1204aren't more effective. I think that's one place. Funding, staff1205levels, how the law is being interpreted, and how recent the1206testimony has to be, what level of proof is required for forced1207labor. UFLPA, luckily, you don't need that. If you're from1208Xinjiang, it's proven. But for other places, on ships, very1209tough. These are the things that are boring, but also super1210consequential in how effective it can be.1211    I think the biggest issues are the ones that I focus on,1212which are putting the responsibility less on your shoulders,1213and less on Customs and Border, and the executive, and putting1214it back more on industry due diligence and having them prove1215that it's not happening. They're the ones that are making the1216money off of it. They should also have the burden. They also1217are in command of their own supply chains. We have to fight1218and, you know, go out to sea and do all sorts of crazy things1219to figure out their supply chains. They're sitting on the data.1220And if they wanted to police their own supply chains, if they1221were forced to, they could. But right now, they don't have to.1222    And China makes it especially easy, because they can throw1223up their hands and say, Well, it's certified by Best1224Aquaculture Practices or whomever. So we think that's pretty1225good. But if you ask them, does anyone actually--what does that1226mean? They say, Well, you should ask them, and we do the best1227we can in China. Those are the places where I think the biggest1228fixes have to happen. And putting pressure on industry to fix1229that and requiring them to do so is probably the biggest thing1230that you folks could do.1231    Senator Kim. Well, thanks for shining a light on this. And1232for the three of you, just the incredibly important information1233that we have. I hope we can take real action here to be able to1234step up and stop some of the most nefarious aspects of this and1235be able to get things better for our fishermen in New Jersey1236and elsewhere. So thanks so much for putting this together.1237Thank you.1238    Chair Sullivan. Thank you, Senator Kim.1239    I'm going to go to round two here. We do have a vote, so1240we're going to keep this kind of quick, but I want to begin.1241Admiral, your testimony--I wanted to ask two questions. You1242testified that MSAFE created a framework but is under resourced1243and under-1244utilized. Where do you think the principal breakdown in that is1245with regard to MSAFE funding, interagency coordination,1246operational capacity?1247    And then, related to that--we're hoping to get my FISH Act1248over the goal line here soon, and that does have a big role for1249our great men and women in the Coast Guard. I chair the Coast1250Guard Subcommittee in the Commerce Committee. What kind of1251specific1252resources do you think we need to make the Coast Guard more1253efficient at meeting IUU fishing interdiction goals? You may1254have seen in the Working Families Tax Cuts Act last year, we1255made the biggest investment in the Coast Guard in American1256history, $25 billion. Huge. Twenty-two new cutters, 16 new1257icebreakers, 40 new H-60 helos. I mean, we are investing1258massively in the Coast Guard. Are there other Coast Guard-1259related priorities that can help on the IUU fishing front? So1260two questions for you.1261    Admiral Clendenin. Well, thank you very much for those1262questions, Senator. They're very important. On the MSAFE,1263again, it's a very laudable effort. It's the only of its kind1264and it brings together departments and agencies in a very1265unique way. We've talked about the complexity, and it's outside1266the Coast Guard wheelhouse, but of customs enforcement and1267traceability. You look at a JADE SPEAR-type investigation, it1268involved many departments and agencies. And that requires very,1269very detailed and intricate work between the departments and1270agencies.1271    As I compare the MSAFE to other work that I've done at the1272national level, when I think about some of the efforts I had at1273the National Security Council, and we were working on a1274strategy in Central America that was routinely briefed at the1275cabinet level, and then I also had the opportunity to work1276transnational organized crime in the strategic division that1277was also briefed at the cabinet level, I look at an incredible1278opportunity here. With your FISH Act, with the MSAFE that's1279already established, with the president's EO that addresses1280having to get after importation of IUU fishing, it connects us1281to both the executive branch and the legislative branch, and1282resources can be brought to the table.1283    The one thing I would say is, when we work in the MSAFE, we1284can't just be cataloging everything that we're already doing.1285Those efforts have to focus on what needs to be done, and that1286sometimes involves changing what agencies are doing, changing1287their emphasis, and funding additional lines of effort, and1288that's hard work. So having to routinely report to Congress and1289the executive branch on how to get ahead, using the MSAFE and1290all these, this is the time to do it. I think this is the time1291to rejuvenate all the efforts against IUU.1292    Chair Sullivan. Great.1293    I'm going to ask a final question of Mr. Pinkert and Mr.1294Urbina. They're related, but you might have different angles on1295it. But it's essentially, if we wanted to have measurable--1296either from Congress or the executive branch--results in this1297area in the next 12 months, where would you focus the efforts?1298Tougher import enforcement? Stronger procurement bans? Pressure1299on certifiers? Exposure of brands using these supply chains and1300slave labor? Entity list designations? Hopefully, my bill is1301going to have the sanctions list component to it when it1302becomes law. A Section 301 investigation?1303    Where would you--and maybe it's not one to just prioritize,1304but to get action and, to be honest, to get publicity on the1305importance of this--which all of you have done a really good1306job at, what would you think in the next 12 months the most1307effective, impactful1308action is that we, either in Congress or the executive branch,1309could take? We've been working with USTR. They're looking at a1310301 investigation. I think they're already undertaking part of1311the investigation aspect. So I think we're pushing on an open1312door with this administration on a lot of this. But I'm just1313curious, from your expertise, where would you prioritize1314efforts? Why don't we start with you, Mr. Pinkert.1315    Mr. Pinkert. Thank you. I would note that the Seafood1316Competitiveness Executive Order specifically talked about using1317Section 301. I would just add that, of course, this bifurcation1318of supply chains issue is a really, really critical aspect of1319that. And they should really be looking into that. As far as1320other things, you mentioned the entity list. And I think we1321need to kind of set the scene for the difficulties that have1322occurred in the last year or so with the entity list, and the1323fact that there's just not much movement in that area. This is1324an interagency group, seven agencies, and some observer1325agencies as well, and it's chaired by the DHS. And there's been1326a lot of turnover among staff. There's been a lot of turnover1327among the political appointees that are charged with keeping1328this program going and keeping it robust. And quite frankly, we1329don't know what the priority is in terms of having robust1330additions to the entity list. So I think that--you know, Ian1331talked a lot about the problem of labor transfers within China.1332And in fact, one of his former colleagues, Daniel Murphy, has1333also written quite a bit about that. In order to really address1334labor transfers, we have to get the entity list up and moving,1335and moving forward.1336    And then finally, civil penalties. That's a totally--I1337don't want to say totally neglected, but mostly neglected, area1338of authority. You've got to make companies pay. Ian talked1339about the TVPA and the venture liability under the TVPA. These1340companies are in a venture making money off of forced labor, in1341many instances. And we need to make them accountable, not just1342in terms of shaming but also financial penalties. Thank you.1343    Chair Sullivan. Great.1344    Mr. Urbina, I'll give you the last word, and then I'm going1345to turn it over to Chairman Smith to wrap up the hearing. I am1346being called by the cloakroom to get down and vote, but I want1347to hear your final answer. You have a lot of views on this, I'm1348sure, and I want to hear them.1349    Mr. Urbina. I'll be very brief. I think what Dean said is1350100 percent correct. It's a sort of bottom-up strategy. I think1351a top-down strategy would be--the civil penalties point is1352akin--focusing on the certification industry, and also on the1353largest single corporate players, be they grocers or seafood1354companies, that the U.S. Government relies on to provide its1355seafood in lots of different places. And figuring out to what1356degree those players alone, through purchasing policy, can be1357pressured to change how well they police their supply chains by1358way of demands from you folks. If you want access to this1359market, then you've got to change your approach to verifying to1360us that you're not tied to these regions. I think that will1361affect the marketplace globally and have trickle-down effects1362that are more efficient than legislation sometimes.1363    Chair Sullivan. Great.1364    Well, listen, I want to thank the witnesses. I'm going to1365turn it over to Chairman Smith here. Excellent testimony. As we1366wrap up, if other members of the Commission have additional1367questions, they will submit them for the record. If you can try1368to get answers back to those other members in the next two1369weeks, we'll leave the hearing record open. But again, I want1370to thank the outstanding witnesses, all three of you. The1371importance of this hearing--I think it's gaining steam in the1372executive branch and in Congress, in a bipartisan way. I think1373that's really positive. Your work, all three of you, has been1374exceptional, and we really appreciate it.1375    Mr. Chairman, I'm going to turn it over to you. Thank you,1376sir. We will be in touch.1377    Co-chair Smith. Thank you. I want to thank Chairman1378Sullivan. Yes, to underscore, we have a vote now over on the1379House side, so I'm going to have to leave momentarily.1380    I want to thank you for your testimony, for your