S.Res. 43

119 SRES 43 IS: Affirming the threats to world stability from a nuclear weapons-capable Islamic Republic of Iran.
 U.S. Senate
 2025-01-29
 text/xml
 EN
 Pursuant to Title 17 Section 105 of the United States Code, this file is not subject to copyright protection and is in the public domain.
 III
 119th CONGRESS
 1st Session
 S. RES. 43
 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
 January 29, 2025
  Mr. Graham  (for himself,  Mr. Fetterman , and  Mrs. Britt ) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the  Committee on Foreign Relations
 RESOLUTION
Affirming the threats to world stability from a nuclear weapons-capable Islamic Republic of Iran.
Whereas numerous officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have repeatedly made statements against the United States, Israel, and their allies and partners, including—
(1)
the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who stated—
(A)
 As long as America continues its wickedness, interference, and savagery, the Iranian nation will not abandon  Death to America . ;
(B)
 The Zionist regime is a deadly, cancerous growth and a detriment to this region. It will undoubtedly be uprooted and destroyed ;
(C)
 We will definitely do everything necessary to prepare the Iranian nation for confronting the Arrogant Powers, whether militarily, in terms of armament, or politically. Our officials are already working on this ; and
(D)
 The United States of America and the Zionist regime will definitely receive a crushing response for what they do against Iran and the Resistance Front ;
(2)
an adviser to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kamal Kharrazi, who stated,  We have no decision to build a nuclear bomb but should Iran's existence be threatened, there will be no choice but to change our military doctrine ; and
(3)
former foreign ministry spokesperson of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Nasser Kanani, who stated,  This action of the three European countries [France, Germany and the United Kingdom] is the continuation of the hostile policy of the West and economic terrorism against the people of Iran, which will face the appropriate and proportionate action of the Islamic Republic of Iran ;
Whereas the Islamic Republic of Iran is directly responsible for the death and injury of United States servicemembers, including—
(1)
between 2005 and 2011, when the Quds Force, a branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, provided explosively formed penetrators to Iranian-backed fighters in Iraq and killed 195 United States troops and wounded nearly another 900 United States troops;
(2)
since the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel, where Iranian-backed proxies have attacked United States troops in the region more than 170 times; and
(3)
on January 28, 2024, when an Iranian-backed proxy launched a drone that killed 3 United States troops and wounded nearly another 40 United States troops stationed at Tower 22 in Jordan;
Whereas the United States Government has reported—
(1)
 Iran's annual financial backing to Hizballah—which in recent years has been estimated at $700 million—accounts for the overwhelming majority of [Hizballah's] annual budget ;
(2)
 Hamas has received funding, weapons, and training from Iran ; and
(3)
 Iran also provides up to $100 million annually in combined support to Palestinian terrorist groups, including Hamas ;
Whereas the Islamic Republic of Iran's support to the Houthis, including through the provision of ballistic and cruise missiles and unmanned weapons systems, has allowed the Houthis to carry out attacks against United States partners;
Whereas, since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has engaged in acts of international terrorism and continuously threatened the United States, Israel, and their partners and allies;
Whereas, on January 19, 1984, the United States designated the Islamic Republic of Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism for repeatedly providing support for acts of international terrorism;
Whereas, on April 11, 2006, the Islamic Republic of Iran announced that it had enriched uranium for the first time to a level close to 3.5 percent at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant in Natanz, Iran;
Whereas, on December 23, 2006, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1737 (2006), which imposed sanctions with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran for its failure to suspend enrichment activities;
Whereas the United Nations Security Council subsequently adopted Resolutions 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1929 (2010), all of which targeted the nuclear program of, and imposed additional sanctions with respect to, the Islamic Republic of Iran;
Whereas, on February 3, 2009, the Islamic Republic of Iran announced that it had launched its first satellite, which raised concern over the applicability of the satellite to the ballistic missile program;
Whereas, in September 2009, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France revealed the existence of the clandestine Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in the Islamic Republic of Iran, years after construction started on the plant;
Whereas, on January 28, 2017, the Islamic Republic of Iran conducted a test of a medium-range ballistic missile, which traveled an estimated 600 miles and provides the Islamic Republic of Iran the capability to threaten United States military installations in the Middle East;
Whereas, in 2018, Israel seized a significant portion of the nuclear archive of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which contained tens of thousands of files and compact discs relating to past efforts at nuclear weapon design, development, and manufacturing by the Islamic Republic of Iran;
Whereas, on September 27, 2018, Israel revealed the existence of a secret warehouse housing radioactive material in the Turquz Abad district in Tehran, and an inspection of the warehouse by the International Atomic Energy Agency (referred to in this preamble as the  IAEA ) detected radioactive particles, which the Government of Iran failed to adequately explain;
Whereas, on June 19, 2020, the IAEA adopted Resolution GOV/2020/34, which expressed  serious concern … that Iran has not provided access to the Agency under the Additional Protocol to two locations ;
Whereas, on April 17, 2021, the IAEA verified that the Islamic Republic of Iran had begun to enrich uranium to 60 percent purity;
Whereas, on August 14, 2021, the former President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, stated,  Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization can enrich uranium by 20 percent and 60 percent and if . . . our reactors need it, it can enrich uranium to 90 percent purity ;
Whereas, on April 17, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran confirmed the relocation of a production facility for advanced centrifuges from an aboveground facility at Karaj, Iran, to the fortified underground Natanz Enrichment Complex;
