J.Hrg.119

1[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 119 Congress]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34                    RESPONDING TO CHINA'S INFILTRATION AND5                           COERCION IN EUROPE6=======================================================================78                                HEARING910                               BEFORE THE1112                         COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND13                           COOPERATION IN EUROPE1415                        U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION1617                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES1819                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2021                             SECOND SESSION2223                               __________2425                             March 4, 20262627                               __________2829 Printed for the use of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in30                                 Europe3132                              [CSCE119-2]3334[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]3536                       Available via www.csce.gov3738                              __________3940                      U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE4163-084                        WASHINGTON : 202642=======================================================================4344            COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE4546                        U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION4748            U.S. SENATE	                U.S. HOUSE4950ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi         JOE WILSON, South Carolina Co-51    Chairman                             Chairman52SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island      STEVE COHEN, Tennessee Ranking53    Ranking Member			Member54JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas		      ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama55KATIE BRITT, Alabama		      EMANUEL CLEAVER II, Missouri56JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania	      LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas57RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona		      JAKE ELLZEY, Texas58MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota	      RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina59JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire         GREG MURPHY, North Carolina60THOM TILLIS, North Carolina	      MARC VEASEY, Texas6162                            EXECUTIVE BRANCH6364                 Department of State - to be appointed65                Department of Defense - to be appointed66                Department of Commerce - to be appointed6768                        C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S6970                              ----------71                                                                   Page7273                             COMMISSIONERS7475Hon. Jake Ellzey, from Texas.....................................     17677Hon. Ruben Gallego, from Arizona.................................     97879Hon. Joe Wilson, Co-Chairman, from South Carolina................    118081Hon. Marc Veasey, from Texas.....................................    188283                               WITNESSES8485Audrye Wong, Nonresident Senior Fellow, American Enterprise86  Institute......................................................     38788Valbona Zeneli, Nonresident Senior Fellow, The Atlantic Council..     58990Vidmantas Verbickas, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lithuania.     79192       RESPONDING TO CHINA'S INFILTRATION AND COERCION IN EUROPE9394                              ----------9596 COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN97                                    EUROPE,98                          U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION,99                                  HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,100                                          Wednesday, March 4, 2026.101102    The hearing was held from 2:40 p.m. to 4:02 p.m., Room1032247, Rayburn House Office Building, Representative Jake Ellzey104[R-TX], Member, Commission for Security and Cooperation in105Europe, presiding.106107    Committee Members Present: Representative Joe Wilson [R-108SC], Co-Chairman; Representative Jake Ellzey [R-TX]; Senator109Ruben Gallego [D-AZ]; Representative Marc Veasey [D-TX].110    Witnesses: Vidmantas Verbickas, Vice Minister of Foreign111Affairs, Lithuania; Audrye Wong, Nonresident Senior Fellow,112American Enterprise Institute; Valbona Zeneli, Nonresident113Senior Fellow, The Atlantic Council.114115    OPENING STATEMENT OF JAKE ELLZEY, U.S. HOUSE, FROM TEXAS116117    Representative Ellzey: Good afternoon, and thank you for118joining us today on this hearing about China's infiltration and119coercion into Europe. I am grateful to Senator Wicker for the120opportunity to chair this important hearing. My name is Jake121Ellzey. I am the Congressman from the sixth congressional122district of Texas, just south of Dallas.123    Before turning our attention to China and Europe, I want to124highlight the greatest current threat to the region that most125of us agree on: Russia. As we mark the fourth year of Russia's126genocidal war on Ukraine, I have tremendous admiration for127Ukrainians who have held the line against formidable odds. The128bravery of Ukrainian soldiers fighting on the frontline for129years on end without respite, neighbors helping each other keep130warm through this brutal winter, and children studying in metro131stations as air raid sirens blare, inspire us all and fuel132Western solidarity and support.133    Putin and Western intelligence said the invasion would be134over in hours, but the spirit of Ukrainians proved them all135wrong. While there is always room to do more, I am proud to say136that the West has stood by Ukraine and strengthened our137collective deterrence against Russia. This includes NATO138nations increasing their spending on defense. We have all come139to understand the threat posed by war criminal No. 1, Vladimir140Putin, and his band of mobsters. However, through this ordeal,141many of our allies in Europe have been slow to recognize that142Russia's patron, China, is angling to become the true winner in143this war. Xi Jinping has complemented Putin's brute force with144a patient, persistent approach to establishing his global145dominance and upending the U.S.-led world order.146    China has shrewdly used Russia's invasion, along with a147suite of overt and covert tools, to assert itself in Europe and148establish beachheads to manipulate the continent. A commitment149to transatlantic security requires attention from both the150threat of Russia's war as well as persistent threat posed by151China's pursuit of hegemony. In a few minutes, I will turn it152over to our panelists who will discuss how China is executing153its strategy to supplant U.S. leadership and European154independence, and the implications of failing to respond155effectively. First, I want to spend a few moments discussing156why Americans and Europeans should care about China's growing157influence.158    For our partners in Europe who lacks official industrial159base or developed tech sector, China's no-strings-attached160offers of investment and trade seem enticing. As Europeans161spend significant resources bolstering Ukraine and growing162their own militaries, many do not seem to see the harm in163allowing China's cash to boost other key sectors. That cash164comes with a catch. With Russia on the march, some believe that165they do not have the resources or political capital to focus on166the harmful elements of China's presence in their countries.167This is a false choice. China and Russia share a vision for the168world where they do what they--the strong do what they can, and169the weak suffer what they must.170    The free markets and democracy in the West are strategic171obstacles to them. We embrace free speech, whereas free speech172is challenged in China's industrial base, as concerned citizens173on both sides of the Atlantic demand publicly that China stop174using Uyghur forced labor. We uphold a commitment to freedom of175religion. That freedom compels people of faith to cry out and176demand accountability when China arrests pastors and destroys177churches that refuse to glorify the CCP. We depend on178journalists to bring facts to light. These journalists threaten179China's Belt and Road Initiative as they reveal a clear trend.180Chinese firms make big promises of massive infrastructure181development, but they deliver half-built ports and train182stations that collapse on commuters. They build junk.183    The innovation and progress delivered by our market184economies provide unwanted competition for China's command185economy, which operates at the whims of central planners and186CCP cadres. Xi's approach to Europe includes concerted,187systematic efforts to undermine the rights and ideals that are188the bedrock of the transatlantic relationship. China's efforts189to silence dissenters, threaten diaspora communities, violate190citizens' privacy, and steal intellectual property have a dual191purpose--bolstering China's image and power while eroding the192values and institutions that set democracies apart. If our193allies in Europe wish to see the next century characterized by194the same freedom and prosperity that we have enjoyed for the195last eighty years, we ought to take the threat posed by China196deadly seriously.197    We must marshal our arsenals, our cyber capabilities, and198our economic might to harden our countries against an insidious199force that seeks to marginalize us. We hope that all of Europe200rejects China's sinister overtures and follows the example set201by our friends in Ukraine and the Baltics, who recognize that202there is no price too high to pay for liberty and independence.203It is time to recommit to the wisdom of our founders: ``Those204who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little205temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.''206    To discuss the troubling effects of China's increasing207infiltration in Europe and how our European allies and the rest208of the democratic world can best respond, I am pleased to209introduce our distinguished panel. Vidmantas Verbickas, vice210minister of