S.Hrg.119-45

1[Senate Hearing 119-45]2[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]34                                                         S. Hrg. 119-4556                 RESEARCH SECURITY RISKS POSED BY FOREIGN7                  NATIONALS FROM COUNTRIES OF RISK WORK-8                  ING AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S NA-9                  TIONAL LABORATORIES AND NECESSARY MITI-10                  GATION STEPS1112=======================================================================1314                                HEARING1516                               BEFORE THE1718                              COMMITTEE ON19                      ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES20                          UNITED STATES SENATE2122                    ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS2324                             FIRST SESSION2526                               __________2728                           FEBRUARY 20, 20252930                               __________3132                       Printed for the use of the33               Committee on Energy and Natural Resources3435[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]3637        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov3839                                __________4041                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE4260-021                    WASHINGTON : 20254344-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------4546               COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES4748                        MIKE LEE, Utah, Chairman49JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming               MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico50JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho                RON WYDEN, Oregon51STEVE DAINES, Montana                MARIA CANTWELL, Washington52TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii53DAVID McCORMICK, Pennsylvania        ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine54JAMES C. JUSTICE, West Virginia      CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, Nevada55BILL CASSIDY, Louisiana              JOHN W. HICKENLOOPER, Colorado56CINDY HYDE-SMITH, Mississippi        ALEX PADILLA, California57LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska               RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona58JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota5960                  Wendy Baig, Majority Staff Director61            Patrick J. McCormick III, Majority Chief Counsel62                 Jasmine Hunt, Minority Staff Director63                 Sam E. Fowler, Minority Chief Counsel6465                           C O N T E N T S6667                              ----------6869                           OPENING STATEMENTS7071                                                                   Page72Lee, Hon. Mike, Chairman and a U.S. Senator from Utah............     173Heinrich, Hon. Martin, Ranking Member and a U.S. Senator from New74  Mexico.........................................................     27576                               WITNESSES7778Dabbar, Hon. Paul M., CEO and Co-Founder, Bohr Quantum79  Technology; former Under Secretary for Science, U.S. Department80  of Energy......................................................     581Puglisi, Anna B., Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford82  University.....................................................   10883Richmond, Hon. Geraldine L., Presidential Chair in Science and84  Professor of Chemistry, University of Oregon; former Under85  Secretary for Science and Innovation, U.S. Department of Energy   1188687          ALPHABETICAL LISTING AND APPENDIX MATERIAL SUBMITTED8889Dabbar, Hon. Paul M.:90    Opening Statement............................................     591    Written Testimony with attached supplemental material........     792    Responses to Questions for the Record........................   15193Heinrich, Hon. Martin:94    Opening Statement............................................     295Lee, Hon. Mike:96    Opening Statement............................................     197Puglisi, Anna B.:98    Opening Statement............................................   10899    Written Testimony............................................   110100Richmond, Hon. Geraldine L.:101    Opening Statement............................................   118102    Written Testimony............................................   120103    Responses to Questions for the Record........................   155104105 RESEARCH SECURITY RISKS POSED BY FOREIGN NATIONALS FROM COUNTRIES OF106 RISK WORKING AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S NATIONAL LABORATORIES AND107                       NECESSARY MITIGATION STEPS108109                              ----------110111                      THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 2025112113                                       U.S. Senate,114                 Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,115                                                    Washington, DC.116    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in117Room SD-366, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Mike Lee,118Chairman of the Committee, presiding.119120              OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE LEE,121                     U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH122123    The Chairman. The Committee will come to order. The Senate124Energy and Natural Resources Committee's hearing on research125security risks posed by foreign nationals from countries of126risk working at the Department of Energy's national127laboratories and necessary mitigation steps. I will give my128five-minute opening statement here in a moment. Then, I will129turn to Ranking Member Heinrich for his opening statement.130Then, I will introduce witnesses and give them an opportunity131to give their five-minute opening statements.132    The U.S. Department of Energy oversees 17 national labs.133These labs have been instrumental in shaping America's134technological and military competitive edge. From the Manhattan135Project to cutting edge AI research, DOE's national labs have136pushed the boundaries of innovation and strengthened our137national security. But for those very same reasons, they have138also become a prime target for espionage. Secretary Chris139Wright, at his confirmation hearing just a few weeks ago, said,140``We must protect and accelerate the work of the DOE labs to141secure America's competitive advantage and security.'' I could142not agree more. And that is precisely why we are here today at143this hearing to explore ways that we can secure American144technology for the benefit of our economic and national145security.146    For years, the Chinese Communist Party has worked to147infiltrate our national labs, targeting top scientists and148siphoning off American research to fuel China's military149ambitions through programs like the Thousand Talents Program.150The CCP systematically recruited elite scientists, nationals of151the People's Republic of China, who were trained in the West,152built their careers in American labs, and worked with American153funding to develop American technology. And then, the CCP lured154them back to China. It is a deliberate strategy to leverage155U.S. taxpayer-funded expertise for the benefit of the Chinese156military, and tragically, we are starting to see the157consequences. Former DOE researchers are helping China develop158hypersonic missiles, deep earth penetrating warheads, and159advanced submarines. These are weapons designed to outmatch and160deter the United States. Make no mistake, Beijing is actively161exploiting weak security protocols, academic collaboration162loopholes, and U.S. grant programs to advance its military163capabilities, all on American taxpayers' dime.164    During his first term, President Trump tightened DOE's165security protocols at the labs. He cracked down on CCP166recruitment programs and ensured accountability at the DOE for167those who approved a researcher from a country of risk working168on DOE projects, making it clear that our national labs169wouldn't be used to strengthen the Chinese military. But170President Biden loosened those restrictions, and the door is171once again open to the CCP, which compels its citizens, by law,172to disclose information that they might have that can benefit173China's strategic goals. That is unacceptable to the United174States. Congress and this Administration must act immediately175to close the gaps, tighten security, and ensure that American176research stays in American hands.177    I am looking forward to understanding how the Department of178Energy, under the Biden Administration, allowed foreign179adversaries to infiltrate our most sensitive research180institutions and exploring ways to ensure this never happens181again. If we fail to protect our scientific leadership, our182intellectual property, and our national secrets, we don't just183lose our competitive advantage, we hand it directly to our184greatest geopolitical rival. So I look forward, needless to185say, to hearing from our witnesses today and learning more186about this emerging problem.187    Now we will turn to Senator Heinrich for his opening188statement.189190          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARTIN HEINRICH,191                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO192193    Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman Lee, and thank you to194our expert panel of witnesses for coming to speak with us195today.196    As Ranking Member of the Senate Energy and Natural197Resources Committee, and also a member of the Senate Select198Committee on Intelligence, counterintelligence at our national199labs is a matter that I believe we should all take very200seriously. But first, I want to discuss another201counterintelligence risk. Last week, the Trump Administration202laid off 1,800 DOE employees. Many of our nation's top experts203in fields essential to our economic and national security, such204as critical and emerging technologies and nuclear safety, were205let go. These employees had top security clearances and were206dismissed without following legal protocol to end those207clearances. And the Trump Administration is now trying to208reverse course and reinstate some of these employees. But you209have to ask, why would they want to go back after being treated210this way? Our best experts have lost trust in the U.S.211Government. President Trump is doing exactly what our212adversaries want. They aren't losing their best experts, we213are. This is a national security threat that will have lasting214impacts on our country for decades to come. I sent a letter to215the President urging the Administration to halt these mass216firings, and I would encourage my colleagues to do the same.217    Turning back to the research security at our DOE national218labs, this is a sensitive issue. We want to avoid telegraphing219to our adversaries details on the research our labs are doing220and what security protocols our national labs take to protect221it. We don't want to give our adversaries a blueprint of any222vulnerabilities. This is why we have always discussed this223issue in a classified setting. And quite frankly, I am224disappointed to read some of the witness testimony to which we225cannot appropriately respond in this open venue. But we are226here today, so let's do our best to take care with how we have227this discussion in a public setting.228    Additionally, as no one on this panel is currently at DOE229or any of the national labs, I think it's important that we be230briefed by DOE and its Office of Intelligence and231Counterintelligence about how it is implementing recently232passed legislation before using this hearing or any hearing as233an impetus for future legislation.234    Most people think about the Department of Energy for its235Manhattan Project beginnings or work advancing energy236technologies. But DOE does much more than just nuclear weapons237and energy. The Department is also the largest supporter of238physical science scientific research in the Federal Government,239conducting research and developing technologies across a range240of fields, from artificial intelligence, to vaccine241development, to astrophysics. The United States has been able242to accomplish breakthroughs in space exploration,243supercomputing, and the human genome project because of the244work at the national laboratories. We have been able to245accomplish so much and be the first to do it, in part because246of the counterintelligence capabilities we possess that have247kept our research safe and secure. The fact that DOE's248Counterintelligence Office is under the umbrella of the249intelligence community is a critical asset that we must250leverage and strengthen.251    The threat of foreign espionage is becoming increasingly252more complex and dangerous. We need to adapt. When scientists253or students from other countries want to come and partake in254our world-class research, we must take a serious look at the255security risks involved, especially individuals from countries256we have deemed a national security concern. On the one hand, we257must recognize and embrace that much of America's science and258technology expertise comes from abroad. Immigrants founded or259co-founded nearly half of top startups in the U.S., and260international students earn 60 percent of computer science261doctorates. Between 1901 and 2023, immigrants have been awarded26236 percent of the Nobel prizes won by Americans