Whereas, on April 19, 2022, the Department of State released a report stating there are  serious concerns  about  possible undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran ;
Whereas, on May 30, 2022, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had achieved a stockpile of 43.3 kilograms (95.5 pounds) of 60 percent highly enriched uranium, roughly enough material for a nuclear weapon;
Whereas, on June 8, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran turned off surveillance cameras installed by the IAEA to monitor uranium enrichment activities at nuclear sites in the country;
Whereas, on July 14, 2022, in The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration, which was signed between President Biden and Israel, the United States stressed its commitment  never to allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon, and that [the United States] is prepared to use all elements of its national power to ensure that outcome ;
Whereas, on July 27, 2022, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Mohammad Eslami, announced that the Islamic Republic of Iran is building a new nuclear reactor at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, which will be one of the largest nuclear facilities in Iran;
Whereas, on December 2, 2022, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi stated,  Iran informed us they were tripling . . . their capacity to enrich uranium at 60 percent, which is very close to military level, which is 90 percent ;
Whereas, on January 25, 2023, Director General Grossi stated,  One thing is true: [the Islamic Republic of Iran has] amassed enough nuclear material for several nuclear weapons ;
Whereas, on February 27, 2023, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had enriched uranium to 83.7 percent, which is just short of the 90 percent threshold for weapons-grade fissile material;
Whereas, on September 4, 2023, an IAEA report estimated the total uranium stockpile of the Islamic Republic of Iran to be 3795.5 kilograms (8367.65 pounds) and that the Islamic Republic of Iran has enough fissile material, that if further enriched, would be sufficient to produce several nuclear weapons;
Whereas, on October 18, 2023, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) lapsed and many proliferation-related penalties and restrictions were lifted, allowing the Islamic Republic of Iran to test or transfer ballistic missiles, which may contribute to the further development of a nuclear weapon delivery system;
Whereas, on December 28, 2023, the Governments of the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom jointly declared,  The production of high-enriched uranium by Iran has no credible civilian justification. These decisions demonstrate Iran’s lack of good will towards de-escalation and represent reckless behavior in a tense regional context … Iran must fully cooperate with the IAEA to enable it to provide assurances that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. ;
Whereas, on February 27, 2024, a spokesperson for the Department of State stated,  We remain seriously concerned about Iran’s continued expansion of its nuclear program in ways that have no credible civilian purpose, including its continued production of highly enriched uranium ;
Whereas, on June 3, 2024, Director General Grossi stated,  Many countries have said if Iran gets nuclear weapons, they will do the same. Adding nuclear weapons to the cauldron of the Middle East is a very bad idea. ;
Whereas, on June 5, 2024, by a vote of 20 to 2, the United States joined other nations in formally censuring the Islamic Republic of Iran for advances in their nuclear program and failure to cooperate with the IAEA;
Whereas, on June 18, 2024, it was reported that intelligence agencies of the United States and Israel were looking into information that the Islamic Republic of Iran may have developed a computer model that could be used for research and development of nuclear weapons;
Whereas, on July 23, 2024, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence published an assessment, in accordance with Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022 ( 22 U.S.C. 8701  note;  Public Law 117–263 ), which stated,  Iran continues to increase the size of its uranium stockpile, increase its enrichment capacity, and develop, manufacture, and operate advanced centrifuges. Tehran has the infrastructure and experience to quickly produce weapons-grade uranium, at multiple facilities ;
Whereas, on November 28, 2024, the Islamic Republic of Iran informed the IAEA that it planned to start enriching uranium with thousands of advanced centrifuges at its Fordow and Natanz plants, while also installing more uranium-enriching centrifuges at those locations;
Whereas, on December 5, 2024, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence published another assessment, in accordance with Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022 ( 22 U.S.C. 8701  note;  Public Law 117–263 ), which stated—
(1)
 Iran's 20-percent and 60-percent enriched uranium stockpiles are far greater than needed for what it claims it will use the uranium for and Iran could produce more than a dozen nuclear weapons if its total uranium stockpile were further enriched ; and
(2)
 Iran probably will consider installing or operating more advanced centrifuges, further increasing its enriched uranium stockpile, enriching uranium up to 90 percent, or threatening to withdraw from the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons ; and
 Whereas, on December 9, 2024, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom released a joint statement that—
(1)
condemns  Iran’s latest steps … to expand its nuclear programme to significantly increase the rate of production of uranium enriched up to 60 percent ;
(2)
expresses extreme concern  to learn that Iran has increased the number of centrifuges in use and started preparations to install additional enrichment infrastructure ; and
(3)
 strongly urge[s] Iran to reverse these steps, and to immediately halt its nuclear escalation : Now, therefore, be it
That the Senate—
(1)
affirms that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s continued pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability is—
(A)
a credible threat to the United States; and
(B)
an existential threat to Israel and other allies and partners in the Middle East;
(2)
asserts all options should be considered to address the nuclear threat the Islamic Republic of Iran poses to the United States, Israel, and our allies and partners;
(3)
demands the Islamic Republic of Iran to immediately cease engaging in any and all activities that threaten the national security interests of the United States, Israel, and our allies and partners, including—
(A)
enriching uranium;
(B)
developing or possessing delivery vehicles capable of carrying nuclear warheads; and
(C)
developing or possessing a nuclear warhead.
1.
Rule of construction
Nothing in this resolution may be construed to authorize the use of military force or the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities.