H.Hrg.119

1[House Hearing, 119 Congress]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34                  BUILDING BRIDGES, COUNTERING RIVALS:5                 STRENGTHENING U.S.-ASEAN TIES TO COMBAT6                            CHINESE INFLUENCE7=======================================================================89                                HEARING1011                                 OF THE1213                   SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC1415                               BEFORE THE1617                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS18                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES1920                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2122                             FIRST SESSION2324                               __________2526                             June 10, 20252728                               __________2930                           Serial No. 119-233132                               __________3334        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs3536[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]3738Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov, http://docs.house.gov,39                       or http://www.govinfo.gov4041                               __________4243                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE4461-418PDF                  WASHINGTON : 20254546-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------4748                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS4950                    BRIAN J. MAST, Florida, Chairman51MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York,52CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey         Ranking Member53JOE WILSON,, South Carolina          BRAD SHERMAN, California54SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia55DARRELL ISSA, California             WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts56TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee              AMI BERA, California57MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee             JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas58ANDY BARR, Kentucky                  DINA TITUS, Nevada59RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 TED LIEU, California60YOUNG KIM, California                SARA JACOBS, California61MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida        SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK,62BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan                  Florida63AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN,       GREG STANTON, Arizona64    American Samoa                   JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida65WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio                JONATHAN L. JACKSON, Illinois66JAMES R. BAIRD, Indiana              SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California67THOMAS H. KEAN, JR, New Jersey       JIM COSTA, California68MICHAEL LAWLER, New York             GABE AMO, Rhode Island69CORY MILLS, Florida                  KWEISI MFUME, Maryland70RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia           PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington71KEITH SELF, Texas                    GEORGE LATIMER, New York72RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana               JOHNNY OLSZEWSKI Jr, Maryland73JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam                JULIE JOHNSON, Texas74ANNA PAULINA LUNA, Florida           SARAH McBRIDE, Delaware75JEFFERSON SHREVE, Indiana            BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois76SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina          MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania77MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington78RYAN MACKENZIE, Pennsylvania7980              James Langenderfer, Majority Staff Director81                 Sajit Gandhi, Minority Staff Director82                                 ------8384                 SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC8586                   YOUNG KIM, California, Chairwoman87MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             AMI BERA , California, Ranking88ANDY BARR, Kentucky                      Member89AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN,       BRAD SHERMAN, California90    American Samoa                   JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas91RYAN ZINKE, Montana                  JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida92JAMES MOYLAN, Guam                   GABE AMO, Rhode Island93SHERI BIGGS, South Carolina          JOHNNY OLSZEWSKI, Maryland94RYAN MACKENZIE, Pennsylvania9596                 Tom Hill, Subcommittee Staff Director9798                        C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S99100                              ----------101102                            REPRESENTATIVES103104                                                                   Page105Opening Statement of Subcommittee Chairman Young Kim.............     1106Opening Statement of Subcommittee Ranking Member Ami Bera........     2107108                               WITNESSES109110Statement of Gregory Poling, Director and Senior Fellow of The111  Southeast Asia Program and Asia Maritime Transparency112  Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies.....     4113  Prepared Statement.............................................     6114Statement of Barbara Weisel, Nonresident Scholar, Carnegie115  Endowment for International Peace..............................    13116  Prepared Statement.............................................    15117Statement of Lynn Kuok, Lee Kuan Yew Chair, Southeast Asia118  Studies, Brookings Institution.................................    23119  Prepared Statement.............................................    25120121                                APPENDIX122123Hearing Notice...................................................    56124Hearing Minutes..................................................    58125Hearing Attendance...............................................    59126127                        Questions for the Record128129Questions submitted to Dr, Lynn Kuok from Rep. Biggs.............    60130Questions submitted to Mr. Poling from Rep. Biggs................    63131Questions submitted to Mrs. Weisel from Rep. Barr................    64132133                  BUILDING BRIDGES, COUNTERING RIVALS:134       STRENGTHENING U.S.-ASEAN TIES TO COMBAT CHINESE INFLUENCE135136                              ----------137138                         Tuesday, June 10, 2025139140                  House of Representatives,141             Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific,142                              Committee on Foreign Affairs,143                                                    Washington, DC.144145    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:24 p.m., in146room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Young Kim (chair147of the subcommittee) presiding.148    Mrs. Kim. of California. The Subcommittee on East Asia and149the Pacific will come to order. This hearing aims to explore150strategies for countering China's influence within the151Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, while enhancing152the United States' engagement in the region. I now recognize153myself for opening statement.154155            OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN YOUNG KIM156157    Again, welcome to the East Asia and Pacific Subcommittee's158hearing titled Building Bridges, Countering Rivals:159Strengthening U.S.-ASEAN Ties to Combat Chinese Influence. This160hearing presents an opportunity for us to examine China's161growing footprint in ASEAN and to discuss ways the U.S. can162counter it by strengthening cooperation across economic,163security, diplomatic, and law enforcement sectors.164    China has long prioritized Southeast Asia in its foreign165policy, using diplomacy, infrastructure investment, and trade166to entrench its influence. In contrast, U.S. economic167engagement has stumbled. Initiatives like the Trans-Pacific168Partnership and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for169Prosperity aimed high but failed to deliver meaningful market170access or address trade imbalances.171    Despite our inability to engage economically, we continue172to build robust relationship with countries like the173Philippines, Vietnam, and Singapore. But we too often174underestimate ASEAN's collective weight in our own Indo-Pacific175strategy.176    We need to ensure the United States has a genuinely177responsive and effective strategy to remain the partner of178choice in ASEAN and ask ourselves, where have our past179strategies in Southeast Asia fallen short? What legislative180tools can strengthen our regional position? Are our frameworks181aligned with ASEAN partners' priorities?182    Despite China's reach, the United States is the preferred183long-term partner of choice for many ASEAN countries. In the1842025 State of Southeast Asia Survey, 52.3 percent favored the185United States over China, recognizing our leadership in186investment, security, innovation, and shared values.187    On security, the United States has made real strides,188expanding maritime security with the Philippines and partnering189with other South China Sea nations on law enforcement, maritime190safety, and capacity-building training, enhancing disaster191response and maritime governance capabilities.192    Economically, however, we are underleveraged. While China193remains ASEAN's top trading partner, the region is a $4194trillion market with enormous potential, especially in critical195minerals, regional trade, and development financing. The threat196of Chinese dominance isn't going away. China is aggressively197pursuing deals, over 100 secured just this April with Vietnam,198Malaysia, and Cambodia. These efforts reflect Beijing's199recognition of growing U.S. engagement and its desire to blunt200it.201    We must show ASEAN partners that China's promises rarely202deliver lasting benefits. We also need a bold, whole-of-203government strategy, one that affirms our leadership,204reinforces our alliances, and upholds the sovereignty and205rules-based order that underpins a free