in chemistry,263medicine, and physics. The Department of Energy would not exist264without the contributions of Enrico Fermi and Hans Bethe--two265immigrants from World War II adversarial nations--to the266Manhattan Project.267    So we must be sure that we have strong research security268safeguards in place while ensuring we can be a home to the best269and brightest from around the world. Striking this balance270between international cooperation in science and technology and271our national security is not easy. In the CHIPS and Science272Act, and more recently in the Fiscal Year 2025 Intelligence273Authorization Act, we authorized bipartisan and balanced274research security improvements for the DOE that strengthen275their capabilities in this space.276    So I look forward to hearing about how Congress can best277support DOE's efforts in safeguarding our research for the sake278of our country's national security. However, as we all know,279not all threats come from foreign entities. Thorough background280checks are required before any individual has access to281sensitive information. In the past few weeks, we have seen282multiple instances of staffers from the Department of283Government Efficiency--which is not a department--or DOGE, gain284access to information systems throughout the Federal285Government. We have seen instances of staff being able to286access federal payment systems at the Treasury Department, as287well as trying to access personal details of Americans at the288Social Security Administration. Jay Tilden, the Head of DOE's289Office of Intelligence, even had to remind staff that DOGE290employees could not have access to SCIFs without a clearance.291All of this is concerning. Along with my colleagues on the292Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I sent a letter to the293White House demanding answers regarding DOGE operations and294their seemingly unfettered access to sensitive information.295These are unprecedented risks to our national security, and it296is paramount that we address them immediately.297    With that, Chairman, I yield back.298    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.299    It is, of course, important to remember that the President,300under Article II, is vested with the ``executive Power,'' and301the President has the authority, constitutionally and302statutorily, to decide who can see what within his303Administration, and when he designates someone as having access304to it, they do have access to that.305    I want to thank our witnesses here today. Let me introduce306each of them quickly, and then we will turn to each of you for307your opening statements.308    First, we have Mr. Paul Dabbar. Mr. Dabbar is the co-309founder of Bohr Quantum Technology and former Under Secretary310of Science at the Department of Energy under the Trump311Administration. As Under Secretary of Science, Mr. Dabbar312managed the national laboratory complex at the Department of313Energy.314    Next, we have Ms. Anna Puglisi. Ms. Puglisi is a Fellow at315the Hoover Institute, a public policy think tank housed at316Stanford University. Ms. Puglisi has testified extensively on317this topic we are discussing today. So we will look forward to318hearing your thoughts as well.319    Finally, Dr. Geri Richmond is the former Under Secretary320for Science and Innovation at the Department of Energy under321the Biden Administration. Dr. Richmond currently serves as the322Presidential Chair in Science, and is a Professor of Chemistry323at the University of Oregon.324    Thanks to all three of you for your willingness to appear325in front of the Committee. We will now turn to Mr. Dabbar for326your opening statement, then to Ms. Puglisi, in order of327introduction, and then to Ms. Richmond.328329  STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL M. DABBAR, CEO AND CO-FOUNDER, BOHR330 QUANTUM TECHNOLOGY; FORMER UNDER SECRETARY FOR SCIENCE, U.S.331                      DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY332333    Mr. Dabbar. Chairman Lee, Ranking Member Heinrich, it is334great to be in front of this Committee yet again, and seeing335many friends here.336    America leads the world in discovery and innovation. No one337else comes close. One can see that in the Nobel Prizes338referenced in the introduction. Examples include nuclear power,339generation of chips, fusion, AI, quantum, solar PV, electric340vehicles, gene editing, and chemistry of batteries of all341types. And much of that was spearheaded at the DOE national342labs. But our top adversary, China, puts tremendous pressure in343appropriating this innovation and then manufacturing it.344Examples include nuclear power stolen from Westinghouse,345lithium-ion batteries at CATL, the LFP batteries at BYD stolen346from MIT patents, electric vehicles, solar PV, GPUs,347semiconductors, and they are trying to steal the future of348quantum and fusion.349    Let me put this into historical context. When I took over350the role of Under Secretary, I discovered that we had351significant stealing of technology at the labs. Not only that,352but our policy allowed our own researchers to legally be353employed by Communist China at the same time as working at our354national labs. After finding this out and going through the355five stages of grief--I forgot from my academy days that NAVY356is an acronym that stands for ``never again volunteer357yourself''--I started mapping out security policy changes. We358banned talent programs. We banned lab employees from working359with countries of risk. We created the technology risk matrix360to restrict engagement on frontier technologies. We restricted361interactions with China and extended Communist China362fundraising restrictions on university researchers who got DOE363funding. All these felt like bringing back common sense.364    However, in the last several years, we have allowed that365risk to increase. The Infrastructure Act funding was given to366Communist-controlled entities in violation of the Act. As367disclosed in the report at the Homeland Security Committee,368Communist Chinese nationals who were employed at DOE labs stole369inventions in violation of U.S. law, and took them to China for370commercialization. They effectively created spy cells by371recruiting new members, and they tried to recruit senior lab372and former political officials. I wrote about that in the Wall373Street Journal, and I submitted that as testimony. We must also374remember that all PRC citizens are required by the Chinese375National Security Law to hand over all information when376directed by the Chinese state.377    In addition, DOE has restarted engagement with Communist378China in sharing energy technologies. They have been379proactively meeting with the Communist government to380reestablish transfer of American invention to China. And what381was interesting was that this effort was never publicly382identified by DOE, but many were able to find that in meetings383and articles in local Chinese newspapers, including pictures.384And those officials in Communist China were hailing China385technology appropriation. I do believe that there are plenty of386people who think that this is important to share with Communist387China for various different reasons, but I expect that the388majority of the American people do not want us to turn over our389technology to our adversaries. And I would venture to say that390this is the view of this full Committee.391    New controls are needed for science and security, and I392know that Secretary Wright is focused on that. While the393current DOE orders on the DOE website provide a framework for394security and counterintelligence, they provide too much395flexibility and discretion for interpretation by politicals,396careers, and lab employees. I recommend that the new DOE team397roll out significant tightened controls, such as requiring lab398under secretaries to be the sole authorizer, with no ability to399delegate authority for all countries of risk, nationals hiring,400visits by labs or meetings, and also create a list of the401waivers that can be found by this Committee for its oversight.402The Senate should consider legislation mandating security403policies that require administrative policies that politicals404would have little discretion in interpreting. I have also405included in my written testimony an idea for DOE to recover406stolen IP. And the Senate should consider extending the NNSA407lab ban on adversary-nation nationals from the three NNSA labs408to all the labs.409    America is the world's greatest superpower in both410technology and in energy. As we invent the future, we should411reengage on strong policies to protect our discovery412leadership.413    [The prepared statement of Mr. Dabbar follows:]414    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]415416    The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Dabbar.417    Ms. Puglisi.418419        STATEMENT OF ANNA B. PUGLISI, VISITING FELLOW,420            HOOVER INSTITUTION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY421422    Ms. Puglisi. Thank you, Chairman Lee, Ranking Member423Heinrich, distinguished members of the Committee and staff,424thank you for the opportunity to participate in today's425hearing. It is an honor to be here alongside the esteemed426experts on this panel. As was mentioned, I am currently a427Visiting Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution and428previously served as the National Counterintelligence Officer429for East Asia. The views presented here though today are my430own.431    My testimony will address why the DOE labs are targeted by432China, and then discuss research security and potential433mitigation strategies. Lastly, I will offer some lessons434learned that include that this is a U.S. problem, not just a435Department of Energy problem. China's government has explicit436efforts to exploit its diaspora. While this must be addressed437and countered, the rights of persons of Chinese ethnicity in438the U.S. must be protected. Finally, we can't protect what we439don't have. We have to invest in the future.440    The U.S. science and technology research enterprise, and441especially the Department of Energy labs, set the global442standard for discovery and innovation. Creating a climate to443safeguard science will take a mindset change. Many in the444research community see current policy changes as punitive.445Because of this, it is important to discuss benefits of446collaboration broadly, as they are not the same across the447different stakeholders. An individual researcher can benefit448from a specific collaboration because it brings them additional449resources, prestige, or access to data or equipment, but it450might not be to the benefit of the U.S. Government, national451security, or the U.S. taxpayer. While China is not the only452country that targets the Department of Energy labs, China's453policies to target the Department of Energy complex are a454deliberate state-sponsored strategy to save time and money.455China uses non-traditional collectors--expert scientists,456business people, and students--to acquire technology and457technological know-how. Our current system is not designed to458counter this kind of threat.459    Current mitigation tools are tactical and narrow by design460because they are crafted to mitigate behaviors with the461assumption that the actor fully participates in a laws-based/462rules-based system. They are basically designed for traditional463counterintelligence threats that focus on intelligence464officers, military end-use, and illegal activities. The465protections in the CHIPS Act and NSPM-33, and as a result some466of the individual programs that have been put in place by467agencies, such as RTES and NSF SECURE Analytics, are a good468start. However, in my written testimony, I provide some factors469for consideration when determining access to the labs and470funding decisions. Reviewing individual factors can help, but471what we really need is a more comprehensive mitigation472strategy. Piecemeal solutions will not have the desired473outcomes.474    I cover these three suggestions in more detail in my475written testimony, but briefly I put forth the following476elements that would make up a national level program. First is477establishing a national center for open-source information.478This would provide detailed information at scale for our479institutions and help them make informed decisions. Second480would be to create a kind of pre-check for collaboration. It is481important to establish an accepted framework of protections and482make those clear--the standards, the norms, and expectations483for visiting researchers, post-doctoral scientists, and484students, and those that agree to those parameters have a fast-485lane for collaborations. And finally, investing in the future--486the investments we make or don't make today will impact our487future competitiveness tomorrow.488    So in conclusion, it is important to remember that China489takes a holistic approach to development. It blurs civilian and490military, private and public. This has deep implications for491the DOE complex because it impacts the basis of entry for492Chinese students and post-docs to U.S. labs. China's laws,493which include the ability to compel citizens to share494information, regardless of who owns it, also complicate the495ability for individual researchers to act independently. So496moving forward, I leave the Committee with the following497thoughts. We really must decide what winning looks like, and498this will take a comprehensive strategy. Extreme positions,499such as closing our eyes or closing our doors, only benefit500China. We either discredit all the efforts to address