H.R. 5369

119 HR 5369 IH: Azerbaijan Sanctions Review Act of 2025
 U.S. House of Representatives
 2025-09-15
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 I  119th CONGRESS  1st Session  H. R. 5369  IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES   September 15, 2025   Ms. Titus  introduced the following bill; which was referred to the  Committee on Foreign Affairs , and in addition to the Committee on  the Judiciary , for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned   A BILL
To provide for a review of sanctions with respect to Azerbaijan.
1.
Short title
This Act may be cited as the   Azerbaijan Sanctions Review Act of 2025  .
2.
Findings
Congress finds the following:
(1)
On September 19, 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military assault on Nagorno-Karabakh, resulting in the forced displacement of the region’s entire Armenian population following a 10-month blockade of the Lachin Corridor, which deprived Armenian civilians access to food, fuel, medicine and other essential goods.
(2)
Azerbaijan’s blockade and forced displacement of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenians followed a major escalation of the conflict during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, during which Azerbaijani military and government officials named in section 3(b) have committed war crimes and serious human rights violations, including the extrajudicial killing of Armenian civilians and prisoners of war; the arbitrary detention, forced disappearances, and torture of Armenian civilians and prisoners of war and other captives, and the deliberate targeting of civilian populations.
(3)
Azerbaijan’s continued detainment, torture, extrajudicial execution, and other serious human rights violations against prisoners of war and captured civilians calls into serious question their commitment to human rights and ability to negotiate an equitable, lasting peace settlement.
(4)
Reporting conducted in September 2022 by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination expressed deep concern over  [a]llegations of severe and grave human rights violations committed during the 2020 hostilities and beyond by Azerbaijani military forces against prisoners of war and other protected persons of Armenian ethnic or national origin—including extrajudicial killings, torture and other ill-treatment and arbitrary detention .
(5)
The Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices released in August 2025 documented  credible reports of: arbitrary or unlawful killings; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest and detention; transnational repression against individuals in another country,  and notes that  the government [of Azerbaijan] did not take credible steps or action to identify and punish officials who committed human rights abuses. .
(6)
Human rights organizations have consistently reported on Azerbaijan’s abuse of prisoners of war and other human rights violations, including a report by Human Rights Watch in March 2021 that found Azerbaijani forces had abused ethnic Armenian prisoners of war and subjected them to  cruel and degrading treatment and torture either when they were captured, during their transfer, or while in custody at various detention facilities .
(7)
Reporting conducted in 2024 by Freedom House found that the Government of Azerbaijan  acted upon a comprehensive, methodically implemented strategy to empty Nagorno-Karabakh of its ethnic Armenian population between 2020 and 2023  and engaged in a  pattern of arbitrary detention, torture, and ill-treatment of Armenians who fell into Azerbaijani custody. .
(8)
In December 2021, an International Court of Justice ruling ordered Azerbaijan to protect from violence and bodily harm Armenians detained during and since the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War.
(9)
At least 23 prisoners of war and hostages are still detained illegally by Azerbaijan as of August 2025 according to the Armenian Government, with independent observers noting that the true number of detainees is likely much higher given the many individuals still missing, and the limited information available due to Azerbaijan’s misrepresentation of their status in an attempt to justify their continued captivity.
(10)
Following Azerbaijan’s offensive in 2023, numerous high-ranking Armenian officials in Nagorno-Karabakh were arrested and detained by Azerbaijan, including Ruben Vardanyan, Davit Manukyan, Davit Babayan, Levon Mnatsakanyan, Arkadi Ghukasyan, Bako Sahakyan, Arayik Harutyunyan, and Davit Ishkhanyan.
(11)
In January 2025, Azerbaijan commenced sham trials of the aforementioned former officials of Nagorno-Karabakh in Baku’s military court, where detainees have been denied due process, the right to a fair trial, the right to legal counsel of their own choosing, and have been charged on political grounds without evidence and in the absence of independent observers.
(12)
In March 2025, Azerbaijan ordered the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the only entity in Azerbaijan with the authorization to visit Armenian prisoners of war and civilian captives, to leave the country.
(13)
International humanitarian law requires parties to an international armed conflict to treat prisoners of war humanely in all circumstances.
(14)
It is a war crime to willfully kill, mistreat, or torture prisoners of war, or to willfully cause great suffering or serious injury to body or health.
(15)
In addition to being bound by customary international law, Azerbaijan is a party to the Geneva Conventions, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) which strictly forbid extrajudicial killings.
(16)
Despite its international legal obligations under the Geneva Conventions and repeated calls by the United States Government, Azerbaijan has not released all relevant persons and instead continues to detain new prisoners of war, hostages, and captured civilians, nor have those responsible for serious human rights violations and war crimes faced legal consequences.
(17)
Following the publication of the terms of the initialed peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan in August 2025, it was confirmed the document omits provisions to ensure the release of Armenian prisoners of war or civilian captives, raising concerns as to Azerbaijan’s commitment to ensuring a just, durable, and dignified peace in the region.
(18)
Amid fraught peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the immediate and unconditional release of Armenian prisoners of war, civilians, and political detainees would represent an important confidence building measure.
(19)
In addition to its arbitrary detention of Armenian prisoners, Azerbaijan also has also unlawfully detained over 300 Azerbaijani journalists, human rights defenders, civic activists and opposition figures, with Azerbaijani authorities escalating civil society crackdowns in the months leading up to the COP29 Climate Summit in November 2024.
(20)
Azerbaijan’s brutal repression of domestic political opposition is of grave concern for the human rights of Azerbaijanis.