and open Indo-Pacific.206    So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, and207your expertise will guide us in crafting stronger, smarter U.S.208policy in Southeast Asia.209    So let me now recognize the ranking member from California,210Mr. Bera, for your opening statement.211212          OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER AMI BERA213214    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.215    I want to thank the witnesses for being here on what is a216timely conversation in an important region, Southeast Asia.217    Southeast Asia is home to more than 650 million people and218has some of the fastest-growing economies in the world,219critical sea lanes, and key partnerships in our interest as we220look at peace and prosperity and sovereignty in the Indo-221Pacific. Collectively, the Southeast Asian ASEAN nations222represent the fifth-largest economy in the world, and it's our223fourth-largest export market. So what we do here in Congress,224the choices that we make, the partnerships and deals that we225put together, matter intensively.226    That is why I really do have some concerns about the Trump227administration's approach. Obviously, sweeping tariffs have228created a lot of uncertainty in the region. But hopefully, it229creates some opportunities.230    Not each country has been looked at equally, and if I think231about a country like Singapore, this is a country that we have232a free trade agreement with, we have mechanisms to resolve233issues, and we have a $2.8 billion trade surplus with234Singapore. So we are doing quite well with a country like235Singapore.236    I would also think about the opportunities--in my237conversations with some of our ASEAN Ambassadors, they don't238want to be put into a position where they have to make a choice239between China, which is in their neighborhood, or the United240States. But the uncertainty that has been created by the Trump241administration approach has brought into clear focus that they242don't want the United States leaving their markets either.243    So this is a time to engage in trade negotiations and244perhaps look for those opportunities where we can reduce those245trade barriers. As someone who was a supporter of TPP, as much246as I would love to go back and see if we could join the CPTPP,247that probably is a ways off. But can we do digital trade? We248ought to be able to do digital trade. It is in our interests,249and certainly, it is in their interests.250    Now, if Vietnam is willing to contemplate going to zero251tariffs, let's engage in what that looks like. Can we work with252countries in the region like Indonesia to help develop253redundant supplies of critical minerals and develop their254geothermal capabilities? We ought to think about that. Can we255work with places like Vietnam that do have energy resources in256their EEZ that are being harassed by the PRC? We ought to work257there.258    And the Philippines, certainly, they have experienced the259brunt of much of the harassment in South China Sea. How do we260work with nations like the Philippines and others to continue261to deepen and return to where we historically have been with262the Philippines?263    So there is many more opportunities. Again, the Trump264administration's approach is not how I would go about doing265this, but we are where we are. We have got to double down on266our conversations, look for those partnerships, create those267redundant supply chains, and bring the Southeast Asian nations268closer together, not as a choice between China and the United269States but recognizing the unique assets, the unique270opportunities, the vibrant young population, and the dynamic271economies of the region.272    So, with that, Madam Chairwoman, let me go ahead and yield273back. I am going to look forward to hearing the testimony of274the witnesses.275    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.276    Other members of the committee are reminded that opening277statements may be submitted for the record. And we are now278pleased to have distinguished panel member witnesses before us279today on this very important topic.280    First, Mr. Gregory Poling is Director and Senior Fellow of281the Southeast Asia Program and Asia Maritime Transparency282Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International283Studies. Thank you for joining us.284    Ms. Barbara Weisel, nonresident scholar at Carnegie285Endowment for International Peace, thank you for being with us.286    And Dr. Lynn Kuok, Lee Kuan Yew Chair in Southeast Asia287Studies at the Brookings Institution.288    This committee recognizes the importance of the issues289before us and is grateful to have you here to speak to us290today. Your full statements will be made part of the record,291and I will ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks to 5292minutes to allow time for member questions.293    Let me now recognize Mr. Poling for your opening statement.294295                  STATEMENT OF GREGORY POLING296297    Mr. Poling. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Kim, Member298Bera, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am299honored to share my views before you today on the topic of300U.S.-ASEAN cooperation to combat China's influence in the301region.302    Before I begin, I should note that CSIS, my home303institution, does not take policy positions, so the views304represented are mine and mine alone.305    In my testimony, I have been asked to address both U.S.306cooperation with ASEAN in the maritime domain, particularly307South China Sea, and more broadly on the geopolitical front.308And I am happy to say that, on the first, I think the U.S. and309its allies and partners, particularly the Philippines, are310doing a remarkable job of holding the line in the face of311Chinese coercion.312    On the second, the broader competition for influence in the313region, I worry that the U.S. is putting at risk what has314traditionally been its stronger position over China and most of315the countries of Southeast Asia. When it comes to the South316China Sea, China seeks to control all activity, peacetime and317military, in clear violation of international law. This is a318direct threat to U.S. national interests, longstanding U.S.319commitments to freedom of the seas, which has been an abiding320U.S. interest since the earliest days of the republic.321    It is also a direct threat to our oldest ally in the Indo-322Pacific, the Philippines. This has been recognized by323administration after administration, Republican and Democrat.324And the U.S. has done a remarkable job in both showing its own325flag, pushing back on Chinese coercion, and helping build the326maritime capacity of partners and allies in the region to327maintain their own presence in disputed waters, even in the328face of what China now has: the largest Navy, the largest Coast329Guard, the largest missile force in the world.330    Under Xi Jinping's leadership, China, for the last decade331plus, has engaged in a campaign of coercion in what is often332called the gray zone, just below the level of military force,333using Coast Guard vessels and Militia vessels to intentionally334create risks of collision, to bully and intimidate smaller335states into giving way in the South China Sea.336    That campaign had a great deal of success for the better337part of a decade. For the last 3 years, that has not been the338case. For the last 3 years, starting at the end of the Rodrigo339Duterte administration in the Philippines but accelerating340under the current presidency of Ferdinand Marcos Jr., we have341seen the Philippines stand tall for the first time in quite a342while.343    The Philippines engaged in a nearly year-and-a-half-long344standoff with China from 2023 to 2024 in order to resupply and345repair its facility the BRP Sierra Madre on Second Thomas346Shoal, an underwater feature, despite the largest presence of347Chinese Militia and Coast Guard we have ever seen deployed in348the South China Sea.349    By December 2023, the Philippines were sailing two to three350ships up against 50 Chinese vessels, didn't blink, managed to351get through, often with a U.S.-paid overhead and with the352U.S.'s repeatedly stated commitment to defend the Philippines353should China use force. And it was China that blinked, not the354Philippines, in that standoff.355    On the oil and gas front, we have seen Vietnam, for the356first time in many years, developing new oil and gas fields357despite a persistent Chinese Coast Guard presence in its358waters. Malaysia, over the last 2 years, set new records for359drilling offshore wells in disputed waters. Even Indonesia,360which has traditionally not viewed itself as a part of this361dispute, has begun to receive forceful bullying and coercion362from the China Coast Guard because of new oil and gas fields it363is developing, and it has done so anyway.364    What we see is a Chinese strategy that is clearly365floundering. And all the U.S. really needs to do is continue366course in order to make sure that China continues to flounder.367Where I am more worried is on our overall influence in the368region.369    As Chairwoman Kim said, if you look at public opinion370polling, elite opinion polling, U.N. voting records,371educational data, the U.S. remains the partner of choice. The372United States is more trusted. Its leadership is more sought373after globally. It is more popular in most places in Southeast374Asia.375    In the Philippines and Vietnam, the U.S. has enormous leads376over China in every metric you could imagine. In Indonesia, the377largest country in the region, Indonesians are conflicted, but378in general they dislike China a great deal more than they379dislike the U.S., although that did flip last year, and I worry380that it will remain the case in the future that China may begin381to edge us out in Indonesia.382    While you have pro-Chinese elites in charge in places like383the military junta in Burma or in Cambodia, when you look at384public opinion polling, Cambodia and Burma are the third and385fourth most pro-American publics in Asia. Even in Laos and386Thailand, the U.S. holds its own. It is really only in Malaysia387where we see China making any considerable ground on this issue388of soft power, of influence, of whose leadership do you389support.390    And to be clear, the U.S. cannot win a geopolitical391strategic competition with China with military and economic392might alone. At the end of the day, it is a competition over393the rules and institutions of the international order. And that394requires other countries to agree with us more often than they395agree with China.396    That means that we need to not forget the power of397attraction, not just coercion and compulsion, that we have to398be the preferred partner, not just the partner that one has to399side with. And so, as we have seen the winding down----400    [Simultaneous speaking.]401    Mrs. Kim. of California. Can you please wrap up? Sorry.402    Mr. Poling. Yes, ma'am--on USAID, VOA and Radio Free Asia,403as we've seen the pauses on Fulbright and student visa404interviews, I worry that we are undermining that multi-decade,405latent advantage we have in being the preferred partner. Thank406you.407    [The prepared statement of Mr. Poling follows:]408    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]409410    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.411    I now recognize Ms. Weisel for your opening statement.412413                  STATEMENT OF BARBARA WEISEL414415    Ms. Weisel. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim, Ranking Member Bera,416and distinguished members of this subcommittee for the417invitation to appear before you today. My name is Barbara418Weisel, and I am currently a nonresident scholar at the419Carnegie Endowment for International Peace but previously spent420nearly two decades working on Southeast Asia at USTR and have421many thoughts on your question on how the U.S. can strengthen422ties to ASEAN to counter China.423    As well recognized by members of this committee, Southeast424Asia is an important U.S. economic partner. It is our fourth-425largest export market and a central player in global supply426chains. U.S. businesses have long been invested in these427dynamic markets, and their ties have expanded in recent years428as businesses, with U.S. Government encouragement, sought to429diversify away from China.430    ASEAN countries stood to benefit directly from these431diversification efforts and hoped they would help strengthen432economic ties to the U.S., commensurate with our expanding433military relations. But the U.S. imposition of tariffs has434created anger and confusion in ASEAN regarding their relations435with the U.S. and resentment about the unilateral nature of436U.S. actions.437    While ASEAN countries have long been concerned about438China's dominance in the region, they see the imposition of439tariffs as a much more immediate threat and direct assault on440their economies. Facing a five-alarm fire set by the United441States, they will not only avoid antagonizing China, their442largest two-way trading partner, but welcome its overtures of443greater economic cooperation.444    It is also likely that the U.S. will reach bilateral445agreements with ASEAN in the coming weeks or months. To446accommodate the U.S., Southeast Asian countries will commit to447lower their tariffs and address longstanding trade barriers and448increase purchases of U.S. LNG, agriculture planes, and other449goods.450    At the same time, they will pursue de-risking strategies451that lessen their economic dependence on the U.S. and expand452trade and investment ties to China and other partners. So,453while the U.S. may see some immediate results from the tariff454leverage it has exerted over Southeast Asian countries, if455China is the threat about which the U.S. is most concerned,456then we need to keep our eye on the ball.457    We need to build an affirmative ASEAN economic strategy458that relies on carrots, not just sticks. This strategy should459build trust and certainty and deepen our economic partnership.460It also should capitalize on ASEAN's interest in keeping the461U.S. engaged in the region, create room for Southeast Asian462countries to work with the U.S. on curbing unfair trade463practices from China, and foster ASEAN integration to promote464regional stability and security.465    Let me briefly offer five proposals for deepening economic466ties. First, we should promote development of the Southeast467Asian critical minerals sector and U.S.-ASEAN critical minimal468supply chains even as we work to build our own capabilities in469this sector. These efforts should include negotiation of470critical minerals agreements with select Southeast Asian471countries. These agreements should include criteria for trusted472critical mineral supply chains and guaranteed supplies of473critical minimal resources for U.S. industry, as the Japanese474Government has successfully done.475    Second, the U.S. should swiftly pursue a plurilateral476digital agreement with Southeast Asian countries trying on the477commitments the U.S. Government is pursuing in its bilateral478agreements with ASEAN countries. Maintaining U.S. leadership479and setting digital trade rules is vital, given this sector's480role in U.S. innovation and economic growth and to ensuring the481U.S. remains at the forefront of the AI revolution. Doing so482also would support U.S. efforts to counter China's model of483digital authoritarianism.484    Third, the U.S. should propose a customs cooperation485initiative that demonstrates its willingness to work in486partnership with ASEAN as a group to tackle this priority487issue. Many Southeast Asian governments already are488strengthening rules in this area, but a U.S.-ASEAN customs489cooperation agreement would better position ASEAN to deal490collectively with transshipment from China.491    Fourth, Congress should fully fund U.S. economic statecraft492tools, including reauthorization of DFC this year. Similarly,493to promote U.S. exports, Congress should reauthorize the494Export-Import Bank next year and ensure adequate funding for495the U.S. Trade and Development Agency.496    And last, the U.S. should consider regionalizing the trade497commitments it is negotiating bilaterally with ASEAN countries,498building out an ASEAN agreement with rules of origin that limit499nonparties from benefiting and including rules in critical500areas to U.S. competitiveness.501    In exchange, the U.S. should gradually eliminate tariffs on502imports from Southeast Asian parties to the agreement. A503regional agreement with reciprocal commitments would504incentivize Southeast Asian countries to deepen supply chains505with the U.S. in ways that can promote U.S. manufacturing and506exports.507    Again, thank you for this opportunity to share my views,508and I look forward to your questions.509    [The prepared statement of Ms. Weisel follows:]510    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]511512    Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you, Ms. Weisel.513    Let me now recognize Dr. Kuok for your opening statement.514515                     STATEMENT OF LYNN KUOK516517    Dr. Kuok. Thank you so much, Chairwoman.518    Chairwoman Kim, Ranking Member Bera, members of the519subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify. It is520an honor to be able to contribute to this important521conversation on strengthening U.S. engagement with Southeast522Asia, a region that is at the geographic as well as the523strategic heart of the Indo-Pacific.524    You have both outlined why Southeast Asia matters, so let525me just say that despite its economic and strategic importance,526the region remains a weak link in U.S. Indo-Pacific engagement.527    U.S. influence in the region is declining, and China is528gaining ground. Both yourself, Chairwoman, and Greg mentioned529how the United States is the partner of choice. But in a530regional survey in 2024, the survey showed for the first time531the majority of respondents in Southeast Asia actually choosing532to align with China over the United States if they were forced533to choose. Now, that margin was slim, overall 50.5 percent534versus 49.5 percent. But support dropped dramatically in some535countries, including all three Muslim majority countries by536about 20 percentage points.537    The 2025 survey you mentioned reflected a modest U.S.538rebound, but it was conducted very early in the year, from539early January to mid-February, and preceded several540developments, most notably the April 2 announcement of tariffs.541This hit all countries in Southeast Asia, including some of its542poorest. Cambodia, Laos, and war-torn Myanmar face a 49543percent, 48 percent, and 44 percent tariff level respectively.544    These Liberation Day tariffs have triggered a strong545backlash in the region. ASEAN leaders recently expressed deep546concern over these unilateral tariff measures, and the547Singapore prime minister warned that they undermine the global548trading order that the United States helped build and declared549bluntly that these are not actions that one does to a friend.550    What began as frustration over limited U.S. engagement, or551limited U.S. economic engagement, in the region is now concern552over counterproductive policies. Washington is not just missing553an economic action in Southeast Asia; it is inflicting real554damage. Tariffs, as well as aid cuts, are hurting Southeast555Asian countries.556    Now, for years, relatively weak U.S. engagement was offset557by the important security role it plays. But that, too, is558increasingly cast in doubt as Washington recalibrates away from559longstanding allies and partners in Europe and the President560openly questions defense commitments. Lack of clarity around561U.S. goals in the Indo-Pacific compounds these concerns as the562possibility of a grand bargain or even a more limited economic563detail entailing concessions to Beijing on issues vital to564allies and partners, such as the South China Sea or the U.S.