S.Res. 212

119 SRES 212 IS: Affirming the acceptable outcome of any nuclear deal between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and for other purposes.
 U.S. Senate
 2025-05-08
 text/xml
 EN
 Pursuant to Title 17 Section 105 of the United States Code, this file is not subject to copyright protection and is in the public domain.
  III
  119th CONGRESS
  1st Session
  S. RES. 212
  IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
  May 8, 2025
  Mr. Graham  (for himself,  Mr. Cotton , and  Mrs.
  Britt ) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the
  Committee on Foreign
  Relations
  RESOLUTION
Affirming the acceptable outcome of any nuclear deal between
  the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and for other
  purposes.
Whereas the acceptable outcome of any negotiations between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran related to Iran’s nuclear program is—
(1)
the complete dismantlement and destruction of its entire nuclear program; and then
(2)
an Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation (commonly known as a  123 Agreement ) between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 ( 42 U.S.C. 2153 ) that also requires the Islamic Republic of Iran to adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency's (referred to in this preamble as the  IAEA ) additional protocols for the verification of nuclear safeguards and forgo domestic uranium enrichment, the reprocessing of spent fuel, and the development or possession of any enrichment or reprocessing infrastructure or capacity;
Whereas the complete dismantlement and destruction of the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program should include, at a minimum—
(1)
disclosing and dismantling all of the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs, including the removal of any previously enriched uranium;
(2)
allowing international inspectors unconditional access to monitor and verify compliance, including allowing short-notice inspections of all buildings in all of its nuclear sites by the IAEA;
(3)
providing information to the IAEA about all parts of its nuclear fuel-cycle;
(4)
allowing the IAEA to freely collect environmental samples at locations beyond the stated sites whenever the IAEA deems such collection is necessary;
(5)
providing the IAEA the right to monitor communications by receiving unimpeded access to all satellite systems and other forms of telecommunications;
(6)
providing designated IAEA inspectors of all nationalities valid visas and unimpeded entry into the Islamic Republic of Iran;
(7)
providing information on any research and development activities relating to the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program;
(8)
providing the IAEA with information about the manufacturing and export of sensitive nuclear-related technologies;
(9)
permitting the establishment of IAEA verification mechanisms at manufacturing and export-import locations; and
(10)
signing and ratifying an Additional Protocol as part of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas more than 20 countries have a peaceful nuclear power capability without the ability to domestically enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel;
Whereas in August 2002, the Islamic Republic of Iran's secret nuclear program was revealed, including the existence of a fuel enrichment plant in Natanz, Iran and the heavy-water plant in Arak, Iran;
Whereas on April 11, 2006, the Islamic Republic of Iran announced that it had enriched uranium for the first time to a level close to 3.5 percent at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant in Natanz, Iran;
Whereas on May 31, 2021, it was reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran failed to provide any explanation for the uranium remnants found at undeclared sites in Iran, and such an explanation had not been provided as of the date of the enactment of this Resolution;
Whereas on May 30, 2022, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had achieved a stockpile of 43.3 kilograms (95.5 pounds) of 60 percent highly enriched uranium, which is roughly enough material to construct a nuclear weapon;
Whereas on February 27, 2023, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had enriched uranium to 83.7 percent, which is just short of the 90 percent threshold for weapons-grade fissile material;
Whereas on September 16, 2023, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran banned the activities of nearly  1/3  of the IAEA’s most experienced nuclear inspectors in Iran, a decision that, according to IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi, harmed the IAEA’s ability to monitor Iran’s nuclear program;
Whereas, on December 28, 2023, the Governments of the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom jointly declared,  The production of high-enriched uranium by Iran has no credible civilian justification ;
Whereas, on July 23, 2024, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence published an assessment, in accordance with the Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022 ( 22 U.S.C. 8701  note;  Public Law 117–263 ), which stated, the Islamic Republic of Iran has  undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so ;
Whereas, on November 15, 2024, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran has continued to expand its enrichment facilities and install additional advanced centrifuges, including at the Natanz Nuclear Facility, where there are 15 cascades of advanced centrifuges, and the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, where there are advanced preparations for the expansion of the facility;
Whereas, on February 26, 2025, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran has between 5 and 7 metric tons of enriched uranium, and had increased its total stockpile of 60 percent highly enriched uranium to 274.8 kilograms (605.83 pounds), which, if further enriched, could be sufficient to produce 6 nuclear weapons;
Whereas, on April 7, 2025, the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, stated that the United States and Israel are  both united in the goal that Iran does not ever get nuclear weapons. If it can be done diplomatically, ... I think that would be a good thing. But whatever happens, we have to make sure that Iran does not have nuclear weapons ;
Whereas, on April 7, 2025, President of the United States Donald Trump echoed that position, stating,  You know, it’s not a complicated formula. Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon. That’s all there is. ;
Whereas, on April 8, 2025, the Islamic Republic of Iran rejected the dismantlement of its nuclear program, stating,  Trump wants a new deal: end Iran’s regional influence, dismantle its nuclear program, and halt its missile work. These are unacceptable to Tehran. Our nuclear program cannot be dismantled ; and
Whereas the United States must never allow the Islamic Republic of Iran to obtain a nuclear weapons capability that threatens the United States or its allies or partners; Now, therefore, be it
That the Senate—
(1)
commends the Trump administration for engaging in direct talks with the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding its nuclear program;
(2)
recognizes the Islamic Republic of Iran’s decades of cheating, the regime's barbaric nature, and its open commitment to destroying the State of Israel must be addressed in any negotiations; and
(3)
affirms support for—
(A)
the complete dismantlement and destruction of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s entire nuclear program; and then
(B)
an Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation (commonly known as a  123 Agreement ) between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 ( 42 U.S.C. 2153 ) that also requires the Islamic Republic of Iran—
(i)
to adopt the IAEA additional protocols for verification of nuclear safeguards; and
(ii)
to forgo domestic uranium enrichment, the reprocessing of spent fuel, and the development or possession of any enrichment or reprocessing infrastructure or capacity.