guidance,1381your wisdom, counsel, breakthrough work. But just to underscore1382how historic and how difficult it is to get anything passed of1383this caliber, I've had the Forced Organ Harvesting Act pass 4061384to 1 in the House. It has passed in the last Congress, passed1385in this one. I can't get it passed in the Senate. I mean, it's1386an abomination what Xi Jinping is doing to the Uyghurs, to the1387Falun Gong, and to others. You know, tens of thousands of young1388people, average age 28, having their organs ripped out--you1389know, killed.1390    My first hearing on forced organ harvesting was 30 years1391ago in 1996. I had a doctor who actually testified as to1392exactly what they were doing. It was low-level exploitation and1393human rights abuse then in terms of numbers, but now it's1394industrial size. And I can't get the bill out of the Senate. So1395I want you to know how important and precedent-setting it is1396for the Chairman to have gotten his bill--the FISH Act--passed1397in the Senate. It was a brilliant1398maneuver on his part. He got it. And it will pass in the House,1399I guarantee it. So I just--you know, I hope people realize1400that. Otherwise, we'd have another great bill sitting and1401languishing in committee that never moves. But now we have a1402really good, solid, actionable piece of legislation that he has1403authored.1404    I know that there are some 30 entity list proposals that1405have not gone forward. I'm not sure if any of them deal with1406seafood. Maybe, Mr. Pinkert, you might know. Part of the answer1407just a moment ago was that there's been a lot of change of1408personnel and the like, but we need to get a more laser-like1409focus on doing just that. And implementation, implementation,1410implementation. And when this bill becomes law, and the FISH1411Act similarly, implementation, implementation, implementation.1412    I have to run--but I can't thank you enough. I mean, you1413have done breakthrough work, all three of you. And the Chairman1414has done, I think, the biggest heavy lift imaginable to get the1415FISH Act passed in the U.S. Senate. I do have a vote, so I'm1416going to have to leave. The hearing is adjourned, and I thank1417you.1418    [Whereupon, at 11:36 a.m., the hearing ended.]14191420=======================================================================14211422                         A  P  P  E  N  D  I  X14231424=======================================================================14251426                          Prepared Statements14271428                                 ______14291430                    Prepared Statement of Ian Urbina14311432                The Outlaw Ocean Project Investigation:1433            China's Forced Labor in the Aquaculture Industry14341435    Thank you, Chair Sullivan and Co-chair Smith, and the rest of the1436Commission, for inviting me to speak. It's an honor to be back before1437you.1438    The last time I was here was in 2023, when the Commission asked me1439to testify about an investigation by my news team, The Outlaw Ocean1440Project, into China's role in global seafood. That reporting focused on1441China's more than 6,500 industrial fishing vessels and its hundreds of1442processing plants. It documented debt bondage, passport confiscation,1443avoidable deaths, fatal beatings, trafficked workers, illegal fishing,1444and a state-coordinated program forcing thousands of workers from1445Xinjiang and North Korea into seafood processing factories. Much of the1446product from those factories was bound for the United States, including1447American military bases and congressional cafeterias, in violation of1448the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and the Countering America's1449Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. In the wake of that reporting,1450Congress, the executive branch, and a small handful of seafood1451companies took action.1452    I'm here today to discuss our current investigation, which will be1453published in the coming weeks and examines the global aquaculture1454industry, including China's role in it.1455    By way of context: seafood is the world's most heavily traded food1456commodity by value, and aquaculture, or fish farming, is the industry's1457fastest-growing sector. As of 2022, more than half of all seafood1458worldwide was farmed rather than caught at sea.1459    This growth has been driven in part by a marketing claim: that fish1460farming is sustainable because it reduces pressure on wild fisheries.1461The problem is that for much of the industry, that claim is false.1462Roughly two-thirds of global aquaculture depends on feed made from1463wild-caught fish, in the form of fishmeal and fish oil. Think of the1464seafood people eat most: salmon, shrimp, tilapia, and sea bream. In1465other words, many farmed fish are fed the very wild fish the industry1466claims it is helping to spare.1467    Not all aquaculture works this way. Roughly a third of global fish1468farming focuses on non-fed species such as clams, oysters, and mussels.1469That form of aquaculture can indeed be sustainable.1470    But most fish farming depends on feed fish. And our investigation1471found that this segment of the industry prefers to begin the story of1472sustainability and ethical sourcing at the farm. If you start the story1473earlier, with the feed, a very different picture emerges.1474    Our recent investigation, called ``Food for Feed,'' did just that.1475Over the past two years, we mapped and reported on roughly 1,4001476fishmeal plants worldwide, boarded and inspected ships supplying them,1477traced the farms to which the feed goes, and tracked the resulting1478seafood to document the hidden costs.1479    In Russia's Far East, we documented forced labor on ships, farms,1480and in factories. In Western Sahara, we found the industry helping prop1481up Morocco's military occupation. In Gambia and Mauritania we found1482fish that once fed local communities increasingly diverted into1483fishmeal factories for export, worsening food insecurity. In countries1484including India and Peru, the industry was tied to at least 801485incidents of civil unrest, some violent, often labor strikes and1486community protests over polluted water or the stench from factories1487cooking thousands of tons of decomposing fish. In Senegal, fishmeal has1488pushed local fishers out of work, so that many are selling or1489repurposing their boats to flee to Europe, usually by making the1490roughly 930-mile journey to Spain's Canary Islands, a route that1491claimed more than 3,000 lives in 2025.1492    These are what economists call externalities: costs pushed onto1493distant countries and communities, while wealthier consumers enjoy the1494luxury seafood produced as a result.1495    So what does this have to do with China? China is the largest1496producer, exporter, and consumer of seafood in the world. It is also1497the single biggest exporter of seafood to the United States. And it is1498rapidly expanding fish farming, so it does not have to send as many1499vessels onto the high seas or into foreign waters. China now grows1500about four times as much fish as it catches, and huge quantities of1501that farmed seafood are exported, including to the United States.1502    What is striking is where much of this expansion is happening:1503Xinjiang and Tibet. Fish farming typically takes place along coasts, in1504near-shore cages or pens. But China is expanding it in mountainous and1505desert regions that are among the most landlocked places on Earth.1506    Our investigation mapped the supply chains of more than 1,200 fish1507farms in Xinjiang and Tibet. We found seafood from these farms going to1508a dozen countries, including the United States, and to companies1509supplying public institutions such as military bases, public schools,1510and congressional cafeterias. Not only is that a violation of the1511Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, but some of these farms in Xinjiang1512are certified as sustainable by U.S.-based programs such as Best1513Aquaculture Practices, which seems mystifying in light of U.S. law.1514    I do not need to remind this Commission that Tibet and Xinjiang are1515among the most repressive regions in China. In Tibet, the government1516has relocated roughly half a million people, leveling villages and1517monasteries for projects including hydroelectric dams and fish farms.1518According to a 2024 Human Rights Watch report, this effort has relied1519on coercive tactics including repeated home visits, threats of1520prosecution, and warnings that utilities could be cut off for those who1521refused to move. In response to such policies, at least 169 Tibetans1522have set themselves on fire, often on camera, outside police stations,1523monasteries, or public squares. In Xinjiang, more than a million people1524have been held in detention camps, while the government has carried out1525large-scale land seizures, forced sterilizations, and criminal1526penalties for speaking native languages or practicing religious and1527cultural traditions.1528    That seafood from these regions is still reaching the United States1529shows how much work remains. American seafood producers, grocers, and1530food-service companies such as Sysco continue to rely on certification1531schemes that claim to police sustainability and forced labor in places1532like China, where spot checks at factories, ships, or farms are1533effectively impossible. China is also a place where asking tough1534questions about Uyghurs, Tibetans, or human rights generally, can get a1535company, civil society group, or journalist expelled. Yet the cost1536savings are so enticing that industry and certifiers continue to make1537that Faustian bargain.1538    Let's be clear: repression in these regions is one of China's1539hidden costs. It is the externality that helps produce cheap seafood.1540It is part of China's competitive advantage and helps explain the trade1541surplus in this commodity.1542    The UFLPA was enacted partly to level that playing field. So were1543tools like the Global Magnitsky Act. Customs and Border Protection has1544used Withhold Release Orders to stop imports suspected of being tied to1545forced labor. Congress has pressed companies through letters and1546hearings like this one, tightened purchasing rules for federally funded1547institutions, and, in rare cases, forced companies to do due diligence,1548putting the burden on industry, rather than journalists or civil1549society, to prove that supply chains are free of illegal or unethical1550hidden costs.1551    Bottom line: The tools