foreign affairs for the Republic of Lithuania. I211have been to Lithuania twice in the last couple of years. I212love your country. My wife wants to move there tomorrow.213[Laughter.] Audrye Wong, nonresident fellow at the American214Enterprise Institute. Valbona Zeneli, nonresident senior fellow215at the American Enterprise Institute. It is a privilege to have216all three experts here today. Thank you to each of you for your217investment and time.218    Dr. Wong, we will begin with you.219220 TESTIMONY OF AUDRYE WONG, NONRESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW, AMERICAN221                      ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE222223    Dr. Wong: Representative Ellzey and the Helsinki224Commission, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I225will just take the next few minutes to outline five key226takeaways about China's influence in Europe.227    First, what are China's strategic goals on the European228continent? One, is to bolster friends and silence critics of229the Chinese Communist Party and its policies, especially on230politically sensitive issues such as human rights, abuse of231Uyghurs in Xinjiang, ongoing territorial disputes, and, of232course, to minimize opposition to Chinese claims over Taiwan.233Second, is to undermine transatlantic cooperation and European234unity through a divide-and-conquer strategy. Even just peeling235off a few dissenters can disrupt the formation of a durable236coalition to counter a malign Chinese influence.237    Second, China adopts a multifaceted, multilayered approach238to exerting influence. It uses both coercion and inducements,239so weaponizing supply chains, for example, while dangling240promises, offers economic benefits. China employs a mix of241subversive and legitimate approaches. Beijing often seeks to242buy support through corrupt investments, through bribery,243through other covert influence tactics, but it also readily244uses elite co-optation, building and cultivating relationships245with a variety of stakeholders and interest groups in246democratic societies to try to persuade them of the validity of247China's interests and policies.248    It also attempts to influence a wide array of targets. We249see activities across, sort of, diplomatic and government250realms, business realms, public realms, and intersecting251tactics, combining economic, information, and propaganda. China252is quite opportunistic at forging alliances of convenience,253aligning--you know, trying to empower certain voices across the254political and ideological spectrum to get them to echo China's255talking points, whether for transactional or ideological256reasons.257    Third, China's economic statecraft may be imperfect, but it258works well enough. What China has done best is to really create259divisions, to drive wedges within Europe among European260countries, as well as between Europe and the United States. You261have, you know, countries that receive a lot of Chinese262investment, who hope to receive more Chinese investment, right,263you know, taking stances in line with China, vetoing EU264statements critical of China, for example, and really co-opting265and adopting Beijing's political rhetoric. Individual countries266often fear targeted economic retaliation in Beijing. This267limits progress, right, at the EU level, when the European268Commission, for example, seeks to introduce more stringent269regulations. That makes it harder to achieve.270    Of course, there is plenty of scrutiny and pushback against271poorly conceived Chinese projects and other forms of illicit272influence, thanks to the relative strength of institutions in273many European nations. The attractiveness of China's market and274its capital could be enough to buy silence on issues that China275really cares about. In addition, China really strategically276alternates the uses of economic inducements to buffer its277periodic use of economic coercion. We have seen examples of,278you know, sanctions imposed on member--you know, European279elected officials, in countries such as Lithuania, but then280subsequently they like to renormalize these trade and281investment flows and offer diplomatic reassurance.282    These promises in this cycle keep governments and companies283coming back, you know, and hoping for more, rather than284actually concerted diversifying away from China. This285combination of carrots and sticks, you know, really helps to286minimize opposition to China, to stymie broader coalition287building against China. This creates more strategic space for288Beijing to pursue its interests with relative impunity.289    The fourth point I want to make is that China often has a290first-mover advantage. There is relatively low, I think,291especially compared to United States elite and public literacy292on China. Because Russia has often been the foremost293conventional threat, this really allows Beijing to fill the294information gap, to dominate and propagate its strategic295narratives, and really shape perceptions and understandings of296Beijing's interests. This logic applies when CCP-linked actors297reach out to local officials, who are more likely to be298concerned with economic development. China often likes to299combine very assertive and aggressive propaganda messaging and300public diplomacy to claim credit and sometimes exaggerate the301importance of China as an economic partner. You have a bridge302constructed by a Chinese company in Croatia that was actually303funded primarily by the European Union. Most people think it is304funded and built by China.305    The fifth point I want to make is that democratic306backsliding, corruption, and patronage politics really provide307weak entry points for Chinese influence and authoritarian308influence in general. We see the intersection of Chinese and309Russian activities, where the lack of transparency and310oversight really makes it easier for strongman politicians to311accept corrupt investment deals in exchange for falling in line312with Beijing's policies. These activities, in turn, perpetuate313a vicious cycle of autocratization, right, entrenching these314illiberal leaders and really undermining good governance.315    At the same time, it is the CCP engages in these illegal316interference tactics, you know, and espionage and all of that,317but it is also quite adept exploiting the openness of318democratic societies, working within existing institutions and319processes, exploiting these vulnerabilities to forge links with320multiple stakeholders and really shape discourse in favor of321China, and create an impression of broader support for Chinese322interests. This sort of broader phenomenon and co-optation has323been quite key in shaping how many elected officials and324business leaders operate in this realm, right?325    Many of these influence activities are managed under the326umbrella of the United Front, which is a diffuse and amorphous327global network of official, quasi-official, and grassroots328organizations that are tasked with mobilizing friends and329suppressing enemies of the Chinese state. CCP foreign influence330tactics have really included, you know, using political331fixtures, power brokers to gain access to government officials,332tasking aides to spy on behalf of China, and even tapping on333pro-China individuals to seek elected office.334    To conclude, I think without overstating the extent of335China's influence, I think the scale of resources that the336party is able to allocate to its foreign policy goals means337that it can make a dizzying multitude of influence attempts and338play a waiting game to see which ones pay off. This is not just339a national security threat, but also corrodes the legitimate340functioning of free and open societies.341    Thank you.342    Representative Ellzey: Thank you, Dr. Wong.343    Now, Valbona Zeneli, who is not with the American344Enterprise Institute, is with the Atlantic Council. Welcome.345346  TESTIMONY OF VALBONA ZENELI, NONRESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW, THE347                        ATLANTIC COUNCIL348349    Ms. Zeneli: Thank you very much, sir. Representative350Ellzey, distinguished members of the Commission, thank you for351the opportunity to testify on this important topic.352    Let me begin with one central point. The European Union has353made significant progress in recalibrating the approach to the354People's Republic of China. However, it is critically important355to remind ourselves that Europe's China policy is not a single356strategy, but it is a product of a complex negotiation between357European Union institutions and 27 member states, each with358distinct economic interests, political pressures, and security359concerns. This reality makes unified and consistent action360toward Beijing very difficult.361    China has expanded its economic footprint across Europe362with a clear strategic purpose: To acquire advanced363technologies, shape global value chains, and build leverage in364critical sectors. Beijing combines state-backed financing,365industrial subsidies, and political engagement to deepen its366presence, targeting advanced manufacturing in Western Europe,367infrastructure and energy in Southern Europe, political368economic relationship in Central and Eastern Europe and the369Western Balkans, through platforms like 14+1 and the Belt and370Road Initiative. For Beijing, this is not simply commercial371gain. This is strategic leverage. It seeks to build dependency372and expand its influence in critical sectors by exploiting373Europe's openness and its regulatory complexity.374    This has structural implications for Europe. First, the375EU's economic security is affected. The economic balance has376shifted sharply over the last two decades. Now China's share of377the global economy is around 20 percent, while the European378Union's has fallen to 14 percent. Trade has expanded, but has379become increasingly imbalanced, with China supplying over 1/5th380of EU imports and a trade deficit exceeding $400 billion. State381subsidies, overcapacity market access restrictions, and export382controls, especially in rare earths and critical inputs, have383created vulnerabilities in European supply chains, triggering a384China shock.385    Second, technology has become the sharpest area of386competition. Europe's reliance on Chinese semiconductors, 5G,387AI, and raw materials creates strategic dependencies, while388Beijing expands its leverage through standards, subsidies, and389embedded tech