-565Philippine Alliance, sows further doubt about American intent,566consistency, and staying power.567    U.S. standing in the region has also been badly hurt by its568handling of the Gaza crisis. Now, although a loss for the569United States doesn't necessarily mean a win for China, Beijing570has been very proactive about continuing to deepen its regional571ties through trade, through investment, through infrastructure,572and through consistent diplomacy.573    And as you mentioned, Chairwoman, in the weeks after the574April 2 tariffs, Beijing visited Southeast Asia and concluded575113 deals. And even if few of those materialize, the signal was576clear that China is a consistent and reliable economic partner,577while the United States throws a wrecking ball at the global578trading system.579    Beijing's actions in the South China Sea are a serious580irritant in its relations with its neighbors, particularly the581Philippines and Vietnam. But I think China has been remarkably582adept at containing the fallout both with the use of economic583incentives as well as quiet diplomacy.584    Southeast Asia does not want to choose between the two585countries, and they will continue to hedge for as long as586possible. But China's growing sway hampers Washington's ability587to engage bilaterally and multilaterally in the region to588strategic effect.589    I have detailed policy recommendations for the U.S.590Government and legislative proposals in my written testimony,591but very broadly, these touch on three areas that the United592States must act on: first, economic engagement. For the region,593economics is security, and failing to understand this leaves594Washington on the back foot. Congress can lead by, first,595reviewing tariffs; second, advancing targeted trade agreements596in strategic sectors, like digital infrastructure and critical597minerals; and third, bolstering funding support for598infrastructure and development.599    The second main area that the United States needs to work600on is strengthening its alliances and partnerships in Southeast601Asia. It has done well with the Philippines, but what is602necessary at the moment is commitment at the very highest603levels to treaty commitments and expanding economic and604strategic engagement with key regional players, including605Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Cambodia.606    And finally, the third area, defending international law607and maritime rights--international law reduces conflict risks608and advances concrete U.S. interests. The second Trump609administration should maintain the strong stance that it610adopted during its first term, when it made regular lawful611assertions of passage rights and freedoms of the seas and when612it affirmed the merits of the 2016 tribunal decision, a step613that the previous administration had failed to take.614    Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member, and members of the615subcommittee----616    Mrs. Kim. of California. Well, let's continue the617conversation during----618    Dr. Kuok. Sure.619    Mrs. Kim. of California.--question and answer period.620    [The prepared statement of Dr. Kuok follows:]621   [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]622623    Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you so much. I appreciate624all of the witnesses giving your opening testimoneys and for625the recommendations that you are making. And we can hopefully626get into that more.627    And let me start with the first round of questioning. As628you all mentioned, we want to be the partner of choice, and our629ASEAN partners are waiting for us to show up. And we need to630provide a clear and consistent economic framework for the Indo-631Pacific region. But unfortunately, we have--U.S. has struggled632to regain momentum in economic engagement following its633withdrawal from TPP.634    So, Ms. Weisel, what elements of the TPP and IPEF prove635effective and ineffective, and how can future agreements636demonstrate strong commitment to Southeast Asia's developing637goals while safeguarding our U.S. interests?638    Ms. Weisel. Thank you for the question. I think, in terms639of TPP, I mean, TPP is now in force. The U.S. is not a party to640that agreement. So it was a successful agreement641notwithstanding the fact that we are no longer a party.642    I think that what was successful about TPP was, first, that643it was a very high-standard agreement and included a lot of644issues that had not been part of previous trade agreements that645advanced rules that were of importance to U.S. economic646competitiveness, including on things like intellectual647property, on state-owned enterprises and competition in other648areas.649    In looking back at what we would want to do were we to650pursue a free trade agreement with the region, I think there651are definitely additional areas/updates that you would want to652consider and things that we learned, for instance, over the653last couple years about resilience of supply chains, about our654competition with China, that you would want to add to an655agreement like that that were not issues then. But as in all656free trade agreements, there are new generations of agreements,657new issues that you need to think about and incorporate in658updated agreements.659    IPAF, I think, was, in my view, more of a political660agreement than an economic agreement and that the purpose of661that was to demonstrate to our trading partners that we were662going to be engaged in the region. We wanted them to commit to663a range of issues related to areas of mutual concern, including664related to supply chains.665    But we were not prepared to discuss market access in any666way, and I think that that really hobbled the effort. I also667think that our decision not to engage on digital trade was668problematic and something that we would want to revisit going669forward.670    Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.671    As we strengthen our strategic posture in the Indo-Pacific,672particularly with ASEAN partners like the Philippines, Subic673Bay, which I visited, is again emerging as a critical location674for U.S. logistics and operational planning. And our defense675cooperation agreement with the Philippines grants us access to676sites like Subic. But we must balance our military presence677with Philippines' constitutional limits on foreign bases and678sensitivities to national ressentiment, which has historically679complicated our security cooperation.680    Mr. Poling, keeping this delicate balance in mind, what681specific capabilities or pre-positioned assets would most682enhance deterrents at Subic?683    Mr. Poling. Thank you, Chairwoman. The most important thing684for the Philippines--well, I suppose there is two. One, it685needs asymmetric capabilities, much like Taiwan or anybody else686facing a giant neighbor. This is not a footrace the Philippines687can possibly win.688    So seeing more deployments like the NMESIS right now,689Tomahawks paired with Philippines' own midrange land-based690capabilities like the BrahMos missiles they bought from India,691is key. It allows the Philippines to hold Chinese vessels in692the South China Sea at risk in a situation in which there is no693number of hauls that they could possibly be sold or loaned that694would make up for the asymmetry they face.695    The second is presence. At the end of the day, there is no696military solution to the South China Sea. The Philippines needs697to be able to show the flag. And they have done a remarkably698good job with a very limited Coast Guard and Navy. We need to699see more uncrewed platforms. We need to see more cheap vessels.700We need to see more support for Philippine basing in the701islands, and that doesn't mean U.S. boots on the ground, but702the U.S. could be providing more funding for the Philippines to703buildup its own facilities, as China and Vietnam do as well.704    Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.705    One of the most pressing challenges in the region is706China's dominant grip on critical mineral supply chains,707especially for material vital to clean energy and defense708technologies. And we mentioned Indonesia is the world's top709producer of nickel. This is critical for battery technologies.710But it is alarming that Chinese companies control 75 percent of711Indonesia's nickel-refining capacity.712    Ms. Weisel, what are the implications of China's choke hold713on critical mineral supply chains for the U.S. and allied714nations?715    Ms. Weisel. Well, I think we are seeing the results of that716choke hold in our industries today where China can limit access717to critical minerals, and then it also controls these critical718minerals from other countries. So I think all of this is quite719disturbing and just reinforces the need for the U.S. to720establish its own supply chains with the region.721    I think, as I mentioned in my testimony, Japan has had722quite a good deal of success in trying to limit its reliance on723Chinese critical minerals by promoting its relationships with724the region. They have an organization called the Japanese725Organization for Metals and Energy Security that has the726purpose of ensuring stable supplies of critical minerals and727energy for Japan.728    Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you----729    Ms. Weisel. The result of that, and something I think we730should be looking at, is that they have been able to731successfully diversify their sources of critical minerals. And732in the funding that they use for this organization that's known733as JOGMEC, they have----734    Mrs. Kim. of California. Yes. Sorry, my time is up. So let735me yield my time to Ranking Member Bera for his questioning.736    Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.737    And we can stick to the topic of critical minerals. Japan738built those redundant supplies after facing economic coercion739and retaliation from China, I think, in terms of choking off740some of those. And we are certainly at risk and experiencing741some of that potential risk right now. So there is an742importance in expedience to not just develop our own domestic743supplies but also look at, in a strategic way, how we go into--744you know, whether that is Vietnam, Malaysia, other--Indonesia--745and build redundant supplies.746    And I would argue, in the Biden administration, the mineral747security partnership gives us some vehicles by which to work748with countries like Japan, Korea, and others to help build749those and perhaps even go into--you know, the Koreans are going750into Mongolia--perhaps go into other areas.751    But this is--I would agree with you, Ms. Weisel, that I752think this is a key area where we can deepen our relationship753in a positive way with Southeast Asian nations, and we should754do so.755    And, Chairwoman, I think we have a hearing actually coming756up soon looking at that particular issue.757    Let's go back to digital trade for a second. While I wish758we could go back to TPP, I clearly thought digital trade was759something that we would get under the Biden administration, and760obviously it didn't happen. It