exist. The question now is whether they'll1552get used.1553    Thank you for your time today.15541555     Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral (Ret.) Scott W. Clendenin,1556                      United States Coast Guard *15571558                                 ______15591560* Strategic Advisor to the report The Geopolitics of the Ocean--Why1561Healthy Seas Are Vital to America's National Security (World Wildlife1562Fund, 2025)15631564I. Opening Statement15651566    Distinguished Members of the Commission: thank you for the1567opportunity to testify. My name is Scott Clendenin. I am a retired Rear1568Admiral from the United States Coast Guard, where I last served as1569Assistant Commandant for Response Policy. I am here in my personal1570capacity today, but also as a Senior Advisor to the recently published1571World Wildlife Fund's and International Conservation Caucus1572Foundation's report The Geopolitics of the Ocean: Why Healthy Seas Are1573Vital to America's National Security. It brings together data,1574analysis, and first-hand perspectives from five former senior national1575security officials--including two U.S. Ambassadors, a former Acting1576National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Administrator,1577and the 26th Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard--all of whom have1578served the Nation in high-level leadership positions for decades.1579    It is important to note up front that my opinions and views1580expressed in my testimony are my own and in no way reflect the official1581position of the U.S. Government, U.S. Coast Guard, the World Wildlife1582Fund, or any other organizations.1583    I want to be direct with this congressional commission--Illegal,1584Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing is much more than a fisheries1585management or conservation problem. IUU Fishing is a national security1586crisis that fuels conflict and transnational organized crime; it1587finances cartels; enables arms and drug smuggling; is intertwined with1588human trafficking and forced labor; undermines the sovereignty of our1589allies while directly defrauding American consumers, and creates an1590unfair playing field for U.S. domestic fishermen who have to compete1591with illegally caught fish on the market.1592    The principal driver of IUU Fishing is the People's Republic of1593China (PRC). Beijing has for decades conceived of and deployed a1594strategy to access, lay claim to, and dominate the global supply of1595seafood in order to exercise power around the world, including through1596gray-zone operations where its global fishing fleet is leveraged as a1597maritime militia. Beijing has used policy incentives, economic1598subsidies, and political encouragement for its distant-water fishing1599fleet to fan out over the world to further the PRC's natural resources1600and geopolitical interests. As Admiral Samuel Paparo, Commander, U.S.1601Indo-Pacific Command, has stated: ``Eight of the 10 world's worst IUU1602fishing violators are state-owned enterprises of the People's Republic1603of China . . . it has the potential to be a real driver of conflict.''1604In short, our nation's action on IUU Fishing could determine whether we1605experience peace or conflict, security or instability, prosperity or1606economic challenges.1607    To that end, I am here to reaffirm that America is a maritime1608nation and that the ocean underpins our economic strength, our food1609supply chains, our strategic influence, and our homeland security. I am1610also here to urge our Nation's elected officials to treat the1611governance of the ocean--and the enforcement against those who prey1612upon it--with the same strategic imperative that we bring to piracy,1613narcotics smuggling, energy security, rare earth minerals, and1614strategic competition with our adversaries.16151616II. IUU Fishing Is a National Security Challenge16171618    Let me begin with the scope of the problem. Under my tenure in the1619U.S. Coast Guard, we declared IUU Fishing to be the world's top1620maritime security challenge--surpassing piracy. The financial losses1621from IUU Fishing are estimated at 16 to 36 billion dollars annually.1622Estimates indicate that potentially up to one third of wild-caught1623seafood consumed in the United States is linked to illegal fishing.1624That is seafood on American dinner tables, in American restaurants, and1625in American grocery stores--caught illegally, often by forced labor,1626processed in opaque supply chains, and sold at a price advantage over1627the American fishermen who play by the rules. President Trump in his1628recent Executive orders on Restoring American Seafood Competitiveness1629and Unleashing American Commercial Fishing in the Pacific addressed1630this issue of fundamental fairness for our American fishermen. I agree1631with this assessment, and we need to meet this moment because this1632issue goes beyond economic unfairness to our domestic industry--it is a1633direct subsidy to criminal networks.1634    Many sources and initiatives document how IUU Fishing is a driver1635of conflict and deeply intertwined with the most dangerous1636transnational threats America faces. For example:16371638      In the Indo-Pacific: China's distant-water fishing fleets1639dominate the maritime domain. Between 2011 to 2024, the region1640experienced 156 conflict events in the Pacific Islands in what amounts1641to regional conflict through the proxy of coast guards and fishing1642fleets. Now the tuna stocks are shifting eastward due to warming1643waters, a trend likely to spark escalated conflicts.16441645      There are strong indications that distant-water fishing1646fleets are involved in drug smuggling and other transnational crimes in1647our hemisphere. In 2018 two Chinese nationals were convicted in U.S.1648Federal District Court of narcotics smuggling following a U.S. Coast1649Guard Cutter interdiction of their fishing vessel with 900 kilos of1650cocaine on the high seas in the Eastern Pacific.16511652      In 2023, the U.S. Navy seized over 2,000 AK-47 assault1653rifles from a Yemeni-crewed fishing vessel in the Gulf, demonstrating1654how traditional fishing craft are used to arm Iranian-funded proxies.1655These same types of fishing vessels are smuggling other illicit cargoes1656across Middle East waterways, serving to1657destabilize the region.16581659      Drug cartels--including Mexico's Gulf Cartel, a1660designated foreign terrorist organization--use fishing vessels to1661conduct drug and migrant smuggling operations along our southern1662maritime border. They also harvest red snapper and other commercially1663valuable species from U.S. waters, violating American sovereignty,1664stealing our natural resources, and exporting them back to the U.S.1665market for millions of dollars in cartel revenue.16661667      In the Gulf of California, the Sinaloa Cartel and Cartel1668Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG) have systematically taken over the1669fishing industry--from individual fishermen, to cooperatives, to1670processing plants, and to exporters. The entire seafood value chains in1671some Mexican coastal communities are now under criminal control.16721673      And finally, on the global level, nearly two-thirds of1674countries assessed have documented cases of forced labor, child labor,1675or other human rights violations in their seafood supply chains. The1676International Labour Organization conservatively estimates that more1677than 128,000 fishermen are trapped in conditions of forced labor1678worldwide, and the Pew Charitable Trust estimates that over 100,0001679fishermen die each year on the sea, and that is likely an1680underestimate.16811682    These examples highlight the types of public and semi-private1683networks we are allowing to profit when we fail to enforce1684traceability, transparency, and the rule of law across global seafood1685supply chains. It is through this lens that the strategic imperative1686for our maritime nation becomes crystal clear: how we, our allies, and1687partner nations meet the challenges posed by IUU Fishing contributes to1688countering PRC's increased geopolitical and economic influence through1689natural resource extraction.16901691III. Geopolitical Competition and the Seafood Battleground16921693    Building on this, the Committee should understand that IUU Fishing1694is not merely a conflict and crime problem--it is an instrument of1695geopolitical competition.1696    The PRC has built vast distant-water fishing fleets that operate1697with state subsidies, with support vessels for refueling and at-sea1698processing, and with what can be described as deliberate strategic1699intent. These fleets operate in the waters of up to 93 countries. In1700some regions, as many as two-thirds of foreign fishing vessels operate1701with disregard for international and coastal state laws. Predatory1702practices such as AIS manipulation, shell company licensing, bribery,1703and transshipment at sea to launder illegal catch are widely documented1704across West Africa, South America, and the Western Pacific.1705    This is not fishing. This is economic coercion. These fleets are1706the maritime equivalent of the debt-trap infrastructure investments we1707have rightly flagged as threats, one example being China's controlling1708interest in Sri Lanka's Hambantota port. These predatory practices are1709designed to secure strategic resource access, spread corruption, build1710dependencies, and extend influence over nations whose maritime1711economies are their primary national asset.1712    The consequences are already playing out in regions of direct U.S.1713strategic1714interest:17151716      In the Indo-Pacific, as noted above, Admiral Paparo,1717Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, has warned that competition1718over fisheries has the potential to be a real driver of conflict.1719Research has found that the presence of foreign fishing vessels1720contributed to 45 percent of fisheries-related conflict events in the1721Pacific Island region. Small island nations--precisely the nations that1722we desire influence with--are being outcompeted and destabilized.17231724      In the Arctic, as ice recedes, pollock stocks are1725shifting from American Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) waters to those of1726Russia and other nations. The Alaskan pollock fishery is worth nearly1727$2 billion annually and supports approximately 30,000 American jobs.1728Foreign vessels--primarily fishing for this stock--are already crowding1729the U.S.