ecosystems. Third, defense and military security390are indirectly, but materially, affected. Economic leverage391creates constraints in decisions, complicates sanctions, and392weakens supply chains. Those are risks that are heightened by393China's alignment with Russia and its support for Moscow's war394in Ukraine.395    In response, the European Union has shifted its posture.396Now has shifted from engagement to cautious competition with397China. Trends like China's growing assertiveness, human rights398issues, COVID-19 supply chain disruptions, and China's399alignment with Russia have created shared concerns across400Europe. In 2019, the EU defined China simultaneously as a401cooperation partner, an economic competitor, and a systemic402rival. Since then, the EU has adopted different mechanisms,403from investment screening mechanisms, anti-coercion404instruments, international public procurement instruments, 5G405security toolbox, Critical Raw Materials Act, a Digital406Services Act, and the Artificial Intelligence Act.407    The EU derisking is to reduce strategic vulnerabilities408without severing economic ties. However, three structural409challenges remain. First, EU institutional fragmentation.410Authority over trade, technology, foreign policy, and security411is divided among EU institutions, Commission, Council, and412Parliament, and the 27 member states. This often produces slow413decisions, overlapping responsibilities, and uneven414implementation. Second, divergent national interests. Larger415economies must balance commercial ties with security concerns.416Some Central European countries continue to seek Chinese417investment. Nordic and Baltic countries often prioritize418security and human rights, so achieving consensus across these419different perspectives is difficult.420    Third, domestic political pressures. Governments must421reconcile political business interests and those that are422seeking market access with security communities that are423warning about dependencies. This produces policy424inconsistencies, even within single-member states. To be425effective, policy responses must operate both at national and426multinational levels. China's assertiveness, coercion, lack of427reciprocity, and alignment with Russia have drawn Europe and428the United States closer, reinforcing the need for429transatlantic unity despite the differences. The key question430is how to implement it.431    Three recommendations. First, the United States and the432European Union should establish a high-level coordination433mechanism to counter China and promote shared economic434security. This should include joint initiatives like critical435minerals, chip manufacturing, aligned inbound and outbound436investment screening, and shared threat assessment. Second,437technology alignment is urgent. Cooperation on export controls,438semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies,439and dual-use goods must be sustained and enforcement-focused.440American technological leadership and European regulatory power441are complementary strengths. Differences over industrial policy442and strategic autonomy must be bridged.443    Third, security cooperation should expand to address China-444enabled support for Russia, strengthen counterespionage and445cyber defenses, and align Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific446strategies where interests intersect. If effectively aligned,447the combined scale of the U.S. and EU economies can shape448global standards, reinforce supply chains, and counter economic449coercion. This will not come from expecting Europe to act as a450Federal superstate, but from sustained cooperation that451combines American economic and military power with Europe's452regulatory authority and market scale.453    In closing, China's rise is the defining geopolitical454challenge of this century. Meeting it requires strategic455clarity, institutionalized cooperation, and a shared commitment456to preserving an open yet secure rules-and values-based457international order.458    Thank you. I look forward to your questions.459    Representative Ellzey: Thank you.460    Minister Verbickas, over to you.461462  TESTIMONY OF VIDMANTAS VERBICKAS, VICE MINISTER OF FOREIGN463                       AFFAIRS, LITHUANIA464465    Mr. Verbickas: Thank you so much, Honorable Representative466Ellzey, distinguished members of Helsinki Commission. It is a467profound honor for me today, as a representative of Lithuania,468to address the U.S. Congress here.469    We are deeply grateful for America's steadfast partnership,470principled leadership, and enduring commitment to securing the471freedom of Lithuania and our region. Today, in my remarks, I472will focus on key elements of Lithuania's experience with473China's coercion. For Lithuania, economic security is not474theoretical. It is shaped by lived experience. When we restored475our independence in 1990, the Soviet Union responded with a476full economic blockade, cutting trade and energy supplies. That477experience taught us a lasting lesson: Dependence creates478vulnerabilities. Since then, we have deliberately reduced479strategic dependencies. We built LNG infrastructure,480diversified energy supply, and synchronized our grid with481continental Europe.482    Today, 70 percent of our energy supplies come from United483States. For us, economic policy and national security are484inseparable. Both must serve and protect our core democratic485values, and the freedom to make independent political choices486without external coercion. This longstanding national approach487to economic security informed Lithuania's decision in 2021.488That year, Lithuania reassessed its economic engagement489frameworks and withdrew from China-led 17+1 format. Lithuania490also expanded economic and cultural engagement within its491existing one-China policy framework, including permitting the492establishment of a Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius.493In response, China imposed unprecedented economic and494diplomatic coercion.495    First, bilateral trade was targeted. Lithuania, as a496country, miraculously disappeared from China's customs systems.497Export permits were delayed or denied. Contracts were not498renewed. Then pressure escalated. Multinational companies were499warned that using Lithuanian components could jeopardize their500access to Chinese market. The impact was immediate. In the501first months, Lithuanian-origin exports to China fell by 99.7502percent, essentially to zero. This was not a commercial503dispute. It was a politically motivated pressure designed to504change a sovereign policy decision.505    At the same time, China undertook unprecedented diplomatic506measures. It unilaterally downgraded diplomatic relations,507without Lithuania's consent, creating a false appearance of508mutual agreement. Our embassy staff was forced to surrender509accreditation and leave Beijing. Lithuania does not recognize510this downgrade, and we maintain our embassy. It continues to511exist. Consular access to detained Lithuanian nationals in512China has also been severely restricted, raising humanitarian513and legal concerns. Lithuania's case illustrates a broader514pattern of economic and diplomatic coercion used against515democratic states whose sovereign decisions do not align with516Beijing's preferences. Trade, supply chains, and diplomatic517status were weaponized altogether.518    How did we respond? First, we acted through the European519Union. European Commission initiated WTO dispute settlement520proceedings. We appreciate the United States stepping up as a521third party in this. Our case accelerated adoption of EU anti-522coercion instrument, strengthening collective response523mechanisms. Second, we intensified coordination with partners,524especially the United States, in critical sectors such as525semiconductors, photonics, biotechnology, and defense526technologies. Third, we diversified rapidly. Lithuanian527exporters oriented toward trusted markets. In subsequent years,528namely last year, 89 percent of Lithuanian-origin exports went529to European Union, European Economic Area, OECD, NATO, and530Indo-Pacific countries.531    By 2025, overall trade flows with China had recovered. The532structure of our exports, though, has changed. Only 1.2 percent533of exports are going to China, Belarus, and Russia. This534adjustment was not accidental. Together with diversification,535Lithuania strengthened its international resilience. Our536investment screening system, in place since 2001, was537reinforced and expanded. It has enabled Lithuania to take538concrete security decisions, including exclusion of high-risk539lenders such as Huawei from our 5G infrastructure. Monitoring540and mitigating strategic dependencies have become a permanent541element of our economic policy. At the same time, we led542international dialogue on economic coercion in OECD with543partners like European Union, the United States, Japan, and544other democracies, to share experience and strengthen545resilience.546    Today, Lithuania remains committed to working closely with547the United States and other like-minded partners to strengthen548resilient and transparent supply chains among democracies. It549is worth mentioning here that Lithuania remains open to550dialogue, restoring diplomatic representation with China. We551believe that stable relations must be based on reciprocity,552respect, and adherence to international conventions.553    Thank you so much. I am looking forward to your questions.554    Representative Ellzey: Thank you, Vidmantas.555    Okay. Well, we have been joined by a couple of our members,556Senator Ruben Gallego, who is a senator from Arizona. His time557is tight. He is a combat Marine who has also sacrificed. As I558see so many people out here who understand what the price of559freedom is, so does he. I leave it over to you.560561     STATEMENT OF RUBEN GALLEGO, U.S. SENATE, FROM ARIZONA562563    Senator Gallego: All right. Thank you, Chairman. Joe, good564to see you again, sir. Good to be back here on this side. Thank565you, Mr. Vidmantas. It has been great to work with Lithuania566and the other Baltic states on the Baltic Security Initiative,567and proud to continue that work.568    You know, one of the things you hit upon is one of the569things I did here on the House side, which was 5G coordination.570What happened with 5G is by time, Europe, and to some degree571the United States, was slow to respond. Now we have a572significant share of 5G