the501problem or we deprive ourselves of the contributions of502foreign-born students or scientists.503    And China is not a neutral actor. And why does this matter?504Because China intimidates and harshly silences its critics.505This has only grown in the past few years, and places506individuals in untenable situations. We do our foreign students507and colleagues a disservice by not highlighting this behavior.508So I want to thank the Committee again for continuing to509discuss this issue. These issues will make us uncomfortable510because they challenge assumptions and established norms.511However, we as a nation have to have these conversations if we512are going to protect and promote U.S. competitiveness.513    Thank you.514    [The prepared statement of Ms. Puglisi follows:]515    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]516517    The Chairman. Thank you.518    Dr. Richmond.519520STATEMENT OF HON. GERALDINE L. RICHMOND, PRESIDENTIAL CHAIR IN521   SCIENCE AND PROFESSOR OF CHEMISTRY, UNIVERSITY OF OREGON;522    FORMER UNDER SECRETARY FOR SCIENCE AND INNOVATION, U.S.523                      DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY524525    Dr. Richmond. Thank you very much, Chairman Lee, Ranking526Member Heinrich, and distinguished members of the Committee.527Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Committee528on the important subject of protecting the integrity of the529U.S. research enterprise from inappropriate foreign influence.530    As a lifelong scientist--working in science for 50 years531now--and researcher, and also a devoted educator, I understand532the critical importance of talking about this topic for533maintaining the nation's competitive edge in science and534technology and ensuring that our research efforts remain secure535and beneficial to the American public. And may I add, in these53650 years I have seen dramatic changes in how we have interacted537with countries of concern like China. I have seen them change.538I have seen the threats become even stronger, and they are as539much of a concern to me now as they were when I was Under540Secretary.541    The United States has long been a global leader in542scientific discovery and technological innovation. It is one of543the reasons why we are able to attract the best and the544brightest in the world. According to a 2024 report from the545National Science Foundation, foreign-born workers make up 19546percent of the overall STEM workforce, as Senator Heinrich547pointed out, and 60 percent of the doctoral level scientists548and engineers in computer science and mathematics in the U.S.549were born outside of this country. We are an open, innovative550society. It is the key driver of our economic success. At the551same time, I realize, as we had at the Department of Energy552when I was there, the actions of certain foreign governments553pose unacceptable risks to the scientific enterprise.554    During my tenure on the National Science Board under555President Trump and now recently as Under Secretary for Science556and Innovation at the Department of Energy under Biden, I saw557firsthand the growing threats to the U.S. leadership in science558and technology. As this Committee well knows, the U.S.559enterprise would not function without foreign-born scientists560and engineers, but we also cannot afford to have things stolen561from us--properties stolen from us by nefarious acts that562threaten our U.S. economy and our national security. We must563strike a careful balance if we are to protect national security564interests without stifling the innovation that has long been565our nation's greatest strength. During my time as Under566Secretary, DOE and its 17 national laboratories worked567diligently to achieve the balance by aggressively strengthening568research security through rigorous background screening, expert569controls, and collaboration policies to mitigate risks of570intellectual property theft and undue foreign influence. For571example, DOE developed a science and technology risk matrix, as572noted, to protect emerging technologies, and it continues to be573updated. This matrix provides a guidance to address potential574concerns associated with economic and international575competitiveness by identifying the risks associated with a576given topic and the resulting level of controls that are577required.578    DOE also developed a comprehensive and rigorous approach to579research, technology, and economic security--what I will refer580to as RTES policy, established new procedures for reviewing581financial awards and loans, and created a new RTES office to582continue to evolve DOE's enhanced due diligence process, engage583with external stakeholders, and review DOE national lab584agreements involving foreign entities. These actions were585supported by security directives from Congress--thank you--and586administrative actions by the National Security Presidential587Memorandum, which was worked on both in the Trump588Administration and the Biden Administration--NSPM-33. Together,589these measures are helping the Department and its partners590mitigate risks that malign foreign governments pose to our591research ecosystem, supply chains, and intellectual property.592    For most U.S. universities--research universities--the593level of due diligence required by NSPM-33 and DOE's updated594policies is a newer paradigm. I saw this when I was on the595National Science Board and I have seen it now. Research596universities serve a critical interface between government,597industry, and academia, and since I am back in academia, I know598this, going back to my home. That is why during my tenure as599Under Secretary, DOE focused heavily on helping universities600develop their own procedures for fostering secure, yet open601scientific collaboration, and training researchers on best602practices. I am proud of the way many university603administrations have stepped up to this research security604challenge, including my own at the University of Oregon.605Security is in the DNA and the structure of our national606laboratories. It has been historically at our national607laboratories and in DOE. It has not been the case at608universities. That's why it's so important for us to work with609them.610    So as this Committee is evaluating research security611measures of the U.S. science and technology research612enterprise, I have offered several recommendations that are613important to consider. While I cannot speak to the status of614DOE activities in my current capacity, I can assure the615Committee that regardless of the Administration, the Department616of Energy and its national laboratories take the responsibility617to protect the scientific integrity of our nation's assets618seriously. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you619today on this important issue, and I look forward to our620discussion.621    [The prepared statement of Dr. Richmond follows:]622    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]623624    The Chairman. Thanks so much to all of you for your opening625statements. We will now proceed to five-minute rounds of626questions alternating between Republicans and Democrats, and I627will begin that now.628    Ms. Puglisi, I would like to start with you, if that's all629right?630    Last week, the New York Times published an article in which631you were prominently featured. You were featured discussing how632the CCP has used legal threats to intimidate American633researchers, including yourself, in an effort to suppress634research that exposes its influence operations. Now, if the CCP635is brazen enough to do this, to try to pressure and influence636American researchers, what does that say about the ability they637have to exert pressure on Chinese nationals from the People's638Republic of China working within U.S. national labs, and639especially keeping in mind that those individuals, if they are640residents of China, what does that say about their ability to641have pressure brought to bear on them given that they are642subject to Chinese laws that can compel them to cooperate with643PRC intelligence-gathering operations?644    Ms. Puglisi. Thank you for that question, Senator.645    I think, you know, it really highlights a disturbing trend,646right? I believe that, you know, we have talked a lot about how647the hope was that as we moved forward with engagement and648collaborations that China would change, and its laws and rules649and norms would become more like our own. Unfortunately, that650is not the case. And so, I think, as I mentioned in my opening651statement and in my written testimony, the importance of652talking about this behavior, and that if we ignore the653pressures that these scientists and students are under, we654really do them a disservice and we do our own society a655disservice because then we become more like them.656    But it really, you know, I think, highlights as well that657it's really hard, you know, for us to understand that kind of658pressure and that we need to put in place those guidelines to659both foster those collaborations, but also to protect that660technology and to ensure that that does not happen.661    The Chairman. But needless to say, the pressure that could662be brought to bear on Chinese nationals at these labs is663immense.664    Ms. Puglisi. Yes, it is. And I think it highlights, as we665have seen over the past year, the articles and stories about666extralegal behavior, not only for scientists, but on different667campuses of, you know, China's actions.668    The Chairman. Now, Mr. Dabbar, your testimony states that669the Department of Energy under the Biden Administration670restarted engagement with China to share U.S. energy671technologies developed in our national labs. In at least one672instance, in 2023, a Lawrence Berkeley National Lab scientist673went to China, where he advised the Dean of the School of674Energy, Power, and Engineering at--University, who also happens675to be an affiliate of the foreign influence arm of the Chinese676Communist Party on how best to construct an engineering lab for677the school. Do you think U.S. national labs should be engaged678in these efforts with our greatest global adversary, and should679American taxpayers be funding such support that ends up680benefiting our adversaries in this way?681    Mr. Dabbar. No, Senator Lee, I don't think we should. They682have been very clear that they want to dominate the tech space.683And as I listed in my testimony, there is a long series of684technologies, including in energy, that were invented at the685DOE national labs and invented by American companies that was686stolen. And so, it is a long track record on this topic of much687of which they are selling to the world was invented in America.688    And so, I think we need to be much more cognizant of this689topic, and I think more controls are needed on this, as I690mentioned in my testimony.691    The Chairman. So that's an expensive proposition, losing692valuable research for which we have paid dearly, and having it693go to our greatest geopolitical adversary isn't an ideal694outcome. In fact, quite far from it. This can have devastating695consequences.696    Now, Section 436 of the Fiscal Year 2025 Intelligence697Authorization Act, which barred foreign nationals from698adversarial nations from accessing our national laboratories699received unanimous approval from the Senate Select Committee on700Intelligence, by a vote of 17 to 0, but it was blocked from the701National Defense Authorization Act due to opposition from the702former Chairman of this Committee. The provision included a703waiver process allowing exceptions when the Secretary of Energy704determined the national or economic security benefits705outweighed the risks. Now, given these strong bipartisan706concerns, would you support enacting similar safeguards to707protect our most sensitive research while allowing for limited708high-level exceptions?709    Mr. Dabbar. I would, Senator. Obviously, it's a bipartisan710topic. The way the current DOE order is written--that was done711when I was Under Secretary--basically required sign-offs to712have any Chinese interaction. I believe a lot of it was713delegated down to lower levels, which basically opened the714doors, as far as I could tell from my conversations with DOE. I715think we need to potentially do exactly as the Intelligence716Committee looked at, which is flip it. Instead of authorizing717and sign-offs, is to do it the other way, where the base case718is to ban that from adversarial nations, and to give waivers as719required. I think that's a better way, given decades of Chinese720infiltration and attempts.721    The Chairman. Leaving the default at ``on'' is dangerous,722in other words.723    I see my time is expired. We will turn the time over to724Senator Heinrich.725    Senator Heinrich. Thanks, Chairman.726    Ms. Richmond, you and I have interacted at some of our727nation's most cherished national labs, places like Los Alamos.728Do you have thoughts on what the current dismissals at DOE and729NNSA could mean for our national security in the long term, and730in particular for workforce morale?731    Dr. Richmond. Yes, Senator Heinrich. Thank you for that732question.733    I agree, and you know, I hope you all know how committed I734was in my position and now with regards to national security735and the concern of China stealing our most valuable assets. But736these cuts, particularly in the security area, but also having737to do with our energy infrastructure, the cuts there, too, give738me even greater concern because they are immediate, because to739be able to work at NNSA, but also to be able to handle740classified information, requires a tremendous amount of741background