is in our interest, certainly in761the region's interest.762    We can work off some of the existing digital trade models,763whether that is taking the digital trade chapter out of USMCA764or looking at some bilateral pieces. But maybe, each of you, if765you wanted to just touch on the importance of getting a digital766trade deal done.767    Maybe we will start with Dr. Kuok and then work to the left768with the region.769    Dr. Kuok. Thank you very much. In terms of the importance770of a digital trade agreement, China is embedding its digital771norms in the region through its deals with countries like772Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, et cetera. And once those norms--the773technology and the norms--are embedded, it becomes quite774difficult to reverse.775    So, there is very little downsides to moving quickly on776this issue. And the U.S. should be alert to it, lest it be in777the same position as it is now in terms of critical minerals778where it allowed China to invest in Indonesia, since Indonesia779banned the export of nickel and allowed China to invest heavily780in its nickel processing.781    The United States was asleep at the wheel in that respect,782and I think it needs to redouble its efforts in terms of783reaching and arriving at a digital trade agreement with784Southeast Asian countries.785    Mr. Bera. Right.786    Ms. Weisel?787    Ms. Weisel. Yes, I would just add that China is active in788this region. They have just recently updated their China-ASEAN789agreement, which now includes additional digital commitments.790And there is active cooperation between the two. So I think791that is something that we really should keep a close eye on.792    But I also would note that the EU is engaged with a number793of ASEAN regions, and the EU has a different approach to794digital trade rules than we do. So, absent the U.S. direct795engagement in the region, we are ceding it to others.796    Mr. Bera. Mr. Poling?797    Mr. Poling. I would just reinforce that last point. We have798325 million people in a world of eight billion and growing. We799can either help set rules in partnership with others, or we can800end up taking the rules.801    What we have already seen is almost everybody in Southeast802Asia has now adopted a European-style GDPR regime. They did803that because we had no alternative. And they asked and asked804and asked, and we didn't present it.805    Later this year, ASEAN will likely release its own digital806economic framework agreement. We don't know what rules will be807in there, but they won't be rules that the U.S. helped set. And808that will be the story as long as we decide to take our ball809and go home.810    Mr. Bera. Great. While IPEF would not have been the811approach that I would have taken. It was an approach that the812Biden administration took. And in our conversations, we looked813at it as a high-standard negotiation, but not each country814could actually meet--whether it was the labor standards,815environmental standards, et cetera.816    And I think how I pitched it to the administration--and I817would pitch it to the Trump administration--was in a modular818way, right? It is easy for us to do a trade deal with Singapore819and Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Korea. It is essential for820us to do a trade agreement with Indonesia, Vietnam,821Philippines, Malaysia.822    And each of those countries may not, at this particular823moment in time, be able to meet those high standards. But if we824use a carrot approach, if we use--and I agree with you. It is825not really a trade deal without market access because obviously826that is what folks want.827    If the Trump administration is listening, I would strongly828urge us to--in a bipartisan way--to try to figure this out. And829if we don't set the norms and the rules, somebody else is, and830we may not like them when we wake up.831    I will yield back.832    Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.833    Let me now recognize Representative Moylan of Guam for 5834minutes.835    Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Ms. Chairwoman.836    And as Guam often serves as first point of contact with the837U.S. for many ASEAN countries, I am very enthusiastic about838further advancing our relationship with them. In the early8392024, the U.S. surpassed China as ASEAN's largest export840market. This dynamic economic development underscores the841importance of strengthening our economy tie with the regional842group.843    However, the potential benefits of ASEAN are not limited to844economics alone. ASEAN also plays a critical role in promoting845regional stability and maritime security, deepening the846cooperation for natural disasters and more.847    Given China's growing influence in the region, it is848imperative that we develop a comprehensive strategy to enhance849our engagement with ASEAN, counter China's influence, and850secure our national interests in the region.851    As for the economic aspect, the U.S. is the largest source852of cumulative foreign district investments, FDI, in ASEAN and853overtook China as the largest export market this year. Now,854while we need to address unfair trade practice in general, we855also need to consider the potential ramifications of proposed856tariff increase on ASEAN countries since many of them have857export-dependent economies.858    To avoid the risks of these countries deepening their859economic dependence to China, we should update our strategic860engagement with them to promote economic prosperity both in the861region and the U.S. and to build a more resilient supply chain.862    When it comes to regional security and maritime security,863the most urgent issue is China's aggression in South China Sea.864Many incidents of harassment against Philippine ships by865Chinese Coast Guard vessels have been reported. And although866ASEAN members don't all share the same stance toward China, if867we can encourage them to share a common position on this issue,868it would serve a powerful voice to deter further aggression.869    Mr. Poling, could you describe how opinions among ASEAN870members are divided on South China Sea disputes? Also, how can871the U.S. encourage them to adopt a more unified position to872secure freedom of navigation and maritime security?873    Mr. Poling. Thank you, Congressman. The Philippines is874obviously the farthest on this spectrum if we were to lay it875out. It has been the most forward-leaning in defending its876rights. It has been the clearest in articulating the legal877nature of its rights and its objections to China's through its878arbitral victory.879    Just behind the Philippines have been Vietnam. There is no880country on earth, when you look at polling, that has more881skepticism or anxiety about China or views China more as a882revisionist threat than Vietnam, and that is because of China's883aggression toward Vietnam in the South China Sea.884    Vietnam has been quietly supportive of the Philippines'885arbitral victory in 2016. It has forged bilateral--quiet886bilateral--Coast Guard cooperation with Manila. It has engaged887in its own large buildup of its facilities in the Spratly888Islands in order to contest Chinese control.889    After that, there is a steep drop-off, I am afraid, of the890other claimants to the waters or islands of the South China891Sea. Indonesia, which hasn't often considered itself a892claimant, has probably been the most forward-leaning in893contesting Chinese activity. And Indonesia has had the clearest894articulation, other than the Philippines, of what is illegal895about China's claims.896    Malaysia has tended to bury its head in the sand and try to897ignore the issue, at least at the political level. Of course,898Indonesian Cost Guard personnel and naval personnel are as899frustrated by China as anybody. Of the non-claimants, Singapore900has really been the only one that has taken a firm position on901the illegality of China's claims.902    And I think we have to recognize that there will never be a903coherent ASEAN position on the South China Sea. Thailand, Laos,904Cambodia--they are not going to invite Chinese retaliation on905themselves in support of the Philippines or Vietnam. And so906there has to be a claimants' grouping, but not an ASEAN907grouping.908    Mr. Moylan. Thank you very much.909    Ms. Weisel, based on your experience in the U.S.910Government, including U.S. trade representative, how do you911assess the potential impact of the proposed tariff increase on912ASEAN members? What do you see as the most effective way to913advance our economic interest in the region? Sorry; you have914very little time.915    Ms. Weisel. I think that the actions, as I said in my916statement, have really put the U.S. at a disadvantage. The U.S.917is seen as kind of impulsive, unpredictable, unilateral actions918that is causing ASEAN to reflect on what it needs to do to919hedge the risk against the U.S. and is forcing them to lessen920their reluctance to work with China because they have no other921choice.922    If they are going to be threatened by the United States,923then they are going to be more open to working with China. And924we have put them in that position.925    Mr. Moylan. Thank you very much.926    Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.927    Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.928    Let me now recognize Representative Amo of Rhode Island for929your 5 minutes' questioning.930    Mr. Amo. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim.931    And thank you to our witnesses for being here. As we have932discussed, ASEAN is just an essential partner to the United933States. It is an opportunity for American power but also for934global collaboration. And I believe the Biden administration935understood this and made ASEAN central to our Indo-Pacific936strategy.937    But I am concerned about the Trump administration's foreign938assistance freeze, the chaotic tariffs, and what that has done939to really take an axe to our relationship with ASEAN nations.940And of course, as we have discussed already today, this really941works against our efforts to counter China's influence in the942region. And Trump's chaos and uncertainty has undermined our943credibility as a partner while doing its part to hurt American944businesses.945    Even worse, China is already stepping in to fill the void946that we have left behind, and in one particular way I want to947highlight in my time today. I am worried about a potential axe948to the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, as949we all know, the DFC. The DFC provides an enormous return on950investment to the American taxpayer, advancing the United951Sates' foreign policy goals and our economic interests, a true952definition of a win-win.953    And the United States private sector is consistently the954largest source of foreign direct investment in the ASEAN955region. The DFC is also a perfect counter to China's Belt and956Road Initiative, providing an alternative to that coercive957financing scheme. In the first three and a half years of the958Biden administration alone, the DFC advanced over $1.4 billion959in private sector investments in the ASEAN countries.960    So, Dr. Kuok, as we work on legislation to reauthorize the961DFC, how do you think we can ensure that the DFC continues962working successfully in the ASEAN region to support our allies963and combat China's growing influence?964    Dr. Kuok. Thank you very much, Congressman. I think you are965right to point out the strategic damage that the withdrawal of966aid has done to the United States. Two caveats on aid--first,967having aid in and of itself might have hurt, U.S. ability to968engage with some of the regional governments who saw aid as969meddling from the United States, or some forms of aid as970meddling from the United States. And there are some reports971that suggest that the strategic return on U.S. aid was unclear.972    Nonetheless, the sudden and abrupt withdrawal of aid from973the United States to some of these countries sends an974unfortunate message of U.S. callousness, especially when it975impacts programs that mean the difference between life and976death in these countries, such as humanitarian assistance,977health programs, and demining, which as you pointed out, China978has already stepped in to fill.979    On development finance, this is clearly something that the980United States need to step up on. And I urge greater focus in981this respect. China's Belt and Road Initiative, which you982mentioned, was initiated in 2013. Amendments or revisions to983the Build Act came in 2018, some 5 years after China's Belt and984Road Initiative.985    Since then, the United States has had various986infrastructure initiatives, development and infrastructure987initiatives, including the Build Back Better World, which was988then repackaged as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure989Investment. And all of this is all well and good and very much990appreciated in Southeast Asia, but it hasn't yet shown any991concrete development in Southeast Asia.992    So urgency is the key here. Otherwise, it starts to feel993like old wine in new bottles. So, certainly, the region is in994urgent need of infrastructure development, and all of this995should have happened yesterday. If not, today or tomorrow would996be great.997    And this is not just in the region's interest. It is in the998U.S.'s interest, as well, as it seeks to reduce regional999reliance on China as well as increase U.S. access in the region1000as well.1001    Mr. Amo. Well, thank you.1002    I see my time is close to expired, so I will yield back.1003Thank you.1004    Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.1005    I would like to now recognize the gentleman from1006Pennsylvania, Representative Mackenzie, for 5 minutes.1007    Mr. Mackenzie. Thank you, Madam Chair.1008    I appreciate the testimony today. It is a very important1009topic as we seek to combat the rising influence of China. And I1010think we all would like to make sure that we have greater bonds1011between the U.S. and the ASEAN countries that we are talking1012about here today.1013    So, for Ms. Weisel, we have seen in the trade disputes1014between the U.S. and China the restrictions that have been1015placed by China on critical minerals coming into the U.S., and1016what that means for our economic vibrancy is felt all across1017our economy, potentially.1018    And so are there opportunities that you see for us to build1019greater relationships with other countries in the region so1020that we could have a diversified supply chain in this area?1021    Ms. Weisel. Thank you for the question, Congressman. I1022think there absolutely are opportunities to build closer ties1023and stronger supply chains. We know this from going back to the1024first Trump administration when the U.S. was encouraging1025companies to build China-plus-one strategies, and ASEAN1026understood that they were going to be a beneficiary of that.1027    Several of the ASEAN countries have important critical1028minerals and are looking to develop their supply chains. They1029see the United States as an important partner in helping them1030build both their--build out their critical mineral supply1031chains and that they are quite interested in partnering with1032us.1033    And I think that what we need to show here is consistency.1034So some of the signals that we sent, for instance, that we want1035to build our own supply chains but we have a 232 investigation1036going on in critical minerals--so, if they partner with us, are1037they then going to be subjected to 232 tariffs that are going1038to undermine the cooperation that we are seeking to build?1039    If we can overcome some of those kinds of concerns and come1040up with the kind of financing that we need to support industry1041in building those supply chains, I think we have some very1042interested partners in ASEAN.1043    Mr. Mackenzie. And that is great to hear because I think we1044saw that coming out of the trade and tariff disputes back in10452018, 2019, is that countries were willing to take on supply1046chain initiatives outside of China, working with the U.S. And I1047think that was actually a good benefit from that trade dispute1048in 2018/2019.1049    I think we have the potential again this time with tariffs.1050There are two different issues going on. There is certainly the1051reciprocity issue that we see across the board being dealt with1052in a lot of countries, and then there is China that is unique.1053The tariffs that are being placed on China are significantly1054higher than in other countries.1055    And I think we have the same potential ahead of us here1056because countries were shaken in 2018/'19, doing business with1057China. They started getting out. Those that stayed,1058anecdotally, have come to regret that. And they have said,1059``You know what? We got the warning shot in 2018/'19. We didn't1060fully listen to you. We didn't get out. We didn't move our1061supply chains fast enough.'' And I think that that has the1062potential to be something that is going to speed up here in1063this latest round of tariffs.1064    So, if you are saying that that willingness is there, then1065the potential for that supply chain disruption with the higher1066tariffs placed on China, I think, is very real. And I think1067ASEAN countries should be ready to take on that American1068business. Get away from China. And I think we have the1069opportunity to have stronger bonds going forward.1070    I will close with one other question for you is, when we1071look at this disruption in trade going on right now, I would1072like to hear from you what other opportunities outside of1073critical minerals do you see as the greatest opportunity for1074ASEAN countries to take on? Is it medical devices? Is it basic1075manufacturing, electronics? What do you see as the biggest1076opportunity for those economies to take on?1077    Ms. Weisel. I think that they are very interested in1078working with us on the digital economy and strengthening their1079digital trade with the United States but also within each of1080these countries. They have large numbers of young people who1081are really digitally educated and do see that as the future of1082their economies. I think that they see opportunities of working1083closely with our digital industries and finding ways to align1084our regulatory approaches.1085    Mr. Mackenzie. All right. Well, I appreciate that. And1086thank you again for testifying. I think we have great1087opportunities that lie ahead for the U.S. and ASEAN1088relationship and look forward to working on those together with1089everybody interested.1090    Thank you, and I yield back.1091    Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.1092    And I now recognize the gentleman from Texas,1093Representative Castro, for 5 minutes.1094    Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairwoman. Chair Kim, I appreciated1095working with you to reintroduce the bipartisan Partner with1096ASEAN Act today. This bill would give ASEAN the same diplomatic1097privileges and immunities that other major multilateral1098institutions already enjoy, a step that I believe would1099strengthen ASEAN's centrality and U.S. regional ties.1100    So I wanted to ask, Mr. Poling, how important is it for the1101U.S. to follow through on this legislation and demonstrate that1102we treat ASEAN as a strategic partner.1103    Mr. Poling. I think it is quite important, particularly at1104a time when ASEAN questions whether the U.S. will follow1105through on a great many commandments it makes. The legislation1106has been pending for I think 3 years. It was first introduced 31107years ago. At a time when ASEAN fears that the U.S. will1108withdraw from multilateral engagement, at a time when the State1109Department has suggested that it will shut down the1110Multilateral Affairs Shop within EAP, which is in charge of1111ASEAN affairs, this can send an important countervailing1112message.1113    Mr. Castro. Thank you.1114    And I want to ask Dr. Kuok--recent polling suggests that1115public polling in the United States has dipped in majority1116Muslim Southeast Asian countries following Israel's war in1117Gaza. And so how has the war in Gaza affected the region's1118public opinion of the United States?1119    Dr. Kuok. As mentioned earlier, the drop in support for the1120United States since the recent Gaza crisis has been precipitous1121in Muslim majority countries, about a 20 percentage point drop1122in support for the United States since the Gaza crisis. And1123support for China in Muslim majority countries is averaging1124about 70 percent amongst Muslim majority countries. And this1125was in the most recent poll, as well, the 2025 poll which saw a1126slight decrease in support for