infrastructure across the continent573that still relies on Chinese vendors, despite, you know, the574presence of European firms that we trust also in the United575States, like Nokia. I am concerned that we might be repeating576that same mistake when it comes to 6G. Ms. Zeneli, I believe--577if I said that correctly, and I apologize if I did not--you578brought up a very good point about trying to have coordinated579action.580    I guess one of the things I am trying to figure out is,581like, how do we do that? Because the best way for us to stop582the emergence of 6G Chinese dominance is for us to have583standards, European standards--or just, like, free world584standards, I would say, aligning with Japan, South Korea, so585that we have market dominance. That way, we actually can find586ourselves in a--we can find our allied tech backings have587market capability. How does that look? How would that look, in588your opinion? What can we do as countries to start doing that589kind of coordination in terms of, you know, market policy,590regulations, and things of that nature?591    Secondarily, one of the things we saw with 5G last time592around was that we were able to convince, especially a lot of593our NATO and European Union allies, and other countries, near594allies. It was, you know, your emerging countries that were595willing to take on the cheaper, subsidized Huawei versus our596Western standards. What can we do? Can we set up a separate597fund that would help some of these developing countries to just598avoid the money trap, the honey trap that China always engages599in? This question could be for--really, for any--all three600here. I do think that, you know, us making sure that we do not601allow China to win the 6G war is going to be extremely602important for us in terms of continuing to have, you know,603democratic dominance in this world.604    Thank you.605    Ms. Zeneli: Well, thank you very much, Representative606Gallego. First of all, thank you for your service.607    I think I fully agree with your point. I believe that at608this time of really growing international tension and rapid,609disruptive technological change, I think strengthening610transatlantic cooperation, but also with the partners in the611Indo-Pacific, is essential. Not only for security, but also for612technological and economic competitiveness, and the ability,613which is most important, of the democratic system to play a614leading role in global technological governance. It is about615the future of technological governance. I think, in this616context, closer coordination between the public and the private617sectors, not only between the governments, on both sides of the618Atlantic and with the Indo-Pacific partners, is increasingly619important.620    The goal, I believe, is to promote shared policy621priorities, like you mentioned, and stronger partnerships,622including moving toward maybe a more integrated transatlantic623technological ecosystem. I could bring an example from Italy,624where I am based now. There is a new law which is called ``Buy625Transatlantic.'' It is focused on enhancing resilience,626actually, growth, security in the years ahead, really looking627at buying all the new technologies, focusing on countries--both628European Union countries but also the United States.629    Now, what to do with countries that do not have the630resources, maybe, to buy--focus on buying cheaper energy? Like631Representative Ellzey mentioned, the no-strings-attached632approach, actually, we believe it's a ropes attached approach633for most of these countries. I think to disincentivize risky634tech partnerships, like with Huawei, in sensitive systems,635governments need a mix of clear rules--they have to be636national, but also European rules--economic incentives, and637allied coordination. First, countries should exclude, actually,638high-risk vendors from critical sectors, including government639communications--we have seen in some cases even the government640is using those risky technologies--lawful intercept systems,641and core infrastructure.642    Second, transatlantic partners should align export643controls, I think it is important, and investment screening, so644companies cannot exploit the gaps that exist within the645European Union, but also within the transatlantic community.646Then, third, governments should offer incentives. They should647offer financial and industrial alternatives, helping allies648reducing those supply risky equipment, and diversify supply649chains. The future is really more coordination in the650transatlantic world.651    Senator Gallego: Anyone else want to answer that? Yes, Mr.652Verbickas.653    Mr. Verbickas: If I am allowed, shortly, like, I just have654to add something to the wonderful answer by Madam Zeneli. In655Lithuania, we heard such discussions about cheaper versus656secure. When we built up our LNG terminal in Klaipeda, we were657criticized for excessive spending, for very expensive658equipment, and decisions. Twelve years later, this project is659economically feasible. It is the same, like, we postponed--you660know, Lithuania was in advancement. It had to be the first661country in Europe to introduce 5G network, and we were the last662country to introduce 5G network, because of that, we forbid663Huawei to enter the market because of economic security664concerns and national security concerns.665    Right today, our ICT development and our local businesses666are working with 5G networks and looking for solutions where667working can expand it. Lithuania is the best advocate for668transatlantic partnership and coordination here. We really need669to find a way to agree between European Union and United States670to work together on those issues--critical materials, energy671mix, energy security, advanced technologies, artificial672intelligence, SMRs, you name it. We have to work together here.673    Thank you.674    Senator Gallego: I apologize. I have to go pick up my675daughter from daycare. That is the real important thing.676[Laughs.] You know, in terms of--I think the easier thing is677the coordination. The harder thing is the funding, because we678are dealing with a lot of countries that have budgets that are679overrun. We are demanding our European partners to have--you680know, go up to five percent of GDP when it comes to their681defense spending, which I am not against either. How do we682create that international fund that is not going to necessarily683benefit Western Europe, Europe in general, but what about when684we are talking about countries like the Philippines, or Africa,685or South America, where they are going to have to make these686trade decisions between do I spend money here and try to stay687good with our Western partners, or do I take the cheap option?688I think that is something that we have to kind of think about689kind of globally as partners.690    Thanks so much, guys. I will see you.691    Representative Ellzey: You are welcome.692    Thank you.693    Now I would like to welcome Congressman Joe Wilson from694South Carolina, who is--you are going to have plenty of time,695Joe. We have got another forty-five minutes. I would like to--696    Co-Chairman Wilson: Just one second.697    Representative Ellsey: Go ahead.698    Co-Chairman Wilson: Hey, before the senator leaves. Hey,699Senator, I want to say something nice about you. [Laughter.]700Okay.701    Representative Ellzey: I said--702    Co-Chairman Wilson: No, hey--703    Representative Ellzey: I thought we were not going to do704that. [Laughter.]705706 STATEMENT OF JOE WILSON, CO-CHAIRMAN, U.S. HOUSE, FROM SOUTH707                            CAROLINA708709    Co-Chairman Wilson: No, Mr. Chairman, I would like to710commend Senator Gallego. He actually led a delegation to Kyiv711in December 2021. While we were there, we were meeting with the712military officials as they were planning for resistance, for713guerrilla warfare. The belief was that war criminal Putin would714roll over the people of Ukraine. Four years later, with the715encouragement of good people--bipartisan--can you believe716Republicans, Democrats, working together--indeed, working717together, supporting the people of Ukraine. Of course,718Lithuania has been so strong in supporting the people of719Ukraine. Over and over again, I just wanted to point out that720we can have bipartisanship, and we do. I appreciate Senator721Gallego's service on behalf of the American people.722    Indeed, that was December 2021. The worst fears came forth723on February 24, 2022, when war criminal Putin, earlier in the724month, had met with President Xi Jinping in China. Together,725the two dictators embraced, declaring, quote, ``no limits726partnership.'' Then, later, clearly authorized by Beijing, the727war criminal Putin invaded Ukraine and launched a genocidal,728full-scale war, with full confidence that China was going to be729100 percent behind it. Putting that in mind, personally, I have730grown up with a great appreciation of the people of China. My731father served in India and China during World War II, in the732Flying Tigers and the 14th Air Force. As I was growing up, I733learned how hardworking the people of India and China are, and734my dad's service in Kunming, Chengdu, and Xi'an.735    Then, sadly, 20 years ago, I actually met with President736Jiang Zemin in the Presidential compound in Beijing. When I was737introduced, Chairman Ellzey, as a Member of Congress, he738yawned. Then somebody said, `` Hey, Joe's the son of a Flying739Tiger.'' He threw his arms up in the air and announced, `` The740American military is revered in China.'' Sadly, that is not741where we are today. Indeed, Americans can be proud of what we742did to liberate China, and our appreciation for the people of743China, people of Taiwan, but understanding there is evil called744the Chinese Communist Party.745    Since the full-scale invasion, cooperation between the746Chinese Communist Party and Russia has deepened. China steals747Western intellectual property, then provides Russia the748technology it depends on to murder Ukrainian families, just as749we see Khomeini has murdered Iranian families. Now he is gone.750China keeps war criminal Putin on life support by purchasing751Russian oil, coal, and natural gas. China is running752interference for Russia in international organizations,753ensuring that war criminal Putin and his army do not face754accountability for their sickening treatment of the Ukrainians.755    China's patronage of Russia has also extended to756destabilize