checks, polygraphs. They ask all your neighbors, and742so, my neighbors are sick of being asked for all these things I743have done. But the point is that when we make these cuts, even744if we say come on back after this weekend cut, what are the745chances that we have increased the risk of someone being hired746by China to come over and share what they have been doing? I,747too, have been recruited. I got a letter not too long ago that748was like, for one hour's work, I could take $40,000.749    Senator Heinrich. Yes.750    Dr. Richmond. Now, you know, I don't have a mortgage to751pay, but there are other people that do. So I just have to say752that these cuts, and especially how they are going to impact753the energy infrastructure----754    Senator Heinrich. Yes.755    Dr. Richmond [continuing]. I think it's time for us to go756to the new Administration and to Secretary Wright and ask what757was the process to decide how to do that, to make these cuts,758because the process that we have at the Department of Energy to759make cuts--and we do make cuts of our federal employees--is760based on budget priorities. When we develop our budgets, we set761the priorities, and if your part of DOE does not fit into those762priorities of the White House and also the Secretary of Energy,763then you eliminate those people, but you do it in almost a two-764year process while you develop this budget.765    Senator Heinrich. Yes.766    Dr. Richmond. Because the priorities are changing all the767time.768    Senator Heinrich. And one of the things that I think it's769important to share with folks is that one of the--probably the770leading red flag for someone being a risk with respect to771recruitment is financial distress. So we just created a whole772bunch of people with really important clearances, really773important expertise, who are all under financial distress. We774created a bunch of targets for the CCP. And I think, I just--I775am aghast at how unthoughtfully this is all being carried out.776    Mr. Dabbar, good to see you again. I want to ask you to777sort of walk us through what currently happens--well, talk778about how the intelligence officers at the labs, the lab779directors, and then DOE intelligence coordinate and then what780happens when they don't all line up and agree.781    Mr. Dabbar. Yes, Senator. So obviously, this has been a big782focus. There's a classified report from MITRE that's out there783that has evaluated the details of that. I think that's kind of784safe to say, and they have obviously had some recommendations785on that particular topic.786    In general, what happens is that the intelligence component787of the DOE has local officers at each of the labs for788counterintelligence. They will do the screening of employees,789if people are traveling, interactions, grant security790clearances. And so, they do that interaction as part of that791intelligence component with the lab complex. In general, that792works quite well. DOE's intel arm is quite well-integrated with793that effort. And I think the biggest challenge on this is not794the structure of it, but as I was mentioning, who has the795approval, right, to allow this interaction to happen. I will796give an example. I have been told many times that any lab797employee can actually do a recommendation and potentially, I798have heard, even a sign-off on people coming to visit a lab.799    And so, if there is a PRC citizen who is employed at the800lab, they could recommend another PRC group coming from China801to enter the lab. And if the authority has been delegated down802to the lab, sometimes these things are happening at a higher803rate than maybe some people at headquarters might like. And so,804who has authority in the sign-off and the interaction of that,805I think that's the core practical issue that probably deserves806to be raised to a more senior level than has, I believe, been807delegated.808    Senator Heinrich. If you have specific examples of that, I809would appreciate if you would share them with this Committee.810    Thanks.811    The Chairman. Senator Cotton.812    Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.813    From my work on the Intelligence Committee over the last 10814years, and now as Chairman, I can tell you this issue is of815critical concern to me. Our national labs are where we develop816some of the scientific research and capabilities that are the817envy of the world, but they lack security measures. And I can818say that it's not just me, it's many other members of the819Intelligence Committee. Five members are on this Committee.820There is a reason why we passed legislation last year,821unanimously, that would have stopped scientists from China and822Russia and even Iran and North Korea and Cuba from being in our823labs.824    Mr. Dabbar, do you know how many Chinese and Russian825scientists were in our labs in the last Fiscal Year for which826we have data?827    Mr. Dabbar. If I have seen your past testimony, I think the828number is around 8,000.829    Senator Cotton. Eight thousand. Out of a total of how many?830Do you know?831    Mr. Dabbar. Well, total lab employees are probably----832    Senator Cotton. No, total foreign visitors.833    Mr. Dabbar. Oh, I am not certain about that.834    Senator Cotton. Forty thousand. So one out of every five835foreign scientists in an American national lab is Chinese or836Russian. Do you know how many American scientists get to go to837equivalent sites in China and Russia?838    Do you know, Mr.----839    Mr. Dabbar. I think it's less.840    [Laughter.]841    Senator Cotton. If I put the over/under at 0.5, would you842bet the over or the under?843    Mr. Dabbar. Maybe even under.844    Senator Cotton. Ms. Puglisi, how many American scientists845get to go to the equivalent sites in Russia and China?846    Ms. Puglisi. Senator, I currently don't have that number.847However, I think that's a point that I have made before this848Committee and others is that it's not reciprocity. I mean, true849collaboration comes from transparency and reciprocity. And850that's one of the things that we are not seeing.851    Senator Cotton. I couldn't agree more.852    Ms. Richmond, do you think one out of every five foreign853scientists at a Chinese or Russian equivalent site is American?854    Dr. Richmond. I don't know those numbers, I'm sorry----855    Senator Cotton. Yes, there is zero reciprocity on this856issue. Why would we allow Chinese and Russian scientists into857our national labs, to say nothing of Iranians and Cubans and858North Koreans, when they don't allow our scientists there? We859have told the directors of these labs for a long time, the860Intelligence Committee, that if they do not get a hold of this861problem then the Congress will solve it for them. And the862legislation that we introduced and passed through the863Intelligence Committee last year, although it didn't get passed864into law, will be brought back up this year. And I am going to865champion that on this Committee and on the Intelligence866Committee because we have to put an end to this threat.867    There are a lot of great people working in the Department868of Energy, to include at our labs and at the Office of869Intelligence and Counterintelligence, one of the very best of870our small intelligence offices around the government, but there871are too many people that have this ``open science'' mindset,872this naive ideological commitment that we have to allow these873foreign adversary scientists into our labs, no matter what the874risk.875    Mr. Dabbar, who has the final word on allowing such a876foreign visitor to visit his or her lab?877    Mr. Dabbar. So the order is flexible on who has the878authority. Previously, when we instituted it, when I was Under879Secretary, it was required to be up at my level, and we were880able to squash a lot of the thousand talents programs. We found881many, many people working for China, including joint nuclear882weapons work. That's a pretty stunning comment I just gave that883we found at one of the labs. I believe--I was told in my884conversations with DOE recently that a lot of that has been885delegated down to the individual lab level, and I am not886exactly certain----887    Senator Cotton. And again, we have great people working at888our individual labs, but by and large, the directors of these889places tend to come from a scientific background, is that890correct?891    Mr. Dabbar. Yes, sir.892    Senator Cotton. They are not coming from the intelligence893community. They are not coming from law enforcement.894    If a foreign national is excluded from one lab, is he895therefore excluded from every other lab?896    Mr. Dabbar. I am not certain how it's currently being897executed.898    Senator Cotton. I think the answer is no.899    Mr. Dabbar. Yes.900    Senator Cotton. If one of our lab directors says no, this901guy from Russia is too dangerous a risk and can't be here, he902can just turn around and try to go to one of the other labs as903well.904    Is it fair to say that sometimes there is a little bit of905competition between these labs for money or prestige or talent?906    Mr. Dabbar. Senator, in one of my times, one of my many907times of uncovering things with intelligence,908counterintelligence at the labs, we found a Chinese national909who had been hired at one of the DOE labs and then they used910that to shift to NIST in Colorado and use the--of having been911hired at a DOE national lab to join a very important quantum912effort at NIST. And as soon as we found that out, we had to913reach out to Commerce very quickly and point out that we were914sorry that this person had gotten that role and basically, we915allowed them to end up at another lab.916    Senator Cotton. Thank you.917    I just want to thank the Chairman for having this hearing.918This is not something that we discuss much in a public setting.919We have examined it very closely for years on the Intelligence920Committee. But it is a grave national security threat. It is a921threat to our prosperity as well because so much of these922technologies end up getting commercialized. And to be clear,923what we are talking about here, again, is foreign nationals.924There has been a lot of testimony, or a lot of statements from925members and the witnesses about the history throughout American926life of foreign-born, naturalized scientists. We are not927talking about that. We are not talking about someone who has928raised their hand and taken the oath of affirmation to become a929citizen or even a legal permanent resident. We are talking930about foreign nationals coming to our lab. This is a grave931threat and we can't allow it to continue.932    The Chairman. Thank you.933    Senator Wyden.934    Senator Wyden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.935    Good to have all our guests, and especially good to be able936to welcome Dr. Geri Richmond, who is a long-time expert in937security and also a long-time University of Oregon Duck, and we938welcome you.939    Dr. Richmond. Go Ducks.940    Senator Wyden. Let me, if I might, ask you about what we941learned at DOE in the Pacific Northwest here very recently.942There were abrupt and significant workforce reductions last943week in the office that carries out the critical work to keep944our electric grid reliable. My take is that this raises945national security issues. It raises fundamental issues for our946economy. What are the implications of something like that, Dr.947Richmond?948    Dr. Richmond. Well, thank you, Senator Wyden, it's good to949be here with you too.950    I think that in terms of our power, our energy951infrastructure, and particularly the cuts at BPA, as well as952the 1,800 people that were just cut off at the Department of953Energy with no clear understanding of the procedure, or why, it954really is going to--I believe as a citizen, that it's going to955not only compromise the safety of our grid, but also will drive956up energy prices. I believe that it will delay current projects957in communities and that it will disrupt our supply chains.958These are, again, my personal opinions, having served as the959Under Secretary for three years, but I think it also is sowing960confusion and chaos among the federal workers because they are961learning about things in the news, and I can't confirm what's962in the news either. But the point is that it's just leading to963a lot of confusion.964    For example, with BPA, there were a number of employees965that were cut. And as a Pacific Northwesterner, like you,966that's really chilling because BPA is so important.967    Senator Wyden. Let me see if I can get a couple of other968questions in real quickly.969    When you went through the process of getting your security970clearance, did you have to disclose all of your foreign971financial conflicts of interest and contacts with government972officials?973    Dr. Richmond. Yes. In fact, because I have worked in so974many different countries--over two dozen developing countries,975in particular--I had to list all the countries I had been to,976whether they had paid for my travel support--which most of them977did not--whether I had any kind of a conflict of interest with978them, with any type of financial support from them continuing,979what all my finances are with regards to all of the investments980that we have. We had to declare all those. We had to be cleared981for a general counsel. I had to get a polygraph test.982    Senator Wyden. I think I got the drift.983    Dr. Richmond. Okay.984    Senator Wyden. If a U.S. Government official had985significant business dealings with the government of China or986failed to disclose all of these contacts with Chinese987government officials, could that derail their