-Russian maritime border, and the PRC continues to explore the1730Arctic, declaring itself as a near-Arctic nation. Moreover, overhead1731surveillance and communications are at best difficult in the Arctic due1732to the physics of satellite orbits, so maritime presence and1733enforcement patrols are critical to preserve our sovereign interests.1734This need for persistent presence in the challenging Arctic operational1735environment is in part why the efforts of Congress to fund Polar1736Security Cutters (PSCs) and Arctic Security Cutters (ASCs) for the1737United States Coast Guard is so important to protecting U.S. interests1738in that region of increasing geostrategic importance.17391740      In South America, Argentina has militarily engaged1741Chinese fishing fleets after discovering hundreds of vessels fishing1742illegally in its waters. Chinese distant-water fishing fleets have1743lined the edges of exclusive economic zones around uniquely biodiverse1744ecosystems like the Galapagos Islands.17451746      Globally, fisheries-related conflict events have1747increased 20-fold since the 1970s. One in four militarized conflicts1748between democracies during the cold war were over access to fisheries1749resources.17501751    This is the strategic context in which IUU Fishing must be1752understood. As the United States has learned in the rare earth minerals1753context, it is not in America's interest to allow geostrategic1754competitors, like the PRC, to dominate access to critical natural1755resources. Seafood is no different.17561757IV. The Economic Stakes for America17581759    Let me also speak to the economic dimension, since both national1760security and commerce concerns vis-a-vis the PRC are in your purview as1761a Commission.1762    The U.S. blue economy--encompassing fisheries, maritime trade,1763shipbuilding, coastal tourism, and marine technology--is a powerful1764engine of American prosperity. The U.S. seafood sector alone is worth1765over $320 billion and employs approximately 2.3 million Americans. The1766United States holds the second-largest marine territory in the world;1767however, 75 to 85 percent of seafood consumed in America is imported.1768That import dependence creates direct exposure to the very IUU Fishing-1769tainted, criminally controlled, and geopolitically manipulated supply1770chains I have just described. The scale of potential economic loss is1771significant: global estimates suggest over $3 trillion in fisheries and1772aquaculture value is at risk over the next decade due to inadequate1773governance and overfishing.1774    The return on investment for getting this right is extraordinary.1775Every dollar invested in sustainable ocean resource management yields1776five dollars in return--through food security, economic stability,1777reduced enforcement costs, and preserved marine assets. Conversely,1778failing to act risks ceding strategic resources to competitors,1779empowering criminal networks, and undermining American global maritime1780influence.17811782V. The Maritime Safety Enforcement Act and What More Is Needed17831784    I would like to personally thank Congress for your leadership on1785this issue. The Maritime Security and Fisheries Enforcement Act--1786MSAFE--is a laudable initiative. It authorizes a whole-of-government1787approach for orchestrating and coordinating the efforts of 211788departments and agencies to combat IUU Fishing, and it requires1789periodic progress update reports to Congress.1790    But while it creates a framework for progress, candor requires that1791I also note for this Committee that the working group initiatives1792established under MSAFE have received little dedicated funding outside1793of internal agency reprogramming and modest budget increases, and their1794collective authority and expertise remain significantly underutilized.1795We all know that interagency coordination without the commensurate1796fiscal resourcing is not a strategy--it is principally an exercise in1797paperwork. Moreover, in my experience in government, if strategic joint1798and interagency initiatives in our government are not periodically1799reinvigorated by both Congress and the executive branch, they will1800naturally be relegated, or migrate, to bureaucratic channels at lower1801echelons of our government's departments and agencies.1802    Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) have1803strengthened monitoring, control, and surveillance, expanded IUU1804Fishing vessel lists, and helped to improve transparency. However,1805their governing rules, forged around a model of consensus, often allow1806a single nation to block enforcement, including the authority to board,1807inspect, and sanction vessels; hence, they cannot obtain agreements on1808what could be the most effective treaty enforcement measures.1809    The U.S. Coast Guard has entered into diplomatic maritime1810agreements that enable combined operations with partner nations to1811counter IUU fisheries, and the service routinely conducts patrols1812focused in part on countering IUU fisheries. Congress has authorized1813the largest, and very needed, acquisition effort in the history of the1814service, including the Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) and Offshore Patrol1815Cutters (OPCs) that are critical to operations that counter IUU1816Fishing. However, it is critical to note that the actions of the U.S.1817Coast Guard at sea alone are insufficient to stem the tide of IUU1818Fishing.1819    To this end I recommend that your commission consider three1820strategic shifts:182118221. Reinvigorate American Maritime Governance Leadership18231824    Maritime governance should be elevated in our Nation's core1825security directives--National Security Directives, congressional1826strategic mandates, and our National Maritime Strategies. Coupling the1827elevation in importance, adequate resourcing mechanisms must enable1828enhanced domestic maritime governance and position the United States as1829a global leader on this front. The National Security Council plays an1830important role to develop and coordinate our IUU Fishing strategic1831efforts to ensure they embody a whole-of-government approach,1832especially when they team with Congress and the Office of Management1833and Budget resourcing those efforts. Resources to implement this1834strategy will allow America to protect, manage, enforce, and deter1835threats to our national maritime resources and to our international1836seafood supply chains and by extension our national security.183718382. Protect America's Maritime Interests Through Alliances and Trade18391840    In regions of strategic importance--the Indo-Pacific, Latin1841America, the Caribbean, and the Arctic--the United States must deepen1842collaboration with partners on maritime domain awareness, capacity-1843building for fisheries enforcement, fisheries management, and coalition1844efforts to counter IUU Fishing. Critically, this does not require new1845funding lines or programs. Resources from the State Department's1846Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) program and the Defense Security1847Cooperation (DSC) Fund can be authorized for this purpose--because IUU1848Fishing is, at its core, both a national security imperative and a1849transnational organized crime criminal challenge.1850    Experience in recent years shows that maritime presence,1851transparent documentation of violations, and coordinated diplomatic1852messaging can change IUU Fishing fleet behavior. More powerfully, when1853multiple nations act together--sharing evidence and issuing demarches--1854states with IUU Fishing-linked fleets often adjust their actions. This1855approach has proven effective in West Africa, the Eastern Pacific, and1856the South China Sea.1857    Regional Fisheries Management Organizations need to find a way to1858evolve or mature from diplomatic coordination bodies into more1859intentional actors supporting fisheries treaty enforcement and1860compliance coordination mechanisms, enabling the levying of1861consequences for violations of international fisheries agreements and1862non-adherence to accepted standards for rules-based order at sea. I1863recognize, given the diplomatic realities that they face, that this is1864easier said than done; however, in the face of shared national security1865concerns throughout history, the international community has agreed to1866powerful enforcement regimes--for piracy, the slave trade, and1867narcotics trafficking--a similar approach is needed to address IUU1868Fishing and the associated crimes.1869    Finally, we must lead international coalitions to ensure global1870seafood traceability, transparency in foreign access and trade1871agreements, and import controls/market access requirements for catch1872information that can document legal origin. These tools exist and have1873been exercised at times. What is missing is the political emphasis to1874deploy them consistently. This hearing is an indication that this is1875about to change, and I commend you for it. Traceability is optimized1876when paired with data-driven fisheries management. The U.S. has the1877best-managed fisheries in the world.1878    Our Regional Fisheries Management Councils balance the interests of1879fishermen, seafood markets, marine biologists, and politicians,1880creating a regulatory framework that levels the playing field for all.1881Sharing our technical expertise, governance process, and enforcement1882regime with partner nations to improve fisheries data collection and1883management would help to address the root causes of IUU Fishing:1884ungoverned fishing of too few fish in the ocean in an unsustainable1885manner.18863. Strengthen Public-Private Partnerships in a Whole-of-Society Effort18871888    Even with all the international efforts I have enumerated, IUU1889Fishing persists at scale. We cannot only interdict or regulate our way1890out of this challenge, and the solutions lie beyond the actions of any1891single government or entity. The reality is that a whole-of-society1892response with broad partnership is needed to address IUU Fishing that1893aligns market forces, industry, technology, diplomacy, maritime1894enforcement, regulation, and civil society.1895    If major importers of seafood--including the United States, Japan,1896Australia, and the European Union--collectively sanctioned companies1897engaged in IUU Fishing activity, the financial incentive for IUU1898Fishing would be dramatically reduced.1899    U.S. departments and agencies are collectively increasing efforts1900to improve seafood traceability to prevent importation. There have