and control Europe. While the CCP's vision for757global dominance by 2049 is grander than the Kremlin's, Xi758Jinping still sees Russia spreading chaos and violence as759useful in weakening Europe and making it more malleable to its760vision. While Russian agents carry out arson attacks and761assassinations, Chinese agents conduct corporate espionage and762silence dissent by threatening and renditioning dissidents. War763criminal Putin's shadow war in the United States and Europe is764also for the Chinese Communist Party. The tactics each765dictatorship uses have been increasingly similar and more766sophisticated, and disturbingly, are aided by technology and767innovation.768    This playbook has been on full display in the Republic of769Georgia. Bidzina Ivanishvili and his Georgian Dream770dictatorship have jailed nearly every opposition leader, defied771the Georgian people who want freedom and prosperity, not772Chinese debt trap diplomacy, as Russian oligarchy. Russia has773long been Bidzina's base of operations and source of wealth.774Since the Georgian Dream seized power through fraudulent775elections in 2024, China has been providing them much of the776surveillance technology, propaganda channels, and financial777backing needed to address and oppress the will of the pro-778American Georgian people. President Donald Trump has rightfully779prioritized Central Asia, the middle corridor. to secure and780diversify our supply chain. The Georgian Dream has essentially781given over the Georgian infrastructure to the Chinese Communist782Party and sold its country into debt slavery. American access783to the middle corridor is essentially controlled by the Chinese784Communist Party.785    Dictators increase violent oppression when they are the786weakest. War criminal Putin has sacrificed over one million787Russians for roughly one percent of Ukrainian territories.788Ukrainians have been so successful in their efforts. Xi has789purged nearly all top military officials. Europe, accommodating790manipulative trade policy and gray zone attacks, will not stop791them. Much weakness will only empower them to grow bolder with792their aggression. Xi and war criminal Putin only understand the793language of strength. I urge European allies to look to lessons794learned from past economic integration and appeasement of795Russia. The unholy alliance between the Chinese Communist Party796and war criminal Putin must be met with complete resolve.797    Lithuania is to be commended for its resolve on Taiwan. We798encourage them to continue their legacy of upholding the799democratic values of maintaining the name of the Taiwan800Representative Office. Indeed, Lithuania is appreciated for the801support of legitimate President Sviatlana [Tsikhanouskaya] of802Belarus, and supporting the courageous people of Ukraine,803successfully defeating war criminal Putin. Western Europe could804learn from our East European allies, and it is an extraordinary805day. I just left the floor to recognize the elimination of the806dictatorship in Tehran.807    With Khomeini being removed, that is the last really808Russian ally in the Middle East, particularly if you add in809that Assad, the dictator of Syria, has actually moved to810Moscow. Now we have a government with President Ahmed al-Sharaa811that is reaching out to work. President Donald Trump is giving812Syria a chance, and, of course, another dictator gone is Maduro813of Venezuela. We can all hope and pray that one day, Lukashenko814of Belarus will join his fellow dictators relocating to Moscow.815    With that, I yield back.816    Representative Ellzey: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let us talk817about China-Russia cooperation real quick. I am going to818address this to Audrye. China and Russia seem to be using819similar gray zone tactics when attacking countries in Europe820and Asia, including subsea cable cutting, influence and821information manipulation campaigns, and airspace incursions. To822what extent are China and Russia's militaries and political823leadership directly collaborating on these types of attacks? Or824are they just copying each other?825    Dr. Wong: Thank you, Representative Ellzey, for the826question.827    I think we certainly see a high degree of alignment in828Chinese and Russian interests. This is not to say that, you829know, they do not have their disagreements. I think at times830they are wary of each other. By and large, I think China is--831you know, is aligned with Russian, and wants to see sort of832destabilization and weakening of democratic, free, and open833societies, including the United States and the European Union.834No. 1, you know, Representative Ellzey, you have outlined sort835of a range of tactics that they have been using. I think we see836a lot of synchronization, especially in the strategic837narratives that they are using on Russia's invasion of Ukraine,838and sort of amplifying, echoing a lot of disinformation that839Russian state media has been propagating.840    I think we also see China sort of going beyond that, where841not only is it sort of amplifying and, you know, spreading842disinformation that is meant to sow discord and sort of expose843the fissures and sort of vulnerabilities in democratic844societies, I think China--in my work, I found that Chinese845state media is actively sort of trying to push the message of846what I call autocratic advantage. Sort of, you know,847highlighting the performance advantages of authoritarian848regimes. Not calling it, you know, autocracy, per se, but sort849of highlighting some of the benefits and advantages that, you850know, having a strongman in power has, and that centralization851of power affords for the people of a country.852    I think in my research I found that actually has853significant impacts on how public--foreign publics globally854think about democracy and the degree of support for democracy.855I think we see an intersection where China is sort of not only856trying to shape the views of China itself, but also, I think,857fundamentally undermining, I think, support for democracy and858accelerating democratic backsliding.859    Representative Ellzey: Thank you, Audrye. Anybody else want860to address that? Go ahead, Valbona.861    Ms. Zeneli: Yes, sir. I think that China and Russia are862strange bedfellows. However, they have shared strategic863alignment. It is mainly to counter--in opposition to the United864States, in opposition to NATO, and that is very open in the865narrative when they repeat each other's narrative, but also to866the liberal international order more in general. I think what867the difference is between China and Russia is that Russia is a868revisionist nuclear power seeking to undermine NATO and destroy869the current international order, while China, which is the870primary long-term competitor of the United States, aims to871reshape--use the global institutions, and reshape and take872advantage of those institutions.873    I think what is important, especially when it comes to the874European Union perspective also on China, which is the topic875also of conversation today, is that one of the main trends that876has changed perceptions in Europe has been really the support877that Beijing has given to Russia for its war in Ukraine. That878has raised awareness in the European Union about the security879challenges. China, at the same time, is a competitor, a880partner, but also a systemic rival. That part of the systemic881rival has increased of its importance, especially after the--882you know, the shattering of the security architecture of Europe883after the invasion of Ukraine. The no limits partnership has884strengthened that, but also the economic cooperation between885the two countries, because they need each other in the886current--in the current stage.887    The Chinese officials have been very open that they would888like--they would not like Russia to go down, even in talks with889members from the European Commission. It is very, very clear.890We just need to be eye-opened and not to really apply sometimes891mirror imaging on things that we think do not make sense,892because they are very openly stating the obvious. Just in the893last--just in the last two years, they have met more than forty894times, President Xi and President Putin. That should tell us895something.896    Representative Ellzey: Sure does. Thank you. Okay. I am897going to yield time to Chairman Wilson for five minutes of898questions. Go ahead, sir.899    Co-Chairman Wilson: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.900Indeed, witnesses, thank you for being here today. It is just901so refreshing to have each of you here. I appreciate the902leadership of Chairman Ellzey today to keep things moving well.903With that in mind, Ms. Zeneli, Italy has become a shining904example of working in the European Union and NATO in great--you905better believe the current[Meloni] government is the longest-906serving out of 67 since World War II. What an incredible907tribute that is. Additionally, I have a personal interest. My908number-two son was a doctor in Naples in the U.S. Navy. I have909three grandchildren speak Italian perfectly, so our910relationship is so positive.911    With that in mind, that is not true with other countries.912It is so sad to me that the success of Italy with the EU and913NATO, and then we have countries that are just weak, almost914complicit. Hungary. It is just the country that should have915inspired everyone from the 1956 revolution, now is bowing down916to the people who drove over patriots there, in Hungary, and917then Spain. Spain's decision last August to trust Huawei with918sensitive information, including judicial wiretaps, has919underscored the threat China still poses to a unified, secure,920and resilient transatlantic tech policy. How can we continue to921disincentivize such tech partnerships that threaten to create922hardware or train vulnerability to be exploited by the Chinese923Communist Party?924    Ms. Zeneli: Thank you very much, Co-Chairman Wilson.925    In Italy, under Prime Minister Meloni, the government has926recalibrated, actually, over the last four years, its China927policy by exiting the Belt and Road Initiative, which has been928one of the perfect examples of showing that, and strengthening929its alignment with the United States and the broader930transatlantic community. I emphasize that because, based on our931research at the Atlantic Council where we look at the current932trends and if the European Union is waking