access to988sensitive Department of Energy secrets or classified989information?990    Dr. Richmond. Yes, and in fact what happened in the991laboratories, during my time, was you had both the IN and also992the lab leaders talking about when there is a concern about a993person being in the laboratory. And what they go through is,994who is going to come onsite, what is their background, what995kind of access would be controlled if they did come onsite, and996this is for visitors also, and what projects can they work on,997and what partnerships do they have? If there is a disagreement998between those two entities in the laboratory, then it gets sent999up to me. I did not have any concerning ones that came up to1000me. And the laboratory said this at the HSST hearing, the1001director said this last week.1002    Senator Wyden. Thank you, Dr. Richmond.1003    Colleagues, I am asking these questions for several1004reasons, and one of them is, according to public reporting, Mr.1005Elon Musk is running DOGE while remaining Tesla's largest1006shareholder. And according to that public reporting, Tesla has1007invested billions in China and makes one million cars a year at1008a factory in Shanghai on land owned by the Chinese government.1009Finally, according to public reporting, Tesla's contract allows1010the Chinese government to revoke Tesla's lease on the land at1011any time if it determines doing so is in the public interest.1012Now, on this Committee, every one of us works for the American1013public interest, and given that as our highest priority, I1014intend, colleagues, to come back and ask further questions1015about this in the days ahead.1016    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1017    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Wyden.1018    Senator McCormick.1019    Senator McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to1020our panel. Grateful to the witnesses for coming to discuss such1021an important issue for our national security, but also for1022Pennsylvania. Pittsburgh is the home of the National Energy1023Technology Laboratory. Many employees from the Princeton Plasma1024Physics Laboratory commute across the Delaware River to call1025Pennsylvania home. And we must ensure that this critical1026national research and these wonderful assets are secure from1027foreign adversaries, and that America remains the global leader1028on energy and other advanced technologies.1029    So I really share the concerns raised by so many today1030about the continued theft of American research and innovation1031by the Communist Chinese Party. It is a huge national security1032risk for all the reasons we have talked about, but it's also1033the stated goal to dominate the commanding heights of1034technology and to use that technological supremacy to undermine1035America's economic might, its geopolitical position, our very1036way of life, and that research and technology theft is a well-1037documented key pillar of the CCP strategy. So with forced1038technology transfers, IP thefts, scientific espionage, not only1039providing the CCP with advantages in economic and1040environmentally important technologies, it's also undercutting1041American workers in Pennsylvania and in other places. We are1042essentially paying for the R&D that China steals to beat us in1043the market space. How can American companies compete in that1044environment?1045    So let me start with you, Ms. Puglisi. You pointed out that1046because the CCP does not play by the same rules in science and1047technology, that our often-narrow research security tools are1048outmatched by China's efforts to steal American technology and1049know-how. How can we make the jump from piecemeal solutions,1050some of which we have discussed here, to a national strategy1051for mitigating these threats?1052    Ms. Puglisi. Thank you, Senator, for that question.1053    I think it's important to highlight, first, and the reason1054why--what creates this challenge is China takes a very hybrid1055approach. It takes a very holistic approach to its S&T1056development. And so, oftentimes, you know, we try to separate1057things out into complete buckets. And so, to have a national1058approach, what we need to do is recognize how different this1059system is, and to look at the individuals and the companies1060that we are dealing with holistically, and acknowledge those1061ties to the Chinese government, and in moving forward, how1062policies that are across both our infrastructure and in1063commerce that recognize that these are supported, that they1064oftentimes don't have to make market-based decisions, that1065individuals--and we know this--are sent to study here, to work1066in the laboratories for a purpose. And we just have to be much1067more deliberate about the way we look at people's backgrounds.1068And to begin with, I think putting in place very clear1069guidelines, because, you know, our system has been built on1070trust, right? And I have been in the lab. I have worked in the1071lab, and no one wants to believe that their collaborator is1072stealing their technology or the student that they are1073supporting is doing that or has some other alternative motives.1074    And so, we must make it very clear.1075    Senator McCormick. And yet, we know they are.1076    Ms. Puglisi. Yes.1077    Senator McCormick. In many cases they are.1078    Ms. Puglisi. And unfortunately, this has been the case, and1079it is well documented. I know the other witnesses have talked1080about this. I, myself, have written a lot about this. And so, I1081think the starting point is being very clear--what are those1082assumptions that we are making?1083    Senator McCormick. Yes.1084    Ms. Puglisi. And you know, sometimes we can't get to yes1085with some of these collaborations.1086    Senator McCormick. Yes.1087    Ms. Puglisi. And that's why we have to engage, you know,1088with the research community to really make clear on that and--1089--1090    Senator McCormick. Thank you. I am going to just move on to1091one more question here if I can.1092    Ms. Puglisi. Okay, sorry.1093    Senator McCormick. Thank you.1094    Ms. Puglisi. Yes.1095    Senator McCormick. Mr. Dabbar, good to see you again.1096    Many research institutions, just following up on this1097question, including the national labs, are engaging in research1098collaboration with third parties--I don't think we have talked1099about that much--here in the United States and overseas, and1100those third parties can also be exploited by our adversaries to1101steal sensitive research, particularly the CCP. What policies1102should DOE put in place to ensure that the research1103collaborations and joint research projects that may be outside1104the labs don't create additional security vulnerabilities? What1105authorities and directives can Congress use to help on that1106mission?1107    Mr. Dabbar. So that certainly happens. Let me give you an1108example. We do accelerator technology with our European1109friends, where they ship us some accelerators sometimes and we1110ship them some equipment sometimes. We generate IP in some of1111these very large pieces of equipment that could have dual-use1112points, and sometimes the Chinese go into Germany, to a lab in1113Germany, to try to appropriate IP that we invented at one of1114our national labs. I know that happened. I have specific1115examples of that. So I do think of any of our collaborations1116with our allies, we need to push the ball. I think we have1117pushed a ball of awareness of them in Germany, France, and1118whatnot, that China is trying to steal stuff, and that if they1119want to work with us, and if we are going to share technology1120with them, they have to meet the same sort of standards that we1121have for ourselves.1122    Senator McCormick. So I think it's fair to say, regardless1123of how tight our security is in our own labs, if we have third1124party research efforts underway that are not equally strong in1125the security measures, then there is a back door where some of1126the same challenges of IP theft and so forth can occur.1127    Mr. Dabbar. Absolutely, Senator. I will pick on one thing1128that Senator Risch has been doing on fusion. America is about1129to break some major bounds on fusion in this next four years.1130There is going to be some major examples. They are trying to1131steal it from us and our international collaborations on1132fusion. And so, that's something that historically was more1133open science, and I think very clearly both domestically as1134well as international, that needs to be greatly enhanced since1135we are about to accomplish quite a bit.1136    Senator McCormick. Thank you.1137    The Chairman. Senator Gallego, you are up next.1138    Senator Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Perfect timing.1139And thank you to our Ranking Member, also.1140    Our national and energy security should always be, of1141course, top-of-mind. And I was proud to be a leader in passing1142the Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA. Among many other things, that bill1143enhanced vetting and limited the entrance of certain foreign1144nationals to DOE lab facilities to protect national security.1145But as former Chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee1146on Intelligence and Special Operations, I also know exactly how1147important it is to be deliberate in the way we discuss1148sensitive operations, especially in open settings. As we do our1149duty to oversee national labs in this Committee, we must not1150give away information that our adversaries could use against us1151or actively gather.1152    So I have a couple questions for Dr. Richmond. In United1153States military operations, our armed forces work with1154interpreters and local allies who make our operations more1155secure and successful. I certainly experienced that in Iraq in1156combat with local nationals, as well as foreign nationals, and1157third-party companies. And so, we have talked a lot about the1158risks of foreign infiltration in our DOE labs. Can you expand1159on the risks of siloing ourselves too much and missing vital1160information from our allies and foreign-born scientists?1161    Dr. Richmond. Yes, thank you, Senator, and thank you for1162your service also.1163    I think that we cannot closet ourselves. I have to say that1164before the wall came down in Europe, I was actually in East1165Germany and I got to see--it was weeks before the wall came1166down--and I could see what a closeted country looks like and I1167have also done the same in Cuba. We have to rely on1168intelligence from other countries too. We have to decide1169whether we trust it or not. We have to decide what we are going1170to do with it. But I am going to go back to your comments,1171ma'am, because we need a coordinated effort across all agencies1172and universities if we are going to use what intelligence we1173have in order to move forward. And the armed forces play a1174critical role in that, and as you know, if we did not have that1175outside information, those partners with us, it would be tough1176to go forward.1177    Senator Gallego. And even along the kind of siloing of1178information and sharing of information, from my experience,1179kind of, as the past Chairman of Intel/Special Operations, I1180even had complaints from our Five Eyes nations, people that we1181are supposed to share our most intricate and sophisticated1182intelligence with, that we still are in such a silo that we1183couldn't really share our intel across platforms fast enough1184for them to actually use it as actual intelligence. When it1185comes to sharing with our close Five Eyes partners or other1186intelligence treaty nations, do you see that also still being a1187problem in terms of some of the research that's found in maybe1188the UK, for example, not being as quickly transferable or1189easily shared for us to actually consume, use, or effectively1190continue the research on?1191    Dr. Richmond. Well, I think it's important--thank you for1192that question. I think it's important for us to add to this1193conversation this issue of open science. Open science is1194science that's going to end up in literature, it's going to be1195published together. That kind of collaboration happens at the1196laboratory because it's natural to do that, whether it be in1197fields like I have worked in with lasers and optics and other1198fields too. We have to have that open science. So what I fear1199is the discussion of really restricting the labs to even things1200in personnel, even things that are truly open science, then my1201concerns are there. So I don't know if that went to your1202question, but it's a point I feel is really important for this1203Committee, many who are not scientists, to understand what the1204open science is as opposed to something that is truly an1205economic threat to us.1206    Senator Gallego. And your testimony outlines multiple1207measures, including a risk matrix to protect emerging research1208and tech at DOE. Are you also concerned that any of those1209security measures will be disrupted or dismantled under new1210agency leadership that does not really understand the goal and1211intent of that matrix?1212    Dr. Richmond. As a citizen myself, yes, I am concerned1213because when you have--what we have always found, and when I1214have gone into the SCIF--and we are not going to divulge any1215classified information--first of all, we do have people from1216other countries that are helping us in the intelligence for1217some of these countries. But the point is that we really have1218to be able to go forward in a manner that allows us to share1219the information that we need and be able to go forward. I am1220not