been1901episodic successes through innovative interagency law enforcement and1902customs investigations. As an example, Operation JADE SPEAR, a U.S.1903interagency effort, demonstrated the power of combining law enforcement1904investigation, customs enforcement, and coordinated financial actions1905that resulted in the delisting of IUU Fishing-linked companies from the1906NASDAQ Stock Exchange. Interpol has also established a program to1907coordinate international investigations into IUU Fishing criminal1908networks and activity. These enforcement efforts need to be replicated1909and conducted at a much larger scale.1910    Industry also has a critical role to play in eliminating IUU1911Fishing from their supply chains. A unified and impactful commitment to1912traceability is needed to transform global seafood supply chains. A1913good example is the ``dolphin safe tuna'' movement in the 1990s, which1914increased the awareness of industry, government, and the public about1915the deaths of dolphins that occurred during tuna fishing and developed1916fishing practices to prevent that from happening. Companies are1917exploring how a similar industry-wide effort could be used to1918illuminate and prevent IUU Fishing from unwittingly existing in their1919supply chain.1920    Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) serve as underutilized force1921multipliers in this mission set that could be better leveraged by1922government and international organizations through increased1923communication and engagement with the NGO community. Often NGOs do not1924require U.S. Government funding or support because they operate on1925philanthropic donations. They desire better partnership with U.S.1926departments and agencies to ensure that their efforts are complementary1927and not redundant to U.S. efforts to counter IUU Fishing activity.1928    The MSAFE Act has helped to better coordinate the IUU Fishing1929capacity-building efforts of U.S. departments and agencies; however,1930U.S. capacity-building efforts should now be better synchronized across1931agencies, allies, NGOs, and international organizations who are1932involved in similar capacity-building efforts. To build the requisite1933capacity to counter IUU Fishing activity, partner nations need1934coordinated support in law and policy frameworks, maritime domain1935awareness, intelligence sharing, enforcement, customs, and1936traceability.1937    Emerging technologies in industry are critical as well--including1938low-cost uncrewed aerial systems (UAS), lower cost patrol vessels,1939commercial satellite data, and AI analytics--which have served to1940dramatically reduce the cost of monitoring EEZs for developing nations.1941Creating sustained offshore presence and awareness in a nation's1942territorial seas, whether through patrols, shiprider agreements, UAS1943surveillance or multinational operations, remains the essential1944objective.1945    Emerging UAS capability technologies provide the ability for1946developing nations to overcome the financial barrier-to-entry for1947effective maritime security by replacing very costly traditional manned1948maritime patrol aircraft programs with much lower cost and lower risk1949UAS systems. These systems can now remain airborne for over a day and1950cover a nation's territorial seas and EEZ and provide the ability to1951share ubiquitous surveillance data enhanced by AI capabilities to1952operators and analysts ashore to document IUU Fishing incursions and1953activities in and around their waters. Moreover, industry now also1954offers mission enablers such as Starlink with lower cost communication1955and good bandwidth, which enables most nations to afford access to IUU1956Fishing monitoring information and intelligence at sea.1957    It is important to note that nations do not always need to board1958IUU Fishing vessels to be effective. UAS or boat crew photos and1959documentation that enable detailed diplomatic demarches to be sent to1960the offending flag state of the IUU Fishing fleets can be just as1961compelling as a seizure at sea with the same desired effect--compelling1962a modification of behavior and conformance to accepted maritime rules-1963based order.1964    Similarly, least developed countries often do not have sufficient1965maritime law enforcement vessels to operate hundreds of miles offshore1966for lengthy periods of time. Recent innovative and lower cost1967approaches to at-sea maritime law enforce-1968ment that have been used by NGOs in Central America can be adopted for1969use in1970Oceania, Africa, and South America as well. Traditional navy and coast1971guard ships and patrol boats are very expensive to acquire and operate,1972but unlike complicated and risky high-speed interdictions of go-fast1973drug trafficking vessels, often at night, least developed countries do1974not need fast interdiction platforms to counter IUU Fishing vessels and1975activity in and around their waters. Instead, effective enforcement1976operations can be accomplished with used offshore supply vessels, which1977can be repurposed to serve as a mother ship or a floating station--with1978plenty of fuel, endurance over 30 days, berthing for multiple boarding1979teams, and 2-4 interceptor boats and crews. This ``wolf pack''1980operational approach can be operated at a fraction of the cost of1981operating typical offshore navy or patrol vessels.1982    Combating IUU Fishing will require these types of innovative1983approaches and a departure from our traditional U.S. regional1984engagement business models to maintain affordable at-sea persistent1985presence to catch IUU Fishing violators in the act.1986    The private sector--including NGOs and industry partners--can serve1987as critical force multipliers for U.S. Government capacity-building1988efforts. Expanded collab-1989oration and explicit authorization for these partnerships would yield1990significant1991returns.19921993VI. Closing19941995    Members of the Commission: Our ocean fisheries resources have1996historically been treated as a conservation issue, separate from1997geopolitics and national security. That approach has not been1998effective. The threats I have described today--from IUU Fishing tied to1999cartels and arms smuggling, to state-subsidized distant-water fleets2000advancing China's influence in our own hemisphere--are not future2001threat or national security risks. They are present and growing.2002    The health and sustainability of our ocean resources, our Nation's2003enforcement of the laws that govern it, our efforts to partner with2004allies on maritime governance, and our efforts to build the capacity of2005nations to combat IUU Fishing in and around their waters are2006inseparable from American maritime strength. The opportunity before2007this Congress is to reframe ocean governance as the strategic2008imperative it is--and to fund, staff, and direct the agencies toward2009whole-of-society partnerships that can meet this challenge.2010    I am grateful for the Commission's time and attention to this2011matter, and I look forward to your questions.2012                                 ______20132014               Prepared Statement of Hon. Dean A. Pinkert20152016              Using U.S. Trade Law To Combat Forced Labor2017                    in the Chinese Seafood Industry20182019    Thank you for the opportunity to testify before this distinguished2020Commission on one of the most urgent tasks in U.S. trade enforcement--2021enhancing efforts to address systematic use of forced labor in China's2022seafood industry. My name is Dean Pinkert. I'm a former commissioner of2023the U.S. International Trade Commission, serving as a commissioner from20242007 to 2017, and as Vice-Chairman of that body from 2014 to 2016. I am2025currently Special Advisor to Corporate Accountability Lab (CAL), a2026human rights nonprofit organization in Chicago. CAL is active in2027petitioning U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for forced labor2028import bans under Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930. In addition,2029CAL participates in the Tariff Act Advocates Group, the Coalition2030Against Forced Labor in Trade, and the Illegal, Unreported, and2031Unregulated (IUU) Fishing & Labor Rights Coalition, and co-chairs the2032Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) Implementation Working2033Group.2034    China is the world's largest seafood producer and exporter,2035supplying a substantial share of the fish and shellfish reaching2036American consumers. There is a documented state practice of using2037Uyghur and other minority-group workers, under coercive conditions, in2038Chinese seafood production. Goods produced under these conditions enter2039U.S. commerce at a price advantage underwritten by human suffering.2040    Congress has assembled a flexible toolkit of legislation that can2041be used to address this problem--including Section 307, the UFLPA,2042Section 1595a civil penalties, and Section 301 of the Trade Act of20431974. The issue is not an absence of statutory authority; it is the2044failure to use these tools at scale, in combination, and with the2045creativity the circumstances demand.2046        strengthening traceability and transshipment enforcement2047                    under section 307 and the uflpa2048    Section 307 prohibits the importation of goods produced in whole or2049in part by forced labor, and the UFLPA creates a rebuttable presumption2050that any goods mined, produced, or manufactured in the Xinjiang Uyghur2051Autonomous Region--or by entities on the UFLPA Entity List--are made2052with forced labor and are therefore inadmissible. These are powerful2053tools. But their effectiveness depends on the U.S. Government's ability2054to trace goods from point of harvest through processing to the port of2055entry; the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force's (FLETF's) ability to2056maintain a timely cadence of placing companies on the Entity List; and2057the willingness of CBP to move under Section 307 directly when the2058UFLPA itself does not satisfy enforcement objectives.2059    Chinese seafood supply chains are deliberately opaque. Fish caught2060in distant waters can be transshipped through intermediary ports,2061relabeled, commingled with locally sourced product, and re-exported to2062the United States. This can render conventional documentation-based2063compliance less than fully effective. CBP should therefore require2064positive traceability documentation--vessel-level catch certificates,2065processing facility records, and chain-of-custody attestations--for2066high-risk seafood species and sourcing regions. Importers who cannot2067provide this documentation should not be permitted U.S. customs entry2068of their merchandise.2069    An existing Federal program provides infrastructure for the2070traceability regime that the forced labor problem in this sector2071demands. The Seafood Import Monitoring Program (SIMP), administered by2072NOAA under 50 C.F.R. Part 300, Subpart Q, already requires collection2073and/or reporting of vessel-level harvest data, species identification,2074and chain-of-custody records for 13 high-risk species. CBP should treat2075SIMP documentation as a necessary--though not always sufficient--2076predicate for admissibility, and NOAA should expand SIMP's species2077coverage to close the gaps that bad actors currently exploit by routing2078tainted product through non-2079covered species and supply chains.