up to the China933challenge, what we have found out is that countries that have934closer relationship with the United States, they go--have been935going closer to the EU perception and to the EU policy on936China, which the European Commission has a very, very serious937policy on China.938    Unfortunately, as I was explaining in my open remarks,939there are so many differences inside Europe, and that makes EU940policy very difficult. Some countries, such as Hungary, have941been the main recipients of foreign direct investment from942China. In 2024, the majority of foreign direct investment that943was arriving in the European Union actually went to Hungary,944with some investment in factories of electric vehicles and945other areas that have become really vulnerabilities also for a946European market, and the supply chains inside Europe.947    Going back to Italy, I will mention a couple of points that948maybe should be a good example for other countries, what has949happened in recent years. It is, of course, you know this950blending of transatlantic loyalty, also with economic caution,951because China is an important market also for Italy. I believe952that should also be the guiding principle for other European953countries. Rome has strengthened its Golden Power investment954screening rules, so even going further, more deeply than the955European Union investment screening rules, and has blocked or956restricted acquisitions of, you know, strategic sectors, such957as in areas such as semiconductors, robotics, and also958telecommunication.959    It has adopted the ``Buy Transatlantic,'' which is the way960to go, also for other countries' procurement approach that961prioritizes European Union member states and American962companies. It is--but also the third element, which is clearly963around democratic values, has raised concerns about human964rights. We do not see that, unfortunately, throughout the965European Union. That is why it is so difficult to have a united966policy in the European Union when it comes to China, because of967the diverging interests and also because of diverging interests968of the economic community in the European Union.969    Co-Chairman Wilson: Indeed, follow the money. That is so970sad. I do not know many people who are aware of the level of971Chinese Communist Party investment with the government and972Hungary. Again, the last government that should be, because973they were the first to stand up to Soviet imperialism.974    With that, I yield back. I will be happy to have other975questions later.976    Representative Ellzey: Mr. Chairman, I am going to go ahead977and give you a couple more minutes. Keep going. It is just the978two of us. Let's have a conversation here. This is good stuff.979    Co-Chairman Wilson: No, no, hey, Mr. Chairman, thank you.980See how--what a good chairman he is? It is amazing. People from981Texas are very bright.982    Indeed, Mr. Verbickas, an example of success is the Baltic983republics. America should--Americans should know that in 1940,984when the Red Army occupied the Baltic Republics, the United985States never recognized the occupation. We never recognized986that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were happy Soviet987republics. They were not happy, and they were not Soviet988republics. They were independent countries. Then, once you989achieve your freedom in 1989 and 1990, it is exciting that the990three countries have just blossomed. What a contrast to the991Russian Federation. Then, equally significant, we learned992recently, Jake and I, that the economies of Estonia, Latvia,993and Lithuania, with Poland, are one and a half times the size994of the Russian Federation and growing much quicker. Hey, what995an example for the people of Russia, they can do better,996looking across the Neva River, and do better as the Baltic997republics.998    With that in mind, which EU members have, from your point999of view, been the greatest allies in responding to China's1000economic coercion? What of the greatest challenges that1001Lithuania has had in working with EU cooperation to face the1002challenge of the Chinese Communist Party?1003    Mr. Verbickas: Thank you. Thank you, Honorable Congressman,1004for your kind words. Really appreciate all the United States1005efforts and the Vilnius Summit declaration, and nonrecognition1006of Lithuania and Baltics' occupation. I got a chance to serve1007at the consulate in Chicago, where we have on our wall the old1008sign of a Lithuanian consulate from pre-war period. We1009appreciate that. To have our diplomatic missions, which never1010ceased to work during the occupation period. This is very, very1011cherishable moment for us.1012    Thank you for the question. Here, like, listening to what1013my colleague said about European Union, we just have to1014remember that if economic coercion for Lithuania, as I1015mentioned in my statement, we saw it from the very, very1016beginning in European Union's economic security strategy, which1017was adopted in the year 2023, in June, with the first steps of1018implementation next year. We can say that the understanding on1019strategic rival-ship with China is in European Union. As you1020rightly stated, this has a lot of angles, so internal1021businesses, domestic investment, what was made of it? When we1022withdraw from 17+1 Road and Belt Initiative, we have met a lot1023of nonunderstanding from our partners what we are doing, why we1024are doing, because it is easy money, as you told, follow the1025money. We had that Klaipeda seaport, which China wanted to take1026over, and incentives were on the table on big amounts.1027    Coming back, what do we see? There is a lot more1028understanding within European Union. Renewed FDI screening1029mechanism, which will be in force from January 1st next year.1030Dual-use export control mechanism. Outbound investment control,1031which none of those countries are keen to see in, but we even1032see our like-minded partners within the states and economies,1033like Netherlands, for instance, who understand that this is a1034threat. This is a threat to lose their comparative advantages.1035I will not be naming countries here, because we are 27 in the1036same pool. We better work together. We better work together,1037find ways to understand each other, to understand each other1038even when we are talking about Hungary, right? What is1039happening? Why is it happening? We better do that.1040    I will repeat transatlantic cooperation mentioned not once1041here at our table. Again, we would consider as utmost1042importance to have that mutual common understanding, to work1043together on our strategic rivals, softly speaking, and to find1044that connection. To find that connection and not to be afraid1045of that cooperation.1046    Thank you.1047    Co-Chairman Wilson: Thank you very much. I would like to1048point out, as you mentioned, about the location in Chicago, I1049am sure that it is a real affirmation of the warm relationship1050we have between Lithuania and the United States. I am sure that1051the second-largest Lithuanian city after Vilnius is Chicago.1052The second-largest Polish city in the world is Chicago. The1053second-largest Bulgarian city in the world is Chicago.1054[Laughs.] We all came together. Of course, I was celebrating1055Bulgaria's National Day yesterday, so, hey, thank you.1056    Representative Ellzey: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1057    Okay, I would like to take a little time here, because1058Audrye's got a stop clock. I have seen you writing furiously. I1059do not have a question for you. What is it you want to say over1060the next couple of minutes? Because you are the expert here. I1061can ask all the questions I want, but you have got some1062thoughts on your mind, so go ahead and give us what they are.1063    Dr. Wong: Sure. Well, actually, it was sort of in response1064to Chairman Wilson's, you know, question and comment about, you1065know, which countries have been most susceptible to Chinese1066influence, and which countries best respond. I sort of think,1067taking a step back, I think, you know, it highlights the1068importance of strengthening democratic resilience and ensuring1069that institutions are strong. That there are checks and1070balances in, you know, all these societies and these countries,1071right, to ensure that there is transparency, awareness of what1072China is doing. That there are enough, you know, stakeholders1073that are able to push back, right, and not just let a dictator1074or a strongman politician sort of be able to accept, you know,1075corrupt deals and do what he wants with it.1076    I think, you know, in terms of looking forward, right, it1077is, I think, you know, sort of, looking at each individual1078country and trying to ensure that civil society, that, you1079know, there is free and fair elections, all of these attributes1080are key in allowing individual countries to be able to push1081back against Chinese influence more broadly.1082    Representative Ellzey: Thank you. Okay, since you have just1083got a few more minutes and my friend Marc Veasey from Texas, my1084neighbor to the west, and north, and--he surrounds me--1085[laughter]--and I would like to welcome him to the hearing1086today. Marc, Audrye's got until 3:45. If you have some1087questions for her, go ahead and ask them, and you have some1088time.10891090        STATEMENT OF MARC VEASEY, U.S. HOUSE, FROM TEXAS10911092    Representative Veasey: I will. Anybody can answer them. I1093wanted to ask, particularly as it relates to the supply chain1094issues that we have talked about related to Greenland, what1095sort of steps can the EU take to prevent China from gaining1096leverage through infrastructure investment or resource access1097when it comes to the issue around Greenland, and the critical1098mineral supply chains? China already dominates those supply1099chains. That is something that I am really concerned about.1100    Dr. Wong: I think some of my colleagues will have good1101answers to that, but I will take a first shot. I think you1102raise--you know, it is a very serious problem and question. I1103think, you know, what we have been talking about, sort of the1104importance of coordination and sort of combining, you know,1105allies in Europe with allies in the Indo-Pacific, so sort of1106thinking about Japan and South Korea and improving that1107coordination to ensure that, you know, there is sort of1108vertical integration of these supply chains, that at each