sure if that quite went to your point.1221    Senator Gallego. Thank you. I yield back.1222    The Chairman. Senator Risch.1223    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for1224holding this meeting. Look, this is a really, really important1225issue that gets almost no attention. I have been 17 years on1226both the Foreign Relations Committee and the Intel Committee,1227and we have watched this cancer grow over those years, and it's1228not going away. It's getting worse and worse. So I am going to1229start at 50,000 feet and bring this down. In 1983, I traveled1230in China. I left China thinking, you know, we are never going1231to have to worry about this. They had no plumbing. They had no1232toilets. They had no phones. They had nothing. It smelled. It1233was terrible. That was in 1983. If you go there today, it's1234like America. Now, it took us over 200 years to get where we1235are. And it has taken them only a handful of decades to get1236where they are. Are they that much smarter than we are? We all1237know better than that. They stole every good idea that we have,1238except for democracy and respect for human rights.1239    So how did that happen? Well, it happened because America1240is so open and so free that we just open the flood gates. And1241today, this problem of the people coming into the labs is1242joined with the question of people that come into the colleges1243and universities. They are identical problems, and the numbers1244are stunning. Americans have no idea that there are hundreds--1245hundreds of thousands of Chinese students studying in America,1246and we have a tiny fraction of that. And as Tom Cotton pointed1247out--he went and dug out the figures--of the thousands of1248Chinese people who visited our labs, and zero Americans have1249visited their labs. I am intimately familiar with the INL, of1250course, you know, the birthplace of nuclear energy on the1251planet. And I talk to those people all the time. I have never1252met a person who has set foot in a Chinese laboratory.1253    So this is the problem--we have given away the farm. And I1254would disagree with Ms. Richmond about open science. We should1255never have given them that, but that ship has sailed. The open1256science is there. It's all over the internet. It's everyplace.1257But they have used it to bootstrap themselves up where they1258are.1259    So let's change lanes for just a second and talk about who1260we are dealing with. A student who comes here, or for that1261matter, an engineer who comes here and goes to one of the labs,1262may have no malign ideas whatsoever. But for a person who lives1263in a communist, autocratic country, nothing belongs to them.1264Their property doesn't belong to them, their thinking doesn't1265belong to them, their intellectual knowledge doesn't belong to1266them. It belongs to the Chinese Communist Party, because in1267those states, the state doesn't exist for the people as it does1268in a democracy like we have, people exist for the state, and1269the state always comes ahead of the people. And so, they take1270these people--when the students go home, they are debriefed by1271the Chinese Communist Party, and every scintilla of information1272they have then belongs to the Chinese Communist Party.1273    And I mean, it's two different systems. There is absolutely1274no question about it. But again, it's really time to slam the1275door on this thing. I have preached about this for years. And1276with all due respect to the scientific community, I can't get1277it through their head that this is a national security issue.1278They say, well, we are all on this planet together. The1279knowledge we have helps everybody. Well, yeah, to a degree. If1280we are fighting polio, that's true. But not when we are1281designing quantum computers. It's not like that at all. And we1282shouldn't be sharing that information at all.1283    So, and by the way, I get real pushback from the colleges1284and universities. Why? There are millions of dollars being1285transferred from China to the colleges and universities. And1286those colleges and universities get very defensive of the1287grants and that that they get from the Chinese Communist Party.1288    Anyway, that's where we are. Folks, how do we get the word1289out to the community, and how do we get the word out to1290Americans that this is a huge problem? And I have only got a1291few minutes left. Start down here and give me your 30-second1292take on that.1293    Ms. Puglisi. Okay, thank you, Senator.1294    First, I just want to add that the whole issue of basic1295science comes up quite a bit, but it's important to note that1296collaborations are very important, and I, myself, have been a1297proponent for open science. However, I think what is lost in1298that conversation is that not everything is shared. And that is1299the challenge because what is happening is that the time and1300resource-intensive parts of that basic research, oftentimes,1301the data, the know-how, the access to how do I actually do1302something, and oftentimes what doesn't work is what is stolen.1303And so, those are the kinds of things, I think, that we really1304need to focus on and have that conversation.1305    Senator Risch. Ms. Richmond, I am almost out of--I am out1306of time--give me a short shot and I am going to give you----1307    Dr. Richmond. Yes, let me say, I am glad to meet you. I1308have been through Chinese laboratories, back in 2010.1309    Senator Risch. I have met somebody, finally. All right.1310    [Laughter.]1311    Senator Risch. I have met one. How many people in America,1312330 million? All right, I've got one.1313    Dr. Richmond. Yes. But the point is, things are changing--1314--1315    Senator Risch. By the way, did you get into the Wuhan lab,1316because we are really interested----1317    [Laughter.]1318    Senator Risch. Probably not.1319    Dr. Richmond. You know, I can't read Chinese, so I have no1320idea what lab I was in. Okay?1321    But the point is, you raise a very important point. Things1322are changing. Your issue about the open science is right, but1323on the other hand collaborations are really important too. But1324again, I believe that we need to have a full discussion of this1325out in the open. Universities need to--and faculty at1326universities need to understand that they could be involved in1327the areas of high-performance computing, AI, quantum,1328bioscience, biotech, accelerator science, battery science, that1329we at the labs consider to be extraordinarily high-risk, so1330that they can understand that they are----1331    Senator Risch. You got that exactly right.1332    Dr. Richmond. Yes.1333    Senator Risch. Paul.1334    Mr. Dabbar. Senator, I think this is a big but narrow1335topic. America is the bright light to recruit people from all1336around the world who want to work at the DOE national labs and1337people want to become Americans. And I think that's good. When1338I was there, we had four lab directors who were naturalized1339citizens from the UK and Canada and Germany and so on, and that1340is excellent, right? They came here. They became American1341citizens. We are still a very small percentage of the world in1342terms of population in the big scheme of things, and I think1343doing that, and all the other people underneath them, with1344citizens from all over. China is the topic----1345    Senator Risch. China is a problem because those people1346can't stay here. We all know what happens to their families if1347they say, hey, we are giving up China, and we are going to1348become a U.S. citizen. They will start--well, anyway, I don't1349want to go into that. They do bad, bad things to their1350families.1351    So my time is up. Thank you.1352    The Chairman. Thank you.1353    Senator Cortez Masto.1354    Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you. I appreciate the panel1355discussion today. It's good to see some of you again.1356    Let me start off with the Nevada National Security Site.1357Most people don't have it in their backyard. I do. Most people1358don't grow up next to it. I did. Most people don't have family1359and friends that work there. I have and still do. So this is an1360issue that is important for us in Nevada, and I appreciate the1361conversation today.1362    Dr. Richmond, let me start with you. In your testimony you1363outlined various legislation like the CHIPS and Science Act and1364the Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act that1365address research security concerns that we have talked about,1366right, that are getting ready to go into effect. Specifically,1367though, you mentioned that DOE was getting prepared to1368implement Section 3112 of the NDAA, which would ban foreign1369nationals from China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran from1370accessing the national laboratories operated by the National1371Nuclear Security Administration without secretarial waivers. So1372given the enhanced research security measures outlined in the1373Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA, how do you think these new regulations1374will affect the mission at Nevada's national laboratories, such1375as the Nevada National Security Site, which we know is1376essential for maintaining our nation's nuclear weapons1377stockpile.1378    Dr. Richmond. Well, thank you, Senator, for that question.1379As you may know, Director Hruby--Jill Hruby--was the one that1380oversaw NNSA while I was in my position, so I don't have all1381the depth of knowledge that she would have, but I do think that1382the lab directors that spoke last week at HSST, even Dr. Kim1383Budil was there, and she does oversee Lawrence Livermore1384National Laboratory. And all five directors that were there--1385three or four of them were NNSA labs--they are ready to do it1386and have accepted it and we will have it done by April 15 or1387whatever the deadline is.1388    Senator Cortez Masto. Okay.1389    Dr. Richmond. What impact that has, I can't speculate on1390it, but I think they are ready to take it on. The concern is,1391though, that they are now going to have to fire, I think, a1392number of people. I think it was close to a thousand or1393something like that, and that, again, compromises our security1394because those people could easily be picked up by our1395adversaries.1396    Senator Cortez Masto. Can I touch on that, because I only1397have so much time, and that was my next question because we are1398now implementing legislation to address foreign nationals1399coming into our labs, but what we are not doing is addressing1400the workforce that is necessary. Now, I have heard all of you,1401and we have had this conversation before about STEM, making1402sure our kids are exposed to it, that they want to go into that1403area of science. We want to make sure that they are now1404stepping into, as they graduate, jobs like we have at the test1405site. What does it say to them that we have just done this1406wholesale firing of people, particularly in my state. People1407are paying attention--their family members, their friends, they1408know what is going on. What does that say to our ability to1409develop that workforce for the future in these STEM courses?1410    Dr. Richmond. Okay, I will put my academic hat on now.1411People are scared. Students are scared. Parents of students are1412scared. Spouses are scared about paying mortgages, that all the1413energy that they have put into this passion they have for1414science is now being questioned for its value. It's very1415personal.1416    Senator Cortez Masto. Let me touch on one final thing. We1417have talked about foreign nationals, and I agree that we have1418to address it. We have passed legislation to do just that, but1419there are other security challenges we are not even talking1420about--cyber threats. Where are we talking about cyber threats1421here? And should we be addressing that as Congress as well?1422    And let me open it up to any of the panel members: talk to1423me about cyber threats. What should we know that we are not1424talking about today that is the next step for us to implement1425when it comes to our national labs?1426    Ms. Puglisi or Mr. Dabbar.1427    Ms. Puglisi. That's a very important point and that's why I1428advocate that we really need a holistic, comprehensive program1429that looks across the board, and cyber would be one of those,1430and also, both external and internal to understand, okay, who's1431sharing what with whom. So that's one. And I just want to pull1432the thread on the collaborations because that's an important1433point and why we really need to demand that reciprocity and1434transparency because it can't be a one-way street, right? And1435we talked about how many people are in our labs, how many1436people in their labs, I mean, these are serious topics and1437serious countries do serious things. And so, we need to ensure1438that there is that reciprocity of, not only people, but1439information. And one of the challenges, I think, with China is1440they are coming down on open science--access to their data,1441access to academic papers, you know, that does not demonstrate1442to me a place that has a serious desire to do true1443collaborations.1444    Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you.1445    I know my time is up. Mr. Dabbar, do you have anything?1446    Mr. Dabbar. So Senator, this is a university example, but1447not a lab example. This just goes to show you that you need to1448have strict controls, and sometimes things can go wrong. We1449found a cybersecurity effort that was funded by DOE at a1450university in which all the principal investigators were PRC1451nationals. Electric grid cybersecurity funded by DOE at