\1\ SIMP can also be improved by2080including additional data elements to address labor abuse risks,2081requiring pre-entry notification of SIMP data, enhancing data2082verification and enforcement activity, and formalizing interagency2083coordination and data sharing.2084---------------------------------------------------------------------------2085    \1\ A recently published meta-analysis shows that seafood2086mislabeling is rampant in the U.S. market, with species substitution2087being the predominant issue, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/2088article/pii/S0956713524008272.2089---------------------------------------------------------------------------2090    Congress should examine any reluctance on the part of CBP to use2091Section 307 to issue sector-wide Withhold Release Orders covering2092Chinese seafood processed in facilities that have received state-2093transferred labor, without requiring individualized proof of coercion2094at each facility. The need for this is highlighted by the fact that CBP2095appears to regard a Withhold Release Order as a necessary predicate for2096imposing civil penalties on U.S. imports of these products.2097                    expanding the uflpa entity list2098    The UFLPA Entity List should be expanded, and the FLETF should2099devote particular attention in this regard to Chinese seafood2100processors, cold-chain logistics firms, and fishing fleet operators.2101    Listing has asymmetric value, meaning its value greatly exceeds its2102cost, by shifting the burden of proof to importers, creating immediate2103commercial pressure on listed entities, and signaling to the broader2104industry that participation in supply chains tainted by Chinese2105government-mandated forced labor carries legal and reputational2106consequence. The FLETF should set an explicit timetable for seafood-2107sector designations and report to Congress on the evidentiary gaps, if2108any, that they believe have delayed action.2109                civil penalties under 19 u.s.c.  1595a2110    Section 1595a authorizes civil penalties for importations made2111contrary to law.\2\ Forced labor importations in violation of Section2112307 fit precisely into this authorization. Yet penalties are rarely2113imposed in the forced labor context, and their deterrent potential has2114largely gone unrealized.2115---------------------------------------------------------------------------2116    \2\ 19 U.S.C. 1595a(c).2117---------------------------------------------------------------------------2118    A robust Section 1595a enforcement program would provide two2119benefits that detentions alone cannot. First, penalties impose a2120financial cost on importers who have not self-policed their supply2121chains and thereby create a direct economic incentive for upstream due2122diligence. Second, penalty proceedings can generate evidence--through2123CBP's demand for importer documentation and the importer's response--2124revealing supply chain structures otherwise hidden from regulators.2125    The ultimate efficacy of such a program will depend in large part2126on how well it is understood by the relevant actors. CBP should2127therefore publicize its enforcement actions and, if possible, provide2128industry and civil society with a penalty matrix that helps them to2129help the government in its efforts to combat forced labor.2130          using section 301 to target supply chain bifurcation2131    Perhaps the most sophisticated challenge in this space is the2132practice of supply chain bifurcation: companies maintaining nominally2133compliant product lines for export to the United States while2134continuing to use state-imposed forced labor in lines destined for2135other markets or sold domestically. Compliance, in other words, is2136purely performative, staged only for CBP's benefit.2137    Section 301 authorizes the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to2138investigate and respond to foreign acts, policies, or practices that2139are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S.2140commerce. A foreign government policy that induces companies to2141simulate compliance while preserving state-imposed forced labor in non-2142U.S.-destined production is exactly the kind of state-implicated2143anticompetitive practice that Section 301 was designed to address; it2144enables the use of forced labor to achieve economies of scale that work2145to the disadvantage of U.S. producers. USTR must not turn a blind eye2146to the geographic sorting of tainted from untainted shipments.2147    The U.S. Government's goal should be that companies disengage2148entirely from state-imposed forced labor rather than allowing it to2149tilt the commercial playing field against U.S. companies.2150                               conclusion2151    We have the legal tools to address forced labor in seafood supply2152chains, including where, as in China, it is an instrument of state2153policy. The myriad laws in this space are mutually reinforcing; when2154deployed with strategic coordination and resolve, they can impose2155meaningful costs on companies that seek to benefit from this egregious2156human rights violation.2157    Congress should (1) urge the Administration both to mandate that2158seafood traceability documentation be provided to CBP and to enhance2159SIMP to address forced labor risk in the seafood sector, (2) work with2160the FLETF to accelerate UFLPA Entity List designations in the sector,2161(3) provide oversight to press CBP in the direction of an active and2162effective Section 1595a civil penalty program, and (4) explore with the2163USTR the possibility of a Section 301 investigation into supply chain2164bifurcation. Each of these steps is plainly within existing legal2165authority.2166    I look forward to the Commission's questions.2167                                 ______21682169                Prepared Statement of Hon. Dan Sullivan21702171    We are here today to examine illegal, unreported, and unregulated2172fishing by the People's Republic of China. What we're dealing with is a2173state-backed system--run by the Chinese Communist Party--that combines2174illegal fishing, market manipulation, and forced labor, all in one2175supply chain. And it's happening at scale.2176    This system has real consequences for American workers, for law-2177abiding producers, and for the integrity of the global seafood market.2178The PRC has built the world's largest distant-water fishing fleet.2179These vessels do not simply compete. They overwhelm. They cheat. They2180show up in other countries' waters. They push into exclusive economic2181zones. They ignore quotas. They transship and relabel the catch to hide2182its origin.2183    That is not fair competition. It is a strategy of economic coercion2184that has direct consequences here at home.2185    Alaska is a seafood superpower. We produce over 60 percent of the2186wild-caught seafood in the United States. In Alaska, we have some of2187the best-managed fisheries in the world. Our fishermen follow the law.2188They respect quotas. They manage sustainably. They preserve these2189resources for future generations.2190    Alaska fishermen should not be forced to compete against fleets2191that disregard those rules, that benefit from state subsidies, and2192flood global markets with cheap products tied to illegal practices.2193That is not fair competition.2194    And it gets worse. There is credible evidence that parts of the PRC2195seafood supply chain involve forced labor, including Uyghur labor and2196North Korean labor in seafood processing. North Koreans and Indonesians2197and others are also being used on Chinese fishing boats in conditions2198that resemble slave labor.2199    So when we talk about illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing,2200we are not just talking about resource theft. We are talking about a2201system in which illegal fishing, hidden sourcing, labor exploitation,2202and market distortion are all connected. That should concern all of us.2203    Then add Russia to this mix. Russian seafood can be processed in2204China, relabeled, and then pushed back into global markets. This2205undermines sanctions and further distorts prices. It should not be2206possible, but it is happening right now, as we speak. This is a serious2207problem, and it deserves serious attention.2208    I weighed in extensively with the Trump administration to2209communicate how much Alaska needs the comprehensive ban on Russian2210seafood imports to the United States to continue. I was happy to see2211the Trump administration renew that ban just a few weeks ago to help2212maintain and strengthen Federal measures that ensure fair trade and2213protect Alaska's fishermen and coastal communities.2214    Congress has also begun to respond. The Senate unanimously passed2215my Fighting Foreign Illegal Seafood Harvests (FISH) Act in April. This2216is an effort I worked on for years with my friend Senator Whitehouse,2217who will join us later in the hearing. The bill recognizes that IUU2218fishing is not simply an environmental issue. It is also an economic2219issue, a labor issue, and a national security issue. It will strengthen2220enforcement, improve coordination, and ensure that the United States2221treats these activities with the seriousness they require.2222    Congress also passed, and the President signed into law, a2223provision I included in the NDAA last year barring the Pentagon from2224selling or procuring Chinese seafood imports in commissaries or serving2225them in military dining facilities. Our servicemen and women should be2226eating freedom fish from the United States, not communist fish2227harvested using slave labor.2228    I have also been a leading advocate