China and increase in support1127for the United States, but still very poor support for the1128United States amongst these Muslim majority countries, and even1129amongst Singaporean respondents, because Singapore has a1130minority Muslim population--sentiment is also quite bleak about1131the United States and its either inaction or its active support1132of Israel. And so that has hurt perceptions of the United1133States.1134    The poll has most clearly reflected the drop in support for1135the United States amongst Muslim majority countries, but it1136hasn't been limited to Muslim majority countries or even the1137Muslim population. The humanitarian crisis is clear for all to1138see.1139    Mr. Castro. And then I want to ask you, given those things,1140what the long-term implications for U.S. credibility and1141influence in the region are, particularly the longer this goes1142on.1143    Dr. Kuok. How much it impacts the United States' ability to1144influence the region will depend on the situation on the ground1145and on the extent to which, humanitarian aid is able to reach1146victims of this crisis. So it will wax and wane accordingly.1147    That said, countries in the region are very pragmatic. So,1148regardless of that crisis, I think it will hurt sentiment, but1149nonetheless, countries will seek to work with the United1150States. And we see that from, say, Malaysia, whose prime1151minister has been the loudest and most vocal in terms of1152criticizing the United States for its support of Israel.1153    Before Malaysia took up the chair of ASEAN, it actually1154expressed that it would seek, as ASEAN chair, to work with1155various important partners, and it mentioned a whole list of1156partners but left out the United States. Since then, Malaysia1157has sought to clarify that it seeks to continue to work with1158the United States. So, even then, it wants to work with the1159United States, but the U.S. has to be there to offer up1160economic and security options.1161    Mr. Castro. Well, and speaking of the economic part--I have116245 seconds left. Let me ask you about the effect of the tariffs1163on public opinion, as well, because that's another major issue.1164    Dr. Kuok. It is unclear at the moment what the effect of1165the tariffs have been on Southeast Asia. The 2025 poll I1166mentioned was conducted from early January to mid-February, so1167before the U.S. disengagement from Europe, before the U.S. aid1168cuts, as well as before the tariffs.1169    But I think it cannot but hurt the United States, given the1170steep tariffs, as I mentioned, on many of the poorest, some1171amounting to almost a 50 percent tariff rate. And these1172countries cannot afford these tariff rates. They are not only1173going to have an economic impact on the region but, as the1174Singapore prime minister pointed out, an impact on the global1175trading system, which will then hurt these countries. And it1176will hurt the United States as well.1177    It might win a little bit in terms of gaining an inch, but1178it will lose a yard because--in terms of its strategic ability1179to influence the region and getting the region to align with it1180on issues important to it-- the U.S.1181    Mr. Castro. I have just run out of time. Thank you.1182    Dr. Kuok [continuing]. will be on a back foot. Thank you.1183    Mr. Castro. Thank you.1184    Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.1185    Let me now recognize the gentlelady from South Carolina,1186Representative Biggs, for 5 minutes.1187    Mrs. Biggs. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim.1188    And thank you to our witnesses for being here today.1189    So my first question is for Mr. Poling. So, in your1190testimony, you emphasized the strategic utility of the U.S.1191Coast Guard in Southeast Asia, particularly in countering1192China's gray zone tactics through partnerships, capacity-1193building, and shipwrighter agreements.1194    Given the success of China's nonlethal coercion via its1195Coast Guard and Maritime Militia, what additional steps would1196you recommend the United States take beyond current initiatives1197to strengthen and expand the U.S. Coast Guard engagement in the1198region? And how can these efforts be better integrated with the1199needs of front-line states like the Philippines and Vietnam?1200    Mr. Poling. Thank you, Congresswoman. I do think that it1201has been important to see now a small presence of U.S. Coast1202Guard cutters, usually one at a time conducting training1203activities in Southeast Asia. The U.S. Coast Guard is stretched1204too thin. We have to acknowledge that it is not going to play a1205direct role in helping support, say, Philippine activity in the1206South China Sea. That is going to remain a Navy role. But the1207more the Coast Guard can be funded to forward-deploy to the1208Indo-Pacific, engage in shipwrighting in the Pacific Islands,1209in training and capacity-building in Southeast Asia, the1210better.1211    The Philippines has done a remarkable job in standing up to1212China. And so far, the threat of U.S. intervention under the1213Mutual Defense Treaty is what has kept this in the gray zone1214where, so far, the Philippines can handle it. The most1215important thing, from my perspective, that we can--continue to1216reinforce the application of the Mutual Defense Treaty and that1217we continue to fund the 10-year security sector assistance road1218map that we have promised to help modernize the Philippine1219military.1220    Mrs. Biggs. Thank you. So I would like to kind of continue1221our discussion. You point out to the Coast Guard's1222effectiveness in building regional trust and countering grey-1223zone tactics. Given the strategic importance of Southeast Asia,1224what political and operational challenges must be overcome to1225expand U.S. Coast Guard deployments and agreements, such as the1226shipwrighter programs or deployed cutters in the region? And1227what specific support should Congress support to achieve this1228expansion?1229    Mr. Poling. I don't think it is possible for the U.S. to1230negotiate a shipwrighter agreement for the South China Sea. The1231nature of the dispute, its multilateral nature, makes it all1232but impossible, and it would be far too politically sensitive1233in the Philippines for, I think, even the Philippines, our1234closest and oldest ally in the region, to ask.1235    But more Coast Guard presence to help the Philippines1236bolster its own capability would be welcomed, and the key there1237is simply funding. The last time we saw significant increases1238in Pentagon budgets, there was efforts to cut the Coast Guard's1239funding. We need to keep in mind that the Coast Guard is an1240important tool of the U.S.'s power and credibility, not just1241the Navy.1242    Mrs. Biggs. Thank you so much for that insight.1243    So my next question is for Ms. Weisel. Your testimony1244emphasizes DFC's role in catalyzing private investment to1245advance both development goals and U.S. strategic interest,1246particularly in Southeast Asia. In that context, how can the1247U.S. interagency better integrate on-the-ground insights to1248improve risk mitigation and foster a more stable investment1249climate for DFC-supported projects across ASEAN?1250    Ms. Weisel. Well, I think as we look to restructure the way1251that we are supporting companies in the region, there is going1252to be an important opportunity to ensure that agencies that are1253on the ground in ASEAN are working together and coordinating1254closely. So you have the Commerce Department playing a1255particular role. You have the State Department having at least1256traditionally played another role, and the aid agencies, also,1257on the ground in these various countries.1258    As we are thinking about restructuring all of this, it is1259really important that we have input from all of these various1260agencies about what the priorities are and the ways that all of1261them can contribute to supporting DFC and U.S. business going1262forward. We have talked about here how important it is to be1263able to rethink the way we are looking at this, given the1264competition that we are facing not just from China but from1265other countries that are competing in the region.1266    And so I think we need to have a very serious look at the1267way we have been coordinating in the past and what we need to1268do going forward.1269    Mrs. Biggs. Thank you so much for your insight.1270    And with that, I yield back.1271    Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.1272    Let me now recognize the gentleman from Maryland,1273Representative Olszewski, for 5 minutes.1274    Mr. Olszewski. Thank you so much, Chair Kim.1275    Thank you to Ranking Member Bera and to all of our1276witnesses today. I just want to first say how much I completely1277agree that the U.S. must strengthen our support for our ASEAN1278partners in the Indo-Pacific, so I really appreciate you all1279being here and your comments today.1280    We know this means defending a free and open region in the1281face of security threats posed by the PRC and also means1282offering a reliable economic alternative in developing1283financing for countries like Laos that are saddled with PRC1284debt, and it also means supplying the kind of foreign1285assistance that USAID and our other development agencies have1286delivered to ASEAN and its member states for more than four1287decades. So just lifting up our actions and words, and so1288appreciate the opportunity for the conversation.1289    I know there has been a lot of talk--I want to turn a1290little bit to solutions through people-to-people ties. And so I1291was hoping that we can focus on that. I believe that we should1292be building on the friendship shared by our combined one1293billion people, and I am proud that Maryland's Johns Hopkins is1294leading the way.1295    In 2023, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International1296Studies launched the U.S.