a1452university with PRC nationals developing the software for1453cybersecurity for the electric grid. We stopped that as soon as1454we found out that that had been done, and I won't go through1455the details, but it's an example that people were not thinking,1456okay, at the Department, when they were issuing funding of1457something that I think is pretty commonsense.1458    So I think this comes back to rules and proper oversight so1459that people down below don't do things that wouldn't pass, you1460know, kind of commonsense for, I think, anyone in this room.1461    Senator Cortez Masto. But if we don't have the staff to1462catch it. Thank you.1463    The Chairman. Senator King.1464    Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1465    The focus today has been on national security, as well it1466should be. That's one of our jobs around here. On the other1467hand, there is an opportunity cost of excluding talent that1468could be important in furthering our own interest in terms of1469technological development.1470    Ms. Richmond, talk to me about that. It seems to me what we1471really need to do is try to find a path between total exclusion1472and not being cognizant of national security risk, but not1473exclude people who can make a significant contribution to our1474national welfare. Do you see what I am trying to find?1475    Dr. Richmond. Yes, so, Senator King, thank you for that1476question. There are so many examples of where Chinese citizens1477have made--I would be happy to give the Committee many1478examples, especially of Chinese researchers who continue to1479contribute in our laboratories and also our universities. It is1480a balance. And particularly for our universities, we have,1481while I was Under Secretary, we started the RTES Office, which1482is Research for Technology and Economic Security. And that is1483basically to make sure that we don't have things happen like1484happened in your Administration, which would check every one1485that's a PI going in for a grant. In the FOA that goes out, it1486is checked to make sure that it is very clear that we are going1487to ask this kind of information when you apply for a grant.1488Then, when the selections are made, look to see who the PIs1489are, are they ones that are safe to go forward with? Is the1490topic one--what about the topic, because the security for some1491topics----1492    Senator King. But universities don't have the security1493clearance apparatus----1494    Dr. Richmond. No.1495    Senator King [continuing]. That the national labs have.1496    I believe that there may be more risk, frankly, on the1497university level than there is at the national labs because at1498the national labs you have a whole--you have1499counterintelligence at Department of Energy and you have those1500kinds of examinations.1501    Dr. Richmond. And that's why we are working with them and1502that's why we are sharing the risk matrix with them as well. I1503was on a video call recently to talk about what they need to do1504in proposals with their PIs to give them guidance on making----1505    Senator King. Mr. Dabbar, how do you think we should strike1506this balance?1507    Mr. Dabbar. Yes, so, one of the orders that we also1508implemented was banning giving money to university researchers1509if they were also taking money under the Thousand Talents1510Program. We had found out that during the previous1511Administration, that they had allowed that, so that literally a1512researcher could be getting money from the Chinese state at the1513same time as from DOE. We decided that was a bad idea. We1514actually spent a bunch of time with university presidents1515explaining that. They had a lot of worry about that. And then,1516at the end of the day, they reached a conclusion that the1517Federal Government can decide what to do its money. I know it's1518a simple kind of conclusion.1519    But one of the big things that they found, as a part of our1520pushing on this topic, was they found out that they had1521researchers who were spending significant time in Communist1522China and basically taking their research--it had nothing to do1523with DOE, it could have been from anyplace. And they didn't1524even know it was happening. I found out at Stanford, for1525example, there was a professor who was supposedly full time,1526who spent nine months a year in China. And the university1527didn't even realize it was going on, even though they were1528paying that professor.1529    So I think awareness with the university system, that they1530need to address their own problems, but I do think additional1531controls around how the Federal Government money is given to1532PIs, the principal investigators----1533    Senator King. Let's go back to the national labs.1534    Mr. Dabbar. Yes.1535    Senator King. If there is a total ban, no Chinese1536researchers whatsoever, is that a good policy or would that1537cost us some good scientific breakthroughs that would otherwise1538be useful? I am trying to find the right line between national1539security and opportunity cost of brilliant researchers from1540anywhere in the world.1541    Mr. Dabbar. I think, Senator, given that there has been,1542literally, a whole generation of successful efforts by1543Communist China in stealing stuff, the Los Alamos Club, but1544then the thousand talents. They keep coming at us. I think the1545better way of doing it is this proposed legislation from the1546Intel Committee that was referenced, which is a ban with1547Chinese nationals at the national labs, which are at the very1548highest level of the United States with the ability of the1549Department of do a waiver. And so, this flexibility----1550    Senator King. So the default would be no.1551    Mr. Dabbar. The default should be no, is my recommendation,1552which was the Intel Committee's unanimous vote, with the1553ability of the Department to grant waivers. So there is still1554flexibility in the idea, but once again, I think the DOE1555national labs are at the top of the security worries.1556    Senator King. I understand.1557    Quick follow-up question. Who is Chinese? There are a lot1558of Chinese Americans. Are they swept into this? What's the1559definition?1560    Mr. Dabbar. Yes, so the way the orders are written is, it's1561citizens.1562    Senator King. Chinese citizens.1563    Mr. Dabbar. Citizens.1564    Senator King. Okay, so a Chinese American who has been here156550 years or a couple of generations would not be included?1566    Mr. Dabbar. Citizens is the way that the order is currently1567written.1568    Senator King. Okay, thank you.1569    Mr. Dabbar. Or Russians, or, I mean, we had an Iranian1570trying to get hired, like an Iranian citizen, and we had1571concerns on the type of technology and we decided not to let1572them in.1573    Senator King. Thank you.1574    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.1575    Senator Cassidy [presiding]. Thank you.1576    And I have taken the gavel, just for everybody's1577information, while Senator Lee goes to vote.1578    Let me follow up on that. I don't know the particulars of1579it, but by the way, I have been elsewhere, so if I ask1580something which is a repeat, I apologize, but I am going to1581pick up where Senator King left off. There were two folks who1582apparently were American citizens, but who were passing1583information to the Chinese Communist Party, that were recently1584arrested from the DOD. And I want to say it's out in San Diego.1585I am a little vague on all of this, but suffice it to say that1586this occurred. So if the restriction is on Chinese citizens,1587and by the way, I am Irish American, right? So I am not saying1588we have this kind of prohibition upon Chinese Americans. I am1589trying to understand this kind of interface where there has1590been an infusion of people who now are naturalized U.S.1591citizens, but in some way still might pose a security risk.1592    And so, we want fairness. We want to capitalize upon1593incredible human talent, but we don't want to be someone's1594sucker. So take into account these naturalized citizens, and1595how would we do that, as a follow up to what Senator King asked1596in terms of establishing security?1597    Yes, ma'am, would you like to go?1598    Dr. Richmond. Yes, so, I think that's a really good1599question. So we have, just to put some data out there, of the1600Chinese citizenship at graduation. After they have been here1601for five years, 88 percent have stayed, and after ten years, 811602percent have stayed. So some--I mean, a lot of them are going1603to stay. And the question is, which ones are the ones that you1604need to be concerned about? So I think what we have done with1605working with the universities and NSF and certainly, Paul, with1606your administration work on this too, is the Department of1607Energy, back in 2019, and then 2021, every PI, every one that1608wants money, has to put down all their connections, okay? And1609with regards to money, visits, financial support, all of that1610has to be there if you are going to get DOE money.1611    And I have been in the SCIF where I have been talking to1612our intelligence people about someone that may arise that1613causes them concern. And those people are also working with our1614vetting--RTES group--in order to figure out who those people1615are because they--I tell university PIs that if you don't1616disclose, and we find out that something is wrong, you are out1617of here.1618    Senator Cassidy. So let me ask you this, though, because I1619once read about how the Chinese missile program began because1620there was a Chinese American who was doing fabulous work, but1621because of a security issue, was not given clearance to1622continue and he just wanted an outlet for his intellect. And1623so, he returned to Communist China and helped develop their1624program. So I guess that brings to mind, is there a way to1625discern between those people who are more loyal to China and1626those who are more loyal to the United States, but if we shut1627off opportunity, they will go where they have opportunity. Do1628you follow where I am going there?1629    Dr. Richmond. Well, Senator Cassidy, that's exactly what we1630have been talking about here, is the concern about all the cuts1631that are happening in the Department of Energy--300 employees1632at NNSA, 1,800 across the Department, and those people have an1633incredible knowledge, scientific background, and if they are1634just really upset, shall I say, they may decide to do that. So1635it concerns me that----1636    Senator Cassidy. Well, people have got to eat. So they have1637got to have a job.1638    Dr. Richmond. Yes, you have to pay the mortgage. You have1639to eat. You can take that contract that I, you know, asked that1640I--the letter that I got recently that said $40,000 for an1641hour's worth of work in China. We will pay all your expenses.1642And you know, for somebody that is mad, is angry at the1643government or for----1644    Senator Cassidy. But that's not actually, that's not my1645fundamental question though. I am going back to this person in1646the 1940s or 50s who was really seeking opportunity. So is1647there a way to discern between those who might be a security1648risk and those who are, you know, they are just, they may1649leave, but they are going to leave because of opportunity or1650other circumstances, not because of their security risk,1651fundamentally?1652    Dr. Richmond. So in the case of the people, again, we go1653through with the RTES program and also the risk matrix at the1654laboratories, we go through as much information as we can that1655they will give us with regards to when they are employed at the1656university or, excuse me, employed in the Federal Government to1657find out whether they could possibly be a risk.1658    Senator Cassidy. And of course, this would apply to people1659of multiple nationalities. I think I heard you mention as I1660walked in, because there are talented people coming into the1661United States for graduate school from the world over, right?1662    Dr. Richmond. Yes, but you don't have to only worry about1663if someone has Chinese background.1664    Senator Cassidy. I get that.1665    Dr. Richmond. There are American scientists that have1666decided they needed the money so they went over to China.1667    Senator Cassidy. I am a little suspicious about some of the1668Canadians----1669    [Laughter.]1670    Dr. Richmond. I don't know, I think it's Irish Americans we1671need to worry about.1672    [Laughter.]1673    Senator Cassidy. You don't have to worry about Irish1674Americans for much.1675    Senator Hickenlooper.1676    Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks1677to all of you for being here. I appreciate this. I grew up in a1678time back in the 60s, where at the height of the Cold War there1679was a continuing cartoon series in Mad Magazine where it was1680Spy vs. Spy, and there was a white spy and a black spy, and1681they were constantly doing tricks with each other in a comical1682competition. We are way beyond that. And I think, you know,1683when I was just getting--I got a master's in earth and1684environmental science, and we had a number of foreign students1685within our program, and it was embryonic in that sense of how1686much they added from their educational system to things that we1687didn't emphasize or didn't understand as well and vice versa. I1688got a great appreciation with that.1689    I taught field geology for a year down in Costa Rica while1690I was still a graduate student and saw that culture and got1691those exchanges. It's incredibly powerful. I mean, look at the1692number of our largest companies that have been started by1693immigrants. The amazing