step1109we are not dependent on China for mining and extraction, for1110processing for the technologies are required, right, to, you1111know, transform these rare earth and critical minerals into the1112strategic inputs for technology and other important sectors.1113    I think ensuring that there is strategic coordination at1114the high levels. I think also putting, you know, your money1115where your mouth is, right? That you are saying, here are1116maybe, you know, some funds. You know, sort of everyone1117pitching in and saying, here is how we can support, you know,1118companies to invest in the whole supply chain. Not just, you1119know, mining, but also the technologies to refine and process1120rare earths, I think, is critical to, you know, diversify and1121derisk and, you know, ensure that we're not dependent on China1122for this at any stage.1123    Representative Veasey: Yes, no, absolutely. Ms. Zeneli, I1124want to ask you, when President Trump and his efforts to want1125to--or say, initially, I guess he has kind of walked back a1126little bit, his efforts to want more influence in Greenland,1127has that helped or hurt Chinese influence in Greenland?1128    Ms. Zeneli: Well, thank you very much, Congressman Veasey.1129    I would like to go a little bit back into the leverage that1130the Chinese have, especially when it comes to Europe. Because1131Europe depends 97 percent on Chinese rare earth and critical1132inputs for its--you know, its technologies. It is a double-1133edged sword, also for the fact that all those that are not1134needed for more spending, more development in defense and1135technologies for the European Union, are dependent on the1136Chinese. That is why we have this dependence and leverage that1137the Europeans have on China.1138    However, Europe has reacted. It has a Critical Mineral Act1139recently. It has a procurement--a new procurement strategy that1140the, you know, European companies will get together and also1141work together toward those issues. When it comes to the1142collaboration with the United States, I would like to point out1143a very important thing that happened a couple of weeks ago.1144Which was the critical mineral summit that took place in1145Washington, DC, with participation of many European Union1146members, but also allies from Indo-Pacific. Right after that,1147there was also an action plan that was signed between the1148United States, the European Union, and Japan to work together1149on those critical minerals.1150    When it comes to Greenland, I would like to say that,1151really, what is important, if we want to focus and really1152counter the Chinese influence in the world, it is transatlantic1153cooperation in all areas. Not only when it comes to China, but1154also when it comes to trade between the United States and1155European Union, when it comes to political alignment, so all1156those issues are critical. That is the best thing that we can1157do to strengthen our cooperation, work together, and understand1158that the transatlantic economy is bound by foreign direct1159investment, not so much trade. One point two trillion [dollars]1160is the trade between the United States and Europe and dwarfs1161any trade relations with China or other partners. It is 7.21162trillion [dollars] of foreign direct investment that supports1163jobs on both sides of the Atlantic--15 million jobs that are1164supported.1165    That is what we should not overlook, the importance of1166transatlantic trade, but also what bonds us together, which is1167values and the values-based and rules-based international1168order. Working together, I think it is the best--it is the best1169way to also counter Chinese influence.1170    Representative Veasey: Yes. Yes. Absolutely. I know that--I1171know that somebody has to go. Jake, I think--who has to go?1172Someone has to leave.1173    Representative Ellzey: Audrye has to leave. I guess she has1174a hard stop at--we were told you had a hard stop. If you do1175not, that is fine.1176    Representative Veasey: Okay. Well, this will be my last1177one. What I very quickly wanted to ask is, what are EU1178countries looking at as it relates to America and China? As it1179relates to, like, Taiwan, Vietnam, and other countries in the1180Pacific? Just watching that retrenchment and watching that1181relationship, and watching everything unfold, what do you think1182that EU countries are watching to see how America handles that1183situation, that is much closer to China, obviously, from a1184geographical standpoint?1185    Dr. Wong: Your questions are what lessons are--1186    Representative Veasey: What do you think the EU countries1187are watching? Like, do you think that they are saying, okay--1188because obviously, for instance, if we were to--if we were to,1189you know, move further away from Taiwan, for instance, right,1190or Japan, and they were left to have to defend themselves, or1191even from a non-defense standpoint when it comes to trade. If1192China becomes the predominant trade partner to some of the1193countries that we have historically had closer relationships1194with, what do you think EU countries are looking at to see how1195all of that sort of unfolds with China, particularly with those1196countries being closer neighbors to China?1197    Dr. Wong: Yes. I think there would--in that unfortunate1198scenario, right, I think there would be a bandwagoning effect,1199right? That is what you are saying. If the United States is not1200going to support Taiwan, if it is retrenching from support for1201its longstanding alliance relationships in Japan and Korea and1202the Philippines, right, and given that, you know, in the past,1203right, United States has articulated that Asia is an1204important--and the Indo-Pacific is an important strategic1205region for Washington and for U.S. interests, I think it would1206send a very strong signal of sort of uncertainty, of U.S.1207unreliability.1208    I think that has unfortunately been a very common theme or1209fear, right, that has inhibited--I think, has affected U.S.1210reputation. I think makes countries--you know, they may not1211like China, but they feel, oh, we have no alternative because1212China is providing the investments, or China is the important1213trading partner. I sort of--I think security retrenchment,1214accompanied by already--I think, already relatively weak U.S.1215economic strategy in the Pacific, right, I think will have, you1216know, brought ramifications for our perceptions of the U.S. as1217a reliable and global leader.1218    Representative Veasey: Yes. Yes. Thank you. Thank you.1219    Representative Ellzey: Keep going, man.1220    Representative Veasey: No, no. [Laughs.] Not right now.1221    Representative Ellzey: Okay. Well, recent reporting1222suggests that China stepped up espionage efforts in high-tech1223firms and academic research centers focused on critical1224emerging industries like AI. What steps should governments,1225companies, and universities be taking to protect intellectual1226property?1227    Valbona.1228    Ms. Zeneli: Thank you, sir. Unfortunately, not much is1229being--I mean there are things that are being developed in1230Europe, but this has been an area where we have not seen big1231policies also coming from the European Union. Unfortunately,1232what we are seeing now in Europe is that, until five years ago,1233we mainly saw state-owned companies, Chinese state-owned1234companies, investing in the European Union. Now we are seeing1235more private companies with smaller investments, investments1236that are not going into the screening mechanism. That is what1237is very important. Right now, governments--there are some1238governments, like Lithuania and some others, that are looking1239deeper into that area, looking at research and development1240institutes, looking at the Confucius Institutes. This is,1241unfortunately, until now, this is not widely European, so we do1242not have those standards that also countries can reach out and1243understand and implement those into their--into their own1244policies.1245    As I was mentioning at the beginning, this is another--this1246is the most important area of future competition, the tech1247competition. That is why we need to protect our, you know,1248technologies. That does not mean that Europe and the United1249States should not be open, because that is our biggest strength1250that we have. However, we should protect and be--you know, be1251safe from theft and from spillover of those technologies toward1252our adversaries.1253    Representative Ellzey: Vidmantas.1254    Mr. Verbickas: If I may, I will back a little bit to the1255question of Honourable Veasey, to combine with this one. What1256does Europe do here? Europe, we think, is waking up, finally, a1257little bit. Not so quick, we want to, as Lithuania, when we are1258talking about, but let us see. Free trade agreement with1259Mercosur negotiated more than 25 years. Free trade agreement1260with India. Indo-Pacific strategy. Free trade agreement with1261United Arab Emirates. Europe is looking for diversification in1262all spheres. We do understand that those goods who are not1263entering United States market from China, they are now trying1264to flood European market. This is in all senses, for consumers1265as well as for businesses and producers, and for technologies.1266    Now, this year, my colleague participated at New Delhi1267artificial intelligence summit in India. A lot of European1268representations this year. Two years ago, it was almost1269nonexistent. We are sharing and talking about transatlantic1270cooperation, but also there is that need to have that1271diversification of businesses, diversification of technological1272cooperation. Because, yes, of course, there are several1273technologies, emerging technologies, which China is now1274dominating, 19 out of 24. This is not good. We need to be back1275a little bit here.1276    Thank you.1277    Representative Ellzey: Thank you. Thank you, Audrye. You1278got one more? Go ahead, then I will make a closing statement as1279we are wrapping up our time.1280    Representative Veasey: The one thing that I did want to1281ask, I know you said that Europe is waking up. If Europe feels1282like they need to have more of a trade policy or trade1283agreement with China to fill some of the gaps that may be left1284from the U.S. not being able to fill those needs, for whatever1285reason, anymore, do you think that there are enough safeguards1286in place? Like, for instance, you know, there has been a lot of1287talk about a few years ago, I think--I cannot remember if it1288was Airbus or if it was Boeing--but there was, like, an entire1289plane that was basically, you know, stolen that the Chinese1290replicated for their own use, to try to break up the duopoly1291between Airbus and Boeing. Do you think that there is enough--1292that European countries also, if they want to go into a newer--1293if they want to go into these newer agreements, that they are1294putting enough safeguards up to protect their countries from1295Chinese being able to spy on their proprietary entities that1296they have? Either one of you can answer.1297    Mr. Verbickas: I can repeat shortly what I have said1298earlier about European Union introducing economic security1299policy in 2023. Just three years ago. We have started to do1300things we have been doing a long way ago, like Lithuania and1301foreign direct investment screening since 2001.1302    Representative Veasey: Do you think you can do all of that,1303though, and still have a robust trading partnership with China?1304Is what I am trying to get at.1305    Mr. Verbickas: Ah, robust trade partnership with China does1306not exist.1307    Representative Veasey: Yes. Okay.1308    Mr. Verbickas: So.1309    Ms. Zeneli: Well, Honorable, I would like to say that--1310repeat here--that the EU has come a long way when it comes to1311recognizing, you know, what China is doing, also seeing China1312as a competitor too, and a rival. I would like to remind1313everyone that back in 2012, when the 16+1 was established,1314there was even optimistic view from the European Union, because1315it was seen as a way to pump more money, more investment in a1316Europe that was suffering from big financial economic crisis.1317That was when the opening also for the Chinese big companies1318was created in Europe, after the crisis, investment from China1319went from less than one billion a year to forty billion a year1320in 2016. That was when the opening was also created for the1321Chinese companies that invested in Central and Eastern Europe,1322but also in Southern Europe. That is the first point. The1323European Union has come a long way.1324    For the very first time, I would like to repeat that the1325European Union is linking economics with national security,1326which was not part of the European vocabulary. However, there1327are divisions inside the European Union. Even the fact that you1328cannot put really in one sentence, though it is pragmatic1329partner, competitor, and rival. That really shows that inside1330the European Union, for 27 member states, there is something1331for everyone. I would also like to remind that while this--1332[inaudible]--was published by the European Commission in 2019,1333the European Council only adopted that four years later, after1334Russia's invasion of Ukraine. That raised awareness of1335challenges from China.1336    On trade, I would like to say that in the last year, only1337trade balance has increased of more than one hundred billion1338between the European Union and China. It is creating--it is1339creating issues and suffering for European companies. That is1340the main issue, I believe, now that Europe and China have to1341sit and really look at, you know, how this overcapacity, which1342is pushed because of the internal problems inside the Chinese1343economy, is then deployed to the European Union.1344    Representative Ellzey: Thank you, Marc.1345    Okay, in the last few minutes, I would like to just close1346with a couple of thoughts. One, is the elephant in the room1347right now is, there is a conflict going on with Iran. I am1348trying to soak up everything I can in the news right now, like1349everybody else is, about what is going on, what the end state1350is, and what our goal is. I saw an article from my other1351favorite group of people, from the Hudson Institute, Zineb1352Riboua, wrote. ``The Iran Strike is All About China.'' It is a1353remarkable article. If you have not had a chance to read it,1354please do, but there is a theme. We are at the point now where1355it has become understood by our friends across the world, those1356who cherish freedom, those who value the freedoms that they1357have gained, in many cases, just 30 years ago, just under a1358generation ago, that none of these four countries--Iran,1359Russia, China, and North Korea--are operating in a silo. When1360we talk about Russia in the Middle East, or China in the Middle1361East, it is not ``or; '' it is ``and.'' They are all working1362together.1363    You have the former ayatollah, may he rot in hell. Genocide1364of the Jews, genocide of his own people, 40,000 dead just a few1365weeks ago. Genocide. Vladimir Putin, genocide of Ukrainians.1366Genocide of Ukrainians. Not right. He sits at the end of the1367table because he knows what's awaiting him down the road. Kim1368Jong-un murdering his own people, starving his own people, up1369to 50 warheads, giving his own daughter the remote control for1370missile launches. Not right in the head. Xi Jinping. Genocide1371of the Uyghurs. Purging of his top staff. A cult of1372personality. They are all working together, just like they were1373back in 1938 and 1940. You could argue, based on your1374understanding of warfare, are we already in it? Is it already1375number three, because of the economic warfare, the intellectual1376property theft? I leave that up to somebody else to discuss.1377    I do like the direction that we are going now as a nation--1378as a world of free nations, slowly getting back together.1379Democracies and freedom-loving people like to avoid the idea1380that there is evil in the world, but you cannot ignore it, and1381it never goes away. It did not end after World War I. It did1382not end after World War II, and it still exists. Unless it is1383stomped on and put out of its misery, it never actually goes1384away. Because it is an idea. With China, you know, my view of1385all of this is a discussion of China and Russia and these other1386countries, those other nations are the imperial guard for1387Russia--for China. China is sitting on the throne of swords,1388behind, just waiting. These are vassal states that it is using1389and employed in dastardly ways to take complete control of the1390world.1391    You know, the dollar is the reserve currency of the free1392world--of the entire world. That is not what China wants. This1393is about power and economic power. It is not going to be ruble.1394It is not going to be the real. It is not going to be the North1395Korean won. They want it to be the yuan. This is a godless,1396sinister government that has no moral compass and is willing to1397take lives for power. We need to recognize that as an1398international community. The U.N. needs to get over being1399feckless. They need to understand what exactly is at stake.1400    As I look out into this room, and as somebody who has to1401shake hands for a living and meet people and understand what is1402going on in their lives, every time I come to a Helsinki1403Commission meeting, I look at the people in the crowd. No. 1,1404they are always youthful. No. 2, I know that they are one1405degree away from knowing somebody, or they themselves have1406witnessed what it is like under tyrannical governments. I1407notice that when I look out into the crowd, they are looking at1408me as if they want me to look at them and understand, and look1409into their eyes, the fear they feel from what these tyrannical1410governments are capable of. I have gained a lot from just1411watching the crowds in these--in these hearings. I am deeply1412grateful for it.1413    I just want you to know that as you are looking and they1414are asking, is the United States still involved? Are they still1415watching out? Do they still care? Well, I tell you, all you1416have to do is listen. Listen closely to Joe Wilson, who is a1417very conservative Republican from South Carolina. who every day1418wears that pin from Ukraine. Just listen to him. Nobody is--he1419is not losing his seat because he supports Ukraine. He is not1420losing his seat because he supports these countries, the1421Baltics, the Nordics, those who understand what tyranny is1422like. He is going to be around here for a long time, so am I,1423so is Marc Veasey. We all work together. Do not buy into the1424narrative of what you see in the media, because it is not news.1425It is a narrative.1426    I tell you what, when I go to Lithuania, and I go to1427Vilnius, the wonderful, happy people there, they are fantastic.1428They are joyous. They sing once a year in a group of 10,000. It1429is a remarkable thing to hear. Mention Russia and watch what1430happens. You are not afraid of Russia. You are not afraid of1431China. You, Israel, Ukraine, the leaders of the free world1432right now, because you are willing to fight for what you1433believe in.1434    Last, I will just say all is not dark. The horizon is1435bright because the arc of the universe bends toward justice. I1436think right now we are rapidly bending toward justice because1437we understand. All of our heads are out of the sand, and we are1438all united in that one belief that good must survive over evil.1439I love associating with good people like Marc and you here on1440our panel. I would like to thank all of you for being here,1441attending, and spending some time with us today.1442    Thank you very much.1443    This meeting is adjourned. [Applause.]1444    [Whereupon, at 4:02 p.m., the hearing ended.]14451446                                 [all]14471448[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]14491450         The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent1451       federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in1452            implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords.14531454          The Commission, Created in 1976, is composed of nine1455     Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the1456              Department of State, Defense, and Commerce.14571458         All Commission publications may be freely reproduced,1459          in any form, with appropriate credit. The Commission1460   encourages the widest possible dissemination of its publications.14611462                              WWW.CSCE.GOV14631464                     youtube.com/HelsinkiCommission14651466                    facebook.com/helsinkicommission14671468                  flickr.com/photos/helsinkicommission14691470                           x.com/HelsinkiComm