for elevating the role of2229seafood within the U.S. Department of Agriculture. We've made2230meaningful progress already. In the FY2026 appropriations, Congress2231provided funding for a Seafood Liaison at USDA. Today, USDA announced2232the creation of a new USDA Office of Seafood. This office is a key2233component for integrating seafood into USDA programs, under the2234direction of the Seafood Liaison, to coordinate seafood policies and2235programs to provide support for our seafood industry, like U.S. farmers2236have. But we need to do more.2237    If illegal seafood can still be caught in one place, processed in2238another, relabeled, and sold into the United States, then we still have2239significant gaps to close. If Withhold Release Orders from Customs are2240not being enforced robustly, if traceability remains incomplete, and if2241import controls are still too easy to circumvent, then bad actors will2242continue to exploit those weaknesses.2243    That is why this hearing matters. We need to understand where our2244enforcement tools are working, where they are falling short, and what2245more should be done. I'm particularly interested in hearing our experts2246testify on the utility of tools like the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention2247Act. Senator Merkley and I have introduced the follow-on to that bill,2248UGASA (the Uyghur Genocide Accountability and Sanctions Act) that2249reinforces some of these provisions. As it moves through the process,2250maybe there is more we can do with it. We're open to suggestions.2251    At the same time, this is not a challenge the United States faces2252alone. Countries around the world are dealing with the same tactics,2253the same coercive pressure, and the same difficulty in enforcing rules2254against distant-water fleets that operate at scale and in the shadows,2255so we need to work with partners to improve enforcement capacity and2256increase the cost of this behavior.2257    Though China's IUU fishing is a global and complex problem, at the2258end of the day, the principle here is simple: If you are engaged in2259illegal fishing, if you are exploiting workers, if you are hiding2260both--then you should not have access to the American market. Period.2261That's the standard.2262    This hearing is an opportunity to expose the Chinese IUU fishing2263system. It is an opportunity to identify where our policies need to be2264stronger and make clear that the United States intends to defend lawful2265producers, uphold human rights, and enforce the rules.2266    I want to thank our witnesses for helping bring transparency to2267what is designed to stay hidden. I look forward to their testimony.22682269                 Prepared Statement of Hon. Chris Smith22702271    I want to recognize my Co-chair, Senator Sullivan, for his2272leadership on this issue and his long record of fighting to protect the2273American seafood industry and American fishermen. His FISH Act just2274passed in the Senate and I will be working with my House colleagues to2275get it passed in the House. His amendment in last year's NDAA2276prohibiting Pentagon commissaries from serving Chinese seafood to our2277men and women in uniform was also a giant step forward. This is exactly2278the kind of serious leadership required to address the challenge of2279Chinese IUU fishing.2280    From the earliest days of seafaring, the oceans have been governed2281not only by currents and commerce, but by rules--rules that distinguish2282lawful navigation from piracy, fair trade from exploitation, and order2283from lawlessness.2284    Today we are confronted with a disturbing modern version of that2285lawlessness: a system of dark fleets, opaque supply chains, illegal2286fishing, and coerced labor that threatens not only American workers but2287also human rights, the rule of law, and our national security.2288    Credible reporting and investigative findings have exposed deeply2289troubling practices within China's distant-water fishing fleet and2290seafood processing industry. These include widespread illegal,2291unreported, and unregulated fishing--known as IUU fishing--as well as2292serious human rights abuses, including forced labor.2293    As our Commission heard in 2023 during the hearing I chaired titled2294``From Bait to Plate: How Forced Labor in China Taints America's2295Seafood Supply Chain,'' a significant portion of China's distant-water2296fleet has been linked to labor exploitation, illegal incursions into2297the sovereign waters of other nations, and exploitation of workers.2298    The abuse does not end at sea. On land, there are grave concerns2299about the use of forced labor--including Uyghur and North Korean2300labor--in seafood processing facilities tied to global supply chains.2301Products processed under these conditions can make their way into2302international markets, including the United States, raising urgent2303legal, moral, and national security concerns.2304    We are joined again today by Mr. Ian Urbina, founder of The Outlaw2305Ocean Project, whose reporting has helped expose these abuses to the2306world. His work, and the work of others, has made one thing2307unmistakably clear: This is not a series of isolated incidents. It is a2308pattern. And it demands a response equal to its scale and seriousness.2309    Ian's testimony at our 2023 hearing told of North Korean laborers2310in Chinese seafood processing facilities whose products entered the2311U.S. market.2312    We have also recently learned that North Koreans are also being2313employed on Chinese flagged tuna longliners, with evidence of forced2314labor that included debt bondage, physical and verbal abuse, and2315excessive overtime. That is not just labor abuse. It is a sanctions2316evasion issue, a human rights issue, and a national security issue.2317    With Senator Merkley and Senator Sullivan, I have called on the2318Departments of State and Homeland Security to coordinate and act2319swiftly to address forced labor in China's seafood industry. We raised2320a particularly alarming possibility: that seafood consumed in the2321United States could be indirectly funding North Korea's nuclear and2322ballistic missile programs.2323    Our message was simple. The United States must not allow its2324consumers, its taxpayers, or its government procurement systems to2325become unwitting participants in forced labor or sanctions evasion.2326That means stronger enforcement to stop tainted seafood at the border,2327and it means ensuring that no Federal procurement system--including2328military bases, school meal programs, or other government facilities--2329relies on products linked to forced labor.2330    Because let's be clear: China's illegal fishing practices and the2331use of forced labor in its seafood supply chain are not merely2332unethical--they are in clear violation of U.S. law, including the2333Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (which I led with Senators Rubio and2334Merkley and Representative McGovern) and the Countering America's2335Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.2336    We know the administration has said that addressing IUU fishing is2337a priority. We know Customs and Border Protection has issued Withhold2338Release Orders on Chinese vessels and barred products from at least one2339Chinese seafood processor.2340    We know CBP has the authority to act. What we need to know now is2341whether that authority is being used with the urgency and rigor this2342crisis demands.2343    After our 2023 hearing, Chinese seafood was added to CBP's priority2344enforcement list. Companies and retailers took notice--Lotte stores in2345South Korea and McDonald's promised to stop importing Chinese seafood.2346    We hope today's hearing produces that same kind of impact--but more2347important--we hope it leads to sustained action.2348    This hearing is about protecting American jobs and protecting2349national security as well. China's distant-water fishing fleet does not2350operate in a vacuum. These vessels often advance the Chinese Communist2351Party's objectives: asserting maritime claims, projecting presence in2352disputed waters, distorting markets, and exploiting vulnerable workers2353in service of larger geopolitical ambitions.2354    So this is about more than seafood. It is about whether the United2355States will tolerate a system that rewards coercion, harms American2356fishermen, weakens sanctions enforcement, creates food insecurity in2357Africa, and erodes the integrity of global commerce.2358    That is why we are here today, and that is why this hearing2359matters.23602361                       Submissions for the Record23622363                              ----------23642365          Questions for Admiral Clendenin from Chair Sullivan23662367    Question. What specific resources do you believe are needed to make2368the U.S. Coast Guard more effective in meeting Illegal, Unreported, and2369Unregulated (IUU) fishing interdiction goals?2370    Answer. The views expressed in this response are my own and do not2371represent the official position of the U.S. Government or the U.S.2372Coast Guard.2373    Over the past 4 years, Congress has provided the Coast Guard with2374additional resources dedicated to counter-IUU fishing. These funds have2375been applied toward additional positions and the establishment of an2376IUU Center of Excellence in Hawaii. My understanding is that these2377investments have significantly strengthened the Service's ability to2378combat IUU fishing. As Congress revisits the IUU challenge with renewed2379interest and focus--and given that these resources were allocated2380several years ago--this is an appropriate time for the Coast Guard to2381reassess its level of both capabilities and capacity employed in this2382mission area, and more specifically to report whether the resources2383provided in 2020 remain adequate today for a mission that has, and2384continues to, expand in both geographic scope and strategic importance.2385    As noted in my testimony, persistent at-sea presence remains the2386single most important factor in the Coast Guard's ability to counter2387IUU fishing, and therefore the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) acquisition2388program is essential. In addition to providing the global reach and2389capacity required to respond to IUU incursions, to support partner2390nations, and to increase persistent presence on the high seas, OPCs are2391urgently needed to replace the aging Medium Endurance Cutter fleet,2392which is operating decades beyond its intended service life. These2393legacy