-ASEAN Institute for Rising Leaders.1297However, President Trump's budget request seeks to end this1298critical educational and cultural exchange.1299    Ms. Kuok, perhaps you can speak to--or Dr. Kuok; I am1300sorry--could you speak to the importance of engaging with youth1301and emerging leaders in ASEAN countries and for the long-term1302U.S. relationship with the region? How would ending educational1303and cultural exchange programs in the region affect U.S.1304influence there and open doors for the PRC to expand its1305influence? And if there is time, I invite our other witnesses1306to answer as well.1307    Dr. Kuok. Thank you very much. I have to admit not to have1308thought very much about this issue because it almost seems very1309obvious that the United States is inflicting a grievous act of1310self-harm when it ends educational programs for the young1311people of the region, who will tomorrow be the leaders of their1312countries.1313    So, clearly, this is a wrong-footed move, and it will hurt1314the United States. I mean, if you look at the youths in the1315region today, I think just anecdotally, some of them have been1316put off from coming to the United States because of some of1317these concerns.1318    But more broadly, as you know, a couple of weeks ago, the1319Shangri-la Dialogue of defense ministers took place in1320Singapore. And at that dialog, Defense Secretary, Hegseth1321talked about how our futures are tied together--the futures of1322the countries of the Indo-Pacific are tied together. Yet it1323feels so much like the region is under an onslaught from this1324part of the world.1325    So it doesn't feel very much like a shared future, and I1326cannot imagine that it feels very much like a shared future for1327the young people whose futures are thrown into uncertainty by1328some of the more thoughtless actions of the administration.1329    Mr. Olszewski. Your thoughts on that particular topic?1330    Ms. Weisel. I would just add that a good case study of this1331is Vietnam, which used to train all of its officials and send1332people to Russia for education. And then, the Vietnamese1333government started sending students to the US and Europe. They1334started going to Europe. And you saw a change in the attitudes1335of those people toward improving relations with the United1336States and deepening cooperation.1337    So you do have these case studies that underscore the1338importance of these educational links.1339    Mr. Poling. I would add that there is no country in1340Southeast Asia that reports in the ISEAS survey every year that1341they want to go study in China. There are several now where1342they have to go study in China; the other doors closed.1343    In general, the U.S., Australia, and the U.K. are the1344preferred educational destinations, especially for Vietnam,1345which provides the third-largest group of foreign students in1346the U.S. and the Philippines. Pausing interviews for student1347visas, canceling Fulbright exchanges--this is only going to1348harm the U.S. in the long term.1349    Mr. Olszewski. I appreciate that.1350    Madam Chair, I think that reinforces the lessons that we1351learned when we were all in the Pacific Islands recently1352together on the trip that you helped lead. So I appreciate our1353witnesses that--and think it sort of speaks to our committee's1354obligation to lift up these kinds of programs for--particularly1355for--I loved the comment about the leaders of tomorrow and1356thinking about our engagement in that way.1357    And with that, I yield back. Thank you.1358    Mrs. Kim. of California. Thank you.1359    I recognize the gentleman from Kansas, Representative Barr,1360for 5 minutes.1361    Mr. Barr. Kentucky.1362    Mrs. Kim. of California. Kentucky. Oh.1363    Mr. Barr. It is Okay. It is Okay. Thank you, Madam Chair,1364for your excellent leadership and holding this hearing.1365    And let me key in on Dr. Kuok's testimony when she talked1366about these ASEAN countries don't--or Southeast Asian1367countries--they don't want to be forced to choose. This does1368corroborate some of the public comments and some of the1369analysis from our embassies when I travel to Thailand,1370Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines.1371    But privately in our meetings with our counterparts, they1372do want to choose. They want to choose the United States. That1373has not changed from the Biden administration to the Trump1374administration. I would argue, especially Indonesia, a vibrant1375democracy--they want to choose. They want to choose the United1376States, and that hasn't changed from one administration to the1377other.1378    In fact, I remember very vividly, when we were in Jakarta,1379hearing a very stern admonition from the foreign minister,1380Marsudi, how terribly upset the Indonesians were and other1381ASEAN country leaders where that President Biden skipped the1382ASEAN conference.1383    So this sense of a vacuum--it is not unique to now. It1384existed before the Trump administration. I think it is not a1385change in policy on trade that has given us this challenge of1386needing to deepen our ties with them.1387    In fact, I want to challenge the critics of the Trump1388administration's trade strategy a little bit when they claim1389that the President's efforts to negotiate more reciprocal deals1390are pushing ASEAN nations toward Beijing or making these1391nations more vulnerable to Xi Jinping's acts of coercion.1392    In fact, what is the objective of the Trump trade policy?1393It is actually to deepen our economic ties. It is to reduce the1394trade barriers to American exporters. And so, if the end goal1395of this is more reciprocal trade between the United States and1396ASEAN, this has enormous potential to reverse the sentiment1397expressed by Foreign Minister Marsudi that the Biden1398administration was not paying enough attention to ASEAN.1399    So, Ms. Weisel, I totally agree with your testimony when1400you talk about a regional agreement that should consolidate and1401expand ASEAN commitments to eliminate tariff and non-tariff1402barriers in goods and services across the region. You say it1403also should require new treatments on customs and trade1404remedies.1405    And then you say in exchange, the United States should1406gradually eliminate tariffs on imports from Southeast Asian1407partners to the agreement. That sounds exactly like the America1408First Trade Policy. We are asking them to lower their trade1409barriers to American exporters, and in exchange, we will reduce1410tariffs on them.1411    Why does this policy not create an opportunity for greater1412economic integration between the United States and ASEAN to the1413detriment of the malign influence of Beijing?1414    Ms. Weisel. Well, as I said at the outset, I think that1415they feel that the tariff threat hanging over them is a five-1416alarm fire. It has caused potentially tremendous damage to1417their economies with all of the uncertainty and the threats.1418    I think that all of the ASEAN countries do indeed want to1419engage more deeply with the United States. They want to have1420greater economic cooperation. But they want to do so as equal1421partners in this negotiation. So, as we look to see areas where1422we can cooperate, a priority for them is reciprocal access.1423    In other words, they would take on the rules that we are1424pushing, and in areas that are important to US like customs,1425digital trade and others. But they would like to see concrete1426benefits in return.1427    Mr. Barr. And I am running out of time, but--and I take1428your testimony in good faith that you argue that the Trump1429policy does have the opportunity to open up U.S. exports to1430Southeast Asia, but you still maintain that they will de-risk1431from the United States as a result of this. I am not sure that1432is necessarily true. If we get better, more integrated economic1433deals as a result of the policy, I think they will de-risk from1434China.1435    I don't have much time left, but I would love--maybe in a1436second round, Madam Chair--to talk about outbound investment1437into China and what is going to replace that if we restrict1438outbound investment in China. Does that create opportunities1439for more U.S. investment into ASEAN as a way to relocate supply1440chains?1441    Mrs. Kim. of California. My ranking member has just left1442for another engagement, and I wasn't planning on doing a second1443round, if you don't mind.1444    Mr. Barr. Okay.1445    Mrs. Kim. of California. So you can submit your questions,1446and hopefully our witnesses may be able to respond in writing.1447    But I do have some closing comments, if I may. It is really1448evident from today's hearing that we need to do more to create1449a responsive and effective Southeast Asia focused strategy.1450That begins with bolstering and strengthening our bilateral and1451multilateral relationship with ASEAN members.1452    Our witnesses today, you have all trotted out key1453suggestions--and thank you so much for that--on how we can1454advance our interests diplomatically, economically, and1455militarily. So it is imperative moving forward that we are able1456to deliver results in a whole-of-the-government manner.1457    If we are going to be the counterbalance that the region is1458counting on us to be, success can be achieved to the extent our1459strategies, policies, frameworks align with the needs of our1460regional partners.1461    Additionally, we need results showing that a viable1462alternative to the CCP's state-driven economic model is1463available. We cannot allow Southeast Asia to be dictated by1464Beijing standards, and we must use every available tool to1465advance our economic agenda while punishing China's unfair1466trade practices.1467    And now is the time for action. I encourage the1468administration and my colleagues across the aisle to work1469together to ensure that our policies would put us in a position1470to be the trusted partner in the region.1471    So I want to thank you again for your valuable testimony1472and answering our members' questions. The members of the1473subcommittee may have some additional questions for the1474witness, like Rep. Barr has, and we will ask you to respond to1475those in writing. And pursuant to the committee rules, all1476members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and1477extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length1478limitations.1479    So, without objection, I declare the committee stands1480adjourned.1481    [Whereupon, at 3:43 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]14821483                                APPENDIX14841485                              ----------14861487               Material Submitted for the Hearing Record1488[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]14891490                                 [all]