innovations and breakthroughs that have1694come from people that came to this country because they wanted1695to live in a free country. To be quite honest, that magnet is1696still very powerful.1697    But I want to ask each of you, I mean, are we doing enough?1698Is the current system sufficient to protect our classified1699research from foreign espionage?1700    Mr. Dabbar. So Senator, I do think, as we have been1701discussing, I think a heightened level of awareness because1702there has been generation after generation of Chinese just1703adapting to try to steal. I would make a broadening point to1704your question, which is not just classified, I mean, the1705leading renewables lab in the world is in your state. It's not1706even close, okay? No other country comes close to that.1707    And so, just to pick on a topic: perovskites for thin-film1708solar may be the next big thing. We don't want that to be in1709Xinjiang, produced by coal and slaves, literally slaves, right,1710because they are the wrong religion. I thought we were over1711that in 1945, but the Chinese are doing that.1712    Senator Hickenlooper. Right.1713    Mr. Dabbar. And I am certain they are trying to steal it1714from your lab--or your nation's lab.1715    Senator Hickenlooper. I view it as my lab.1716    Mr. Dabbar. Yeah, yeah--in your state.1717    And so, I think as a broadening point--not just1718classified--it includes both economic impact technologies as1719well as classified.1720    Senator Hickenlooper. I would agree.1721    Dr. Richmond.1722    Dr. Richmond. Yes, I agree with that. And I think what we1723are talking about here is an evolving situation, and it will1724continue to evolve. So we have to have a system together that1725is adaptable, can quickly move----1726    Senator Hickenlooper. But is our system now sufficient, is1727the question, right? We have got to be adaptable, but there are1728all kinds of things we can do to improve it, but----1729    Dr. Richmond. It can always be improved. It can always be1730improved, but I think, certainly under the Biden1731Administration, we took what we got from the past1732administration, heightened it up even more. And as we go1733through, we are going to have to look to see how much it needs1734to be heightened any more.1735    Senator Hickenlooper. That's fair.1736    Dr. Richmond. But again, it's not just classified1737information. It's also the AI and many of the other areas.1738    Ms. Puglisi. And I am going to foot-stomp that. It's1739beyond--it's more than the classified information because it's1740really a lot of the technologies of the future--it's AI, it's1741biotech, it's the new materials in manufacturing. And so, I1742think what is really important is to focus on the behavior. And1743I think that a lot of the new regulations and rules that are1744being put in place are a start and are beginning to do that,1745but I think it's going to take time to implement those. And1746again, I think we have to take that really holistic look. And1747we can't set and forget, right? This is dynamic. The technology1748is changing. The vectors--the threat vectors are changing. And1749so, it's going to require a constant dialogue.1750    Senator Hickenlooper. The magnitude of those threat vectors1751has never been greater.1752    Ms. Puglisi. Right.1753    Senator Hickenlooper. And I think we have to maintain that1754sense of urgency that you guys all have shown.1755    Ms. Puglisi. Yes.1756    Senator Hickenlooper. So I appreciate that.1757    Several of you have talked about foreigners coming into our1758universities and being more motivated or adding a great deal to1759innovation. I think we have got to get back, also, to how do we1760get our kids in this country--I mean, the reason universities1761are receiving and open to receiving these foreign students is1762because we don't have a pipeline that is sufficient to provide1763the technology and the STEM kids. We have got to get to them in1764elementary school. Do you guys have, do you realize--do you1765connect that problem and the solution of it with this issue1766about our national security?1767    Start at this end, this side.1768    Ms. Puglisi. That's an excellent point. I mean, STEM1769education, we should start at K-12 and really do things to1770support----1771    Senator Hickenlooper. K-3.1772    Ms. Puglisi. Yes, actually, the earlier parts, I mean,1773because you hear kids, by the time they are in middle school,1774they are saying----1775    Senator Hickenlooper. Absolutely.1776    Ms. Puglisi [continuing]. I can't do math.1777    But that's going to take an effort, and we want to make1778sure that we draw from the wide swath of Americans from all1779over the country. And so, that starts, you know, with support1780from the undergraduate and make people understand what the1781possible is and also, I want to--it's the technically1782proficient workforce----1783    Senator Hickenlooper. We are out of time.1784    Dr. Richmond. So do you realize that our country has the1785lowest retention rate in the world for kids that decide they1786want to be a scientist at 18 and don't end up being a scientist1787at 24?1788    Senator Hickenlooper. Outrageous. I totally--I do know----1789    Dr. Richmond. Lowest.1790    Senator Hickenlooper. Outrageous.1791    Senator Cassidy. Senator Justice.1792    Senator Justice [presiding]. Oh, thank you so much, Mr.1793Chairman.1794    You know, I have said this a bunch of times, but I am1795probably a new kid on the block, but I am not a kid, you know,1796I have got a lot of white hair and I have been around, and1797around, and around. I can tell you just simply just this--I1798truly believe that energy, absolutely, is the key to just about1799every single thing that we have got going. That's all there is1800to it.1801    Now, and if it's that level of key, I have just got to1802share with you just a couple things, real quick. First of all,1803we have one of these 17 labs in Morgantown, West Virginia, and1804we are really proud of that. And I can tell you that I have1805just gotten through being the Governor of the great State of1806West Virginia for eight years, and to be perfectly honest, we1807were able to do lots and lots and lots of good stuff. And1808little West Virginia, that a lot of people told a lot of bad1809jokes about, to tell you the truth, along the way, became a1810diamond in the rough that everybody missed. And with all that1811being said, successes like you can't imagine. And we are1812really, really proud of exactly what we did.1813    Now, with that being said, along the way, there was a1814gentleman that I ran into way, way, way before I ever became1815Governor, and he was a PRC national and just the most1816legitimate-speaking gentleman that you could ever be around.1817And then, all of a sudden, as I became the Governor, we found1818out things that were going on with him in his life and1819everything that tied right back to his homeland that absolutely1820astounded us. I mean, absolutely a gentleman that--as a guy1821that is suspicious of almost everybody a lot of times, but1822absolutely trusting in everybody--I believed with all in me1823that this guy was the real deal. A guy that absolutely we1824trusted in every way. And we were astounded with what we found.1825That's all there is to it.1826    Now, energy is, I think, so important it's off the chart1827right now. It's off the chart how important energy is. Do you1828realize if you are a business guy--and that's me--do you1829realize that we can't cut our way out of these messes? We1830can't. We can mind the store and we can surely do a lot better,1831but at the end of the day, we got to find a way to grow. And1832the way to grow, absolutely, hands down, is energy, period.1833That's all there is to it.1834    So if it is the most important--and it is, it truly is, you1835know--then we have got to be on guard and we have got to do1836better because the world is trying to absolutely discover or1837steal our inner-most secrets all the time--all the time. So1838with all that being said, I would say to everybody, from the1839guy that's the white-haired guy from West Virginia that's a1840business guy, not a politician--I am a guy that talks to you1841just with common sense and logic. I would say beware. And1842absolutely, we got to do better. And these folks right here are1843the key to us doing better in a lot of ways.1844    So I do have one question, and it just parallels everything1845that I have already said because, you see, I really believe1846that President Trump, because I am a real friend with the1847family, and I am proud of that, and absolutely, I am trusting1848of the family, and he is our President and he is now saying to1849all of us, look, we have got a problem here. We need to do1850better. And so, let's get at doing better. But my question real1851fast is just this, and this is to Ms.--is it Puglisi? Did I get1852that halfway close?1853    Ms. Puglisi. Puglisi, yes.1854    Senator Justice. Okay, you know, and my question is just1855this, given your expertise in counterintelligence or research1856security, can you provide insight into the extent of1857collaboration between DOE national laboratories and the Seven1858Sons universities in China, please?1859    Ms. Puglisi. Thank you very much.1860    Well, I, myself, have not done empirical research to be1861able to give you the exact numbers. There have been a number of1862articles that look at those kinds of collaborations. And for1863those who are not aware, the Seven Sons are universities that1864work directly with the military. And so, you know, this is very1865concerning because, you know, China says that it will--it's1866civil military fusion. It will use anything that it acquires1867and apply it to its military. And so, those are affiliations1868and collaborations that we really need to take a closer look1869at.1870    Senator Justice. Well, thank you so much. And I know my1871time is expired, but I would say just this--I will do anything1872and everything I can do to help all of you in every way at any1873time. We have got to become safer and we have got to become1874more protective, in my book.1875    Thank you so much.1876    The Chairman [presiding]. I want to thank all of our1877witnesses for being here today. This really has been a great1878hearing, and we are going to keep the record open until close1879of business, 6:00 p.m., tomorrow, February 21, for the1880submission of written questions for the record for our1881witnesses and items included in the hearing record.1882    I do, before we gavel out, I want to just correct the1883record on some things that have been said today.1884    Over the last week there has been a lot of fairly1885misleading and poorly sourced reporting regarding dismissals at1886the U.S. Department of Energy, and here are some facts that I1887think are relevant and significant, but often omitted.1888President Trump and the Department of Energy are committed to1889making government more accountable, efficient, and restoring1890proper stewardship of the American taxpayer dollar. And the1891previous Administration was not a responsible steward of that,1892and we are paying the price for it heavily in the form of1893inflation. In just four years, the Biden Administration1894expanded the Department of Energy's federal workforce, and it1895did so by more than 20 percent, adding more than 3,000 federal1896employee positions. In the last year alone, the Biden1897Administration increased the size of the Department of Energy1898federal workforce with 1,000 new employees.1899    Delivering on President Trump's mandate, supported by more1900than 77 million American voters, the Energy Department began on1901Thursday dismissing a portion of recently hired federal1902employees classified in the Federal Government as probationary1903employees. Across the Energy Department, less than 7001904probationary employees have been dismissed. These dismissal1905numbers pale in comparison to the total amount of positions the1906Biden Administration hired over the last four years. They are1907also less than the total positions added by the Biden1908Administration in the last year.1909    Now, contrary to many news reports, the Energy Department's1910nuclear weapons production plants and nuclear laboratories are1911exempt from these dismissals. So those aren't part of it. At1912the Energy Department's Power Marketing Administration, PMA,1913fewer than three percent of total employees were dismissed and1914were primarily administrative roles. Of the more than 70,0001915contractors and federal employees at the National Nuclear1916Security Administration, or NNSA, fewer than 50 employees were1917dismissed. These employees held primarily administrative and1918clerical roles. The Energy Department will continue its1919critical mission of protecting our national security and1920nuclear deterrents in the development, modernization, and1921stewardship of America's atomic weapons enterprise, including1922the peaceful use of nuclear technology and non-proliferation.1923    So it is important that we keep the facts aligned. When1924people are crying that the sky is falling, it usually is not,1925and that certainly is the case here. In any event, I thank the1926witnesses for being here today. It has been a good, informative1927discussion. We have laid a good record and I very much1928appreciate your help.1929    The hearing stands adjourned.1930    [Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m. the hearing was adjourned.]19311932                      APPENDIX MATERIAL SUBMITTED19331934                              ----------19351936[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]19371938                                 [all]