cutters face increasing maintenance challenges resulting in2394reduced operational availability (days on patrol at sea), limiting the2395Service's ability to sustain patrols in contested or remote regions.2396The OPCs will be the backbone of the Coast Guard's at-sea capacity and2397will be the workhorses supporting the Service's efforts to stem IUU2398fishing.2399    As IUU fishing activity expands into the Arctic and higher2400latitudes, the Arctic Security Cutter (ASC), currently under2401construction, will provide indispensable capability and capacity.2402Conventional non-icebreaking-capable cutters cannot safely operate in2403or near ice, and communications and overhead imagery are more2404challenging in the Arctic due to satellite-orbit geometry. The planned2405fleet of 11 Arctic Security Cutters will provide the persistent2406presence required to deter and respond to incursions into U.S. northern2407waters. Until the ASC fleet is fully operational, the interim high-2408latitude capabilities provided by USCGC STORIS, which was placed into2409service in August 2025, will remain critical.2410    The modularization program currently being prototyped on STORIS--2411and directed by the Executive Order on Restoring America's Maritime2412Dominance--is particularly important for the IUU mission, especially in2413the Arctic. Modern containerized modularity enables rapid augmentation2414of capabilities such as additional berthing, enhanced communications,2415expanded intelligence capabilities, and embarked scientific modules.2416    Both the ASC and Polar Security Cutter (PSC) classes will be2417designed to embark these modular capabilities, allowing each patrol to2418be tailored to mission requirements.2419    Last, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) capabilities will be essential2420to the IUU mission in a variety of ways. UAS will soon be embarked on2421most Coast Guard cutters, providing organic surveillance capability2422that will greatly enhance maritime domain awareness for the IUU2423mission. In addition, UAS aerial patrols for counter-IUU fisheries2424missions in the Arctic limit risk to manned aircraft and their embarked2425crews given the harsh operational conditions found in the northern2426latitudes. Continued support for the Coast Guard's UAS program will be2427essential and may present an area that would benefit from increased2428resourcing.2429    Thank you for your leadership on this critically important IUU2430fishing mission, which is vital to U.S. national security, regional2431stability, and global food security.24322433    Question. Are there other Coast Guard-related priorities that can2434help on the IUU fishing front?2435    Answer. The views expressed in this response are my own and do not2436represent the official position of the U.S. Government or the U.S.2437Coast Guard.2438    In 2020, the 26th Commandant, Admiral Schultz, in the Service's IUU2439Fishing Strategic Outlook, identified combating IUU fishing as the top2440operational concern for the majority of America's maritime partner-2441nation Coast Guards and Navies. Schultz noted, ``The Coast Guard's IUU2442Fishing Strategic Outlook outlines the Service's efforts to combat the2443scourge of IUU fishing over the next decade. We are committed to2444working with our allies and like-minded partners to strengthen the2445international fisheries enforcement regime and counter this pervasive2446threat. As a recognized world leader in maritime safety, security and2447environmental stewardship, the Coast Guard has a responsibility to help2448build a coalition of partners willing to identify and address IUU2449fishing bad actors and model responsible global maritime behavior.''2450Since publishing this Strategic Outlook, co-chairing the MSAFE IUU2451Committee, and expanding the Service's global engagement, the Coast2452Guard has become an international leader in counter-IUU maritime2453governance and operations. However, as noted in my testimony, the Coast2454Guard cannot address this challenge alone. A whole-of-society approach2455that integrates the work of Federal departments and agencies, industry,2456nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and civil society is required.2457    To support this, IUU fishing should be elevated within national2458security priorities to a level comparable to narcotics trafficking and2459piracy. The MSAFE interagency effort should receive increased2460visibility, provide regular updates to Congress and the executive2461branch, and have its efforts incorporated into periodic, focused2462National Security Council-level discussions.2463    The Coast Guard, along with other departments and agencies,2464conducts extensive international capacity-building related to counter-2465IUU fishing, including law-2466enforcement instruction, fisheries education, legal and policy2467development, and broader capacity-building initiatives. A persistent2468challenge is ensuring that these efforts are coordinated not only2469across U.S. agencies, but also with foreign partners and2470nongovernmental organizations, to ensure they are additive and2471complementary rather than redundant. Additionally, these activities2472must be more closely aligned with operational objectives and measurable2473outcomes. Departments and agencies often report activities rather than2474results and impact, frequently providing only anecdotal examples. A2475system of macrolevel indicators--developed jointly with intelligence2476and NGO communities--would allow the United States to assess whether2477global IUU fishing trends are improving.2478    Improved intelligence collaboration is also essential. The U.S.2479Government shares information and intelligence with partners and NGOs2480through collaborative IT platforms and through Information Fusion2481Centers to improve awareness of vessels engaged in IUU fishing2482activities. While this effort is important, these mechanisms often2483remain cumbersome due to information-sharing policy constraints that2484prevent broader collaboration. Analytic products from NGOs--such as2485Global Fishing Watch--can exceed both the quality and timeliness of2486information available from the U.S. Government. The advantage of the2487IUU fishing mission is that classified information is not essential to2488produce quality targeting data. Crowd-sourced efforts to enrich2489unclassified, commercially available overhead data--enhanced with2490artificial intelligence--can provide timely information on IUU fishing2491fleets and fully inform priority patrol areas globally. Greater2492collaboration in unclassified, publicly releasable platforms would2493allow U.S. agencies, foreign partners, and NGOs to fully collaborate2494using the same data, enabling timely shared tactical information2495without releasability barriers. This would significantly enhance2496operational awareness for all partner nation patrols.2497    Coast Guard efforts must also be integrated into broader joint and2498interagency initiatives outside the Service's traditional mission2499areas. While the Coast Guard provides the persistent presence, boarding2500capability, and intelligence support needed to challenge IUU fishing at2501sea, it does not have the lead role in traceability, import2502inspections, or supply chain enforcement. The Coast Guard supports2503these efforts through intelligence and the Coast Guard Investigative2504Service, but as noted in my testimony, effective international2505traceability and inspection regimes--implemented in close partnership2506with industry--are essential. Reducing the market for IUU-tainted2507seafood imports would diminish the economic incentives that drive IUU2508fishing globally. Without this effort, it will be difficult to counter2509global IUU fishing effectively through at-sea enforcement alone.2510    The Coast Guard's efforts need to be fully integrated into a2511broader unified, coordinated, whole-of-society approach--bringing2512together joint and interagency resources, foreign partners, NGOs, and2513civil society. This approach would significantly strengthen national2514efforts to counter IUU fishing. This synergy can be achieved through2515regular, structured engagement of the MSAFE Committee and its working2516groups by congressional and executive branch leadership, including2517periodic discussion and progress monitoring at the National Security2518Council level.2519    Thank you for your leadership in addressing the IUU fishing2520challenge, which is vital to U.S. national security, regional2521stability, and global food security.25222523              [THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK]25242525 [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]25262527                          Witness Biographies25282529    Ian Urbina, Director and Founder, The Outlaw Ocean Project25302531    Ian Urbina is the founder and director of The Outlaw Ocean Project,2532a Washington, DC-based nonprofit journalism organization that2533investigates human rights, environmental, and labor abuses across the2534world's oceans. Before launching the project, he spent nearly 17 years2535as a staff reporter for the New York Times. His work has earned2536numerous honors, including a Pulitzer Prize, two George Polk Awards,2537and an Emmy.25382539    Rear Admiral Scott W. Clendenin, USCG (Ret.), Owner, Dog Zebra2540Solutions LLC25412542    Rear Admiral Scott Clendenin served 33 years on active duty in the2543U.S. Coast Guard and retired as Assistant Commandant for Response2544Policy, where he oversaw operational policy across seven mission areas.2545He spent 14 years at sea on six Coast Guard cutters, commanded four of2546them, and led international multi-mission patrols involving narcotics2547interdiction, fisheries enforcement, mass-migration response, search2548and rescue, and disaster response. Ashore, he held senior intelligence2549and policy roles supporting national operations and interagency2550efforts. He is a 1990 graduate of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy.25512552    Hon. Dean A. Pinkert, Special Advisor, Corporate Accountability Lab25532554    The Honorable Dean A. Pinkert is an international trade and human2555rights consultant who serves as special advisor to Corporate2556Accountability Lab. He spent 10 years as a commissioner at the U.S.2557International Trade Commission, including 2 years as Vice Chairman. He2558has testified before Congress and has written and spoken widely on2559trade policy, including U.S. efforts to prevent the importation of2560goods produced with forced labor.25612562                                 [all]