(21)
The detention and subsequent torture and ill-treatment of journalists like Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reporter Farid Mehralizada, critics of the Aliyev government like Dr. Gubad Ibadoghlu, and human rights advocates like Rufat Safarov, raises fundamental concerns about due process and the integrity of the legal proceedings against those who express political dissent in Azerbaijan.
(22)
Azerbaijan is designated as  Not Free  by Freedom House due to the absence of political rights, civil liberties, and rule of law.
3.
Review of sanctions with respect to Azerbaijan
(a)
Determination
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a determination, including a detailed justification, of whether any person listed in subsection (b) meets the criteria for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to—
(1)
section 1263(b) of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act ( 22 U.S.C. 2656  note); or
(2)
section 7031(c) of the National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Act.
(b)
Persons listed
The persons listed in this subsection, which includes officials of Republic of Azerbaijan, are the following:
(1)
Lieutenant General Hikmat Izzat oglu Mirzayev, Commander of the Special Forces.
(2)
Lieutenant Colonel Elgun Aliyev, Chief of the Military Police.
(3)
Colonel Elshan Sanaev, Commander of Azerbaijani Military 218th Commando Brigade.
(4)
Lieutenant General Anvar Afandiyev, Commander of Azerbaijani Ground Forces.
(5)
Major General Jeyhun Hasanov, Penitentiary Service of the Ministry of Justice.
(6)
Ali Naghiyev, Chief of the State Security Services.
(7)
Samir Nuriyev, Chief of Staff to President Aliyev.
(8)
Fuad Alasgarov, Assistant to the President for Law Enforcement and Military Affairs.
(9)
Orhan Samadov, Office of the General Prosecutor.
(10)
Vugar Guliyev, Office of the General Prosecutor.
(11)
Ziya Masurov, Office of the General Prosecutor.
(12)
Parviz Mirhashimov, Office of the General Prosecutor.
(13)
Babakhan Hasanaliyev, Office of the General Prosecutor.
(14)
Hamza Eldar Akbar oglu, Office of the General Prosecutor.
(15)
Alakbarov Valeh Hasan oglu, Office of the General Prosecutor.
(16)
Faiq Qaniyev, Judge at Baku Court on Grave Crimes.
(17)
Mirza Khankishiyev, Judge at Baku Court on Grave Crimes.
(18)
Ilham Mahmudov, Judge at Baku Court on Grave Crimes.
(19)
Eldar Ismayilov, Judge at Baku Court on Grave Crimes.
(20)
Javid Huseynov, Judge at Baku Court on Grave Crimes.
(21)
Samir Aliyev, Judge at Baku Court on Grave Crimes.
(22)
Azad Madjidov, Judge at Baku Court on Grave Crimes.
(23)
Zeynal Agayev, Judge at Baku Court on Grave Crimes.
(24)
Sabuhi Huseynov, Judge at Baku Court on Grave Crimes.
(25)
Afgan Hajiyev, Judge at Baku Court on Grave Crimes.
(26)
Telman Huseynov, Judge at Baku Court on Grave Crimes.
(27)
Ali Mammadov, Judge at Baku Court on Grave Crimes.
(28)
Vusal Gurbanov, Narimanov District Court Judge.
(29)
Kamranov Hafiz, Narimanov District Court Judge.
(30)
Yusif Yusifov, Chief Investigator of the Investigation Department for Combating Organized Crime, Ministry of Internal Affairs.
(31)
Abbasov Mirzali Abdulali oglu, Baku Court of Appeals.
(32)
Major General Abulfat Rzayev, Main Organized Crime Department, Ministry of Internal Affairs.
(33)
Mammadov Elchin, First Deputy Prosecutor General.
(34)
Lieutenant Fuad Rafael oglu Nabiyev, Azerbaijan Ministry of Defense.
(35)
Elchin Guliyev, State Border Service of Azerbaijan.
(36)
Ilham Mehdiyev, State Border Service of Azerbaijan.
(37)
Vusal Sultanov, State Border Service of Azerbaijan.
(38)
Azad Alakbarov, State Border Service of Azerbaijan.
(39)
Ismayil Akbarov, State Border Service of Azerbaijan.
(40)
Ramin Bagirov, State Border Service of Azerbaijan.
(41)
Lieutenant Colonel Elgün Aliyev, Military Police Department of the Ministry of Defence.
(42)
Karim Valiyev, Chief of the General Staff of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces.
(43)
Nemat Avazov, Director of the Investigation Department, Office of the Prosecutor General.
(44)
Tagiyev Azer Heydar oglu, Nasimi District Court Judge.
(45)
Ali Hasanov, Head of the Department for Public and Political Issues.
(46)
Mehman Ahmadov, Director of State Security Service Investigative Isolator and Temporary Detention Facility in Baku.
(47)
Major General Hikmat Hasanov, Commander of the 1st Army Corps of Azerbaijan.
(48)
Kamran Aliyev, Prosecutor General.
(49)
Ulviyya Shukuruvo, Baku City Sabail District Court Judge.
(50)
Elnur Ismayilov, Deputy of Baku Investigative Detention Center.
(51)
Major General Mais Barkhudarov, Commander of the 1st Army Corps of Azerbaijan.
(52)
Major General Zaur Sabir Memmedov, Deputy Head of Azerbaijan’s Special Forces.
(53)
Colonel Tehran Mensimov, Commander of the Nakhichevan Army’s Special Forces.
(c)
Appropriate congressional committees defined
In this Act, the term  appropriate congressional committees  means—
(1)
the Committee on Foreign Relations, Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and
(2)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.